N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who commits a tort outside New York that causes injury in New York when the defendant reasonably expects New York consequences and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Marcus v. Archer · filed 2020-08-24(a)(3)(ii)

Marcus alleges that specific jurisdiction exists under CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii), which confers jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who commit a tortious act outside New York that causes injury within New York, if he “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” ... This is a four-part test. A plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant committed a tort outside the state; (2) the act caused injury within the state; (3) the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences within the state; and (4) the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. ... Applying the situs-of-injury test to the case at hand, it is clear that the situs of Marcus’s non-economic injuries — “mental pain and anguish, extreme emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation, and harm to health” (FAC ¶ 94) — is not New York but Louisiana, where the lawsuit against him was filed and is being litigated. ... As Marcus has failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of the § 302(a)(3) test, there is no need for the Court to discuss the final prong: whether Defendants derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for an out-of-state act causing in-state injury when the statutory conditions are met.

Truck-Lite Co., LLC v. Grote Industries, Inc. · filed 2020-09-29(a)(3)(ii)

The R&R recommends that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Grote for Truck-Lite’s strobe and stop/tail/turn lamp claims under New York’s long-arm statute (CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii)), and that exercising personal jurisdiction over Grote for those claims comports with due process. ... This Court carefully reviewed the R&R, the briefing on objections, and the relevant record. Based on that de novo review, the Court accepts and adopts Judge Roemer’s recommendation to deny Grote’s motion in its entirety.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) allows jurisdiction over an out-of-state tort that causes in-state injury when the defendant reasonably expects in-state consequences and derives substantial interstate or international commerce revenue.

DSM Nutritional Products, LLC v. Provitas, LLC · filed 2020-12-16(a)(3)(ii)

At issue, then, is section 302(a)(3)(ii). Jurisdiction under this provision “rests on five elements”: First, that defendant committed a tortious act outside the State; second, that the cause of action arises from that act; third, that the act caused injury to a person or property within the State; fourth, that defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the State; and fifth, that defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate commerce.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that commits an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury, reasonably expects consequences in New York, and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

The Glenn H. Curtiss Museum of Local History v. Confederate Motors, Inc. · filed 2021-02-11(a)(3)(ii)

Under CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii), a court in New York may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the defendant (1) committed a tortious act outside New York that causes injury within New York, (2) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state, and (3) derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires the commercial injury's situs to be in New York, and section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient nexus between New York business activity and the specific claims.

USA Sevens LLC v. World Rugby Ltd. · filed 2021-02-25(a)(3)(ii); (a)(1)

Plaintiffs' contention that World Rugby is subject to jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) is likewise unavailing because plaintiffs did not plead that New York is the situs of the alleged commercial injury they sustained ( see e.g. Deutsche Bank AG v Vik, 163 AD3d 414, 415 [1st Dept 2018] ["the situs of commercial injury is where the original critical events associated with the action or dispute took place, not where any financial loss or damages occurred" (internal quotation marks omitted)]). ... However, plaintiffs fail to allege a sufficient nexus between the parties' broad, overall relationship and plaintiffs' specific claims in this suit ( see generally McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 270, 272 [1981]). ... This meeting, which did not result in an agreement between the parties, did not constitute the transaction of business sufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction over defendants ( see e.g. Paterno v Laser Spine Inst., 24 NY3d 370, 377-379 [2014]; Juron & Minzner v Dranoff & Patrizio, 194 AD2d 402 [1st Dept 1993]). ... Nor does World Rugby's sending of payments to New York satisfy CPLR 302(a)(1) ( Magwitch, L.L.C. v Pusser's Inc., 84 AD3d 529, 531 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012]).

Section 302(a)(3) locates an economic injury where the event giving rise to the injury occurred.

Bartosiewicz v. Nelsen · filed 2021-09-29(a)(3)

Defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3) because the situs of an economic injury is the location of the event giving rise to the injury.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an alleged tort committed outside New York to cause injury in New York; the place where a plaintiff feels financial harm does not establish the injury’s situs.

Paraco Gas Corporation v. Ion Bank · filed 2021-07-06(a)(3)

Plaintiff also does not make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(3), because it does not plausibly allege defendant committed a tortious act outside New York that caused injury within New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the defendant should expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Travel Leaders Group v. Corley · filed 2022-03-30(a)(3)(ii)

New York’s long-arm statute provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act outside of the state that causes injury to any person or property in New York if that entity “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants engaged in false advertising on the internet from their principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. (Report at 11.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ false advertisement caused financial and reputational injury to Plaintiffs in New York, where their principal executive office and headquarters are located. (/d. at 12.) Additionally, because Defendants promoted themselves as affiliated with a New-York based travel agency, Plaintiffs have also shown the Defendants expected, or should have expected, that their actions would have consequences in New York. (Jd. at 13.) Accordingly, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a tortious act outside New York that gives rise to the claim and causes injury within New York.

Greenwood v. Arthrex, Inc. · filed 2022-06-13(a)(3)

For long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3), a defendant must commit a tortious act outside of New York, the cause of action must arise from that tort, and the tort needs to cause injury in New York, Albino v. Global Equip. USA, Ltd., No. 14CV6519, 2018 WL 3537060, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 23, 2018) (Telesca, J.) (Docket No. 22, Pl. Memo. at 5).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York to establish personal jurisdiction based on an out-of-state tort.

Bailon v. Pollen Presents · filed 2023-09-13(a)(3)(ii)

Because Plaintiff has not alleged an injury in New York, she does not provide a basis for maintaining personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3)(ii).

CPLR 302(a)(3) locates a commercial tort injury involving solely economic loss where the original critical events occurred, rather than where the financial loss occurred.

Quad Capital Portfolio A LLC v. AbbVie Inc. · filed 2022-01-06(a)(3)

Personal jurisdiction could also not be established pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3), because, "[i]n the context of a commercial tort, where the damage is solely economic, the situs of commercial injury is where the original critical events associated with the action or dispute took place, not where any financial loss or damages occurred" ( CRT Invs., Ltd. v BDO Seidman, LLP , 85 AD3d 470, 471-472 [1st Dept 2011]). The "original critical events" were the making of the misrepresentations at issue (in Illinois), not the purchase of shares in reliance thereon (in New York).

Section 302(a)(3) looks to where the original injury occurred; later pain or medical treatment in New York does not change that location.

Filsoof v. Wheelock Street Capital, LLC · filed 2023-11-30(a)(3)

Regardless, the location of plaintiff’s ongoing suffering or medical treatment does not alter the situs of the injury.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort threatens specifically identified prospective New York business and its consequences in New York were reasonably foreseeable.

American Integrated Security Group Inc. v. Terra Sound Technology LLC · filed 2023-09-28(a)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, at this stage of the litigation, AISG has established a prima facie case that Ferus caused injury in New York, and thus has established jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury in New York; a plaintiff’s New York headquarters alone does not place the injury there.

Cabot Lodge Securities, LLC v. Stoltmann Law Offices, P.C. · filed 2023-10-16(a)(3)

At bottom, Cabot has not alleged any harm to its New York business. All the claimants are outside New York, Werts worked in Colorado, and the arbitrations are in Colorado. So the tort and its first effects happened outside New York. Cabot felt the aftershocks in New York simply be- cause it is headquartered here. Under § 302(a)(3), that is not enough.

