N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim has a substantial relationship to those transactions.

Battista v. American Institute for Mental Studies · filed 1992-05-07(a)(1)

It is clear that AIMS’ contacts with New York were purposeful and that there was a substantial relationship between its transactions in New York and the claim asserted (CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., supra).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that sufficiently transacts business in New York.

Brylgrove Ltd. v. Tomkins, PLC · filed 1992-06-11(a)(1)

A review of the facts demonstrates that Tomkins, PLC sufficiently "transacted business” in New York to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of New York pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467; Bulova Watch Co. v Hattori & Co., 508 F Supp 1322, 1345).

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident insurance guaranty association merely because it fulfills its statutory obligations in a New York action.

Frialator v. Guaranty Fund Management Services · filed 1992-10-14(a)(1)

This court must analyze whether the defendant, NHIGA "transacts any business within the state [of New York] or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state”. ... For the reasons stated in the above cases and because it would be purely a matter of the application of New Hampshire law to determine the indemnity and contribution issues, this controversy should be determined in the State of New Hampshire. This court does not have jurisdiction to determine this matter in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a connection between the defendant’s business transactions in New York and the cause of action.

Walsh v. Maryland Bank, N.A. · filed 1992-11-10(a)(1)

As the first paragraph of the statute indicates, merely transacting business in New York is not enough.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful New York business activity is substantially related to the claim, even if the person never enters the state.

Catauro v. Goldome Bank for Savings · filed 1993-01-11(a)(1)

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find that the appellant’s conduct represented purposeful activity in New York sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over him (see, Matter of Casey, 145 AD2d 632; V.R.W., Inc. v Weiss, 118 AD2d 567; Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin v Thompson, 78 AD2d 795; Bankers Trust Co. v Santos O. Suarez V., 526 F Supp 1262).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim when the defendant’s New York business activity has a substantial connection to the alleged breach, even if that activity breached a different contract provision.

Wilhelmshaven Acquisition Corp. v. Asher · filed 1993-01-15(a)(1)

Nevertheless, the New York meeting with Dreyfus has jurisdictional significance because of the substantial connection between Asher’s discussions with Rich and defendants’ repudiation of the July 13 agreement. Asher’s meeting with Rich was the first of a series of meetings which enabled defendants to repudiate the agreement without losing the financing necessary to purchase the refinery, and thus made repudiation of the agreement financially feasible. Accordingly, plaintiff’s breach of contract claims arise from this transaction of business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident theatre company in an employment contract dispute when its New York audition of the actor substantially advanced the contract.

Berk v. Theatre Arts of West Virginia, Inc. · filed 1993-03-26(a)(1)

For the reasons that follow, I conclude that defendant Theatre Arts of West Virginia’s acts in New York constitute the minimum contacts necessary to permit this court to exercise its long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the contract giving rise to the claim was negotiated and signed in New York.

Gilbert v. Wilson · filed 1993-05-25(a)(1)

Since the court must resolve doubts in Plaintiffs favor, Plaintiffs allegations that the subject agreement was negotiated and signed in this district constitutes a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under New York law, notwithstanding Defendants’ controverting allegation that the contract was signed in Massachusetts.

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from transactions in New York; an accident abroad does not meet that requirement merely because the plaintiff bought a travel package in New York from an unrelated agency.

Weinstock v. Le Sport · filed 1993-06-10(a)(1)

In this case, "long-arm” personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) is unavailable. The cause of action here clearly did not arise from the transactions which occurred in New York (see, Meunier v Stebo, Inc., 38 AD2d 590). The horseback riding accident in St. Lucia bears little relationship to plaintiffs purchase of a travel package in New York from a travel agency unrelated to defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a single New York visit to retrieve a file when incidental fee discussion produces no contract.

Juron & Minzner v. Dranoff & Patrizio · filed 1993-06-10(a)(1)

Given this purpose, defendant’s one visit to New York was not such as to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business contacts with New York; communications about work centered in another state do not suffice.

United States Theatre Corp. v. Gunwyn/Lansburgh Ltd. Partnership · filed 1993-06-25(a)(1)

Therefore, because Gunwyn’s contacts with the forum are not of a sufficiently “purposeful” character and because the “center of gravity” of the dispute is in Washington, D.C., we grant defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose New York business transactions, including transactions through communications or agents, are sufficiently related to the claims.

Camel Investments Ltd. v. Transocean Capital (Bermuda) Ltd. · filed 1993-07-19(a)(1)

Here, the appellants’ actions in transacting business in New York through the use of telephones, "faxes”, and wire transfers as well as through its agents, makes the exercise of personal jurisdiction appropriate.

Section 302(a)(1) does not support personal jurisdiction when the alleged misconduct has no substantial or meaningful connection to New York.

Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy · filed 1993-03-22(a)(1)

We cannot say that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon the absence of personal jurisdiction inasmuch as the record fails to establish any substantial or meaningful connection between the alleged malfeasance committed by the defendant in Indiana and the State of New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not require the New York business contact and the alleged breach to arise from the same provision of a contract.

Safeguard Security, Inc. v. Ryan · filed 1993-11-09(a)(1)

There is no merit to defendant’s claim that his alleged contact with New York is not substantially related to the claim against him because his contact did not arise from the same provision of the contract that the complaint alleges he breached.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Crouch v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc. · filed 1993-10-15(a)(1)

Therefore, this court may only exercise jurisdiction over Merchant’s if (1) the non-domiciliary transacts business within New York; and (2) the claim against the non-domiciliary arises out of that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state partnership when its purposeful acts in New York constitute a transaction of business.

Cacciatore v. Van Wagner · filed 1994-02-28(a)(1)

By these purposeful acts, the partnership availed itself of the benefits and protection of New York law to an extent sufficient to constitute a transaction of business pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Rielly Co. v Lisa B. Inc., 181 AD2d 269; see also, Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business activity and the cause of action; the connection must be established to support jurisdiction.

Stratagem Development Corp. v. Heron International N.V. · filed 1994-02-28(a)(1)

In any event, assuming that the September 1989 meeting was a transaction of business, the Court agrees with the findings of the April 19th Report that the “arising out of’ requirement has not been met.

Section 302(a) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s business transactions in New York; transactions there do not establish jurisdiction over a claim arising from negligence outside the state.

Begley v. Maho Bay Camps, Inc. · filed 1994-04-12(a)

N.Y. CPLR 302(a), the state’s long-arm statute, provides for jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who “transacts any business” within the state if the cause of action arises from such transactions. In this case, defendant alleges that it is a foreign defendant because it is incorporated in the U.S. Virgin Islands, and plaintiff does not dispute this. However, it appeal's that plaintiffs cause of action do^es not arise out of defendant’s transaction of business in New York but out of its negligence outside the state. The provisions of section 302 are thus inapplicable in this case.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on New York business visits unrelated to the dispute or any agreement between the parties.

Levant Line, S.A. v. Marine Enterprises Corp. (In Re Levant Line, S.A.) · filed 1994-04-21(a)(1)

Although Methenitou did visit New York in furtherance of MEC’s business as Levant’s agent, those visits had nothing to do with the current dispute, and did not lead, as in the Paribas case, to any agreements between the parties. Accordingly, under this test, MEC is not subject to personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a nondomiciliary to purposefully transact business in New York before its business contacts support personal jurisdiction.

Milliken v. Holst · filed 1994-06-06(a)(1)

An examination of the circumstances in this case leads us to conclude that, the defendants did not purposefully transact business in New York so as to subject them to the jurisdiction of the New York courts.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary’s only New York contact is mailing arbitration claims there because the arbitration forum requires it.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Barnum · filed 1994-08-18(a)(1)

The court also does not have jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute. ... Here, the respondents’ only contact with the State, their mailing of claims statements to New York City, was a requirement, not a voluntarily chosen benefit.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim arises from those contacts.

