N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(1) requires a business transaction in New York attributable to the non-domiciliary from which the claim arises.

Ferrante Equipment Co. v. Lasker-Goldman Corp. · filed 1970-04-15(a)(1)

In our opinion the record before us does not spell out a proper A case for 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) jurisdiction, because appellant (1 has been unable to point to a single Transaction of business by 1 respondent in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) allows long-arm service only when the claim arises from purposeful activities in New York; unrelated business in the state does not suffice.

Leesona Corporation v. Duplan Corporation · filed 1970-08-07(a)(1)

The New York Court of Appeals has consistently held that long-arm service of process under CPLR § 302 is available only when the cause of action arises out of purposeful activities carried on in New York, even if the defendant transacts other business in the state. ... Accepting those allegations as true, which I must do on the present state of the record, I find that service of process could not have issued out of the Eastern District of New York against those six remaining defendants ... who are not plaintiffs in New York but have joined in this motion to transfer.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an insurer that transacts no business in New York and issued the policy in Vermont to a Vermont resident.

Wiesner v. Emma Laing Stevens Hospital · filed 1970-12-10(a)(1)

As to paragraph 1 of subdivision (a) of CPLR 302, neither Vermont nor Union transacts any business within the State of New York. In the instant case, the insurance policies in question were issued in Vermont, to a Vermont resident by Vermont corporations.

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Meunier v. Stebo, Inc. · filed 1971-12-20(a)(1)

In our opinion plaintiff has failed to prove that the events which gave rise to his cause of action were in any way related to the Pennsylvania corporate defendant’s activities within this State. Consequently, it cannot be said that his cause of action arose from that defendant’s transaction of business here and he is thus not entitled to avail himself of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) (see Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int., 19 N Y 2d 533; Noble v. Singapore Resort Motel of Miami Beach, 21 N Y 2d 1006).

Section 302(a)(1) can provide personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation based on its New York business dealings.

W. Lowenthal Co. v. Colonial Woolen Mills, Inc. · filed 1972-01-20(a)(1)

The trial court found it had jurisdiction of Colonial under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1). In addition to affirming that finding, we find that Colonial was “ doing business ” here. (CPLR 301.)

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from business transactions conducted in New York for a non-domiciliary defendant.

John De Nigris Associates Inc. v. Pacific Air Transport International Inc. · filed 1972-03-16(a)

We conclude that plaintiff’s cause of action arises from business transactions within this State for and in behalf of the defendant within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a]).

Under CPLR 302(a)(1), whether a nonresident transacted business in New York is determined by considering the entire transaction.

Collateral Factors Corp. v. Meyers · filed 1972-04-18(a)(1)

In determining whether the defendants are subject to jurisdiction under the long-arm statute — CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1)—the entire transaction must be considered.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Bristol Recreation Systems, Inc. v. Contract Furnishers Corp. · filed 1972-04-19(a)(1)

IT CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) provides that New York can exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents who have transacted business within the state personally or through an agent, if the cause of action arose out of the transaction of that business. Furnishers availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in this State and is subject to its jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York, in person or through an agent, and the cause of action arises from that activity.

Al Negelberg & Co. v. Trans Fresh Corp. · filed 1972-04-24(a)(1)

Appellant, Trans Fresh, a foreign corporation, with no place of business in New York State, and not qualified to do business here, has not transacted any business here which would permit the invocation of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par 1) to sustain personal jurisdiction in this ease. ... It is clear that defendant did not transact business within the State, either in person or through an agent and the cause of action did not arise from defendant’s activities within the State.

A plaintiff’s own activity in New York does not establish that a nondomiciliary defendant transacted business there.

Chertok v. Ethyl Corporation of Canada · filed 1972-05-03(a)(1)

The plaintiff then, in effect, has succeeded only in making a showing of his own activities within the forum. This type of presentation tortures the requirement that the defendant transact business within the state.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident client based solely on a telephone retainer and the lawyer’s New York services; the client’s own New York contacts matter.

Perlman v. Martin · filed 1972-05-16(a)(1)

Therefore, since the claimed telephonic retainer and New York based legal services alone do not confer jurisdiction, the court must determine to what extent, if any, the client himself had requisite New York contacts.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction to enforce a foreign divorce decree merely because the decree incorporates a separation agreement executed in New York.

Carmichael v. Carmichael · filed 1972-07-05(a)(1)

In our opinion, this proceeding to enforce the alimony and child support provisions of a foreign divorce decree, incorporated into the decree from a separation agreement executed in New York, does not fall within the ambit of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1). ... In our opinion, incorporation of the provisions of the agreement into the foreign decree does not provide a nexus between this enforcement proceeding and the business transacted sufficient to sustain a finding that the former arises out of the latter.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction based on a borrower’s New York loan transaction even when a renewal note was executed outside New York.

Irving Trust Company v. Smith · filed 1972-10-12(a)(1)

Neither contention is correct. The loan was made by a New York bank which acted as the defendant’s agent for the purchase of stock in New York. The promissory note was sent to the plaintiff in New York and the collateral to secure the loan was lodged here. These are purposeful contacts with New York. ... Second, where the original transaction would support New York jurisdiction, the circumstance that the renewal note was executed outside the State is irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a defendant’s purposeful New York activities concerning the contract in dispute, considered together, amount to transacting business in the state.

Atlantic Metal Products, Inc. v. Blake Construction Co. · filed 1972-12-12(a)(1)

In our view, the transactions conducted by defendant’s representatives with respect to the contract in controversy during their visits to New York, coupled with the subsequent placement by defendant of a draft in the sum of $14,370.50 with plaintiff’s New York attorney, which was sent to him in New York-to be held in escrow by him pending delivery by plaintiff of a balance of materials theretofore agreed upon at a second meeting in New York, at which time the differences of the parties were negotiated and resolved, constituted in their totality the purposeful activities necessary to confer jurisdiction pursuant to the statutory standard set forth in CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary’s New York business activities give rise to the claim; an office or property in New York is unnecessary when its activities establish a substantial connection with the state.

Rocke International Corp. v. Victory Engineering Corp. · filed 1973-01-22(a)(1)

In this case the court concludes that defendant’s activities fell within the reach of Section 302(a)(1), CPLR, and, in fact, exceeded the minimum contacts necessary to constitutionally subject it to the personal jurisdiction of the State of New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that transacts business in New York, including where the promissory note at issue was executed there.

Scruggs v. International Investments, Ltd. · filed 1973-03-20(a)(1)

The court has jurisdiction over the defendant on two grounds: ... 1. That the defendant foreign corporation “ transacts any business within the state” (CPLB 302, subd. [a], par. 1; or CCA, § 404, subd. [a], par. 1). ... As to the first the facts are that the promissory note, the subject of this litigation, was executed in the State of New York (Pacer Int. Corp. v. Otter Distr. Co., 51 Misc 2d 737); the letterhead of the corporation shows a New York address during the period of execution of the note; and the record indicating the holding of the assets levied against by the order of attachment in the name of the defendant lists the address shown on the letterhead. The other basis for jurisdiction is the levy against assets held in the name of the defendant here in New York City pursuant to the order of attachment. Each, in and of itself, is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the defendant corporation.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful activity in New York that creates minimum contacts, but does not require regular and systematic activity there.

Klein v. EW Reynolds Co., Inc. · filed 1973-03-26(a)(1)

The transaction of business test does not require regular and systematic activities within the state, but it does require some purposeful activity within the state giving rise to at least some minimum contacts between the forum and the party over whom it is asserting jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident vacationer for a hotel bill arising from a stay in New York.