Section 302(a)(3) requires the original event causing the injury to occur in New York; damages felt there later do not establish an injury within the state.

Buliga v. Rudolph and Hellman Automotive · filed 2024-04-22(a)(3)

Here, the original event that caused the injury took place in the United Kingdom, not in New York. ... Thus, there is no personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

For commercial injuries under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), the situs of injury is where the events causing the injury took effect.

Safra v. SNBNY Holdings Ltd. · filed 2024-03-28(a)(3)(ii)

Because the impact of the Dilution Events flowed from Gibraltar, the "situs" of Alberto's injury is not, as Alberto avers, in New York.

Section 302(a)(3) does not establish an in-state injury from lost copyright licensing opportunities solely because the licensee’s principal place of business is in New York; the loss is located where the customers are.

Creative Photographers, Inc. v. Grupo Televisa S.A.B. · filed 2024-04-08(a)(3)

It can be localized to the geographies where Plaintiff lost licensing opportunities. ... That location is where the customers are located. ... It is not in Plaintiff’s principal place of business. Plaintiff has thus not properly alleged personal jurisdiction under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)(i) and (ii) do not confer personal jurisdiction when the alleged injury occurred outside New York.

Kraemer v. Edelstein · filed 2025-02-24(a)(3)(i) and (ii)

Further, because the situs of the alleged injury occurred in Pennsylvania-rather than New York-there is no jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3) (i) and (ii).

For a commercial tort causing solely economic harm, the situs of injury under § 302(a)(3) is where the original critical events occurred, rather than where financial loss was felt.

Murray v. Stone · filed 2024-09-26(a)(3)

New York does not have personal jurisdiction over defendants under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). In the context of a commercial tort, where the damage is solely economic, the situs of a commercial injury is where the original critical events associated with the action or dispute took place, not where any financial loss or damages occurred ( see Paterno v Laser Spine Inst. , 112 AD3d 34, 44 [2d Dept 2013], affd 24 NY3d 330 [2014]; see also Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. , 226 AD3d 60, 83 [1st Dept 2024]; Deutsche Bank AG v Vik , 163 AD3d 414, 416 [1st Dept 2018]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires a direct injury in New York; a plaintiff’s New York domicile alone does not establish one.

Partech, Inc. v. Jackson · filed 2025-01-29(a)(3)

The mere fact that a plaintiff is domiciled in New York does not, standing alone, establish that they will experience a threatened loss of business in New York that warrants jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires the original injury to occur in New York for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction based on an out-of-state tort.

Z.A. v. Hyatt Corporation · filed 2025-08-20(a)(3)

Applying the situs-of-injury test here, the Court finds no basis for personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. section 302(a)(3), because the complaint makes clear that the injury sustained by Z.A. occurred in St. Kitts and Nevis, not in New York.

CPLR 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York and evidence supporting the defendant’s qualifying business contacts or substantial interstate or international revenue.

Kraemer v. Edelstein · filed 2026-04-09(a)(3)

Plaintiff's reliance on CPLR 302(a)(3) is particularly inapt because the situs of the alleged injury is Pennsylvania, and plaintiff failed to meet his burden to submit any evidence that Spitale "regularly . . . solicits business" in the state or "derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce" for jurisdiction to be proper under this provision (CPLR 302[a][3][i] and [ii]).

Section 302(a) requires a plaintiff to show that the cause of action arose from the defendant’s acts.

Orellano v. Samples Tire Equipment & Supply Corp. · filed 1985-04-15(a)

In any event, there was a total failure by plaintiff to demonstrate that the cause of action arose from acts of Samples (CPLR 302 [a]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a direct relationship between the claim and the defendant’s business conduct in New York.

Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Mary Rose Menzies · filed 1983-08-12(a)(1)

We agree with the New York courts’ interpretation of section 302(a)(1) which requires “a direct relation between the cause of action and the in-state conduct” as “an important condition of acquiring jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary defendant.”

CPLR 302 requires a factual connection between the cause of action and New York for single-act long-arm jurisdiction.

National Enerdrill Corp. v. Crown Drilling, Inc. · filed 1983-04-06

However, nothing in the affidavit in support of the motion or in the memorandum of law states either that defendant is doing business in New York (the requirement for traditional long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 301) or that the. cause of action is in some manner factually related to New York (the requirement for single-act long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302).

CPLR 302 does not provide personal jurisdiction when the cause of action does not arise from the defendant’s activities in New York.

Sheldon Estates, Inc. v. Perkins Pancake House, Inc. · filed 1975-06-30

Since the cause of action did not arise out of defendant’s activities within the State, jurisdiction may not be predicated upon any of the provisions found in CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a guarantor solely because the guaranteed contract is performed in New York when the guarantee was made elsewhere and the guarantor transacted no other related business in the state.

Bird v. Computer Technology, Inc. · filed 1973-09-18(a)(1)

Ferrante Equipment v. Lasker-Goldman, 26 N.Y.2d 280, 309 N.Y.S.2d 913, 258 N.E.2d 202 (1970) held, in the words of the Court of Appeals in Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Advertising, Inc., 32 N.Y.2d 583, 587-588, 347 N.Y.S.2d 47, 51, 300 N.E.2d 421, 423 (1973), “that the mere performance of a contract in New York, when it is guaranteed elsewhere and the parties transacted no other business with respect to it in this State, would not, in and of itself, be sufficient to subject either party to the process of our courts.” The defendant there was the guarantor, who did no business in New York, though he guaranteed a contract to be performed in New York. I cannot distinguish the Court of Appeals’ own gloss on Ferrante, supra, from the facts at issue, and am constrained to hold it applicable.

Section 302(a) reaches only causes of action arising from the acts it enumerates.

Scanapico v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, and Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company and Atlant · filed 1970-12-18(a)

Here the difference between the hypothetical case of the New York purchased ticket and the actual case of the Florida purchased one becomes important since New York's long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a), covers only "a cause of action arising from any of the acts" there enumerated and Mrs. Scanapico's is not one of them.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a claim arising from business the nondomiciliary transacts in New York.

Ellis v. Newton Paper Co. · filed 1964-10-01(a)(1)

Under the broadened provisions of CPLR 302 the court may also exercise personal jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary who “ transacts any business ” here as respects a cause of action arising therefrom (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302 does not treat a corporate officer’s acts on behalf of a corporation as the officer’s individual transaction of business in New York.

United States v. Montreal Trust Co. · filed 1964-10-20(a)(1)

It is clear that the activities of Klein as a corporate officer on behalf of the corporations do not constitute the transaction of business by Klein individually.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a claim arises from business transacted in New York through negotiations and physical performance there, even if goods were delivered f. o. b. outside the state.

Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc. · filed 1964-07-02(a)(1)

Most importantly, the installation and testing of the machines in New York were participated in, if not supervised, by defendant. These elements required defendant through responsible officials and employees to be present in New York and to perform in New York various phases of the stipulations of the agreements between the parties. There was, therefore, significant physical performance by defendant, in New York. That the machines were delivered f. o. b. Chicago, Illinois, does not detract from these cogent indicators of transacting business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the claim and the nondomiciliary's business transactions in New York.

