N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims in New York.

In Re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation · filed 2010-03-15(5)

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims is three years in New York, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), and two years in Virginia—the state in which Plaintiffs' causes of action accrued.

Section 214(5) requires actions to recover damages for personal injuries to be commenced within three years.

Montalvo v. Chiaramonte · filed 2010-06-03(5)

The first cause of action seeks to recover damages for the personal injuries sustained by the decedent, i.e., for his conscious pain and suffering (see Ratka v St. Francis Hosp., 44 NY2d 604, 609 [1978]; Lancaster v 46 NYL Partners, 228 AD2d 133, 138 [1996]; Matter of Ruiz v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 165 AD2d 75, 80 [1991]), and thus was timely commenced (CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year statute of limitations for an action to recover damages for a personal injury, measured from the date of injury.

TINNELL v. Invacare Corp. · filed 2011-05-12(5)

In such case, the applicable statute of limitations is established by N.Y. CPLR § 214(5), which provides a three-year statute of limitations in “an action to recover damages for a personal injury,” measured from the date of the injury.

Section 214(5) requires personal injury actions to be commenced within three years.

Mose v. San giovanni · filed 2011-05-17(5)

Since this action was commenced after the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred (see CPLR 214 [5]; Rinaldi v Rochford, 77 AD3d 720 [2010]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for injury to property.

BROOKS, III, LLORD BYRON v. AXA ADVISORS, LLC · filed 2013-03-15(4)

Rather, the three-year limitations period for injury to property applies (see CPLR 214 [4]; Chase Scientific Research, 96 NY2d at 30).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year statute of limitations for recovering personal injury damages.

Hicks v. Moore · filed 2013-03-01(5)

Here, the district court acknowledged that Hicks's section 1983 claim was likely time-barred. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (courts borrow state limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (three-year statute of limitations for recovering damages in personal injury). ... We have independently reviewed the record and, even liberally construing the amended complaint, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Hicks's claim as time-barred.

Section 214(6) gives professional negligence claims a three-year time limit.

Health Acquisition Corp. v. Program Risk Management Inc. · filed 2013-04-24(6)

In addition, DFJ failed to establish that some or all of the plaintiffs’ causes of action against it are time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]; see also Symbol Tech., Inc. v Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 69 AD3d 191, 194-196 [2009]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Kelley v. Schneck · filed 2013-05-02(5)

Plaintiff received letters of administration on April 1, 2008, the infancy toll of CPLR 208 does not apply to the deceased child’s claim for pain and suffering (see generally Heslin v County of Greene, 14 NY3d 67 [2010]; Baez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 80 NY2d 571 [1992]), and the three-year negligence statute of limitations controls (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on injury to property claims.

Estrada v. Metropolitan Property Group, Inc. · filed 2013-10-15(4)

However, that claim is time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; Yatter v Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 261 [1st Dept 1998]), as the alleged injury occurred more than three years before the filing of this action.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions running from accrual.

Twersky v. Yeshiva University · filed 2014-01-29(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years from the accrual of the cause of action. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 2013).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitation period for a negligence action seeking damages for personal injuries.

Alvarez v. Wright · filed 2014-05-14(5)

Accordingly, the three-year limitation period (see CPLR 214 [5]) applicable to a negligence cause of action against the defendants was to expire on June 28, 2002.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Hollowell v. Decaro · filed 2014-06-11(5)

Further, the three-year statute of limitations, as tolled for 18 months by CPLR 210 (b) due to Decaro’s death, expired on June 17, 2012 (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(4) requires tortious interference claims to be brought within three years, while section 214(6) applies a three-year limit to legal malpractice claims.

AQ Asset Management, LLC v. Levine · filed 2014-07-10(4), (6)

This claim was properly dismissed as time-barred, having been brought more than three years after the August 2007 ouster (see CPLR 214 [4]; Turecamo v Turecamo, 55 AD3d 455, 455 [1st Dept 2008]). ... The motion court correctly dismissed the ninth and tenth causes of action in the fourth-party complaint alleging legal malpractice against Levine, and the seventeenth counterclaim alleging legal malpractice against Zimmermann, as barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]; Champlin v Pellegrin, 111 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 214(4) gives actions to recover damages for injury to property a three-year statute of limitations.

MohonkPreserve,Inc.vUllrich · filed 2014-07-10(4)

CPLR 214 (4) provides that an action to recover damages for injury to property is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see Mandel v Estate of Frank L. Tiffany, 263 AD2d 827, 829 [1999]).

Section 214(5) supplies the limitations period for a personal injury claim, which had expired before the plaintiff sought to add another defendant.

McLaughlin v. 22 New Scotland Avenue, LLC · filed 2015-10-29(5)

We also conclude that Supreme Court properly denied plaintiff's cross motion to amend her complaint to assert a cause of action against AMCH after the running of the applicable statute of limitations period (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) gives negligent training and supervision claims a three-year limitations period.

Smith v. Conway Stores, Inc. · filed 2015-09-16(5)

The allegations of negligent training and supervision were governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]; Timothy Mc. v Beacon City Sch. Dist., 127 AD3d 826 [2015]; Diana F. v Velez, 126 AD3d 856 [2015]; Kelly G. v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 99 AD3d 756 [2012]; S.C. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 97 AD3d 518 [2012]; Gonzalez v City of New York, 286 AD2d 706 [2001]). This action was commenced on June 17, 2011, and arises out of an incident alleged to have occurred on January 30, 2010. Therefore, so much of the complaint as alleged negligent training and supervision was not time-barred.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligent hiring and negligent supervision claims.

Calamari v. Panos · filed 2015-09-23(5)

The statute of limitations applicable to causes of action alleging negligent hiring and negligent supervision is three years (see CPLR 214 [5]). ... Thus, as Mid Hudson contends, the plaintiffs’ proposed additional causes of action accrued outside the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Bonilla v. Tutor Perini Corp. · filed 2015-12-16(5)

After the dismissal of a previous action without prejudice, the plaintiff commenced the instant action within the applicable limitations period (see CPLR 214 [5]; see also Judiciary Law § 282).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action.

Davis v. Sanseverino · filed 2016-12-13(5)

After the applicable three-year statute ... of limitations had elapsed (CPLR 214 [5]), Davis commenced this action against the Sanseverinos.

