N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(5) applies a three-year limitations period to personal injury claims grounded in negligence, even when a claim is framed as a contract action.

Lynch v. Albany Medical Center Hospital · filed 1976-04-01(5)

Since plaintiff’s suit was commenced over three years after the mishap in question and over one year after decedent’s death, the first cause of action in negligence for personal injury is barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 5; CPLR 210, subd [a]), as is the third cause of action which, although nominally a contract action, is similarly grounded in negligence (Schmidt v Merchants Desp. Transp. Co., 270 NY 287, mot for rearg den 271 NY 531; 35 NY Jur, Limitations and Laches, § 35).

For tort claims based on personal injury, CPLR 214’s three-year limitations period runs from the date of injury.

City of Utica v. Holt · filed 1976-09-27

The alleged wrong producing the damage is tortious— either negligence or the violation of a statute, ordinance or similar enactment — and consequently "the statute runs from the date of injury”.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for a conscious pain and suffering claim.

Velez v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. · filed 1977-03-10(5)

The Statute of Limitations for that cause of action being three years (see CPLR 214, subd 5) the action was not barred at the time of the petition for leave to sue. The petition should have been granted to that extent.

Section 214(5) bars personal injury claims grounded in negligence or tortious breach of warranty when brought more than three years after the injury.

Strenk v. Rausch Equipment Corp. · filed 1977-07-12(5)

Inasmuch as over five years had passed from the time of plaintiff’s accident until defendant was served, any cause of action grounded in negligence, breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code or breach of warranty as a tortious wrong to a remote user would be time-barred (CPLR 214, subd 5; Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725 subd [1]; Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395; Dickey v Lockport Prestress, 52 AD2d 1075).

Section 214(5) gives a three-year limitations period for abuse of process because it is a personal injury not covered by CPLR 215.

Levine v. Sherman · filed 1976-06-09(5)

CPLR 214 (subd 5), taken together with section 37-a of the General Construction Law, then, is the controlling provision. All personal injuries not covered under CPLR 215 fall under CPLR 214. ... Since abuse of process is a personal injury provided for by CPLR 214, the six-year catchall of CPLR 213 for unspecified situations is inapplicable.

Section 214 requires negligence actions for personal injury to be commenced within three years of the injury.

Beninati v. Oldsmobile Division of General Motors · filed 1978-04-06

The negligence causes of action for personal injury are covered by CPLR 214, which states that such actions must be commenced within three years from the injury. Clearly, the 1976 action does not comply with the statute. Causes of action numbered third, fifth and seventh are dismissed.

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, running from the date of injury.

George v. Mt. Sinai Hospital · filed 1978-04-18

The service of the amended summons and complaint was not timely and was barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations which commenced to run on August 13 and 14, 1972 (CPLR 214; Stutz v Guardian Cab Corp., 273 App Div 4).

CPLR 214(5) gives a personal injury claim, including a prima facie tort claim, a three-year limitations period unless CPLR 215 specifically covers it.

Serrano v. Flight Motel, Inc. · filed 1978-06-21(5)

Under the provision of CPLR 214 (subd 5) all actions to recover damages for personal injury are governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations other than those specifically denominated in CPLR 215. It should be noted that the provisions of CPLR 214 are not restricted to personal injuries resulting from negligence but would also include intentional torts.

CPLR 214’s three-year limitations period bars a prima facie tort claim arising from a discharge when the action is brought more than three years after the discharge.

Wolpert v. First National Bank · filed 1977-12-05

Since the action was instituted more than three years after plaintiff’s discharge, the first cause of action (properly denominated by Special Term as one for prima facie tort), insofar as it related to plaintiff’s discharge, is time-barred by virtue of the provisions of CPLR 214; we therefore need not consider whether it would also have been barred by the governing one-year period of CPLR 215 (subd 3).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a strict products liability claim.

Reis v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 1978-02-27(5)

In either event, the period of limitations has long since expired—three years for strict products liability under CPLR 214 (subd 5) (see Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395, 399-400) or four years for breach of warranty under subdivision (1) of section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code (see Victorson, supra, p 403).

Section 214(5) imposes a three-year limit on personal-injury claims sounding in strict products liability, even when pleaded as breach of implied warranty.

Mack v. Clairol, Inc. · filed 1979-04-03(5)

Special Term erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint as time-barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 5) and in granting permission to amend the complaint to include a cause of action for strict products liability.

Section 214 gives a personal representative three years from the date of injury to bring a claim for the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering.

Cruz v. Mount Sinai Hospital · filed 1978-03-14

The second cause of action in the case at bar is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations which accrued on the date of the injury inflicted (CPLR 214; Stutz v Guardian Cab Corp., 273 App Div 4).

Section 214(4) supplies a three-year limitation period for a deputy sheriff’s negligent operation of a patrol car when the one-year limit for official acts does not apply.

Dixon v. Seymour · filed 1978-05-11(4)

If this section does not apply, then the three-year limitation of CPLR 214 (subd 4) would control. ... The deputy’s negligence would give rise to liability not because it would be a violation of his duties as a deputy, but because it would violate the duty of reasonable care assumed by everyone who operates an automobile on the highway.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period governs a negligent hiring claim even when the injury resulted from an assault.

Wimmer v. Pratt Institute · filed 1978-06-06

It is the alleged negligent hiring which is the gravamen of the complaint and this is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214).

CPLR 214’s three-year limitation governs a surviving personal injury action for funeral expenses paid or incurred by the decedent’s estate.

Guiltinan v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center · filed 1978-09-28

Thus, funeral expenses, if paid or incurred by the decedent’s estate are part of the personal injury action (Wall v Wanser, 24 Misc 2d 132) and are governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations provided in CPLR 214.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Potenza v. Partenreederi, M/S "Assenburg," · filed 1980-11-06

Plaintiff failed to initiate the instant action within the applicable limitations period, which is 3 years for personal injuries.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal-injury claims sounding in tort, including strict products liability claims.

Marie v. European Health Spas, Inc. · filed 1980-12-11(5)

We agree that any claim sounding in tort, including one founded on a theory of strict products liability, would be barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395; CPLR 214, subd 5).