Gilper v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc. · filed 1973-03-29(a)(1)

In the case at bar appellant contracted for board and lodging at appellee’s resort hotel in New York State. Even though appellant was vacationing, she chose to deal with a business enterprise which in turn had to comply with various laws and regulations that provide benefits and protection to its guests such as those regarding health, safety and civil rights. When appellant “purposefully” availed herself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York, she thereby “invok[ed] the benefits and protection of its laws” relating to the conduct of her activities. We find sufficient “contacts” and state interest on the facts here, so that service of process on appellant outside the territorial limits of New York was in accordance with its laws and did not constitute a denial of due process of law.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who participate in New York negotiations for the transaction underlying the claim.

Mendelson v. Fleischmann · filed 1973-05-16(a)(1)

Defendants by their presence there, and participation in the broker’s negotiation with Macintosh in New York “transacted business in the State of New York” within the meaning of New York CPLR § 302(a).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a contract negotiated outside New York and a few later visits to New York to witness product tests.

A. I. L., a Division of Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Symetrics Industries, Inc. · filed 1973-05-23(a)(1)

The visits of a few representatives of the defendant to Melville, N.Y., long after the execution of the contract, for witnessing tests were in no way a substantial contact in New York. ... The Court concluded that the defendant did not transact any business within this State and that it lacks jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business conduct in New York by the defendant; the plaintiff’s credit check and lease execution in New York and a defendant’s first viewing of a car there do not suffice.

A-Leet Leasing Corp. v. Kingshead Corp. · filed 1973-06-13(a)(1)

There is no traditional basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to CPLR 301, and it does not appear that defendants’ conduct falls within either the letter or the .spirit of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1), the long-arm statute based upon a defendant’s transaction of business in New York out of which plaintiff’s cause of action arises. ... Similarly, plaintiff’s execution of the lease in New York after obtaining approval of the defendants’ credit does not amount to ‘ ‘ purposeful conduct ’ ’ on the part of the defendants in New York, and the individual defendant’s first contact with the auto, on the premises of a third party in Nyack, New York, can hardly fall within the meaning of such a significant phrase.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose delivery of a signed guarantee in New York forms the guarantee contract there.

Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Advertising, Inc. · filed 1973-07-02(a)(1)

Since the contract of guarantee was made in this State‘by Schuminsky’s personal delivery of the instrument to the defendant in New York, it follows that the New York courts have jurisdiction over him.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident mortgage brokers who solicit New York business and enter the state for a purposeful financing transaction involving New York property.

Buffalo Downtown Garage, Inc. v. Winfield Associates, Inc. · filed 1973-07-06

We agree that there was a purposeful business transaction in New York when defendants’ principals came to Buffalo from Chicago to engage in financing a second mortgage on plaintiff’s real property in New York. Such visit, although in response to a telephone call from plaintiff’s representatives, was initiated in the first instance by advertisements regularly placed in the Wall Street Journal by defendants holding themselves out as mortgage brokers and available to transact business in New York and elsewhere. We conclude, as did the trial court, that this was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over defendants in New York (CPLR 302; Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26 N Y 2d 13).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from business transacted in New York through its agents, including substantial contract negotiations.

National Iranian Oil Co. v. COMMERCIAL U. INS. CO. OF NY · filed 1973-08-14(a)(1)

Taken together, the pre-contract and post-contract negotiations carried on in New York by Horowitz and Colmen on behalf of TME were sufficient to constitute transaction of business within the meaning of CPLR § 302(a)(1).

A persistent course of conduct and substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in New York can constitute transacting business in the state under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Victorson v. Kaplan · filed 1973-08-21(a)(1)

In 1964 a judicial determination was made that Bock engaged in a persistent course of conduct and derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in this State (Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc 2d 599, affd. 22 A D 2d 854, affd. 16 N Y 2d 1070) and this is .sufficient to constitute the transaction of business within this State pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires business transacted in New York; work at a New Jersey dock does not qualify merely because the dock is within the Port of New York.

International Terminal Operating Co. v. Skibs A/S Hidlefjord · filed 1973-10-01(a)(1)

To apply it, plaintiff would have to show that work done in Port Elizabeth— where the S.S. Puna was docked when plaintiff claims to have done the work giving rise to plaintiff’s cause of action —somehow amounted to a transaction of business in New York. ... Thus in the court’s view there is no conceivable theory by which New York long-arm jurisdiction could be achieved.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over a nonresident customer merely because the customer's out-of-state broker later places the order in New York.

Drexel Burnham & Co. v. Silverman · filed 1973-11-08(a)(1)

The incidental circumstances that following all action by the defendants, their local broker undertook the interstate activity of placing a telephone call order to New York surely will not provide the basis for “ long-arm ” jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s New York business transactions.

Evans v. Eric · filed 1974-01-04(a)(1)

The mere fact, even if true, that defendants were doing Business in New York is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Plaintiff’s cause of action must arise out of the business so transacted.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign nonprofit corporation that conducts membership and disciplinary proceedings in New York.

Garofano v. United States Trotting Ass'n · filed 1974-01-29(a)(1)

If it transacts any business in this State, it may be attached personally in New York. (CPLR 302, subd. [2], par. 1.) ... On the face of this record, there can be no doubt that the USTA transacts business in New York, generally, and did so in this very instance.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary employer when a contract calls for sales in New York and requires the employer’s independent business activities there, even if the contract was made elsewhere.

Savitz v. Zim Chemical Co. · filed 1974-09-26(a)(1)

The court further is cognizant of the fact that the contract, although made in Georgia, called for performance in the State of New York with the employee being a salesman, which would, by the very nature of his job and the territory covered under the contract, require independent activities on the part of the defendant corporation in the State of New York to keep his business active and to properly service it in the nine States embraced in the contract, including the State of New York. ... Under the facts and circumstances, the court should and hereby does deny the motion of the defendant to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the issue of jurisdiction of this court under CPLR 302(subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York, assessed from the totality of the non-domiciliary’s activities in the state.

John J. Galgay, as Trustee in the Reorganization of R. Hoe & Co., Inc. v. Bulletin Company, Inc. · filed 1974-10-16(a)(1)

We conclude in assessing the totality of Bulletin’s activities within the forum that there is no sufficient basis to find that purposeful conduct occurred within the statute and the cases construing it.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from business transacted in New York.

New England Laminates Co. v. Murphy · filed 1974-12-13(a)(1)

Nowhere in the complaint is there a claim that the plaintiff’s cause of action against Fortin arose out of the transacting of any business in New York.

Ownership of property in New York connected to the contract in suit can constitute transacting business in the state; substantial factual disputes about that ownership require a jurisdictional hearing.

Dobb Pharmacal Co. v. White Cross Stores, Inc. · filed 1975-02-10(a)(1)

The affidavits herein having raised substantial issues of fact as to the purported ownership by White Cross Stores, Inc. (a Pennsylvania corporation) of property in New York in connection with the contract in suit, which ownership would be tantamount to a transaction of business in this State for the purposes of our long-arm statute (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1; Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24 A D 2d 326; cf. Parhe-Bernet Galleries v. Franlclyn, 26 N Y 2d 13, 16), it follows that a hearing will be necessary in order to completely resolve the jurisdictional question (see Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F. 2d 583; Perlman v. Martin, 70 Mise 2d 169; cf. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., supra).

Section 302(a) does not confer jurisdiction when the claim does not arise from the defendant’s acts or business transacted in New York.

Carbone v. Fort Erie Jockey Club, Ltd. · filed 1975-04-17(a)

This is necessarily so, because under no view of the facts of this case could it be found that plaintiff’s cause of action arose out of acts of defendant in New York or business that defendant transacted in New York (see ...).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that transacts business in New York by seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment there.

Overmyer v. Eliot Realty · filed 1975-06-06(a)(1)

Furthermore, it is clear that defendant engaged in purposeful activity in this State by seeking enforcement of the Texas judgment and the court holds such activity to be transaction of business here, which supports acquisition of in personam jurisdiction (CPLR 302, subd [a], par l).

