N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose purposeful business activity in New York is substantially related to the claim.

Cartiga, LLC v. Aquino · filed 2025-02-04(a)(1)

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds the allegations in the AC sufficient to plead that she “purposefully avail[ed]” herself of “the privilege of conducting business in New York,” thus subjecting her to personal jurisdiction under the state’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) supports personal jurisdiction when contract negotiations in New York substantially advance a business relationship and are substantially related to the claims.

GE Renewable North America, LLC v. SKF USA Inc. · filed 2025-02-07(a)(1)

Accordingly, the negotiation of the addendum in New York is substantially related to the claims against SFK. Accordingly, New York’s long-arm statute supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction over SFK.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business contacts.

Bowers v. Grupo Televisa, S.A.B. · filed 2025-02-21(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s claim does not arise out of Defendant’s contacts with New York, and Defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claims arise from those transactions.

Hakimyar v. Habib Bank Limited · filed 2025-02-25(a)(1)

Because the Complaint sufficiently alleges personal jurisdiction based on Defendant’s own purposeful availment of the New York banking system and transacting business in New York in connection with the claims, there is no need at this time to decide whether the Complaint adequately pleads other bases for personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim substantially relates to those transactions.

Maidenbaum v. Marcus · filed 2025-03-04(a)(1)

In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Defendants have purposely availed themselves of the privilege of transacting within New York and are subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state diocese when its purposeful activity in New York has a substantial relationship to the claim.

ARK 301 v. Diocese of Brooklyn · filed 2024-09-26(a)(1)

Therefore, plaintiff adequately alleges that Diocese of Burlington engaged in "purposeful activity" in New York, and that there is a "substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted" (id). ... Based on the foregoing, the motion is denied for the reasons stated by the Appellate Division in the related action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Matchroom Boxing Limited v. Paul · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

These facts are sufficient to demonstrate that Paul “transact[ed] . . . business” in New York under N.Y. C.P.L.R § 302(a)(1) and that the instant defamation claims “aris[e] from” Paul’s conduct.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful New York business contacts connected to the claim; incidental work in New York and communications with someone there do not suffice.

Paige v. Digital Business Networks Alliance, LLC · filed 2025-03-10(a)(1)

Because the Court finds that no single act on the part of each Defendant is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, “nor that the ‘totality of [each Defendants’] contacts’ establish an ‘ongoing course of conduct or relationship in the state,” it may not exercise jurisdiction over Defendants under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over nonresident directors whose business activities in New York give rise to the plaintiff’s claims.

Bloomfield v. SAS · filed 2025-03-21(a)(1)

Fulconis and Maguin transacted business in New York by serving on Sage’s board, travelling to New York for Sage business, and communicating with Pollack about Sage’s management, among other activities. ... The plaintiff’s claims arise from these transactions.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a defendant’s New York business transaction only when the claim arises from that transaction.

Schiller-Egles v. The PromptCare Companies, Inc. · filed 2025-03-25(a)(1)

“To determine whether a defendant is subject to jurisdiction under 302(a)(1), the court must decide (1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action arises from such a business transaction.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a claim has a sufficient nexus to a non-domiciliary’s New York business activity; one claim element arising from that activity can establish the nexus.

Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Blackfly Investments, LLC · filed 2025-03-26(a)(1)

As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged facts that, if credited by the trier of fact, would suffice to establish specific jurisdiction over Defendant under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business contacts; unrelated transactions do not establish specific jurisdiction.

Kee v. The Detroit Lions, Inc. · filed 2025-03-30(a)(1)

But Plaintiff has not alleged that the contributory or vicarious infringement claims against the Detroit Lions arose out of their contacts with New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim has a substantial relationship to that business.

Washington v. NETworks Presentations, LLC · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

This constitutes a substantial nexus between the Corporate Defendants’ business transactions and Plaintiff’s hair plan claims, sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat an employee’s planned move to New York and prospect of working there as proof that the employee’s supervisors transacted business in New York.

Roddey v. KPMG L.L.P. · filed 2025-04-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s intent to move to New York, coupled with the prospect of working in-person out of KPMG’s New York office in the future, does not suffice to establish that Individual Defendants transacted business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary's New York business transactions have a sufficient nexus to the asserted claim.

Huaman v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2025-04-21(a)(1)

Based on these allegations, there is sufficient nexus between United's business transactions in New York and Plaintiffs allegations of discrimination to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1)’s transacting-business requirement is not met by a remote employee’s occasional interactions with colleagues in New York.

Logan Finance Corporation v. McLaughlin · filed 2025-05-01(a)(1)

This is insufficient to establish that the totality of McLaughlin’s interaction with New York satisfies N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)’s transacting business requirement.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

White v. Santos · filed 2025-05-02(a)(1)

Based on the information Plaintiff provided in his complaint, it is likely that the state court would have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims. See Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) ("To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity"). Therefore, the Court rejects this aspect of Plaintiff's objections.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that purposefully transacts business in New York when the claim has a substantial relationship to that transaction.

Dumigan v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. · filed 2025-05-25(a)(1)

Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(l), a New York Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if the nondomiciliary has purposefully transacted business within the state and there is "a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted" (Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch, 149 AD3d 485 [1st Dept 2017] quoting Paterno v Laser Spine Ins., 24 NY3d 370,376 [2014]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that business.

Trisura Insurance Company v. Bighorn Construction and Reclamation, LLC · filed 2025-05-28(a)(1)

The Court does not have jurisdiction over either Jicarilla LLC or Repsol Development LLC under Section 302(a)(1). An evaluation of the facts of this case leads to the conclusion that neither “transacted business” in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully directs services to New York and the claim arises from those activities.

Narang v. Armour · filed 2025-06-03(a)(1)

Thus, the MOU—and Narang’s claims arising from it—stem directly from Armour’s and JK Operations’ (as a signatory of the MOU) purposeful direction of services to New York. That is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim has a substantial relationship to that transaction.

Barber v. Loreal USA, Inc. · filed 2025-06-06(a)(1)

Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(l), a New York Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if the nondomiciliary has purposefully transacted business within the state and there is "a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted" (Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch, 149 AD3d 485 [1st Dept 2017] quoting Paterno v Laser Spine Ins., 24 NY3d 370, 376 [2014]). ... This is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction at the pleading stage, especially because Luster has failed to come forward with any affirmative evidence that it did not manufacture or design the allegedly dangerous products at the time of Plaintiffs use, nor have they established that they did not distribute any products in New York at the time of Plaintiffs alleged use.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state supervisor who regularly directs allegedly discriminatory workplace conduct at an employee in New York.

Ruiz v. Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank · filed 2025-06-10(a)(1)

As multiple courts have concluded, an out-of-state or out-of-country supervisor subjects himself to the personal jurisdiction of New York courts under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) by regularly directing allegedly discriminatory workplace conduct at an employee physically present in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an employer based solely on an employee’s remote work from New York when the employer was unaware of that work location.

D'Anzieri v. HHarrison Global LLC · filed 2025-06-25(a)(1)

Without evidence that Defendants knew Plaintiff worked remotely from New York, premising personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of her work location would be akin to extending personal jurisdiction to a non-domiciliary that makes telephone calls or sends communications into New York. Those contacts are clearly, however, an insufficient basis on which to exercise jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction.