Sunrise Industrial Joint Venture v. Ditric Optics, Inc. · filed 1995-01-16(a)(1)

All of these contacts were purposeful with respect to New York, they involve the lease at issue, and are substantially related to the underlying claims raised by the plaintiff. Accordingly, they suffice for purposes of asserting long-arm jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose continuous, purposeful New York business activity gives rise to the claim.

Snyder v. Madera Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1995-01-17(a)(1)

Rather, Madera engaged in continuous, purposeful activity in New York sufficient to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

A request for Florida arbitration sent through the NYSE’s New York correspondence office does not constitute transacting business in New York for personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McLeod · filed 1995-02-23(a)(1)

Respondent never engaged in any business transactions in this State which would subject her to the long arm of our jurisdiction (CPLR 302 [a] [1]), nor did her use of the NYSE correspondence "facility” in New York (Kidder, Peabody & Co. v Marvin, 161 Misc 2d 12, 22) constitute a jurisdictional choice of forum.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over an out-of-state equipment lessee merely because payments go to New York and the equipment must be returned there.

Concrete Pipe & Products Corp. v. Modern Building Materials, Inc. · filed 1995-03-17(a)(1)

It is well established that a foreign defendant whose only contact with New York is the purchase of goods by telephone or mail from a New York plaintiff is not subject to long-arm jurisdiction ... It makes no difference that this case involves a lease rather than a purchase, that the payments were transmitted to New York, or that the equipment was to be returned to New York at the end of the lease term.

CPLR 302(a)(1) supports personal jurisdiction over a defendant who negotiates and signs in New York the contract on which the claim is based.

Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Van De Wetering · filed 1995-07-13(a)(1)

Finally, Dr. Beeren’s contention that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) must also be rejected. The fact that he negotiated and signed in New York the very contract that is the basis for the cause of action against him is sufficient basis for long-arm jurisdiction (see, Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648, 653; Firegreen Ltd. v Claxton, 160 AD2d 409, 411).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction when a tort claim arising from an injury outside New York is too remote from the defendant’s sales and promotional activities in New York.

Sedig v. Mountain · filed 1994-05-31(a)(1)

In addition, the plaintiff’s tort claim, originating from a ski slope injury in Vermont, is too remote from the defendant’s alleged sales and promotional activities to support long-arm ...jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268; Chamberlain v Jiminy Peak, 155 AD2d 768).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s only New York contact is wiring payments to a New York bank at the other party’s request.

Continental Field Service Corp. v. ITEC International, Inc. · filed 1995-07-27(a)(1)

Defendant’s only contact with New York was its wiring of payments at TCFS’ request to a Marine Midland bank account in New York. However, this passive accommodation does not establish the requisite purposeful activity to justify jurisdiction.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a claim for misappropriated fees has the necessary nexus to business transacted with New York clients.

Spirgel v. Ackerman & Co. · filed 1995-11-02(a)(1)

Jurisdiction also exists under CPLR 302 (a) (1). Plaintiff’s allegation that the individual defendants have misappropriated fees attributable to New York clients with whom the partnership had contracted to perform services both before and after its move to New Jersey establishes the necessary nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action.

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a plaintiff’s New York activities when neither the contract nor the work required those activities to occur there.

Lamco Group, Inc. v. Universal Life Insurance · filed 1995-11-07(a)(1)

None of them used New York activities by a plaintiff for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction when such activities — but for the plaintiffs convenience — could have occurred in some other state. ... We find the reasoning in PaineWebber applicable to the case at bar. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment for want of personal jurisdiction is granted.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction.

Geller Media Management, Inc. v. Beaudreault · filed 1996-01-10(a)(1)

Therefore, Beaudreault purposely availed himself of the privilege of engaging a New York agent, thereby enjoying the protection of New York’s laws. Furthermore, the instant action arises out of an alleged breach of this agreement, and therefore the acts giving rise to the claim arise out of Beaudreault’s transacting business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient nexus between a defendant’s New York business transactions and the claim asserted.

Agency Rent a Car System, Inc. v. Grand Rent a Car Corp. · filed 1996-02-13(a)(1)

Under such circumstances, the necessary Section 302(a)(1) jurisdictional nexus between the business conducted and the claim asserted is absent.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; mail, phone, and fax contacts about financing a New Jersey business did not satisfy that requirement here.

Premier Lending Services, Inc. v. J.L.J. Associates · filed 1996-04-25(a)(1)

In the present case, plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants’ mail, phone and fax contacts with New York concerning a mortgage from a New Jersey bank for a New Jersey business rise to the level of purposeful availment of New York laws.

CPLR 302 does not confer long-arm jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary neither transacts business nor contracts to provide goods or services in New York; hiring through an out-of-state union that uses a New York hiring hall is too remote.

Shabrawy v. Ocean Ships, Inc. · filed 1996-04-25(a)(1)

Nor may the courts of this State exercise "long-arm jurisdiction” over the nondomiciliary defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 because the defendant did not transact any business or contract to provide any goods or services in this State (see, Frummer v Hilton Hotels Intl., 19 NY2d 533, 535-536, cert denied 389 US 923). The fact that defendant hired plaintiff through a Maryland-based union, which used a New York hiring hall, is too remote to confer jurisdiction (cf., Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v Barnes & Reinecke, 15 NY2d 443, 456-458).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when its purposeful business activities in New York have a substantial relationship to the claim.

Multi-Modal International, Inc. v. Anglia North America, Inc. · filed 1996-05-28(a)(1)

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, an examination of the record reveals that it conducted purposeful business activities within this State, and that there is a substantial relationship between its transactions and the claims asserted.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident bank solely because a check it places in the usual collection channels is eventually paid in New York.

Citibank, N. A. v. Intercontinental Bank · filed 1996-07-12(a)(1)

Here, the facts do not indicate that Intercontinental is engaged in any business activities in New York sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CPLR 302. Intercontinental has no office or place of business in New York and does not own any real property within New York. Intercontinental’s sole contact with New York is that it placed a check into the usual channels for collection and the check made its way to New York because Zurich’s bank was located there. This does not constitute conduct from which Intercontinental should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York that bears a substantial relationship to the lawsuit.

Pontarelli v. Shapero · filed 1996-09-12(a)(1)

There is no basis to exercise "long-arm” jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary defendants pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) where, as here, plaintiff has failed to set forth any allegations showing that defendants had transacted any purposeful business activity bearing a substantial relationship to the subject matter of the lawsuit in this State (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467), or under CPLR 302 (a) (2) or (3) where, as here, the only tort alleged to have been committed, defamation of character, cannot form the basis for long-arm jurisdiction under the specific language of the statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when a breach-of-contract claim arises from its purposeful business activities in New York.

Cosmetech International, LLC v. Der Kwei Enterprise & Co. · filed 1996-10-09(a)(1)

Der Kwei’s alleged activities in New York are sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this Court based on Cosmetech’s breach of contract claim.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary only when the defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business activity.

United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1996-11-08(a)(1)

Under this provision, two conditions must be met for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant: (1) the defendant must “transact business” in New York; and (2) the claim against defendant must arise out of that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a contract claim when the defendant’s New York business transactions are sufficiently related to the claim, even if the alleged breach occurred elsewhere.

Marsin Medical International, Inc. v. Bauhinia Ltd. · filed 1996-11-15(a)(1)

Similarly, this case concerns the out of state breach of a contract whose terms defendant Bauhinia negotiated, at least in part, while physically present in New York. The New York transactions are therefore “sufficiently related” to this cause of action to justify the exercise of jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business activity; a later accident in another state does not satisfy that requirement merely because the driver may have traveled through New York.

