N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213(1) gives a constructive-trust claim based on a broken promise six years from the breach to be commenced.

Dominguez v. Morris · filed 2010-10-26(1)

Since that alleged breach of a promise occurred less than six years before the plaintiff commenced this action, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the appellant’s cross motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1]; Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262, 267 [1987]; Zane v Minion, 63 AD3d 1151, 1153-1154 [2009]; Panish v Panish, 24 AD3d 642, 643 [2005]).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim a six-year limitations period that begins when the wrongful act occurs.

Tampa v. Delacruz · filed 2010-10-26(1)

Here, the six-year limitations period began to run either on November 22, 1994, when the property at issue was conveyed to the defendants, or approximately two months later, when the defendant Madelyn Delacruz, the plaintiff’s sister, allegedly misrepresented to the plaintiff that a one-half interest in the property had been conveyed to the plaintiff pursuant to an agreement between the parties.

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful conduct or event that creates a duty of restitution.

Klamar v. Marsans · filed 2010-12-21(1)

A claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year statute of limitations found in CPLR 213 (1), and “begins to run at the time of the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution” (Maric Piping v Maric, 271 AD2d 507, 508 [2000]; see Vitarelle v Vitarelle, 65 AD3d 1034, 1035 [2009]; Panish v Panish, 24 AD3d at 643).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive-trust claim six years from the wrongful act that creates a duty of restitution.

Bodden v. Kean · filed 2011-07-05(1)

A cause of action to impose a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, which begins to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution (see CPLR 213 [1]; DeLaurentis v DeLaurentis, 47 AD3d 750, 751 [2008]; Auffermann v Distl, 56 AD3d 502 [2008]; Reiner v Jaeger, 50 AD3d 761 [2008]).

Section 213(1) gives a plaintiff six years after the breach of an alleged promise to bring a constructive trust claim based on that breach.

Christodoulou v. Christodoulou · filed 2011-11-09(1)

Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs cause of action to impose a constructive trust was not timely commenced within six years (see CPLR 213 [1]) after the defendants breached their alleged promise by refusing to transfer an ownership interest in the defendant corporation to the plaintiff (see CPLR 213 [1]; Morris v Gianelli, 71 AD3d 965, 966-967 [2010]; Zane v Minion, 63 AD3d 1151, 1153-1154 [2009]).

CPLR 213 (1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution, rather than from discovery of the fraud.

Knobel v. Shaw · filed 2011-12-13(1)

The constructive trust claim was properly dismissed as time-barred. Such a claim “is governed by the six-year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213 (1), which commences to run upon occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution, and not from the time when the facts constituting the fraud are discovered” (Kaufman, 307 AD2d at 127).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim a six-year limitations period that begins when a wrongful act creates a duty of restitution.

Quadrozzi v. Estate of Quadrozzi · filed 2012-10-03(1)

The equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, which begins to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act from which a duty of restitution arises (see CPLR 213 [1]; Bodden v Kean, 86 AD3d 524, 525 [2011]; DeLaurentis v DeLaurentis, 47 AD3d 750, 751 [2008]).

Under CPLR 213(1), the six-year limitations period for a constructive trust claim based on a promise to convey property begins when the promise is unequivocally repudiated.

Gaddi v. Gaddi · filed 2013-07-02(1)

Contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]). The limitations period did not begin to run until May 2010, when defendant unequivocally repudiated her promise to convey legal title by demanding that plaintiffs vacate the premises (see Quadrozzi v Estate of Quadrozzi, 99 AD3d 688, 690 [2d Dept 2012]).

Section 213(1) gives six years to bring a constructive trust claim; when the claim rests on promised payment for property, the period begins when payment is due.

In re the Estates of Thomas · filed 2015-01-02(1)

Affording the pleadings the most liberal construction, we conclude that the statute of limitations began to run with respect to the NGR property sometime between 1989 and 1992, which is when the promised payments for the property were due and owing. The six-year statute of limitations thus expired, at the latest, in 1998, which is 15 years before this proceeding was commenced.

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful conduct or breach that gives rise to a duty to return the property.

In re the Estates of Thomas · filed 2015-01-02(1)

That promise was thus not breached until 2012, when decedents died and respondent failed to share that stock with his siblings. Inasmuch as this proceeding was commenced in 2013, the claim for a constructive trust over the NYSFC stock therefore is not time-barred.