Section 214 gives a party three years from accrual to bring a negligence action for personal injuries.

Feehan v. United States Lines, Inc. · filed 1981-09-01

In New York, a party must bring an action for personal injuries due to negligence within three years of the time the cause of action accrued. N.Y. CPLR § 214 (McKinney) (1972).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from an accident to commence a negligence action by valid service.

Berlin v. Ogren · filed 1979-10-18(5)

Under these circumstances, on December 12, 1976, three years having transpired since the date of the accident without defendant being validly served with the summons and complaint, it is clear that the three-year limitations period applicable to this negligence action (CPLR 214, subd 5) had run so as to render this action time barred.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Downes v. State · filed 1980-06-12

Here, the applicable Statute of Limitations for negligence is three years (CPLR 214).

Section 214(5) gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Rosner v. Maimonides Hospital · filed 1980-07-28(5)

We note, however, that the second cause of action sets forth a cause of action in negligence and not, as found by Special Term, in contract. As such, it is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see CPLR 214, subd 5).

Section 214(5) gives negligence and products liability claims a three-year limitations period running from the date of injury.

Jordan v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1980-03-28(5)

The negligence and products liability actions have a three-year Statute of Limitations, running from the date of injury (CPLR 214, subd 5; Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395).

CPLR 214’s three-year period cannot be applied to a personal injury claim against a public authority employee without first determining whether the authority must indemnify the employee.

Albano v. Hawkins · filed 1981-06-22

We disagree with Special Term’s application of the three-year Statute of Limitations (see CPLR 214) without resolving the indemnification issue.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence actions seeking damages for personal injuries.

Arce v. Sybron Corp. · filed 1981-07-27(5)

This is a negligence action to recover damages, inter alia, for personal injuries for which the time limit is three years (CPLR 214, subd 5).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for a personal-injury negligence claim.

Sprague v. Luna Park Co-op · filed 1981-08-24

The first cause of action (which sounds in negligence) should have been dismissed by Special Term, as it was time barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214), and the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the six-month extension set forth in CPLR 205 (subd [a]).

Section 214(5) gives plaintiffs three years to bring negligence and strict liability product claims, with the period beginning when injury occurs.

Klein v. Dow Corning Corporation · filed 1981-10-01(5)

New York law gives product liability plaintiffs three years to assert claims in negligence and strict liability. ... Here damage occurred only when the prostheses burst. ... That is when plaintiff’s claim accrued.

Section 214(5) gives strict products liability claims a three-year limitations period running from the date of injury.

Singer v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1981-11-17(5)

Strict products liability sounds in tort and the Statute of Limitations as to such cause of action is the three-year period applicable to negligence actions found in CPLR 214 (subd 5) and runs from the date of the injury (Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395).

CPLR 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from the injury to bring a personal injury claim sounding in negligence or strict products liability.

McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, Division of Bristol-Myers Co · filed 1982-04-19(5)

Her claim is therefore governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations period prescribed by CPLR 214 (subd 5) which began to run in 1971, at the time of injury (see ... 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 214.13).

Section 214 gives a strict products liability claim three years from the first injury; later consequential damage does not restart the period.

New York Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1983-09-12(4), (5)

The applicable Statute of Limitations in a strict products liability action is the three-year period found in CPLR 214 (subds 4, 5) which begins to run at the time of injury (Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395). ... The subsequent cracks in the roof membrane did not give rise to new causes of action.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence and strict products liability claims.

Mid-Hudson Mack, Inc. v. Dutchess Quarry & Supply Co. · filed 1984-02-06

With respect to causes of action sounding in negligence and strict products liability, the applicable Statute of Limitations is the three-year period found in CPLR 214.

Section 214 gives negligence, statutory violation, and strict products liability claims three years to be filed, measured from when the injury occurs.

Fitzpatrick v. A. H. Robins Co. · filed 1984-01-09

Three of the causes, namely, negligence, violation of “statutes, codes, laws [and] ordinances” and strict products liability are subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214). ... Said causes of action accrued when the injury occurred (see Lindsey v Robins Co., 60 NY2d 417), and that date, according to plaintiff, was in 1979.

Section 214(5) gives negligence and strict products liability claims a three-year limitations period that, for injury from an implanted contraceptive device, runs from when the infection occurs.

Davis v. A. H. Robins Co. · filed 1984-03-06(5)

Concededly, a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 5) applies to the plaintiffs’ negligence and strict products liability claims; and, a four-year Statute of Limitations (Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725, subd [1]) applies to the plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims. ... Accordingly, insofar as the date of the injury is concerned, the Lindsey case is controlling, and the date from which the Statute of Limitations ran is when the infection occurred.

CPLR 214 (5) applies a three-year limitations period to personal injury claims even when pleaded as breach of contract or warranty.

Erickson v. YMCA of Nyack · filed 1985-02-04(5)

Hence, this case is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations period provided in CPLR 214 (5) ... Inasmuch as this action was commenced more than five years after plaintiff’s accident, it was properly dismissed.

Section 214(5)'s three-year limitation period applies to claims seeking damages for personal injuries, even when framed as breach of contract.

Davis v. St. Joseph's Children's Services · filed 1984-03-06(5)

In this case, the proposed contract theory of liability set forth in the third cause of action to the proposed amended complaint quite plainly seeks damages for personal injuries only. Accordingly, the three-year Statute of Limitations for personal injury actions continues to be applicable.

Section 214(5) does not support summary judgment against a claim for cumulative injury from repeated injections when factual questions remain about the effect of injections within the three-year limitations period.

Aranoff v. Winthrop Laboratories, Division of Sterling Drugs, Inc. · filed 1984-06-19(5)

In essence, it is claimed that the injury resulted from the cumulative effect of injections of Talwin upon the body over the period of time involved. In our view, there are factual issues respecting the cause of the muscular myopathy and other injuries and the effect of accumulated injections over the period involved which require competent medical proof at trial. These cannot be finally resolved upon a motion for summary judgment.

Section 214’s three-year negligence limitations period does not apply to an assault claim merely labeled “negligent assault.”