Section 214(3) provides a limitations period that can bar an untimely claim unless the plaintiff raises a triable issue about tolling or its applicability.

Vetro v. Middle Country Central School District · filed 2017-03-15(3)

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred (see CPLR 214 [3]; 215 [3]; Education Law § 3813 [2]; General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]; Yang v Oceanside Union Free School Dist., 90 AD3d 649, 649 [2011]; cf. Drakeford v Brooklyn Dist. Attorney, 266 AD2d 134, 134 [1999]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the relevant statutes of limitation were tolled or were otherwise inapplicable (see Yang v Oceanside Union Free School Dist., 90 AD3d at 650).

Section 214(5)'s limitations period bars negligence claims based on incidents in the 1990s even after applying the 10-year insanity toll.

Acevedo v. Episcopal Social Servs. of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2018-06-28(5)

To the extent the negligence claims are premised on the 1990s incidents, they are time-barred, even applying the 10-year insanity toll ( see CPLR 208; CPLR 214[5]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for negligent hiring and supervision claims even when the employee's underlying act was intentional.

McCarthy v. Mario Enters., Inc. · filed 2018-07-05(5)

Moreover, the negligence of an employer is not transformed into intentional conduct simply because the employee's wrongful conduct was intentional ( see Green v Emmanuel African M.E. Church , 278 AD2d at 132-133). Thus, plaintiff's allegations of negligence were timely asserted within the applicable three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [5]; Smith v Conway Stores, Inc. , 131 AD3d 1040, 1040 [2015]).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from the accident to commence a personal injury action.

Goodman v. Skanska USA Civ., Inc. · filed 2019-02-27(5)

As a general matter, an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]; Kamath v Building New Lifestyles, Ltd. , 146 AD3d 765, 767). Here, the defendants met their prima facie burden by demonstrating that the statute of limitations began to run on May 4, 2011, when the alleged accident occurred, and that the instant action was commenced on October 13, 2015, more than three years later ( see Barrell v Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. , 29 AD3d 612).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Kammerzell v. Clean Burn, Inc. · filed 2018-10-10

Since the relevant three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214) expired prior to the filing of the plaintiff's motion, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate the applicability of the relation-back doctrine ( see Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173, 177-178).

CPLR 214(5) gives a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress a three-year limitations period.

Schwartz v. Walter · filed 2019-04-10(5)

Here, the plaintiff did not seek to amend his complaint to [*2]add a cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress until after the three-year statute of limitation had expired ( see CPLR 214[5]; Goldstein v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 32 AD3d 821, 821), and the plaintiff did not argue that the cause of action was timely pursuant to the relation-back doctrine ( see CPLR 203[f]; Buran v Coupal , 87 NY2d 173, 177). Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint.

Section 214 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

MIHRANIAN v. KALKIN · filed 2020-01-15

Under New York law, negligence claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. CPLR § 214.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Yany's Garden LLC v. The City of New York · filed 2020-01-15(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations for personal injury torts is three years. Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5)). ... This means that the statute of limitations ran in June 2014, well before Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court.

CPLR 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Ludwig v. Van Horn · filed 2019-12-11(5)

Although the plaintiff commenced the action within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions in New York ( see CPLR 214[5]), the applicable statute of limitations in Pennsylvania, which is two years, had expired at the time the action was commenced (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524[7]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for personal injury.

Szarka v. Paratore · filed 2020-01-15(5)

An action to recover damages for personal injury is subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]).

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim.

Miller v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company · filed 2019-09-17

As for Plaintiffs’ other claims, they are subject to even shorter periods under New York law; their claims for tortious breach of the implied covenant is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, N.Y. CPLR § 215(3),8 and their negligence claim is subject to a three-year limit, N.Y. CPLR § 214. Thus, all of Plaintiffs’ claims lapsed in 2006 at the latest.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Segarra v. Delta Airlines, Inc · filed 2020-06-12(5)

And New York’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) allows three years to commence an action for personal injuries.

Duncan v. Emerald Expositions, LLC · filed 2020-09-16(5)

The plaintiff, who allegedly was injured on January 26, 2013, timely commenced this action on January 22, 2016, within three years of her alleged injury ( see CPLR 214[5]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for negligent hiring and supervision claims.

National Recruiting Group, LLC v. Bern Ripka LLP · filed 2020-05-20(5)

Furthermore, we agree with the Supreme Court's rejection of the plaintiff's contention that the proposed counterclaim alleging negligent hiring and supervision was patently devoid of merit on the ground that it was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]; Wander v St. John's Univ. , 163 AD3d 896, 897).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to commence an action for personal injuries.

Aurilia v. Carbonara · filed 2020-07-15(5)

Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]). Here, the defendant met her prima facie burden by demonstrating that the statute of limitations began to run on July 22, 2013, when the alleged accident occurred, and that this action was commenced on November 8, 2017, more than three years later ( see Barrell v Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. , 29 AD3d 612).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Nossov v. Hunter Mtn. · filed 2020-07-22(5)

Here, it is undisputed that the motion was made after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action for personal injury.

Goldrich v. Masco Corporation · filed 2023-03-27(5)

Under New York law, “an action to recover damages for a personal injury” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Plaintiff appears to have brought this Action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Turner v. Pride & Servs. El. Co., Inc. · filed 2024-12-23(5)

A three-year statute of limitations governs personal injury actions (see CPLR 214 [5]), and a cause of action for negligence begins to accrue from the date the plaintiff was injured (Noe v Lynch, 224 AD3d 511, 512 [1st Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 904 [2024]; St. Rose v Thompson, 201 AD3d 765, 766 [2d Dept 2022]). It is not disputed that plaintiff’s accident occurred on February 17, 2016, that plaintiff commenced this action on February 9, 2019, and that plaintiff did not name CEMD as a defendant until 2021. Thus, CEMD has established that plaintiff failed to timely commence this action against it.

Section 214(5) gives claims for negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and training a three-year limitations period that begins on the date of the event underlying the claim.

Navarra v. Dreimiller · filed 2025-09-25(5)

While Defendants’ Motion fails to address the issue, in New York, claims for negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and training, are subject to the three-year statute of limitations outlined in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), and accrue on the date of the event on which the claim is based.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence actions, subject to the relation-back doctrine.

