N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a defendant deliberately uses its New York branch for transactions substantially related to the claims.

Strauss v. Lyonnais · filed 2016-03-31(a)(1)

Most importantly, Defendant executed the five New York Transfers through the New York Branch, repeatedly and deliberately using New York’s banking system to effect the alleged financial support of Hamas that is the basis for Plaintiffs’ claims. Given the quality of those contacts and their close connection to New York, the Court concludes that § 302(a)(1) permits the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that activity; possible distribution into New York by national retailers does not establish those requirements.

Eyeking, LLC v. JSS, LLC · filed 2018-06-19(a)(1)

All that the Plaintiff alleges is that the Defendant sold products to national retailers who eventually distributed the Defendant's products throughout the country, including possibly to New York. This is insufficient. ... Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing that the Defendant transacted business within New York State. ... Therefore, the Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing that there is an articulable nexus between the claim asserted and the Defendant's New York connections.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a non-domiciliary asks a New York entity to transfer securities.

Madison Stock Transfer, Inc. v. Exlites Holdings Int'l, Inc. · filed 2019-03-25(a)(1)

Therefore, requesting that a transfer be made-something short of transferring the securities-is insufficient to trigger jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the non-domiciliary's New York business activity for that activity to support personal jurisdiction.

Corley v. Vance · filed 2019-03-27(a)(1)

In point of fact, it is almost certainly the case that Plaintiff's claims against Facebook arise out of the latter's activity in California, where its records custodians are located. ... Accordingly, New York's long-arm statute does not confer jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim against Facebook.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transactions; doing business in New York generally is insufficient.

RamiroAviles v. S&P Global, Inc. · filed 2019-03-28(a)(1)

Thus, even if Portsmouth can be said to transact business in New York as a general matter, Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of making out a prima facie showing that the particular claims they assert here "aris[e] from" that business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when a claim arises from the defendant’s business transactions in New York.

New London Assocs., LLC v. Kinetic Soc. LLC · filed 2019-04-11(a)(1)

NLA has made a prima facie showing that the Blue Chip Defendants are subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York. NLA has alleged that, while in New York, the Blue Chip defendants entered into transactions with Twelvefold and Kinetic -- both New York entities. NLA's claims against the Blue Chip Defendants arise from those transactions.

Section 302(a)(1) and (a)(3) do not provide jurisdiction over an insurer’s coverage suit when the claim arises from out-of-state insurance policies rather than the insured’s New York acts.

Hiscox Insurance Company, Inc. v. Bordenave · filed 2019-06-26(a)(1), (a)(3)

Because Hiscox’s cause of action therefore does not “aris[e] from” acts occurring in New York, § 302 does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Hiscox’s bid for a declaratory judgment.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary provides funds as an active investment in New York real estate.

United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd. · filed 2015-08-07(a)(1)

On a motion to dismiss, when the court must draw inferences iñ favor of the Government, it is plausible on these facts that the funds were sent as part of an active investment into New York.real estate. In the court’s view, this is sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction -under New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction under its “contracts anywhere” provision when an insurer contracts to provide coverage in New York and the action arises from that contract.

Blau v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America · filed 2015-08-17(a)(1)

Allianz North America does not contest that Blau has satisfied the second prong of the section 302(a)(1) analysis—that this action “arises from” Allianz North America’s contract with Zupnick. Finally, because the court concludes, at this stage, that Blau has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under the “contracts anywhere” provision of CPLR section 302(a)(1), the court need not determine whether he has made a sufficient showing under the “transacts business” provision of the same statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on a single New York transaction when the claim arises from that transaction.

Noval Williams Films LLC v. Branca · filed 2015-09-03(a)(1)

And New York’s long-arm statute is a “single act” statute; accordingly, this one transaction in New York relating to the claims at issue suffices for the exercise of specific jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer specific jurisdiction based on communications recruiting a New York resident to work outside New York.

Yih v. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company · filed 2019-06-24(a)(1)

Ultimately then, this is an instance where an out-of-state Defendant sent communications into New York to solicit Plaintiff to perform “non-New York services,” which “do[es] not support personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1).” ... Accordingly, this Court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant under section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1)'s nexus requirement is met for a subpoena when the requested records concern transfers facilitated by a foreign bank's New York banking activity.

Gucci America, Inc. v. Li · filed 2015-09-29(a)(1)

Furthermore, with respect to the second prong of the § 302(a)(1) analysis, there is a strong relationship between BOC’s New York conduct and Gucci’s subpoena requests. ... Clearly, there is more than “an articulable nexus” between BOC’s New York business activity and Gucci’s discovery requests.

Section 302 requires a nexus between the claim and conduct in New York; the Connecticut conduct alleged here did not satisfy that requirement.

Sonterra Capital Master Fund v. Barclays Bank Plc · filed 2018-12-21

Plaintiff FrontPoint's unjust enrichment claim against Defendant UBS involves conduct alleged to have taken place in Connecticut, not New York. Therefore the unjust enrichment claim does not meet the standard of New York's long-arm statute, ... and cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction.

In assessing whether a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York, a single six-month contract does not establish an ongoing contractual relationship.

Gordian Group, LLC v. Syringa Exploration, Inc. · filed 2016-03-10(a)(1)

Because the Agreement is the only source of contractual obligations between the parties, it is therefore properly characterized as a single short-term contract and not the foundation of an ongoing contractual relationship.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully directs funds into a New York correspondent bank account and the claim arises from that use.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita, Bank B.S.C. v. Bahrain Islamic Bank · filed 2016-03-30(a)(1)

The Banks’ purposeful use of correspondent bank accounts in New York constitutes a “transaction of business” within New York. ... The Committee’s cause of action for the avoidance of a preferential transfer “arises from” the Banks’ use of the New York correspondent bank accounts. ... That specific jurisdiction may be asserted under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) is strong evidence that the assertion of jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process.

Section 302(a)(1) does not require a foreign bank to direct payments into its New York correspondent account for that account to support personal jurisdiction.

Nike, Inc. v. Wu · filed 2018-11-19(a)(1)

In spite of the Banks' arguments, New York's long-arm statute clearly does not require, as a condition precedent to personal jurisdiction, that foreign banks direct the payment of funds into their correspondent accounts.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a claim related to a defendant’s New York transaction even when some or all of the alleged wrongdoing occurred outside New York.

Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC · filed 2016-03-31(a)(1)

There is no requirement under § 302(a)(1) that a plaintiffs claim must arise exclusively from New York conduct. To the contrary, as long as there is a relatedness between a plaintiffs claim and the defendant’s New York transaction, § 302(a)(1) confers jurisdiction even if some, or all, of the acts constituting the breach sued upon occurred outside New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; merely making a website available to New York residents is insufficient.