Aybar v. US Tires & Wheels of Queens, LLC · filed 2022-11-02(a)(1)

To satisfy the second prong, the statute requires an "articulable nexus" or "substantial relationship" between the cause of action sued upon, or an element thereof, and the defendants' business transactions in New York (D & R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 NY3d 292, 298 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Licci v Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327, 329; McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268; Lowy v Chalkable, LLC, 186 AD3d 590; Qudsi v Larios, 173 AD3d 920).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who transacts business in New York only when the claim arises from that business activity.

Daou v. BLC Bank, S.A.L. · filed 2022-07-28(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) gives New York courts specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

Republic of Guatemala v. IC Power Asia Development Ltd. · filed 2022-08-05(a)(1)

By contrast, the Court agrees that there is specific jurisdiction. ... Under New York law, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) “confers on courts personal jurisdiction over a defendant who ‘transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,’ ‘[a]s to a cause of action arising from’ such a transaction.” ... It can, therefore, fairly be said that ICPA transacted business in New York within the meaning of the New York long arm statute and availed itself of the New York forum in consummating the specific transaction that underlies the arbitral Award in this suit.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a defendant who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

Aritomo v. Rhee · filed 2022-11-22(a)(1)

Thus, while only one New York meeting occurred, it is sufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on New York business activity connected to the claim or an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the defendant conducts substantial business there.

D'Anzieri v. HHarrison Global LLC · filed 2022-12-02(a)(1), (a)(3)

To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity. ... Section 302(a)(3) does not apply here because Plaintiff does not allege that Pitel’s comments or Defendants’ failure to provide accommodation at the California convention caused any injury to her in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose sufficient in-person New York activities relate to the plaintiff's claims.

People v. JUUL Labs, Inc. · filed 2023-01-05(a)(1)

This evidence establishes that defendants conducted sufficient in-person activities within New York State related to the People's claims against them in this action, and sufficiently supports the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over them pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) (see generally Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 206 AD3d 442, 443-444 [1st Dept 2022]).

Section 302(a)(1) allows New York courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York or contracts to supply goods or services there, when the claim arises from that activity.

Richardson v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2022-08-26(a)(1)

Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that, “in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the two requirements of § 302(a)(1) are satisfied: “(1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

PDO Max, Inc. v. Malcmacher · filed 2022-12-05(a)(1)

Under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) specifically, a plaintiff must establish that (a) the defendant transacted business within the state, and (b) the claim asserted arises from that business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the cause of action arises from that transaction.

Brocco v. Eastern Metal Recycling Terminal LLC · filed 2022-12-29(a)(1)

In order to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(1), a court must decide "(1) whether the defendant 'transacts any business' in New York and, if so, (2) whether th[e] cause of action 'aris[es] from' such a business transaction" (Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, 673 F3d 50, 60 [2d Cir 2012], quoting Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F3d 239, 246 [2d Cir 2007]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, when the claim arises from that business activity.

Chanel, Inc. v. Shiver and Duke LLC · filed 2022-08-30(a)(1)

Section 302 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that “(1) the defendant . . . transacted business with the State; and (2) the claim asserted . . . arise[s] from that business activity.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the cause of action arises from that transaction.

Veerji Exports v. Carlos St Mary, Inc. · filed 2022-10-05(a)(1)

WHEREAS, the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defaulting Defendants. Carlos and CSMI “transact[ed] business within” New York and Plaintiff’s cause of action “aris[es] from” that transaction of business. See CPLR § 302(a)(1), (c).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from business transacted in New York; an examination taken there does not establish jurisdiction over a claim arising from separate examinations outside the state.

Fontanetta v. American Board of Internal Medicine · filed 1969-08-05(a)(1)

Under the precise language of the statute, plaintiff does not allege “a cause of action arising from” any acts performed in New York. His claim is not based on the transaction of business in New York, where he took a written examination which he passed, but on his being failed in oral examinations administered and graded outside New York.

Section 302(a)(1)’s “transacts any business” test covers a tax commission’s purposeful auditing activity in New York.

United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission · filed 1973-09-17(a)(1)

Clearly, the Commission’s conducting of audits is “purposeful activity” in the State of New York within the meaning of the “transacts any business” test of § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful activity by the defendant in New York; a New York attorney’s performance of services there does not alone establish jurisdiction over an out-of-state client.

Amins v. Life Support Medical Equipment Corp. · filed 1974-03-29(a)(1)

The other familiar authorities cited by plaintiff, e.g., Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 256 N.E.2d 506 (1970), do not rescue him from the burden of demonstrating purposeful activity by this defendant within New York other than plaintiff’s own performance of professional services.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful business activity in New York gives rise to the claim.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Interbanca-Banca Per Finanzi-Amenti a Medio Termine, S.P.A. · filed 1975-12-10(a)(1)

On the basis of the facts elicited in discovery, the Court finds that Interbanca engaged in sufficient purposeful activity in New York to constitute the transaction of business within the meaning of N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1), ... and holds that Interbanea is subject to personal jurisdiction because the claims here involved arise out of the transaction of business by Interbanea in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) treats a property settlement agreement negotiated and executed in New York while both parties were residents, and governed by New York law, as a transaction of business in the state.

Graning v. Graning · filed 1976-02-18(a)(1)

In personam jurisdiction also exists in this case under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1975). The agreement upon which this suit is premised was apparently negotiated and executed in New York while both parties were New York residents. The agreement provides that it is to be governed by New York law. Such an agreement is a transaction of business within the state for purposes of N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who purposefully transacts business in New York when the cause of action arises from those transactions.

El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co. · filed 1977-08-04(a)(1)

The plaintiff correctly contends that by virtue of the incorporative provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e), these activities subject the defendants to this court’s jurisdiction under the New York long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1972) since the defendants “transact business” within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires specific business transactions in New York that give rise to the claim.

Pavlo v. James · filed 1977-10-19(a)(1)

Based on these facts, the plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing a basis for jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1). Plaintiff makes no assertions of specific transactions occurring in New York in which defendant participated, or how such transactions, if they existed, would relate to his instant claim for damages. Such a showing of acts occurring in New York and giving rise to the claim is necessary under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over foreign insurers whose purposeful New York communications and payment arrangements relate to the claim.

China Union Lines, Ltd. v. American Marine Underwriters, Inc. · filed 1978-06-23(a)(1)

In the aggregate, the moving defendants engaged in extensive purposeful activity in New York. Their letters, telephone calls and telex messages with respect to the CNA-China Union matter were directed solely to New York. The transaction was negotiated with a New York-based broker. The moving defendants looked to reap substantial sums in premium payments— payments that they arranged to have mailed to them from Alexander in New York. And they agreed to channel into New York all payments which they might be required to make. ... Under these circumstances, I find the moving defendants have invoked the benefit and protection of the laws of New York by availing themselves of the privilege of transacting, within the state, business from which the cause of action alleged arose. Accordingly, they are properly subject to jurisdiction.

Section 302 requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York for jurisdiction based on that transaction.