Yang v. Griffin · filed 2025-10-02(5)

It is undisputed that the instant action was filed more than a month after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations for negligence (CPLR 214[5]) . However, plaintiff demonstrated that the relation-back doctrine was applicable here utilizing the factors set forth in Buran v Coupal (87 NY2d 173, 178 [1995]) ( see Ramirez v Elias-Tejada , 168 AD3d 401, 402-403 [1st Dept 2019]).

CPLR 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action for personal injuries.

O'Brien v. County of Nassau · filed 2025-12-17(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Executive Orders (A. Cuomo) Nos. 202.8 and 202.67 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8, 8.202.67) tolled the applicable statute of limitations for a 228-day period from March 20, 2020, to November 3, 2020 ( see Baker v 40 Wall St. Holdings Corp. , 226 AD3d 637, 638; McLaughlin v Snowlift, Inc. , 214 AD3d 720, 721). Thus, contrary to the court's determination, the applicable statute of limitations expired on July 16, 2022 ( see CPLR 214[5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, subject to certain exceptions.

Cotto v. Robinson · filed 2025-12-31(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries, with certain exceptions not relevant here, is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) generally sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Steward v. Brooklyn Pier 1 Residential Owner, LP · filed 2026-02-18(5)

An action to recover damages for personal injuries is generally subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]; Ruiz v Sanchez , 219 AD3d 1363, 1363).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action.

Duncan v. Cadman Assoc. LLC · filed 2026-03-02(5)

"Pursuant to CPLR 214 (5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries, with certain exceptions not relevant here, is subject to a three-year statute of limitations" ( Fitzpatrick v City of New York , 232 AD3d 670, 672 [2d Dept 2024]). ... Therefore, the claims of negligence asserted against the movants do not relate back and are time-barred.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Scaringi v. Elizabeth Broome Realty Corp. · filed 1991-09-20(5)

As the Statute of Limitations for personal injuries would have expired after three years on December 22, 1990 (CPLR 214 [5]), plaintiff’s attorney attempted to make a timely interposition of the claim by filing a summons with the New York County Clerk (CPLR 203 [b] [5]) on December 21, 1990.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Hilliard v. Roc-Newark Associates · filed 2001-10-29(5)

The plaintiffs served the amended summons and complaint adding RNA as a defendant as of right prior to service of Holiday Inn’s answer (see, CPLR 1003), but after the Statute of Limitations had expired as to RNA (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

CPLR 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions; physical delivery of the summons and complaint to the county clerk before that period expires makes the action timely despite a later date stamp.

Peace v. Zhang · filed 2005-02-04(5)

The papers however, were not date-stamped at the Clerk’s office until November 15, 1999, three days past the expiration of the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]; General Construction Law §§ 20, 24, 25-a). ... Because, in our view, plaintiffs established that the summons and complaint were physically delivered to the County Clerk’s office prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, this action was timely commenced.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Weckbecker v. Skanska USA Civ. Northeast, Inc. · filed 2019-06-12

Since the applicable three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214) expired prior to the commencement of the third-party action, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate the applicability of the relation-back doctrine ( see Boodoo v Albee Dental Care , 67 AD3d 717; Hemmings v St. Marks Hous. Assoc., 169 Misc 2d 155 [Sup Ct, Kings County], affd 242 AD2d 284; Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 1009).

Section 214(5) gives a negligence claim for personal injuries a three-year limitations period.

Egelandsdal v. Massaro · filed 2025-11-12(5)

Here, as there is no dispute that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff's cause of action alleging negligence ( see CPLR 214[5]) had expired by the time that the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to serve and file a supplemental summons and amended complaint adding MAS as a direct defendant, whether the amendment may be allowed depends upon whether the relation-back doctrine applies ( see CPLR 203[f]; Buran v Coupal , 87 NY2d 173, 178; Duffy v Horton Mem. Hosp. , 66 NY2d 473, 477-478; Deputron v A & J Tours, Inc. , 93 AD3d 629, 629), with the burden being on the plaintiff to establish that the doctrine applies ( see Rivera v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr. , 175 AD3d 522, 523-526).

CPLR 214(2) gives an action to recover a liability created by statute a three-year limitations period.

North Shore Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist. · filed 2025-03-12(2)

This action is therefore governed by the three-year statute of limitations for "an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute" (CPLR 214[2]; see Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. , 31 NY3d 187, 196; Eldridge v Carmel Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 82 AD3d at 1150; Connetquot Cent. School Dist. v Greenport Union Free School District , 100 AD2d 923).

CPLR 214 (2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims based on liabilities created by statute, including claims under Civil Rights Law § 79-n (2).

A.M.P. v. Benjamin · filed 2021-11-24(2)

Given the substantive differences between claims asserted under Civil Rights Law § 79-n and common-law assault and battery claims, we are convinced that Civil Rights Law § 79-n (2) creates liability that would not exist but for the statute and that therefore the three-year statute of limitations period in CPLR 214 (2) applies to plaintiff's third cause of action ( see Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 96 NY2d at 209-210; Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson , 67 NY2d at 174).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year period for claims based on liability imposed by statute, unless another law prescribes a different period.

Engelman v. Rofe · filed 2021-03-04(2)

Defendants argue that even if CPLR 215 does not apply, CPLR 214(2), which provides that an action to recover upon a liability "imposed by statute" must be commenced within three years, and Administrative Code § 8-502(d) requires City HRL claims to be filed within three years. However, CPLR 201 states that the times listed in CPLR article 2 apply "unless a different time is prescribed by law." Inasmuch as the VGM itself provides a different time than that prescribed in CPLR 214(2), the time prescribed in the VGM controls.

Section 214(2)'s three-year limit applies to a liability created by statute only when the liability would not exist without the statute.

People v. Duggan · filed 1968-06-27(2)

It is well settled that the phrase “ liability created or imposed by statute ” as utilized in section 214- applies only to liability which would not exist but for a statute (Shepard Co. v. Taylor Pub. Co., 234 N. Y. 465, 468; Bevelander v. Town of Islip, 10 A D 2d 170, 171-172).

Section 214(2) applies a three-year limitations period to a municipality’s statutory reimbursement claims accruing on or after September 1, 1963.

City of Buffalo v. Maggio · filed 1965-10-19(2)

Therefore any payments made prior to September 1, 1963, the effective date of the CPLR, are governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations and the payments made on or after said date are subject to the new three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd. 2).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action based on statutory liability, subject to applicable tolling.