Megna v. Biocomp Laboratories Inc. · filed 2016-08-12(a)(1)

Upon review, the Court finds that Meg-na has not demonstrated a sufficient connection between the Website and New York residents to constitute purposeful activity. First, mere availability of the Website to New York residents is insufficient.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a website without alleged commercial activity in New York.

Sullivan, Jr. v. Walker Construction, Inc. · filed 2019-05-07(a)(1)

However, Plaintiff has not alleged a reasonable probability that Defendant’s website has been “actually used to effect commercial transactions with customers in New York.” ... Accordingly, there is no personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) and (a)(3) do not confer personal jurisdiction over a website operator merely because its website is accessible in New York; the plaintiff must show the required New York business activity or tort contacts.

Sullivan, Jr. v. Jersey Strong Licensing LLC · filed 2019-07-12(a)(1), (a)(3)

The Court thus finds that Defendant does not transact business in New York through the Website, and is not subject to jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). ... The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3) over Defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim against a non-domiciliary to arise from its New York business activity; unrelated New York contacts do not establish specific jurisdiction.

Corley v. Vance · filed 2019-08-15(a)(1)

The Complaint contains no allegations that Blackberry has engaged in any conduct in New York giving rise to a cause of action against it. ... Accordingly, New York’s long-arm statute does not confer specific jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim against Blackberry.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Out Of The Blue Wholesale, LLC v. Pacific American Fish Co. Inc. · filed 2019-08-23(a)(1)

Because this action arises from Plaintiff’s attempts to make such payments, the second requirement of CPLR section 302(a) (1) is satisfied.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the New York business activity and the claim; a claim arising from conduct in another state does not satisfy that requirement merely because a New York company was involved.

Alessi Equipment, Inc. v. American Piledriving Equipment, Inc. · filed 2019-09-16(a)(1)

Simply put, APE’s claim against White does not arise out of activities in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer specific jurisdiction when the defendant’s alleged conduct is unconnected to business activity in New York.

Now-Casting Economics, LTD. v. Economic Alchemy LLC · filed 2019-09-24(a)(1)

For similar reasons, specific jurisdiction is also not proper under the New York long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a nexus between the defendant’s New York business transactions and the claim to establish personal jurisdiction.

In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litigation · filed 2019-10-04(a)(1)

Plaintiffs have not established a nexus between the alleged business transactions in New York and the claims of this antitrust case.

Section 302(a)(1) does not support personal jurisdiction when the defendant’s asserted New York contacts are conclusory or too attenuated to be attributed to it.

Franklin v. Coloplast Corp. · filed 2019-10-21(a)(1)

All proposed contacts for Coloplast A/S are either conclusory or so attenuated as to not be fairly attributable to it. Thus, this Court cannot find personal jurisdiction over this defendant under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant arranges distribution and performance in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Pickett v. Migos Touring, Inc. · filed 2019-11-12(a)(1)

The Court holds that Plaintiff has pleaded facts which support a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) because Quality Control transacted business here by arranging for the distribution and performance of Defendant’s Work within the state of New York, and that Plaintiff’s action for copyright infringement, arises from that transaction of business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who sells allegedly infringing goods to a retailer that resells them in New York.

Car-Freshner Corporation v. Just Funky LLC · filed 2019-11-25(a)(1)

Regarding New York’s long-arm statute, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a domiciliary of Ohio, because Defendant sold its allegedly infringing product to Hot Topic, a retailer who resold the product in the Northern District of New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York, directly or through an agent, when the claim arises from that business.

Minner v. Navient Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-02-25(a)(1)

C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) contains two requirements relevant to this action: (1) the non- domiciliary must transact business (by itself or through an agent) within the state, and (2) the claim against the non-domiciliary must arise out of that business activity. ... Taking Minner’s allegations as true, this Court finds that Minner has made a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over NC under CPLR § 302(a)(1) as well.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a company that supplies goods into New York under contracts with third parties when the claims arise from those goods.

RV Skincare Brands LLC v. Digby Investments Limited · filed 2019-07-24(a)(1)

In sum, QuickBox’s conduct brings it within the ambit of C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) because it supplied goods into New York (albeit at the direction of third parties) that are now the subject of Plaintiffs’ infringement claims.

Section 302(a)(1) reaches a non-domiciliary that contracts to supply goods in New York, including by processing a sales representative’s orders for those goods.

Heritage Lace, Inc. v. Underwraps Costume Corporation · filed 2019-08-16(a)(1)

If, as Underwraps contends, FeBland is merely an independent contractor who earns a commission (Dkt. No. 31 at 2), then by processing FeBland’s orders (Dkt. No. 31 at 2–3), Underwraps is “contract[ing] . . . to supply goods” within the state of New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident contracts to provide services in New York and the claim arises from that activity.

Schleifer v. Lexus of Manhattan · filed 2019-09-24(a)(1)

Under the second prong of § 302(a)(1), Plaintiff has sufficiently made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a carrier that undertakes to deliver goods in New York for claims arising from that delivery.

HEROD'S STONE DESIGN v. MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY S.A.. · filed 2020-01-22(a)(1)

Here, evidence and allegations before the Court show that BNSF undertook to deliver the marble tiles to New York, and consequently is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York for Plaintiff’s claims arising out of that delivery.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that activity; an Internet defamation claim does not satisfy those requirements merely because the articles use a New York document or appear on a website accessible in New York.

Cameron v. Gorski · filed 2019-10-28(a)(1)

Thus, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged defendant transacted business in New York or that plaintiff’s claim arises from defendant’s contacts in New York. Accordingly, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant targets New Yorkers through an interactive website and the claim arises from that website activity.

Camacho v. Vanderbilt University · filed 2019-12-04(a)(1)

In light of this, the Court understands that Plaintiff intended to plead that Defendant targets its website at New Yorkers by using the website to solicit applications during college fairs held in New York State. Coupling this allegation with the alleged interactivity of the Website, the Court concludes that New York’s long-arm statute is satisfied.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on a college’s informational website being accessible to New York residents.

Sullivan, Jr. v. Ringling College of Art And Design, Inc. · filed 2019-12-04(a)(1)

Thus, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant transacts business in New York based on its operation of a website does not satisfy § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) can support personal jurisdiction based on a single New York transaction when the claim arises from that business activity, even if New York sales are a small share of the seller’s total sales.

Brady v. Anker Innovations Limited · filed 2020-01-13(a)(1)

Finally, it does not matter that Fantasia’s sales to New York only account for 10% of its total, worldwide sales because, as previously explained, a single act is sufficient to support jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a defamation claim when the statements have a substantial nexus to the defendant’s business activities in New York.

Bah v. Apple Inc. · filed 2020-02-10(a)(1)

Here, the totality of the circumstances supports a finding that a sufficient nexus exists between Bah’s claims and defendants’ in-state business as the defamatory statements were made to protect and advance defendants’ New York commercial activities, were made in New York, and were directed to a specific New York audience.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim has an articulable nexus to that business.