Zoey Paint Corp. v. Boston Ship Repair, LLC · filed 2025-06-25(a)(1)

Additionally, a "court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary so long as two elements are satisfied: (1) the defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in the state and (2) the claims must arise from those transactions" ( Matter of New York Asbestos Litigation , 212 AD3d 584, 586 [1st Dept 2023]). ... By this standard, defendant has further established that it is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires facts showing that the defendant purposefully transacted business in New York; widespread use of its products there does not suffice.

Lewis v. Samsung SDI America, Inc. · filed 2025-07-02(a)(1)

Here, the first prong is not met, as Plaintiff has failed to allege facts or provide any evidence that SDI transacted business within New York, let alone in a purposeful manner. ... The second allegation, that SDI’s batteries are widely used in New York, where there are over 65,000 e-bikes used by delivery workers, also fails to establish that SDI transacts business in New York in a purposeful way.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from a non-domiciliary’s business transaction in New York.

Chappell v. Bank of America , N.A. · filed 2025-07-11(a)(1)

Moreover, the allegations contain no facts meeting the second requirement of CPLR 302(a)(1): that the cause of action arises from a business transaction in the state.

Section 302(a)(1) does not count unfinished deals as an ongoing business relationship for personal jurisdiction.

Iconoclast Advisors, LLC v. GoBig Solar, LLC · filed 2025-07-17(a)(1)

Since these deals were never finished, they cannot be considered part of an “on-going relationship” for purposes of C.P.L.R. § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary purposefully targets the New York market and the claim has an articulable nexus to that business activity, even if the particular product was not sold in New York.

Salter v. Meta Platforms, Inc. · filed 2025-07-25(a)(1)

MEAN purposefully availed itself of the New York market by making representations about the effects of its lock for New York residents, and it received the benefits of that intentional connection regardless of whether the particular lock in question here was actually sold in New York ( see Aybar v US Tires & Wheels of Queens, LLC , 211 AD3d 40, 50-51 [2d Dept 2022]). In light of all the circumstances, we conclude that plaintiffs' allegations establish the requisite " 'articulable nexus' . . . or 'substantial relationship' . . . between the business transaction and the claim[s] asserted" ( Licci , 20 NY3d at 339).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Hernandez v. J & M Corona Deli Corp. · filed 2025-08-13(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not allege that Marca and Patel are domiciled in New York, but the Court has personal jurisdiction over them because they “own[ed] and operate[d]” J&M Corona Deli and, therefore, transacted business in New York, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise from their wage and hour violations during his employment with J&M Corona Deli. (Compl. ¶ 12; see also Hernandez Aff. ¶ 6.)

Section 302(a) requires a substantial relationship or articulable nexus between a claim and the defendant’s conduct in New York.

ICICI Bank Limited, New York Branch v. Doshi · filed 2025-03-31(a)

The statute also requires that the cause of action must “aris[e] from” one of the acts enumerated above. Id. The “arising from” requirement is satisfied if a plaintiff shows a “substantial relationship” or “articulable nexus” between the claim being asserted and the actions taken in the forum state. ... Therefore, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over ICICI UK’s claims against the Defaulting Defendants and those claims against them must be dismissed.

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between the defendant’s New York business transaction and the plaintiff’s claim; a sale in New York does not establish jurisdiction when no element of the claim arose there.

Zeng v. HH Fairchild Holdings, LLC · filed 2025-05-14(a)(1)

The allegation that Plaintiff is entitled to a share of all of HH LLC’s profits from the sale of PPE, which includes profits from a single sale to New York City, does not provide a basis for the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over HH LLC in New York where no element of any cause of action — no promises, no reliance, no performance, no breaches, and no damages — are alleged to have occurred in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a New York business transaction from which the claim arises; sparse, attenuated contacts do not establish jurisdiction.

Pinnacle Holding Company, LLC v. Allen · filed 2025-09-02(a)(1)

To determine jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1), a court must decide: (1) whether a defendant “transacts any business” in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action “arises from” such a business transaction. ... Thus, plaintiffs fail to make a prima facie case for jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that contracts to supply goods in New York when the claim arises from that contract.

Green Mountain Electric Supply, Inc. v. Power Manufacturing, LLC · filed 2025-09-05(a)(1)

The cause of action for the instant case is breach of the same contract, and, as such, the Court finds that Defendant transacted business within New York and is subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York, personally or through an agent.

McGuire v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield · filed 2025-09-25(a)(1)

Plaintiff made a prima facie showing that RCBS is subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), which provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who in person or through an agent transacts any business within the state.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant provides online services to a New York customer and the claim has an articulable nexus to that transaction.

Shopify Inc. v. Shopline Technology Holdings Pte. Ltd. · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

The Court finds these allegations that Shopline provided its online services to a customer in New York sufficient to show Shopline transacted business within the state. ... Likewise this demonstrates an articulable nexus between the copyright infringement claims and this transaction, since Shopify alleges the product provided to Fosterry contained the copyrighted material.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when allegations support an inference that a bank repeatedly used its New York branch for transactions connected to the alleged wrong, even without identifying specific transactions.

Moses · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

In New York, a “court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Even though the complaint does not point to specific, terrorist-linked transactions in New York, what reasonably follows from Plaintiffs’ allegations is that BNPP used its New York office several times to facilitate its interactions with Iranian customers.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transactions; a merely coincidental connection is insufficient.

GPC3 I, LLC v. Javarone · filed 2025-10-08(a)(1)

But Mr. Javarone’s conduct during those proceedings—the conduct that meets § 302(a)(1)’s first “transacting business” requirement— is “merely coincidental” to any potential misrepresentations that happen to reference those proceedings. Because GPC3’s fraudulent inducement claim does not “arise from” Mr. Javarone’s New York conduct, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Javarone with respect to that cause of action.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat mailing an already executed letter of credit to a New York beneficiary as transacting business in New York.

Hudson Insurance Company v. Regent Bank · filed 2025-10-21(a)(1)

That single mailing of an already-completed and executed letter of credit does not constitute “transacting business” in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) supports personal jurisdiction over defendants who transact business in New York.

Krens · filed 2025-10-22(a)(1)

The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Nicholas Krens, GCAM, and GCAM 2 because they are domiciled in New York, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301, and over Defendants Thomas Krens and EMRCA because they transact business in New York, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction; an online sale shipped to a New York buyer can make a prima facie showing.

Luiz C. Peck Garrido v. Xgimi Technology Incorporated · filed 2025-11-12(a)(1)

Although Defendant contests personal jurisdiction, New York’s long-arm statute only requires that a defendant transacted business in New York and the cause of action arose from the transaction. ... Since Plaintiff, who resides in Long Island, alleges that Defendant sold him the projector via its website and shipped it to him in New York, there is a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a prima facie showing that the defendant purposefully transacted business in New York to establish long-arm jurisdiction.

Ovaskainen v. Ovaskainen · filed 2025-12-09(a)(1)

In this defamation action, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of long-arm jurisdiction over defendant, as he provided no evidence that defendant purposefully transacted business within the state ( see CPLR 302[a][1]; SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v American Working Collie Assn. , 18 NY3d 400, 404 [2012]; Concotilli v Brown , 168 AD3d 426 [1st Dept 2019]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary's business contacts with New York have a sufficient nexus to the asserted claim.