United States ex rel. Sabella v. Newsday · filed 1970-06-22(2)

Since there is no statute of limitations included in the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state law analogue is the source of the appropriate limitations period. Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 15 S.Ct. 217, 39 L. Ed. 280 (1895); Swan v. Board of Higher Education, 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1963). The moving party relies upon New York’s three year period. CPLR 214(2) (“an action to recover upon a liability * * * created or imposed by statute * * * ”); Romer v. Leary, 425 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1970). This period runs from the time when the cause of action accrued (CPLR § 203 (a)) — April 22,1966 — and would bar the claim unless the period was tolled.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions to recover a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.

State v. Cortelle Corp. · filed 1972-07-06(2)

The court is of the opinion that this is an action to recover upon liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute and that, therefore, subdivision 2 of CPLR 214 imposing a three-year Statute of Limitations applies to these actions.

Section 214(2) shortened the limitations period for actions to recover upon a liability created by statute to three years, effective September 1, 1963.

Rosenberg v. Raymond v. Martin · filed 1973-04-27(2)

The period for actions “to recover upon a liability created by statute” was shortened to three years, effective September 1, 1963, by CPLR § 214(2), but CPLR § 218(b) provides that any cause of action not barred on that date would have the benefit of the six years previously allowed.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for liabilities imposed by statute, including claims under Regulation T and § 7(c).

Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield · filed 1973-11-29(2)

While the question is novel and not entirely free from doubt, we hold that the applicable New York limitations statute for a claim stated under Regulation T and § 7(c) is CPLR § 214(2) relating to liabilities imposed by statute.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for statutory liability claims, which federal courts apply to civil rights actions brought in New York.

Kaiser v. Cahn · filed 1974-12-19(2)

We have held, in this Circuit, that the applicable statute of limitations in a federal civil rights case brought in New York is the three years provided by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) — liability based on a statute. ... Since the first complaint filed by appellant was on September 2, 1970, that complaint, as well as the subsequent complaints, was barred on its face by the applicable three-year statute.

Subdivision 2’s three-year limitations period does not apply to the Commissioner’s setoff of overpaid unemployment benefits when the Commissioner has obtained a confession of judgment.

In re the Claim of Soto · filed 1970-12-29(2)

Neither the two-year period under section 594 nor the three-year period under subdivision 2 of CPLR 214 is applicable (People v. Duggan, 30 A D 2d 736) and since the Commissioner secured a confession of judgment for the overpayment, the 20-year period under CPLR 211 is, relevant.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period does not govern a loan disclosure claim subject to the federal Truth in Lending Act’s one-year limit.

Conrad v. Home & Auto Loan Co. · filed 1975-04-21(2)

It might, therefore, be argued, as the plaintiffs do, that the three-year limitation in CPLR 214 (subd 2) governing actions upon a forfeiture should apply where section 358, rather than a TIL penalty, is invoked. ... Accordingly, the appropriate Statute of Limitations to be applied to the plaintiffs’ first cause of action would seem to be the one-year statute provided in title 15 (§ 1640, subd [e]) of the United States Code. It follows that the plaintiffs’ first cause of action must be dismissed because the period of limitations commences to run from the date of the making of the loan (Chevalier v Baird Savs. Assn., 371 F Supp 1282 [DC Pa, 1974]; Wachtel v West, 476 F2d 1062, cert den 414 US 874; CPLR 3212, subd [b]; Matter of City of Jamestown v Sfetko, 15 AD2d 403).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit does not apply to a preexisting wrong merely because a statute provides a remedy or standing to sue.

State of NY v. Cortelle Corp. · filed 1975-11-25(2)

These causes of action, therefore, do not depend upon liabilities, penalties, of forfeitures created or imposed by statute within the meaning of CPLR 214 (subd 2). Put another way, a statute in regulating a substantive right or the procedure for its enforcement does not create or impose a liability, penalty or forfeiture.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil rights actions based on a liability created by statute.

Montagna v. O'HAGAN · filed 1975-10-23(2)

Section 214(2) of the New York Civil Practice Law & Rules prescribe a three-year limitation period for actions to recover upon a liability created by statute. Since plaintiff’s claim for wrongful retirement accrued in October of 1969, it is clear that any claim for deprivation of civil rights in connection therewith became time-barred in October of 1972 and hence his action instituted in April of 1975 is clearly barred.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil rights claims based on a liability created by statute.

Ervin v. Lanier · filed 1975-11-24(2)

Section 214(2) of the New York CPLR provides in pertinent part as follows: ... Again in view of the fact that the last acts charged against Pan Am in support of the claimed conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil rights occurred in September of 1969, it is clear that plaintiff’s claims with respect thereto became time-barred in September of 1972.

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for these Civil Rights Act claims, and the plaintiffs’ state court proceedings did not toll it.

Meyer v. Frank · filed 1976-03-11(2)

The three-year statute of limitations prescribed by New York CPLR § 214(2) (McKinney’s 1963) is the most appropriate state statute for the cases at bar. ... Whether the impact of the cases at bar is viewed narrowly or broadly, no federal policy persuades this court that the statute of limitations should be tolled under these circumstances.

Section 214(2) provides the three-year limitations period for federal civil rights claims based on statutes against individual defendants.

Martin Hodas, East Coast Cinematics, Inc. v. Lindsay · filed 1977-04-20(2)

The court holds that C.P.L.R. § 214(2) is the most appropriate state limitation period, and that plaintiffs’ claims are not time-barred.

CPLR § 214 provides a three year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in New York State.

Martin v. Mario Merola, District Attorney, Bronx County · filed 1976-02-05

We note that, in the absence of any federal statute of limitations, § 1983 actions brought in New York State are governed by the three year period provided in CPLR § 214 for suits based on a statute.

Section 214(2) gives a claim for a liability created by statute a three-year limitations period, which barred this indemnification claim brought more than three and one-half years after the petitioner first became entitled to relief.

Klimczak v. Connrex Corp. · filed 1975-10-31(2)

Since this proceeding was brought over three and one-half years after petitioner was first entitled to relief, it is not timely under CPLR 214 (subd 2).

Section 214(2)'s three-year period for statutory liabilities does not apply to a Bivens claim founded on the Constitution.