CPLR 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for accounting and constructive trust claims.

Kohan v. Nehmadi · filed 2015-07-02(1)

The court properly found that plaintiff’s causes of action for an accounting and a constructive trust were not time-barred. The statute of limitations for those claims are six years (CPLR 213 [1]; Knobel v Shaw, 90 AD3d 493, 493 [1st Dept 2011]).

CPLR 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful act that creates a duty of restitution; when property was acquired lawfully, the period begins when the promise to transfer it is breached.

Barone v. Barone · filed 2015-07-15(1)

A cause of action “for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1), which starts to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution” (Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801, 802 [1991] [citations omitted]). ... Under those circumstances, the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust did not begin to run until sometime in 2012, when Maria allegedly breached her promise to the plaintiff (see Crivaro v Crivaro, 295 AD2d at 306).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action to impose a constructive trust.

Matter of Courant · filed 2016-08-17(1)

CPLR 214 (3) provides a three-year statute of limitations for a conversion cause of action, whereas CPLR 213 (1) provides a six-year statute of limitations for a cause of action to impose a constructive trust.

Section 213(1) applies to constructive trust claims, which accrue when the defendants acquire title to the property.

Cullen v. Torsiello · filed 2017-12-13(1)

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s cause of action for a constructive trust, which accrued at the time the defendants acquired title to the property, was not time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action seeking to impose a constructive trust.

Athanasatos v. Scarpa · filed 2019-06-12(1)

To the extent that the plaintiff contends that she is entitled to a constructive trust based on the alleged promise made to her by her mother and aunt, her cause of action is time-barred. The statute of limitations for a cause of action seeking to impose a constructive trust is six years ( see CPLR 213[1]; Auffermann v Distl , 56 AD3d 502).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful act that creates a duty of restitution.

Matter of Steinberg · filed 2020-05-14(1)

"A cause of action for a constructive trust is governed by the six-year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213 (1), which begins to run upon the occurrence of the allegedly wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution" ( Tornheim v Tornheim , 67 AD3d 775, 776 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Auffermann v Distl , 56 AD3d 502, 502 [2008]). ... Because the petition was filed in May 2018, and the subject property was sold to the three entities in August 2014, this cause of action was commenced well within the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim a six-year limitations period that begins when the allegedly wrongful act creates a duty of restitution.

Matter of George · filed 2021-05-20(1)

As relevant here, a cause of action to impose a constructive trust is subject to a six-year statute of limitations and accrues "upon the occurrence of the allegedly wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution" ( Matter of Steinberg , 183 AD3d 1067, 1072 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see CPLR 213 [1]; Auffermann v Distl , 56 AD3d 502, 502 [2008]).

Section 213(1)-(2) applies a six-year statute of limitations to constructive trust claims.

Reif v. The Art Institute of Chicago · filed 2024-02-28(1)-(2)

Constructive trust claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See Bice v. Robb, 324 F. App’x 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 213(1)-(2)). The plaintiffs’ constructive trust claim would have accrued in 2006 when the defendant refused its demand, the statute of limitations would have run in 2012, and the HEAR Act would not have revived the claim because the plaintiffs had the opportunity to bring the claim after 1999.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for constructive trust claims, running from the wrongful act that creates a duty of restitution.

Morales v. Rolon · filed 2024-04-10(1)

A cause of action to impose a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, which begins to run at the time of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution" ( Abakporo v Abakporo , 202 AD3d 646, 650 [citation omitted]; see CPLR 213[1]).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful withholding of property to be brought.

Matter of Newman · filed 2024-06-27(1)

Here, the allegedly wrongful withholding that constitutes the basis of the constructive trust claim is the refusal by Jody's executor to return to Isabel the proceeds of the money that Isabel had transferred to Jody in the years 2006 through 2008. That refusal did not occur until after Jody's death in 2017, when Isabel, after the discovery of the depletion of the No. 2 accounts, demanded the return of the proceeds of her transfers to Jody. Since it is undisputed that a constructive trust claim is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213[1]), the constructive trust petition was timely when Robert filed it on behalf of Isabel's estate in 2019.