Kuvshynov v. Fox News Network, LLC · filed 2025-12-29(a)(1)

During the course of the allegedly tortious activity, Hall repeatedly communicated with Fox employees in New York, provided broadcast material for New York, and was in search of broadcast material for the New York market at the time Kuvshnyova and Hall were injured by artillery shells. These facts alone are sufficient to invoke CPLR 302(a)(1) ( see Al Rushaid v Pictet & Cie , 28 NY3d 316, 323 [2016]). Moreover, Hall's alleged contacts with New York, namely taking direction from, communicating with, and sending broadcasts to New York have a sufficient nexus to the Kuvshynovs' claims since their daughter was killed while generating media content for Fox's New York executives and the New York market.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on an airline ticket purchased in New York when the claimed injury occurred during travel outside New York.

Jordan · filed 2026-01-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, personal jurisdiction does not exist under CPLR § 302(a)(1) on the basis of Jordan’s location in New York when she purchased the tickets for her and her daughter.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary purposefully conducts business in New York through a teaming agreement.

Hill · filed 2026-02-24(a)(1)

Thus, even applying the higher standard, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of showing Overwatch Defense purposefully engaged in and availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in New York when it entered the Teaming Agreement.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries whose active participation in a New York business establishes sufficient contacts with the state.

People v. Yellowstone Capital LLC · filed 2026-03-04(a)(1)

Since the petition alleges active knowledge and participation by these respondents as explained above, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1), and these contacts meet the standards as to satisfy due process.

Section 302(a)(1) requires specific factual allegations that a non-domiciliary defendant transacted business in New York; allegations about defendants as a group do not establish personal jurisdiction over each individual.

Brower · filed 2026-03-09(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not made allegations with sufficient factual specificity regarding Defendants conducting business in the State of New York, and that they have thus failed to meet their burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction would be proper under CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on incidental calls and emails with New York contacts when the defendant performs its work elsewhere.

Ardent Harmony Fund, Inc. v. BDO Trinity Ltd. · filed 2026-04-08(a)(1)

These incidental communications, undertaken by the defendant merely because the credit advisors were domiciled in New York, are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) (see Musial v Donohue, 225 AD3d 1164, 1165; Bloomgarden v Lanza, 143 AD3d at 852; CRT Invs., Ltd. v BDO Seidman, LLP, 85 AD3d 470, 471).

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between the defendant’s New York business activity and the claim; merely offering goods through an e-commerce platform available in New York does not establish that nexus.

Wang v. Laview Eagle Eye Technology Inc · filed 2025-08-14(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff’s Am. Compl. alleges only that Defendant offers goods for sale through an e-commerce platform available in New York, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead facts to support a finding of an articulable nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action sued upon.

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between a New York business transaction and the claim; a licensing agreement in New York did not establish jurisdiction over claims arising from the later diversion of funds elsewhere.

Cellura · filed 2025-09-24(a)(1)

The Court finds that this series of inferences is too attenuated to establish an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the Sports Illustrated License Agreement and the causes of action in this case.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient relationship between the claim and the defendant’s New York business transactions; strict causation is unnecessary.

O'Reilly · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

Assuming that CGML transacted business in New York, which CGML does not dispute, Plaintiff’s argument fails on the second prong. While this nexus requirement does not call for strict causation, Plaintiff’s NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and negligence claims do not bear sufficient “relatedness” to CGML’s alleged business activities in New York under Second Circuit precedent.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business activity and the claim; a New York choice-of-law provision in promissory notes executed in Georgia does not establish that relationship.

Lesavoy v. Brady · filed 2025-10-08(a)(1)

While it is undisputed that the decedent transacted business within the state, that two of the three promissory notes were to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York is insufficient to support jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) where the promissory notes were executed in Georgia ( see Shalik v Coleman , 111 AD3d 816, 818) nor is there any nexus between New York and the property sought under the fourth cause of action, which is located in Georgia.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction where defendants’ New York conduct is very limited and much of it lacks an articulable nexus to the claims.

Lash v. TDR Capital LLP · filed 2025-11-18(a)(1)

In any event, this action should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant United Kingdom entities ( see CPLR 302[a][1]; D&R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro , 29 NY3d 292, 297-299 [2017]). Defendants' in-state conduct was very limited ( see Presidential Realty Corp. v Michael Sq. W. , 44 NY2d 672, 673-674 [1978]; C-Life Group Ltd. v Generra Co. , 235 AD2d 267, 267 [1st Dept 1997]), and much of it lacked an articulable nexus to plaintiffs' claims ( see Brandt v Toraby , 273 AD2d 429, 430-431 [2d Dept 2000]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose purposeful business activity in New York gives rise to the claim; physical presence is not required.

City of New York v. Continental Vitamin Corp. · filed 1966-05-24(a)(1)

CPLR section 302(a) (1) provides that service may be made without the state upon a nonresident if he “transacts any business within the state” out of which the cause of action arises.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a non-domiciliary defendant to purposefully transact business in New York; a contract with a corporation that operates there is insufficient by itself.

Global Tech Industries Group Inc. v. Wells · filed 2022-07-21(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff has not met its burden of establishing a prima facie showing that Wells transacted any business in New York, the Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over Wells.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a person whose New York contacts arise solely from a lawsuit brought abroad against a New York resident.

Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz · filed 2008-03-03(a)(1)

The court, therefore, concluded that on the facts of this case personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained over defendant under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Plaintiff asks us to disregard the decision of New York’s highest court on a controlling jurisdictional issue that requires us to interpret and apply New York law. This we cannot do.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign litigant whose New York contacts stem entirely from a lawsuit abroad and its effects on a New York resident.

Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz · filed 2008-03-03(a)(1)

This Court affirmed the district court’s decision as to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) and jurisdictional discovery, and certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question whether N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) confers personal jurisdiction over defendant. ... The Court of Appeals having answered that question in the negative, the decision of the district court is now affirmed in its entirety.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; transfers involving a New York bank account and related communications alone do not establish jurisdiction.

Timothy Coffey Nursey Landscape, Inc. v. Soave · filed 2019-01-23(a)(1)

There was no basis for personal jurisdiction under New York CPLR § 302(a)(1) because defendants did not transact any business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s business relationship with a New York entity gives rise to the claims.

Skatteforvaltningen v. The Goldstein Law Group PC 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan · filed 2020-12-02(a)(1)

For the same reason, personal jurisdiction over Acer is authorized by the Pennsylvania and New York long arm statutes. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b) (authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party who “transacts any business within the state”).

An airline transacts business in New York under § 302(a)(1) by flying out of JFK or selling tickets for flights departing there.

Kim v. Korean Air lines · filed 2021-01-14(a)(1)

On the first prong, Korean Air flies out of JFK, and Delta sells tickets for flights out of JFK, so they “transacted business within” New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that transaction for specific jurisdiction.

Miller v. Mercuria Energy Trading, Inc. · filed 2018-03-05(a)(1)

To determine whether it has specific jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1), "a court must decide (1) whether the defendant 'transacts any business' in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action 'aris[es] from' such a business transaction."

Section 302(a)(1)'s transaction-of-business requirement can be satisfied by a foreign bank's New York branches, use of New York correspondent or settlement accounts, and advertising in the state.

Nike, Inc. v. Wu · filed 2018-09-25(a)(1)

Given all of the Banks' physical bank branches in New York, their use of New York-based correspondent accounts and/or settlement accounts, and their advertisement of their services in the forum, this Court finds that the Assignee has adequately shown that all of the Banks have transacted business in the state, under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary's New York business activities are substantially related to the claim, even without a causal link.