Regan v. Sullivan · filed 1976-07-30(2)

Unless a cause of action itself is founded upon a statute, CPLR § 214(2) cannot apply.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period for statutory liabilities does not govern claims that a securities exchange breached its contractual duty to supervise a member firm.

Arneil v. Ramsey · filed 1976-05-12(2)

It would seem that the applicable statute of limitations should be New York CPLR § 214(2), which provides for a three year period for actions “to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” ... I find that plaintiffs’ § 6 claims (Counts V-XII) are governed by the limitations period applicable to contracts.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for an action to recover a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.

Lincoln First Bank v. Rupert · filed 1977-12-16(2)

The governing period of limitation is three years under CPLR 214 (subd 2) which applies to "action[s] to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” and not the one-year limitation in section 1640 of title 15 of the United States Code as respondent contends (see Conrad v Home & Auto Loan Co., 53 AD2d 48; and see Meyer v Frank, 409 F Supp 1240, 1241; Lombard v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 407 F Supp 1166, 1171).

Section 214(2)'s three-year limit for causes of action created by statute does not govern an equitable rescission claim based on liability that existed at common law.

Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn, Inc. v. Rochester Telephone Corp. · filed 1978-07-13(2)

Rescission is an equitable cause of action (Overland v Le Roy Foods, 113 NYS2d 124, affd 279 App Div 1085), therefore the six-year Statute of Limitations governs (CPLR 213, subd 1; Buscarello v Guglielmelli, 44 Misc 2d 1041, 1042-1043; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 213.01) and not the three-year statute which controls causes of action created by statute (CPLR 214, subd 2). A cause of action against a utility for unjust discrimination existed at common law (New York Tel. Co. v Siegel-Cooper Co., 202 NY 502); hence, a statute was not necessary to impose liability (cf. Shepard Co. v Taylor Pub. Co., 234 NY 465).

Section 214(2)’s three-year period does not govern a direct Fourteenth Amendment damages claim treated as a tort.

Lombard v. Board of Ed. of City of New York · filed 1977-11-15(2)

Our decision in Ervin v. Lanier, 404 F.Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), suggesting that the applicable limitation period might be the three year action upon a statute (CPLR § 214(2)) was in effect modified by the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals in Fine.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for malpractice actions.

Lacks v. Marcus · filed 1979-03-08(6)

The first cause of action is one for malpractice. It accrued, if at all, in 1970 or earlier. The present action was instituted September 28, 1977. The Statute of Limitations in actions for malpractice is three years. (CPLR 214, subd 6.) The action is thus barred unless the Statute of Limitations has been tolled.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for an action to recover on a liability created or imposed by statute.

Kowalski v. Department of Corrections · filed 1978-12-18(2)

The applicable Statute of. Limitations is three years pursuant to CPLR 214 (subd 2) ("an action to recover upon a liability * * * created or imposed by statute”).

Section 214(2) gives a claim a three-year limitations period when the liability would not exist but for a statute.

State v. City of Binghamton · filed 1979-11-21(2)

If a claim would not exist but for a statute, the claim is upon "a liability * * * created or imposed by statute”, and carries a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 2; see Shepard Co. v Taylor Pub. Co., 234 NY 465, 468; Klimczak v Connrex Corp., 49 AD2d 1031, 1032).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limit for an action based on a liability that would not exist but for a statute, even if the plaintiff also pleads a contract to perform that statutory duty.

European American Bank v. Cain · filed 1981-02-23(2)

It is the general rule that where a duty, and hence liability for its breach, would not exist but for a statute, an action to recover upon such liability is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR, 214 (subd 2) (Shepard Co. v Taylor Pub. Co., 234 NY 465, 468; Lorberblatt v Gerst, 10 NY2d 244, 248; 2 Carmody-Wait, NY Prac, Limitation of Actions, § 72).

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1981 claims.

Seymore v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1980-01-16(2)

Section 297(5)’s statute of limitations is therefore less appropriate in a § 1981 action than is the more general limitation period of CPLR § 214(2).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit does not bar an application for judgment on support arrears reserved in a continuing Family Court proceeding.

Connors v. Connors · filed 1980-02-22(2)

In the matter before this court, the petitioner seeks a judgment for arrears reserved generally in a support proceeding previously commenced and still continuing. ... Accordingly, the respondent’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petitioner’s application is barred by reason of the three-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 214 (subd 2) and on the grounds of loches is denied.

CPLR 214(2) does not apply to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because those statutes provide remedies for enforcing federal constitutional rights rather than create liability.

Staffen v. City of Rochester · filed 1981-04-03(2)

Consequently, they are not actions upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture and CPLR 214 (subd 2) does not apply.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period does not apply to a section 1983 excessive-force claim based on assault and battery because the claim creates no new liability.

Pitt v. City of New York · filed 1981-11-12(2)

This court thus concludes that the section 1983 claim for excessive force is not a liability created or imposed by statute and that the three-year period of limitation authorized by CPLR 214 (subd 2) does not attach.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period for liabilities created by statute does not apply when the essence of a claim is constitutional, even if the claim has a statutory component.

Pauk v. Board of Trustees · filed 1983-06-16(2)

Further, although plaintiff’s claim has some statutory component, it is basically a constitutional claim (Matter of Clark v Water Comrs. of Amsterdam, 148 NY 1). It is the Constitution which guarantees plaintiff the right to be appointed on the basis of merit; the Education Law merely makes article V specifically applicable to defendant. This distinction is crucial because the New York Constitution is not a statute for Statute of Limitations purposes (Matter of Clark v Water Comrs. of Amsterdam, supra). The essence of plaintiff’s-first cause of action is thus neither contractual nor statutory, but constitutional. For this reason, CPLR 213 (subd 1) is applicable to it and plaintiff’s action has not expired.

Section 214(2) gives an insurer three years from the accrual of its independent statutory claim to sue for first-party benefits.

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Jamaica Water Supply Co. · filed 1981-12-14(2)

It is not truly a negligence action, such as falls within the compass of CPLR 214 (subd 5); it is rather “an action to recover upon a liability * * * created *** by statute”, under CPLR 214 (subd 2). ... Hence the insurer here was entitled to sue for the first-party benefits within three years after the completion of two years after the injury (since Morris had not sued for such benefits during that period of two years).

Section 214(5) gives three years for a personal injury claim involving a defective implanted device, measured from when the device causes injury rather than when it is inserted.

