N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims governed by New York law.

COUSAR v. MORGAN · filed 2022-03-08(5)

The residual limitations period in New York State is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5); see also Pearl, 296 F.3d at 80. Under New York’s three years limitations period, Plaintiff’s claim was required to be filed within three years of the October 2015 search.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for §§ 1983 and 1985 claims brought in New York, and New York’s COVID-19 executive order tolls that period.

Rich v. State of New York · filed 2022-03-31

Claims arising under §§ 1983 and 1985, when brought in this district, are governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); Hernandez-Avila v. Averill, 725 F.2d 25, 27 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984). ... The Court concludes, therefore, that Executive Order 202.8 tolls the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, which apply New York’s three-year limitations period—but not Plaintiff’s § 1986 claims, because the applicable statute of limitations for that claim is found in the federal statute itself.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Paul v. Capra · filed 2022-03-31(5)

Under New York Law, personal injury actions have a three-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Thus, Section 1983 actions filed in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for this personal-injury claim; adding a defendant after it expires requires relation back.

Leung v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. · filed 2022-04-06

Since the plaintiff sought leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint to add JFK IAT as a defendant after the expiration of the relevant three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214), the plaintiff was required to demonstrate the applicability of the relation-back doctrine ( see Buran v Coupal , 87 NY2d 173, 177-178; Kammerzell v Clean Burn, Inc. , 165 AD3d 768, 769).

Section 214(5)'s three-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Steinbergin v. City of New York · filed 2022-04-27(5)

For claims arising in New York, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Latouche v. Hammer · filed 2022-04-29(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim based on these allegations therefore expired three years later, in or about 2008; when Plaintiff filed this complaint in 2022, any § 1983 claim arising from his ingestion of Remeron in 2005, had long since expired.

Section 214 supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims filed in New York, subject to applicable tolling.

Rivera v. City of New York · filed 2022-05-13

Ordinarily, under the three-year statute of limitations, Mr. Rivera’s claims would have been time-barred on October 7, 2020. ... Because the statute of limitations for Mr. Rivera’s § 1983 claims was tolled between March 20, 2020 and November 3, 2020, Mr. Rivera’s claims are timely.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including Section 1983 claims filed in New York.

Velez v. Collado · filed 2022-07-22(5)

In New York, a three-year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and thus to Section 1983 actions. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(2) gives NYHRL claims a three-year limitations period measured from the filing of the court action.

Prude v. Logistics One Transport, Inc. · filed 2022-09-09(2)

For plaintiff’s NYHRL claim, the limitations period begins on June 16, 2017 – 3 years prior to when he filed his complaint in this Court.

Section 214(3) gives claims for conversion and unjust enrichment three years from the wrongful act to be brought.

Gadzhievich v. Gref · filed 2022-09-13(3)

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims for conversion and unjust enrichment must be brought within three years from the occurrence of the conversion or the unjust act.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Garland v. Warden, Fishkill Correctional Facility · filed 2022-10-24(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5)'s three-year negligence limitations period does not bar a motion to substitute a receiver made within three years of the accident.

Wen Mei Lu v. Wen Ying Gamba · filed 2022-10-27(5)

Lastly, because Gao's motion was made within three years of the accident, we reject respondent's contention that the application was barred by the three-year negligence statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 actions in New York.

Silva v. Annucci · filed 2022-11-08(5)

In New York, a three year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and thus to Section 1983 actions. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years from the alleged discriminatory act to bring a NYSHRL claim.

Parker v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, Inc. · filed 2022-11-09(2)

Claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are generally time-barred unless filed within three years of the alleged discriminatory acts. See Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 2003); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–502(d)). Defendant’s alleged discriminatory acts took place between December 2018 and February 2019. See PAC ¶ 10. The statute of limitations, therefore, expired in February 2022.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for a property-damage claim; adding a defendant after that period requires the claim to relate back.

Cedarwood Assoc., LLC v. County of Nassau · filed 2022-12-14

Since the plaintiffs sought leave to amend the complaint to add Suez as a defendant after the expiration of the relevant three-year limitations period ( see CPLR 214), the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate the applicability of the relation-back doctrine ( see Buran v Coupal , 87 NY2d 173, 177-178; Kammerzell v Clean Burn, Inc. , 165 AD3d 768, 769).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Komatsu v. The City of New York · filed 2023-01-03(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims were already barred by the three-year limitations period on January 3, 2022, when he first sought permission from District Judge Ramos to file this suit.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Adeniji v. New York City Police · filed 2023-02-07(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(4) gives tortious interference and unfair competition claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the injury, rather than its discovery.

Hardwire, LLC v. Freyssinet International et CIE · filed 2023-02-08(4)

Claims are deemed to have accrued on the date the injury occurred, not when it is discovered.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 personal injury claims in New York.

Ataroua v. Tamir · filed 2023-02-22(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim that Jane Doe failed to protect him, in violation of his constitutional rights, for failure to state a claim and as time-barred.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims; a continuing hostile work environment claim may be timely when misconduct extends into that period.

Brandenburg v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America · filed 2023-02-23(2)

In general, to bring a claim under the NYSHRL, the actionable conduct must occur within a three- year statute of limitations. See Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). ... But construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that there are, at a minimum, genuine disputes of material fact with respect to whether Father Makris’s alleged misconduct continued into the limitations period.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period applied to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Vann v. Wolfe-Friedman · filed 2023-03-06(5)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” ... In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including Section 1983 actions in New York.

Booker v. Murphy · filed 2023-03-30(5)

In New York, a three year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and thus to Section 1983 actions. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Gudanowski v. John Doe, N.Y. State Trooper · filed 2023-04-24

As explained in the MTD Decision, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims have a three-year statute of limitations. (MTD Decision at 6); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214. Thus, the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s claims expired on January 2, 2020.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Leggett v. Ontada · filed 2023-06-20(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Construing the complaint as asserting claims related to his incarceration, any such claims that arose at Sing Sing are time barred because Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 3, 2023, after the three-year limitation period expired.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims in New York.

McPherson v. State of New York · filed 2023-07-27(5)

The statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, which is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,” is three years. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims, subject to applicable tolls.

Santiago v. State of New York · filed 2023-07-28(5)

Initially, we agree with claimant that the court erred in concluding that it lacked authority to grant the cross-motion. Here, the court concluded that it lacked the power to consider the cross-motion because it was filed in January 2022, which was after the three-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence claims would have expired based on the accrual date of October 13, 2018 ( see generally CPLR 214 [5]). ... After accounting for the tolling of the applicable statute of limitations during part of the original limitations period, we conclude that the cross-motion was timely.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Morrow v. Janis · filed 2023-08-07(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are time barred.