Rounds v. Rea · filed 1996-11-26(a)(1)

Even if Rea traveled in New York, a- point which is contested, the subsequent accident did not arise out of any New York business transaction. Further, the fact that Rea is alleged to have been driving in an unsafe manner in New York is irrelevant to the fact that the accident occurred in Pennsylvania as any injury suffered by Plaintiff was suffered in Pennsylvania, not New York. Therefore, even if Plaintiffs allegations as to Rea’s driving pattern and his presence in New York were to be found to be true, the cause of action in this case did not arise in New York, and thus, N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. § 302 simply does not apply against either Rea, Rush Trucking, or Musial.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business contacts; unrelated contacts cannot establish jurisdiction.

Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark International Ltd. · filed 1997-02-24(a)(1)

Insofar as these contacts are not related in any way'to the underlying cause of action, they are irrelevant for purposes of determining whether there is personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) because the lawsuit does not “arise from” these contacts.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York to establish personal jurisdiction; pursuing personal complaints about a family member’s care does not satisfy that requirement.

Kim v. Dvorak · filed 1997-05-22(a)(1)

Unlike Supreme Court, we find that plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient evidence demonstrating that Dvorak engaged in any form of " 'purposeful [business] activities’ ” (Talbot v Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 NY2d 827, 829, supra, quoting McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272) within this State to justify subjecting her to personal jurisdiction in our courts.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful activity in New York; merely alleging that a defendant sent faxes there does not establish that it transacted business in the state.

Semi Conductor Materials, Inc. v. Citibank International PLC · filed 1997-07-15(a)(1)

Merely pleading, as plaintiff does, that defendant sent faxes to plaintiff in New York is insufficient to establish purposeful activity in this forum.

Section 302 requires a nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s conduct in New York.

Welsh v. Servicemaster Corp. · filed 1996-07-03

Thus, New York’s long arm statute requires a strong nexus between the plaintiffs cause of action and the defendant’s in state conduct. ... Welsh’s complaint fails to allege any connection between Defendants’ activity in New York state and her injuries, which apparently occurred in Connecticut. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to assert jurisdiction under CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business contacts and the claim asserted.

Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine · filed 1997-11-19(a)(1)

Accordingly, the court finds no identifiable nexus or substantial relationship between the hospital Defendants’ contacts with New York and Plaintiffs’ cause of action sufficient to predicate jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1).

For transaction-based jurisdiction under § 302, a nondomiciliary must purposefully transact business in New York, and the claim must substantially relate to those transactions.

I.L.G.W.U. National Retirement Fund v. Meredith Grey, Inc. · filed 1997-12-08(a)(1)

The only portion of article three that conceivably could apply in this situation is CPLR § 302, New York’s long-arm statute. In order for a court to subject a non-domieili-ary defendant to a court’s long-arm jurisdiction, a defendant must engage in purposeful transactions within the state and there must be a substantial relationship between the transactions and the claim asserted.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully conducts business in New York that is directly related to the claims.

Champion Motor Group, Inc. v. Visone Corvette of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1998-01-29(a)(1)

The purposeful activities of VCM in New York, directly related to the alleged contract and the alleged fraud, are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CPLR 302(a)(1) for transacting business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a buyer that sends its trucks into New York to take delivery of goods when the claim arises from that transaction.

Empire Beef Co. v. Meyners-Robinson Co. · filed 1998-03-13(a)(1)

By sending its trucks to Rochester and taking delivery of the meat there, defendant transacted business in New York within the meaning of the statute (see, Kaddis Mfg. Corp. v Gil-Bar Rubber Prods. Co., 103 AD2d 1010).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a connection between the claim and the defendant’s New York business transaction; a contract with New York companies does not establish jurisdiction over an injury that did not arise from it.

Holness v. Maritime Overseas Corp. · filed 1998-06-25(a)(1)

Here, Norshipco did make a contract with MOC and IBC, both New York corporations, to repair their ship, but plaintiffs alleged injury and the tort action based on it cannot be said to have arisen directly out of this contract, even if the contract were considered a transaction occurring in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between a defendant’s New York business transactions and the claims arising from them.

Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 1998-08-27(a)(1)

Even if plaintiffs offered evidence of BAT Industries’ business transactions in New York either on its own or through an agent, plaintiffs have failed to make any showing that the causes of action arise from these transactions or that there is a substantial relationship between the transactions and plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, there is no jurisdiction over BAT Industries under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) focuses on the defendant’s activities in New York; the plaintiff’s presence there during negotiations does not itself establish that the defendant transacted business in the state.

Palace Exploration Co. v. Petroleum Development Co. · filed 1998-11-13(a)(1)

Thus, while Palace gives great weight to the fact that it was located in New York for the entire length of the negotiations, the proper focus of the jurisdictional inquiry under CPLR § 302(a)(1) is on the defendant’s activities, not the plaintiffs presence, in the state. ... Thus, the court finds that Palace has failed to make a prima facie showing that PDC has “transacted business” within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on a letter sent into New York soliciting continued use of services in Puerto Rico.

Daly v. Llanes · filed 1998-12-10(a)(1)

The only contact alleged by plaintiff, the letter sent to plaintiff soliciting continued use of BPIPR’s services in Puerto Rico, is insufficient alone to confer jurisdiction over Lanauze.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when the defendant engages in purposeful business activity in New York sufficient to support jurisdiction in the action.

London v. Versus Technology, Inc. · filed 1998-12-22(a)(1)

We agree with the motion court that there was a sufficient showing that defendant engaged in purposeful business activity within the State to subject it to the jurisdiction of New York courts in this action (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]; ...).

Section 302(a)(1) requires sufficient purposeful activity in New York to establish that a defendant transacted business there, and the claim must relate to those contacts.

Alas International Ltd. v. Ramiz · filed 1999-01-07(a)(1)

Such contacts, alone or collectively, do not show that Massie or Bino transacted business in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Sternberg v Nathan, 112 F3d 505 [unpublished opn], 1997 US App LEXIS 10376; Packer v TDI Sys., 959 F Supp 192, 200), and bear no relationship at all to the fourth through eleventh counterclaims which, asserting various torts based on the commencement of allegedly groundless civil and criminal proceedings in Venezuela and the publication of allegedly defamatory advertisements in Venezuelan newspapers, arose at a different time and place and involve different documents than the first and second counterclaims (see, Monsanto Intl. Sales Co. v Hanjin Container Lines, 770 F Supp 832, 839-840, mod 1991 US Dist LEXIS 14189 [SD NY, Oct. 8, 1991, Wood, J.], affd 962 F2d 4).

Section 302(a)(1) requires sufficient purposeful activity in New York connected to the claim to establish personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary.

Alas International Ltd. v. Ramiz · filed 1999-01-07(a)(1)

Jurisdiction is lacking over Massie and Bino for failure to show sufficient New York purposeful activity in connection with the memorandum of understanding that defendants attack as the product of fraud in their first and second counterclaims.

Section 302(a)(1)'s arising-from requirement can be met when a contract claim concerns conduct outside New York but the agreement is sufficiently related to business transacted in New York.

Schomann International Corp. v. Northern Wireless, Ltd. · filed 1999-01-26(a)(1)

Although the Complaint alleges a breach of contract based on Defendants’ conduct outside New York, the action arises directly from the Agreement, which is “sufficiently related to business transacted” in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when the claim arises from business the defendant transacted in New York; meetings and execution of an agreement there can satisfy the business-transaction requirement.

Nassar v. Florida Fleet Sales Inc. · filed 1999-02-04(a)(1)

Dellorfano attended a meeting in New York on the Escrow Agreement prior to its execution and executed it in New York. Moreover, the relevant performances, including a transfer of the money to Dellor-fano’s account and an agreement to return the funds after ten days, are contemplated to take place in New York. As a result, Dellorfano’s activities in connection with the Escrow Agreement constitute “transacting business” within the meaning of section 302(a).

Section 302(a)(1) independently supports personal jurisdiction over both defendants in a contract action.