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat an out-of-state advertiser as transacting business in New York based on minimal newspaper distribution there that the advertiser neither controlled nor benefited from.

Yanni v. Variety, Inc. · filed 1975-06-17(a)(1)

We do not find on this record that appellant may fairly be held to have transacted business in New York within the meaning of the statute (Strelsin v Barrett, 36 AD2d 923).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on occasional visits to New York by corporate officers when the visits are not for transacting business in the State.

Meyer v. Gas Magazines, Inc. · filed 1975-10-28(a)(1)

Clearly the court had no in personam jurisdiction of defendant (CPLR 3211, subd [a], par 8), since there was no evidence that defendant transacted any business within the State (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1) or indeed committed any other acts which might form a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302. The occasional visits of certain officers of defendant to New York, which, for the most part, were for plaintiffs benefit, were not for the purpose of transacting business in the State.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a single visit to New York for other business, incidental discussions there, and a contract neither executed nor performed there.

Emi Film Distributors, Ltd. v. L. D. S. Film Co. · filed 1975-11-24(a)(1)

Such jurisdiction is determined in this diversity case by the New York long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a)(1). The defendant’s only contact with New York consisted of a single visit to the state by William Bates. Bates came to New York on other business, and his' discussions with the plaintiff were merely incidental to the purpose of his trip. Indeed, the defendant L. D. S. Film Co., a partnership, was not even in existence at the time of Bates’ visit. Moreover, the contract, if one existed, was neither executed nor performed in New York. Bates’ conduct in New York is thus an insufficient basis on which to ground personal jurisdiction in this state.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the nondomiciliary’s transaction of business in New York.

Masonite Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. · filed 1976-01-05(a)(1)

Regardless of the standard used and viewing the matter most favorably to the third party plaintiff, I find that neither the damage to the cargo nor the right to indemnity arose directly or indirectly from the supposed New York transactions of Palm Line.

A brief New York visit by the defendant’s officer, coupled with extensive telephone communications about contract performance, did not amount to transacting business in New York under § 302(a)(1).

Concrete Detailing Services, Inc. v. Thomsson Steel Co. · filed 1976-01-07(a)(1)

The question remains then whether the visit by an officer of defendant to New York, coupled with extensive telephonic communication between the parties by which defendant allegedly involved itself in the daily performance of the plaintiff’s duties under the contract, constitutes a transaction of business in New York by the defendant which will sustain jurisdiction. ... Even the broad sweep of the “long arm” statute cannot be satisfied by such minimal contact bolstered only by the whims of a plaintiff or perhaps his counsel.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary in an action arising from business transacted in New York, with appropriate service anywhere.

Merigone v. Seaboard Capital Corp. · filed 1976-02-11(a)(1)

In this case, Shwidock could have been served anywhere, and the court would have obtained jurisdiction over him pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1). New York’s long-arm statute gives jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries for actions arising out of business they transact here. This case concerns a note which Shwidock signed in New York. He signed both as president of a New York corporation and as an individual. The corporate business and Shwidock’s personal economic activity all took place in New York. The transaction in question was totally New York contacted. Under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1), this suit could have been commenced by appropriate service anywhere.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from business transacted in New York; unrelated transactions do not establish personal jurisdiction.

McShan v. Omega Louis Brandt Et Frere, S.A. And Societe Suisse Pour L'IndustrIe Horlogere Management Service · filed 1976-05-26(a)(1)

As we have already indicated, section 302 requires that the cause of action on which suit is brought arise out of the transaction of business in this jurisdiction. The Sherman Act offense arises out of the transaction of business between the defendants and Morris, and has nothing to do with the payment of royalties to McShan which is at issue here.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the defendant has not transacted business in New York.

Vicente v. Trinidad & Tobago · filed 1976-07-01(a)(1)

Even were we to analogize the State to a foreign corporation rather than treat it as a sovereign, we find that the State had neither been transacting business in New York, within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) (Longines-Wittnauer v Barnes & Reinecke, 15 NY2d 443), nor was its presence in New York sufficient to grant jurisdiction under CPLR 301 (Frummer v Hilton Hotels Int., 19 NY2d 533).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over former New York residents when their purposeful purchase of and participation in a New York corporation gives rise to a shareholder contribution claim.

Havlicek v. Bach · filed 1976-07-14(a)(1)

The court concludes that the purchase of 10*000 shares of the New York corporation by New York residents, coupled with knowledge of and participation in the operation of the corporation, was "purposeful activity” under the circumstances here, especially when that stock purchase constituted the third-party defendants, as joint tenants, to be the largest shareholders in that corporation. ... He cannot escape his proportionate share of those responsibilities by leaving the State and thereby rendering ineffective the process which by CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) subjects him to local jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a transaction of business in New York and limits jurisdiction to causes of action arising from that transaction.

A. C. Dutton Lumber Corp. v. Van Ness Lumber Co. · filed 1976-10-18(a)(1)

Defendants, if subject to personal jurisdiction at all, are subject thereto pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1), which requires the transaction of business in New York as the predicate for jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is limited to causes of action arising out of that transaction of business. The record on this appeal is insufficient to permit a determination as to whether defendants transacted business in New York and, if so, whether this cause of action arises out of such transaction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who, personally or through an agent, engages in purposeful New York business activity connected to the claims.

Milton R. Barrie Co. v. Levine · filed 1976-10-19(a)(1)

It appears that appellant, in person or through an agent, engaged in purposeful business activity in New York in connection with the causes of action alleged, so as to afford personal jurisdiction over appellant under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires sufficient purposeful activity in New York to establish jurisdiction based on transacting business there.

Aero-Bocker Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Allied Fabrics Corp. · filed 1976-10-21(a)(1)

The totality of defendant’s acts connected with New York are insufficient to qualify as transacting business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for an out-of-state defamatory statement about that person's purposeful New York business transaction.

GTP Leisure Products, Inc. v. B-W Footwear Co. · filed 1977-01-14(a)(1)

When a nondomiciliary engages in a purposeful business transaction in New York and makes a defamatory statement outside of New York about that specific transaction0, New York courts may exercise jurisdiction over his person for a cause of action based upon the defamatory statement.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant negotiates a contract in New York and makes repeated visits there to supervise its performance.

Katz Agency, Inc. v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp. · filed 1977-03-08(a)(1)

Furthermore, defendant engaged in "purposeful activity” in New York, inasmuch as the contract was negotiated in New York and there were numerous visits of defendant’s officers to New York to supervise performance (CPLR 302 Subd [a], par 1; Atlantic Metal Prods, v Blake Constr. Co., 40 AD2d 966; American Broadcasting Cos. v Hernreich, 40 AD2d 800; Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v Barnes & Reinecke, 15 NY2d 443, 456-458).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant transacted business in New York.

A. Colish, Inc. v. Professional Press, Inc. · filed 1977-04-11(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant was transacting business within this State (see CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1; McKee Elec. Co. v Rauland-Borg Co., 20 NY2d 377, 382; Aero-Brocker Knitting Mills v Allied Fabrics Corp., 54 AD2d 647; Concrete Detailing Serv. v Thomsson Steel Co., 411 F Supp 1021).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when its purposeful business activities in New York give rise to the claim, even if the resulting setoff occurs elsewhere.

Northern Structures, Inc. v. Union Bank · filed 1977-05-20(a)(1)

We find that defendant by negotiating with and coming to an agreement with Imperial and its other creditors purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York and Union Bank’s decision to set off the deposit was a result of those purposeful activities. Since the instant cause of action resulted from Union Bank’s activities in New York, it is appropriate for the courts of New York to entertain long-arm jurisdiction over this nondomiciliary bank under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat a settlement meeting held during a defendant’s personal visit to New York as a business transaction from which the cause of action arose.