Lindsey v. A. H. Robins Co. · filed 1983-01-17(5)

In Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co. (37 NY2d 395, 399-400), the Court of Appeals held that the period of limitations with respect to strict products liability claims “begins to run at the date of injury and that the duration of such period is that found in CPLR 214 (subds 4, 5) under which there is a limitation of three years in actions for personal injury and property damage”. ... The cause of action accrued when that injury occurred, not at some earlier date when the shield had been inserted, but had not yet had a harmful effect on Joyce Lindsey.

Section 214(2) gives a person three years to bring a civil action for employment discrimination under Executive Law § 297(9).

Murphy v. American Home Products Corp. · filed 1983-03-29(2)

Consequently the institution of civil actions to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices under subdivision 9 is governed by the three-year period of limitations prescribed in CPLR 214 (subd 2) applicáble to “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” (emphasis added; contrast State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 86 [holding that statutory provisions did not create “new claims but only provide particular remedies and standing in a public officer”]).

CPLR 214(2)’s three-year period applies when a claim depends on a liability created by statute that was not recognized at common law.

Sturgis v. Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n · filed 1983-12-22(2)

It follows, therefore, that plaintiffs’ cause of action is based upon a statute creating a new liability not recognized in the common or decisional law of this State and that CPLR 214 (subd 2) is applicable (see Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 307).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims that depend on a liability created by statute, regardless of the label given to the claim.

Connetquot Central School District v. Greenport Union Free School District · filed 1984-04-23(2)

plaintiff’s putative “account stated” cause of action herein is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (subd 2).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover upon a liability imposed by statute.

Medici v. Lorenzo De Medici, Inc. · filed 1984-05-01(2)

Thus, CPLR .214 (subd 4), which provides a three-year Statute of Limitations for actions to recover damages for injury to property, does not control. Instead, CPLR 214 (subd 2), which provides a three-year Statute of Limitations for actions to recover upon a liability imposed by statute, does.

Section 214(2) gives the City three years to sue for unmetered water charges because the personal obligation to pay them is created by statute.

City of New York v. Steinfeld · filed 1984-10-18(2)

The quoted language is declaratory of a new cause of action, measured by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for water charges for fiscal year 1977-1978 is time barred, such claim having accrued in June of 1977, and the instant action having been commenced in January 1981.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period for statutory liabilities applies to wrongs not recognized in common or decisional law; it does not govern this oil-spill indemnity action.

State v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co. · filed 1984-12-18(2)

Moreover, it is clear that defendant’s underlying liability for an oil discharge falls outside the purview of the CPLR provision referring to the limitations period for statutory liabilities. That provision has been construed to apply to statutorily imposed liabilities “for wrongs not recognized in the common or decisional law” (State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 86).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit does not apply to a claim for money had and received, a common-law form of action.

City of New York v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1985-05-23(2)

The City’s claim is in the nature of assumpsit for money had and received, a common-law form of action of equitable derivation. ... Hence, the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (2) is inapplicable, and the six-year period of CPLR 213 governs.

Section 214(2) gives the State three years to sue for statutory oil spill cleanup costs, measured from the fund’s last payment or identification of the discharger, whichever occurs later.

State v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co. · filed 1984-03-01(2)

Next, we hold that the three-year period of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (subd 2), rather than the six-year contract limitations period provided in CPLR 213, is applicable. ... In our view, the strict liability imposed on dischargers under article 12 of the Navigation Law compels a holding that a cause of action accrues as of the date of the last payment made by the fund or as of the date of identification of the discharger, whichever occurs later.

CPLR 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim based on liability imposed by Public Housing Law § 127.

Olean Urban Renewal Agency v. Herman · filed 1984-04-12(2)

County Court should have vacated its order granting plaintiff partial summary judgment and, since the motion papers established the Statute of Limitations defense sufficiently to warrant judgment as a matter of law (see CPLR 3212, subd [b]), granted defendants partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under section 127 (see Rogoffv San Juan Racing Assn., 77 AD2d 831, affd 54 NY2d 883).

Section 214(2) gives a person three years to bring a Human Rights Law action for discriminatory discharge against the State.

Koerner v. State of New York · filed 1984-06-29(2)

We held that the institution of a civil action to recover damages pursuant to the Human Rights Law for discriminatory discharge by a private employer is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 214 (subd 2), inasmuch as the action was one to recover upon a liability created by statute (id., at p 307). ... As we held in Murphy, a judicial action for discriminatory discharge commenced pursuant to the Human Rights Law is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations; we need look no further to determine whether a shorter period might be applicable had plaintiff attempted to have his rights adjudicated by some other procedure.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period does not govern actions under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act challenging a state education agency’s decision.

Adler v. Education Department of New York · filed 1985-04-25(2)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Lee P. Gagliardi, Judge, held that this action pursuant to the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982) (“EAHCA”), was barred because it was not brought within the four-month statute of limitations set forth in N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 217 (McKinney 1972) (“CPLR”), as opposed to the three-year statute applicable to “an action to recover upon a liability ... created or imposed by statute” as provided for by CPLR § 214(2). We affirm.

Section 214(2) gives three years to sue on a liability imposed by statute, even when the parties signed an agreement that creates no separate duty.

Medicare&medicaid Gu 35,373 Eugene Hollander v. Stanley Brezenoff, Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of · filed 1986-04-10(2)

Where a duty undertaken by contract has already been imposed upon the parties by statute, the mere existence of the contract does not alter the parties’ obligations to one another. Thus, an action to recover upon such liability is governed by the three-year statutory limitations period.

Section 214(2)'s three-year limit does not apply when a statute merely provides a new remedy for an existing liability.

State v. INA Underwriters Insurance · filed 1986-10-08(2)

By so doing, section 190 is providing a new remedy and, under the State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Regional Tr. Serv. (79 AD2d 858, 859, supra) rationale, CPLR 214 (2) does not apply.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year personal injury limitations period that the court borrowed for Title I LMRDA claims.

Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95 of Laborers' International Union · filed 1985-09-20(5)

The Court finds that the state three-year statute of limitations applicable in federal civil rights actions ... most appropriately strikes ... the balance established in Del Costello because that statute recognizes the need for a reasonable time period within which to vindicate rights similar to those created in Title I. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Title I claims are not time barred. ... In New York this is the three-year statute of C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Title I LMRDA claims brought in New York.