Payne v. McGettigan's Management Services LLC · filed 2020-05-26(a)(1)

That McGettigan routinely visited and managed the Bar constitutes transaction of business in New York state. Likewise there is an articulable nexus between McGettigan’s New York business activities and plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an online seller whose New York sales are substantially related to the claims, even without an identified sale of an infringing item to a New York customer.

Pearson Education, Inc. v. Doe 1 · filed 2020-06-30(a)(1)

It is true that Plaintiffs do not allege that a particular Counterfeit Book was sold or distributed by Ault to a specific customer in New York. But they nonetheless have satisfied the “relatively permissive” showing required for this prong. ... Because Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Ault “arise from” his transaction of business in New York, jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) is proper.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business in New York through online storefronts when the claims arise from that business.

ABC v. DEF · filed 2020-07-03(a)(1)

The plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defaulting defendants. The defaulting defendants have transacted business within the state by virtue of the defaulting defendants’ operation of online user accounts and merchant storefronts through which customers in New York can view and purchase the counterfeit products at issue in this case.

Sales of an allegedly infringing product in New York can satisfy § 302(a)(1) and (a)(2) as grounds for personal jurisdiction.

American Infertility of New York, P.C. v. Deep Blue Health New Zealand Ltd. · filed 2020-07-23(a)(1)-(2)

Because Defendant sold the infringing product in New York, Judge Moses reasonably concluded that the requirements of N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 302(a)(1)-(2) were satisfied.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant whose New York business activity gave rise to the claim.

Bell v. Koss · filed 2020-08-07(a)(1)

The complaint alleges only contract claims, so the relevant provision of New York law is C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), which allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant that “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), so long as “the claim asserted . . . arise[s] from that business activity,” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that his contracts with EEC designated New York as the venue for any dispute, Compl. ¶ 2, but he has not demonstrated any contacts between Kain or Sharmini Kumar and this forum—much less contacts that gave rise to his claims.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank when its claim-related use of a New York correspondent account consists of three passively received transfers that do not show purposeful availment.

Vasquez v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. · filed 2020-08-10(a)(1)

The Court therefore holds that HSBC Hong Kong’s use of a New York-based correspondent account in connection with plaintiffs’ three transfers was not an act of purposeful availment sufficient to subject it to specific personal jurisdiction in New York under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over out-of-state clients who retain a New York lawyer and repeatedly communicate with that lawyer in New York about the representation.

The Kogan Law Group, P.C. v. Brace · filed 2020-08-26(a)(1)

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Client Defendants because they formed an attorney-client relationship with KLG and projected themselves into the New York legal services market.

Section 302(a)(1) allows New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

North Fork Partners Investment Holdings, LLC v. Bracken · filed 2020-11-23(a)(1)

To establish jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), Plaintiff must allege that: (1) a defendant has “transacted business” in New York, and (2) the claim asserted arises from that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Guglielmo v. Nebraska Furniture Mart, Inc. · filed 2020-12-18(a)(1)

As stated above, New York’s long-arm statute permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary if: (i) the non-domiciliary transacts business in New York state; and (ii) the claims against the non-domiciliary arise out of that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defamation claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transaction; an unrelated business trip does not establish jurisdiction.

Hillel v. Obvio Health USA, Inc. · filed 2021-01-21(a)(1)

Even if the Individual Defamation Defendants’ minimal ties to New York would be enough to satisfy the transacting business criterion, Plaintiff still must show that her claims “aris[e] from” those transactions. Licci, 673 F.3d at 60. She cannot.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that purposefully transacts business in New York in a transaction substantially related to the claim.

RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Garcia Hamilton & Associates, LP · filed 2021-01-22(a)(1)

Garcia Hamilton has therefore not transacted business in New York within the meaning of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) and, because there is no other statutory basis for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Garcia Hamilton, RBC’s complaint must be dismissed without prejudice to its refiling in an appropriate forum.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

MDG Real Estate Global Limited v. Berkshire Place Associates, LP · filed 2021-02-02(a)(1)

Only CPLR § 302(a)(1), conferring jurisdiction over a defendant who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” appears remotely relevant, and it is clear that the provision does not salvage MDG’s claim.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business activity.

S & P Investment Group, LLC v. Kingdom Materials Holdings LLC · filed 2021-02-11(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) provides for jurisdiction if (a) the defendant transacted business in New York and (b) the claim arises from that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York.

Ascento Capital, LLC v. MinervaWorks, LLC · filed 2021-06-01(a)(1)

As to the first factor, we find that Minerva transacted business in New York because an agent of Minerva visited New York to discuss the Contract; the parties negotiated the Contract, in part, in New York; and Minerva maintained an ongoing contractual relationship with a New York corporation.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

Laba v. JBO Worldwide Supply Pty Ltd · filed 2021-07-01(a)(1)

Accepting as true all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and construing all reasonable inferences in light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendants’ actions satisfy section 302(a)(1) of the New York long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

City Of New York v. Singh · filed 2021-09-13(a)(1)

A plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) by establishing “first, that defendant transacted business within the state of New York, and second, that this action arises from that transaction of business.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business within New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

Kumar v. ElectrifAi, LLC · filed 2021-09-28(a)(1)

The Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Mr. Scott and Ms. Hornberger under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) because the two “transact[ed] business within the state.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from those business activities.

Sandstone Springs, LLC v. Virag Distribution, LLC · filed 2022-07-29(a)(1)

In the present case (despite the factual disputes as to its contents and duration), Plaintiff’s meeting with Koutsogiannis of Defendant in December 2019, coupled with subsequent email and telephone negotiations in establishing the sales agreement, is purposeful contact with New York that are sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant, see id. at 266, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 867. ... Upon the totality of circumstances alleged herein, specific jurisdiction in New York upon Defendant exists. Thus, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Docket No. 5) is denied on specific jurisdiction grounds.

Section 302(a)(1) requires specific facts supporting a defendant’s transaction of business in New York; a general allegation about all defendants is insufficient.

Farsura v. QC Terme US Corp · filed 2022-09-13(a)(1)

First, although the complaint states that “all Defendants transact business [in] . . . New York,” Compl. ¶ 19, Plaintiffs provide no specific facts which support the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Whitebridge Defendants under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in the state or contracts to supply goods or services there when the claim arises from that activity.

Donnelly v. Anand · filed 2022-09-22(a)(1)

CPLR 302(a)(1) provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state . . . .” “To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts to supply goods or services there when the claim arises from that activity.

Aero AG Holdings, LLC v. Huggoes Fashion LLC · filed 2022-09-26(a)(1)

Put simply, “the defendant must have transacted business within the state[,] and [] the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... These allegations fall far short of the long-arm statute’s requirement that Aero connect Ali with a single “purposeful transaction” directed at New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from those business contacts.

