N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on a nonresident seller’s telephone, mail, and fax efforts to resolve a dispute over a contract formed and performed outside New York.

Slapshot Beverage Co. v. Southern Packaging MacHinery, Inc. · filed 1997-10-10(a)(1)

The Court concludes that as to a jurisdictional basis, no significance should be attached to the defendant’s attempts to resolve the dispute by communicating with plaintiffs New York office via telephone, mail and facsimile.

Section 302(a)(1) permits long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who transact business locally, even without a local office.

Valentino v. Principio · filed 1997-10-21(a)(1)

Accordingly, City Court even has long-arm jurisdiction, if any of the elements of CPLR 302 are satisfied. In the case at bar, although the defendants may not have an office for the transaction of business within the county, they are certainly transacting business within the county.

Section 302(a)(1) treats negotiations by telephone, letter, and facsimile that advance the formation of a contract as transacting business in New York.

Saltzman v. Louisiana Auction Exchange, Inc. · filed 1998-03-20(a)(1)

Although the negotiations that led to the letter agreement occurred through the use of telephones, letters, and facsimiles, these factors do not prevent the application of New York’s long-arm statute. ... As long as the discussions or negotiations advance the formation of a contract, the parties transacted business within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient agency relationship before a purported agent’s New York acts can establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Yurman Designs, Inc. v. A.R. Morris Jewelers, L.L.C. · filed 1999-08-11(a)(1)

While New York’s approach to agency under § 302(a)(1) may be “flexible,” it is not so elastic as to encompass the instant case. The cases cited by Yurman finding an agency relationship have involved a closer nexus between a defendant and its purported agent than exists here.... In the present case, the relationship between Morris and Earl is far more attenuated. Yurman has not established that Earl acted in New York for the benefit of, and with the knowledge and consent of Morris.

Section 302(a)(1) treats a union’s active participation in New York fund-raising, public relations, and economic pressure activities as transacting business.

Corporate Campaign, Inc. v. Local 7837, United Paperworkers International Union · filed 1999-10-28(a)(1)

Defendant unconvincingly argues that its admitted participation in the corporate campaign in New York should not be deemed “transacting business” for purposes of CPLR 302 (a) (1) because this is not the regular business of the Union. A union’s business is not limited to representing employees in collective bargaining negotiations, but also includes fund-raising, public relations and economic pressure tactics to advance its members’ interests — precisely the services performed by plaintiff with defendant’s active participation.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat faxes and phone calls to New York, without more, as transacting business in the State.

Granat v. Bochner · filed 2000-01-25(a)(1)

Contrary to plaintiffs argument, sending faxes and making phone calls to this State are not, without more, activities tantamount to “transacting business” within the meaning of the aforecited long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a person merely because she caused a corporation to file suit in New York from outside the state, unless the corporation is a mere fiction.

H.S.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Woo Lae Oak, Inc. · filed 2001-04-13(a)(1)

Here, Paik’s purposeful activity in the state went no further than causing HSW to file a trademark law suit. The conduct of an agent outside of New York — defendants do not allege that Paik herself ever came to New York, sent documents to New York or spoke to anyone in New York — does not constitute “purposeful activity in the state,” and therefore does not give rise to personal jurisdiction. The fact that HSW consented to jurisdiction by filing the law suit, at least with respect to defendants’ counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, cannot subject Paik to jurisdiction unless HSW is a mere fiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when an interactive website transacts business in New York and the claim arises directly from that transaction.

Thomas Publishing Co. v. Industrial Quick Search, Inc. · filed 2002-12-18(a)(1)

Having decided to create an interactive website that enables it to transact business in New York, IQS is subject to personal jurisdiction here under CPLR § 302(a)(1) because the cause of action for infringement arises directly out of the transaction of business, to wit, the use of an allegedly infringing website.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction based on an agent’s purposeful activity in New York negotiating the note at issue.

San Ysidro Corp. v. Robinow · filed 2003-11-18(a)(1)

Although the IAS court did not address the branch of defendant’s motion seeking dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), we find no question on this record that Richard Robinow was, at all relevant times, acting on behalf of his elderly father and that his appearance in New York to negotiate the terms of the subject note was sufficiently purposeful activity to confer jurisdiction (CPLR 302; see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460 [1988]; Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler v Dreyfuss, 266 AD2d 51 [1999]).

A New York driver’s license and vehicle registration can satisfy § 302(a)(1)’s transacting-business requirement.

Johnson v. Ward · filed 2004-04-22(a)(1)

Guided by these principles, we conclude that defendant’s New York driver’s license and vehicle registration are sufficient to satisfy the “transacting business” requirement.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary uses a New York agent to license the work at issue in a copyright infringement claim.

Vasquez v. Negron · filed 2006-05-16(a)(1)

Plaintiff alleges that Torres Negron has a contract with ASCAP, a New York entity, pursuant to which ASCAP licenses the very piece of music that allegedly infringes plaintiffs copyright. ... Therefore, New York will extend long-arm jurisdiction over Torres Negron in this particular lawsuit pursuant to C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) may permit personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s website when its significant commercial elements amount to transacting business in New York.

Vandermark v. Jotomo Corp. · filed 2007-07-06(a)(1)

We conclude on the record before us that there is an issue of fact whether MRC’s creation and maintenance of a Web site amounts to the transaction of business in New York, and that issue turns on whether the Web site has significant commercial elements, which typically are found to constitute the transaction of business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully solicits New York business through an interactive website and its agents, and the claim has a substantial nexus to those transactions.

Kaloyeva v. Apple Vacations · filed 2008-10-08(a)(1)

The court concludes that the plaintiffs’ cause of action arises out of Admiral Travel’s forum-related activities under the authority of Apple Vacations and as such, there was a substantial nexus between the transaction and plaintiffs’ claim. Accordingly, said activities are sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on defendant Apple Vacations pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits long-arm jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary’s agent negotiates material contract terms in New York for the nondomiciliary’s benefit.

Owens v. Freeman · filed 2009-08-06(a)(1)

Inasmuch as plaintiffs established that defendant’s agent engaged in purposeful activities in New York for defendant’s benefit by negotiating material terms of the contract here, we agree with Supreme Court that there was long-arm jurisdiction (see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]; Polansky v Gelrod, 20 AD3d 663, 664 [2005]).

Section 302(a)(1) can provide jurisdiction over a nonresident who buys services through an ongoing New York business relationship; the defendant need not supply the services.

McNamee v. Clemens · filed 2011-02-03(a)(1)

Moreover, it is clear, based on the allegations in the complaint, that regardless of who was providing or receiving services and regardless of what those services were, McNamee and Clemens were involved in an ongoing relationship, the type of which gives rise to personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on an agent’s acts only when the agent acts for the defendant; the plaintiff’s own acts or its agent’s acts do not suffice.

Pramer S.C.A. v. Abaplus International Corp. · filed 2010-06-10(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1) also creates New York jurisdiction over any party whose agent undertakes certain acts. Notably, it must be the defendant’s agent. The plaintiff may not rely on its own activity, or the activity of its agent, as a predicate for jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) requires evidence that a corporation controlled its alleged agent’s transaction before that transaction can support long-arm jurisdiction over the corporation.

OneBeacon America Insurance v. Newmont Mining Corp. · filed 2011-03-17(a)(1)

New York does not have long-arm jurisdiction over Dawn pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) on the theory that Newmont was acting as Dawn’s agent when it purchased the insurance policies at issue (see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v EMCOR Group, Inc., 9 AD3d 319 [2004]). There is no evidence that Dawn exercised control over Newmont with respect to Newmont’s purchase of insurance (see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that transacts business in New York through its website.