Clean Coal Techs., Inc. v. Leidos, Inc. · filed 2019-03-28(a)(1)

While the allegations do not demonstrate that Dr. Paul's allegedly tortious activities were caused by the New York transaction, they are hardly "unmoored" from it. ... While the Court finds personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), it briefly examines and rejects the remaining arguments for jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires specific allegations about an in-state agent’s business activities to support personal jurisdiction through an agency theory.

Bailey v. Recreational Equipment, Inc. · filed 2023-09-23(a)(1)

Here, Bailey does not name any particular in-state agent upon whose actions he relies, let alone specify what in-state business they transacted. It should go without saying that under those circumstances, he has not adequately pleaded an agency theory.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when their agent commits acts in New York in furtherance of a conspiracy.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Inoue · filed 1985-06-25(a)(2)

Pursuant to the conspiracy between Christakis and Inoue, Christakis was the defendants’ “agent” in New York, and in that context the acts performed by Christakis confer jurisdiction over the Japanese defendants within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (2).

Section 302(a)(1) permits a family member’s New York activities to support personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the family member acts with the nondomiciliary’s consent and for their benefit.

Reiner v. Durand · filed 1985-02-21(a)(1)

This inquiry does not focus narrowly on where the agreements were executed; instead, since Mrs. Molles can be considered as the agent of her brother and sister within the meaning of § 302(a), her activities in New York can be considered.

Section 302(a)(1) requires some measure of control over a person whose New York acts are attributed to a non-domiciliary as an agent.

Pasame Realty Corp. v. Ridge Village Partnership · filed 1983-07-27(a)(1)

Because Baker did not act as an “agent” of the defendants within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1), there is no basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them and the motion to dismiss must be granted.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when an agent purposefully conducts business in New York for the principal or commits a tortious act there on the principal’s behalf.

Abbate v. Abbate · filed 1981-07-27(a)(1), (a)(2)

Defendant purposefully directed McMahon to travel from Pennsylvania to New York and persuade plaintiff to accept his terms. This is the clearest sort of a case of transaction of business. ... Although any fraudulent intent on defendant’s part had to have been conceived in his home State of North Carolina, it is our view that the locus delicti is the place of misrepresentation and not the place where the fraudulent intent was formulated. Accordingly, we hold defendant is also subject to the in personam jurisdiction of our courts for committing a tortious act in this State through the misrepresentations of his agent McMahon.

Section 302(a)(1) does not attribute earlier New York negotiations to a nondomiciliary who later joins the transaction if the negotiator was not the nondomiciliary’s agent when the negotiations occurred.

Plaza Realty Investors v. Bailey · filed 1979-12-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s contention that Bailey, Jr. adopted and ratified Freed’s negotiations in New York when he joined in the deal on December 30 cannot be upheld. Plaintiff has not cited and this Court has not found any decisions in which the New York courts have attributed to a nonresident defendant the activities of an individual in New York who was not the nonresident defendant’s agent at the time that the New York-based activities were engaged in.

Section 302 requires an out-of-state principal to dominate and control an in-state agent before the agent’s acts can subject the principal to New York jurisdiction.

Faim Information Services, Inc. v. Borchert · filed 1975-06-04(a)(1), (a)(2)

As stated in the first opinion, at 94,580-81, the rule in New York is that an out-of-state principal must exercise “domination and control” over the in-state agent in order for the principal to be subject to the jurisdiction of New York courts. ... Moreover, each one of the Cleveland Group, as well as Borchert, affirms that no agency relationship existed between the members of the board and Borchert. Since the facts involved in the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are identical with the facts presented by the Sibley motion in Faim I, the motion to dismiss the complaint against Doerge, Herzog, Gilligan and Saunders is granted.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based on his acts and directions to parties in New York.

In re the Estate of Rothko · filed 1975-12-18(a)

While it may be true that Lloyd is a nonresident of New York, the court is of the opinion that he has submitted himself to this court’s jurisdiction by virtue of his acts and directions to the respondent Marlboroughs in this jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not let an agent establish personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary principal based solely on the agent’s own New York activities.

Traub v. Robertson-American Corp. · filed 1975-05-22(a)(1)

If he is concededly an "agent,” a recent pair of Court of Appeals cases indicates he cannot rely anyway simply on his own activities to supply jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par [1]).

Section 302(a)(1) attributes a representative’s New York activities to a nonresident when the representative acts at the nonresident’s request and for its business purposes; a formal agency relationship is unnecessary.

Arcata Graphics Corp. v. Murrays Jewelers & Distributors, Inc. · filed 1974-11-05(a)(1)

However, the acts of MAI in representing Murrays in New York must be attributed to Murrays. It is not necessary that there was a formal agency relationship between Murrays and MAI. It is enough if MAI acted at the request of and for the business purposes of Murrays.

Section 302(a)(1) and (2) do not attribute New York agents’ acts to out-of-state officers merely because they serve the same principal.

Marsh v. William A. Kitchen and Ray T. Zakovich, and United States of America · filed 1973-06-18(a)(1) and (2)

We hold that appellees did not transact business, nor did they commit tortious acts, in New York in person or though their agents within the meaning of Section 302(a)(1) or (2).

Section 302 permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who directs a New York broker to sell mistakenly credited securities with intent to defraud; operating the New York account also constitutes transacting business without physical presence in the State.

Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Chelednik · filed 1971-09-20(a)(1), (a)(2)

CPLR 302 authorizes the courts of this State to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if he commits a tortious act within the State (other than defamation of character). The allegations in the complaint that defendant knowingly permitted the securities to remain in his account without notifying plaintiff, and, with the intent to defraud plaintiff, instructed plaintiff to sell the securities for defendant’s account, are sufficient to bring defendant within the ambit of1 this provision. Furthermore, operation of the account in New York constituted the transaction of business in New York. One need not be physically present in New York to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts under CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when a claim arises from a contract negotiated and concluded in New York through the nondomiciliary’s agents.

Karlin v. Avis · filed 1971-05-20(a)(1)

Since no affidavit submitted by the defendants disputes the crucial facts that a brokerage agreement was concluded in New York between Karlin and McNiece and Ault, acting as agents for Warren Avis, the case falls squarely within § 302(a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful New York business activity is connected to the claim, even without physical presence in the state.

AVIATION SALES CORPORATION v. Canada ITW Limited · filed 1972-08-07(a)(1)

To be subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a) (1), a nondomiciliary defendant need not be physically present in the state.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York through an agent.

Med-Span Shipping Services, Ltd. v. Jerry Jones MacK, Inc. · filed 1978-01-10(a)(1)

We, therefore, find that Mack “transacted]” business through an agent within the state and is subject to our in personam jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not impute a New York agent’s in-state activities to a non-domiciliary principal when the agent sues the principal for payment for those activities.

Loria & Weinhaus, Inc. v. H. R. Kaminsky & Sons, Inc. · filed 1978-12-06(a)(1)

When a New York agent sues a non-domiciliary principal seeking to be paid for services rendered in New York, the agent’s in-state activities will not be imputed to the non-domiciliary even if a proper agency relationship is involved.

Section 302(a)(1)'s transacting business requirement is not met by toll-free calls to New York to place orders or discuss delivery delays.