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Chavez v. Morales · filed 2024-11-20(1)

Contrary to the defendants' contention, they also failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the cause of action to impose a constructive trust is time-barred. "A cause of action to impose a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, which begins to run at the time of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution" ( Abakporo v Abakporo , 202 AD3d 646, 650 [citation omitted]; see CPLR 213[1]; Morales v Rolon , 226 AD3d 765).

CPLR 213(1) generally gives constructive trust claims six years, but a three-year conversion period applies when the claim sounds in conversion and legal remedies provide complete relief.

Angel v. Strulovich · filed 2025-07-16(1)

Generally, "[a] cause of action to impose a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, which begins to run at the time of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution," regardless of when it was discovered ( Morales v Rolon , 226 AD3d 765, 766 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 213[1]). However, a shorter, three-year statute of limitations governing conversion claims applies when the cause of action for the imposition of constructive trust sounds in conversion and legal remedies will "afford[ ] the plaintiffs full and complete relief" ( Gold Sun Shipping v Ionian Transp. , 245 AD2d 420, 421; see Hellman v Hoenig & Co. , 244 AD2d 529, 530).

For a constructive trust claim, the six-year limitations period begins when the property owner refuses to perform the promise, rather than when the parties made or modified the agreement.

Booth v. Booth · filed 1991-12-05(1)

Supreme Court correctly rejected the contention that plaintiffs action is untimely under the six-year Statute of Limitations for constructive trusts (see, CPLR 213 [1]). Contrary to defendant’s argument in his brief, the statute did not begin to run when the parties modified the alleged agreement in December 1980. According to plaintiff, the Booths "allegedly refused to perform their promise” (Savage v Savage, 63 AD2d 808, 809, appeal dismissed 46 NY2d 771) in 1989, when plaintiff was reportedly told she would never obtain her promised interest in the subject property. Only then did the statute begin to run (supra; see, Lyons v Quandt, 91 AD2d 709, 710).

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust actions a six-year limitations period that begins when the wrongful act giving rise to restitution occurs, rather than when fraud is discovered.

Paine Webber Real Estate Securities, Inc. v. D.G. Meyer & Co. · filed 1993-04-12(1)

Further, an interpretation finding section 206(a)(1) inapplicable here comports with the general New York rule regarding the accrual of actions for constructive trusts: “[a]n action to impress a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations period provided under CPLR 213(1) that ‘commences to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from, the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered.’ ” Mattera v. Mattera, 125 A.D.2d 555, 509 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1986), quoting Boronow v. Boronow, 111 A.D.2d 735, 490 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 (1985), aff'd 71 N.Y.2d 284, 525 N.Y.S.2d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1375 (1988) (emphasis added). Holding that the limitations period for actions against constructive trustees does not begin to commence until discovery of the facts on which the right depends would vitiate the above-stated rule, as it would mean that the limitations period would, in fact, commence to run from the time the facts constituting fraud are discovered. As such, I conclude that the action for constructive trust is time-barred.

Section 213(7) provides a six-year limitations period for specified actions by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder.

Pereira v. Centel Corp. (In Re Argo Communications Corp.) · filed 1991-12-27(7)

We hold that Trustee’s first count alleging breach of fiduciary duty is timely under both CPLR §§ 213(2) and 213(7).

Section 213(7) gives six years for a corporation's action against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder to recover damages for waste or injury to property.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead America Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (In Re Buckhead Amer · filed 1994-01-28(7)

One question, therefore, is whether plaintiffs tor-tious interference claims are claims brought “by or on behalf of a corporation,” within the meaning of section 213(7). ... Moreover, for purposes of analysis under section 213(7), the question is not so much whether this action generally is “on behalf’ of the debtor corporations; rather, the appropriate question is whether the particular claims at issue (tortious interference) are brought “on behalf’ of the corporation. When framed in this manner, resolution of this issue remains unclear, although it appears significant that the indentures underlying these claims are designed for protection of the creditors who are parties thereto rather than for the benefit of the corporation itself. ... In any event, it is apparent that these issues cannot be properly resolved at this procedural juncture. ... Therefore, for the reasons stated, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs tortious interference claims will be denied.

The six-year limitations period for rescission of a premarital agreement is tolled while spouses live together in a continuing marital relationship and begins when they separate after the marriage breaks down.