Trott v. Merit Department Store · filed 1985-01-31

Special Term properly treated plaintiff’s first cause of action for “negligent assault” as an assault, governed by the one-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 215) and not the three-year negligence Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year period for negligence claims, but a claim against a sheriff or deputy for omission of an official duty falls under the one-year period in CPLR 215(1).

Maurice v. Stoddard · filed 1985-02-13(5)

We must now proceed to determine whether CPLR 215 (1), the one-year Statute of Limitations, or CPLR 214 (5), a three-year Statute of Limitations, applies. ... This appears to come squarely within CPLR 215 (1) since the injury complained of is alleged to have resulted from the omission of an official duty. ... The cause of action for conscious pain and suffering against defendants Stoddard, Flanigan and Hulbert is therefore dismissed.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for a negligence claim against a sheriff’s department based on the general duty to maintain safe premises.

Adams v. County of Rensselaer · filed 1985-03-28(5)

If this section does not apply, the three-year period of limitations of CPLR 214 (5) would control. ... Negligence in allowing liquid to accumulate on the floor of the jail does not involve a breach of the official duty of the Sheriff to supervise the jail, but a breach of the general duty of an operator of any building to maintain certain portions of the building in a reasonably safe condition. With regard to this cause of action, the one-year Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 215 (1) is not applicable.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury tort actions.

Munsell v. La Brasserie Molson Du Quebec Limitee · filed 1985-12-17(5)

The New York statute of limitations in a tort action for personal injuries is three years. New York CPLR § 214(5) (McKinney 1972).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Rossi v. Ed Peterson Cutting Equipment Corp. · filed 1986-01-24(5)

Thus, pursuant to CPLR 202, the New York Statute of Limitations for an action to recover damages for a personal injury, CPLR 214 (5) providing for a three-year period, is applicable. It is further undisputed that the underlying action was commenced within the three-year period and that the tolling provisions of CPLR 207 are not alleged nor apparently applicable.

Section 214 gives a claimant three years to bring a negligence action, measured here from the date the injury occurred.

Johnson v. State · filed 1986-03-25

Here, the three-year Statute of Limitations for negligence actions (see, CPLR 214) began to run on September 22, 1982 (see, Riley v State of New York, 105 AD2d 1104; see also, Schwartz v Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 NY2d 212, supra; Schmidt v Merchants Desp. Transp. Co., 270 NY 287, supra) and the application, first made by notice of motion served June 13, 1985, was timely (the adjournments and delay subsequent to the making of the original notice of motion do not preclude consideration of this application at a time beyond the three-year Statute of Limitations [Rydeberg v State of New York, 108 Misc 2d 362; Jenkins v State of New York, 119 Misc 2d 144]).

Section 214(5) gives negligence actions a three-year limitation period.

Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow · filed 1986-07-01(5)

negligence actions are subject to a three-year limitation period (CPLR § 214(5)), and assault actions to a one-year period (CPLR § 215(3)). The events underlying these claims allegedly took place on December 26-27, 1979 and December 20-21, 1980. The action was filed on July 19, 1985. Thus, under either limitations period, these claims are time-barred absent some saving or tolling provision.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Hernandez v. Empire Mutual Insurance · filed 1986-06-17(5)

No evidence in the record supports plaintiffs allegations that the defendants made further misrepresentations after issue was joined on March 25, 1976. The Statute of Limitations for the negligence cause of action thus expired on March 26, 1979, three years after issue was joined. (CPLR 214 [5].)

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury actions; parental abduction does not extend that period as a continuing wrong once the parent knows the children’s whereabouts.

Tinker v. Abrams · filed 1986-08-01(5)

Not later than 1976, plaintiff was apprised of all the facts with which she could have commenced the present action. Thus, at the latest, the applicable three-year statute of limitations began to run in June of 1976, and expired in 1979. Her complaint, filed in 1984, is time-barred.

The three-year limitations period for a personal injury action begins on the date of the accident, even when the plaintiff must later establish a serious injury to sue under the No-Fault Law.

Jackson v. L. P. Transportation, Inc. · filed 1988-11-05(5)

There should be an affirmance. Supreme Court properly found that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on the date of the accident.

Section 214(5)’s three-year period applies to personal injury claims sounding in negligence; intentional tort claims are subject to the one-year period under section 215(3).

Gallagher v. Directors Guild of America, Inc. · filed 1988-11-10(5)

The operative distinction between the sort of causes of action governed by CPLR 215 and those within the scope of CPLR 214 is whether the particular claim involved is for an intentional tort (see, Wheeler v State of New York, 104 AD2d 496, 498) or a tort sounding in negligence (see, Trott v Merit Dept. Store, 106 AD2d 158, 159).

Section 214 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period; disputed facts about timeliness may require trial.

Greater Johnstown City School District v. Cataldo & Waters · filed 1990-03-01

Negligence is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214). ... These conflicting arguments present a triable issue of fact not determinable by motion.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Syndicate Building Corp. v. City University of New York · filed 1991-06-25

Since the Statute of Limitations for negligence is three years (CPLR 214), the application under Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) is timely.

Section 214(5) applies to a loss-of-consortium claim derived from a personal-injury claim.

Gouldsbury v. Dan's Supreme Supermarket, Inc. · filed 1989-10-16(5)

The fourth cause of action brought on behalf of the plaintiff Jacqueline Gouldsbury to recover damages for loss of consortium is time barred since it is derivative of John Gouldsbury’s underlying cause of action to recover damages for personal injuries (CPLR 214 [5]; see, Rothfarb v Brookdale Hosp., 139 AD2d 720).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for a negligence claim seeking damages for personal injuries.

Maldonado v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center · filed 1989-12-11(5)

However, the second cause of action to recover damages for personal injuries based upon negligence is not time barred as the appellant was clearly served within the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) bars a personal injury action commenced more than five years after the alleged injury.

Livigni v. City of New York · filed 1990-04-02(5)

Nor did the court err in dismissing the action against Universal as time barred, as the action was commenced against Universal more than five years after the slip and fall allegedly occurred (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to commence a personal injury action.