HALAS, SHAWN v. DICK'S SPORTING GOODS, INC. · filed 2013-04-26(a)(1)

Therefore, defendant was transacting business in New York through the use of its website, and the court properly concluded that there is long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on New York business conducted by others for a defendant’s benefit, with its knowledge and consent and under some control, without a formal agency relationship.

New Media Holding Co. v. Kagalovsky · filed 2012-07-17(a)(1)

Contrary to defendants-appellants’ contention, there was no need to establish a formal agency relationship between them and the other defendants, since it was shown that the other defendants acted purposely in New York for their benefit and with their knowledge and consent, and that defendants-appellants exercised “some control” over the other defendants in the matter (id.).

Section 302(a)(1) and (a)(2) permit jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based on business transacted or tortious conduct committed in New York through their agent.

Front, Inc. v. Khalil · filed 2013-02-14(a)(1), (a)(2)

These allegations are sufficient to establish that the UK defendants transacted business in New York, through Khalil as their agent, and therefore to invoke jurisdiction over them pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see New Media Holding Co. LLC v Kagalovsky, 97 AD3d 463 [1st Dept 2012]). ... The allegations also are sufficient to establish that the UK defendants engaged in tortious conduct in New York, again acting through Khalil as their agent, and therefore to invoke jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2) (see Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 252 AD2d 1, 17 [1st Dept 1998], affd 94 NY2d 43 [1999]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction.

Thorsen v. Sons of Norway · filed 2014-02-06(a)(1)

To establish specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR Section 302(a)(1), a plaintiff must set forth facts showing that the non-domiciliary defendant (1) “transacts business within the state” and (2) that the “cause of action arisfes] from” that transaction of business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when an agent transacts business in New York on a principal’s behalf.

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger · filed 2014-04-25(a)(1)

Donziger’s actions in New York on the LAP Representatives’ behalf therefore satisfied the requirements of New York CPLR § 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on purposeful telephone dealings with a New York business when those dealings are substantially related to the claim.

C. Mahendra (NY), LLC v. National Gold & Diamond Center, Inc. · filed 2015-02-10(a)(1)

However, the motion court erred in finding that the parties’ telephone dealings over several years and in the two transactions at issue were insufficient as a matter of law to confer personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that agrees with an agent to sell property in New York.

In Re the Estate of Stettiner · filed 2017-02-14(a)(1)

In this case, personal jurisdiction was acquired based on IAC’s admitted agreement with Sotheby’s to act as its agent to sell the painting in New York in 2008.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporate officer when corporations conduct New York business as the officer’s agents, with the officer’s knowledge, consent, and control.

Brady v. Basic Research, L.L.C. · filed 2015-03-31(a)(1)

These allegations demonstrate Gay’s control over the corporations and that they acted with his knowledge and consent and therefore Basic Research and Zoller served as Gay’s agents and plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit a local representative’s activities to establish jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who lacks control over the representative.

America/International 1994 Venture v. Mau · filed 2016-11-23(a)(1)

Here, the critical element of control is completely lacking. The plaintiffs did not allege, and Valeri did not assert, that the defendant, in fact, exercised any control over Kraft.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York through an agent engaged to sell its artwork.

Gowen v. Helly Nahmad Gallery, Inc. · filed 2018-05-08(a)(1)

Under this theory of engaging the Helly Nahmad Gallery to sell artwork owned by IAC, jurisdiction is proper under CPLR 302(a)(1) where Defendant IAC has transacted business by and through its agents.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer specific jurisdiction over a website operator whose activity is not purposefully directed at New York.

Pinder v. S. DiCarlo, Inc. · filed 2020-03-03(a)(1)

Thus, the well-pleaded factual allegations do not permit this Court to exercise specific jurisdiction over 5 Lion under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires an agency relationship for jurisdiction based on another person’s New York business transactions; a co-conspirator’s acts alone do not suffice.

QBE Americas, Inc. v. Allen · filed 2022-03-25(a)(1)

Rather, CPLR 302(a)(1) requires an agency relationship, even if not “a formal agency relationship,” in which the purported agent “acted purposely in New York for [the defendant’s] benefit and with [her] knowledge and consent, and that defendant[] ... exercised some control over the other[s] ... in the matter.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York through an agent and the claim arises from that transaction.

Life Ins. Fund Elite, LLC v. Hamburg Commercial Bank AG · filed 2024-01-03(a)(1)

Here, the court has personal jurisdiction over Promontoria pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(l).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary uses a New York agent to negotiate a contract and receive related royalty payments in New York.

Keep On Kicking Music, Inc v. Universal Music Group, Inc. · filed 2024-08-05(a)(1)

In any event, that Kreyol and Melodie appointed a New York agent to negotiate a contract in New York and accept royalty payments for the work at issue in this case to the agent’s New York office is sufficient to constitute transacting business or contracting to supply goods or services in the state. Accordingly, the Court concludes that exercising specific personal jurisdiction over Kreyol and Melodie in this action comports with the requirements of § 302(a).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary parent that transacts business in New York through its subsidiary when the claim arises from that business.

Palmer v. eCapital Corp. · filed 2024-08-13(a)(1)

Here, eCapital transacted business in New York through ABL, its New York-based subsidiary. ... Accordingly, the Court may properly assert personal jurisdiction over eCapital pursuant to § 302(a)(1) of New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits a jointly operated platform’s New York contacts to be attributed to an operator when assessing personal jurisdiction.

Edmar Financial Company, LLC v. Currenex, Inc. · filed 2024-06-17(a)(1)

The Court agrees, and it holds that the jurisdictional contacts of the Currenex Platform in New York may be imputed to SS Global.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose business transactions in New York give rise to the claim, including through a website offering goods for sale and shipment to New York.

Toro v. Cowtown Boot Company · filed 2024-09-26(a)(1)

A court in New York may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary if (1) the non-domiciliary “‘transacts any business in the state’; and (2) the ‘cause of action aris[es] from that business transaction.’” Romero v. 88 Acres Foods, Inc., 580 F.Supp.3d 9, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting CPLR § 302(a)(1)). In a near-identical case to this one, Campbell v. Gallery Model Homes, Inc., 2024 WL 1076541, at *3—4 (S.D.N.Y. March 12, 2024), my colleague Judge Torres held that a Texas corporation that operated a website which offered the sale and shipment of goods to consumers in New York was subject to New York’s long arm statute. Campbell is near-identical to the instant case; in both, a legally blind plaintiff filed a complaint against a Texas corporation for failing to maintain an accessible website to purchase goods from. Therefore, this Court has personal jurisdiction over CBC under New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on business transacted in New York through an agent, but the plaintiff must plead facts supporting the agency relationship.

Northwell Health Inc. v. Carefirst - BCBS National Capital Area · filed 2024-12-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff has simply failed to plead the requisite facts that Empire acted as Defendant’s agent so as to plausibly allege that Defendants “transact[ed] business in New York” under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when deliberate debt collection activity in New York gives rise to the plaintiff’s claims.

Kamal v. Pressler, Felt & Warshaw, LLP · filed 2025-03-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, Kamal has averred facts that, if credited, establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to 302(a)(1).

An interactive booking website does not establish that a defendant transacts business in New York without facts showing that the defendant targeted New York customers.

Wills v. Resorts World Las Vegas, LLC · filed 2025-06-17(a)(1)

Although defendant’s website is interactive because it allows customers to book hotel rooms, plaintiff fails to allege facts tending to show that defendant targeted individuals in New York, such that defendant purposefully availed itself of New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not attribute another person’s New York conduct to a nondomiciliary without facts showing the nondomiciliary directed or consented to that conduct.