Cohen v. Vaughan Bassett Furniture Co., Inc. · filed 1980-08-28(a)(1)

Jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR § 302, the “long-arm” statute, does not appear to be available here because the cause of action did not arise out of a transaction of business by defendants in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s New York business transactions; solicitation in New York does not establish jurisdiction over an unrelated out-of-state injury.

Wisselman v. Mount Snow, Ltd. · filed 1981-10-07(a)(1)

Accordingly, since plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie showing that the cause of action arises out of Mt. Snow’s business transactions in New York, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction is hereby granted.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary conducts a substantive meeting in New York about the contract giving rise to the suit.

CT Chemical (USA), Inc. v. Horizons International., Inc. · filed 1985-06-28(a)(1)

Viewing this meeting in the light most favorable to CT, as required by Hoffritz for Cutlery, supra, compels a finding that Horizons transacted sufficient business in New York to establish jurisdiction pursuant to § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity by the non-domiciliary defendant in New York; the defendant’s contacts must be sufficient to support personal jurisdiction.

International Customs Associates, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1995-08-08(a)(1)

In short, the totality of Lio Ho’s activities are insufficient to provide personal jurisdiction in New York over Lio Ho. Even crediting all of the plaintiffs’ allegations in the light most favorable to them, the plaintiffs have not made out a prima facie case that Lio Ho’s activities rose to the level of purposeful activity needed to confer personal jurisdiction in New York under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) reaches employees whose New York conduct amounts to transacting business there, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not treat the loss of customers in other states as injury within New York merely because the plaintiffs are based there.

American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp. · filed 1971-03-18

We hold that by their conduct the individual defendants transacted business within the meaning of section 302(a) 1. ... Accordingly we hold that Dytron's alleged tortious activity in Kentucky and Pennsylvania did not cause plaintiffs "injury * * * within the state," and we affirm dismissal of the complaint against Dytron.

Section 302(a)(1) provides jurisdiction over nonresident respondents when the contract at issue was executed in New York.

In Re the Arbitration Between Hidrocarburos Y Derivados, C.A. & Lemos · filed 1978-04-12(a)(1)

The state’s jurisdiction over nonresident respondents arises out of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), the COA having been executed in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) reaches nonresidents whose New York business activity gives rise to the claim, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not treat the loss of out-of-state customers as injury within New York merely because the plaintiff is based there.

American Eutectic Weeding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp. · filed 1971-03-18(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

We hold that by their conduct the individual defendants transacted business within the meaning of section 302(a) 1. ... Accordingly we hold that Dytron’s alleged tortious activity in Kentucky and Pennsylvania did not cause plaintiffs “injury * * * within the state,” and we affirm dismissal of the complaint against Dytron.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the nondomiciliary’s New York business transactions; a local union’s conduct cannot supply jurisdiction over an international union without a demonstrated agency relationship.

Baldwin v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1976-03-31(a)(1)

Since plaintiff has failed to establish that the Local acted as the Union’s agent in breaching its duty to fairly represent him, and since plaintiff’s claim does not arise from the independent New York contacts of the Union, long-arm jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR § 302 does not lie.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on one purposeful New York transaction substantially related to the plaintiff’s claim.

Baron Philippe De Rothschild v. Paramount Distillers, Inc. · filed 1996-05-01(a)(1)

Personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 302(a)(1) may be satisfied with proof that just one transaction occurred in New York as long as defendants’ activities were purposeful and substantially related to plaintiffs’ claim.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who purposefully transacts business in New York related to the claim, even without entering the state.

Mojica v. Reno · filed 1997-07-11(a)(1)

Respondent Caplinger thus not only transacted business in New York, but did so in this very court, and with regard to the very claim Mojica brings before this court, namely the legality of his deportation order. He is thus amenable to service under CPLR 302(a)(1), and the court has personal jurisdiction over him.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in New York when the claim has an articulable nexus or substantial relationship to those activities.

Henderson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 1998-09-18(a)(1)

A suit will be deemed to have arisen out of a party’s activities in New York if there is “ ‘an articulable nexus,’ or a ‘substantial relationship,’ between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident whose purposeful New York activities have an articulable nexus or substantial relationship to the claim.

Henderson v. INS · filed 1998-09-18(a)(1)

A suit will be deemed to have arisen out of a party's activities in New York if there is " 'an articulable nexus,' or a 'substantial relationship,' between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York."

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose business contacts related to the dispute show purposeful availment of New York.

Worldcom Technologies, Inc. v. ICC Inteleca Communications, Inc. · filed 1999-03-04(a)(1)

We therefore conclude that the quality of contacts between Defendant and New York State indicate that Defendant has “purposefully availed [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities in [New York], thus invoking the benefits and protection of [its] laws,” and find that a New York State court would have personal jurisdiction over Defendant for the purposes of this action pursuant to § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when a claim has a sufficient connection to business the defendant transacted in New York; allegations of that connection can suffice at the pleading stage.

Dimon Inc. v. Folium, Inc. · filed 1999-05-03(a)(1)

Plaintiff thus has articulated the requisite connection between its tort claims and the business defendants transacted in New York to ground this Court with personal jurisdiction over these claims. Whether it can prove this at trial remains to be seen, but the allegations are sufficient at this stage of the case.

Section 302(a)(1) treats a defendant’s New York affiliates, trade show representatives, and sales to New York residents as transacting business in the state.

Hsin Ten Enterprise USA, Inc. v. Clark Enterprises · filed 2000-12-29(a)(1)

Furthermore, defendants have affiliates who reside in New York, have representatives who have appeared in trade shows in New York, and have sold several Exercise Machines to New York residents. These acts rise to the level of transacting business under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s New York business transactions are sufficiently related to the claim.

Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili · filed 2001-05-29(a)(1)

Viewed in their totality, Paula’s business-related contacts with New York are sufficient, and sufficiently closely related to Sun Forest’s cause of action, to give rise to personal jurisdiction over her under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a claim sufficiently related to a defendant’s New York business transaction even if the plaintiff was not a party to that transaction.

Cuccioli v. Jekyll & Hyde Neue Metropol Bremen Theater Produktion GmbH & Co. · filed 2001-07-02(a)(1)

Thus, while this case is unusual in that the plaintiff was not a party to the licensing and production agreements that defendant negotiated in New York— in other words, defendant did not transact business in New York with plaintiff — the statute does not so require. Consideration of the totality of the circumstances leads to the conclusion that there is a sufficient relationship between plaintiffs claim and the business defendant transacted in New York so that there is no unfairness to subjecting defendant to suit here on this claim.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary’s New York business contacts have a substantial relationship to the claims.

Clarendon National Insurance v. Lan · filed 2001-07-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, because Pacific’s transactions in New York have a substantial relationship to the disputes and issues that Clarendon alleges are arbitrable, and because Pacific negotiated with respect to these disputes and issues in New York, and agreed that New York law would apply to those disputes, Clarendon has established the substantively important contacts required to establish that Pacific “transacted] business” in New York such that this Court has personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that contracts to supply goods in New York, even if the goods are ultimately delivered elsewhere.