Section 214 applies a three-year limitations period to claims for tortious interference, unfair competition, and conversion.

Dumbo Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Piece of Cake Moving & Storage LLC · filed 2023-08-21(3), (4)

Additionally, for the reasons set forth herein, amendment would be futile as to several of the withdrawn state law claims—specifically, Dumbo’s claims for tortious interference, unfair competition, and conversion—because they are time-barred. See Doc. 41 at 24. Indeed, just as the fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty claims, all of these claims are similarly governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See generally CPLR §§ 214(3) and (4).

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period applied to Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Cathlin v. The City of New York · filed 2023-10-18(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to bring claims arising out of his arrest and prosecution, his claims were filed beyond the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim.

Razzoli v. Richmond University Medical Center · filed 2023-10-25(5)

New York law gives a plaintiff two years and six months to bring a medical malpractice claim and three years to bring a negligence claim.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on the architect malpractice and breach of contract claims asserted here.

Moises-Ortiz v. FDB Acquisitions LLC · filed 2023-11-28(6)

FDB's newly asserted claim alleging RA's malpractice and breach of contract was properly dismissed as time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214[6]). The fourth third-party action was commenced in March 2022 and the damages sought herein for personal injury accrued on February 27, 2017, the date of the accident ( see Ackerman v Price Waterhouse , 84 NY2d 535, 541 [1994]).

CPLR 214 gives the tort claims covered by subdivisions (2), (4), and (5) a three-year limitations period.

Mira v. Argus Media · filed 2023-12-19(2), (4), (5)

As to those three defendants, the limitations periods expired, at the latest, in April 2015 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is subject to a one-year limitations period, and April 2017 for all the other tort causes of action, which are subject to a three-year limitations period (CPLR 214[2], [4]-[5], 215[3]).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Washington v. Abedin · filed 2024-01-08(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Because Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are untimely and she does not allege any facts demonstrating that equitable tolling should apply, the Court dismisses such claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 214’s three-year limitations periods barred the statutory restraining-notice and negligence claims filed more than three years after Vanguard’s response.

Belen v. Herman · filed 2024-01-17(2), (4)

Defendant Vanguard’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ restraining notice violation and negligence claims (Counts One and Thrce) are granted. Both claims are based on Vanguard’s response to the restraining notice on October 3, 2017; both are subject to three-year limitations periods; and both became time-barred on October 3, 2020, more than twenty months before this suit was filed in the Supreme Court on June 24, 2022, See Broecker v. Conklin Prop., LLC, 138 N.Y.S.3d 177, 181 (N-Y. App. Div. 2020) (citing CPLR § 214(4)); Syndicate Bldg. Corp. v. City Univ. of N_Y., 573 N.Y.S.2d 386, 389 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1991); CPLR § 214(2) (three-year statute of limitations applics to recovery actions “imposed by statute”).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period; claims based on conduct before that period are untimely.

Dixon v. City of New York · filed 2024-02-13(2)

Generally, the statute of limitations for claims brought under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL is three years (see CPLR § 214 [2]; Administrative Code § 8-502 [d]). ... Therefore, any alleged conduct that occurred prior to December 28, 2019, including but not limited to any claims related to plaintiff’s 2016 and 2018 pregnancies, are dismissed as untimely.

Section 214 gives a negligence action three years from the date of injury, and parties may shorten that period by contract.

Markel American Insurance Company v. Mr. Demolition, Inc. · filed 2024-02-14

Under New York law,1 the statute of limitations for a negligence action is three years from the date of the injury. ... Here, MT and Plaintiff’s Insured agreed to contractually shorten the above statutes of limitation such that any claim against MT had to be brought within two years of MT’s completion of the work.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which New York courts apply to Section 1983 claims.

Toran v. The County of Nassau · filed 2024-03-18(5)

“In New York, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.” Id. ... Plaintiff’s federal claims against Officer Dolan and the County based on the November 17, 2017 incident—which occurred more than three years before Plaintiff filed the Complaint on September 16, 2021—must be dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York, subject to tolling.

Corines v. The Westchester County Dept. of Correction · filed 2024-03-25(5)

As explained in the Court’s prior order, New York’s general three-year statute of limitations governs in § 1983 cases. ... What is left is a situation where some of Plaintiff’s allegations may be time-barred, but where it is impossible to tell which ones based on the pleadings. In that circumstance, any doubt defeats a motion to dismiss.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL discrimination and retaliation claims.

Atherley v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2024-03-29(2)

Claims under the Rehabilitation Act, NYSHRL and NYCHRL “are subject to a three- year limitations period.” ... N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (providing a three-year statute of limitations for discrimination claims); ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act against the DOE and disability discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL against Caldwell are also dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214 gives negligence and GBL § 349 claims three years from accrual; each separate fine starts its own period for a negligence claim.

Baldeo v. Airbnb, Inc. · filed 2024-03-30(2), (4)

The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ negligence and GBL claims is three years from the date of accrual. ... For each alleged injury, the statute of limitations began to run on the date Plaintiffs were fined.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims seeking damages independently of an Article 78 challenge.

Paulino v. 335 Grand Realty, Ltd · filed 2024-04-08

As to causes of action 14, 16 through 20, and 21B, C, D, E and E, the City Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on expiration of the Article 78 four-month SOL as this Court cannot conclude that these monetary claims were incidental to the Plaintiff's Article 78 challenges and were not asserted in the OSC. See Hertzel , 131 AD3d at 925; see generally CPLR § 214. The Court construes said causes of action to be rooted in alleged negligence, which has a three-year SOL.

Section 214(6) provides a three-year limitations period for the claim against the architect.

Board of Mgrs. of the 15 Union Sq. W. Condominium v. BCRE 15 Union Sq. W. LLC · filed 2024-04-16(6)

The applicable statute of limitations here is three years. CPLR 214(6). ... As BCRE filed suit May 11, 2023, the suit is untimely.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 personal injury claims brought in New York.