King v. Best Western Country Inn · filed 1991-07-03(5)

As plaintiff is a New York resident, the New York statute of limitations of three years within which an action must be commenced in personal injury claims ... (N.Y. CPLR § 214(5)) applies. The cause of action accrued on September 7, 1987. The final day to commence the action was September 7, 1990.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim for negligent hiring and retention of an employee.

Gallas v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North & South America · filed 1991-07-03

The cause of action alleging negligent hiring and retention of an employee is subject to the three-year limitation of CPLR 214.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for a derivative tort claim for loss of services.

Thomas v. New York City · filed 1993-02-05

Thomas also states a derivative tort claim for loss of services based on the abuse suffered by the infant plaintiffs while in the foster care system. The applicable statute of limitations for such claims is three years. N.Y. CPLR § 214.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence action.

Boyea v. Fiore · filed 1991-10-17(5)

However, that statutory provision has no application in this case because the Statute of Limitations had not run on either of the causes of action alleged in the complaint (see, CPLR 214 [5] [three-year statute in negligence action]; CPLR 215 [3] [one-year statute in battery action]).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Rescildo v. R.H. Macy's · filed 1993-01-28

In light of the New York Statute of Limitations period of three years (see, CPLR 214), however, the complaint is reinstated solely with respect to the causes of action brought on behalf of the infant plaintiff who, unlike his father, may avail himself of New York’s toll for infancy (CPLR 208).

CPLR 214's limitations period bars a personal injury claim against a defendant when the action against that defendant was not timely commenced.

Opont v. Duclair Realty Corp. · filed 1993-02-16

The action against Heat Timer was therefore properly dismissed as barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Abrams v. Design Works, Inc. · filed 1993-11-08(5)

The instant action was untimely commenced against the corporate defendant. The service upon the Sheriff prior to the expiration of the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]) caused an extension of that period by 60 days (see, CPLR 203 [b] [5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury claims; a claim against a defendant added after that period is barred if it does not relate back.

Hernandez v. William J. Scully, Inc. · filed 1994-04-04(5)

The appellants moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as it is asserted against them, alleging that the plaintiff’s claim was time barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]). ... Consequently, the appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations should have been granted (see, Wimbish v Green, 191 AD2d 491).

CPLR 214 (5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence action, including a claim for gross negligence arising from alleged sexual abuse by a doctor.

Robinson v. Franklin General Hospital · filed 1994-03-29(5)

An action in negligence carries a three-year Statute of Limitations pursuant to CPLR 214 (5) and therefore plaintiff’s cause of action for gross negligence and sexual abuse were commenced timely.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Mevis v. Eli Lilly & Co. · filed 1996-05-23(5)

While defendant’s failure to raise this question of law before the IAS Court does not bar this Court’s review (Chateau D’ If Corp. v City of New York, 219 AD2d 205), the argument is without merit since it relies on the applicability of CPLR 214 (5), which is a three-year Statute of Limitations and thus longer than the two-year Indiana Statute of Limitations.

Section 214 bars a personal injury action commenced more than three years after it accrues.

Kinsella v. Astroland Kiddie Park, Inc. · filed 1996-10-07

Since the action was commenced more than three years after the accrual of the action, it is barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period does not bar a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim filed within three years of discovering the improper burial that caused the emotional harm.

Augeri v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 1996-03-08

Because this action was commenced within three years of discovery of the improper burial, it is not barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims, running from when the cause of action accrues.

Marino v. Buck · filed 1996-09-27

The negligence cause of action is barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214), which began to run when the cause of action accrued.

Section 214(5) supplies the limitations period for negligence and strict products liability claims.

Megna v. Becton Dickinson & Co. · filed 1995-05-15(5)

Similarly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s observation that even if the complaint had adequately pleaded a negligence or strict products liability cause of action, such claims would be barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]; see generally, Martin v Edwards Labs., 60 NY2d 417).

Section 214(5) sets the limitations period for personal injury actions.

Braunstein v. Taj Group of Hotels · filed 1997-01-30(5)

The evidence supported the Special Referee’s finding that service was attempted on April 1, 1992, outside the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [5]).

CPLR 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for personal injuries.

Lisciandri v. White · filed 1997-03-17(5)

After issue was joined, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations on actions to recover damages for personal injuries {see, CPLR 214 [5]). ... Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed.

CPLR 214 (5) gives claims for repetitive stress injuries a three-year limitations period.

Hayes v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1997-03-03(5)

The Statute of Limitations applicable to RSI claims is the three-year period provided by CPLR 214 (5) ... Under either approach the plaintiffs claims are untimely since the instant action was not commenced until more than three years after both the date the plaintiff’s symptoms first manifested themselves or the date she first used the IBM keyboard.

Section 214(5) bars a repetitive stress injury claim commenced more than three years after the plaintiff’s symptoms occurred.

Liverpool v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1997-09-15(5)

The Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred as to the defendant Xerox Corporation since the plaintiff’s symptoms of repetitive stress injury occurred more than three years prior to the commencement of this action (see, CPLR 214 [5]; Badillo v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 237 AD2d 553; Hayes v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 237 AD2d 254).

Section 214(5) bars a repetitive stress injury claim brought more than three years after the injured person’s symptoms occurred.

Badillo v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1997-03-31(5)

The Supreme Court correctly dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted by the appellants as time-barred, since the injured appellant’s symptoms of repetitive stress injury occurred more than three years previous to the commencement of this action (see, CPLR 214 [5]; Hayes v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 237 AD2d 254]).

Section 214(5) bars a repetitive stress injury claim when symptoms occurred more than three years before the action began.

Hartman v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1997-06-23(5)

The Supreme Court correctly dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Dell Computer Corporation ... (hereinafter Dell) and Brother International Corporation as time-barred, where the injured plaintiffs symptoms of repetitive stress injury occurred more than three years previous to the commencement of this action (see, CPLR 214 [5]; Badillo v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 237 AD2d 553; Hayes v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 237 AD2d 254).

Section 214’s three-year period for a repetitive stress injury claim runs from the onset of symptoms or the last use of the keyboard, whichever is earlier.