Lieberman v. Lieberman · filed 1992-06-10(1)

Accordingly, I hold that the six-year Statute of Limitations on defendant’s counterclaim for rescission of the premarital agreement entered into by plaintiff and defendant on August 27, 1980 was tolled during the time the parties lived together in a continuing marital relationship, and that the statute did not begin to run until March 1988, when the marriage had irretrievably broken down and the parties started living separate and apart.

Section 213(4) imposes a six-year limitation period on an action upon a mortgage of real property.

Egrini v. County of Suffolk · filed 1993-06-02(4)

Plaintiff’s interest in the property as first mortgagee does not make this an action upon the mortgage.

Section 213(8) measures discovery of fraud from when the plaintiff knew or could with reasonable diligence have known of it.

Fleisig v. ED&F Man Capital Markets, Inc. · filed 2021-06-30(8)

New York law prescribes that a cause of action for fraud accrues on the date the plaintiff “discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. UBS AG, 144 A.D.3d 436, 437 (1st Dep’t. 2016) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8)). ... Since Fleisig and Condor had actual knowledge of all of the facts necessary to bring a fraud claim by June 2017 at the latest, but did not pursue a claim until September 2019, the fraud claim is barred by the contractual limitations period in the Customer Agreement.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

Emerson Electric Co. v. Holmes · filed 2023-07-28(8)

Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed a year and two months after Plaintiff’s discovery of the conveyances, which is squarely within the two-year statute of limitations for a Section 276 claim.

Section 213 gives mistake claims six years and fraud claims six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Equinox Gallery Ltd. v. Dorfman · filed 2018-01-25(6), (8)

In New York, a cause of action based upon mistake must be brought within six years, while an action based on fraud must be commenced within "six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(6), (8). ... Because this action was filed on January 11, 2017, Plaintiff's fraud and mistake claims are timely.

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within six years of the fraud or two years of its actual or imputed discovery, whichever is longer.

Sands Bros. Venture Capital II, LLC v. Metropolitan Paper Recycling, Inc. · filed 2020-05-08(8)

CPLR 203(g) and 213(8) are clear that a cause of action for fraud must be commenced (i) within six years of the occurrence of the fraud or (ii) within two years of the actual or imputed discovery thereof, whichever is longer ( K & E Trading & Shipping v Radmar Trading Corp ., 174 AD2d 346 [1st Dept 1991]).

CPLR 213(8) gives a fraud claimant six years from the wrong or two years from discovery, including when reasonable diligence could have revealed the fraud, whichever is longer.

Grgas v. Harrigan · filed 2019-05-24(8)

To the extent that plaintiff argues that the factual allegations in the complaint can be construed as asserting a claim based on fraud, we note that a cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the commission of the wrong, or within two years from the date the fraud was discovered or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer ( see CPLR 213 [8]; Pericon v Ruck , 56 AD3d 635 [2008]). Here, plaintiff admitted that she was aware of the alleged fraud in 2008 and, thus, this action, commenced in 2017, over eight years later, is time-barred.

Section 213(8) gives a fraudulent concealment claim the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the fraud.

Kleeberg v. Eber · filed 2019-05-23(8)

The statute of limitations for a fraudulent concealment claim is the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered it. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). Here, there is a factual issue of when Plaintiffs learned or could have learned of fraud. Therefore, the Court cannot find that this claim is untimely as against Gumaer.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years of its actual or imputed discovery, whichever is longer.

Endervelt v. Slade · filed 1994-11-01(8)

CPLR 203 (g) and 213 (8) provide that a cause of action for fraud must be commenced within (1) six years of the occurrence of the fraud, or (2) two years of the actual or imputed discovery thereof, whichever is longer (K&E Trading & Shipping v Radmar Trading Corp., 174 AD2d 346 [1st Dept 1991]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff seeking rescission for actual fraud six years from the fraud or two years from when the fraud was or should have been discovered, whichever is later.

Percoco v. Lesnak · filed 2005-12-05(8)

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]). Where, as here, “rescission is sought on the ground of actual fraud, the Statute of Limitations is six years from the commission of the fraud or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the fraud, whichever is later” (Hoffman v Cannone, 206 AD2d 740, 740-741 [1994]; see Fixler v Fixler, 290 AD2d 482 [2002]; Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum, 271 AD2d 427 [2000]; Garguilio v Garguilio, 201 AD2d 617 [1994]).

For fraud, Section 213(8) allows an action within the greater of six years after accrual or two years after discovery, or when it reasonably could have been discovered.