Testa v. Gallagher · filed 1985-11-05(5)

Accordingly, I apply the three-year period of § 214(5) to plaintiffs’ claims under Title I of the LMRDA.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for New York actions under 42 USC § 1983 seeking relief for deprivation of federal civil rights.

Giovannetti v. Dormitory Authority of State · filed 1985-12-12(5)

Thus, in New York, the three-year Statute of Limitations provided in CPLR 214 (5) applies to State actions brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover for deprivation of Federal civil rights (id.).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which the court applies to § 1983 actions.

Surak v. Coughlin · filed 1986-11-10(5)

New York, however, has two personal injury statutes: the three year period prescribed by New York C.P.L.R. § 214(5) governing personal injury claims based on negligence or strict liability and the one year period prescribed by C.P.L.R. § 215(3) that governs claims based on intentional torts. ... The personal injury statute of limitations, C.P.L.R. § 214(5), with a longer limitations period, reinforces the underlying federal interest served by § 1983 in remedying a “broad range of potential torts from personal injuries to infringements of individual liberty.”

Section 214(2) gives three years to sue on a liability that would not exist without a statute, including an insurer’s statutory lien for no-fault benefits.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Nelson · filed 1986-04-03(2)

Thus, both options made available to the insurer pursuant to Insurance Law § 673 (2) for recouping amounts paid as first-party benefits create new liabilities subject to the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1981 claims arising in New York.

Grant v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York · filed 1986-07-02(2)

The Second Circuit has determined that the statute which is applicable to causes of action arising in New York is CPLR § 214(2), which mandates a three-year limitations period. ... Plaintiffs complaint was filed with this Court on July 15, 1981. Therefore, all of her § 1981 claims alleging discrimination occurring prior to July 15, 1978 are time-barred and must be dismissed.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 and § 1985(3) actions in New York.

Andujar v. Rogowski · filed 1986-12-09(5)

Section 1983 actions are governed by the most closely analogous state statute of limitations for personal injuries. ... In New York, that is the three-year statute of CPLR § 214(5), N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 214(5). ... Courts look to the same state statute of limitation to govern actions under § 1985(3).

Section 214 provides three years to bring an action based on statutory liability or a covered personal injury; the complaint here was untimely under either provision.

Doty v. Rochester City Police Department · filed 1986-01-06

Under any of the three foregoing possibilities for measuring the timeliness of this civil rights action (CPLR §§ 214(2), 214(5), or 215(3)), Doty’s complaint would be barred.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit applies to liabilities created by statute, but not to liabilities that existed at common law and were recognized or implemented by statute.

State v. Danny's Franchise Systems, Inc. · filed 1987-06-22(2)

CPLR 214 (2) only governs liabilities which would not exist but for a statute (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169; State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83). Furthermore, it does not apply to liabilities existing at common law which have been recognized or implemented by statute (State of New York v Cortelle Corp., supra).

CPLR 214 (2) provides a three-year limitations period for a liability created by statute only when the statute is essential to the claim and the liability is independent of the common law; a false imprisonment claim does not qualify.

Bryden v. Wilson Memorial Hospital · filed 1988-01-21(2)

When a statute creates a new liability independent of the common law for which no other Statute of Limitations period is prescribed, the applicable period is the three-year period of CPLR 214 (2) (see, Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175). ... Here, plaintiff’s first cause of action is, in essence, a claim based upon the common-law theory of false imprisonment.

CPLR 214’s three-year limitations period applies to Dram Shop Act claims, including claims arising from an injured person’s death.

Bongiorno v. D.I.G.I., Inc. · filed 1987-04-30(2)

For the reasons stated hereinbelow, it is this court’s opinion that the within action is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 214 and, accordingly, plaintiffs application for an order dismissing defendants’ fourth affirmative defense is granted.

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a Dram Shop Act claim because the Act creates a statutory liability.

Bongiorno v. D.I.G.I., Inc. · filed 1988-06-20(2)

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that plaintiffs action is properly subject to the three-year limitations period prescribed by CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitation does not apply to a liability that existed at common law, even if a statute recognizes it.

Kolomensky v. Wiener · filed 1987-12-07(2)

The appellants’ claim does not fall within the ambit of CPLR 214 (2) since a cause of action to ... recover damages for wrongful eviction has been recognized at common law and thus is not purely statutory (Maracina v Shirrmeister, 105 AD2d 672; Dzubey v Teachers’ Coll., 87 AD2d 783), and courts of this State have repeatedly held the provisions of CPLR 214 (2) do not apply to liabilities existing at common law which have been recognized or implemented by statute (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169).

CPLR 214 (5) supplies a three-year limitations period for section 1983 claims.

Bryant Avenue Tenants' Ass'n v. Koch · filed 1988-03-24(5)

Because the action was brought within the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (5), the claims under section 1983 are timely asserted (423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 480).

CPLR 214(2) gives statutory causes of action, including Dram Shop Act claims, a three-year limitations period.

Scott v. Grumann-Olsen, Division of Grumann Allied Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-01-19(2)

There is a three-year limitation for statutory causes of action (CPLR 214 [2]). The amendment was just sought in March 1988, almost eight years after the incident, so the proposed statutory cause of action is obviously time barred.

Section 214(2) applies a three-year limitations period to claims based on liabilities created or imposed by statute, including this no-fault insurer reimbursement claim.

Pacific Insurance v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1989-05-08(2)

That being the case, the action is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to liabilities created or imposed by statute (CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214(2)’s three-year period does not apply when the statute expands a liability that already existed at common law.

State v. Bronxville Glen I Associates · filed 1991-06-06(2)

Because the Martin Act did not create a liability non-existent at common-law, CPLR 214 (2) does not apply, even though the Martin Act may expand the definition of fraud so as to create new liability in some instances (State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83).

Section 214(2)'s three-year limit does not apply to Martin Act investor-fraud claims because liability for investor fraud existed at common law.

State v. Bronxville Glen I Associates · filed 1992-03-12(2)

Because the Martin Act did not create a liability nonexistent at common law, CPLR 214 (2) does not apply, even though the Martin Act may expand the definition of fraud so as to create new liability in some instances (State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83).

Section 214(2)'s three-year limitations period applies only to liabilities newly created by statute and does not govern actions under Debtor and Creditor Law § 273-a.