Paxful, Inc. v. Strandberg · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

In considering these arguments, Judge Netburn accurately sets forth the standard for determining personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302: ... N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of- state party if that party “transacts any business within the state” and if the claim arises from these business contacts. ... The Court has nonetheless reviewed Judge Netburn’s R&R and finds it to be thorough, well-reasoned, and free of any clear error, Accordingly, Judge Netburn’s R&R will be adopted in its entirety, and Paxful’s claims against Strandberg will be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from those business contacts.

Paxful, Inc. v. Lukkonen · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

In considering these arguments, Judge Netburn accurately sets forth the standard for determining personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302: ... N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out- of- state party if that party “transacts any business within the state” and if the claim arises from these business contacts. ... Accordingly, Judge Netburn’s R&R will be adopted in its entirety, and Paxful’s claims against Lukkonen will be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b){2}.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

Prince v. The Intercept · filed 2022-10-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not satisfy the first prong of Section 302(a)(1). ... Because Plaintiff has not satisfied either prong of Section 302(a)(1), New York courts do not have jurisdiction over this defamation claim against Mr. Emmons.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary based on purposeful business transactions in New York that have a sufficient nexus to the plaintiff's cause of action.

Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. · filed 2022-11-01(a)(1)

This testimony raises an issue of fact as to the existence of the requisite purposeful business transactions in New York necessary to assert long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) (see D&R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario FalcÓn PiÑeiro, 90 AD3d 403, 405 [1st Dept 2011]). The decedent's deposition testimony also raises an inference that he was injured by the asbestos inside the gloves when they ripped open while he was wearing them. This testimony may provide a sufficient nexus between plaintiff's cause of action and SGI's alleged New York business transactions (id.).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Starke v. Krupica · filed 2022-12-14(a)(1)

There are two requirements for personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1): first, “defendant must have transacted business within the state”, and second, “the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... Section 302(a)(1) is a “single act statute,” so personal jurisdiction may be appropriate if the defendant engaged in a single transaction even if he did not enter New York, “so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

Vivi Holding Eastern Corp v. Wong · filed 2023-01-19(a)(1)

A person who seeks permission from a Virginia state commission for a Virginia corporation to use an assumed or fictitious name — and who lists a return address in New York, signs the application in New York, and has her signature notarized in New York — has not transacted business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) lets New York courts exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

State of New York v. Vayu, Inc. · filed 2023-02-14(a)(1)

These facts demonstrate a clear intent by Vayu to engage purposefully in business activities within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a seller purposefully makes sales to New York consumers and the claims substantially relate to those sales.

Moonbug Entertainment Limited v. Sell · filed 2023-02-16(a)(1)

In sum, defendants’ actions more than satisfy the requirements of § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that New York business activity.

Dixon v. Stedman · filed 2023-03-30(a)(1)

These allegations suffice to make a prima facie showing that the individual defendants transacted business in New York within the meaning of Section 302(a)(1). ... By undertaking this representation, defendants “purposely availed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within New York and thereby invoked the benefits and protections of its laws.” ... Accordingly, personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants is proper under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Pitcher v. Union Carbide Corporation · filed 2023-08-16(a)(1)

The Court therefore concludes that exposure in New York – where Chattem sold and advertised those products – satisfies this threshold.

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between the defendant’s New York sales and the plaintiff’s claims.

Executive Park Partners LLC v. Benicci Inc. · filed 2023-05-31(a)(1)

Like in Common Cents, Real Selling, and Mondellbahn, here too there is no articulable nexus between Defendant’s sales in New York and Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Perna v. Sacred Heart Univ, Inc · filed 2023-03-01(a)(1)

“To establish personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... Plaintiff has not plausibly asserted that the cause of action sued upon derives from “some articulable nexus” from the alleged business activity by Defendant in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the defendant transacts business in New York and the claim has an articulable nexus or substantial relationship to that transaction.

Noris Med., Inc. v. Siev · filed 2023-03-21(a)(1)

The determination of whether long-arm jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(1) is a "two-pronged inquiry" which requires a court to decide "(1) whether the defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, (2) whether [the] cause of action aris[es] from such a business transaction" (Wilson v Dantas, 128 AD3d 176, 181 [1st Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted], affd 29 NY3d 1051 [2017]). The second prong requires a showing of "an 'articulable nexus' or 'substantial relationship' between the business transaction and the claim asserted" (Licci v Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327, 339 [2012] [internal citations omitted]; see also Matter of James v iFinex Inc., 185 AD3d 22, 28-29 [1st Dept 2020]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim has an articulable nexus or substantial relationship to that activity.

Select Harvest USA LLC v. Indian Overseas Bank · filed 2023-03-28(a)(1)

To establish jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1), a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant has “transacted business” in New York, and (2) the claim asserted arises from that business activity. ... Under the first prong, a non-domiciliary defendant need not be physically present in New York to “transact business,” so long as the defendant has engaged in “purposeful activity,” for example, “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” ... Under the second prong, “a suit will be deemed to have arisen out of a party’s activities in New York if there is ‘an articulable nexus,’ or a ‘substantial relationship,’ between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Zhongzhi Hi-Tech Overseas Investment Ltd. v. Shi · filed 2023-07-17(a)(1)

New York’s long arm statute provides, in part, “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). “‘To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.’” ... Furthermore, Petitioner’s arguments regarding Respondent’s defense in the Baliga action fail to meet either prong of the statutory analysis required under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). First, defending an action is not considered to be “doing business” in the New York. ... Second, Petitioner has not asserted sufficient facts regarding how there is an “arguable nexus” between the Baliga lawsuit and the present action.

Section 302(a)(1) allows personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York only when the claim arises from that business activity.

Newton v. Meyer · filed 2023-03-17(a)(1)

Accordingly, Newton fails to allege a sufficient “articulable nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action sued upon” to establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) allows New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Dicks v. Cooks Junction, Inc. · filed 2023-04-04(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1), “Plaintiff must allege that (1) Defendant has ‘transacted business’ in New York, and (2) the claim asserted arises from that business activity.” ... The first prong of § 302(a)(1) is satisfied in this instant case. ... The second prong of §302(a)(1) requires that Plaintiff’s cause of action “arise from” Defendant’s transactions in New York. ... This Court thus concludes that the second prong of § 302(a)(1) is also met and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is proper under New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful New York activities bear a substantial relationship to the claim.

Serota v. Cooper · filed 2023-05-17(a)(1)

In this case, in opposition to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction over the defendant existed under CPLR 302(a)(1). The defendant did not conduct sufficient purposeful activities in New York which bore a substantial relationship to the subject matter of this action so as to avail herself of the benefits and protections of New York's laws (see Unitrade Corp. v International Data Sys., Inc., 114 AD3d 934, 935; Iavarone v Northpark Partners, LP, 89 AD3d 902, 903; Muse Collections, Inc. v Carissima Bijoux, Inc., 86 AD3d 631, 631).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claims arise from that business.