In re China Construction Bank Corp. · filed 2025-08-06(a)(1)

At most, the allegations suggest a failure to supervise Lam, but none of the alleged facts imply that CCB Asia played an “active role” or was the “primary actor” in directing Lam’s conduct toward New York. As such, Lam’s actions cannot be imputed to CCB Asia for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits an agent’s New York conduct to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident principal only when the principal directed, knew of, and controlled that conduct.

In re China Construction Bank Corp. · filed 2025-08-06(a)(1)

Although Plaintiffs argue that CCB Asia may be liable for Lam’s actions under the theory of respondeat superior, such allegations cannot establish personal jurisdiction, which requires Plaintiffs to show that Lam’s conduct in New York was undertaken at CCB Asia’s direction, with CCB Asia’s knowledge, and under CCB Asia’s control.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an online seller whose interactive website lets buyers in New York place orders.

McGraw-Hill Global Educ. Holdings, LLC v. Khan · filed 2018-06-22(a)(1)

Because Defendants' "website is interactive and allows a buyer in New York to submit an order online," Audiovox, 2012 WL 3061518, at *3, Plaintiffs have established this Court's personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302 does not govern personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s consent to a procedure that dispenses with service of summons.

Copeland Planned Futures, Inc. v. Obenchain · filed 1973-05-29

Defendants contend the court below erred in entering an in personam judgment against defendants because the New York judgment was entered without service of summons as required by N.Y. CPLR §§ 302, 304, 308 and 313. ... The New York statutes and cases on which defendants rely do not deal with the problem of jurisdiction by consent over the person of the defendant. They deal, rather, with the nonresident defendant over whom personal jurisdiction is sought to be asserted when he has not consented to a particular form of procedure.

Section 302 long-arm analysis is unnecessary when the parties have consented to personal jurisdiction.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shaddock · filed 1993-05-20

Respondents also contend that even if the arbitration provision is deemed to constitute consent to personal jurisdiction, the Court must still engage in long-arm analysis under N.Y. CPLR § 302 before asserting jurisdiction. Respondents are wrong.

Consent to personal jurisdiction does not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302.

Techo-TM, LLC v. Fireaway, Inc. · filed 2014-12-23

Business Corporation Law § 1314 (b) (4) provides for cases against a non-domiciliary that would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of this State’s courts pursuant to CPLR 302. However, while New York recognizes consent as a basis for personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 301; Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C301:l), it does not recognize consent as a basis for long-arm jurisdiction (see Graham v New York City Hous. Auth., 224 AD2d 248 [1st Dept 1996]).

Section 302 does not treat a nonresident physician’s follow-up calls and letters with a New York doctor as supplying services in New York, or treatment of out-of-state patients in the physician’s home state as interstate commercial activity.

Etra v. Matta · filed 1983-07-14(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Similarly, telephone calls and letters exchanged between Lown and Matta do not amount to the supply of services under that section. ... While clearly appellant is alleged to have committed a tortious act outside of the State causing injury in the State, and he most likely should have expected his acts to have consequences in the State from whence his patient came, the treatment of unsolicited patients in one’s own home State should not support the imputation of interstate commercial activity.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a factual basis for foreseeable consequences in New York and substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell · filed 1970-09-16(a)(3)(ii)

Not only is there a dearth of facts to support the allegation that Kerman committed the tort of misrepresentation during the negotiations in England, but the record contains no information upon which a finding may be made either as to the foreseeability of the consequences of Kerman’s conduct or as to the extent to which he derives revenue from international commerce. ... This is tantamount to a concession that under the present state of the record there is no basis for extending the jurisdiction of this court to Kerman under § 302(a) (3) (ii)..

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires interstate commerce activity extensive and regular enough to make injury in the state a foreseeable risk of the business; the tortfeasor need not specifically anticipate injury in that state.

Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell · filed 1972-10-30(a)(3)(ii)

Although no case has required a tortfeasor to be specifically aware, that his product might cause injury in the very state seeking to subject him to suit, it is clear that activity in interstate commerce must be sufficiently extensive and regular to make this possibility a foreseeable risk of the business.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s substantial interstate revenue requirement can be satisfied by a national trade association’s out-of-state revenue and the nationwide program that generates it.

Goggi Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp. · filed 1976-06-18(a)(3)(ii)

Finally, under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii), the defendant must “derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” This requirement is satisfied by BIA’s concession that in 1974, allegedly a high income year, its non-Illinois revenue was approximately $140,000. ... Moreover, BIA’s relationship with the nation-wide industry which it represents coupled with the fact that its nationwide certification program, which is challenged in the instant action, is the source of its interstate income are factors similar to those in Path Instruments which overcome any doubt as to the fulfillment of the “substantial revenue” requirement in this case.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)'s substantial interstate revenue requirement excludes businesses whose operations are local; revenue from clients in neighboring states may be treated as local revenue.

United Bank of Kuwait, PLC v. James M. Bridges, Ltd. · filed 1991-06-04(a)(3)(ii)

Revenues derived from these local clients cannot credibly be deemed revenues from “interstate” commerce in any but the most literal sense.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not require a defendant’s substantial international revenue to come from transactions in New York.

Traver v. Officine Meccaniche Toshci SpA · filed 2002-12-05(a)(3)(ii)

However, as the case law makes clear, under § 302(a)(3)(h), as long as it is reasonably foreseeable that Defendant's acts would have caused injury in New York and that Defendant derives substantial revenue from international commerce, it is not necessary that Defendant derive any of its international revenue from transactions in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits courts to assess substantial revenue from international commerce over multiple years rather than only the year the complaint was filed.

Justus v. Toyo Kensetsu Kohki Co., Ltd. · filed 2002-10-24(a)(3)(ii)

The Court is persuaded that the better approach is to consider a period of years to determine whether Defendant Toyo derived “substantial revenue” from international commerce. Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, nothing in the case law suggests that the Court must limit itself to the year in which the complaint was filed.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s substantial revenue requirement is not satisfied merely because a plaintiff invested in a defendant’s employer.

Pincione v. D’Alfonso · filed 2012-12-20(a)(3)(ii)

In particular, we agree that plaintiff cannot establish that defendants Guiseppe Paolone, Guiliano Milia, or Berardo Ambrosi received significant revenue from international commerce by alleging that Pincione invested money in their employer, Pescara Calcio, S.p.A.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce to support personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort.

AmTrust Financial Services, Inc. v. Lacchini · filed 2017-02-23(a)(3)(ii)

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not confer jurisdiction over Lacchini, because, among other things, the Complaint is devoid of allegations that he “derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce,” and Lacchini attests that he does not, Lacchini Declaration ¶ 11.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) requires evidence that the defendant derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in New York; a distributor’s New York sales do not establish that amount without evidence of the defendant’s income.

Regenlab U.S. LLC v. Estar Techs. Ltd. · filed 2018-08-15(a)(3)(i)

In order to secure jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(i), Plaintiff must show that Estar "derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed" in New York. ... On this record, the Court cannot say that Estar's income from New York was substantial.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s substantial revenue requirement concerns interstate or international commerce, not revenue from New York customers.

Prokos v. Haute Media LLC · filed 2020-08-11(a)(3)(ii)

For purposes of this element, the issue is whether Haute Living “derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii), not whether a portion of Haute Living’s revenue comes from individuals or entities in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires sufficient allegations that the defendant expected or should have expected its conduct to have consequences in New York.

Bangladesh Bank v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. · filed 2023-05-30(a)(3)(ii)

The court also properly held that it did not have jurisdiction over BRHI under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that BRHI expected or should have expected its conduct to have consequences in New York (see LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210, 214-215 [2000]).