Peralta v. The City of New York · filed 2024-04-18(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed his complaint approximately ten months beyond the limitations period and, for the reasons discussed above, neither the voluntary dismissal of his first lawsuit nor the alleged failure to investigate could have tolled the statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Navarro v. Carroll · filed 2024-04-22(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Plaintiff’s complaint, however, was filed on July 18, 2023, beyond the expiration of the three-year limitations period.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Campbell v. Office of Mental Health · filed 2024-05-29(5)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” ... In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period that applies to § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Holliday v. Artist · filed 2024-06-07(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year filing period for NYSHRL and NYCHRL discrimination claims; the court added 228 days for COVID-19 tolling when the period had not expired by March 20, 2020.

Thompson v. City of New York · filed 2024-06-11(2)

Pursuant to CPLR § 214 (2), a cause of action for discrimination under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL must be commenced within three years following the events leading to the claim. ... However, Plaintiff's claims survive due to the tolling of statutes of limitation in place during the pendency of the Covid-19 pandemic. Specifically, any statute of limitations that did not expire prior to March 20, 2020, had 228 days added to it. This additional time brings the instant complaint within the statutory limits ( see McLaughlin v Snowlift, Inc. , 214 AD3d 720, 721 [2d Dept 2023]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for the Village's property-damage claim, which the insurer could not bring after making its first payment when that period had expired.

New York Mun. Ins. Reciprocal v. Stewart's Shops Corp. · filed 2024-06-13(4)

As plaintiff's first payment under the policy was made after the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the Village's claim had expired, plaintiff could not have brought the claim at that time ( see CPLR 214 [4]; Group Health, Inc. v Mid-Hudson Cablevision, Inc. , 58 AD3d 1029, 1030-1031 [3d Dept 2009]).

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Kates v. State of New York · filed 2024-06-27

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is three years. See Jewell v. County of Nassau, 917 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1990); N.Y. CPLR §214(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, which was filed in state court (and thereafter removed) on or about July 1, 2023 – twelve years after the 2011 conviction it seeks to challenge – is manifestly untimely, and plaintiff has not set forth any proper reason for tolling.

Section 214(2) requires NYSHRL discrimination claims to be commenced within three years of the events giving rise to them.

Gala v. City of New York · filed 2024-08-21(2)

"Pursuant to CPLR § 214 (2) [and Administrative Code § 8-502(d)], a cause of action for discrimination under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL [, respectively,] must be commenced within three years following the events leading to the claim."

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to Title IX claims brought in New York.

Pund v. St. Francis College · filed 2024-09-11(5)

Title IX borrows the relevant state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Curto v. Edmundson, 392 F.3d 502, 504 (2d Cir. 2004). And “[i]n New York, personal injury claims must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued.” Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5)). ... Plaintiffs initiated this action in February 2023, so all claims that accrued prior to February 2020 are time-barred.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for negligence personal injury claims and nursing-home claims under Public Health Law § 2801-d.

Barreto v. Richmond Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Specialty Healthcare · filed 2024-09-20(2), (5)

Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injuries due to negligence is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [5]). Similarly, a cause of action brought against a nursing home pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-d, as a liability created or imposed by statute, is governed by a three-year limitations period (CPLR 214 [2]; see Gold v Park Ave. Extended Care Ctr. Corp., 90 AD3d 833 [2d Dept 2011]). ... The Court finds that Defendant established, prima facie , that the three-year statute of limitations period for the personal injury claims brought by Plaintiff began to run on December 23, 2020, and that the instant action was commenced on January 2, 2024, more than three years later ( see Aurilia v Carbonara , 185 AD3d 767 [2d Dept 2020]).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in New York.

Genao v. Rivera · filed 2024-09-26(5)

The Report correctly found that a three-year statute-of-limitations period applies here, given that Plaintiff brings Section 1983 based upon conduct which occurred in New York.

Section 214(4) and (5) allow three years to bring property and personal injury claims; the accrual date is excluded, February 28 and 29 count as one day, and a Sunday deadline extends to the next business day.

D & A Grandview LLC v. 60 Davidson LLC · filed 2024-10-19(4), (5)

The moving defendants' argument concerning the statute of limitations was grounded in CPLR 214 (4)'s and (5)'s provisions that actions to recover damages for injury to property or person must be commenced within three years. ... Accordingly, the questions posed at the outset of this decision are answered as follows: In determining the expiration of a statute of limitations period one accounts for a leap day in the middle of the period by deeming the two-day period of the preceding day and the leap day as one 24-hour day. If a limitations period expires on a Sunday, the expiration day becomes the next succeeding business day. Moreover, the accrual date for a statute of limitations period is excluded from the reckoning. This Court denied those branches of the moving defendants' motions seeking dismissal on a statute of limitations argument.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions arising in New York.

Murray v. The State of New York · filed 2024-12-06(5)

That is because “[i]n section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the ‘general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,’” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989)) (alterations in original), which in New York is three years, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on the City's consumer protection claims, barring claims based on statements made before April 22, 2018.

City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. · filed 2025-01-14(2)

Accordingly, the Court holds that allegations of violations for statements made before April 22, 2018, are time-barred under CPLR § 214(2) and pursuant the parties' Stipulation.

Section 214 gives plaintiffs three years to bring conversion and unjust-enrichment claims.

City of Almaty, Kazakhstan v. Sater · filed 2025-01-15

Accordingly, the limitations period to bring conversion and unjust-enrichment claims expired in 2016. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; City of Almaty, 503 F. Supp. 3d at 64–66.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims filed in New York.

Murray v. The State of New York · filed 2025-02-02(5)

That is because “[i]n section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the ‘general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,’” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989)) (alterations in original), which in New York is three years, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Johnson v. New York State Office of Childrens and Family Services · filed 2025-02-18(5)

The statute of limitations applied to ... claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 is three years.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for conversion and tortious interference with contract claims.

Shanghai Pearls & Gems, Inc. v. Paul · filed 2025-03-13(3), (4)

Both the conversion and tortious interference claims are governed by three-year statutes of limitations ( see CPLR 214[3], [4]; Swain v Brown , 135 AD3d 629, 631 [1st Dept 2016]; Turecamo v Turecamo , 55 AD3d 455, 455 [1st Dept 2008]), and plaintiff does not dispute that the latest the claims could have accrued was on May 28, 2019, the date of D&M's bankruptcy filing. Plaintiff commenced this action more than three years later, on August 23, 2022.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions brought in New York.

Lopez v. Guziczek · filed 2025-04-16

In New York, Section 1983 actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 2013). ... Accordingly, because service wasn’t perfected until October 11, 2023, Plaintiff’s false arrest, excessive force, cruel and unusual punishment, and deliberate indifference claims are time-barred.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for Human Rights Law claims, subject to applicable tolls.