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Schneider · filed 1977-07-26(a)(1)

A meeting to discuss settlement of a lawsuit undertaken while a defendant is in New York on personal business is not, in our view, a “transaction of business” out of which the cause of action may be said to have arisen.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a bank that did not purposefully conduct activities in New York and passively received funds there through another bank’s unilateral choice.

Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-New York · filed 1978-03-02(a)(1)

In our view, disclosure has revealed nothing which forms the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over Aroostook in the present case. In particular, Aroostook has not "purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws” (p 396). On the contrary, it has passively and unilaterally been made the recipient of funds which at its customer’s direction it has declined.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not treat physical presence at a New York business meeting alone as transacting business in the state.

Presidential Realty Corp. v. Michael Square West, Ltd. · filed 1978-03-23(a)(1)

Although the nature and purpose of a solitary business meeting conducted for a single day in New York may supply the minimum contacts necessary to subject a nonresident participant to the jurisdiction of our courts (see, e.g., Riener Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648; cf. Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13), physical presence alone cannot talismanically transform any and all business dealings into business transactions under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par [1]) (e.g., McKee Elec. Co. v Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 NY2d 377; cf. Glassman v Hyder, 23 NY2d 354).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when purposeful business negotiations in New York give rise to the asserted claims.

Transatlantic Cement, Inc. v. Lambert Freres Et Cie · filed 1978-04-19(a)(1)

Since plaintiff claims that the mere negotiations constituted a breach of, and an interference with, a contract, the New York City negotiations give rise to the causes of action alleged. We therefore have jurisdiction over LFC and Lambert under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when meetings and contract negotiations in New York, together with advertising and exhibition there, provide a basis for it.

Morrissey v. Sostar, S. A. · filed 1978-06-27(a)(1)

The meetings of plaintiff and defendant Ponti in New York to discuss the making of the motion pictures, negotiations in New York by their attorneys leading to the execution of the contract, and the fact that the motion pictures were advertised and exhibited in New York provided a basis for personal jurisdiction over defendant Ponti (Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13, 17; Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648, 651, 652; CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant’s New York business activities to be substantially proximate to the alleged unlawful acts for the claim to arise from those activities.

Xedit Corp. v. Harvel Industries Corp., Fidelipac · filed 1978-07-21(a)(1)

The defendants’ New York activities must be substantially proximate to the allegedly unlawful acts before the cause of action can be said to arise out of those activities.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise out of business transacted in New York.

Nemetsky v. Niger · filed 1978-07-31(a)(1)

Second, an essential criterion for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) is that the cause of action must arise out of the business transacted in New York. ... The trade acceptance is not shown to have arisen out of the business transacted by Banque when it opened the letter of credit at Credit Lyonnais.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary’s officers make purposeful visits to New York in relation to the contract underlying the claim.

American Contract Designers Inc. v. Cliffside, Inc. · filed 1978-10-11(a)(1)

There were two visits to New York City by high-level officers of the defendant Cliffside, which, taken together, do amount to sufficiently “purposeful acts in relation to the contract,” and not merely “casual visits.” ... The Court therefore concludes that section 302(a)(1) of the New York CPLR permits the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant in this ease.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from business transacted in New York.

Nemetsky v. Banque de Developpement de la Republique Du Niger · filed 1978-11-03(a)(1)

Second, an essential criterion for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) is that the cause of action must arise out of the business transacted in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat the mere shipment of goods or sending of letters into New York as transacting business in the state.

American Edelstaal, Inc. v. Maier · filed 1978-11-13(a)(1)

These circumstances do not add up to the transacting of business in New York. The mere shipment of goods into New York, and the mere sending of letters into New York, is not sufficient.

Section 302(a)(1) provides for personal jurisdiction over defendants transacting business within New York.

Preferred Electric & Wire Corp. v. Katz · filed 1978-11-28(a)(1)

Moreover, it appears that all of the defendants were transacting business within the State of New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) and were “doing business” within the State of New York under CPLR § 301.

A nonresident creditor’s visit to New York to negotiate repayment of an existing debt does not, by itself, constitute transacting business under § 302(a)(1).

Beldock v. Braun · filed 1979-01-25(a)(1)

In the instant case, defendant’s officers came into New York pursuant to Rondon’s request to negotiate a realistic repayment schedule of a $100,000 debt to the defendants. This activity cannot be said to be the type of “transaction of business” that was contemplated by the New York legislature in adopting § 302(a)(1) or the New York Court of Appeals in its interpretations of this provision.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a legal-fee claim when the lawyer’s work on New York business transactions gives rise to the client’s payment obligation.

Wisehart, Friou & Koch v. Hoover · filed 1979-05-22(a)(1)

Since there can be no argument that business was transacted, and the plaintiff’s allegations of its role therein cannot be disputed in a motion to dismiss, it must be said in the fullest sense that the obligation, if any, to pay legal fees “arose” from the business transactions conducted here.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on brief negotiations of minor contract terms in New York after the substantive bargain was reached elsewhere.

National Spinning Co., Inc. v. Talent Network, Inc. · filed 1979-12-31(a)(1)

Federal case law, moreover, although not determinative in interpreting a state statute, supports the proposition that where jurisdiction under § 302(a) is predicated solely on contract negotiations in this state, such negotiations must be of “substantive importance ... in concluding the contract.” ... Applying these principles to the instant case, we find the extent of defendant’s negotiations in New York insufficient to satisfy the statutory standard.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident shareholders when their ownership of a New York corporation gives rise to an employee’s statutory wage claim against them.

Kane v. Benson · filed 1980-04-21(a)(1)

Thus, the court holds that the moving defendants’ ownership of shares in Autocar, a New York corporation allegedly subject to the terms and conditions contained in BCL § 630, is purposeful activity from which the instant cause of action arises which satisfies the requirement of transaction of business in New York for actions brought against a non-domiciliary under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from business transacted in New York, and disputed facts about those transactions require a hearing before jurisdiction can be resolved.

Dulman v. Potomac Baking Co. · filed 1980-05-19(a)(1)

To assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant, plaintiff relies on CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) which requires that a stated cause of action arise from the transaction of business within New York. However, there are issues of fact pertaining to the extent of business transacted within the State of New York regarding two alleged agreements, which preclude the resolution of the jurisdictional question without a hearing.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who conducts related litigation in New York and precludes that person from claiming immunity from service while attending it.

Lerman v. Lerman · filed 1980-06-06(a)(1)

This defendant has chosen to come into the State of New York and litigate various aspects of her legal rights vis-a-vis her former spouse. Having subjected herself to the parameters of our long-arm statute, she cannot now claim the privileges of a nonresident from immunity from service of process while in this State voluntarily to conduct litigation. Accordingly, she is not immune from the instigation of related litigation directly arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose business activity in New York relates to the claim.

Republic Nat. Bank of New York v. Sabet · filed 1981-04-06(a)(1)

This appears sufficient to support a finding that Habib Sabet conducted business in New York under CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful acts in New York; the sale there of property subject to an out-of-state financing agreement does not, by itself, establish that the lender transacted business in New York.

Spungin v. Chinetti International Motors · filed 1981-06-04(a)(1)

Against these undisputed assertions by Citytrust, the solitary circumstance that an automobile subject to the Connecticut financing agreement was sold in New York falls short of a showing that the bank committed any of the purposeful acts that § 302(a)(1) requires.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful activity by the defendant in New York connected with the matter in suit to support jurisdiction for transacting business.