Section 302(a)(3) does not require a connection between the out-of-state tort and the defendant’s substantial revenue; under clause (ii), foreseeability concerns New York consequences generally.

Gillmore v. J. S. Inskip, Inc. · filed 1967-07-10(a)(3)

The “ substantial revenue ” provisions of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3) do not require any connection between the tortious act committed outside the State and the deriving of revenue from goods used in New York or from interstate or international commerce (Judicial Conference Report proposing the bill that became chapter 590, 1966 McKinney’s Sess. Laws, p. 2790), and, under clause (ii) of that section the “ requirement of foreseeability relates to forum consequences generally and not to the specific event which produced injury within the state ” (ibid.).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) uses an objective test to decide whether a nondomiciliary should reasonably expect an out-of-state act to have consequences in New York.

Brown v. Erie-Lackawanna Railroad · filed 1967-07-20(a)(3)(ii)

The test of whether the defendant expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in this State is an objective not a subjective (i.e., what is in the mind of the nonresident) one, and should be so construed (Homburger and Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York’s Long-Arm Statute, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 67, 74 [1966]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires proof that the foreign defendant engages in substantial interstate commerce.

Chunky Corporation v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co. · filed 1969-03-28(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff has not, however, adduced any proof that Grover engages in substantial interstate commerce, an essential requirement for invocation of § 302(a) (3) (ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)'s interstate commerce requirement excludes a local physician who treats patients in two bordering states.

Markham v. Gray · filed 1975-05-01(a)(3)(ii)

Since the practice of a profession is predominantly local in character, interstate commerce under Section 302(a) (3) (ii) should be construed to incorporate the profession-business dichotomy, at least to exclude a local physician who treats his patients in two bordering states.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s substantial interstate revenue requirement can be provisionally satisfied by a substantial transaction with a New York depositor, even when fuller proof is in the defendant’s control.

Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 1975-09-25(a)(3)(ii)

While plaintiff has not completely satisfied the requirements of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]) to the extent that there is no proof that Totowa "derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce”, that knowledge is peculiarly under the control of Totowa, and the failure of the plaintiff to come forward with substantial proof at this time should not mean that defendant must prevail on the motion. Subsequent discovery will surely cure this flaw (CPLR 3211, subd [d]). In any event, the fact that the instant transaction involves $200,000 of a New York depositor suffices to show at this time that Totowa may derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce.

A small-town physician’s practice across state lines does not satisfy the substantial interstate revenue requirement when those activities are insufficiently substantial.

Frances J. Markham and George W. Markham v. William H. Anderson, Jr. · filed 1976-02-13(a)(3)(ii)

In our view it is unnecessary to decide whether the practice of medicine by a physician is “commerce” for jurisdictional purposes, since we agree with the conclusion of the District Court that Dr. Anderson’s interstate activities, whether commerce or not, are not “substantial” within the meaning of CPLR § 302(a)(3)(h).

Section 302(a)(3)(i) and (ii) do not confer jurisdiction when the defendant’s revenue from New York and interstate sales is a very small percentage of his total income.

Parker v. Green · filed 1978-06-12(a)(3)(i)-(ii)

The total revenue appellant derives from the sale of needles either in New York or in interstate commerce represents a very small percentage of his total income from all sources. Hence, there is no jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, els i, ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not provide personal jurisdiction when the defendant derives no revenue from interstate commerce.

Cwick v. City of Rochester · filed 1985-01-29(a)(3)(ii)

On appeal, third-party plaintiff limits the issue to whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]). We affirm. There is no evidence contradicting Morgan’s averments that he derived no revenue from interstate commerce; thus, the requirements of this section have not been met (see Parker v Green, 63 AD2d 977).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s substantial-revenue requirement considers the amount of interstate or international revenue, not just its share of total income.

Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace · filed 1986-10-22(a)(3)(ii)

But this court resists a mechanical approach to an issue that implicates due process concerns. A child who earns a few dollars by trading foreign postage stamps may derive 100% of his income from international commerce. Yet his revenue is hardly “substantial” if the term is to have any practical or constitutional significance. As a prerequisite of personal jurisdiction, the term is significant both practically and constitutionally, and this court adjudges Mr. Wallace’s consulting fees insubstantial.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not require substantial revenue from international commerce to be linked to New York or the United States.

Broadcasting Rights International Corp. v. Societe Du Tour De France · filed 1987-12-09(a)(3)(ii)

Contrary to STDF’s assertions, section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not require that the substantial revenue from international commerce be linked to New York or the United States.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s substantial interstate revenue requirement can be satisfied by a corporation’s sales when jurisdiction is asserted over its officers for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York.

Facit, Inc. v. Krueger, Inc. · filed 1990-02-27(a)(3)(ii)

HFT’s sales of over $4 million through 15 independent representatives, see Facit, 657 F.Supp. at 1071, is thus sufficient to meet the “derives substantial revenues through interstate commerce” requirement of New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not impute a corporation’s interstate revenue to a nonshareholding officer when assessing personal jurisdiction over the officer.

Siegel v. Holson Co. · filed 1991-07-16(a)(3)(ii)

Turning to the provisions of § 302(a)(3)(h), while Hoffmeister is the president of a company that derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce, that revenue is not imputed to Hoffmeister for jurisdictional purposes because he is a non shareholding officer of the corporation.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not require substantial revenue to come from the defendant’s particular activities at issue.

Benson v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1994-04-27(a)(3)(ii)

The CPLR says substantial revenues must be received but does not require that these revenues must relate to the particular activities of the defendant.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s substantial interstate-commerce revenue requirement is not met merely because a physician with a local practice frequently receives referrals from New York or holds an unused New York medical license.

Ingraham v. Carroll · filed 1997-10-21(a)(3)(ii)

Thus, in terms of the substantial revenue from interstate commerce requirement of subdivision (a) (3) (ii), the existence of nothing more than an informal, even if frequent, referral practice from a New York HMO is insufficient, as is the fact that respondent holds an apparently completely unexercised privilege to practice medicine in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state tortfeasor whose New York sales constitute doing business and generate substantial revenue from goods used in the state.

Reynolds v. Aircraft Leasing, Inc. · filed 2002-10-30(a)(3)(i)

In light of the number of sales in New York, Precision does business here within the meaning of the clause, and it derives a substantial portion of its revenue in New York from goods used or consumed here.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) measures substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce, rather than from New York commerce alone.

McGlone v. Thermotex, Inc. · filed 2010-09-21(a)(3)(ii)

As to the latter prong of the statute, the issue is not whether Thermotex derives substantial revenue from commerce within the State of New York, but whether the company derives such revenue from “interstate or international” commerce.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a plaintiff relying on an out-of-state tort to establish the defendant’s qualifying business activity or substantial revenue.

Mangia Media Inc. v. University Pipeline, Inc. · filed 2012-02-28(a)(3)

Moreover, while it is premature to rule on the merits of any fraud claim, the court holds that even accepting the allegations regarding fraud, Plaintiffs have failed completely to establish facts to support the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to either of the revenue requirements of Sections 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires evidence that a defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce to establish personal jurisdiction.

SunLight General Capital LLC v. CJS Investments Inc. · filed 2014-02-18(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff cannot establish personal jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii), in the absence of evidence that these defendants “ derive [ ] substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.”

Under CPLR 302(a)(3), substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce is assessed by comparing that revenue with the defendant’s total gross sales revenue.