Pfeffer v. Mark · filed 1999-02-26(a)(1)

This Court need not decide this issue, because, in any event, jurisdiction is sustained as to both defendants under § 302(a)(1) as discussed in Section II.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an insurer merely because its insured drove into New York.

New York Central Mutual Insurance v. Johnson · filed 1999-04-26(a)(1)

Furthermore, the unilateral act of MAIF’s insured of driving into New York does not satisfy the requirement that MAIF have contact with or purposefully avail itself of New York such that it can be deemed to be transacting business under New York’s long-arm statute (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 253).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim is connected to that business.

Cybertech Communications Corp. v. Quad International, Inc. · filed 1999-06-08(a)(1)

The nature and quality of these contacts comprise a sufficient New York nexus to establish that Quad was transacting business here, and there is a connection between the business transacted and the claim asserted (see, McGowan v Smith, supra, at 272).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary in a defamation action when purposeful business activity in New York has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Montgomery v. Minarcin · filed 1999-07-08(a)(1)

Viewing the totality of Minarcin’s activities in this State (see, Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v Barnes & Reinecke, 15 NY2d 443, 457, n 5, cert denied sub nom. Estwing Mfg. Co. v Singer, 382 US 905; Catauro v Goldome Bank For Sav., 189 AD2d 747, 748), we conclude that plaintiffs allegations are sufficient and supported by record evidence demonstrating that Minarcin engaged in purposeful activity in this State which is directly related to and forms the basis of plaintiffs causes of action so as to be deemed to have transacted business in this State within the intendment of CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Talbot v Johnson Newspaper Corp., supra, at 829; Legros v Irving, supra, at 55).

Section 302(a)(1) treats sending advertisements into New York for broadcast there as transacting business in the state, even when the sender is not supplying goods or services.

Courtroom Television Network v. Focus Media, Inc. · filed 1999-08-19(a)(1)

While the IAS Court was correct that Focus’s sending of the review and dub tapes did not qualify as “supply[ing] goods and services” in New York because Focus was not selling tapes, the act of sending the tapes of advertisements into New York to be broadcast from Court TV’s New York studio was a purposeful transaction of business in the State.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the claim and the defendant’s activities in New York.

National Telephone Directory Consultants, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. · filed 1998-10-27(a)(1)

Further, jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the cause of action and the defendant’s in-state activities.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not support long-arm jurisdiction when the claim is too remote from the defendant’s activities in New York.

Menary v. Outward Bound, Inc. · filed 1999-06-28(a)(1)

We also find that the plaintiff’s claim is too remote from the activities of the defendant Hurricane Island in New York to support long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Sedig v Okemo Mtn., 204 AD2d 709; Chamberlain v Jiminy Peak, 155 AD2d 768, 769).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in the forum; an earlier business relationship does not establish jurisdiction over later, independent alleged infringement.

Dimensional Media Associates, Inc. v. Optical Products Development Corp. · filed 1999-03-25(a)(1)

Although OPD arguably transacted business in this district, the causes of action asserted in this case simply do not arise from those transactions.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a cause of action to arise from the defendant’s business transacted in New York.

Swindell v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. · filed 1999-03-26(a)(1)

Thus, § 302(a)(1) requires not only that the defendant transact business in the state, but also the cause of action must arise from the very business transacted within the state.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction.

New York Islanders Hockey Club, LLP v. Comerica Bank—Texas · filed 1999-10-09(a)(1)

This single act of lending, coupled with several telephone calls into New York by Comerica concerning the funding of the purchase, is sufficient under New York law to constitute “transacting business” by Comerica in New York State.

CPLR 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over non-New York domiciliaries who purposefully transact business in New York through representatives when those activities are substantially related to the action.

Paramount Adjustment Co. v. Home Insurance · filed 1999-12-21(a)

As the motion court found, third-party defendants, although non-New York domiciliaries, were subject to the jurisdiction of New York courts since they purposefully transacted business in this State (see, CPLR 302 [a]) by having representatives perform business activities here on their behalf, which activities were substantially related to the subject matter of the third-party action (see, Kappas v T.W. Kutter, Inc., 192 AD2d 402; see also, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 466-467).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a non-domiciliary’s New York business transaction only when the claim arises from that transaction.

Niagara Mohawk Energy Marketing, Inc. v. Entergy Power Marketing Corp. · filed 2000-03-29(a)(1)

Additionally, jurisdiction may not be predicated on CPLR 302 (a) (1), which permits long-arm personal jurisdiction over “any non-domiciliary * * * who in person or through an agent * * * transacts any business within the state”, because that section provides a basis for jurisdiction only where the cause of action arises out of the New York transaction (see, Holness v Maritime Overseas Corp., supra, at 224). Here, there was no New York transaction out of which any of the causes of action arise; here, defendant had no contract with plaintiff to deliver power to it.

Under CPLR 302(a)(1), a claim arises from New York business transactions when it has a clearly articulable nexus to them, even if the injury occurs elsewhere.

Lebel v. Tello · filed 2000-05-09(a)(1)

Moreover, although the accident occurred in Santa Fe, it plainly arose out of the transaction of business in New York since there was a clearly articulable nexus between the accident and the transactions in New York (McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim has a direct relationship to that business.

Photoactive Productions, Inc. v. AL-OR International Ltd. · filed 2000-06-14(a)(1)

It is clear that CPG’s claim for payment has a direct relationship to the business transacted by AL-OR in New York. Therefore, the Court finds that CPG has established that specific jurisdiction is proper pursuant to section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the defendant’s contracts were negotiated, signed, and performed in California and payment was received there.

Arista Technologies, Inc. v. Arthur D. Little Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2000-12-28(a)(1)

Nevertheless, the Court finds that Design Labs did not transact business in New York State within the meaning of CPLR section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires claims against a nondomiciliary to arise from that person's transaction of business in New York.

Bellhaven Nursing Center v. Roth · filed 2001-02-20(a)(1)

Jurisdiction was not obtained over the nondomiciliary appellants pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) because the causes of action asserted against them did not arise from their transaction of business in New York (see, Riblet Prods. Corp. v Nagy, 191 AD2d 626; Precision Concepts v Bonsanti, 172 AD2d 737; Storch v Vigneau, 162 AD2d 241).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who purposefully transacts business in New York when the claim is substantially related to that transaction.

Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. McDonnell · filed 2001-06-19(a)(1)

SSB, through its verified complaint and the declaration of Frank Pagnotta, SSB’s Senior Vice President, sets forth several bases showing that McDonnell and the Cornell Trust are subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1). ... I conclude that jurisdiction is appropriate under the New York long-arm statute and turn to the issue of whether such an assertion is constitutional.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a direct connection between the New York business transaction and the claim; transactions only generally related to the alleged wrongdoing do not suffice.

Jacobs v. Felix Bloch Erben Verlag Fur Buhne Film Und Funk KG · filed 2001-09-10(a)(1)

These types of transactions are too far removed from the crux of the lawsuit to satisfy the § 302(a)(1) test.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on one purposeful New York transaction when the claim has a substantial relationship to that transaction.

Wright v. 299 Union Avenue Corp. · filed 2001-11-19(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1) is “a ‘single act statute’ and proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s business transaction.

Mingmen Acupuncture Services, P. C. v. American Transit Insurance · filed 1999-11-19(a)(1)

The State and the City long-arm statutes (CCA 404; CPLR 302 [a] [1]) each provide in identical language that long-arm jurisdiction will be applied only to “a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section.”

Section 302(a)(1) requires a nexus between the defendant’s business transactions and the claim asserted.

Citadel Management Inc. v. Hertzog · filed 1999-11-30(a)(1)

These transactions have no articulable nexus with the underlying English judgment and, as such, do not constitute acts arising from the transaction of business which would constitute a predicate for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial nexus between business transacted in New York and the claim; booking a hotel room there is too remote from a negligence injury at a hotel outside New York.