J. E. T. Advertising Associates, Inc. v. Lawn King, Inc. · filed 1981-11-02(a)(1)

Here, there was no purposeful activity undertaken in New York by Lawn King which is connected with the matter in suit. The contract was negotiated by telephone or mail, and no meetings were held in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s business transactions in New York.

Rios v. Marshall · filed 1981-11-23(a)(1)

Since plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out Meranda’s transactions in New York, jurisdiction may not be predicated on CPLR § 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state buyer whose purposeful New York activities materially advance the negotiation and performance of the contract at issue.

Dulman v. Potomac Baking Co. · filed 1981-12-28(a)(1)

Although “physical presence alone cannot talismanically transform any and all business dealings into business transactions under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par [1])” ... the instant defendant’s activities in New York in October and December of 1977 designedly and materially forwarded the negotiation and performance of the contract for the sale of the oven. Therefore, we also affirm the denial of the motion as to the cause of action for breach of that contract.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful business activities in New York relate to the action.

Sasso v. Gallucci · filed 1982-02-05(a)(1)

Although defendant Magda was a nondomiciliary at the time of this action’s commencement, jurisdiction has been obtained under the long-arm statute (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1). ... Such participation constitutes sufficient purposeful activity to subject her to jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat mailing a draft or documents to New York for payment as transacting business in the state.

Faravelli v. Bankers Trust Co. · filed 1982-03-18(a)(1)

The mailing of a draft or documents to New York for payment does not rise to the level of activity contemplated by CPLR 302 as a basis for personal jurisdiction (Amigo Foods Corp. v Marine Midland Bank-N. Y., 39 NY2d 391, after remittitur 46 NY2d 855, affg 61 AD2d 896).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose purposeful activity in New York has a substantial relationship to the cause of action.

Amodeo v. Star Manufacturing Co. · filed 1982-06-17(a)(1)

The pertinent law on this question is that a nondomiciliary is subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts under the cited statute if it can be established that the nonresident defendant has engaged in some purposeful activity within the State and there is a substantial relationship between the activity and the cause of action sued upon, i.e., if it can be shown that a foreign defendant had some business contacts within the State and that the subject cause of action arose out of those contacts (McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268).

Section 302 does not provide personal jurisdiction when the cause of action does not arise from an act committed in New York State.

Copulsky v. Boruchow · filed 1982-06-25

CPLR 302, the “long arm statute”, is inapplicable because the cause of action did not arise out of an act committed in New York State.

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between business transacted in New York and the cause of action.

Ring Sales Co. v. Wakefield Engineering, Inc. · filed 1982-10-12(a)(1)

Jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) is lacking because plaintiff has set forth no “articulable nexus between the business transacted [within New York] and the cause of action sued upon” (McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on contacts with New York banks for property appraisals and a visit to view the property when no negotiations occurred in New York.

Roddy v. Schmidt · filed 1982-11-09(a)(1)

Plaintiffs do allege that defendants contacted New York banks for appraisals of the property, and it is true that one of the defendants came to New York to view the property with a representative of the charitable corporation, but no negotiations then took place. These activities, however, are not sufficient to provide a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a contract breach arising from business transacted in New York or a contract to supply goods or services there.

Gianna Enterprises v. Miss World (Jersey) Ltd. · filed 1982-12-06(a)(1)

Under § 302(a)(1) the breach must arise from business transacted within the state or from a contract to supply goods or services in the state. The pleadings make clear that no contract exists between plaintiff and the defendants to satisfy this standard, and no injury to plaintiffs occurred in New York from any alleged tort.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from acts in New York attributed to the defendant.

Tom Lyons Trucking, Inc. v. De Salve Service · filed 1982-12-17(a)(1)

We add only that since the complaint does not allege a cause of action arising from the acts in New York of one Ken Winters, who is claimed by plaintiff to have acted as defendant’s agent, there is no basis for jurisdiction over defendant under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

American White Cross Laboratories, Inc. v. H.M. Cote, Inc. · filed 1983-02-14(a)(1)

This is a strained reading of the statute. Cote’s activities in New York led to the creation and implementation of the joint venture. The causes of action alleged in the complaint cannot be regarded as “arising from” that transaction of business; the joint venture no longer exists.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an organization that transacts business in New York by continuously promoting its goals there through its agents or controlled affiliates.

United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1983-07-12(a)(1)

An organization which assiduously seeks to enlarge its membership and which continuously and systematically promotes its corporate goals by such activities in this State, whether conducted by officers and agents of the United States Power Squadrons or by the officers of affiliates which it dominates and controls is transacting business in New York and is subject to its jurisdiction (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1; International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310; United States Jaycees v McClure, 305 NW2d 764 [Minn], supra).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business activity and the claim; a mere link in the chain of events is insufficient.

Faherty v. Fender · filed 1983-09-28(a)(1)

Thus, plaintiffs’ causes of action arise out of defendant’s activities in New York only to the extent that such activities were a link in the chain of events leading to the Texas lawsuit. As the cases above indicate, however, this connection is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of § 302 that plaintiff’s cause of action bear a “substantial relationship” to defendant’s forum activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business, including an employment agreement negotiated and entered into there.

Lovebright Diamond Co., Inc. v. Spragins · filed 1983-10-24(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) of the CPLR provides that jurisdiction may be obtained over someone “who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within the state” so long as the cause of action arises out of the transaction of that business. ... Here, clearly, the plaintiffs cause of action arises from the employment agreement allegedly negotiated and entered into in New York.

CPLR 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in New York.

Manow International Corp. v. High Point Chair, Inc. · filed 1983-12-08

However, he found that the defendant transacted business in New York under CPLR 302 and was subject to its jurisdiction. The record substantiates the special referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. We, therefore, confirm that report.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when purposeful activity in New York results in the contractual relationship at issue.

Roman v. Sunshine Ranchettes, Inc. · filed 1983-12-12(a)(1)

These contacts evidence “purposeful activity in New York directed toward and resulting in the establishment of a contractual relationship” ... and are a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who negotiated and executed in New York the contract giving rise to the claim.

Leab v. Streit · filed 1984-04-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff argues persuasively that this Court has competence over defendant pursuant to Section 302 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”). ... This Court finds that defendant transacted business within the state when, as a resident of New York, he negotiated and apparently executed, in New York, the contract for the sale of real property located in New York that is the subject matter of this lawsuit.

Section 302(a)(1) permits long-arm jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when a contract has sufficient New York connections, including a mortgage secured by New York property and an agreement to assume payments on a New York mortgage.

Key Bank v. Lake Placid Co. · filed 1984-07-26(a)(1)

In the instant case, the wrap-around mortgage was secured by property located in New York, the mortgage was recorded in New York and one of the mortgagors, Lake Placid, is a New York corporation. Additionally, as part of the contract, North Mississippi agreed to assume payments on the primary mortgage which was purely a New York transaction involving New York parties. Thus, in this case, the requirements of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) for long-arm jurisdiction have been met.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business or services, while § 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York that indirect financial consequences at the plaintiff’s New York office do not establish.

Insurance Co. of State of Pa. v. Centaur Ins. Co. · filed 1984-08-22(a)(1), (a)(3)

Plaintiff has not shown that the instant causes of action arise from the alleged transaction of business in New York or contracting to supply services in New York. ... Indirect economic injury in New York by virtue of plaintiff maintaining its principal place of business here cannot, even if proven, sustain jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, there is no showing of tortious injury within New York to support the application of § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a showing that a nondomiciliary transacted business in New York to support jurisdiction on that basis.

Totalplan Corp. of America v. Lure Camera Ltd. · filed 1985-01-31(a)(1)

Except as Lure Camera Limited’s alter ego, an hypothesis rejected for present purposes, Northwest Pipe has not been shown to do ... anything construable as “doing business” or “transacting any business” in New York, within the meaning of CPLR §§ 301 and 302(a)(1).