Guerrero v. Ogawa USA Inc. · filed 2023-06-26(a)(1)

Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction because it “transacts any business within the state” of New York and Guerrero’s claims arise out of such transaction of business, under circumstances where the exercise of jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts to supply goods or services there.

Kelly Toys Holdings LLC. v. 19885566 Store · filed 2023-06-29(a)(1)

Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” That is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction here. Alibaba.com and AliExpress.com are “interactive” websites that enable Defendants and other companies to sell and ship counterfeit products to consumers in New York. ... This is sufficient to meet the “single act” requirement of Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

Farsura v. QC Terme US Corp · filed 2023-07-05(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary “who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... After drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, Struna v. Leonardi, 626 F. Supp. 3d 657, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Whitebridge.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an entity that transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

Jordan v. Golden Bridge Books · filed 2023-07-06(a)(1)

New York’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over any entity that “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a}(1). Based on the allegation in the Complaint that Golden Bridge has “conducted significant business in New York through marketing to New York-based residents,” including by “offering the [] Book that is the subject of the action,” Compl. § 4, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Golden Bridge.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

Kalaj v. Kay · filed 2023-07-17(a)(1)

Pursuant to Section 302(a)(1), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who, “in person or through an agent,” (1) “transacts any business within the state” or (2) “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

Foley v. Union De Banques Arabes Et Francaises · filed 2023-07-20(a)(1)

Given the factual similarities between the claims here and those in Licci III, this Court holds that jurisdiction is proper under CPLR § 302(a)(1) because “repeated use of the correspondent account shows not only transaction of business, but an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the transaction and [Plaintiffs’ claims].” Licci III, 20 N.Y.3d at 340.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from those contacts.

Astra Veda Corporation v. Apollo Capital Corp · filed 2023-07-24(a)(1)

N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party if that party “transacts any business within the state,” and if the claim arises from these business contacts.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York when the claim arises from that activity.

Kyle v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2023-08-04(a)(1)

On this record the Court finds that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1). ... The Court finds that the “transacts business” element of § 302(a)(1) is satisfied. ... Therefore, the Court finds that all elements necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) are met here.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York, even if that person has not entered the state.

Law Off. of Cary Scott Goldinger, P.C. v. Deluca · filed 2023-08-09(a)(1)

Under New York's long-arm statute, "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state" (CPLR 302[a][1]), regardless of whether that non-domiciliary has actually entered New York State (see Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d at 380).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

ALLSTAR MARKETING GROUP LLC v. ANDNOV73 · filed 2023-08-14(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), a plaintiff must meet two requirements: “(1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... The Court therefore concludes that the Defaulting Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting business in the State of New York and that there is a direct relationship between these activities and Allstar’s claims. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 302(a)(1) is proper.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the cause of action arises from that transaction.

Koutsoudakis & Iakovou Law Group, PLLC v. Bulent · filed 2023-08-14(a)(1)

Under § 302(a)(1), a court examines “(1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such a business transaction.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from those transactions.

Bendit v. Canva, Inc. · filed 2023-08-22(a)(1)

The Complaint plausibly alleges facts, however, giving rise to specific jurisdiction under New York’s Long-Arm Statute. ... The test for specific jurisdiction is whether Defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, whether this case arises from these business transactions. ... Here, a contract executed in New York, with a New York resident, under New York law, for a photoshoot which then took place in New York City, satisfies Section 302(a)(1)’s requirements.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, and the claim arises from those acts.

Dental Recycling North America, Inc. v. Stoma Ventures, Inc. · filed 2023-05-12(a)(1)

Stated differently, the reimbursed shipment of samples constitutes neither a “transact[ion of] business within the state” nor a “contract[ ] anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), nor does it constitute a “substantial relationship” or an “articulable nexus” to this false advertising cause of action, Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V., 450 F.3d at 103. Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) may provide personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state manufacturer or supplier that contracts to supply goods or services in New York.

D'AMBOLA v. DAILY HARVEST, INC. · filed 2023-05-30(a)(1)

With respect to Stone Gate Foods and Smirk’s, New York’s longarm statute appears to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction, because as a manufacturer and a supplier, respectively, of Daily Harvest’s Lentil Product, these Defendants presumably contracted to supply goods or services to Daily Harvest in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) allows a defendant to transact business in New York without being physically present there.

Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc. · filed 2023-06-02(a)(1)

Malwarebytes does not have to be physically present in New York to transact business there within the meaning of the first clause of Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign entity that transacts business or contracts to supply goods or services in New York, while Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction for qualifying tortious acts outside New York that cause in-state injury and meet the statute’s other requirements.

AMERICAN GIRL, LLC v. ZEMBRKA · filed 2023-06-26(a)(1) and (a)(3)

Section 302(a)(1) of New York’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity if it “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” ... The few dozen instances that Plaintiff has identified in which New York customers purchased the allegedly infringing products do not qualify as business transactions for the purposes of New York’s long-arm statute. ... Without the shipment of an allegedly infringing product in this case, there is no New York transaction from which Plaintiff’s trademark infringement claims arise. As such, there can be no personal jurisdiction based on the transaction of business. ... Plaintiff also may establish specific jurisdiction over Defendants under Section 302(a)(3) of New York’s long-arm statute. ... In order to demonstrate long-arm jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3), a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) Defendants committed a tortious act outside the state; (2) Plaintiff’s cause of action arose from that act; (3) the tortious act caused injury to a person or property within the state; (4) Defendants expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the state; and (5) Defendants derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. ... Accordingly, Defendants are not subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 302(a)(3).

Section 302 requires a defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that transaction.

Henkin v. Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. · filed 2023-07-28(a)(1)

New York’s long arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, requires that the Bank “transact[ed] business within the state and the cause of action arises from that transaction.” Reed Int'l, Inc. v. Afghanistan Int'l Bank, No. 21-cv-10626, 2023 WL 2138600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023). The “transacting business” requirement is satisfied by the purposeful availment standard discussed above. Additionally, there must be “a relatedness between the transaction and the legal claim such that the latter is not completely unmoored from the former.” See Licci, 732 F.3d at 168-69.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a cause of action to arise from the nondomiciliary’s business transacted in New York; an accident in Vermont did not arise from that business.

Curran v. Rouse Transportation Corp. · filed 1964-03-23(a)(1)

As to Boise, personal jurisdiction may only be obtained over him if the cause of action arose from the business he was doing or transacting within this State (former Civ. Prac. Act, § 229-b; CPLR 301; 302, subd. [a], par. 1). He may have been doing or transacting business within this State, but this court is of the opinion that the cause of action, which is based upon an accident which occurred in Vermont, cannot reasonably be said to have arisen out of that business within the meaning and intent of the statute.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a cause of action to arise from business transacted in New York; goods merely passing through New York do not establish that connection.