Mitschele v. Schultz · filed 2006-11-30(8)

An action for fraud must be brought within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff. . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years after the plaintiff discovered it or reasonably could have discovered it.

Lipszyc v. Lipszyc · filed 2023-11-29[8]

A cause of action based on fraud must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time that the plaintiff discovered the fraud or with reasonable diligence could have discovered it ( see CPLR 213[8]; 203[g]; Sargiss v Magarelli , 12 NY3d 527, 532).

Section 213 provides six-year limitations periods for specified claims and, for fraud, uses the longer of six years after accrual or two years after discovery.

Meyer v. Seidel · filed 2023-12-21(1), (6), and (8)

Such a claim, when it rests on a theory akin to fraud, is subject to the catch-all limitations period provided in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1), which is six years. ... A claim for rescission based on mistake is to be brought within six years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(6); and the limitations period "runs from the date of the alleged mistake or actionable wrong." ... Under New York law, for a claim "based upon fraud[,] the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or could reasonably have been discovered.

The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, Inc. v. The Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research · filed 2024-08-20(8)

The statute of limitations for fraud is the “greater of” six years from when the cause of action accrues or two years after plaintiff “discovered the fraud [] or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). ... Therefore, because July 2017 was more than two years before the parties’ October 2019 tolling agreement, plaintiff’s fraud claim is time-barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Gaines v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceutical · filed 2024-08-25(8)

Accordingly, the claims are also time-barred. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (claims based on fraud must be brought within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the Plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it”); Plaintiff has not suggested, in his third amended complaint, any basis for tolling of the limitations period.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud claim to be filed within six years of accrual or two years of actual or reasonably diligent discovery of the fraud.

Jared V. v. Nikki X. · filed 2026-01-15(8)

Even providing plaintiff with the benefit of every favorable inference as the nonmoving party, Supreme Court properly concluded, as a matter of law, that his fraud claims relative to the signing of the separation agreement and the divorce papers were barred by the six-year statute of limitations, and were not saved by the two-year discovery exception ( see Goldring v Goldring , 290 AD2d 365, 365 [1st Dept 2002]).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within the later of six years after accrual or two years after the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Gutkin v. Siegal · filed 2011-06-30(8)

An action based upon fraud must be commenced within the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time plaintiff discovered or, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered the fraud (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) bars fraud counterclaims that are time-barred under its limitations rule.

Ross v. Rosa · filed 2011-06-10(8)

We further conclude, however, that those parts of the counterclaims sounding in fraud are time-barred (see CPLR 213 [8]).

CPLR 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within the greater of six years after accrual or two years after the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Sandpebble Builders, Inc. v. Mansir · filed 2011-12-20(8)

To the extent that the cause of action is asserted against Mansir in her individual capacity, and alleges that she was acting outside of the scope of her employment, it is time-barred by CPLR 213 (8).

Section 213(8) bars fraud counterclaims when the claimant knew or could have discovered the relevant facts more than seven years before asserting them.

Benedict v. Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan · filed 2010-10-26(8)

However, the counterclaims asserted against the plaintiffs, sounding in constructive and actual fraud and unjust enrichment were time-barred and, therefore, also should have been dismissed on that ground (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009]; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d at 139). The appellant was aware of the pendency of this action, and knew or could have discovered more than seven years prior to interposing his counterclaims that he was not a party.

A fraud claim must be brought within six years of the fraud or two years after the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is longer.

Pericon v. Ruck · filed 2008-11-18(8)

“A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered, whichever is longer” (Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]; see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim filed more than six years after any of the possible accrual dates considered by the court.

Jones v. Safi · filed 2009-01-13(8)

Regardless of whether the plaintiffs claims accrued in September 1996 (when the real estate closings occurred), ... they were properly dismissed insofar as asserted against the respondents as untimely because the present action was not commenced until the fall of 2006 (see CPLR 213 [8]; 214 [6]; 215 [1]; 217 [1]).

Section 213(8) permits a fraud action within six years after accrual or two years after discovery of the fraud, whichever is longer.

Zwecker v. Kulberg · filed 1994-11-14(8)

However, based upon the plaintiffs’ allegations that the individual defendant induced them into investing in the WACO partnership by, in part, falsely stating that he would not receive a commission, and since the plaintiffs did not allegedly learn of the commissions until 1989, the cause of action alleging fraud in connection with the WACO partnership was timely brought (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; see generally, Rattner v York, 174 AD2d 718, 721; Del Vecchio v Nassau County, 118 AD2d 615).