Section 302 requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s business transactions in New York for jurisdiction based on those transactions.

Uni-Petrol Gesellschaft Fur Mineraloel Produkte, M.B.H. v. MT Lotus Maru · filed 1985-03-28(a)(1)

Even if the various provisions of the charter parties did represent sufficient contacts to constitute the transaction of business within the meaning of CPLR § 302 by Norsk, Uni-Petrol has not alleged that its cause of action arises out of the business transacted by Norsk in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on New York business dealings related to the claim; negotiations over continued representation can create a factual issue requiring denial of a motion to dismiss.

Murray, Hollander, Sullivan & Bass v. HEM Research, Inc. · filed 1985-05-14(a)(1)

While the mere execution of the related note document might not be sufficient to assert long-arm jurisdiction over defendants (Presidential Realty Corp. v Michael Sq. W., 44 NY2d 672), there were, in fact, additional negotiations regarding such document, creating at least an issue of fact and requiring at least an interim denial of the motion.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a claim sufficiently related to business the defendant transacted in New York, even when the alleged breach occurred elsewhere.

Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. And Edwin Jay, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd. And Jack E. Ayers · filed 1985-05-15(a)(1)

Rather, having established that defendants transacted business in New York, plaintiffs need show only that the cause of action is sufficiently related to the business transacted that it would not be unfair to deem it to arise out of the transacted business, and to subject the defendants to suit in New York.

Section 302 cannot support personal jurisdiction when the suit does not arise from an event within New York.

Abrantes v. St. Gotthard Schiffahrts, A.G. · filed 1985-05-21

Thus, since the suit does not arise from an event within New York, jurisdiction over the defendants cannot be predicated on CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s activities in New York.

New World Capital Corp. v. Poole Truck Line, Inc. · filed 1985-06-20(a)(1)

A fundamental requirement of CPLR § 302(a)(1) is that the cause of action asserted must arise out of the defendant’s activities in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between the defendant’s New York business or contracts to ship products into New York and the cause of action.

Krajewski v. Osterlund, Inc. · filed 1985-06-24(a)(1)

Jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) is lacking because plaintiff has set forth no “articulable nexus” between either the alleged business transacted in New York or the contracts for shipment of defendant’s products into New York, and the cause of action sued upon (see, McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272; Ring Sales Co. v Wakefield Eng., 90 AD2d 496).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial connection between the business transacted in New York and the specific claim asserted.

Martin E. Segal Co. v. Barton · filed 1985-06-27(a)(1)

Similar reasoning compels a finding in this action that jurisdiction based on CPLR § 302(a)(1) would be improper. There is no meaningful dispute about the extent of Barton’s New York contacts. However, Segal has not established, or even alleged, that the visits to New York or the business conducted during those visits is related in a substantial or proximate manner to the alleged violations of the non-competition agreement.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transaction.

Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd. · filed 1985-09-17(a)(1)

Thus, the first, fifth, and seventh causes of action do not arise out of the defendants’ New York transactions. The Court cannot premise jurisdiction over the moving defendants on CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) treats a contractually directed deposit into a nondomiciliary’s New York bank account as a transaction of business from which a claim may arise, even when the related note was executed elsewhere.

Catalyst Energy Development Corp. v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. · filed 1986-04-09(a)(1)

Similarly, in this case, the fact that the promissory note was not executed in New York does not dispose of the jurisdictional issue. The underlying transaction of business out of which plaintiff’s cause of action arose was the deposit of $50,000 in defendant's bank account.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from business transacted in New York; phone calls and correspondence with a New York broker alone do not meet that requirement.

Advance Realty Associates v. Krupp · filed 1986-05-29(a)(1)

New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a)(1) confers jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose transaction of business in New York gives rise to the cause of action in question. ... Phone calls and correspondence with a New York broker do not add up to a transaction of business in New York.

CPLR 302(a)(1) treats an out-of-state insurer’s purposeful New York activities, considered together, as transacting business for personal jurisdiction.

People v. British & American Casualty Co. · filed 1986-06-12(a)(1)

Even looking directly to CPLR 302 (a) (1) respondents are clearly transacting business for jurisdictional purposes. Contrary to respondents’ argument, the facts alleged do not amount to "mere solicitation”. Rather, the acts here, taken in totality, show purposeful activity within New York sufficient to form minimum contacts.

A single trip to New York for a preliminary meeting does not, on these facts, constitute transacting business under § 302(a)(1).

Berk v. Nemetz · filed 1986-11-04(a)(1)

Therefore, the Court here finds that movant Nemetz’s single trip to New York for a preliminary meeting with plaintiff and Mr. Gates fails to satisfy the requirements under § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary based on a single purposeful business meeting in New York connected to the suit.

CPC International Inc. v. McKesson Corp. · filed 1986-11-13(a)(1)

New York jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1), may be established over a nondomiciliary, upon the basis "of a solitary business meeting conducted for a single day in New York” (Presidential Realty Corp. v Michael Sq. W., 44 NY2d 672, 673 [1978]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business activity and the claim; a completed contractual relationship does not establish jurisdiction over a later, unrelated claim.

Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp. · filed 1987-01-15(a)(1)

Contrary to Special Term’s finding, therefore, Stuart MacLaren’s 1984 letters cannot be viewed as an attempt to enforce a contract; the parties’ duties under the contract had been completed and there was no 1984 New York business activity which would justify bringing the MacLarens into New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who negotiates a contract in New York when the claim arises from that contract.

Cross & Cross Properties, Ltd. v. Everett Allied Co. · filed 1987-03-12(a)(1)

Everett, through its president Dern, was physically present in New York for negotiation of and agreement in principle to the contracts out of which the cause of action arose. These factual allegations present very nearly the “clearest sort of case” for long-arm jurisdiction under New York law.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when its New York business activities relate to the contract claim.

Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co. · filed 1987-04-03(a)(1)

In sum, the Court finds that the corporate defendant’s meetings with plaintiff in the forum, its additional physical presence in the forum, and its other activities in New York are sufficient to subject Schmitt Co. to personal jurisdiction in New York under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit jurisdiction over a claim arising from one contract based on the defendant’s performance under a separate contract.

A.C.K. Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1987-05-26(a)(1)

These two contracts are entirely separate and the performance under one contract may not be the jurisdictional predicate under CPLR § 302(a)(1) for a cause of action under the other contract.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a guarantor when the claim is sufficiently connected to the guarantor’s New York business activity; an attenuated connection is insufficient.

Seiko Time Corp. v. Pascual · filed 1987-10-14(a)(1)

We therefore conclude, as we believe a New York state court would, that Seiko’s cause of action is sufficiently connected to Jose’s transaction of business in New York to justify asserting jurisdiction over him in New York. With respect to Carmen, however, we conclude that the link between the business transacted in New York and the alleged breach is too insubstantial to subject her to suit in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transactions, even when those contacts suffice to show that the defendant transacted business there.

Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Donald F. Muldoon & Co. · filed 1988-03-30(a)(1)

But Alexander has not met the second requirement under § 302(a)(1) — that the claims against Miro arise out of Miro's transactions of business in New York.

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the claim and the defendant’s business transaction in New York.

In re the Estate of Bruno · filed 1987-01-15(a)(1)

Personal jurisdiction is not properly obtainable under this provision unless a substantial relationship between the claim and the transaction in New York is established (see, McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272).

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat phone and fax contacts as transacting business in New York when the defendant performs all work elsewhere for an out-of-state client and never visits New York for business.

Lawrence Wisser and Co., Inc. v. Slender You, Inc. · filed 1988-09-26(a)(1)

Where Burton performed all work outside of New York for a client based outside of New York and did not come even once to New York on business, she did not purposefully avail herself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York, and thus was not transacting business in this state within the meaning of § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s New York business transaction.