Kelly v. NEC Technologies, Inc. · filed 1998-01-22

On November 25, 1997, the Court of Appeals unanimously announced a new rule in RSI cases: the cause of action accrues at the onset of symptoms, or upon the last use of the keyboard, whichever is earlier (Blanco v American Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 NY2d 757). ... Since those accrual points were within three years of the commencement of this action, their claims are not time-barred.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a repetitive stress injury claim, measured from the earlier of symptom onset or last use of the injury-producing device.

Williams v. Dynamic Decision, Inc. · filed 1998-07-27(5)

Since the plaintiff alleged in her complaint that her last use of the device manufactured by International Business Machines Corporation (hereinafter IBM) took place in September 1989, five years before she commenced this action, the action against IBM is time-barred pursuant to the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (5).

Section 214(5) gives a negligent retention or supervision claim a three-year limitations period.

Sharon B. v. Reverend S. · filed 1997-11-19(5)

The three-year Statute of Limitations applies to a cause of action for negligent retention or supervision (see, CPLR 214 [5]), and defendants failed to establish that the action was commenced more than three years after the last act of alleged ... sexual abuse.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year period for commencing a personal injury action.

Leylegian v. Federal Paper Board Co. · filed 1998-06-09(5)

Under the circumstances, there was no mistake as to the identity of Peterson and Grant, and therefore plaintiff could and should have commenced the action within the three-year period specified in CPLR 214 (5) (see, Greene v Davidson, 210 AD2d 108, lv denied 85 NY2d 806).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for unspecified personal injury actions, including section 1983 claims filed in New York.

Buckley v. City of Syracuse · filed 1998-12-01(5)

Thus, in this case, New York’s three-year statute of limitations for unspecified personal injury actions applies.

Section 214(5) gives personal injury actions, including claims under 42 USC § 1983, a three-year limitations period.

Lopez v. Shaughnessy · filed 1999-04-19(5)

For Statute of Limitations purposes, the plaintiffs cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is characterized as a personal injury action (see, Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261; Feuer v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., supra, at 839). The Statute of Limitations for personal injury actions is three years (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Young v. Yager · filed 1999-10-01(5)

Here, plaintiff made his application to the court after the three-year Statute of Limitations had expired on his personal injury action (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for State constitutional tort claims as general personal injury actions.

Brown v. State · filed 1998-12-03(5)

CPLR 214 (5) is New York’s limitation period governing general personal injury actions and, therefore, a three-year Statute of Limitations applies to a State constitutional tort claim.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for products liability actions.

St. Patrick's Home for the Aged & Infirm v. Laticrete International, Inc. · filed 1999-09-28(4)

As the Statute of Limitations in product liability actions is three years (CPLR 214 [4]), and plaintiffs 1994 action was commenced more than three years after the accrual date, it is barred by the Statute of Limitations.

CPLR 214 (5) gives a plaintiff three years to commence a personal injury action.

Morris v. Start · filed 2000-01-13(5)

Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of CPLR 205 (a), and the complaint was properly dismissed as time barred pursuant to the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period bars a personal injury action commenced after that period expires.

Hambric v. McHugh · filed 2001-12-10

Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ second action, which was commenced after the expiration of the Statute of Limitations, should have been dismissed as time-barred (see, CPLR 214, 3211 [a] [5]; see also, Hafkin v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 97 NY2d 95).

CPLR 214(5) bars a negligence claim filed more than three years after the claimant learned of the alleged negligent delay, even if the claimant received the underlying order later.

Baskerville v. State · filed 2000-10-26(5)

The claim was properly dismissed as barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (Court of Claims Act § 12 [2]; CPLR 214 [5]) upon a finding that, assuming claimant was under no obligation to discover the existence of the order himself, the State, acting through an Assistant Attorney General who was representing the Justice then presiding in the part of the Supreme Court where claimant had brought his habeas application, in fact did advise claimant of the denial of his habeas application, in September 1991, in response to claimant’s application for a writ of mandamus compelling the habeas court to render a decision on his habeas application (Matter of Baskerville v Adlerberg, 176 AD2d 1251).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for tortious interference with contract and tortious inducement of breach of fiduciary duty, running from when the injury is sustained.

American Federal Group, Ltd. v. Edelman · filed 2001-04-12(4)

The fifth and sixth causes of action for tortious interference with contract and tortious inducement of breach of fiduciary duty accrued no later than February 1993, i.e., upon termination of defendant Edelman’s employment contract with plaintiffs and his acquisition of their business, by which time all of the damages that plaintiffs claim as a result of the interference had been sustained. Accordingly, such causes of action are barred by the admittedly applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [4]).

CPLR 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims.

Interboro Mutual Indemnity Insurance v. Isaac · filed 2001-11-05

The claims sounding in negligence which Earl Cheatham and Sheila Cheatham sought to add to their answer are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

Cipolla v. County of Rensselaer · filed 2001-01-11

Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are governed by a three year statute of limitations, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214, and, thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are not time barred.

CPLR 214 provides a three-year limitations period for actions arising out of negligence.

Sclafani v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 2001-05-09

Athough this is a 1945 case, under CPLR 214 the statute of limitations for actions arising out of negligence is still three years.

CPLR 214 (5) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within three years.

Lynch v. Carlozzi · filed 2001-06-28(5)

The limitations provision of CPLR 214 (5) requires that an action for personal injuries be commenced within three years. As plaintiff was injured on August 18, 1991, this action, if commenced by August 17, 1994, would have been timely.

Section 214(4) and (5) give negligence and strict products liability claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the date of injury.

Gianakakos v. Commodore Home Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-07-26(4), (5)

Plaintiff’s causes of action sounding in negligence and strict products liability are subject to the three-year Statutes of Limitation of CPLR 214 (4) and (5) and accrued upon the date of injury (see, Snyder v Town Insulation, 81 NY2d 429, 432; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v Hunter Turbo Corp., 241 AD2d 505, 506).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for a motor vehicle injury claim.

Williams v. Majewski · filed 2002-02-01(5)

The limitations period expired on or before May 3, 2000 (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to commence a personal injury action.

Seppala v. Meadowbrook Care Center, Inc. · filed 2002-03-04(5)

The parties concede that the applicable statute of limitations period is three years (see, CPLR 214 [5]). ... Since the action was not commenced within the three-year statute of limitations, the motion to dismiss the complaint was properly granted.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Dallemand v. Sun Co. · filed 2002-12-02(5)

The statute of limitations expired on May 28, 2000 (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) requires a personal injury damages action to be filed within three years unless a statutory exception applies.