APC Commodity Corp. v. Ram Dis Ticaret A.S. · filed 1997-05-19(a)(1)

“That purposeful activity directed at New York is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction pursuant to the statute” despite the fact that the two containers of apricots were ultimately shipped to Port Elizabeth, New Jersey.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that contracts to provide services in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants v. Affinity Card, Inc. · filed 1998-07-16(a)(1)

New York provides for specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that “transacts any- business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” but only where the cause of action arises out of the aforesaid transaction. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1998). ... Affinity is amenable to service pursuant to New York’s long arm statute, having contracted to provide services in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a direct and substantial relationship between a defendant’s New York business activity and the cause of action.

Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc. · filed 1998-07-15(a)(1)

Although a defendant need not engage in “systematic and continuous” transactions in New York, there must be a direct and substantial relationship between the instate activities and the cause of action. ... The libel claim does not arise from defendant’s delivery of mail orders to New York. Therefore, this Court may not properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when significant commercial interaction with New York residents through a website gives rise to the claim.

Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co. · filed 2000-05-31(a)(1)

Moreover, the interaction is both significant and unqualifiedly commercial in nature and thus rises to the level of transacting business required under CPLR § 302(a)(1). ... The Court concludes that City National’s activity over the internet confers personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction in a defamation action when the claim arises from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Bozell · filed 2001-05-24(a)(1)

Thus, based on Lewis’s transactions of business in New York, out of which the WWFE’s defamation action arises, this Court has personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a non-domiciliary to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that business activity.

Snyder v. Ply Gem Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-09-25(a)(1)

The relevant portion of New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a)(1), contains two requirements: (1) the non-domiciliary must transact business within the state, and (2) the claim against the non-domiciliary must arise out of that business activity.

A contract’s choice-of-law clause does not prevent personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) when the defendant’s New York business contacts otherwise suffice.

Creative Socio-Medics, Corp. v. City of Richmond · filed 2002-08-21(a)(1)

Thus, CSM may acquire personal jurisdiction over Richmond even though the law of the state of Virginia may have to be applied.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on one purposeful transaction in New York when it has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Padilla Ex Rel. Newman v. Bush · filed 2002-12-04(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) is a “single act statute”: only one transaction is needed to confer jurisdiction, so long as the defendant’s activities were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between those activities and the claim in suit.

Section 302(a)(1) treats in-state acts forming or advancing contracts as transactions of business that can support jurisdiction over substantially related claims.

Nasso v. Seagal · filed 2003-04-11(a)(1)

All of these activities constitute transactions of business for the purposes of Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York.

Walker v. Smith · filed 2003-04-15(a)(1)

Jurisdiction is proper under Section 302(a)(1) only if it can be established that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction when the defendant’s contacts with New York do not amount to transacting business there.

Hutton v. Priddy's Auction Galleries, Inc. · filed 2003-06-27(a)(1)

In light of the factors articulated by the Second Circuit, it is beyond cavil that defendants have not transacted business within New York as required by section 302(a)(1).

A single purposeful business transaction can support jurisdiction without the defendant entering New York if the transaction substantially relates to the claim.

Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan · filed 2003-08-08(a)(1)

Under this section, a single transaction of business is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, even if the defendant never entered New York, “so long as the defendant’s activities [in New York] were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.”

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on faxes, mail, and checks sent to New York when those contacts are insufficient to constitute transacting business there.

Ainbinder v. Potter · filed 2003-09-19(a)(1)

The plaintiffs do claim that Potter transacted business under Section 302(a)(1) by sending facsimiles and mail to the plaintiffs in New York. (Opp.Mot-¶ 17.) In addition, Potter is alleged to have sent checks to Ainbinder in West Hempstead, New York. (Id, ¶ 18.) It is clear under New York law, however, that those contacts are insufficient to meet the requirements of Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that purposefully transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

New York Access Billing, LLC v. ATX Communications, Inc. · filed 2003-10-21(a)(1)

Even though neither ATX Telecommunications Services of Virginia, LLC nor Co-reComm Virginia, Inc. are incorporated in New York state nor have their principal places of business in New York state, there is sufficient evidence that they transacted purposeful business in the state of New York. There is also sufficient evidence that their failure to pay for the access charges incurred was a claim that arose out of transacting business in New York. ATX Telecommunications Services of Virginia, LLC and CoreComm Virginia, Inc. are, therefore, subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of New York under New York’s long arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York from which the claim arises; an unspecified contact to order supplies and request services does not establish jurisdiction.

CES Industries, Inc. v. Minnesota Transition Charter School · filed 2003-10-23(a)(1)

Indeed, the plaintiff provides no facts showing the sort of purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protections of this state contemplated by Section 302(a)(1). Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of personal jurisdiction under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a single purposeful activity in New York that has a substantial relationship or articulable nexus to the claim.

Padilla v. Rumsfeld · filed 2003-12-18(a)(1)

Section 302 is a single-act statute; jurisdiction attaches if the defendant engages in a single purposeful activity that has a substantial relationship or articulable nexus to the claim asserted.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s purposeful New York business transactions have a substantial relationship to the asserted claims.

Miller v. Calotychos · filed 2004-01-29(a)(1)

The Court finds, as elaborated above, that Defendants’ contacts with New York were sufficient to constitute transaction of business. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that it may proceed to consider this action by virtue of the personal jurisdiction over Defendants conferred by CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant's New York business transaction gives rise to the claim against it.

Novak v. Overture Services, Inc. · filed 2004-03-25(a)(1)

Upon these facts, it is clear that a transaction with a resident of New York gave rise to the specific claims alleged in the complaint. Therefore, Section 302(a)(1) applies to the instant circumstances.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York; an established New York office with employees and software development operations satisfies that requirement.

Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Micromuse, Inc. · filed 2004-04-15(a)(1)

Under New York’s long arm statute, the Southern District of New York could have exercised jurisdiction over the Defendant in the case at bar. New York’s long arm statute authorizes a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business within the state. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat telephone negotiations for an out-of-state real estate purchase as transacting business in New York merely because one party was there during some calls.

Maranga v. Vira · filed 2005-05-03(a)(1)

The mere fact that some telephonic negotiations regarding the contract in this case were conducted while one of the parties to the contract was in New York does not suffice to make the contract, or the telephonic negotiation of it, a transaction of business in New York by the Defendants.

Section 302(a)(1)'s transaction of business requirement can be satisfied by negotiating and executing a settlement agreement in New York.

Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor · filed 2005-09-28(a)(1)

After reviewing the record de novo, we believe that the extensive New York negotiations over the MSA and model escrow legislation language, and the agreement's ultimate execution in New York, satisfy § 302(a)(1)'s transacts-any-business requirement.

Section 302(a)(1) requires New York business contacts meaningfully related to the relief sought; for a petition to vacate an arbitration award, the relevant acts are the arbitrators’ challenged actions.

Solé Resorts, S.A., De C v. v. Allure Resorts Management, LLC · filed 2005-10-12(a)(1)

So too, here, in the context of determining whether § 302(a)(1) of the C.P.L.R. provides personal jurisdiction, it is clear that the relevant contacts are those meaningfully related to the relief sought by petitioner — ie., the actions of arbitrators, all of which occurred in Florida.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over claims on replacement notes when those notes satisfy obligations arising from business transacted in New York.