Huaman v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2025-04-21(2), (5)

The statute of limitations under the New York State and City Human Rights laws is three years (CPLR 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-502(d); CPLR 214[5]; see also Campbell v NYC Dept. of Educ., 200 AD3d 488,489 [1st Dept 2021]). ... Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations, coupled with the toll provided by Governor Cuomo's tolling of the statute of limitations in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the additional toll provided by the filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint makes all of Plaintiff's claims dating back to July of 2020 timely.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Hernandez v. City of Middletown N.Y. Police · filed 2025-04-22(5)

The statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh · filed 2025-05-02(5)

Next the City argues that the three-year statute of limitations bars Sikorsky’s claim. See N.Y. CPLR § 214(5); Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Section 1983 does not provide a specific statute of limitations. Thus, courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injury actions under state law.”). Just as a claim becomes ripe when it accrues, the statute of limitations begins to run when the claim accrues. See Eagleston, 41 F.3d at 871. Sikorsky’s claim accrued in June 2021, and he filed this action in March 2022, well within three years. The statute of limitations does not bar Sikorsky’s claim.

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 a three-year limitations period.

Koenigsberg v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbia Univ. · filed 2025-05-30(2)

Claims brought pursuant to GBL §349 and §350 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §214(2).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period.

Ruiz v. Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank · filed 2025-06-10(2)

“NYSHRL and NYCHRL each have three-year statute of limitations periods.” Siddiqi v. N.Y. City Health Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d)). ... Conduct alleged to have occurred before October 13, 2017 may support only Ruiz’s hostile-work-environment claim; any disparate-treatment claim based on conduct prior to that date is time-barred.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims filed in New York.

Hodge v. Rykers Islands · filed 2025-07-11(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... The Court thus also dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 as untimely, and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of injury to bring a negligence claim for injury to property; for losses from wire transfers, each claim accrues when the transfer occurs.

Chappell v. Bank of America , N.A. · filed 2025-07-11(4)

In New York, an action to recover damages for injury to property must be commenced within three years from the time the cause of action accrues. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4) (McKinney 2025). ... Plaintiffs’ alleged injury occurred on the date of each wire transfer. ... Therefore, all claims based on wire transfers made before September 18, 2021 are time-barred.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Rosa v. Administration for Children's Services (ACS) · filed 2025-08-05(5)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Plaintiff’s claims against Police Officer Mickey arising in 2019, are therefore dismissed as time-barred, and the Court grants 30 days’ leave to replead.

Section 214(2) gives plaintiffs three years from the alleged discrimination to bring NYSHRL claims.

Katz v. New York City Hous. Preserv. & Dev. · filed 2025-08-18(2)

Causes of action under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL have a three-year statute of limitations from the date of the alleged discrimination ( Mascola v City Univ. of New York , 14 AD3d 409, 409 [1st Dept 2005]; CPLR § 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of New York § 8-502[d]).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in New York.

Nemhard · filed 2025-09-03(5)

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant is time barred because more than three years have elapsed since Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of his injury, namely, the wage garnishment. ... That is because “[i]n section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the ‘general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,’” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989)) (alterations in original), which in New York is three years, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214 supplies the three-year personal injury limitations period that applies to Section 1983 and Title VI claims brought in New York.

Winbush v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2025-09-10

Similarly, claims arising under Section 1983 when brought in this district are governed by New York’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; Rich v. New York, No. 21-CV-3835-AT, 2022 WL 992885, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022). The statute of limitations for both Plaintiffs’ Title VI and Section 1983 claims is therefore ordinarily three years.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1981 claims governed by the analogous New York period.

Jones v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2025-09-19(5)

In New York, that is the three-year limitations period that applies to personal-injury claims set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Applying that three-year statute of limitations here, it is evident from the face of Jones’s complaint that his claim is time-barred.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Baker · filed 2025-09-22(5)

“In New York, that period is three years.” Id. (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5)); ... Plaintiff filed the instant motion in January 2025, nearly two years after the statute of limitations had lapsed.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to Title IX claims in New York.

Pund v. St. Francis College · filed 2025-10-16(5)

This Court has determined that Title IX claims are most analogous to personal injury claims, id., and the statute of limitations in New York for personal injury claims is three years from when a claim accrues, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Accordingly, the statute of limitations for the Punds’ Title IX claim is three years.

Section 214(2) gives claims for violations of Insurance Law § 3224-a a three-year limitations period.

P.S.C. Community Servs., Inc. v. New York State Catholic Health Plan, Inc. · filed 2025-10-22(2)

The statute of limitations in this action is three years ( see CPLR 214[2]). ... Thus, NYSCHP failed to establish that the cause of action accrued more than three years before the action was commenced ( see CPLR 214[2]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which also applies to Section 1983 actions in New York.

Beaman · filed 2025-10-31(5)

In New York, a three year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and thus to Section 1983 actions. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(2) gives an action to recover unpaid tolls imposed by statute a three-year limitations period.

Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Fleming · filed 2025-12-08(2)

Plaintiff is bringing this action pursuant to McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 6802 (Payment of tolls and charges). Thus, this is an action to recover a liability or penalty imposed by statute and is subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 214(2).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Rehabilitation Act claims arising in New York.

Jordan · filed 2026-02-24(5)

“Rehabilitation Act Claims in New York are governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).” Piazza v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 669, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations omitted). Therefore, as with the plaintiff’s Section 1981 and 1983 claims, the only facts alleged within the statute of limitations are from August 2022, when the DOE declined to hire the plaintiff for two different teaching jobs.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Merckx · filed 2026-03-19(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations for such actions is three years. Doe v. NYS Off. of Child. & Fam. Servs., No. 1:20-cv-01195 (BKS/CFH), 2021 WL 2826457, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2021) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. §214(5)).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Pearson · filed 2026-03-27(5)

“In New York, a three-year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and thus to Section 1983 actions.” Woods, 2024 WL 3567149, at *8; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Accordingly, Pearson’s procedural due process claim against Bellnier remains viable and will proceed.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for state constitutional tort and 42 USC § 1983 claims.

Broton v. County of Onondaga · filed 2026-04-24(5)

Plaintiff's state constitutional tort claims, the 1st through 6th causes of action, are subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]; Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 318 [3d Dept 1998]), as is plaintiff's 12th cause of action, asserting various 42 USC § 1983 claims (see CPLR 214 [5]; BL Doe 3 v Female Academy of the Sacred Heart, 199 AD3d 1419, 1420-1421 [4th Dept 2021]).