Brunette Sunapee Corp. v. Zeolux Corp. · filed 1964-04-29(a)(1)

Even if the machines touched New York in their commercial journey, plaintiff may not avail itself of section 302 under these circumstances. It is apparent that none of the elements of a cause of action for negligence or a cause of action for breach of implied warranty arose out of the transaction of business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Life Companies, Inc. · filed 1964-04-29(a)(1)

With or without the consideration of the facts set forth in the plaintiff’s affidavits, and which, incidentally, have neither been controverted or denied, it is clear that defendants’ activities have fulfilled the requisite jurisdictional requirements, Bach is amenable to extraterritorial service under Section 302(a) N.Y. CPLR if it "transacts any business within the state,” and the cause of action arises out of the business transacted.

Section 302(a)(1)'s “arising from” requirement covers a tax claim based on income allegedly derived from a non-domiciliary's New York business.

United States v. Montreal Trust Co. · filed 1964-05-01(a)(1)

I hold that the cause of action asserted here “arises from” the alleged transaction of business by Klein, within the meaning of the New York statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that executes a contract in New York and sends an officer there for related examinations.

Lewis v. American Archives Ass'n · filed 1964-07-22(a)(1)

The facts also show that Guiles was actually examined before trial in Washington County and that defendant’s vice-president came into this State to attend the examinations before trial. I conclude that there was sufficient contact with New York State by the defendant to give this court jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on billing a New York buyer and conducting limited negotiations about complaints concerning the goods.

Perlmutter v. Standard Roofing & Tinsmith Supply Co. · filed 1964-09-01(a)(1)

It would appear, therefore, that the sole contact of Standard with this State was its billing for the materials to the plaintiffs and the limited negotiations regarding the complaints surrounding the alleged defective materials. To grant personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of such unsubstantial contact would offend the traditional notions of justice and fair play.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when a contract is negotiated and consummated in New York, including for a tort claim closely intertwined with that contract.

Janklow v. Williams · filed 1964-09-25(a)(1)

Furthermore, the negotiations and the consummation of the contract having occurred within the State, there can be no question that CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) is applicable, particularly where the tort action is so closely interwoven with the contract entered into between the parties.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from business transacted in New York; buying tickets there does not make a claim for negligence during an out-of-state trip arise from the sale.

Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd. · filed 1964-12-09(a)(1)

302 is limited, insofar as it is relevant, to 'a cause of action arising from * * * business (transacted) within the state.' We assume for the sake of argument that the sale of the tickets by defendants to plaintiffs through Herren-Rogers was a business transaction within New York. We cannot, however, agree that plaintiffs' cause of action in tort arose from that sale.

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction for a claim arising from a defendant’s relationship to New York realty when the claim arose, even if the defendant later sold the property, moved away, or faces only a damages remedy.

Tebedo v. Nye · filed 1965-02-09(a)(3)

CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3) grants in personam jurisdiction when the cause of action arises out of the fact of ownership, use or possession of New York realty. The fact that defendants no longer have an interest in the realty and no longer live in this State is immaterial, as is the nature of the remedy sought. Jurisdiction is grounded on the relationship existing between the defendant and the realty out of which the cause of action arose at the time the cause of action arose.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over claims based on an oral agreement when the defendant took no action concerning that agreement in New York, even if an earlier New York agreement led to it.

Rene Boas & Associates v. Vernier · filed 1965-03-23(a)(1)

In the absence of any showing that the oral agreement with defendant was negotiated or concluded by defendant in New York, or that defendant did any other act with respect to the oral agreement in New York, it cannot be said that the causes of action arose from an act of defendant in the transaction of business within the State (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1). The fact that a prior written agreement was historically necessary to the inception of the subsequent oral agreement does not alone, for purposes of the jurisdiction statute, support personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a cause of action arising from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York to establish personal jurisdiction.

Schnall v. Clearfield Cheese Co. · filed 1965-03-23(a)(1)

Jurisdiction over the defendant in this action depends upon whether or not the plaintiff has a cause of action “ arising from ” the transaction of “any business within the state” (see CPLR 302). Inasmuch as it does not appear from plaintiff’s amended complaint or his affidavits that he has any such cause of action, the motion under CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 8) to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted.

Negotiating and concluding goods contracts by mail and telephone with New York residents alone does not establish sufficient New York business activity for personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co. · filed 1965-04-06(a)(1)

We fail to see in what material respect Hammons invoked the benefits and protections of New York law merely by negotiating and concluding goods contracts through the mails and by telephone with persons residing in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on negotiating and concluding goods contracts by mail and telephone with New York residents.

Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co. · filed 1965-04-21(a)(1)

We fail to see in what material respect Hammons invoked the benefits and protections of New York law merely by negotiating and concluding goods contracts through the mails and by telephone with persons residing in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction; an employee’s in-state performance of a contract can constitute the defendant’s transaction of business.

Schneider v. J & C Carpet Co. · filed 1965-04-27(a)(1)

The activities of the plaintiff in New York in furtherance of the contract must be considered as being those of the defendant. Thus, it is clear that the defendant was transacting business in this State within the contemplation of CPLR 302. Since the performance of the contract constituted the requisite transacting of business, the instant action — bottomed on the alleged breach of that contract — arose therefrom and the elements necessary for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 are present.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York for jurisdiction based on transacting business.

Ellis v. Smith Transfer Corp. · filed 1965-11-08(a)(1)

The record contains little evidence, if any, of any act by which appellants availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in New York, thus invoking the benefits and protection of our laws. This is the sine qua non of each case where jurisdiction is founded on CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) (Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 15 N Y 2d 443).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Johnson v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOC'Y OF THE UNITED STATES · filed 1965-12-01(a)(1)

Upon remission the court at Special Term shall determine as a fact upon the basis of all the proof that may be offered by the parties whether the cause of action for tort described in the complaint arose itself from the transaction of any business by third-party defendant within the State under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1); and if it did not so arise, whether the activities of third-party defendant meet the criteria prescribed by Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. (220 N.Y. 259) for "doing business" within the State.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s business transaction in New York; unrelated New York business does not confer personal jurisdiction.

Schroeder v. Loomis · filed 1965-01-22(a)(1)

In order for this case to come within the area of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1), the particular transaction of business within the State must have resulted in the cause of action. In other words, any unrelated business in New York would not furnish sufficient grounds to hold the defendants liable for these particular causes under 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on purposeful business activity in New York related to a contract, even if the contract was formally executed elsewhere.

Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc. · filed 1965-05-27(a)(1)

Therefore, even though the last act marking the formal execution of the contract may not have occurred within New York, the statutory test may be satisfied by a showing of other purposeful acts performed by the appellant in this State in relation to the contract, albeit preliminary or subsequent to its execution.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a guarantor when the guaranteed payment was designated for performance in New York and the claim arises from a default there.