Hinsch v. Outrigger Hotels Hawaii · filed 2001-07-24(a)(1)

This is because he cannot show the requisite nexus between the transaction relied upon and his cause of action. Courts have consistently held that the in-state activity of booking a hotel room is too remote from negligence alleged to have taken place at a foreign hotel to satisfy Section 302.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a negligence claim wholly unrelated to the defendant’s activities in New York.

Brandt v. Toraby · filed 2000-06-26(a)(1)

Insofar as the alleged negligence of the defendant and the resulting cause of action to recover damages for personal injuries are wholly unrelated to any of the defendant’s actions in New York, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between a nondomiciliary’s New York activity and the claim; unrelated retail website activity does not establish jurisdiction over a wholesale contract dispute.

Armouth International, Inc. v. Haband Co. · filed 2000-11-06(a)(1)

The only activity in New York that could possibly be deemed “purposeful” is the activity the defendant engaged in through its Internet retail website. The plaintiff failed, however, to sustain its prima facie burden of establishing a substantial relationship between the Internet retail activ...ity and the defendant’s alleged breach of contract to purchase wholesale goods.

CPLR 302 requires purposeful activity in New York; a meeting to finalize documents for an acquisition in Peru did not satisfy that requirement.

Samsung America, Inc. v. GS Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-12-21

The four-day meeting in New York attended by the non-New York resident defendants, members of a consortium to acquire a steel mill in Peru, did not constitute the kind of purposeful activity within the State that would subject those defendants to jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (see, Packer v TDI Sys., 959 F Supp 192, 197; Catsimatidis v Innovative Travel Group, 650 F Supp 748, 751).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim is substantially related to that business.

Southridge Capital Management, LLC v. Lowry · filed 2002-02-25(a)(1)

To come within New York’s longarm statute under CPLR § 302(a)(1), Lowry must have engaged in purposeful activities within New York, and there must be a substantial relationship between those activities and the transac tion out of which the cause of action arose. ... Since the cause of action by Southridge is sufficiently related to the business Lowry transacted in New York, it confers personal jurisdiction.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business through a New York office in connection with the events underlying the complaint.

Samuel-Rozenbaum USA, Inc. v. Felcher · filed 2002-03-12

The cross motion to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant was properly denied. Although a Colorado resident, defendant transacted business exclusively through plaintiffs New York office for several months preceding the events which form the basis of plaintiffs complaint. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was properly obtained pursuant to CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank when its New York payment account, contract terms, and prior course of dealing establish purposeful business activity in the state.

Indosuez International Finance B v. v. National Reserve Bank · filed 2002-05-07(a)(1)

NRB, however, maintained a New York bank account for payment of the option payments and the nonoption payments (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]). ... Such conduct constitutes purposeful exercise by NRB of the privilege of conducting business in New York State sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction (see Banco Ambrosiano v Artoc Bank & Trust, 62 NY2d 65, 71-73 [1984] [finding sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction based on foreign defendant’s consent to be paid in United States dollars put into a New York account and on prior routine conduct of exchange deals]; Parex Bank v Russian Sav. Bank, 116 F Supp 2d 415, 422 [SD NY 2000] [same]).

Section 302 did not support personal jurisdiction over a defendant who had not transacted business in New York and whose agreement gave no notice that the plaintiff was a New York corporation or would suffer injury there.

Seaweed, Inc. v. DMA Product & Design & Marketing LLC · filed 2002-09-04

Although Malloy signed the Agreement, that document did not put Malloy on notice that Seaweed was a New York corporation or that any injury to Seaweed would be incurred in New York. Nor does it appear that Malloy transacted any business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial connection between the defendant’s New York business activities and the claim; visits unrelated to the claim do not establish personal jurisdiction.

United Computer Capital Corp. v. Secure Products, L.P. · filed 2002-09-11(a)(1)

Defendants’ few New York visits over three years are irrelevant to plaintiffs claims and cannot provide a basis for exercising jurisdiction over defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient nexus between the claim and the defendant’s business transactions in New York.

HD Brous & Co. v. Synthesys Secure Technologies, Inc. · filed 2002-11-04(a)(1)

In this case, there is a sufficient nexus between Synthesys’ business activities in New York and the instant action because all of the above-noted activities relate either to the formation of the Agreement or to the services that Brous provided pursuant to the Agreement. As such, the second element is met.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an unjust-enrichment claim when the alleged enrichment is substantially proximate to the defendant’s New York business activity.

SAS Group, Inc. v. Worldwide Inventions, Inc. · filed 2003-02-13(a)(1)

In sum, Worldwide’s alleged unjust enrichment is substantially proximate to its New York activities — a meeting where it solicited SAS’s business and had preliminary discussions concerning the sale of slap wraps.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; inviting a New York writer to a Colorado ranch and mailing a press kit to New York do not qualify.

Carey v. C Lazy U Ranch, Inc. · filed 2003-04-14(a)(1)

The lone act of soliciting the plaintiff to visit the Ranch in Colorado with the hope that the plaintiff might write a favorable article for publication in a travel magazine, plus the mailing of a press kit to the plaintiff in New York, does not qualify as a purposeful act performed by the defendants in New York so as to constitute the transaction of business in the state (see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., supra; La Rosa v Levine, 49 Misc 2d 932, 933 [1966]; CPLR 302 [a] [1]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary’s New York business meetings and telephone negotiations relate to the parties’ business relationship.

Traffix, Inc. v. Herold · filed 2003-05-02(a)(1)

Moreover the several telephone negotiations conducted from New York between defendant and Mr. Stollman, (Stollman Aff ¶ 61.), coupled with the above meetings warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transaction; a later loan does not establish jurisdiction over an earlier claim to shares.

Mende v. Milestone Technology, Inc. · filed 2003-05-22(a)(1)

Assuming, arguendo, that Milestone did transact business in New York by borrowing $225,000 from Gaillard, Plaintiffs claims, nevertheless, do not “arise” from that transaction.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that solicits business and contracts to provide goods or services in New York when the claim arises from that contract.

J & D Supply Group v. Dydacomp Development Corp. · filed 2003-06-19(a)(1)

Such facts are sufficient to fall within the reach of this State’s long-arm jurisdiction statute (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; People v Concert Connection, 211 AD2d 310, 315 [1995], appeal dismissed 86 NY2d 837 [1995]; Anderson Dev. Corp. v Isoreg Corp., 154 AD2d 859, 859-860 [1989]) and satisfy the concomitant due process requirements (see LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210, 216-218 [2000]; see also Burger King Corp. v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 477 [1985]; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 444 US 286, 297 [1980]; Liberatore v Calvino, 293 AD2d 217, 220 [2002]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the claim has a sufficient nexus to a New York transaction in which the nondomiciliary actively and purposefully participated.

Giant Group, Ltd. v. Andersen · filed 2003-12-09(a)(1)

The complaint thus sets forth a sufficient nexus between the New York transaction in which L.H. Friend and Presson were actively and purposefully involved and plaintiffs claims to support an assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]; McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272 [1981]).

Section 302(a)(1) supports long-arm jurisdiction based on defendants’ New York meetings and communications connected to a transaction in which they have an economic interest.

Lazard Freres & Co. v. West Group Properties · filed 2004-01-13(a)(1)

The motion court correctly found long-arm jurisdiction (CPLR 302 [a] [1]) as against all defendants based on CGR Advisors’ meeting with the New York-based plaintiff in New York at which the marketing of CGR’s option to purchase the Rolim defendants’ interests in the West* Group defendants was discussed; ... and the many telephone and facsimile communications and document transfers between defendants and the New York plaintiff (see Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13 [1970]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a defendant’s New York business transaction has a substantial relationship to the claim, assessed under the totality of the circumstances.