Kilmer v. Flocar, Inc. · filed 2002-12-18(5)

Plaintiff did not file her claim until March 30, 2001, eleven months after the statute of limitations expired; consequently, New York’s Statute of Limitations, C.P.L.R. § 214(5), bars plaintiffs action as untimely.

CPLR 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

Poulos v. U-Haul International, Inc. · filed 2003-03-10

The instant action was commenced in 2001, five years after the cause of action accrued in 1996. Accordingly, the action is time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year deadline to commence a personal injury action.

Meiselman v. McDonalds Restaurants · filed 2003-05-05(5)

As this action was not properly commenced until December 2000 approximately one year and two months after the three-year statute of limitations expired (see CPLR 214 [5]), the action was properly dismissed.

Section 214(5) sets the limitations period used to determine whether a late personal injury claim may be filed.

Rizzo v. State · filed 2003-10-07(5)

Movants’ motion is timely (Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]; CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for a negligence claim.

Howard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 2004-03-11

In any event, since the cause of action sounds in negligence the applicable statute of limitations is three years (See CPLR §214; Kirkland v. American Title Insurance Co., supra, 692 F. Supp. 153) ; hence, this claim is not time barred .

Section 214 gives a negligence plaintiff three years from accrual to file suit.

Southfield Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd. · filed 2004-06-18

The statute of limitations for negligence claims under New York law is three years from accrual of the cause of action. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 1996).

Section 214 gives a negligence claim under New York law a three-year limitations period running from accrual.

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd. · filed 2004-06-18

The statute of limitations for negligence claims under New York law is three years from accrual of the cause of action. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 1996). ... Whether or not plaintiffs could ultimately prevail on their negligence claim against Diamond Time, such a claim would be barred because it was filed more than three years after it would have accrued.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for personal injuries.

Sadeghinia v. Pierre · filed 2004-03-22(5)

His action to recover damages for personal injuries was subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions; a motion to add a defendant after that period expires is untimely.

Riccardelli v. Metropolitan Transportation Authuroty · filed 2004-04-26(5)

The plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the summons and complaint was untimely, as it was made after the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (5) (see LoCiciro v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 288 AD2d 353, 354 [2001]). Therefore, the motion was properly denied.

Section 214(5) gives a personal injury negligence claim a three-year limitations period that begins on the date of injury.

DiPietro v. Feldman-Mondlick, Inc. · filed 2004-04-30(5)

The contract does not clearly and unambiguously limit plaintiffs’ time for suing for personal injuries (cf. Fitzpatrick & Weller, 309 AD2d at 1273), and the statutory limitations period of three years therefore applies (see CPLR 214 [5]). The negligence cause of action accrued on the date of the alleged injury, January 16, 1999, and was therefore timely interposed (cf. Gianakakos, 285 AD2d at 908-909).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Respass v. Dean · filed 2004-05-03(5)

Thus, this action is governed by, and barred by the expiration of, the three-year period of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (5).

CPLR 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims.

Siler v. Lutheran Social Services of Metropolitan New York · filed 2004-09-13

The parents’ negligence cause of action is similarly time-barred, as the action was not commenced within the three-year period of limitations applicable thereto (see CPLR 214; Guerrera v Foundation Tit. & Escrow Corp., 303 AD2d 456 [2003]).

Section 214(5) gives three years to bring a negligence claim; serving a motion to add a defendant does not toll that period when the motion is filed after it expires.

Marceca v. City of New York · filed 2004-10-26(5)

Accordingly, as the action against Keyspan was not commenced within the applicable three-year statute of limitations for negligence actions, and plaintiff did not obtain a toll of the statute of limitations by filing her motion for leave to amend the complaint with the court prior to the expiration of said time limitation, her claims against Keyspan must be dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(4) gives a gross negligence claim three years from accrual to be filed.

Anunziatta v. Orkin Exterminating Co. · filed 2004-12-03(4)

In sum, given the jury’s finding that plaintiffs’ gross negligence cause of action accrued in January 1994, and because a three-year statute of limitations governs that claim, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4) (McKinney 2003), the plaintiffs did not bring a timely civil action, and the district court was correct to enter judgment in accordance with the jury’s answer to interrogatory number six, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b).

Section 214 gives a negligence plaintiff three years to sue, measured from the alleged negligent act rather than a later injury.

Polidoro v. Chubb Corp. · filed 2005-01-20

In a negligence case, a three-year statute of limitations applies under N.Y. CPLR 214. ... Plaintiffs awareness of the harm at a later date is irrelevant to the calculation of when the statute of limitations time period began.

Section 214(4) gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period, barring claims that accrued more than three years before suit.

Reznor v. J. Artist Management, Inc. · filed 2005-04-22(4)

However, the statute of limitations for negligence is three years, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4), meaning that Rez--nor is barred from bringing a cause of action that accrued more than three years before he brought this suit, on May 19, 2004.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim, and a later injury does not delay the start of that period.

Polidoro v. Chubb Corp. · filed 2005-06-02

Plaintiffs awareness of the harm at a later date is irrelevant to the calculation of when the statute of limitations time period began. Plaintiff, therefore, failed to timely file her complaint of March 22, 2004, within the three-year statute of limitations set out in N.Y. CPLR 214.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim for injury to property, measured here from the broker’s alleged wrongdoing rather than the insurer’s later insolvency.

Polly Esther's South, Inc. v. Setnor Byer Bogdanoff, Inc. · filed 2005-09-09(4)

Section 214 (4) establishes a standard three-year time limit for “any injury to property” not attributable to bodily exposure to substances.

Section 214(5) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within three years of the injury.

Provenzano v. Ioffe · filed 2004-11-01(5)

The respondents made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the accident occurred on August 18, 1999, and that this action was not commenced until well after the running of the applicable statute of limitations on August 18, 2002 (see CPLR 214 [5]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Hughes v. Nie · filed 2004-11-08(5)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the motion of the defendant General Motors Acceptance Corporation which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it by the plaintiffs Brian Booth and Phyllis Booth (hereinafter the Booths) on the ground that it was time-barred (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of injury to commence a personal injury action.