Standard Enterprises, Inc. v. Bag-It, Inc. · filed 1987-10-14(a)(1)

Here, the 800 number toll-free calls, whether to place orders as Standard suggests, or to discuss delivery delays on orders placed by Bag-it with Pine Associates, as Bag-it alleges, cannot support a finding of transacting business sufficient to satisfy N.Y.C.P. L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s agent attends a New York meeting that creates the contract underlying the claim, even if that is the agent’s only meeting in the state.

Pennie & Edmonds v. Austad Co. · filed 1988-03-15(a)(1)

The single meeting in New York is sufficient under these circumstances, where defendant knew the purpose of the meeting, to allow the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, because the contract between the parties was created at that meeting. ... This court may statutorily exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from a business transaction in the state; advertising solicitation alone does not establish that transaction.

Rocket Jewelry Box, Inc. v. Noble Gift Packaging, Inc. · filed 1994-07-06(a)(1)

Further, while Noble has directed into the Southern District catalogs advertising the “Paris line,” this solicitation does not amount to a transaction from which Rocket’s claim may arise. Without proof of at least one “Paris line” transaction in the Southern District, I cannot hold that Noble’s acts substantially related to or gave rise to Rocket’s asserted claim of patent infringement. Consequently, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) over Noble.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat a principal’s collect telephone calls to a New York agent as the principal’s independent business activity in New York.

Helfer Commodities Corp. v. Pellegrino · filed 1975-03-07(a)(1)

Collect telephone calls into New York to the agent are not regarded as “defendant’s independent activities” within this state, for jurisdictional purposes.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident when an agent conducts business in New York for the nonresident’s benefit and with the nonresident’s consent, and the suit arises from those activities.

Citicorp International Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Refining Co. · filed 1989-03-16(a)(1)

In addition, as long as Karin’s agent Robert was within New York State for her benefit and with her consent, there is jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). ... Thus Robert acted as Karin’s agent, and this court has jurisdiction over Karin pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a) permits jurisdiction based on a nondomiciliary’s agent’s New York conduct when the agent acted for the nondomiciliary’s benefit, with their knowledge and consent, and under some control by them.

Deem v. Lockheed Corp. · filed 1989-10-06(a)

Section 302(a) expressly provides that a nondomiciliary may commit a tortious act in New York “through an agent.” In order to establish agency for the purpose of § 302(a) plaintiff must prove “that the alleged agent acted in New York for the benefit of, with the knowledge and consent of, and under some control by, the nonresident principal.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York through an agent and the claim arises from those transactions.

Pdk Labs, Inc., Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee v. Mitchell K. Friedlander, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant · filed 1997-01-09(a)(1)

This persistent campaign by Friedlander’s New York agent to secure PDK’s investment constitutes business transacted in New York under CPLR § 302(a)(1). ... PDK’s cause of action, which seeks a declaration that Friedlander lacks standing to bring false advertising claims against PDK, arises out of Friedlander’s unique business transactions in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires proof that a purported New York agent acted for the nonresident defendant’s benefit and with its knowledge and consent.

Yurman Designs, Inc. v. A.R. Morris Jewelers, L.L.C. · filed 1999-03-04(a)(1)

Yurman has not established that Earl acted in New York for the benefit of, and with the knowledge and consent of Morris. ... Accordingly, Earl cannot be held to be an agent of Morris under 302(a)(1), and thus is not subject to jurisdiction under New York law.

A single business transaction in New York can support personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) when the claim has a sufficient nexus to that transaction.

Correspondent Services Corp. v. J.V.W. Investments Ltd. · filed 2000-11-30(a)(1)

A plaintiff asserting jurisdiction under § 302(a) need not show regular or continuous activity in the state; even a single action within New York is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 302(a) if it has a sufficient nexus with the cause of action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits a New York business meeting conducted by an agent to be imputed to a nonresident when assessing personal jurisdiction.

Cooper, Robertson & Partners, LLP v. Vail · filed 2001-05-14(a)(1)

Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it is reasonable to assume that Vail Jr. and Mrs. Vail acted as Vail Sr.’s “agents.” The meeting, therefore, may be imputed to him.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when agents transact business in New York on its behalf and the claim arises from those activities.

National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. BP Amoco P.L.C. · filed 2004-01-30(a)(1)

BP’s and Aon’s activities suffice to subject them, and those for whom they acted as agents, to the personal jurisdiction of a New York court on a cause of action that arises out of those activities.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when an interactive website lets New York residents enroll, pay fees, and obtain course materials, establishing a prima facie showing that the defendant transacts business in the state.

Excelsior College v. Frye · filed 2004-02-12(a)(1)

It permits students to log in to their personal account and conduct transactions relating to that account including enrollment, payment of fees, and obtaining course materials. These facts constitute a prima facie showing that defendants transact business within the state.

Faxes and solicitation of business, without more, do not constitute transacting business in New York under § 302(a)(1).

Bay Fireworks, Inc. v. Frenkel & Co., Inc. · filed 2005-03-05(a)(1)

Even if these faxes were from UDD to businesses located in New York, it is well-settled that faxes and the solicitation of business without more cannot constitute “transacting business within the statute.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on an agent’s New York business transactions when the agent acts for the defendant’s benefit, with its knowledge and consent and under some control, and the transactions relate to the claim.

Oriska Insurance v. Power P.E.O., Inc. · filed 2004-12-08(a)(1)

Power acted as the defendants’ agent in establishing contacts with New York and such contact is attributable to the defendants. Therefore, personal jurisdiction over the defendants is conferred pursuant to New York’s long arm statute, C.P.L.R. § -302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a non-domiciliary’s relationship with agents or co-conspirators acting in New York when the plaintiff establishes that relationship under the applicable jurisdictional burden.

Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc. · filed 2008-03-27(a)(1)

I have also concluded, in the alternative, that Maersk has shown that it is more likely than not that Mohinder is an agent or co-conspirator under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), thus satisfying the post-discovery 12(b)(2) standard for surviving a motion to dismiss. Because the New York long-arm statute applies, and exercising jurisdiction comports with Due Process, Mohinder is subject to the jurisdiction of this court independently of the Maersk shipping contracts.

Section 302 requires a legal basis to attribute one defendant’s contacts to another; an allegation that the defendants form an integrated enterprise does not suffice.

Tese-Milner v. De Beers Centenary A.G. · filed 2009-01-23

Plaintiff fails to show that there is a legal basis for attributing the contacts of Non-Moving Defendants to Moving Defendants under three of its four legal theories, § 302, Rule 4(k)(2), and § 12 of the Clayton Act. Plaintiff instead justifies attributing Non-Moving Defendants’ contacts to Moving Defendants solely by relying on the allegation that De Beers is an integrated enterprise. As already noted, the Court has not encountered, and Plaintiff does not offer, any legal support for the contention that “integrated enterprise” has any legal meaning for the purposes of the relevant personal jurisdiction law.

Section 302(a) permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident through an agent who acts in New York for the nonresident's benefit, with knowledge and consent, and subject to the nonresident's control.

RSM PRODUCTION CORP. v. Fridman · filed 2009-02-19(a)

In order “[t]o be considered an agent for jurisdictional purposes, the putative agent must have acted in the state ‘for the benefit of, and with the knowledge and consent of the non-resident principal.” ... In addition, Plaintiffs must allege that the alleged principal “exercised some control over the activities of the alleged agent.”

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that transaction; an alleged agent’s New York activity cannot establish jurisdiction without facts showing the principal’s knowledge, authorization, and control.