Sacco v. Reel-O-Matic, Inc. · filed 2020-05-06(a)(3)

This element is construed as a comparison between a defendant's gross sales revenue from interstate or international business with total gross sales revenue ( see Allen v Canadian Gen. Elec. Co. , 65 AD2d 39, 41, affd 50 NY2d 935, citing Allen v Auto Specialties Mfg. Co. , 45 AD2d 331, 333).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires the plaintiff to allege that the defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Johnson v. The Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC · filed 2024-03-21(a)(3)(ii)

For that reason alone, § 302(a)(3)(ii) does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise specific jurisdiction over Richards.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the defendant has negligible New York business and had no reason to expect its out-of-state conduct to have consequences in New York.

Pyle v. 260-261 Madison Ave. LLC · filed 2024-06-25(a)(3)

Marine cannot be said to do or solicit business regularly in New York, engage in any persistent course of conduct in New York, or derive substantial revenue from New York ( see CPLR 302[a][3][i]). Product sales in New York were minimal or nonexistent in most years from 2014 through 2018 and income derived from Marine's New York sales represented, at most, one-tenth of 1% of its total revenue for the years 2014 through 2018 combined ( see Murdock v Arenson Intl. USA , 157 AD2d 110, 113-114 [1st Dept 1990]). Neither has it been shown that Marine should have expected or had reason to expect its alleged tortious activity in manufacturing a defective sling in Alabama would have directconsequences in New York ( see CPLR 302[a][3][ii]; LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co ., 95 NY2d 210, 214-215 [2000]).

Section 302’s transacting-business test does not govern jurisdiction based on attachment.

Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Incorporated and a & W Foods · filed 1978-04-14

The constitutional standard of due process may be met by fewer contacts, however, than those required under the more restrictive statutory test of “doing business,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301, as the New York Court of Appeals implicitly recognized in Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 286-88, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 200 N.E.2d 427 (1964), or the (possibly) more restrictive test of “transacting business,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, since neither of these statutes governs jurisdiction based on attachment.

Section 302(a) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in the state.

Greenwich Life Settlements, Inc. v. Viasource Funding Group, LLC · filed 2010-10-04(a)

Because ViaSource conducts business in New York County, (see Compl. ¶ 6; Answer ¶ 6), it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, which encompasses New York County. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) ("[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state....").

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the claim arises from the nondomiciliary's transaction of business in New York.

Vodopia v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. · filed 2010-10-25(a)(1)

Under New York law, which governs our jurisdictional inquiry, see PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997), these allegations are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over both defendants. With respect to PENAC, the allegations in the complaint – which are neither questioned nor challenged by defendants – establish specific jurisdiction because they make clear that this suit “arise[s] from” PENAC’s “transact[ion] of business within the state” – specifically, its employment of plaintiff.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a website that only lets visitors contact the seller and does not permit any part of a transaction online.

A.W.L.I. Group, Inc. v. Amber Freight Shipping Lines · filed 2011-12-09(a)(1)

However, a website is still considered passive and insufficient to confer jurisdiction where, as here, the only purported “exchange of information” available on the website is a direct link allowing a user to contact the seller and does not allow for any part of a transaction to occur online.

A passive informational website, without alleged New York transactions or tortious acts involving the claim, does not support specific jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) or (a)(2).

Albany International Corp. v. Yamauchi Corp. · filed 2013-10-22(a)(1), (a)(2)

A “passive website” that simply makes information available to others in a foreign jurisdiction will not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. ... Plaintiff concedes that AstenJohnson does not make “process belts” and does not allege any other basis through which AstenJohnson offers allegedly infringing shoe press belts for sale in New York outside of the defendants’ websites. Accordingly, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over AstenJohnson is not warranted.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on a New York business transaction only when the claim has a substantial relationship to that transaction.

Hood v. Ascent Medical Corp. · filed 2017-05-24(a)(1)

While even “one transaction in New York” may suffice, New York’s long-arm statute authorizes specific jurisdiction only where that transaction has a “substantial relationship” to the claim asserted in the instant case.

Section 302(a) requires New York contacts connected to the claim to establish specific jurisdiction; attendance at unrelated meetings is insufficient.

Jacubovich v. State of Israel · filed 2020-05-28(a)

Furthermore, Appellants offer no facts to demonstrate that CTCC’s contacts with New York are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). Although representatives of CTCC attended meetings in New York City along with representatives of Appellees, DCI, and Israel Bonds International, Appellants do not allege that any conduct relevant to this case occurred at those meetings.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Guglielmo v. Jeg's Automotive, Inc. · filed 2021-03-17(a)(1)

To establish jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1), Plaintiff must allege that: (1) Defendant has “transacted business” in New York, and (2) the claim asserted arises from that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in the state when the claim arises from that business.

Amimon, Inc. v. Shenzhen Hollyland Tech Co. Ltd · filed 2021-11-30(a)(1)

Thus, while Amimon’s allegations that Hollyland acted through EC Pro in New York may not be sufficient to establish general jurisdiction under § 301, they are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary in a libel action when the alleged libel is connected with business transacted in New York.

Modica v. Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1967-07-12(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) provides, however, that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who £ £ transacts any business within the state ’ ’. ... There is no question but that the act complained of was connected with the transaction of business in the State of New York and the court ... has therefore acquired jurisdiction by the personal service upon the defendant Victor D. Chase.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose purposeful, continuous, substantial and profitable activity in New York establishes the required minimum contacts.

Fairview Block Co. v. Peoples Trust Co. of New Jersey · filed 1979-04-02(a)

The evidence elicited at the hearing conclusively established that the defendant had engaged in purposeful, continuous, substantial and profitable activity in this State within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd [a]). Thus, the minimum contacts constitutionally required to bring the defendant within the purview of the statute have been established.

Section 302(a)(4) permits personal jurisdiction based on New York real property only when the action arises from its ownership, use or possession.

Aluminal Industries, Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Associates · filed 1980-11-18(a)(4)

Although Tinsky does own property in New York, CPLR § 302(a)(4) is confined to actions arising from the ownership, use or possession of real property; the statute does not make ownership, use or possession of real property per se a basis of jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a conspirator who joins after a New York tort when he knows of and ratifies the earlier act.

Dixon v. MacK · filed 1980-12-10(a)(2)

Since Rick, as a conspirator, ratified the acts of his co-conspirators in New York, knew that prior overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy had taken place in New York, and, we infer, knew that plaintiff was being “deprogrammed” against his will, the necessary abduction of Dixon in New York and by Rick’s co-conspirators was an act committed also on Rick’s behalf, with his approval and assent. ... Therefore, we conclude that the New York long-arm statute, § 302(a)2., confers jurisdiction over Rick on this Court.

Section 302(a)(2) requires facts supporting a conspiracy before an alleged coconspirator’s New York tortious acts can establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Mandaglio v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners · filed 1981-12-09(a)(2)

This is not enough to sustain jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2) on the ground that others, acting as a defendant’s agents in furtherance of a conspiracy among individuals, committed tortious acts within the State.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on in-state acts of coconspirators who were agents of the defendants.

Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Firemen's Insurance · filed 1982-12-30(a)(2)

Thus the acts of the coconspirators who in law were agents of ATI and the Dufrenes, were the acts of ATI and the Dufrenes, sufficient, within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 2) to confer in personam jurisdiction on the Dufrenes and their corporation.

CPLR 302 does not permit long-arm jurisdiction based solely on stock ownership and corporate control when the record does not show that the alleged agent acted under the defendants’ control or for their benefit.