Antaeus Enterprises, Inc. v. SD-Barn Real Estate, LLC · filed 2005-10-18(a)(1)

The substance of the sequence of events therefore is that the SD notes now in suit were issued in satisfaction of SD’s obligations undertaken in connection with the DIP loan, which was negotiated in New York. In these circumstances, the totality of the circumstances warrant the conclusion that the claims at issue here arose out of defendants’ transaction of business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when the defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Beatie and Osborn LLP v. Patriot Scientific Corp. · filed 2006-05-09(a)(1)

Thus, jurisdiction is proper under section 302(a)(1) when: (1) the defendant has transacted business in New York; and (2) the cause of action arises out of the subject matter of the transacted business.

Section 302(a)(1) treats New York business transactions connected to a contract containing an arbitration clause as sufficiently related to a challenge to the resulting arbitration award.

Sole Resort, S.A. De C v. V. Allure Resorts Management, Llc, Docket No. 05-5786-Cv · filed 2006-06-13(a)(1)

Accordingly, we think that any transaction of business in New York in connection with a contract as to which there is an arbitration provision bears an “articulable nexus” to a challenge to the arbitrators’ disposition of a dispute pursuant to that arbitration provision.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state party transacts business in New York and the claim arises from those business contacts.

Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener · filed 2006-09-05(a)(1)

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party if that party "transacts any business within the state" and if the claim arises from these business contacts. ... There are sufficient business contacts to support personal jurisdiction over the Investors under New York's long-arm statute. The Investors entered into a brokerage account agreement with Broker and executed numerous stock trades through Broker's New York offices on various New York exchanges.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between a claim and the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Thomas v. Ashcroft · filed 2006-11-28(a)(1)

Even if the court interpreted the complaint as seeking to obtain jurisdiction under the "transacting business" prong of New York's long-arm statute—based on Thomas's allegations that the criminal investigation took place in New York and the criminal complaint was filed in New York—Thomas failed to show that his cause of action arose from such transactions. ... In other words, there is no substantial relationship between the DEA agents' alleged confiscation of Thomas's eye drops in California and any transaction in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully conducts business in New York that has a substantial nexus to the claim, including by directing work assignments to an employee there.

International Healthcare Exchange, Inc. v. Global Healthcare Exchange, LLC · filed 2007-01-11(a)(1)

This conduct is sufficient to demonstrate purposeful transaction of business that has a substantial nexus to Plaintiffs employment discrimination cause of action, within the meaning of section 302(a)(1) of New York’s C.P.L.R.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transaction; an agent’s receipt and disbursement of funds in New York was insufficiently related to an earlier contract to establish jurisdiction over a breach claim.

Weisberg v. Smith · filed 2007-02-21(a)(1)

While Regal’s receipt and disbursement here of funds on behalf of Roberts adds something to plaintiffs argument, I am left with the conviction that it was insufficiently related to plaintiffs contract with Roberts to justify a conclusion that it would be fair to subject Roberts to suit in New York by plaintiff for breach. Accordingly, I hold that plaintiffs claim does not arise out any transaction by Roberts of business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from goods shipped to New York under a contract to supply them there.

Great Northern Insurance v. Constab Polymer-Chemie GMBH & Co. · filed 2003-09-19(a)(1)

As Schoeller-USA claims that “there was a contract to ship goods to New York ... and goods were shipped under that contract,” it has alleged a prima facie case of jurisdiction under the “contracting to supply goods” prong of C.P.L.R. § 802(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction under its goods-or-services prong when a defendant sends samples to New York but supplies the contracted goods elsewhere.

Wickers Sportswear, Inc. v. Gentry Mills, Inc. · filed 2006-01-24(a)(1)

After considering the quality of the shipments, along with the other factors, it is clear that § 302(a)(1) provides no basis for jurisdiction. There simply is no support for Plaintiffs contention that Defendant supplied goods or services into New York. Those goods and services were supplied to Plaintiffs factories in New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Ontario.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim arises from those transactions.

Druck Corp. v. Macro Fund (U.S.) Ltd. · filed 2004-06-17(a)(1)

We are satisfied that defendants’ contacts with New York were prima facie purposeful and that the cause of action arose from the transactions characterized by these purposeful New York contacts. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business in New York and the claim has a substantial nexus to that business.

Hughes v. BCI International Holdings, Inc. · filed 2006-09-14(a)(1)

These contacts are sufficient to constitute a transaction of business in New York both by Michael Cunningham personally and by the entities that he represented, namely, CHG, Sustainable Projects, and SPDG Fibre. Furthermore, there is a “substantial nexus” between this transaction (i.e., the formation of BCI and the solicitation of capital for it) and plaintiffs’ claims in this action.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that business.

POSVEN, C.A. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2004-01-12(a)(1)

Under section 302(a)(1), jurisdiction is proper when: (1) the defendant has transacted business in New York; and (2) the cause of action arises out of the subject matter of the transacted business.

Section 302(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over individual defendants who lack sufficient contacts with New York.

Caraveo v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2004-03-26(a)

As the district court correctly determined, none of the individual defendants has sufficient contacts with New York to subject him or her to personal jurisdiction under these rules. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose New York business transactions or contract to supply goods or services in New York give rise to the claim.

Boehner v. Heise · filed 2006-01-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1) because they transacted business in New York and contracted to supply goods or services within the state.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial nexus between business transacted in New York and the asserted claim; a tenuous connection does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Cutting Edge Enterprises, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Attorneys General · filed 2007-03-06(a)(1)

But this connection is too tenuous and does not constitute a “substantial nexus” between the transaction of business in this state and the claims asserted.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary purposefully acts in New York and that conduct forms the basis for the claims; the activity need not be commercial.

People of New York v. Operation Rescue National · filed 2007-05-03(a)(1)

Benham’s arguments that his conduct was not commercial business, and was protected by the First Amendment are in this context, as the district court noted, irrelevant. Ben-ham’s conduct both took place in New York and was purposefully directed towards New York. It also forms the basis for the claims asserted against him and Operation Rescue National (“ORN”).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Lipin v. Hunt · filed 2008-02-20(a)(1)

Even if Hunt’s written and telephonic communications to Plaintiff in New York can be considered “transactions] [of] business within the state,” none of Plaintiffs causes of actions arises out of these “transactions.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful business activity in New York has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Taylor Devices, Inc. v. Walbridge Aldinger Co. · filed 2008-03-12(a)(1)

However, the court finds that Plaintiff has established a prima facie showing, under the totality of circumstances presented here, Agency Rent A Car System, 98 F.3d at 29 (citing Paine-Webber, Inc. v. Westgate Group, Inc., 748 F.Supp. 115, 118 (S.D.N.Y.1990)), that Walbridge Mexico transacted business in New York sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1) over Plaintiffs cause of action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a trader who places orders on a New York exchange by telephone from outside the state when the claim arises from those trades.

U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC · filed 2008-06-10(a)(1)

Hunter was clearly transacting business within the state, albeit by telephone from Canada, which is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Energy Brands Inc. v. Spiritual Brands, Inc. · filed 2008-07-16(a)(1)

Personal jurisdiction is proper under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) because defendants have transacted business within New York and the causes of action arise from that business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

In Re Banco Santander Securities-Optimal Litigation · filed 2010-07-30(a)(1)

Plaintiffs argue that PWC Ireland is subject to personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), which provides for specific jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries when the non-domiciliary “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” and when the claim “arises from” the transaction. As explained above, to establish personal jurisdiction under this section of New York’s long-arm statute the Plaintiffs must show that PWC Ireland transacted business in New York and the Plaintiffs’ claims arise from PWC Ireland’s business transaction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat the mere publication of a defamatory statement in New York as transacting business there.

Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker · filed 2007-06-26(a)(1)

In defamation cases, by contrast, the "single act" of uttering a defamation, no matter how loudly, is not a "transact[ion of] business" that may provide the foundation for personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because an out-of-state defendant posts allegedly defamatory statements on a website accessible in New York.

Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Tim Walker, Docket No. 04-3924-Cv · filed 2007-06-26(a)(1)

As we have seen, New York case law establishes that making defamatory statements outside of New York about New York residents does not, without more, provide a basis for jurisdiction, even when those statements are published in media accessible to New York readers. ... We conclude that posting the “Black List Report” did not constitute “transact[ing] business” under section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a contract to supply goods or services in New York and a claim arising from the relevant New York contacts; an insurance policy issued abroad for an accident abroad did not meet those requirements here.

Bohn v. Bartels · filed 2007-12-12(a)(1)

Fidelidade cannot be said to have made a promise specifically to perform services in New York. ... Bohn’s cause of action does not arise out of any conduct in New York, including those contacts that Bohn attributes to Fidelidade, such as Bartels’s domicile and Fidelidade’s obligation to defend Bartels.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over an alleged trademark infringer based on an offer to sell even one allegedly infringing item in New York; a sale to the plaintiff’s investigator counts absent coercion or trickery.

Cartier v. SEAH LLC · filed 2009-01-22(a)(1)-(3)

The offering for sale of even one copy of an allegedly infringing item, even if no sale results, is sufficient to give personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringer under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a), subd. 1, 2 and 3. ... So in the absence of evidence that Seah was “entrapped” into making a sale into the State of New York that it would not have made but for some coercion or trickery, the sale to the investigator should not be disregarded.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant transacted business in New York and that the action arises from that transaction.

Royalty Network Inc. v. Dishant. Com, LLC · filed 2009-07-29(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

To make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction pursuant to section 302(a)(1), a plaintiff must establish, first, that defendant transacted business within the state of New York, and second, that this action arises from that transaction of business. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302; Sole Resort, 450 F.3d at 104.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in New York, and one New York transaction is sufficient even if the defendant never enters New York.

GEM Advisors, Inc. v. Corporación Sidenor, S.A. · filed 2009-10-27(a)(1)

In addition, section 302 is “a ‘single act statute’ and proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a claim arising from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Navaera Sciences, LLC v. Acuity Forensic Inc. · filed 2009-11-03(a)(1)

The long arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary only “[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated” therein, including the transaction of business within the state. ... That single meeting and the contractual choice-of-law and notification provisions are not sufficient to subject Acuity to personal jurisdiction in New York because Acuity did not project itself into the New York market or purposefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the cause of action arises from that transaction.

AIG FINANCIAL PRODUCTS CORP. v. Public Utility District No. 1 · filed 2009-12-15(a)(1)

Under New York State law, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary “who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within the state,” provided that the “cause of action aris[es] from” such transaction of business. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Thus, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) if the defendant (1) “transacts any business” in New York and (2) the plaintiffs cause of action arises from such transaction of business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who purposefully transacts business in New York when the claim has a substantial relationship to that activity.

Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC · filed 2010-08-05(a)(1)

We hold that those contacts permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), and satisfy both the minimum contacts test and the reasonableness test of the Due Process Clause.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from the defendant's purposeful transaction of business in New York.

Zibiz Corp. v. FCN TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS · filed 2011-03-02(a)(1)

Defendant’s contacts with New York are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to Section 302.

Section 302(a)(1) gives New York courts jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose claim arises from transacting business in New York, including when the defendant purposefully avails itself of New York's laws.

Trabucco v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.P.A. · filed 2010-03-19(a)(1)

A cause of action “arising from” the acts of a person who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” provides the Court a basis for exercising jurisdiction over such a person. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1); ... Proof of even one transaction in the state is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 522 N.E.2d 40 (1988).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger · filed 2011-03-07(a)(1)

Even if the LAP Representatives do not satisfy Section 301, they would be subject to specific jurisdiction in New York under Section 302(a), which provides: ... “1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” ... In the totality of circumstances, Chevron is likely to establish a sufficient nexus between the LAP Representatives’ transaction of business here, both in person and through their agents, to bring them within CPLR § 302(a), subd. 1.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a claim arising from business transacted in New York, including contract negotiations conducted through an agent.

Loop Production v. Capital Connections LLC · filed 2011-06-06(a)(1)

Brandon thus transacted business in New York State when he allegedly participated in negotiations about the Contract. ... Consequently, the uncontroverted factual allegations in the Complaint sufficiently demonstrate a basis for the Court to assert personal jurisdiction over both Moving Defendants and the Moving Defendants have failed to present a meritorious defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York through policy sales and related loan dealings.

Moskowitz v. La Suisse, Societe D'Assurances sur la Vie · filed 2012-03-30(a)(1)

Construing La Suisse’s allegations liberally, and taking as true all uncontroverted facts, the Court concludes that § 302(a)(1) confers personal jurisdiction upon Kraus. Kraus transacted business in New York when he sold Marriage Policies; and negotiated, applied for, and signed loans for the Policyholders to maintain the policy premiums.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from a business transaction in New York.

China National Chartering Corp. v. Pactrans Air & Sea, Inc. · filed 2012-07-31(a)(1)

Here, there can be no question that the cause of action in this matter did not "arise from” a "transaction” in New York — the transaction at the heart of the plaintiff's cause of action is damage to cargo loaded onto a vessel in China and unloaded in Florida. Therefore, no alternative basis for personal jurisdiction under Section 302 — even ignoring any issues of waiver of that argument — exists here.

Section 302(a)(1) supports specific jurisdiction when at least one element of a claim arises from the defendant’s New York business contacts; every element need not be related to those contacts.

Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL · filed 2012-11-20(a)(1)

Yet CPLR 302 (a) (1) does not require that every element of the cause of action pleaded must be related to the New York contacts; rather, where at least one element arises from the New York contacts, the relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted supports specific jurisdiction under the statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat an out-of-state attorney’s delivery of an opinion letter for a New York stock transaction, without purposeful New York activity, as transacting business in the state.

Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Reeve · filed 2013-02-07(a)(1)

However, the Court finds that even when assuming that all of the Plaintiffs allegations are true and that Garel expressly provided the Opinion Letter to its client pursuant to a Stock Purchase Agreement that was to occur in New York State, this does not meet the requisite threshold for “transacting business” under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction under its transacting-business prong based solely on a defendant’s telephone calls and emails to a New York plaintiff.

Wego Chemical & Mineral Corp. v. Magnablend Inc. · filed 2013-05-21(a)(1)

However, the only allegations that Wego has proffered to support jurisdiction is that the Magnablend made telephone calls and sent emails directed to Wego in New York. The precedents cited above determine that the acts are insufficient. Thus, because Wego has failed to establish even a prima facie case regarding any of the five factors, there is no basis for an exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to the “transacting business” prong of Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state accountant that prepares its work outside New York and sends comfort letters to a New York underwriter without otherwise purposefully conducting business in New York.