Newman v. Capitol Life Insurance · filed 2014-09-15(a)(1)

To determine the existence of jurisdiction under this subsection, the Court must decide “(1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such a business transaction.” ... In short, Newman has failed to make a prima facie showing that this Court has jurisdiction over Capitol Life under either the CPLR or the New York Insurance Law.

Section 302(a)(1) treats a foreign parent as transacting business in New York through a subsidiary whose purposeful activities benefit the parent and occur with its knowledge and direction.

Ingenito v. Riri USA, Inc. · filed 2015-03-03(a)(1)

Riri USA’s sales and distribution in New York are for the benefit of Riri SA, and are done with the ongoing knowledge of, and at least to some extent at the direction of, Riri SA. ... The Court finds that Riri SA has engaged in sufficient purposeful activity in the state to conclude that it has “transacted business” for the purposes of section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose agent transacts business in New York when the claims arise from those transactions.

Rainbow Apparel Distribution Center Corp. v. Gaze U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2013-10-30(a)(1)

Plaintiffs have successfully established a prima facie case that jurisdiction over Hong is proper under CPLR 302(a), on an agency theory, and Due Process concerns are met.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York through agents and the claims arise from that business.

Hecklerco, LLC v. YuuZoo Corp. · filed 2017-05-11(a)(1)

Although it is a close question, construing these documents in the light most favorable to. the plaintiffs, and resolving all doubt, in their favor, as the Court must, Plaintiffs have met their burden to establish that YuuZoo, by using YZ and the WF defendants to sell YuuZoo shares to Plaintiffs in New York, conducted business in New York, and that Plaintiffs’ claims arise from that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York through an agent when the claim arises from that business.

In re Welspun Litigation · filed 2019-05-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, plaintiffs have produced evidence that, if credited, would establish personal jurisdiction over the New York plaintiffs’ claims against WIL under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a New York resident can access a website that does not sell goods or services to New York residents.

Diaz v. The Kroger Co. · filed 2019-06-04(a)(1)

In consequence, the fact that Plaintiff can access the Website in the Bronx, standing alone, does not amount to Defendant’s transacting business in the state for purposes of New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state buyer whose repeated orders create a continuing business relationship with a New York seller when the claim arises from those transactions.

Roxx Allison Ltd. v. Jewelers Inc. · filed 2019-07-10(a)(1)

Here, regardless of who first approached whom, defendant purposefully and voluntarily maintained a years-long relationship with plaintiff, during which time defendant placed many orders for jewelry worth a great sum of money. Accordingly, The Jewelers transacted business within New York within the meaning of C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). There is no serious dispute that the instant suit "aris[es] from" that transaction of business. The Court therefore finds that personal jurisdiction is proper under New York's long-arm statute.

The same agency analysis applies under § 302(a)(1) and § 302(a)(3).

Wolo Mfg. Corp. v. ABC Corp. · filed 2018-11-07(a)(1), (a)(3)

The agency analysis is the same under both Section 302(a)(1) and Section 302(a)(3) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when its agents transact business in New York on its behalf and the claims arise from that activity.

Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC · filed 2019-09-16(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that, at the pleading stage, Plaintiffs have met their burden to establish specific jurisdiction over Bank Saderat for claims arising from the alleged conspiracy in this action under New York CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) treats regular sales to New York customers through Amazon as transacting business in the state.

Carson Optical, Inc. v. RQ Innovasion Inc. · filed 2020-03-30(a)(1)

Here, RQ’s regular use of Amazon to sell its magnifying products throughout the United States, including New York, constitutes transacting business under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over sellers who use highly interactive websites to sell the products at issue to New York customers.

Smart Study Co., Ltd. v. A Pleasant trip Store · filed 2020-05-07(a)(1)

Because all Defendants operate such a “highly interactive website” as a means to sell their products into New York, and because those websites are accessible in this state, personal jurisdiction over Defendants is appropriate.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction through an agent’s New York activities when the defendant benefits from and knows of those activities and exercises some control over the agent.

Pascarella v. Sandals Resorts International · filed 2020-03-04(a)(1)

CPLR § 302 covers a defendant’s conduct “in person or through an agent.” ... “To establish that the out-of-state defendant acted through an agent” for purposes of personal jurisdiction, “Plaintiffs do not need to establish a formal agency relationship between the defendant and his agent,” but do need to “convince the court that the agent engaged in purposeful activities in this State in relation to plaintiffs’ transaction for the benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of the defendants and that they exercised some control over the agent in the matter.” ... Plaintiffs have not adduced any facts showing that SRI or SRB exercised control over TI with respect to Plaintiffs’ trip.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state seller whose interactive website sells goods to New York customers when the claim arises from an attempted purchase through that website.

Quezada v. U.S. Wings, Inc. · filed 2021-12-07(a)(1)

U.S. Wings’ website is interactive, as it allows for the purchase and exchange of goods, including to New York, and therefore confers personal jurisdiction. ... As for the second prong of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, this cause of action arises from such a business transaction since Quezada alleges he attempted to access U.S. Wing’s website to make a purchase. ... Therefore, U.S. Wings is within the reach of New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claims arise from those transactions.

King v. Habib Bank Limited · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

The CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdictional inquiry is twofold: under the first prong the defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in the state, and under the second prong, the claims must arise from the transactions.

Section 302(a)(2) requires a plaintiff seeking jurisdiction based on an alleged agent’s tortious acts in New York to prove the agency relationship; an unsupported assertion does not suffice.

Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Company · filed 1966-02-07(a)(2)

On the contrary, plaintiff cannot by a “bland assertion” that those Koppers employees were the agents of the individual defendants confer personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants upon this court, even if it is assumed arguendo that those employees committed tortious acts of some sort within New York. The burden of pleading and proving jurisdiction is upon the party asserting its existence.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary's estate when the decedent purposefully transacted business in New York through personal agents.

United States v. The Montreal Trust Company, and Tillie v. Lechtzier, Executors of the Estateof Isidor J. Klein, Decease · filed 1966-04-25(a)(1)

In deciding, under New York law, the substantiality of contacts with this state for purposes of 302, we must be satisfied, before that section is properly invoked, that a non-domiciliary over whom jurisdiction is sought, purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965). We are satisfied here, that Klein, through the activities conducted by his agents in New York, transacted sufficient business in this state to justify the government's service of process upon his estate pursuant to the provisions of New York's 'long-arm' statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a corporation’s officer makes sufficiently extensive and purposeful visits to New York to negotiate the contract at issue.

Liquid Carriers Corporation v. American Marine Corporation · filed 1967-02-28(a)(1)

The activities of American Marine’s vice president within the state were sufficiently extensive and purposeful to constitute a transaction of business by American Marine under CPLR Section 302(a) 1 and to subject American Marine to the jurisdiction of the New York courts.

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign seller through an independent distributor merely because the distributor files required price schedules in New York.

Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co. · filed 1966-04-05

Quite clearly Penrose was not defendant’s agent. It bought goods from defendant which it then sold to others, including plaintiff, at an advanced price. No clearer instance of an independent contractor can be imagined. The mere fact that Penrose performed the ministerial act of filing schedules does not constitute Penrose an agent except for the purpose of so doing. As this act is in itself not doing business, this limited agency is meaningless on the issue of defendant’s presence here.

Section 302 permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary through an in-state agent, including an agency established by estoppel, even if the nondomiciliary never entered New York.