American Barrick Resources Corp. v. Canarim Investment Corp. · filed 1989-08-31

We find that the record does not contain sufficient evidence that Smith was acting as agent under the control of or for the benefit of defendants-appellants Canarim Investment Corp., Ltd., 321264 B.C. Ltd., and Reyard Saadien, to support long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302. In our view, the stock ownership and corporate control exercised by certain of appellants in defendant Gold Standard, Inc., without more, does not provide a sufficient basis to constitute Gold Standard’s president an agent of appellánts for jurisdictional purposes.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary guarantor when its guarantee of a domestic corporation’s debt is to be performed in New York, even if the guarantor was not physically present in the state.

Rielly Co. v. Lisa B. Inc. · filed 1992-07-23(a)(1)

The guarantee of the debt of a domestic corporation by a nondomiciliary corporation in like circumstances has been held by this court to provide New York courts with jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Fashion Tanning Co. v Shutzer Indus., 108 AD2d 485). As was the case in Fashion Tanning Co. v Shutzer Indus. (supra), although Bogatin, a nondomiciliary of New York, was not physically present in this State conducting business with plaintiff on a personal basis, the fact that its guarantee was to be performed here was sufficient to satisfy long-arm jurisdiction (see, supra, at 486).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who guarantees an obligation to be performed in New York.

Skrabalak v. Rock · filed 1994-10-20(a)(1)

Addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction, we find that Supreme Court correctly determined that defendant’s guarantee of an obligation to be performed in this State is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Rielly Co. v Lisa B. Inc., 181 AD2d 269; Fashion Tanning Co. v Shutzer Indus., 108 AD2d 485; see also, Peekskill Community Hosp. v Graphic Media, 198 AD2d 337).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendants’ activities make them subject to personal jurisdiction in New York.

Cavaliere v. New Jersey Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1997-02-18(a)(1)

Further, the plaintiff failed to establish that the activities of the defendants made them susceptible to New York jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on tortious acts in New York by a non-domiciliary’s agent when the agency is sufficiently pleaded.

Tucker v. Sanders · filed 2010-07-02(a)(2)

We further conclude in any event that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that Kanaley, a New York resident, acted as defendants’ agent with respect to the real estate investment at issue (see CPLR 302 [a] [2]), and thus that the motion was properly denied on that ground as well.

Section 302(a)(4) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident based on ownership of real property in New York.

Gleason v. Town of Clifton Park Planning Board · filed 2011-12-08(a)(4)

Here, although the record indicates that Bartlett was, and may still be, a resident of Georgia, she is nevertheless subject to the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of her ownership of the subject property (see CPLR 302 [a] [4]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an actionable tort committed outside New York to support personal jurisdiction.

Lantau Holdings Ltd. v. Orient Equal Intl. Group Ltd. · filed 2018-05-31(a)(3)

Haitong is not subject to New York jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3). Among other things, the statute requires the defendant to have committed a tort outside the state. However, the complaint, which asserts claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud against Haitong, fails to state a cause of action for either.

Section 302(a)(4) provides personal jurisdiction based on ownership of the New York property at issue, even when the owner may have a statute of limitations defense.

Matter of Nemeth v. K-Tooling · filed 2018-07-05(a)(4)

To the contrary, the court had jurisdiction over her by virtue of her ownership of the subject property ( see CPLR 302 [a] [4]), and such jurisdiction was unaffected [*3]by her potential statute of limitations defense ( see Windy Ridge Farm v Assessor of Town of Shandaken , 11 NY3d 725, 727 [2008]) [FN2] .

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business activity.

Broumand v. Joseph · filed 2021-02-27(a)(1)

CPLR § 302 provides New York courts with a second path to specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. “To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... The Court again disagrees and holds that neither respondent is subject to specific jurisdiction in New York under the state’s long-arm statute.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries whose purposeful New York contacts give rise to the plaintiff’s claims.

Nazario v. ByteDance Ltd. · filed 2025-06-27

Additionally, the court has personal jurisdiction over the social media defendants because plaintiff alleges that the social media defendants derive substantial revenue from New York state and specifically target New York City residents such as Zackery with subway surfing content, and plaintiff’s causes of action arise from those purposeful contacts (CPLR § 302).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist for a tortious act in New York, with service under the CPLR even when Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253 also applies.

Leibowitz v. Hare · filed 1984-10-23(a)(2)

In his treatise, New York Practice, Professor David D. Siegel compares CPLR 302 with section 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and concludes that “[t]here will often be an overlap between § 253 and CPLR 302 (a) (2), which supplies longarm jurisdiction for a tortious act committed in New York. When both provisions apply, plaintiff can choose either, using the ordinary service methods of the CPLR if CPLR 302 is chosen” (p 112). ... For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the within complaint on the ground that this court does not have jurisdiction by reason of improper service is denied.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants when their alleged tortious acts and related production and marketing occur in New York.

Apple Corps Ltd. v. Adirondack Group · filed 1983-12-15

The other defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this court under the long-arm provisions of CPLR 302. Since it is claimed that defendants have committed and are about to commit further tortious acts within the State, that the defendants’ album, the cover and the label were done within the State and that a large part of the promotion and marketing efforts of the defendant would be within the State, there is no question but that this court has jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on purposeful acts in New York, including taking delivery there through a carrier and returning goods there for repair.

Kaddis Manufacturing Corp. v. Gil-Bar Rubber Products Co. · filed 1984-07-13(a)(1)

Defendant performed purposeful acts in New York by taking delivery of the goods in Rochester through its carrier and thereafter by returning a portion of the goods to Rochester for repair (see CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1; Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648, 654; Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v Barnes & Reinecke, 15 NY2d 443, 457; Dulman v Potomac Baking Co., 85 AD2d 676, 677; cf. Katz & Son Billiard Prods. v Correale & Sons, 26 AD2d 52, affd 20 NY2d 903).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state party uses industry distribution channels to offer allegedly infringing products for sale in New York.

German Educational Television Network, Ltd. v. Oregon Public Broadcasting Co. · filed 1983-09-08(a)(2)

By the same token, OPB placed into motion accepted industry procedures which had the practical effect of offering allegedly infringing products for sale in New York. In consequence, the passing off, if such there was, occurred in New York; and that is sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2).

CPLR 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over an individual defendant merely because the plaintiff asserts a conversion claim.

Laufer v. Ostrow · filed 1982-03-30

Nor does the claimed conversion ... cause of action furnish any basis for CPLR 302 jurisdiction over Ostrow individually (Fantis Foods v Standard Importing Co., 49 NY2d 317, 326-327).

Section 302(a)(2) provides long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant when a wrongful death claim arises from tortious acts committed within New York.

Immediate v. St. John's Queens Hospital · filed 1978-11-20(a)(2)

Since the wrongful death claim arose out of tortious acts committed within the State, defendant Spindler was at all times subject to long-arm jurisdiction and the tolling provision of CPLR 207 does not apply (see CPLR 302, subd [a], par 2; Burwell v Whitmoyer, 56 AD2d 950; Goodemote v McClain, 40 AD2d 22).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when an in-state representative commits a tortious act on its behalf at its request and for its benefit.

Eliah v. Ucatan Corp. · filed 1977-06-28(a)(2)

Under these circumstances, I hold that Ziff-Davis was the agent of Ucatan with respect to the publication of the advertisement in New York within the meaning of CPLR § 302.

For jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1), an agent's New York acts must benefit the nonresident, occur with its knowledge and consent, and be subject to some control by it.

Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., Ltd. · filed 1978-05-30(a)(1)

To constitute an agent for purposes of the statute, the alleged agent must have acted in this state for the benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of the nonresident and the non-resident must exercise some element of control over the agent.

Section 302(a)(2) and (a)(3) do not treat a breach of contract as a tortious act that supports long-arm jurisdiction.