G. Benedict Corp. v. Epstein · filed 1965-06-02(a)(1)

In my opinion, therefore, although the note and guarantee were executed in Massachusetts, the cause of action arose out of a default ... in payment in Albany, New York, the place designated in writing for the performance (the “ transacting of business ”) of the note and the guarantee, making the defendant Lewis amenable to personal jurisdiction in this suit upon the guarantee.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that purposefully transacts business in New York, while section 302(a)(2) does not apply when the alleged tortious acts occurred outside New York.

Wilsey v. Gavett · filed 1965-12-13(a)(1), (a)(2)

In adopting a “transacting business ” test, the Legislature sought to discard the former “rigid” standard of “doing business” in favor of a more flexible one. What is required now is simply that a person engage in some purposeful activity in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary’s officers conduct business in New York in furtherance of the contract underlying the suit.

A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda. · filed 1966-01-11(a)(1)

The undenied acts of defendant’s officers in New York in defendant’s behalf in furtherance of the performance of the contract constituted the transaction of business within this State in connection with the subject of this action, and within the meaning and intent of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1), so as to confer jurisdiction of this action upon the courts of New York.

Hiring a New York attorney to represent an out-of-state domiciliary in a New York probate proceeding does not constitute doing business in New York under section 302(a)(1).

Winick v. Jackson · filed 1966-03-23(a)(1)

The hiring of a New York attorney by an out-of-State domiciliary to represent her in a probate proceeding pending in this State does not constitute doing business within the State within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1)'s business transaction test may be satisfied by purposeful acts in New York related to a contract, including acts before or after its execution.

Bankers Security Life Insurance Society v. Vitex Manufacturing Co. · filed 1966-03-31(a)(1)

The statutory test may be satisfied by a showing of other ...purposeful acts by tbe nonresident in this State in relation to tbe contract, albeit preliminary or subsequent to its execution.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s agent conducts meaningful business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction, even if the activity is brief.

Pallas v. Driv-Rite, Inc. · filed 1966-04-02(a)(1)

These acts of the defendant’s agent though accomplished with the utmost dispatch, in point of time, are meaningful, and meet the announced criteria which makes Section 302(a) 1 applicable.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that executed the contract at issue in New York as a transaction of business there.

Sharp Export, Ltd. v. Mulco Products, Inc. · filed 1966-04-04(a)(1)

The defendant is subject to New York jurisdiction under CPLR 301 as having done business here, and under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) in that, by executing the contract in issue in New York, defendant was “ transacting ” business here.

Section 302(a)(1) treats a foreign manufacturer’s continuous shipments into New York, in-state agent activity, and distribution of sales literature there as transacting business in the state.

Wilsey v. Gavett · filed 1966-04-06(a)(1)

In summary defendant’s acts of shipping its products into this State on a continuous, well-planned basis, the activities of agents in this State and the distribution of sales literature in this State constituted the transaction of business here.

Insignificant contract negotiations in New York are insufficient to establish that a non-domiciliary transacted business in the state.

Verner v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co. · filed 1966-05-09(a)(1)

To my mind, the fact that part of the contract negotiations, and an insubstantial part at that, took place in New York is insufficient to sustain jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a) (1).

CPLR 302 does not permit personal jurisdiction based solely on a defendant’s registration of a trailer in New York.

Roseland v. National Transportation Co. · filed 1966-12-30(a)(1)

The registration of the trailer in New York is not such a transaction of business as of itself would sustain jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a New York meeting about a contract made outside the state with a nonparty to the suit when substantially all performance occurred elsewhere.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Borden Co. · filed 1967-01-31(a)(1)

Even if there was such an obligation, the presence of Catalysts at a New York meeting to discuss performance of a contract to which Borden was not a party, which contract was entered into out of state and under which contract substantially all performance took place in Louisiana, is clearly not the type of purposeful activity required to sustain jurisdiction under CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat the mere existence of a contract, even one executed in New York, as transacting business in the state.

McNellis v. American Box Board Co. · filed 1967-03-30(a)(1)

It is this court’s opinion that the mere existence of a contract, even if executed in New York, between the bankrupt plaintiff and the defendant, Lessin & Liberty, is not the transacting of business within the State of New York under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Borden Co. · filed 1967-04-07(a)(1)

Turning to the facts of this case, it is clear that the acts performed by Vulcan in New York constituted the transaction of business here and that the instant cause of action arose out of such transaction of business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary general partner whose New York partnership business is related to the plaintiff’s claim, even if the partnership agreement was executed elsewhere.

Krause v. Hauser · filed 1967-05-12(a)(1)

Their activities in New York both prior and subsequent to the execution of the agreement constitute a sufficient basis for the plaintiff’s reliance upon section 302.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc. · filed 1967-05-18(a)(1)

However, the plaintiff does not allege that he had any dealings at all with the British corporate defendant or its agents in this State. Therefore, it may not be said that his cause of action arose from the British corporation’s transaction of any business here, and he is not entitled to avail himself of CPLB 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) in order to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of our courts.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer that conducts no business activities in New York and sells through an independent distributor.

Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co. · filed 1967-05-25(a)(1)

It is perfectly evident that Bombay does not transact “ any business within the state” (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1). It maintains no offices, bank account, telephone listing, or warehouse for the storage of goods here, nor does it employ any salesmen, solicit any orders, make any sales or conduct any shipping activities in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants served outside New York when their contracts were executed and negotiated in New York and the security was paid there.

United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Nationwide Theatres Investment Co. · filed 1967-05-26(a)(1)

From the affidavits it appears that both the lease agreement and the guaranty agreement were executed in New York; that considerable negotiations took place in New York; and that the security was actually paid in New York. Under such circumstances service in Ohio was valid and confers jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary’s combined New York activities sufficiently constitute transacting business in the state.

Atlantic Steamers Supply Co. v. International Maritime Supplies Co. · filed 1967-06-08(a)(1)

Whether or not the signing of the basic contract in New York by itself would be sufficient in this case we need not determine (although we feel that it would), since we have in combination, as outlined above, sufficient activities to meet the statutory standard.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in New York, but shipment of goods alone, without other contacts with the state, is insufficient.

Bard v. Steele · filed 1967-10-31(a)(1)

In our view, Special Term correctly held that appellant “ transact [ed] * * * business within the state” (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1) and thus became amenable to our process. Concededly, transactions limited to the shipment of goods, with no showing of any other contact with the forum State, do not meet the test thus imposed.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a catalog order without a showing that the defendant circulated catalogs or other promotional material in New York.

Maggio v. Gym Master Co. · filed 1967-10-05(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not shown that the catalog used by School Equipment, Inc. was circulated in New York by defendant Gym Master. Neither has there been any showing that Gym Master circulated any other catalogs or promotional material within the State. Absent such a showing, this court cannot say that the activities of Gym Master come within the scope of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

A nonresident does not transact business in New York under § 302(a)(1) merely by executing a note elsewhere and making it payable in New York.