Taibleson v. National Center for Continuing Education · filed 2002-02-15(a)(1)

The court must look at the totality of the circumstances in determining whether plaintiff’s claim has a nexus and relationship to defendant’s transaction in this forum. Weil came into New York to meet with and audit plaintiff’s seminar. Defendant was looking for a lecturer from the New York metropolitan area. As noted above, Weil’s auditing of plaintiff’s seminar was a substantial factor in the negotiation leading to plaintiff’s retention by defendant. Thus, plaintiff’s claim arises from defendant’s acts in this state.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on one New York transaction only when the transaction has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Edelman v. Taittinger, S.A. · filed 2002-10-29(a)(1)

Although CPLR 302 is a “single act” statute, requiring proof of only one transaction in New York to invoke jurisdiction, there must be a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted (Kreutter v McFadden Oil, 71 NY2d 460, 467; see Samsung Am. v GS Indus., 278 AD2d 138), which does not appear here.

Section 302 requires an articulable nexus between a defendant’s New York business transactions and the transaction underlying the claim; conjecture and speculation cannot establish jurisdiction.

Massaro v. Wellen Oil & Chemical, Inc. · filed 2003-04-07(a)(1)

However, in opposition to Wellen’s prima facie showing that it did not transact business in New York, and that even if it did, that there was no “articulable nexus” between such transactions and the transaction upon which the plaintiffs cause of action is based (McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272 [1981]), the plaintiff offered an argument based entirely upon conjecture and speculation, which is insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Bogdanovic v Norrell Health Care Servs., 300 AD2d 611 [2002].

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that activity.

Jn Realty LLC v. Estate of Marvin · filed 2003-06-21(a)(1)

Jurisdiction exists under Section 302(a)(1) if (a) the defendant has transacted business within the state; and (b) the claim arises out of that activity.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a connection between the defendant’s New York contacts and the asserted claim for specific personal jurisdiction.

Realuyo v. Abrille · filed 2004-03-29(a)(1)

The district court construed the allegations in favor of Realuyo and correctly held that the defendants’ respective alleged contacts with New York do not have the requisite connection to the allegedly defamatory article and there is therefore no basis for personal jurisdiction over them under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires a nondomiciliary to purposefully transact business in New York; the telephone, fax, and e-mail communications described here were insufficient to establish jurisdiction.

Warck-Meister v. Lowenstein · filed 2004-05-13(a)(1)

The various telephone, fax and e-mail communications upon which plaintiff relies, purportedly concerning defendants’ exhibition and sale of her art, are not, under the circumstances herein, adequate transactional predicates for an assertion of jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Libra Global Tech. Servs. [UK] v Telemedia Intl., 279 AD2d 326 [2001]; Worldwide Futgol Assoc., Inc. v Event Entertainment, Inc., 983 F Supp 173, 177 [1997]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial nexus between business transacted in New York and the claim asserted.

SNS Bank v. Citibank · filed 2004-05-13(a)(1)

Personal jurisdiction was never acquired over the directors of defendant Captiva Finance, a Cayman Islands corporation (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]). ... As for the two directors who attended a Captiva board meeting in New York in December 2000, there was no “substantial nexus between the business transacted [here] and the cause of action” sued upon (Richbell Info. Servs. v Jupiter Partners, 309 AD2d 288, 308 [2003]), inasmuch as the complaint is directed at omissions from a 1996 offering memorandum and the replacement of the financial manager in 1999.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim has a substantial nexus to that business.

Olympus America, Inc. v. Fujinon, Inc. · filed 2004-06-10(a)(1)

A claim arises out of a party’s contacts in New York if there is a substantial nexus between the transaction of business here and the cause of action sued upon (McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272 [1981]). The totality of the circumstances, combined with the nature and quality of Cisco’s purposeful activities, established jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state sales representative who earned substantial commissions over several years for a New York manufacturer, even when the representative solicited customers outside New York.

Vacuum Instrument Corp. v. EPM Co. · filed 2004-06-28(a)(1)

New York may exercise “long-arm” jurisdiction over a foreign independent contractor, which for several years earned substantial commissions as a sales representative for a New York manufacturer, and which did so by soliciting customers in a territory that does not encompass New York (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648 [1977]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that activity; courts assess the contacts as a whole.

Matera v. Native Eyewear, Inc. · filed 2005-02-10(a)(1)

After considering the totality of the circumstances, in the Court’s view, the Defendant has “transacted business” within the meaning of Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over foreign successors alleged to have continued their predecessor’s business in New York in violation of contractual obligations.

Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v. Sir-Tech Software, Inc. · filed 2005-02-15(a)(1)

Moreover, we hold that its allegations are sufficient to bring its claim within CLPR 302 (a) (l). AGI’s allegations, if true, would establish that the Canadian defendants reincarnated themselves as successors to their New York business, and in their Canadian corporate capacity, continued to do business in New York in violation of their contractual obligations to AGI.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to purposefully transact business in New York; remote contract communications and billing statements alone do not establish jurisdiction when the work and delivery occur elsewhere.

Burrows Paper Corp. v. R.G. Engineering, Inc. · filed 2005-03-03(a)(1)

Therefore, since defendant “did not avail [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities in New York,” Burrows cannot establish jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s contacts do not amount to transacting business in New York, even if the parties formed an enforceable contract.

Mortgage Funding Corp. v. Boyer Lake Pointe, LC · filed 2005-07-21(a)(1)

However, even assuming that an enforceable contract was formed, as explained in more detail below, the Defendants did not “transact business” in New York within the meaning of C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s business contacts with New York, considered together, support jurisdiction over a claim arising from the transaction.

ADP Investor Communication Services, Inc. v. in House Attorney Services, Inc. · filed 2005-08-18(a)(1)

Under “the totality of the circumstances test analysis,” this Court finds that ADP has thus far made a prima facie showing personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary solicits New York investors and communicates and meets with them in New York about their business venture.

L&R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg · filed 2005-10-04(a)(1)

The record, which shows that respondent solicited significant amounts from petitioners, New York investors, communicated by telephone and mail with them in New York, and visited New York on several occasions to discuss the business of the parties’ joint venture, supports a finding that respondent’s contacts with New York were sufficient to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Fabrikant & Sons v Adrianne Kahn, Inc., 144 AD2d 264 [1988]; Courtroom Tel. Network v Focus Media, 264 AD2d 351, 353 [1999]).

Section 302(a)(1) can treat a nonresident’s employment agreement as transacting business in New York when it creates a substantial, continuing relationship with a New York employer, even if the agreement was made elsewhere.

Opticare Acquisition Corp. v. Castillo · filed 2005-11-07(a)(1)

Although the record in this case is silent as to where the appellants negotiated and executed their employment agreements, we conclude that even assuming they were not made in New York, the appellants transacted business here by entering into agreements which, in each case, gave rise to substantial relationships, both substantively and temporally, with a New York employer.

Section 302(a)(1) treats an out-of-state employee’s sustained, daily relationship with a New York employer as transacting business in New York sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

SmartPros, Ltd. v. Straub · filed 2005-12-19(a)(1)

The defendant’s “systematic, ongoing relationship with a New York company, with which [he] w[as] in daily contact” due to his employment, just as if his office were physically located in New York, is transacting business in New York sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Opticare Acquisition Corp. v Castillo, 25 AD3d 238 [2005]; George Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648, 653 [1977]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a defendant who transacts business in New York or contracts to supply goods or services there when the claim arises from that transaction.

PT. Bank Mizuho Indonesia v. PT. Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Corp. · filed 2006-01-24(a)(1)

Nor does plaintiff allege that defendants “transacted] any business within the state or contract [ed] anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [1]), or that the cause of action arising out of this transaction otherwise invoked the jurisdiction of our courts (see Holness v Maritime Overseas Corp., 251 AD2d 220, 224 [1998]).