Bachrach v. Keaty · filed 1988-10-06(a)(1)

In addition to proving that the Keatys were transacting business in New York, § 302 requires that Bachrach establish that his cause of action arose from the transaction of business at issue.

Section 302 does not provide jurisdiction when the cause of action arises from a transaction that occurred entirely outside New York.

H. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Novacor Chemicals Ltd. · filed 1988-10-25

Here, the entire transaction occurred in Canada and therefore § 302 is inapplicable.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant’s New York activities under the specific contract at issue to support personal jurisdiction; unrelated sales to New York customers do not suffice.

Spectra Products, Inc. v. Indian River Citrus Specialties, Inc. · filed 1988-11-10(a)(1)

Under CPLR 302 (a) (1), it was defendant’s activities with respect to the specific contract at issue that determined whether defendant was subject to jurisdiction (see, Pacamor Bearings v Molon Motors & Coil, supra, at 356). Any services or goods that defendant may have supplied to New York customers was ineffective to sustain jurisdiction since plaintiffs action does not arise out of these sales (see, J.E.T. Adv. Assocs. v Lawn King, supra, at 745; see also, Del Bello v Japanese Steak House, supra).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a nonresident’s purposeful New York investment activity even when the transactions the nonresident directed did not actually occur.

Picard v. Elbaum · filed 1989-02-27(a)(1)

That the activities the Elbaums believed they were directing were not in fact happening does not change the calculus for finding jurisdiction. The inquiry into whether jurisdiction is proper focuses on the intent of the non-domiciliaries, as reflected by their actions.

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires determining whether a nondomiciliary transacted business in New York; further discovery may be necessary to resolve that question.

Mark III Associates, Inc. v. HEC Engineering Co. · filed 1989-03-10(a)(1)

In this regard, further discovery is necessary to determine whether defendant conducted systematic, purposeful and continuing activities in New York ... or transacted any business within the State (CPLR 302 [a] [1]). Defendant’s motion to dismiss is therefore denied without prejudice.

Section 302(a)(1) does not provide personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who has never conducted or transacted business in New York when that claim is uncontradicted.

Power v. Rhodes · filed 1989-04-03(a)(1)

The appellant, who is not a domiciliary of this State, moved to dismiss the third-party complaint insofar as it is asserted against him for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that he has never conducted or transacted business within the State of New York as an individual or as a sole proprietorship (CPLR 302 [a]). Since no facts were presented in opposition to the motion to contradict his claim, the motion should have been granted (CPLR 3211 [a] [8]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York attributable to the defendant; the New York citizenship of limited partners or funding from New York citizens alone is insufficient.

Pappas v. Arfaras · filed 1989-05-11(a)(1)

Upon a thorough review of the record, however, it appears that if jurisdiction over the defendants can be found at all, it must be found in CPLR 302(a)(1). ... Similarly, the mere fact that some of the limited partners of Cider Mill and Newtown Sports are citizens of New York or that A-C Associates is supported by funds from New York citizens does not amount to “purposeful activity” attributable to defendants in the state.

A New York telephone directory listing with a New York address and a local number reaching an out-of-state office does not, by itself, establish that a defendant transacts business in New York under § 302(a)(1).

Carte v. Parkoff · filed 1989-07-10(a)(1)

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the defendant transacts business in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (1). ... The only distinguishing feature in the present case is that the telephone listing for the defendant included a New York, rather than a foreign, address. This distinction is, in our opinion, immaterial to the issue whether the defendant in fact transacted business in New York.

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires a claim against a foreign corporation to arise from business transacted in New York.

Krakower v. Battles Universal, Inc. · filed 1989-07-17(a)(1)

In order to invoke jurisdiction over a foreign corporation pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) the plaintiffs cause of action must arise out of the transaction of any business within the State.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary corporation when the evidence fails to show that it transacted business in New York.

Leiderman Associates v. Robotool Ltd. · filed 1989-10-16(a)(1)

A review of the credible evidence in the record supports the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the defendant Colorado corporations did not transact business in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business activities and the causes of action asserted.

EAC Systems, Inc. v. Chevie · filed 1989-10-19(a)(1)

The causes of action herein do not arise out of defendant’s earlier activities as a corporate officer and director.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the New York business transaction and the claim; performing an incidental contractual obligation in New York by chance does not satisfy that requirement.

Hvide Marine Intern. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau · filed 1989-10-27(a)(1)

Performance of an incidental contractual obligation by chance in New York will not satisfy the "substantial relationship" requirement of CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from business transacted in New York.

Muollo v. Crestwood Village, Inc. · filed 1989-11-06(a)(1)

An essential criterion for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) is that the cause of action must arise out of the business transacted in New York (Apicella v Valley Forge Military Academy & Jr. Coll., 103 AD2d 151, 154; Nemetsky v Banque De Developpement, 65 AD2d 748, affd 48 NY2d 962).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a New York meeting to have a substantial or critical relationship to the transaction at issue before it can support jurisdiction as transacting business.

Manhattan Life Insurance v. A.J. Stratton Syndicate · filed 1990-01-23(a)(1)

These contacts are of sufficient quantity to find that defendants were transacting business if the meeting in New York had some substantial or critical relationship to the matters which form the basis for this litigation. If, on the other hand, the New York meeting concerned matters between defendants and Manhattan Life which are outside the scope of the transaction in question, CPLR § 302(a)(1) jurisdiction would be improper. Because plaintiffs have not provided any facts regarding the subject matter of the November 7, 1983 meeting, the court cannot find that the defendants have transacted business within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim relates to that business.

Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas · filed 1990-04-04(a)(1)

Viewing these jurisdictional facts in totality, DKP has established a prima facie case that Douglas and Johnson transacted business within New York in relation to the contract in dispute within the meaning of CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from business transacted in New York.

Darby v. Compagnie National Air France · filed 1990-04-13(a)(1)

Nonetheless, Darby fails to establish how the drowning in the disputed vicinity of the Copacabana "arose out of' the hotel reservation system in New York. For the court to exercise jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a), it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the cause of action arose from the business transacted in New York and not the negligence of the hotel where the accident occurred.

Section 302(a)(1)’s transaction of business standard is satisfied when a nondomiciliary corporation’s salaried director attends multiple New York meetings connected to its investigation of an insurance claim.

Insurance of Pennsylvania v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1990-04-26(a)(1)

Here, codefendant Terry, in his capacity as a salaried director of Robins, admittedly attended at least three meetings in New York with the insured’s representatives in connection with Robins’ intensive investigation of Synfuels’ insurance claim. We find this to be sufficient, in the circumstances, to satisfy the transaction of business standard.

Section 302(a)(1)’s transaction-of-business standard is satisfied when a corporation’s director attends three New York meetings connected to its investigation of an insurance claim.

Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1990-06-28(a)(1)

Here, codefendant Terry, in his capacity as a salaried director of Robins, admittedly attended at least three meetings in New York with the insured’s representatives in connection with Robins’ intensive investigation of Synfuels’ insurance claim. We find this to be sufficient, in the circumstances, to satisfy the transaction of business standard.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim is substantially related to that business, even if the alleged tort occurs elsewhere.

Hedlund v. Products From Sweden, Inc. · filed 1988-09-07(a)(1)

We find that Moberg’s attendance at these business meetings in New York, as described by Plaintiffs, supported by the notes of the November meeting, is sufficient for a prima facie showing that Mo-berg “transacted business” in New York for the purposes of the long-arm statute. ... Resolving all doubts in favor of the Plaintiffs, as we must do at this procedural stage, we find that the alleged tortious interference in contractual relations as to the Scandia/Sundstrom contract grows out of and is intimately intertwined with the interpretation of the Scandia/PFS contract negotiated in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the New York activity and the claim; New York sales and promotion were too remote from an injury on a Massachusetts ski slope.