Hubbard, Westervelt & Mottelay, Inc. v. Harsh Building Co. · filed 1967-11-30(a)(1)

No business whatever was transacted by the defendant within New York and no purposeful act was committed by it in the State. ... This is glaringly different from a situation where a defendant executes a note outside of New York State, makes it payable within this State to accommodate the payee and that is his only activity in or with New York State.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

American Radio Ass'n v. A. S. Abell Co. · filed 1968-03-13(a)(1)

While each of the above-enumerated contacts may constitute the transaction of business in this State, not one may be relied upon to uphold jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, since the cause of action alleged in the complaint does not, as is required by statute, arise from any of the acts enumerated.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose purposeful business activity in New York leads to the transaction giving rise to the claim.

General Turbine Corp. v. Helwig Carbon Products, Inc. · filed 1968-04-09(a)(1)

Here the defendant’s representative’s purposeful business activity in New York preceded and culminated in the transaction out of which the cause of action arose. As a consequence of such activity the plaintiff properly obtained personal jurisdiction of the defendant in accordance with the provisions of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Noble v. Singapore Resort Motel of Miami Beach · filed 1968-04-18(a)(1)

Since the cause of action asserted against the defendant corporation did not arise from the transaction of any business in New York within the sense of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1), the only question presented is whether the defendant’s activity in the State constituted the doing of business in the traditional sense under CPLR 301.

A nondomiciliary who enters New York for medical treatment transacts business in the state under CPLR 302(a)(1) and is subject to jurisdiction in the treating physician’s action for payment.

Cohen v. Haberkorn · filed 1968-05-06(a)(1)

A nondomieiliary who enters this State to receive medical treatment thereby “ transacts * * * business within the state,” within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1), and is, therefore, amenable under that statute to the jurisdiction of our courts in an action by the physician to recover the value of the services rendered; and in personam jurisdiction may be acquired over such nondomiciliaries by service of process without the State (CPLR 313).

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction based on transacting business in New York when the nonresident sends no goods there, performs no services there, and owns no property there.

Green & White Construction Co. v. Columbus Asphalt Corp. · filed 1968-06-27(a)(1)

It cannot be held that this defendant transacted any business within the state when it sent no goods to the state, performed no services within the state and owns no property within the state.

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state buyer whose orders originate outside New York and whose purchases are shipped there F.O.B. New York.

Total Sound, Inc. v. Universal Record Distributing Corp. · filed 1968-07-01(a)(1)

Nor did the defendant transact business in New York under CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Carrolton Associates v. Abrams · filed 1968-07-18(a)(1)

In response to the inquiry as to whether the defendants Abrams and Narva did “transact any business” here, I find that they did.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from business it transacted in New York, including purposeful negotiations there concerning the disputed agreement.

Potter's Photographic Applications Co. v. Ealing Corporation · filed 1968-10-11(a)(1)

The “transacts business” standard of § 302 requires less contacts than those required by the “doing business” test. ... However, by the express terms of the statute, the cause of action must arise out of the business transacted within New York. ... On this alternative ground, therefore, Ealing’s motion to dismiss the complaint must also be denied.

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction based on mere mail and telephone communications about a noncommercial contract between an individual nonresident buyer and a New York seller.

Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn · filed 1969-02-06(a)(1)

But as yet, in the evolutionary expansion of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents, mere mail and telephonic communication concerning a noncommercial contract between an individual nonresident buyer in California and a domiciliary seller in New York do not constitute those minimal contacts sufficient to establish the transaction of business in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign freight forwarder whose shipment arrangements and personnel remain outside New York and whose only New York contact is mailing bills of lading.

Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S/S American Champion · filed 1969-05-27(a)(1)

A fortiori, where as here a freight forwarder merely makes arrangements in Great Britain for the shipment to New York of the products of an unrelated manufacturer, where the activities which its own personnel perform take place outside of New York, where it has no personnel within the state, and where its sole active commercial contact with anyone in New York is its mailing of the independent carrier’s bill of lading to a New York City warehouseman and its own bill of lading to the New York importer, it cannot be said that the freight forwarder has transacted business in New York within the meaning of CPLR § 302(a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a single soliciting telephone call and resulting contract without sufficient business activity in New York.

Electronics Devices, Inc. v. Mark Rogers Associates · filed 1969-08-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, from a reading of the plaintiff’s papers, the court has been unable to determine that the defendant herein carried on such negotiations with the plaintiff in New York State with such continuity of activity as to justify a finding that the contacts of the defendant in this State amounted to the ‘ ‘ transaction of any business ” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who actively participates by telephone in a New York auction, including through an assistant present in the state.

Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn · filed 1970-01-08(a)(1)

In sum—the definite and substantial personal involvement of the defendant in the auction here was sufficient, in and of itself, to render him subject to our jurisdiction under CPLR 302. Furthermore, his use of Nash as his assistant and messenger clearly established that he was transacting business in this State “through an agent” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over individuals who transact business in New York for their private benefit through a corporate facade.

Alosio v. Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. · filed 1970-01-09(a)(1)

Appraising the respective submissions in this light, the court finds it amply established for present purposes that the movants did in fact and in legal effect “transact” business in New York for their private and personal benefit (with the corporation constituting at most a facade), justifying the claim of jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s business transacted in New York; an in-state written examination does not establish jurisdiction over a claim arising from separate out-of-state oral examinations.

Joseph R. Fontanetta, M. D. v. American Board of Internal Medicine, a Non-Profit Corporation · filed 1970-02-06(a)(1)

We hold that plaintiff’s claim arises out of events that took place only in St. Louis or Philadelphia, and does not arise out of the transaction of business in New York. Accordingly, we agree with Judge Judd that section 302(a) (1) does not apply.

The place where a contract was made does not by itself determine whether a non-domiciliary transacted business in New York.

Henlopen Manufacturing Co. v. Carlson Tool & Machine Co. · filed 1967-12-04(a)(1)

Assuming the last act necessary to a contract to be the one fixing the locus of that contract, it nevertheless appears that the place of the contract will not always be controlling to determine jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident owner when the sale of New York real estate constitutes transacting business in the state.

Karrat v. Merhib · filed 1970-02-25(a)(1)

There are sufficient minimal contacts to provide this court with jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1), since performance of any contract of sale of New York realty owned by defendants necessarily involves transaction of business within the “ single act statute ” or under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 4).

Section 302(a)(1) reaches a freight forwarder that undertakes to deliver goods to New York, even when it uses a steamship line to carry them.

Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S.S. American Champion · filed 1970-03-27(a)(1)

It can scarcely be doubted that a British ocean carrier delivering cargo in New York would come within CPLR 302(a)(1) as a non-domiciliary who 'transacts any business within the state' and would thus be subject to suit for breach of the contract of carriage. ... We see no sufficient basis for reaching a different result with respect to W&J in the American Champion and Rubens cases. ... W&J was no less transacting business in New York because it employed steamship lines to perform the carriage for it.