Pride Laboratories, Inc. v. Athea Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1976-11-29(a)(2), (a)(3)

We find no merit to the argument that a breach of contract constitutes a tortious act and may form a basis for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], pars 2, 3) (see Amigo Foods Corp. v Marine Midland Bank-N. Y., 39 NY2d 391).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary’s false representation is first communicated by a letter read in New York, and section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over claims for legal services rendered in New York.

Polish v. Threshold Technology Inc. · filed 1972-12-27(a)(1), (a)(2)

Thus, defendants’ tortious act occurred in New York where the contents of defendants ’ letter were perused by plaintiff and from where he parted with his stock certificate. ... Turning to the third and fourth causes of action, plaintiff’s claim that he rendered legal services to the defendants in New York establishes a sufficient nexus for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer who transacts business in New York or commits an alleged tortious act there.

Lutz Feed Co. v. Audet & Co. · filed 1972-11-20(a)(1), (a)(2)

The assertion by the third-party defendant Benson that the complaint must be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over him is without merit. At the time of the alleged tort, Mr. Benson, as an officer of a New York corporation, was certainly transacting business in the State (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1); moreover, according to the documentary evidence submitted in opposition to the motion, the alleged tortious act was committed within the State (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 2).

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary corporation for a tortious act committed in New York by its agent at the corporation’s direction.

Gasarch v. Ormand Industries, Inc. · filed 1972-08-17(a)(2)

Accordingly, the wrongful refusal to transfer is a tortious act which under CPLR § 302 may be imputed to Ormand rendering it amenable to suit in New York thereon.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an ordinary contract claim merely because the plaintiff alleges that the defendant never intended to perform.

Stanat Manufacturing Co. v. Imperial Metal Finishing Co. · filed 1971-04-08(a)(2)

This action sounds in contract. Permitting plaintiff to convert the case into a tort action for jurisdictional purposes would frustrate the design of Section 302 which differentiates between tort and other actions.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction when an in-state tort injures the plaintiff, even if the tortious act was directed at someone else.

Karsh v. Karsh · filed 1970-04-22(a)(2)

CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) provides for jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who “ commits a tortious act within the state ”. There are no words of limitation such as the defendant urges. On the contrary, the only requirement is that the plaintiff suffer damage or injury as a result of the tortious act.

Section 302(a)(2) requires factual support for a tortious act in New York; a conclusory assertion that wrongful acts occurred there is insufficient.

Lamarr v. Klein · filed 1970-11-19(a)(2)

Such statement is conclusory and completely insufficient to establish that the defendant committed a tortious act in this State so as to validate the service made upon him.

Section 302(a)(3) can confer jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary in a breach of warranty action when the alleged conduct is a tortious act and the other statutory requirements are met.

Naples v. City of New York · filed 1970-03-30(a)(3)

Having allegedly committed a tortious act within the meaning of the statute, Janesville is amenable to the jurisdiction of our courts in a breach of warranty action arising from the act.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a breach of warranty involving goods rendered inherently dangerous to person or property.

Frank Angelilli Construction Co. v. Sullivan & Son, Inc. · filed 1964-12-18(a)(2)

Nevertheless, the policy considerations behind extending the field of personal jurisdiction show that a line should be drawn to include only those cases involving goods rendered inherently dangerous to person or property.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act in New York personally or through an agent.

Chiesa v. McGregor · filed 2022-10-26(a)(2)

New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(2), provides, in pertinent part, that, "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . commits a tortious act within the state." To be considered an "agent" for purposes of CPLR 302(a), an individual must have "engaged in purposeful activities in the State in relation to a transaction for the benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of the defendant and the defendant must have exercised some control over the agent in the matter" (America/Intl. 1994 Venture v Mau, 146 AD3d 40, 54 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a claim arising from a tortious act committed within New York.

Duke v. Housen · filed 1979-01-12(a)(2)

Under the provisions of N.Y. CPLR § 302, the defendant, although a non-domiciliary of the state of New York, was still subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of that state based upon his commission of a tortious act within the confines of the state itself.

Section 302(a)(2) treats offering infringing goods within New York as a tortious act that supports personal jurisdiction.

Oral-B Laboratories, Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp. · filed 1985-06-19(a)(2)

After the hearing on the preliminary injunction I concluded that the offering of infringing goods within the state constitutes a tortious act pursuant to N.Y.CPLR § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) requires a prima facie showing that the alleged tort occurred in New York to support personal jurisdiction.

PI, Inc. v. Quality Products, Inc. · filed 1995-12-22(a)(2)

Accordingly, because the plaintiff has failed to make even a prima facie showing that the alleged tortious interference occurred in New York, N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(2) cannot provide personal jurisdiction over Ogle and Renaldo.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over officials who direct tortious acts in New York through subordinates.

Grove Press, Inc. v. Central Intelligence Agency · filed 1980-01-15(a)(2)

The language of the long-arm statute reflects a policy that such defendants will not be permitted to shield themselves from jurisdiction by acting through subordinates.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on allegedly infringing sales in New York even when those sales are a small percentage of the defendant’s total sales.

Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc. · filed 1992-09-04(a)(2)

Hence personal jurisdiction may be established over a defendant when New York sales constitute only a small percentage of the infringing activities.

Section 302(a)(2) permits long-arm jurisdiction over a person who commits a tortious act within New York, except for a defamation claim.

Karriem v. American Kennel Club · filed 1996-12-30(a)(2)

N.Y. CPLR § 302(a), subd. 2, confers long arm jurisdiction over persons committing tortious acts within the state except as to claims for defamation.

Section 302 permits long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose production and packaging of goods for export causes tort injury in New York.

Aini v. Sun Taiyang Co., Ltd. · filed 1997-05-06(a)(2)

Nevertheless, it appears, in light of Lipton v. The Nature Co., 781 F.Supp. 1032, 1035-36 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd., 71 F.3d 464 (1995), that the Court has jurisdiction over these parties because their manufacture and packaging of TOPICLEAR products in England for export to the United States constituted the commission of a tortious act outside New York causing injury within New York. See N.Y. CPLR § 302(a), subd. 2.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s in-state injury requirement is satisfied by alleged harm to a business in the New York market from confusion among New York computer users.

American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc. · filed 1997-08-14(a)(3)(ii)

Those claims of harm in the New York market are sufficient to satisfy the statute’s requirement of injury “within the state.”

Section 302(a)(2) requires the alleged tortious conduct to occur within New York for it to support personal jurisdiction.

777388 Ontario Ltd. & K.R. Moeller Associates, Ltd. v. Lencore Acoustics Corp. · filed 2001-05-04(a)(2)

Because the tortious conduct alleged by counterclaim plaintiffs was not committed in New York, personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2) is unavailable.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury within New York; financial consequences felt there do not suffice when the events causing the injury occurred elsewhere.

Shakour v. Federal Republic of Germany · filed 2002-05-02(a)(3)

In addition, the occurrence of financial consequences in New York as a result of the fortuitous location of plaintiffs in New York is an insufficient ground under Section 302(a)(3) where the underlying events took place outside New York. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged injury took place in Germany, not in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer through a distributor when the manufacturer had no reason to expect the distributor’s sales in New York.

The Topps Co., Inc. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co. · filed 1997-04-28(a)(2)

Although the fact that Verburg was a United States corporation and the fact that the ingredient legend on the packaging for the Diamond Lollipop includes the designation “colors for U.S.A.” may support an inference that B.I.P. anticipated sales in the United States, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that B.I.P. knew that sales could be expected in New York. ... Accordingly, Verburg cannot be held to be an agent of B.I.P. under § 302(a)(2), and thus B.I.P. is not subject to personal jurisdiction under New York law.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction solely because a website located outside New York is accessible in the state, even if it offers a product for sale.