Section 214's limitations period expires despite service of a summons that fails to confer personal jurisdiction.

Wiley v. Chaloff · filed 1989-12-28

Since the summons did not contain the notice required by CPLR 305 (b), plaintiff never acquired personal jurisdiction over defendants (see, Parker v Mack, 61 NY2d 114) and the Statute of Limitations has long since expired (see, CPLR 214).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for the claims at issue.

O'Diah v. Volkswagon of Ameri · filed 2004-01-14(5)

First, as Ese acknowledges, both Massachusetts and New York provide for a three-year limitations period. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Therefore, there is no conflict of law that would have necessitated choosing between the two.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

American Council of the Blind of New York, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2020-10-20(5)

The Court concludes that all alleged violations occurring before June 27, 2015—three years before this action was filed—are untimely. ... For claims under both federal statutes, the Second Circuit has held that the three-year limitations period provided by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) applies.

Section 214(5)'s limitations period for a negligence personal injury action may be subject to equitable estoppel when the defendant's conduct induced the plaintiff to delay filing.

Hover v. Claveraok Grange No. 934 · filed 1965-02-06(5)

It appears that this action was commenced on September 10, 1964, obviously beyond the statutory period (CPLR 214, subd. 5; cf. Civ. Prac. Act, § 49, subd. 6). ... There being a triable issue as to estoppel, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

CPLR 214’s three-year limit for conversion claims may be subject to equitable estoppel when the defendant’s affirmative wrongdoing caused the delay in filing suit.

General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa · filed 1966-07-07

Our courts have long had the power, both at law and equity, to bar the assertion of the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations where it is the defendant’s affirmative wrongdoing — a carefully concealed crime here — which produced the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding.

Section 214 gives negligence actions a three-year limitations period, but misleading settlement representations may equitably estop a defendant from asserting it.

Dupuis v. Van Natten · filed 1978-02-23

Plaintiffs’ purpose in adding the causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentations is, of course, to avoid the three-year negligence Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214). ... Furthermore, since the defendants raise the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations in their answer, the doctrine of equitable estoppel must also be considered by the trier of the facts. If the representations or conduct of the defendants misled the plaintiffs, even innocently, this is enough.

Section 214(4)’s three-year limit for property damage claims may be subject to equitable estoppel when a defendant’s affirmative conduct induces the plaintiff to delay filing.

Golden v. Scalise · filed 1982-04-29(4)

Special Term correctly refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel (see Immediate v St. John’s Queens Hosp., 48 NY2d 671).

Section 214’s limitations period for a derivative claim is not tolled unless the defendant made affirmative misrepresentations that induced a delay in suing.

Scharfman v. National Jewish Hospital & Research Center · filed 1986-08-25

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant made any actual affirmative misrepresentations to induce him to forego a timely lawsuit, and, therefore, he is not entitled to a tolling of the Statute of Limitations as to his derivative cause of action (CPLR 214; see, Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442; Manno v Levi, 94 AD2d 556, 564, affd 62 NY2d 888, cert denied sub nom. Fleishman v Lilly & Co., 469 US 1192).

CPLR 214’s three-year period applies to medical malpractice based on acts before July 1, 1975, but a factual issue about fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel can prevent summary judgment on a limitations defense.

Fishman v. Hymes · filed 1985-11-21

Defendant then moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as barred by the Statute of Limitations, asserting that the action was in essence one for malpractice and accordingly precluded since it was not commenced within the applicable three-year period. ... Under the unusual circumstances presented, we affirm the denial of the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice to a new summary judgment motion by the defendant in which competent evidence addressing the dispositive issues raised by the claim of equitable estoppel is presented.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury actions, but a defendant may be estopped from asserting it when misleading conduct causes the plaintiff to delay.

Peterson v. Long · filed 1987-08-27(5)

Relevant to this motion are the provisions of CPLR 214 (5) which ... limit the commencement of an action for personal injury to a period of three years. ... This court holds that the defendants are estopped from pleading the Statute of Limitations.

CPLR 214’s limitations period bars personal injury and property damage claims filed more than three years after the accident when the plaintiff has not shown grounds to estop the defendant from asserting it.

Griesemer v. Bourst · filed 1988-06-02

Plaintiff, having failed to set forth facts supporting reliance on defendant’s alleged misrepresentation or in establishing diligence in ascertaining the validity of Aetna’s disclaimer of insurance, has failed to bring her case within any of the exceptions to CPLR 3211. Defendant is entitled to a dismissal of the complaint on the ground of the Statute of Limitations.

Section 214 gives three years to bring a conversion claim, but equitable estoppel can bar a defendant from asserting that limit when its conduct caused the delay.

Fouad v. Citibank, N. A. · filed 1989-05-31(3)

The defendant, Citibank, N. A., has moved for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Mohamed Amr Fouad, on the grounds that this suit for conversion is barred by the Statute of Limitations which requires that suit be filed within three years of the date of the conversion (CPLR 214 [3]). ... Accordingly, the court denies the defendant Citibank’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of Statute of Limitations since equitable estoppel bars the applicability of the Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on a conversion claim, but equitable estoppel may prevent a defendant from invoking it.

In re the Estate of Spewack · filed 1994-04-19(3)

Thus, unless respondent is equitably estopped from pleading the statute of limitations, in this case a three-year statute (CPLR 214 [3]), the proceeding is time barred. There are questions of fact, however, the resolution of which will bear upon the question of equitable estoppel.

Section 214 bars untimely negligence claims when the plaintiff alleges no facts sufficient to estop the defendant from asserting the limitations defense.

Dmoch v. Iolab Corp. · filed 1994-04-07

The IAS Court properly dismissed the first, second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action, sounding in medical malpractice/negligence as time barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, 214-a). These causes of action failed to allege any facts sufficient to estop defendants from pleading a Statute of Limitations defense (cf., Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 448-449).

The three-year limitations defense under CPLR 214(2) may be barred by equitable estoppel when the defendant’s conduct makes it inequitable to assert it.

Spitzer v. All-Pro Telemarketing Associates Corp. · filed 2003-02-21(2)

First, even if CPLR 214 (2) was applicable to all 12 causes of action, which it clearly is not, “[t]he denial to defendant [s] of the benefit of the Statute of Limitations is within the power of a court of equity.” ... Thus, defendants are estopped from interposing the defense of the statute of limitations.

A plaintiff seeking to estop a defendant from relying on Section 214(5)'s limitations period must sue within a reasonable time after the facts supporting estoppel cease to operate.