Lodge v. Western New York Dance Studios, Inc. · filed 1967-05-19

While Fred Astaire has not physically come into the State, he has projected himself into the State. It is well settled that an agency may arise by estoppel when a person represents that another is acting on his behalf. ... While the ultimate responsibility for the acts allegedly committed by the defendants must await a trial, I hold that Fred Astaire is subject under CPLR 302 to the jurisdiction of the State of New York, and should be required to defend the action brought against him in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a subsidiary for claims arising from New York business transacted through its parent corporation.

Gonzales v. Ametek, Inc. · filed 1966-04-22(a)(1)

“ I also find, in response to the issue delineated in the order of reference, that movant transacted business in this State, within the meaning of paragraph 1 of subdivision (a) of CPLR 302 from which the two causes of action arose, through the activities of its sole customer, its parent corporation, which eoncededly did business here. ... The findings, views and recommendations hereinbefore set forth are adopted by the court and confirmed in all respects.

Section 302(a)(1) does not provide jurisdiction over a defendant based on New York business conducted by a company that is not its agent.

Kirkland v. Sapphire International Touring, Ltd. · filed 1966-11-17(a)(1)

As to the first question, it follows from my conclusion that FIT was not Sapphire’s agent, that Sapphire was not transacting business in New York through FIT. The acts of FIT were its own acts, not Sapphire’s, and hence they afford no basis for jurisdiction over Sapphire.

Under CPLR 302(a)(1), shipping goods to an intermediary on consignment does not necessarily rule out that intermediary’s agency in transacting business in New York.

Crossley Glove Co. v. Wakefield Leathers, lnc. · filed 1968-05-21(a)(1)

The only question, then, is whether or not Corwin was, in fact, Wakefield’s agent in negotiating and executing the contract, to the extent that it was executed. In this connection, the strongest statement as to Corwin’s status made in the moving affidavit is that the goods were shipped to Corwin on consignment; and that somewhat conelusory statement is factually unsupported, but if true does not necessarily dispose of the question of agency.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York through an agent whose activities the nondomiciliary controls.

Hodom v. Stearns · filed 1969-06-27(a)(1)

Upon all the proof the conclusion is irresistible that defendant retained such domination and control over the activities of Hodom as to justify a finding that Stearns was transacting business in this State through Hodom and was deriving monetary gain therefrom.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary client when his attorneys purposefully retain New York counsel and pursue a judgment there for his benefit.

Elman v. Belson · filed 1969-07-25(a)(1)

It does not appear unfair to us, within the confines of the statute (CPLR 302, subd. [a]), to require the defendant to respond in New York to the plaintiffs for services resulting in a judgment on his behalf rendered in New York.

Section 302 permits suit against an airline in Nassau County when it authorizes a local travel agency to promote and sell its passenger transportation there.

Gordon v. Braniff Airways, Inc. · filed 1967-11-09

The defendant’s contention that it was not doing business in Nassau County, although it admittedly authorized the above-identified travel agency to represent it in the respects herein-above indicated, as appears from the photostat of defendant’s certificate of appointment attached to the affidavit submitted in opposition, is both incongruous and untenable. The court holds that the suit is maintainable here in Nassau County under the long-arm statute (CPLR 302), and the motion to dismiss the complaint is accordingly denied.

Section 302(a)(1) does not require an exclusive agency when a third party relies on New York acts that a foreign principal requested for its benefit.

Orient Mid-East Lines, Inc. v. Albert E. Bowen, Inc. · filed 1969-02-24(a)(1)

I believe that the law does not require an exclusive agency in this situation, but merely that the principal request purposeful acts by a person in New York for the benefit of the foreign corporate defendant.

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a corporation based on its mail order business and sales to businesses that resell to individuals when those activities are not systematic and continuous.

Boltons Trading Corporation v. Killiam · filed 1970-12-21

The Court finds that Eastin-Phelan’s mail order business and its sale of films to businesses which then deal with individuals do not constitute a systematic and continuous activity which would subject it to the jurisdiction of this court under the copyright statute or under § 302 of the CPLR.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York through an agent engaged in purposeful activity there.

Stark v. Spitz · filed 1972-03-20(a)(1)

Under these circumstances, defendant, through Conforti, engaged in purposeful activity and transacted business within this State so as to subject himself to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of this State within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) (Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26 N Y 2d 13; Hodom v. Stearns, 32 A D 2d 234).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York through agents negotiating on its behalf.

Haar v. Armendaris Corp. · filed 1972-11-02(a)(1)

Defendant, therefore, through plaintiff and his associate as its agents, transacted business within this State within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York through a true agent when the claim arises from that business.

Mattgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Aaron · filed 1974-04-15(a)(1)

Under Section 302(a), a nondomiciliary may transact business in the state “through an agent.” And if the non-domiciliary actually transacts business through an agent in New York though he is himself not present, there may be jurisdiction. ... Here a true agency appears to have been created by the defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on an agent’s purposeful business activity in New York even when the nondomiciliary defendant was not physically present there.

Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller · filed 1974-10-16(a)(1)

The non-domiciliary defendant need not have been physically present in New York to have transacted business for purposes of CPLR § 302(a)(1); it is sufficient if the defendant’s agent is present and engages in purposeful activity on his behalf. ... From all of the foregoing, defendant Rose Heller’s affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction lacks merit.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary purposefully enters New York to form the contractual relationship underlying the suit, even if the work is later performed elsewhere.

George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz · filed 1975-07-24(a)(1)

In opposition plaintiff denies none of the foregoing, but insists that defendant’s entry into an employment relationship within this State fulfilled the "transacts any business” clause of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1). Under the circumstances presented in this case, we agree. ... Viewing defendant’s activities in their entirety, it is obvious that he initiated contact with plaintiff; voluntarily entered this State with the evident desire to become one of its sales representatives; and, thereafter, accepted the very contractual obligations upon which he is now being sued.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant negotiates in New York and an agent signs the agreement giving rise to the suit there.

Potash v. Ringer · filed 1977-01-25(a)(1)

In this case the defendant was allegedly present at least once in New York negotiating the sale price of the stock, and further the defendant’s agent, Gary Berger, signed the agreement that is the source of this controversy in New York. Therefore, on the basis of the facts alleged by the plaintiff we find that this Court has jurisdiction over the defendant and so his motion for dismissal is denied.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when business transacted in New York by a nondomiciliary or its representative gives rise to the claim.

East New York Savings Bank v. Republic Realty Mortgage Corp. · filed 1978-03-13(a)(1)

The cause of action arose out of those activities. Hence, New York has personal jurisdiction over the defendant (see CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) makes the nature and purpose of a nonresident’s New York visits decisive; occasional visits unrelated to forming or continuing the disputed contract do not establish jurisdiction.

Pneuma-Flo Systems, Inc. v. Universal MacHinery Corp. · filed 1978-07-28(a)(1)

It is not the number of such incursions, or their duration, however, which is dispositive; rather, it is their nature and quality. Thus, in each of the cases where jurisdiction over a non-resident has been upheld due to the visits of its officials, those meetings were for purposes essential to the formation or continuance of the contract which has given rise to the litigation. ... Consequently, Universal has not subjected itself to this Court’s power by virtue of the occasional visits paid plaintiff by its various corporate officers.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident guarantor based solely on a promise to pay an obligation in New York.