Paladino v. Time Warner Cable · filed 2005-03-28(5)

In any event, the action was timely commenced within three years of the date the plaintiff was injured (see CPLR 214 [5]), which is when the claim accrued (see Jackson v L.P. Transp., 72 NY2d 975, 976 [1988]; Smalley v Hutcheon, 296 NY 68, 72 [1946]; Marino v Proch, 258 AD2d 628 [1999]).

CPLR 214(5) bars a personal injury claim against a defendant added after the limitations period expires.

Rinzler v. Jafco Associates · filed 2005-08-01(5)

The plaintiff did not attempt to add Fairfield as a defendant until after the statute of limitations had expired (see CPLR 214 [5]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly granted Fairfield’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it (see CPLR 3211 [a] [5]).

Section 214 gives claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress a three-year limitations period.

AB Ex Rel. EF v. Rhinebeck Central School District · filed 2005-03-21

A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; Tornheim v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 988 F.Supp. 279, 286 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1997). ... Therefore, KL’s claim against Mawhin-ney for negligent infliction of emotional distress is also barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 214 bars a personal injury action commenced after the limitations period expires when the plaintiff has not established grounds to estop the defendants from asserting it.

Spirig v. Evans · filed 2006-02-21

In support of their motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them as time-barred, the appellants submitted uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that this action to recover damages for personal injuries was commenced one day after the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations (see CPLR 214). ... Similarly, the plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claim of ongoing settlement negotiations with the carrier, even if true, does not give rise to an estoppel (see Dailey v Mazel Stores, 309 AD2d 661 [2003]; Brauner v Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 227 AD2d 306 [1996]; see also Dastech Intl. v F.T.L. Intl., 2 AD3d 667 [2003]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Garcia v. Peterson · filed 2006-09-26(5)

It is undisputed that the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions (see CPLR 214 [5]) and the two-year limitations period for wrongful death (see EPTL 5-4.1) had expired when the action was commenced.

Section 214(5) gives a negligent impairment of the right to sue claim a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff learns the evidence was destroyed.

Lewis v. Worzman · filed 2005-10-25(5)

The action was properly dismissed upon the ground that the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [5]) governing plaintiff’s claim for negligent impairment of the right to sue based on his employer’s destruction of the ladder from which he fell (see Curran v Auto Lab Serv. Ctr., 280 AD2d 636, 637 [2001]) began to run in 1991, when plaintiff learned that his employer had destroyed the ladder, not in 2002, when plaintiffs products liability action was dismissed for lack of evidence as to the ladder’s retailer or manufacturer.

Section 214 gives a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress a three-year limitations period.

Dawkins v. Williams · filed 2006-02-07

Under New York State law, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period for a personal injury negligence claim runs from the date of injury, not the date the allegedly negligent work was performed.

Barrell v. Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc. · filed 2006-05-09

Contrary to the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendant plumbing company for negligent installation of the washing machine and attendant plumbing accrued on the date the injury was sustained, and not on the date the work was performed (see Cubito v Kreisberg, 69 AD2d 738, 744 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 900 [1980]; DiPietro v Feldman-Mondlick, Inc., 6 AD3d 1216, 1217 [2004]; Marrero v Marsico, 218 AD2d 226, 227 [1996]; Gile v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 281 App Div 95 [1952]; cf. City School Dist. of City of Newburgh v Stubbins & Assoc., 85 NY2d 535 [1995]). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim against the plumbing company to recover damages based on negligence is not barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214).

CPLR 214(5) bars a personal injury action commenced 11 years after the accident.

Benitez v. Mutual of America Life Insurance · filed 2006-11-21(5)

The motion court further noted that initiation of the New York County action, fully 11 years after the accident, ran afoul of the statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [5]); furthermore, the saving provision of CPLR 205 (a) specifically did not apply, by the terms of that statute, where the earlier dismissal was by reason of “neglect to prosecute.” The Second Department has affirmed the Queens dismissal for failure to prosecute (24 AD3d 708 [2005], appeal dismissed 6 NY3d 844 [2006]), and we conclude that the instant action was untimely commenced.

Section 214(5) bars a personal injury action that was not commenced within its limitations period.

Ali v. Moss · filed 2006-12-19(5)

...within the relevant period of limitations (see Marino v Proch, 258 AD2d 628 [1999]; CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) sets the three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which barred the claims against Nissan because they did not relate back.

Contos v. Mahoney · filed 2007-01-16(5)

The Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of the defendants Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, NissanInfiniti L.T., and NILT, Inc. (hereinafter collectively Nissan), to dismiss the amended complaint based on the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]).

CPLR 214’s three-year personal injury limitations period applies to a petition for leave to sue MVAIC and is tolled during the petitioner’s infancy.

Steele v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. · filed 2007-02-01

She brought the instant petition for leave to sue on August 18, 2004, well within the applicable three-year statute of limitations for a personal injury action (CPLR 214), which had been tolled during her infancy (CPLR 208).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Mongardi v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. · filed 2007-11-21(5)

In support of summary judgment, defendant sufficiently established that the action was commenced against it after the statute of limitations had expired (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for negligence claims against an insurance broker runs from issuance of the policy at issue when each annual policy is negotiated and placed anew.

Kurt Wayne, Inc. v. Lead Underwriters at Lloyds London · filed 2006-12-06(4)

Plaintiffs’ claims against defendants AIB and Manham are, thus, timely, regardless of whether they are governed by the three-year limitations period for negligence or the six-year limitations period for breach of contract.

Section 214(4) gives a negligence claim against an insurance broker a three-year limitations period that runs from when the plaintiff suffers injury.

Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 2007-09-28(4)

Under CPLR § 214(4), the applicable statute of limitations for negligence ... is three years. ... Plaintiffs negligence claim is therefore timely whether the damages arose on the date of the fire or when INA disclaimed coverage.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Cator v. Bauman · filed 2007-04-20(4)

The statute of limitations for the negligence cause of action is also three years (see CPLR 214 [4]; Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group, 96 NY2d 20, 30-31 [2001]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period running from the date of conversion.