Roswick v. Mount Sinai Medical Center · filed 2005-10-25(5)

Although plaintiff urges that he is entitled to the benefit of an estoppel preventing defendant from relying on the applicable statutes of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]; 214-a) to obtain the action’s dismissal, he failed to make the requisite showing that he brought his action “within a reasonable time after the facts [allegedly] giving rise to the estoppel . . . ceased to be operational” (see Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 450 [1978]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury actions; an unreasonable reliance on an incorrect accident date does not estop a defendant from asserting that limit.

Davis v. Sabella · filed 2008-02-21(5)

Plaintiff does not dispute that her fall occurred on September 23, 2001 or that the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]) expired before she commenced this action. ... Under the circumstances, plaintiffs reliance on any representation made by defendant’s carrier as to the date of her fall was neither reasonable nor justified (see Dombroski v Samaritan Hosp., 47 AD3d at 82-83).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period, but a defendant’s affirmative concealment may estop the defendant from asserting that limit if the plaintiff acts diligently.

Su v. Yeh · filed 2025-07-17(3)

Under New York law, conversion claims must be brought within three years of the date of conversion. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3). However, a defendant may be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense “when the plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action.”

Section 214(7) gives a spouse three years from discovering the facts constituting fraud to bring an action to annul the marriage.

T.O. v. D.L. · filed 2024-11-22(7)

Plaintiff testified that although the parties allegedly were married in 2017, he had no knowledge of the marriage until April, 2024, two months prior to his commencement of the action. Plaintiff's testimony was not disputed by Defendant. As such, there is no basis in the record which would lead this Court to believe that Plaintiff had knowledge of facts sufficient to suggest that a person of ordinary intelligence would have known of Defendant's fraud prior to April, 2024. Accordingly, the Court finds that the action was filed timely.

Section 214(7)'s three-year limit for an annulment based on fraud applies even when the defendant does not plead it.

Shoddy v. Shoddy · filed 1966-04-26(7)

To limit the question posed in this type of action merely to a question of an unpleaded defense overlooks the fact that not only is a Statute of Limitations provided as a defense in CPLR 214 (subd. 7) former subdivision 9 of section 49 of the Civil Practice Act but also that a time limitation is incorporated in subdivision (e) of section 140 of the Domestic Relations Law, former section 1139 of the Civil Practice Act, as part of the substantive cause of action. ... Such inclusion of a time provision in both sections would logically suggest an intent on the part of the Legislature to make time a substantive condition of the action so that the court is without jurisdiction to pronounce a degree dissolving the marriage whether the limitation is asserted as a defense or not.

Section 214(7)’s three-year limit for annulment based on fraud extinguishes the claim when it expires, even if the defendant does not plead the limitation.

Romano v. Romano · filed 1966-06-30(7)

Subdivision 9 of section 49 of the Civil Practice Act is now found in CPLR 214 (subd. 7). The language has been changed but there is no change of substance. ... The contention of appellant that the issue of time limitation may only be raised in a defended action and where such a defense is affirmatively pleaded is without merit. ... It follows that plaintiff lost both remedy and right to enforce the remedy when she failed to commence her action within the statutory period.

Section 214 sets a three-year period from discovery of fraud for an action to annul a marriage; that period is part of the statutory claim and must be established by the plaintiff even if the defendant defaults.

Romano v. Romano · filed 1967-05-16

CPLR 214, in turn, provides that an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud must be commenced within three years of the time plaintiff discovered the facts constituting the fraud. ... If time is integral with the cause of action, the plaintiff must establish as part of his case that three years have not gone by since he discovered the fraud, and this whether or not the defendant defaults. ... Therefore, the time fixed in the statute must be treated as a qualification annexed to the created right (Gatti Paper Stock Corp. v. Erie R. R. Co., 247 App. Div. 45, affd. 272 N. Y. 535; Fairclough v. Southern Pacific Co., 171 App. Div. 496).

An action to annul a marriage for fraud must be commenced within three years after discovery of the fraud; facts suggesting fraud trigger a duty to inquire within a reasonable time.

Mienik v. Mienik · filed 1982-12-06(7)

Even prior to the enactment of section 140 of the Domestic Relations Law and CPLR 214 (subd 7), which provide that an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud must be commenced within three years from the time the plaintiff discovered the facts constituting the fraud, there was an obligation imposed upon the victim of the fraud to discover the fraud within a reasonable time after the marriage and to disavow the marriage (Matter of Rivette, 283 App Div 439, 440; Marks v Marks, 283 App Div 1136; Jennings v Jennings, 186 Misc 1021; Ackerman v Ackerman, 35 Misc 2d 890). ... Accordingly, that part of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing, as time barred, the cause of action to annul the marriage, should have been granted.

Section 214(7) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action to annul a marriage for fraud; the plaintiff must plead and prove timely filing.

Parente v. Wenger · filed 1983-06-08(7)

In Romano v Romano (19 NY2d 444), it was established that the three-year period provided by CPLR 214 (subd 7) for the commencement of an action to annul a marriage for fraud is an inherent part of the cause of action, i.e., a condition precedent to liability, and, as such, the burden is cast upon the plaintiff to plead and prove that he has brought the action within the prescribed time limit. ... Since the fraud alleged in the proposed complaint was committed in 1953, and was discovered no later than 1977, any cause of action based thereon would be time barred.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Leib-Podry v. Gates III · filed 2025-06-30(5)

Because New York has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), V. Leib would have had to file suit by 1999.

Section 214(5) gives negligent infliction of emotional distress claims a three-year limitations period.

Chai v. New York University · filed 2024-09-04(5)

As Plaintiff concedes, intentional infliction of emotional distress is governed by a one-year statute of limitations, while negligent infliction of emotional distress is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Kramer v. Meridian Capital Group, LLC, 201 A.D.3d 909, 912, 162 N.Y.S.3d 400 (2d Dep’t 2022) (citing CPLR 214(3), (5)).

Section 214(5) gives a claimant three years from a trip-and-fall injury to bring a personal injury claim.

Anderson v. State of New York · filed 2024-08-07(5)

The applicable statute of limitations for a claim for personal injuries resulting from a trip and fall is three years from the occurrence ( See CPLR §214[5]), and since the alleged accident occurred on December 4, 2021, the motion is timely.

CPLR 214(5) generally requires an action for personal injuries to be commenced within three years.