Chamberlain v. Peak · filed 1989-11-09(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1) requires an articulable nexus, a substantial relationship, between the New York activity, business or transaction and the asserted claim and injury (see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467; McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272). Here, plaintiff’s tort claim, originating from a ski slope injury in Massachusetts, is too remote from defendant’s New York sales and promotional activities to support long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Pellegrino v Stratton Corp., 679 F Supp 1164; Apicella v Valley Forge Military Academy & Jr. Coll., 103 AD2d 151; Meunier v Stebo, Inc., 38 AD2d 590).

Section 302 (a) (1) requires the defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise directly from that business.

Storch v. Vigneau · filed 1990-06-14(a)(1)

In order to obtain jurisdiction under this statute, the following conditions must be met: (1) the defendant must transact business in the State; and (2) the cause of action must be directly related to, and arise from, the business so transacted.

Section 302(a)(1)’s transacting-business requirement is not satisfied by signing a minor contract modification in New York when the underlying transaction was negotiated elsewhere.

PaineWebber Inc. v. Westgate Group, Inc. · filed 1990-09-21(a)(1)

In-state execution of a minor contractual provision—or, as here, a memorial-ization of a previously agreed-upon term— does not rise to “transacting business” under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302 does not provide jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to the defendant’s New York activities.

Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc. · filed 1990-11-13

Alexander & Alexander has not argued that Sedgwick’s activities in New York are related to the Landoil transaction at issue in this litigation. Therefore, New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302, which permits the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over actions based upon transactions in New York, is not applicable.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a direct, proximate connection between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s New York business for personal jurisdiction.

Sherwin v. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. · filed 1990-12-08(a)(1)

Plaintiffs causes of action must be directly and proximately related to the business transacted in New York in order to provide a basis for section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful activity in New York connected to the transaction at issue; an attempt to settle a preexisting contract does not by itself establish personal jurisdiction.

Mahtani v. C. Ramon, Inc. · filed 1990-12-20(a)(1)

Vague references by plaintiff to discussions had in New York which could have taken place either before or long after the transaction complained of fail to demonstrate purposeful activity by the defendants in this State that was undertaken in connection with the transactions at issue. At best, plaintiff’s allegations barely suffice to demonstrate that there was an attempt to settle differences with respect to a preexisting contract which, in and of itself, does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in this case.

CPLR 302 requires a connection between the New York transaction and the claim for long-arm jurisdiction.

Landoil Resources Corporation v. Alexander & Alexander Services · filed 1991-01-02

Alexander & Alexander has not argued that Sedgwick's activities in New York are related to the Landoil transaction at issue in this litigation. ... Such corporations can still be sued in New York for a particular transaction connected to New York if the cause of action arises out of that transaction, no matter how insignificant a portion of its total revenues that transaction represents.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction based on a foreign defendant’s New York contacts only for a claim arising from those contacts.

Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Lloyd · filed 1991-03-28

As plaintiffs concede, CPLR § 302 by its terms allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction based on a foreign defendant’s contacts with New York only “as to a cause of action arising from” those contacts.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a New York visit unrelated to the suit or an agreement choosing New York law.

First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilson · filed 1991-03-28(a)(1)

Since the statutory requirements of CPLR 302 (a) (1) have not been satisfied, it was error to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) supports personal jurisdiction when defendants or their agents negotiate and execute contracts in New York as purposeful activities from which defendants benefit.

Home Box Office, Inc. v. Baum · filed 1991-04-09(a)(1)

Furthermore, Special Term properly confirmed the Referee’s determination, pursuant to CPLR 4403, given that there was sufficient factual support to justify jurisdiction over defendants, pursuant to this State’s long-arm statute (CPLR 302 [a] [1]). To the extent some of the individual defendants and agents of CEP negotiated and executed the Affiliation Contracts and Letter Agreements in this State, such acts demonstrate purposeful activities from which defendants benefitted so as to justify jurisdiction.

Merely being named in a will does not, by itself, constitute transacting business in New York under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

In re Roy · filed 1991-05-16(a)(1)

Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, merely being named in someone’s will does not, standing alone, mean that an individual has transacted business within the State under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim against a non-domiciliary to arise from that party’s New York business activity.

Monsanto International Sales Co. v. Hanjin Container Lines, Ltd. · filed 1991-06-25(a)(1)

Even assuming that plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of agency between Kien Hung and Hanjin, and that this agency allows plaintiffs to satisfy the transacting business prong of the test, plaintiffs cannot show that the claim against Kien Hung arose out of this activity, the second prong necessary to establish jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires the cause of action to arise from the defendant’s business transactions in New York.

King v. Best Western Country Inn · filed 1991-07-03(a)(1)

As plaintiff does not allege that her reservation contract was made in New York, the subsequent alleged tort cannot be said to have “arisen” out of defendant’s “transacting business” in New York (even if we assume arguendo defendant did “transact business” in New York).

Section 302(a) requires a proximate causal connection between the defendant’s New York business transaction and the claim arising from it.

Darby v. Compagnie Nationale Air France · filed 1991-07-12(a)

The Opinion held that jurisdiction under § 302(a) was inapplicable where Darby failed to establish, as a matter of proximate causation, how the drowning at the Hotel "arose out of’ the reservation system in New York. ... Therefore, for the same reasons as set forth in the Opinion, jurisdiction under § 302(a) is similarly inapplicable to Darby’s cause of action against Sisal.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on a foreign defendant’s New York contacts only for claims arising from those contacts.

Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Lloyd · filed 1991-07-18(a)(1)

As plaintiffs concede, CPLR § 302 by its terms allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction based on a foreign defendant’s contacts with New York only “as to a cause of action arising from” those contacts. ... Plaintiffs have not made a color-able claim that Krupp and Sietas are subject to personal jurisdiction in New York under CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat acquiring film rights in California from a California entity as transacting business in New York.

Viacom International, Inc. v. Melvin Simon Productions, Inc. · filed 1991-10-02(a)(1)

Acquiring all rights to a twelve year old motion picture in California from a California entity does not constitute an activity equivalent to transacting business in New York.

A single New York meeting does not establish transacting business under § 302(a)(1) when it does not substantially advance the proposed business relationship.

ICC Primex Plastics Corp. v. LA/ES Laminati Estrusi Termoplastici S.P.A. · filed 1991-10-10(a)(1)

Contract negotiations in New York will satisfy that standard if the discussions “substantially advanced” or were “essential to” the formation of the contract or advanced the business relationship to a more solid level. ... Tested by that standard, plaintiff has failed to establish a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a nonresident’s oral discussions with a New York resident about contributing to expenses when those discussions do not amount to purposeful activity in New York.

Jacobson v. Grindlinger · filed 1991-12-16(a)(1)

We further find that the defendant’s alleged oral discussions with his ex-wife concerning the payment of bar mitzvah expenses do not amount to "purposeful” activity within New York which would justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant’s person (see, Kulko v California Superior Ct., supra; Klette v Klette, 167 AD2d 197, 197-198; cf., Kreutter v McFadden Oil Co., 71 NY2d 460, 467).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a direct relationship between the claim and the defendant’s in-state business activity; advertising a resort in New York does not establish jurisdiction over an injury at the out-of-state resort.

Lane v. Vacation Charters, Ltd. · filed 1990-10-05(a)(1)

Alternatively, plaintiff seeks to establish jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1). This section confers jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that “transacts business within the state or contracts anywhere to provide goods and services in the state” if there is a “direct relationship between the cause of action and the instate conduct.” ... Fatal to plaintiffs reliance on this statute is the absence of a nexus between the in-state activity already discussed and the cause of action.