Export Credit Corp. v. Diesel Auto Parts Corp. · filed 1980-10-24(a)(1)

The issue, then, is whether a nonresident guarantor’s promise to pay an obligation in New York, without more, suffices to confer longarm jurisdiction on that guarantor. The Courts of New York have decided that this lone contact is not enough. ... Thus, personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants fails under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1)’s transacting business requirement can be satisfied by substantial New York transactions conducted through a defendant’s agents.

FSI Group v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1980-11-24(a)(1)

It is clearly established from the sum and quality of transactions that defendant’s contacts within the state exceed the necessary “minimum” and satisfy the “transacting business” requirement of CPLR § 302(a)(1). Where a third party complaint against a foreign principal arises out of the acts of his “agent” in New York, those acts will suffice for the jurisdictional requirement of “purposeful activity.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York through an agent and the claim arises from that business; agency depends on the realities of the relationship.

Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd. · filed 1981-02-12(a)(1)

Quite aside from our findings with respect to CPLR 301, Hattori transacts business in New York. The cause of action arises out of the actions of the New York subsidiaries in New York on behalf of Hat-tori. ... Here, as in the case of CPLR 301, courts look to the realities rather than the formalities of agency to decide whether business has been transacted through an agent.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York through an agent and that business is reasonably related to the plaintiff’s claim.

McLoughlin v. Commercial Airways (Pty) Ltd. · filed 1985-01-24(a)(1)

Moreover, it is even clearer that COMAIR transacted business within this State through its agent, SAA New York, within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1); ... and that such business “was reasonably related” to plaintiffs’ cause of action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary negotiates business in New York through an agent and the claim arises from those negotiations.

Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd. · filed 1985-02-07(a)(1)

I find that JWS Ltd. transacted business in New York by negotiating with Polk through its agent, JWS Inc., and that this lawsuit arises out of those negotiations.

Joint control of a business enterprise, as in a partnership or joint venture, can satisfy the control element of agency for long-arm jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Cutco Industries, Inc. v. Naughton · filed 1986-11-26(a)(1)

Consistent with those well-settled principles, we hold that where there is joint control of a business enterprise — similar to that existing in a partnership or joint venture— enough control has been shown to establish prima facie this particular element of agency to satisfy long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Future Ways, Inc. v. Odiorne · filed 1988-11-01(a)(1)

New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a)(1), gives the Court personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who “transacts business within the state.” ... Therefore, defendant has not “transacted business” in New York and jurisdiction cannot be based on CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York through an agent and that business is sufficiently related to the plaintiff’s claims.

Holmes v. First Meridian Planning Corp. · filed 1989-11-16(a)(1)

In our view, Supreme Court correctly found that New York courts have long-arm jurisdiction over AMC pursuant to CPLR 302. ... We conclude, first, that AMC transacted business in this State when, through First Meridian, it made loans to plaintiffs for their Florida condominiums.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York, including through substantial activity by an agent in the state.

Gazis v. John S. Latsis (USA) Inc. · filed 1990-01-30(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when it transacts business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state. The activity of an agent of a party within the state, if substantial, will justify personal jurisdiction over that party.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer jurisdiction over a corporation based on an officer’s acts when the officer acted for another corporation.

Lawford v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1990-06-18(a)(2)

Plaintiff provides no evidence that Harvey ever acted in his capacity as a NYLCAN officer when dealing with plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff has not shown that jurisdiction would be proper under CPLR 301 or 302(a)(2), and thus service cannot be accomplished under N.Y. Bus. Corp. law § 307.

Under CPLR 302(a)(1), a choice of law clause alone does not establish personal jurisdiction, and the defendant’s New York business contacts must relate to the claim.

Peter Lisec Glastechnische Industrie GmbH v. Lenhardt Maschinenbau GmbH · filed 1991-12-31(a)(1)

While, based upon the facts of a particular case, a choice of law clause might be considered relevant in determining whether a non-domiciliary transacted business in this State (see, e.g, Cutco Indus. v Naughton, 806 F2d 361, 367), absent more, it is insufficient to warrant a finding of long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1). ... Thus, even if there were more factual support for the alleged contacts of defendants with New York, absent a showing that such contacts were related to plaintiffs’ present claim of breach of the settlement agreement, no finding of personal jurisdiction would be warranted.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in New York by a foreign defendant’s agent when the suit relates to that business.

Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Application Art Laboratories Co. · filed 1992-01-14(a)(1)

I hold that this court has personal juris-dicción over Application Art in this suit by virtue of the transaction of business by Application-Art’s agent in this state pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1).

For long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302, a representative’s New York activities are attributed to a non-domiciliary that requested and benefited from them.

Kappas v. T.W. Kutter, Inc. · filed 1993-04-15(a)(3)(i)

The activities of a representative of a non-domiciliary in New York will be attributed to the non-domiciliary for the purpose of long-arm jurisdiction if the non-domiciliary requested the performance of those activities in New York and benefitted therefrom (Cato Show Print. Co. v Lee, 84 AD2d 947, 949).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant plays a crucial role in a transaction beyond minor acts such as buying stock and signing a guaranty.

Plotch v. Sheibar · filed 1994-02-24(a)(1)

Jurisdiction over defendant Plotch exists under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Home Box Off. v Baum, 172 AD2d 222). While the State has no real interest in only minor transactions (see, Money-Line, Inc. v Cunningham, 80 AD2d 60, 64), here, defendant Plotch did not merely buy stock in the corporation that would hold the motel and sign a personal guaranty, but played a crucial role in facilitating defendants Sheibars’ acquisition of the motel by ensuring that the couple would face no personal financial risk.

Section 302(a)(1) treats union officers’ purposeful efforts in New York to collect dues and hold an evidentiary hearing as transacting business.

Madden v. INTERN. ASS'N OF HEAT & FROST INSULATORS · filed 1995-04-19(a)(1)

Clearly, the individual Defendants' attempts to collect dues and their holding of an evidentiary hearing to enforce their management policies is "purposeful activity" in the State of New York under the "transacts any business" test of § 302.

Section 302(a)(1)’s “transacts any business” requirement includes activity that is not profit-seeking.

Madden v. International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers · filed 1995-04-19(a)(1)

Courts, however, have consistently construed the term “business,” in the context of New York’s long-arm statute, to encompass more than profit-seeking activities.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who purposefully enters New York’s service economy through a contract when the claim arises from services provided under that contract.

McLenithan v. Bennington Community Health Plan · filed 1996-01-04(a)(1)

Therefore, in view of this and because King’s entry into New York’s service economy via the CHP contract was purposeful and significant, we find that he is subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction under its transacting-business prong when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that activity.

Melkaz International Inc. v. Flavor Innovation Inc. · filed 1996-04-29(a)(1)

To establish jurisdiction under the “transacting business” prong of this section, Melkaz must demonstrate both that Flavor Innovation “transacted business” within New York and that the subject claim arose from Flavor Innovation’s in-state business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on an agent’s related New York business activity when the principal benefits, knows of and consents to the activity, and exercises some control over the agent.

Murphy v. Cuomo · filed 1996-02-02(a)(1)

However, plaintiff has sufficiently verified (1) that ISI engaged in business activity related to the cause of action; (2) for the benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of Zarc; and (3) that Zarc exercised “some control” over ISI.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over nonresident partners when their New York partners transact related business in the state as their agents.

Durkin v. Shea · filed 1997-03-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of long-arm jurisdiction over the D.C. and Florida partners under CPLR § 302(a)(1).