Randolph v. Brazen Fox · filed 2024-09-11(5)

"Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is generally subject to a three-year statute of limitations" ( Ruiz v Sanchez , 219 AD3d 1363, 1363). ... Here, the defendants met their initial burden by identifying that the date of injury alleged in the amended complaint was more than three years prior to the date on which the amended complaint was filed ( see Calamari v Panos , 131 AD3d 1088, 1090).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for personal injury.

Anonymous J.A. v. Golden Fields, LLC · filed 2024-10-01(5)

Pursuant to CPLR §214 (5), a three-year statute of limitations applies to an action to recover damages for personal injury.

Section 214(5) generally requires personal injury actions to be commenced within three years.

Fitzpatrick v. City of New York · filed 2024-11-13(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries, with certain exceptions not relevant here, is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Here, Moriarty met its prima facie burden by establishing that the second amended complaint was filed more than three years after the plaintiff's accident, which occurred in March 2018.

CPLR 214 (5) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for personal injury.

Paul v. Lyons · filed 2024-11-15(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (5), a three-year statute of limitations applies to an action to recover damages for personal injury.

Section 214(5) gives non-specified personal injury claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Jackson v. Goodfellas Pizzeria, Inc. · filed 2024-12-20(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (5), a three-year statute of limitations applies to non-specified personal injury causes of action, such as the one here.

Section 214(5) gives a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim a three-year limitations period.

Sarkar v. City of New York · filed 2024-03-28(5)

The statute of limitations for negligent infliction of emotional distress is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5); see also Sash v. City of New York, 2006 WL 2474874, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2006). As such, the claim is clearly time-barred.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Patrick v. Comprehensive Med. Supply, LLC · filed 2024-03-20(5)

The defendants met their initial burden of demonstrating that the amended complaint was untimely insofar as asserted against UTR because it is undisputed that the amended complaint was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, subject to applicable tolls.

Baker v. 40 Wall St. Holdings Corp. · filed 2024-04-03(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Here, due to the tolling provision of the executive orders, the statute of limitations within which the plaintiff was required to commence this action was tolled between March 20, 2020, and November 3, 2020, a period of 228 days ( see McLaughlin v Snowlift, Inc. , 214 AD3d at 721). Thus, this action, which was commenced against Star-Delta on July 29, 2021, was commenced against that defendant within the statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of injury to commence a personal injury action, subject to any applicable toll.

Buss v. Stryker Corp. · filed 2024-04-24(5)

An action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute [*2]of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]; Williams v Ideal Food Basket, LLC , 219 AD3d 917, 918) and accrues at the time of injury ( see Snyder v Town Insulation , 81 NY2d 429, 432; Barrell v Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. , 29 AD3d 612, 613). Here, the defendants met their initial burden by showing that even after applying the tolling period as set forth in the parties' tolling agreement, the instant action was commenced more than three years after the date of the plaintiff's injury ( see Ruiz v Sanchez , 219 AD3d 1363, 1364; St. Rose v Thompson , 201 AD3d 765, 766).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, measured from accrual.

Grasse v. State of New York · filed 2024-06-06(5)

Nevertheless, permission to file a late claim may be granted, in the discretion of the Court of Claims, "if a motion is made before the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to an action against a private citizen" ( Campos v State of New York , 139 AD3d 1276, 1278 [3d Dept 2016]) — in this case, three years after the claim accrued ( see CPLR 214 [5]).

CPLR 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action; the COVID-19 executive orders tolled that period from March 20 through November 3, 2020.

Williams v. Ideal Food Basket, LLC · filed 2023-08-30(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Thus, this action, which was commenced against Feil-BLS and Broadwall on March 4, 2021, was commenced against those defendants well within the statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) generally requires an action for personal injury damages to be commenced within three years.

Ruiz v. Sanchez · filed 2023-09-13(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is generally subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214 gives negligent infliction of emotional distress claims a three-year limitations period.

Horsburgh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-03-27

Under New York law, a three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is time barred and dismissed accordingly, with prejudice.

Section 214(5) gives a person three years to commence an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

McLaughlin v. Snowlift, Inc. · filed 2023-03-08(5)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within three years of the occurrence causing the injury.

Morgan v. Holly St. Holding Corp. · filed 2022-02-24(5)

Actions St:t:king to recover damages for personal injuries must be commenced within t.hret:-years of the alleged occurrence causing tJ1e injury (CPLR 214 [5] ).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Finck v. VL 10 1620 New Highway, LLC · filed 2022-03-16(5)

It is undisputed that the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]) already had expired when the amended complaint was filed, and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the relation-back doctrine applies ( see id. § 203[b]; Matter of Germain v Town of Chester Planning Bd. , 178 AD3d 926, 927).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a dog-bite personal injury claim in New York.

Swayze v. Lafontant · filed 2022-06-21(5)

The first factor is undoubtedly met — the statute of limitations for a dog bite in New York is three years, and this incident occurred in 2018 — and this lack of recourse counsels an extension, though it is true that Swayze was not aware of his mistake until long after the complaint was filed.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action in New York.

Strickland v. Hegedus · filed 2022-06-27

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in New York is three years. See NY CPLR §214.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

Ramsaroop v. The Department of Education of The City of New York · filed 2022-02-08

A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is subject to a three- year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; AB ex rel. EF v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 312, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). ... Since the complaint was filed on June 23, 2020, Doc. 2, his claim falls within the three-year statute of limitations and may not be dismissed for that reason.

Section 214(5) gives claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress a three-year limitations period.

Kramer v. Meridian Capital Group, LLC · filed 2022-01-26(5)

Causes of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed by a one-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 215[3]; Scifo v Taibi , 198 AD3d 704), and causes of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress have a three-year limitations period ( see CPLR 214[5]; Schwartz v Walter , 171 AD3d 969, 970). Accordingly, the fifth and sixth causes of action were also time-barred.

CPLR 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to commence an action for personal injuries.

Jordan-Covert v. Petroleum Kings, LLC · filed 2021-11-03(5)

An action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]).

Section 214(5) requires an action for personal injuries to be commenced within three years of the injury.

St. Rose v. Thompson · filed 2022-01-12(5)

Here, Thompson met her initial burden by showing that the action was commenced more than three years after the date of the plaintiff's injury ( see CPLR 214[5]; Lindsay v Pasternack Tilker Ziegler Walsh Stanton & Romano LLP , 129 AD3d 790, 792).

Section 214(5) requires personal injury actions to be commenced within three years after accrual, except when the injury was caused by an intentional tort.