Telebyte, Inc. v. Kendaco, Inc. · filed 2000-07-24(a)(2)

The existence of a web site outside New York, even one that offers a product for sale, cannot alone confer jurisdiction over the defendant under CPLR § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) requires the court to determine whether the defendant was physically present in New York when the alleged tortious act occurred.

Meteoro Amusement Corp. v. Six Flags · filed 2003-05-27(a)(2)

The contentious issue is whether defendant was physically present in New York at the time the alleged tortious act took place, to wit, the solicitation and sale of season passes to Northern District residents from its website.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; a bank’s deposit of a check in Nevada does not satisfy that requirement merely because the check clears against a New York account.

Baptichon v. Nevada State Bank · filed 2004-02-09(a)(3)

The original event causing plaintiffs injury thus occurred in Nevada, where NSB deposited the check. Under no reasonable analysis can it be said that the injury occurred in New York, as required under section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)’s in-state injury requirement can be satisfied by threatened harm from confusion among New York customers, even before the allegedly infringing product is sold.

PDK Labs, Inc. v. Proactive Labs, Inc. · filed 2004-07-15(a)(3)

Therefore, the harm and threatened harm to PDK from confusion of its actual or potential New York customers who view Proactive’s packaging constitutes a sufficient injury under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from the defendant’s business transactions or tortious conduct in New York.

Doe v. City of New York · filed 2008-02-06(a)

These contacts are plainly sufficient to establish jurisdiction over Tefft because Plaintiffs claims arise from Tefft’s contacts with the NYPD, emails he sent while doing work for the NYPD in NYPD offices in New York City, and the solicitation of his email briefings to New York City law enforcement officers.

Lost sales or customers satisfy the in-state injury requirement only when the sales or customers are in the New York market.

Darby Trading Inc. v. Shell International Trading & Shipping Co. · filed 2008-03-31(a)(3)(ii)

While Plaintiff is correct to note that lost sales or customers can satisfy the “injury within New York” requirement under Section 302(a)(3)(ii), those lost sales must be in the New York market, and those lost customers must be New York customers.

Section 302(a)(2) allows New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act in New York.

Blakeman v. the Walt Disney Co. · filed 2009-05-11(a)(2)

Given these allegations that defendants Gramment and Stark participated in the copyright infringement by supplying the plaintiffs work with knowledge that the subsequent infringing movie would be distributed in New York, the Court finds that the requirements of Section 302(a)(2) are met as to both defendants Grammnet and Stark.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a tortious act within New York when the claim arises from that act; allegations of personal involvement can suffice at the pleading stage.

Iqbal v. Hasty · filed 2007-06-14(a)(2)

Under New York's long-arm statute, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who "in person or through an agent ... commits a tortious act within the state" so long as the cause of action arises from that act. ... The same intertwining of the issue of personal involvement with the issue of personal jurisdiction that provides us with pendent appellate jurisdiction also demonstrates that the pleading of personal involvement suffices to establish personal jurisdiction, at least at this preliminary stage of the litigation.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a claim arising from an in-state tortious act committed personally or through an agent; a supervisory title alone does not establish jurisdiction.

Arar v. Ashcroft · filed 2008-06-30(a)(2)

Under New York’s long-arm statute, “a court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who ‘in person or through an agent . . . commits a tortious act within the state’ so long as the cause of action arises from that act.” Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)). ... As we recently observed, personal jurisdiction cannot be predicated solely on a defendant’s supervisory title; “[r]ather, a plaintiff must show that a defendant personally took part in the activities giving rise to the action at issue.” Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Section 302(a)(2) permits specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the cause of action arises from a tortious act allegedly committed in New York.

Mahar v. US XPRESS ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2010-02-24(a)(2)

Under the New York long-arm statute, at the time this action was instituted, specific jurisdiction existed over Morgan as a non-domiciliary because the cause of action arises from a tortious act she allegedly committed within New York State. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(3) requires specific facts showing that the defendant should have expected consequences in New York and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Mazloum v. International Commerce Corp. · filed 2011-11-07(a)(3)

In so far as it could be said that the "original event” of the tort of conversion alleged in the complaint was the deposit by Mazloum of $1.5 million into an account at an HSBC Bank in New York, Mazloum would still fail to obtain jurisdiction, as he has not alleged specific facts that Miller expected or should reasonably have expected that his actions would have consequences in New York, or that Miller derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce, both of which are necessary to obtain jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary commits a tortious act in New York; an alleged refusal in New York to return property can establish a prima facie basis for jurisdiction even if the demand was made elsewhere.

Ash v. Richards · filed 2014-07-14(a)(2)

Ash argues that the district court erred in concluding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Richards pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2), which provides for jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary where he “commits a tortious act within the state.” ... While Ash alleged that he demanded that Richards return his property over the telephone, while Richards was in Chicago, Ash’s complaint and supporting affidavit maintain that Richards initially refused to return Ash’s property while Richards was in New York. ... We find, therefore, that Ash has met his burden of making a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act while physically present in New York.

Ward v. Stewart · filed 2015-09-29(a)(2)

As relevant here, New York’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a non-domieiliary who “commits a tortious act within the state” while physically present there.

Section 302(a) covers tortious acts committed within and outside New York.

Trisvan v. Heyman · filed 2018-03-30(a)

Section 302(a) encompasses tortious acts taking place within and out of state.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a direct injury in New York; financial exposure from a New York lawsuit arising from an out-of-state injury is too remote.

Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Kuehne + Nagel, Inc. · filed 2018-07-16(a)(3)(ii)

Third-Party Defendants may have catalyzed a chain reaction that eventually reached New York, but the New York-based effects of their conduct are too "remote or consequential" to constitute a direct injury under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(2) permits specific jurisdiction when a plaintiff alleges a colorable tort committed by the defendant while physically present in New York.

Powers-Barnhard v. Butler · filed 2020-08-21(a)(2)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged, at minimum, a colorable tort of battery against Mr. Butler that occurred while Mr. Butler was physically in New York. ... Thus, Plaintiff has met her burden of establishing specific jurisdiction over Mr. Butler under section 302(a)(2).

Section 302 does not provide specific jurisdiction on tortious-act grounds when the defendants committed no tortious act in New York and caused no injury there.

Comunale v. Gemma · filed 2020-02-11(a)(2), (a)(3)

Defendants neither committed a tortious act within New York, nor did they commit a tortious act causing injury to person or property within the State.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a plaintiff feels economic consequences in New York.

Campbell v. Azrak · filed 2020-07-15(a)(3)(ii)

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to plead where Defendant allegedly committed all of the tortious acts; and even though Plaintiff may have felt the economic consequences of such acts in New York, that alone is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act outside New York that causes injury in New York, subject to the statute’s additional requirements.

Rudersdal, EOOD v. Harris · filed 2020-09-30(a)(3)

Judge Lehrburger correctly found that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the FIB Defendants pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3), but the Court declines to adopt his recommendation with respect to Rule 4(k)(2) at this time. ... Because the original event occurred in Bulgaria, not New York, there was no injury in New York, which defeats jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3). ... The Court adopts his recommendation that the court decline to exercise personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) but declines to adopt his recommendation regarding Rule 4(k)(2) at this time and reserves judgment on that issue.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

WOODSON v. FULLBEAUTY BRANDS · filed 2021-03-31(a)(1)

The New York statutory basis would be § 302(a)(1) of New York’s Civil Practice Law, which provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Section 302(a)(1) requires that “(1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.”