Miller Investment Trust v. Chen · filed 2013-06-21(a)(1)

Based on these alleged facts, the Court finds that Hansen did not engage in purposeful activity in New York and, therefore, personal jurisdiction cannot be established under section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a borrower solicits a New York loan, discusses its terms in New York, and sends repayments there.

O'Mahoney v. Susser · filed 2013-07-30(a)(1)

Susser’s initiation of a transaction aimed at securing money from New York, his meeting in New York with the lender and discussion of final details regarding the Note, and his transmittal of monies to New York to satisfy the Note’s obligations, together distinguish this case from others in which this court has held an out-of-state defendant’s contacts to be insufficient under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claims arise from that business.

Huang v. iTV Media, Inc. · filed 2014-04-08(a)(1)

At the pleading stage, these are legally sufficient allegations that Lin transacted business in New York, giving rise to these causes of action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on purposeful bids placed on a New York exchange even when the bids do not result in completed trades.

United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Wilson · filed 2014-06-26(a)(1)

Nor can Defendants defeat personal jurisdiction on the grounds that, they merely placed bids and did not consummate trades on the Three-Month Contract or because Newedge, not DRW, was the entity responsible for identifying DRW’s counter-parties. ... Accordingly, the CFTC has adequately alleged that Defendants transacted business under the New York long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based solely on a host parent’s limited supervision by a New York corporation when the actual supervision occurs elsewhere.

Fisher v. International Student Exchange, Inc. · filed 2014-08-07(a)(1)

While Preiss’s hosting of Plaintiff was supervised and coordinated by a New York corporation, the affidavits and Complaint demonstrate that any real day-to-day supervision was conducted by Pulsipher and Toews in Montana. Accordingly, the Court finds the limited applicability of this factor insufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction over Preiss.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

AVRA Surgical Robotics, Inc. v. Gombert · filed 2014-08-21(a)(1)

Even if so, however, AVRA cannot establish specific jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) because it fails to show that any of its claims against Gombert arise from a transaction of business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over out-of-state attorneys based on emails with a New York client about services performed outside New York.

Lipson v. Birch · filed 2014-09-23(a)(1)

Similarly, the e-mail exchanges here are insufficient to support personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1) against Birch and Williamson, who are non-resident defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business in New York and the claims have a substantial relationship to those transactions.

Williams v. Preeminent Protective Services, Inc. · filed 2015-01-29(a)(1)

It is clear from the face of the Complaint that there is a “substantial relationship” between the work plaintiff alleges she undertook for defendants and her claims in this suit, which arise out of her termination by defendants. Thus, plaintiff has satisfied all three requirements necessary to invoke N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a debt collector whose purposeful collection communications with New York residents give rise to the claims.

Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices · filed 2015-06-04(a)(1)

Kennedy’s activities in New York— mailing one debt collection notice to Eades, engaging in one debt collection phone call with Eades, and mailing a summons and complaint to both Plaintiffs — are enough to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to transact business in New York in relation to the asserted claim before that activity can support personal jurisdiction.

Jonas v. Estate of Leven · filed 2015-07-27(a)(1)

In sum, no defendant transacted business in New York in relation to plaintiffs’ first breach of contract claim, and therefore personal jurisdiction does not exist over defendants pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on exploratory meetings in New York and related communications that produced no agreement.

V Cars, LLC v. Israel Corp. · filed 2012-09-30(a)(1)

Here, the only meetings that occurred in New York were “exploratory.” ... These contacts are not sufficient to provide a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit personal jurisdiction based on a sale to the plaintiff’s investigator when the defendant has no other meaningful New York contacts.

Buccellati Holding Italia Spa v. Laura Buccellati, LLC · filed 2013-03-27(a)(1)

Under the unusual circumstances of this case, in which Plaintiffs have not offered evidence of any meaningful contacts between Defendants and New York, this Court will not rely on the sale of a handbag to Plaintiffs’ investigator as a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on an out-of-state communication required to exercise federal rights when the recipient’s New York headquarters is the only connection to the state.

Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby · filed 2013-08-08(a)(1)

We conclude that a communication from out-of-state, required for the exercise of rights conferred under a federal statute, cannot alone constitute a purposeful availment of "the benefits and protections of [New York's] laws," at least where the only connection to New York is that the recipient's business headquarters has a New York address.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant repeatedly uses New York bank accounts to conduct business and those transactions have a substantial relationship to the claims.

Dandong v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd. · filed 2013-08-22(a)(1)

In short, Pinnacle’s “repeated use” of the New York account “shows not only transaction of business, but an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the transaction” and Plaintiffs’ claims in this case.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary on a breach of contract claim when it contracts to ship goods to New York, ships them, and the claim arises from that activity.

Allied Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, Inc. · filed 2013-09-04(a)(1)

Plaintiff has, therefore, made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over MFS under the “contracting to supply goods” prong of Section 302(a)(1) for purposes of its breach of contract claim.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a seller that contracts to supply goods it knows are destined for New York, even if the buyer arranges shipment from outside the state.

Roberts-Gordon LLC v. Pektron PLC · filed 2014-02-14(a)(1)

C.P.L.R. § 302(a) does not draw a distinction, as Pektron contends, between goods “shipped” and goods “supplied.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank when its repeated use of a New York correspondent account is sufficiently related to the claims against it.

Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL · filed 2013-10-18(a)(1)

The plaintiffs have therefore made a prima facie showing that the district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over LCB with respect to their Anti-Terrorism Act, ATS, and Israeli law claims pursuant to the state long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat an out-of-state publisher’s targeting of New York readers, by itself, as transacting business in New York for a defamation claim.

Trachtenberg v. Failedmessiah.com · filed 2014-08-29(a)(1)

Therefore, even if the Five Towns article was intended to warn the Orthodox Jews of New York about plaintiff, SPCA makes clear that such “targeting” is not a jurisdiction-conferring transaction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant markets and sells services to New York customers through a website and the claim arises from those transactions.

Brown v. Web.com Group, Inc. · filed 2014-10-28(a)(1)

Defendant avails itself of the benefits of transacting business in the State by marketing services to and entering transactions with New York-based customers via www.web.com. The instant dispute stems from those activities. Therefore, personal jurisdiction is appropriate under New York law.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on legal services performed outside New York and communications with New York parties when the lawyers did not solicit the work or purposefully conduct business in New York.

Bissonnette v. Podlaski · filed 2015-10-07(a)(1)

Applying those standards here, the Court is compelled to conclude that Defendants’ activities do not suffice to confer jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1). Defendants did not solicit the business of Plaintiff, his New York-based publisher, or his New York-based agent; instead, Cheney reached out to Podlaski while he was in Indiana. Additionally, Defendants never traveled to New York, even for a day; instead, all communications between Defendants and Plaintiff, Plaintiffs agent, and Plaintiffs publisher took place from Indiana.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Minnie Rose LLC v. Yu · filed 2016-03-11(a)(1)

Because Defendants purposefully transacted business in New York, and that business lead to the purportedly fraudulent scheme that gave rise to the current litigation, personal jurisdiction is appropriate under New York law.