Wilsey v. Sam Mulkey Co. · filed 1968-03-01(5)

CPLR 214 (subd. [5]) eliminates the provisions of the Civil Practice Act which distinguished personal injuries resulting from negligence and those not resulting from negligence. CPLR 214 (subd. [5]) requires that an action to recover damages for personal injury be commenced within three years after the cause of action has accrued, except where the personal injury was caused by an intentional tort.

Section 214(5) bars a personal injury negligence claim brought more than three years after the injury.

Licari v. Isbrandtsen Co. · filed 1969-02-03(5)

Insofar as the action is based on negligence, that aspect is clearly time-barred since the accident in which plaintiff, a longshoreman, allegedly sustained injuries occurred April 25, 1962, and action was not commenced until September 14, 1965 (CPLR 214, subd. 5; Johnsen v. McAllister Lighterage Lines, 8 A D 2d 831).

Section 214 gives plaintiffs three years from accrual to commence a personal injury action.

Daigle v. Leavitt · filed 1967-07-18

New York requires that an action of this sort be commenced within three years of its accrual (CPLR 214) and that was done.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions; in federal diversity court, Rule 3 determines when an action commences for that period.

Sylvestri v. The Warner & Swasey Co., Inc., Salvatore J. Sylvestri v. Comad, Inc. · filed 1968-06-24(5)

This service was accomplished on March 23, 1964, within the 3 year New York statute of limitations period, CPLR § 214(5). ... Under all these circumstances we conclude that Rule 3, Fed.R.Civ.P., is the proper measure of the commencement of this action for purposes of the statute of limitations and that therefore the action was timely commenced against Comad.

CPLR 214 imposes a three-year limit on negligence claims that is not extended by combining them with a claim for unseaworthiness.

Brannigan v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. · filed 1966-10-20

It is clear, of course, that the provisions for a limitation of three years against negligence claims of this nature represent the Federal policy and that of New York as well. (U. S. Code, tit. 46, § 688, and U. S. Code, tit. 45, § 56; CPLR 214.) Consequently, we are not constrained to enlarge the period by judicial construction, as did the District Court in Campanile (supra).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on personal injury claims.

Furey v. Milgrom · filed 1974-03-25

The three-year period of the Statute of Limitations would therefore have expired on May 25, 1971 (CPLR 214). An action, to be timely, would accordingly have had to be instituted on or before that date by service of the summons (CPLR 203, subd. [b], par. 1).

Section 214(5) requires a negligence action to be commenced within three years of the injury.

Tamburo v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. · filed 1971-05-20(5)

Plaintiff, who claimed to have been injured in defendant’s place of business on April 29, 1966, delivered a summons to the Sheriff of Cayuga County on April 29, 1969, the last day on which an action for negligence could be commenced. (CPLR 214, subd. 5.) ... Defendant’s motion should have been granted and the complaint dismissed, as plaintiff’s action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions; the court applied a 60-day extension based on delivery of the complaint to the Sheriff.

Calabrese v. Coch · filed 1974-05-23(5)

The second affirmative defense alleges the bar of the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to personal injury actions (CPLR 214, subd. 5) and the third affirmative defense alleges the bar of the two-year Statute of Limitations in wrongful death actions (EPTL 5-4.1). The accident occurred on May 25, 1970 and service was made on defendant on June 15, 1973, more than three years later. However, the service of the complaint was entrusted to the Sheriff on May 17, 1973, entitling plaintiff to a 60-day extension of time (CPLR 203, subd. [b], par. 5) and accordingly, we find that Special Term was correct in striking the second affirmative defense.

Section 214 allows three years to bring a personal injury negligence action.

Bifulco v. Sauer · filed 1974-06-03

This action was timely brought on February 17, 1970 (CPLR 214).

Section 214(5) gives a strict products liability claim three years from the injury to be filed.

Victorson v. Kaplan · filed 1973-08-21(5)

Thus, a ‘ ‘ strict-liability-in-tort ’ ’ claim accrues at the time of1 injury and inasmuch as the claims herein were asserted within three years of injury (CPLR 214, subd. 5), they are not time barred.

Section 214(5) gives a personal injury claim based on strict products liability three years from the date of injury.

Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc. · filed 1974-04-15(5)

By reason of the Codling and Veles decisions, we hold that Mendel is not applicable to strict-products-liability cases and that the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims (CPLR 214, subd. 5) and themormal tort rule that the claim accrues at the time of the injury apply to the plaintiffs’ causes of action which seek recovery on the strict-products-liability theory.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for prima facie tort claims.

Rolnick v. Rolnick · filed 1967-12-01(5)

A prima facie tort is subject to the limitation of three years (CPLR 214, subd. 5).

Section 214’s three-year period applies to an adult’s derivative negligence claim and is not tolled along with the infant’s claim.

Annacchino v. Annacchino · filed 1969-12-16

The derivative cause of action in a negligence case belonging to an adult, cannot be tolled along with the infant’s claim from which it arose. Thus, the three-year statute applies (CPLR 214), and the motion is granted.

CPLR 214 bars a personal injury negligence claim filed more than three years after the injury.

McCoy v. American Israeli Shipping Co. · filed 1973-06-07

The Statute of Limitations is clearly a valid defense with respect to the issue of negligence in light of the elapsed time between the date of the accident and commencement of this action.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim, beginning when the plaintiff is injured.

Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. · filed 1974-10-18

Plaintiff’s negligence claims are founded on the law of New York, and as such are subject to the three-year statute found in New York CPLR § 214. The period begins when the cause of action arises. In this case, it arose on the day of closing, June 30, 1969, because on that date, Alexander parted with money and was damaged.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including a parent's claims for a child's medical expenses and lost services.

Robusto v. Johnson · filed 1976-06-22

In the instant case the statutory period prescribed is three years. (CPLR 214.)

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Barnette v. Butler Aviation International, Inc. · filed 1977-01-28

Both New York’s two-year period of limitation for wrongful death (EPTL 5-4.1) and the three-year period for personal injury actions (CPLR 214) have expired.

Section 214 gives a person three years from the date of injury to bring a strict products liability claim for personal injury or property damage.

Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. · filed 1975-07-02(4), (5)

We now hold that the period of limitation with respect to these claims begins to run at the date of injury and that the duration of such period is that found in CPLR 214 (subds 4, 5) ... under which there is a limitation of three years in actions for personal injury and property damage.

Section 214 gives a products liability claim treated like negligence a three-year limitations period measured from the accident.

Weinstein v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1976-03-25

This would mean that the applicable statute would be three years from the time of the accident (CPLR 214).