A phone call from outside New York to purchase an item there, followed by payment sent to New York, does not establish the business activity needed for jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1).

Stengel v. Black · filed 2006-04-27(a)(1)

An out-of-state phone call to New York for the purpose of purchasing an item here, and defendant’s subsequent transfer of payment to New York, do not constitute the active participation in business transactions that would require him to defend himself in our courts (see L. F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin v McTamney, 89 AD2d 540 [1982], affd 59 NY2d 651 [1983]; M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods, v Corréale & Sons, 26 AD2d 52 [1966], affd 20 NY2d 903 [1967]; cf. Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13 [1970]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident that purposefully conducts business in New York through electronic or telephone communications when the claim substantially relates to that business.

Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investments · filed 2006-06-06(a)(1)

We have in the past recognized CPLR 302 (a) (1) long-arm jurisdiction over commercial actors and investors using electronic and telephonic means to project themselves into New York to conduct business transactions ( see e.g. Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13 [1970]; Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v University of Houston, 49 NY2d 574 [1980]), and we do so again here.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident whose New York business transactions have an articulable and substantial nexus to the claim.

Newbro v. Freed · filed 2004-09-08(a)(1)

However, based on the two-year duration of the Freeds’ account with Eberhard, their face-to-face visits with Eberhard, their substantial and ongoing communications with Eberhard, and the fact that the alleged misconduct of a New York broker lies at the heart of this action, I find that there is an articulable and substantial nexus between the Freeds’ New York transactions and the cause of action alleged here.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a negligence claim arising from an out-of-state accident lacks a substantial relationship to the defendant’s New York activities; a New York license and vehicle registration alone do not supply that nexus.

Johnson v. Ward · filed 2005-05-05(a)(1)

The relationship between the negligence claim and defendant’s possession of a New York license and registration at the time of the accident is too insubstantial to warrant a New York court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant. The negligent driver could have had a license from any state, or no license—that defendant had a New York license and registration is merely coincidental. As such, plaintiffs cannot rely on CPLR 302 (a) (1) to establish long-arm jurisdiction based on the facts of this case.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful New York business activity has a substantial relationship to the claim; negotiating a bond sale through electronic messages can qualify.

Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investments · filed 2005-06-14(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1) permits a New York court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if the non-domiciliary conducts “purposeful activities” within the state and the claim against the nondomiciliary involves a transaction bearing a “substantial relationship” to those activities ... Accordingly, we find that defendant transacted business in this state and that the claim at bar arises from that business activity.

Section 302 does not provide personal jurisdiction when the action is unrelated to the defendant’s New York activities.

M'baye v. WORLD BOXING ASS'N. · filed 2006-04-28

M’Baye has not contended that the WBA’s activities in New York are related to the circumstances of this case. Therefore, CPLR § 302, New York's long-arm statute that permits the exercise of jurisdiction over actions based on transactions in New York, is not applicable.

Section 302(a)(1) requires sufficient New York contacts for long-arm jurisdiction; faxing executed contracts to New York and making a few follow-up calls were insufficient.

Kimco Exchange Place Corp. v. Thomas Benz, Inc. · filed 2006-11-08(a)(1)

The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that the defendants had insufficient contacts with this state to support long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1). We agree.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity directed at New York; fortuitous or random contacts do not establish jurisdiction.

Barrett v. TEMA DEVELOPMENT (1988), INC. · filed 2006-11-15(a)(1)

Tema’s connections with New York through the IUA are considerably more “fortuitous” and “random” than they are purposefully directed at New York as required for jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the insurance policy was negotiated in New Jersey through a New Jersey broker and insured only New Jersey risks.

Markel Insurance v. GFM Construction, Inc. · filed 2006-12-05(a)(1)

The record reveals that Hartan’s representatives met with Turner, at Turner’s New Jersey offices, to conduct negotiations regarding the subject policy. In addition, all of the risks insured by Markel’s policy with GFM are located in New Jersey. Both CPLR 302 (a) (1) and due process require that this action be dismissed.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who purposefully transacts business in New York when the claim has a substantial relationship to that business.

Alden Personnel, Inc. v. David · filed 2007-03-20(a)(1)

Here, the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that the defendant transacted business in the state of New York in connection with their causes of action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Scheuer v. Schwartz · filed 2007-07-05(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1) permits Supreme Court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary where: (1) the defendant transacted business within the state and (2) the cause of action arose from that transaction of business (Johnson v Ward, 4 NY3d 516 [2005]).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on an ongoing contractual relationship and limited calls, emails, billings, and correspondence with a New York plaintiff when the defendant’s overall conduct does not amount to transacting business in New York.

Patel v. Patel · filed 2007-07-14(a)(1)

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant “transacted business” in New York such as to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s contract is performed abroad and its New York contacts consist of payments and administrative communications.

Sandoval v. Abaco Club on Winding Bay · filed 2007-07-30(a)(1)

Taking these factors together, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant “transacts business” in New York such that it should be subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) — all four of the factors articulated by the Second Circuit in Sunward Elees, point to the conclusion that exercising personal jurisdiction here would be inappropriate.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York in connection with the plaintiff’s cause of action.

Cornely v. Dynamic HVAC Supply, LLC · filed 2007-10-30(a)(1)

Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs (see Brandt v Toraby, 273 AD2d at 430), their allegations demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendant transacted business in New York in connection with the plaintiffs’ causes of action, and it was thus subject to the Supreme Court’s long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see George Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648, 650-653 [1977]; Alden Personnel, Inc. v David, 38 AD3d 697, 699 [2007]; Opticare Acquisition Corp. v Castillo, 25 AD3d 238 [2005]; Empire Beef Co. v Meyners-Robinson Co., 248 AD2d 1012, 1013 [1998]; Dulman v Potomac Baking Co., 85 AD2d 676, 677 [1981]).

Section 302 requires purposeful activity by the defendant to establish jurisdiction based on transacting business in New York; a driver’s trip into the state does not by itself count as the insurer’s activity.

American Transit Insurance v. Hoque · filed 2007-11-08(a)(1)

Nor is appellant transacting business in New York (CPLR 302); that the driver of the offending vehicle, which was registered in Pennsylvania, drove in this state is not “purposeful activity” on the part of appellant.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a seller whose alleged sales and shipments of infringing textbooks into New York give rise to the claims.

Cenage Learning, Inc. v. Buckeye Books · filed 2008-01-16(a)(1)

Transactional personal jurisdiction exists over TRU by virtue of its alleged sales of infringing and unauthorized foreign edition textbooks to the defendants in New York and its shipment of nine of those textbooks into New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who negotiates the agreement at issue while in New York.

Bui v. Berman · filed 2008-02-14(a)(1)

Although a Florida resident, defendant transacted business within the state when, while in New York, he negotiated the subject loan agreement with plaintiff (CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Ivens Stanton Assoc. v Nor-Quest Resources, 195 AD2d 314 [1993]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for claims arising from purposeful transactions conducted through New York brokers.

State v. Samaritan Asset Management Services, Inc. · filed 2008-10-29(a)(1)

Therefore, the defendants’ use of New York brokers to effectuate their trades is sufficient to subject them to New York jurisdiction as to those transactions.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has never entered New York when the defendant purposefully transacts business there and the transaction has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Bogal v. Finger · filed 2009-02-24(a)(1)

New York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [1]), even where that defendant has never physically entered the state (see Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13, 17 [1970]), “so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transactions and the claim asserted” (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary’s purposeful visits to New York substantially advance a contractual relationship, even if the visits occur after the contract is formed.

National Electric Systems, Inc. v. City of Anderson · filed 2009-03-10(a)(1)

Rather, defendant’s presence in New York was the result of pre-meditated acts anticipated prior to the formation of the contract, and the visits substantially advanced the contractual relationship because the transformers would not have been shipped absent defendant’s observation of satisfactory performance testing. Therefore, the second factor for whether defendant transacted business in New York heavily supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that purposefully transacts business in New York through a broker when those activities substantially relate to the claim.