Savino v. LLOYDS TSB BANK, PLC · filed 2007-06-14(3)

New York’s statutory period of limitations for conversion claims is three years which begins to run from the date of conversion. ... Again, as this lawsuit was not commenced within three years of that date, the claims for conversion and aiding and abetting conversion are time-barred.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Xavier v. RY Management Co. · filed 2007-11-13(5)

RY met its initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the three-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions had expired prior to the commencement of the action against it (see CPLR 214 [5]; see generally Austin v Interfaith Med. Ctr., 264 AD2d 702, 703 [1999].

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action; once the defendant shows the action was filed late, the plaintiff must present evidence that it was timely or raise a factual dispute.

Lessoff v. 26 Court Street Associates, LLC · filed 2009-01-13(5)

Since the plaintiff failed to produce any evidentiary facts with respect to the date of the accident, that branch of the motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the appellant as time-barred should have been granted.

Section 214 (5) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within three years of accrual, ordinarily measured from the date of injury.

Torres v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc. · filed 2008-02-08(5)

Because plaintiffs injury occurred on December 5, 2002, the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired one day prior to the commencement of the action.

Under CPLR 214(5), a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim accrues when the plaintiff suffers the required emotional distress.

Schultes v. Kane · filed 2008-04-11(5)

Because extreme emotional distress is an element of each of these causes of action, and plaintiff could not truthfully allege all of the elements until she suffered this element of injury, these causes of action did not accrue until she suffered distress as a result of learning that her children’s bodies had been disinterred ... As plaintiff commenced the action within two months after these causes of action accrued, the statutes of limitations had not expired (see CPLR 214 [5]; 215 [3]; Yong Wen Mo v Gee Ming Chan, 17 AD3d 356, 358-359 [2005]).

Section 214(5) imposes a three-year limitations period on personal injury actions.

Levinsky v. Mugermin · filed 2008-06-03(5)

The instant action was commenced after the expiration of the statute of limitations and was properly dismissed as time-barred (see Gem Flooring v Kings Park Indus., 5 AD3d 542 [2004]; CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Hirsh v. Perlmutter · filed 2008-07-22(5)

The original summons and complaint, in which Saul Perlmut-ter was named as the only defendant, apparently were filed at some point shortly before the expiration of the three-year limitations period applicable to this action (see CPLR 214 [5]).

CPLR 214 (5) gives a person three years from accrual to bring an action for personal injury damages against a private citizen.

Gibson v. Roswell Park Cancer Institute Corp. · filed 2008-09-09(5)

Pursuant to CPLR article 2, and specifically CPLR 214 (5), the statute of limitations in an action to recover damages against a citizen of the state for personal injury would be three years from accrual.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Stubbs v. Pirzada · filed 2008-10-07(5)

Since the action was commenced within the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions (see CPLR 214 [5]), that portion of the complaint which sought to recover damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium against Medstar was timely brought.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for a constitutional tort claim.

Frederick v. State · filed 2009-01-23(5)

Since the proposed claim appears to assert causes of action for the intentional tort of false imprisonment (CPLR 215 [3] [a one-year statute of limitations]), and a constitutional tort for violation of claimant’s rights (CPLR 214 [5] [a three-year statute of limitations]; see Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172 [1996]), the motion is properly before the court.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims; a claim against a defendant who was not timely served may be dismissed after that period expires.

Lehman v. North Greenwich Landscaping, LLC · filed 2009-09-29

On February 22, 2006, three days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214), the plaintiff commenced this action against Horton and North Greenwich by filing a summons and complaint in the Westchester County Clerk’s office. ... Since Horton was not timely served and the statute of limitations has expired, the Supreme Court should have granted Horton’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (8) for lack of personal jurisdiction and as time-barred.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Henriquez v. Inserra Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 2009-12-15(5)

On December 6, 2007, one day before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]), the plaintiffs filed a summons and complaint in the Rockland County Clerk’s office naming Paragon Management Group, Inc., as a defendant.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Kinder v. Braunius · filed 2009-06-16(5)

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly determined that the action purportedly commenced by the supplemental summons and amended verified complaint was time-barred (see CPLR 214 [5]) and that the relation-back doctrine did not apply (see CPLR 203 [b]; Hirsh v Perlmutter, 53 AD3d 597, 599 [2008]).

Section 214(5) requires personal injury actions to be filed within three years.

Elliott v. the Marist Bros. of the Schools, Inc. · filed 2009-12-21(5)

New York’s statute of limitations requires contract actions to be filed within six years, ... and personal injury actions to be filed within three years. ... Plaintiffs claims are barred under New York law since the alleged acts stopped occurring in 1983.

Section 214 (5) sets a three-year limitations period for this type of personal injury action.

Kabir v. County of Monroe · filed 2009-12-30(5)

We have previously determined that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (5) applies in such actions (see Smelts v O’Hara, 302 AD2d 948 [2003]).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for medical facility negligence claims.

Gibbons v. FRONTON · filed 2009-09-24

The statute of limitations in New York for medical facility negligence is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214. ... Gibbons’ medical facility negligence claim was timely as the statute of limitations for that claim is three years under both New York and Florida law.

Section 214 gives a spouse three years to bring a loss of services claim.

Chambers v. Mirkinson · filed 2009-12-01

The husband’s claim, however, is governed by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214; Schrank v Lederman, 52 AD3d at 497). Since the summons and complaint were filed on March 1, 2007, the plaintiffs April and July 2004 consultations at Hillside fall within the three-year limitations’ period, and the husband’s loss of services claim is not time-barred with respect to those dates.

Section 214(5) requires personal injury actions to be commenced within three years.

Rinaldi v. Rochford · filed 2010-10-12(5)

Since this action was commenced after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion by the defendants pursuant to CFLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred (see CPLR 214 [5]; Lessoff v 26 Ct. St. Assoc., LLC, 58 AD3d 610, 611 [2009]; Tricoche v Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Co., 48 AD3d 671, 672 [2008]; Gem Flooring v Kings Park Indus., 5 AD3d 542, 544 [2004]).