Orr v. Kinderhill Corporation · filed 1993-03-16(2)

Thus, CPLR § 214(2) does not apply to actions under Debtor & Creditor Law § 273-a.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period applies to liabilities newly created by statute, so it does not govern fraudulent conveyance actions under Debtor & Creditor Law § 273-a.

Orr v. Kinderhill Corp. · filed 1993-03-16(2)

Section 273-a simply fleshed out the meaning of a fraudulent conveyance by stigmatizing certain conveyances made during litigation. Thus, CPLR § 214(2) does not apply to actions under Debtor & Creditor Law § 273-a.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period applies to newly created statutory causes of action, not statutes that merely codify existing common law claims.

Pereira v. Centel Corp. (In Re Argo Communications Corp.) · filed 1991-12-27(2)

Even if Trustee had done so, New York Courts have consistently held that CPLR § 214(2) does not apply to statutes that merely codify existing common law causes of action. Only new statutory causes of action fall under the limits imposed in § 214(2).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit for actions upon a statute imposing a penalty or forfeiture does not govern attorney misconduct claims based on liability recognized at common law.

Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America v. Handel · filed 1993-04-27(2)

Defendants’ argument that Guardian’s causes of action based upon the Judiciary Law are time barred is without merit. The six-year limitation for fraud actions (CPLR 213 [8]) is controlling, and not the three-year period for actions upon a statute imposing a penalty or forfeiture (CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for claims under New York’s Dram Shop Act because the Act creates a liability not drawn from common law.

Platano v. Norm's Castle, Inc. · filed 1993-09-13

A three year statute of limitations is applicable to the New York’s Dram Shop Act pursuant to CPLR 214 since it creates a new liability not drawn from common law.

Section 214(2)'s three-year limit for actions to recover a statutory penalty or forfeiture does not govern treble damages claims under Judiciary Law § 487.

New York City Transit Authority v. Eisen · filed 1994-04-19(2)

We have recently held that the six-year Statute of Limitations for fraud actions (CPLR 213 [8]), not the three-year Statute for actions to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute (CPLR 214 [2]), controls a cause of action for treble damages under Judiciary Law § 487 (Guardian Life Ins. Co. v Handel, 190 AD2d 57, 62), and thus we modify to reinstate plaintiffs second cause of action.

Section 214(2) gives a carrier three years from its payment of no-fault benefits to seek statutory reimbursement from the primarily responsible carrier.

Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1994-07-21(2)

Its obligation to do so and its right to seek reimbursement were rights "created or imposed by statute” (Insurance Law art 52) thereby making CPLR 214 (2) the applicable period of limitations. Its claim therefore accrued when it made such payments (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, supra).

CPLR 214 (2) gives the Commissioner three years to bring an action under the PESH Act, even when the action seeks equitable relief.

Hartnett v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1994-05-16(2)

We conclude that an action for relief pursuant to the PESH Act is governed by the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit for penalties imposed by statute does not apply to proceedings to recover unpaid franchise taxes, which are exempt from CPLR article 2.

Wetzler v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc. · filed 1995-01-10(2)

By statute, proceedings brought to recover unpaid franchise taxes are generally exempt from the operation of ... CPLR article 2 (Tax Law § 219) and, thus, are not subject to either the three-year period of limitation controlling penalties imposed by statute (CPLR 214 [2]) or the six-year period controlling contract actions (CPLR 213).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for an action to recover on a liability imposed by statute.

Muller v. Hannon · filed 1996-01-29(2)

The causes of action based on Real Property Law § 442-a were properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 214 (2), which provides for a three-year Statute of Limitations in an action to recover upon a liability imposed by statute.

Section 214(2) gives a judgment creditor three years to bring an action against an insurer under Insurance Law § 3420(a)(2) because that action exists solely by statute.

Gewirtz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1996-10-29(2)

CPLR 214 (2) provides that an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute except as provided in CPLR 213 and 215 must be commenced in three years. ... Thus, the three-year Statute of Limitations applies to this action.

Section 214(2) gives MVAIC three years from its initial no-fault benefit payment to seek reimbursement from the responsible insurer.

Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1996-11-21(2)

We also conclude that, when as here, MVAIC is entitled to recover payments of no-fault benefits from the primary insurer, the three-year limitations period in CPLR 214 (2) begins to run upon the initial payment to the claimants.

Section 214(2) bars loss-transfer claims for payments made more than three years before the demand for arbitration.

In re Budget Rent-A-Car · filed 1997-03-13(2)

Petitioner sought a permanent stay of arbitration on the ground it was time barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2). ... We modify to bar claims for payments made more than three years before August 17,1995, the date of the State Fund’s demand for arbitration.

Section 214(5)’s three-year limitations period does not apply to a Medicaid rate challenge merely because the petition conclusorily alleges a violation of federal Medicaid law.

Concourse Nursing Home v. Perales · filed 1995-09-07(5)

The nature of the instant action is indistinguishable from McBarnette (supra) and is therefore subject to a four-month Statute of Limitations. As this Court noted in Matter of Medical Arts Sanitarium v New York State Dept. of Health (184 AD2d 399, 399-400), a proceeding is not "subject to the three year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214 (5) applicable to claims brought under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1396a (a) (13) (A) (the Boren Amendment), merely because the petition recites a conclusory allegation that the determination violates Federal Medicaid Law.”

CPLR 214 (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions to recover upon a liability created by statute, including PESHA actions seeking equitable relief.

Hartnett v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1995-10-26(2)

Applying these definitions, this PESHA action is manifestly one to recover upon a liability created by statute, to which CPLR 214 (2) clearly applies. This action was properly dismissed as untimely.

Section 214(2) gives taxpayer actions under General Municipal Law § 51 a three-year limitations period.

Shechtman v. Sverdrup & Parcel Consultants, Inc. · filed 1996-04-25(2)

As such, it is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [2]; ...). The action was thus untimely, and the complaint as against the individual defendant should have been dismissed on Kiernan’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 214(2)'s three-year limitations period does not apply when a statute merely codifies a liability that existed at common law.

Bruchman v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC · filed 1998-03-17(2)

As the liability at issue in this claim would have existed even if § 4-103(5) had not been enacted, the Court follows Aetna and finds that the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR § 213(2), rather than the three year period under CPLR § 214, applies to Zaloom’s claims under U.C.C. § 4-103(5).