Transportation Insurance v. Simplicity, Inc. · filed 2009-04-28(a)(1)

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the defendant Simplicity, Inc. (hereinafter Simplicity), is amenable to jurisdiction in New York pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1). The record demonstrates that Simplicity, a Pennsylvania corporation, engaged in a 12-year business relationship with the defendant Preferred Services of NY, Ltd. (hereinafter Preferred), a New York insurance broker, during which Simplicity transacted business within New York by engaging the services of Preferred to procure numerous insurance policies on its behalf and in accordance with its specifications, including the specific policies which are at issue in this action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a claim arises from the defendant’s business activities in New York.

MWL Brasil Rodas & Eixos Ltda v. K-IV Enterprises LLC · filed 2009-09-11(a)(1)

Thus, the cause of action did arise out of K-IV’s business activities in New York, and therefore § 302(a)(1) conveys jurisdiction as well.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over a Vermont injury claim when the defendant’s New York transactions did not directly give rise to that claim.

Arroyo v. Mountain School · filed 2009-12-22(a)(1)

Defendants are not subject to specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1). ... Defendants’ duty of care to plaintiff arose in Vermont, not in New York.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on access to New York branches when the claim arises from deposits made outside New York and has no relationship to that access.

In re the Guardianship of A.A.C. · filed 2009-01-12(a)(1)

Therefore, the court may not exercise jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) as there is no relationship, substantial or otherwise, with respect to the arrangement between the movants and CUSC, which allows their members to use a CUSC branch in New York to access their accounts located in another jurisdiction, and the claims asserted herein which arise out of deposits made outside of New York (see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d at 469).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between a nondomiciliary’s New York business activities and the claim asserted.

Copp v. Ramirez · filed 2009-02-24(a)(1)

Even if we were to find that these activities by defendants in New York during the Ground Zero rescue effort satisfy the requirements of transacting business in New York, plaintiffs have failed to meet the second prong of CPLR 302 (a) (1), that these activities are substantially related to the defamation claims alleged in this action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has never entered New York if the defendant purposefully acted there and the transaction substantially relates to the claim.

Muse Collections, Inc. v. Carissima Bijoux, Inc. · filed 2011-07-26(a)(1)

Personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant can be conferred under CPLR 302 (a) (1) “even where that defendant has never physically entered the state, 'so long as the defendant’s activities [in New York] were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted’ ” (Kaprall v WE: Women’s Entertainment, LLC, 74 AD3d 1151, 1153 [2010] [citation omitted], quoting Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful New York activities that show a nondomiciliary availed itself of the benefits and protections of New York law.

Iavarone v. Northpark Partners, LP · filed 2011-11-15(a)(1)

The Supreme Court properly determined that the number, nature, and quality of the defendant’s contacts with New York, as alleged by the plaintiff, did “not evince purposeful activities by which they availed themselves of the benefits and protections of New York law” (Muse Collections, Inc. v Carissima Bijoux, Inc., 86 AD3d 631, 631 [2011]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on purposeful New York business transactions connected to the claim; disputed facts about those transactions can prevent dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

D&R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcón Piñeiro · filed 2011-12-01(a)(1)

Although it was plaintiff alone who initially brought defendant’s product into New York, and defendant did not itself initially undertake any purposeful business activities in New York during the period in which the parties’ contract was concededly in effect, defendant’s subsequent formation of an exclusive relationship with Kobrand, and its direct shipping of wine to Kobrand, may constitute the requisite purposeful business transactions in New York under CPLR 302 (a) (1). Of course, for jurisdiction to exist there must be an “articulable nexus” between the cause of action and defendant’s New York business transactions (McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272 [1981]). But, particularly considering the parties’ dispute regarding the terms of their oral contract, such a nexus may be established here. We need not rule definitively on that point in this context; we need only hold that defendant is not entitled to dismissal of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on one purposeful New York transaction when the claim substantially relates to that transaction.

Daniel B. Katz & Associates Corp. v. Midland Rushmore, LLC · filed 2011-12-27(a)(1)

“CPLR 302 (a) is a ‘single act statute [and] . . . proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted’ ” (Kimco Exch. Place Corp. v Thomas Benz, Inc., 34 AD3d 433, 434 [2006], quoting Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who never enters New York when the defendant’s activities in the state are purposeful and substantially related to the claims.

People v. Frisco Marketing of NY LLC · filed 2012-03-23(a)(1)

Considering all of the evidence and accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Tucker, 75 AD3d at 1097), we conclude that “CPLR 302 (a) (1) jurisdiction is proper ‘even though the [individual] defendants] never enter[ed] New York, [inasmuch as their] activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction^] and the claim[s] asserted’ ” (Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007], quoting Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]; cf. SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v American Working Collie Assn., 18 NY3d 400, 404 [2012]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a nondomiciliary defendant to purposefully avail himself of the privilege of transacting business in New York.

Royalty Network, Inc. v. Harris · filed 2012-05-31(a)(1)

Plaintiff, a New York music publishing corporation, did not make a sufficient showing of conduct by which the nondomiciliary defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of transacting business so as to invoke the benefits and protections of New York’s laws (CPLR 302 [a] [1]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident employer when its purposeful New York transactions, including contract negotiations and employee activities performed there on its behalf, have a substantial relationship to the claim.

Sanderson v. Horse Cave Theatre 76 · filed 2012-07-26(a)(1)

The contract required that Sanderson perform a substantial number of activities in New York, which he did, on behalf of and with the approval of KRT. Therefore, although KRT did not enter New York, its activities in New York, including negotiating Sanderson’s employment contract and the activities Sanderson performed, on KRT’s behalf, as part of his executive director’s job, were purposeful and a substantial relationship between KRT’s New York transactions and Sanderson’s claim is asserted in the complaint.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s visits to New York to discuss the parties’ business provide sufficient contacts with the state.

Warnaco Inc. v. Trialand S.A. · filed 2013-01-31(a)(1)

Similarly, the evidence that defendant visited New York on several occasions to discuss the business of the parties’ venture supports a finding that defendant’s contacts with New York were sufficient to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Fabrikant & Sons v Adrianne Kahn, Inc., 144 AD2d 264 [1st Dept 1988]).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires purposeful invocation of the privileges of conducting business in New York; limited telephone and email contact related to an Internet advertising campaign was insufficient.

Collins v. Yodle, Inc. · filed 2013-04-11(a)(1)

Given the nature of their work on plaintiffs Internet advertising campaign and his limited contact with them via telephone and email, their conduct “did not amount to a purposeful invocation of the privileges of conducting business in New York” so as to confer personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (Executive Life Ltd. v Silverman, 68 AD3d 715, 716-717 [2009]; see Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007]; Professional Personnel Mgt. Corp. v Southwest Med. Assoc., 216 AD2d 958, 958 [1995]).

Section 302(a)(1) dismissal may be denied pending discovery where the allegations could satisfy the business-transaction and claim-nexus requirements.

Cacchillo v. Insmed Inc. · filed 2011-06-29(a)(1)

Taking the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and treating the jurisdictional assertions as true, Plaintiff may be able to satisfy both prongs of the Section 302(a)(1) analysis. ... However, these facts must be developed through discovery. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transaction; an attorney’s New York bar membership does not establish jurisdiction over claims arising from unrelated New Jersey conduct.

Eastboro Foundation Charitable Trust v. Penzer · filed 2013-06-18(a)(1)

Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that Penzer’s maintenance of an active New York license constitutes a transaction of business, Bernath’s claims relate exclusively to actions Penzer took in New Jersey in connection with a New Jersey transaction, and thus do not arise from Penzer’s membership in the New York bar.