For fraud claims, the six year limitation period runs from the fraud or, alternatively, two years from discovery of the fraud.

Leone v. Sabbatino · filed 1997-01-21(8)

Since the plaintiff’s action is based upon a claim of actual fraud under Debtor and Creditor Law § 276 (see, e.g., Apple Bank for Sav. v Contaratos, 204 AD2d 375; Polkowski v Mela, 143 AD2d 260), she was entitled to commence her action within either six years from the date of the fraud, or two years from the date of her discovery of the fraud (see, Bernstein v La Rue, supra).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim brought more than six years after it accrued and more than two years after the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Suero v. Fort I Group, L.P. · filed 2003-05-08(8)

Because plaintiff did not sue until 1996, eight years after the last representation ... her fraud claim is time-barred pursuant to CPLR 213 (8) and 203 (g).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within the longer of two years after actual or imputed discovery or the otherwise applicable period measured from accrual.

Roccanova v. Commissioner of the Department of Social Services · filed 2004-10-21(8)

The plaintiff, however, fails to take into account that CPLR 213 (8) specifically provides that “the time within which the action [based upon fraud] must be commenced shall be computed from the time the plaintiff or the person acting under whom he claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (amended L 2004, ch 403, § 1, eff Aug. 17, 2004), and that CPLR 203 (g) conjunctively adds that: “[W]here the time within which an action must be commenced is computed from the time when facts were discovered or from when the time when facts could with reasonable diligence have been discovered, or from either of such times, the action must be commenced within two years after such actual or imputed discovery or within the period otherwise provided, computed from the time the cause of action accrued, whichever is longer.”

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Kramer v. Meridian Capital Group, LLC · filed 2022-01-26(8)

An action sounding in fraud must be commenced within "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213[8]; see Kotlyarsky v Abrazi , 188 AD3d at 854). Here, the alleged forgery of the plaintiff's signature, and any injury it caused to the plaintiff's reputation, took place in October 2010. This action was not commenced until January 2017, more than six years later ( see CPLR 213[8]).

Section 213(8) sets a time limit for fraud actions that can bar a plenary action.

Wolfert v. Buttolph · filed 1994-07-05(8)

We further note that under the circumstances, a plenary action based upon fraud would be time barred (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) provides a discovery based accrual rule for fraud actions, subject to its two-year-from-discovery limit.

Dignelli v. Berman · filed 2002-04-15(8)

There is no basis as a matter of law to impose a discovery accrual rule in the absence of any allegations of fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) permits a fraud action within six years of the fraud or within two years after the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the fraud.

Feinberg v. Shaw · filed 2002-10-24(8)

Defendants’ conclusory motion papers did not specify the accrual dates for the various legal and equitable causes of action in the complaint, and adduced no evidence that plaintiff, who claims he was a client of the individual defendant, had knowledge of facts from which the alleged fraud could reasonably have been inferred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; see Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d 723; Assad v City of New York, 238 AD2d 456, 456, lv dismissed 91 NY2d 848).

Section 213(8)'s fraud discovery accrual rule applies to claims predicated on actual fraud, including breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent conveyance claims.

St. John's University, New York v. Bolton · filed 2010-12-10(8)

Plaintiffs claims for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and fraudulent conveyance are all predicated on an allegation of actual fraud and are therefore subject to the fraud discovery accrual rule.

Section 213(8)'s discovery rule does not revive a fraud claim when the plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that reasonable diligence could not have uncovered the fraud earlier.

Gonik v. Israel Discount Bank · filed 2011-01-04(8)

The discovery rule, which would only arguably apply to the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims in any event (see CPLR 213 [8]; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 122 [2003]; Yatter v William Morris Agency, 268 AD2d 335, 335-336 [2000]), is inapplicable here because plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts that she could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud earlier than September 2008.

Section 213(8)'s discovery accrual rule does not apply to constructive fraud claims.

Ingham ex rel. Cobalt Asset Management, L.P. v. Thompson · filed 2011-10-25(8)

The discovery accrual rule does not apply in cases alleging constructive fraud (id,.; see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8)'s discovery-based exception does not apply to a negligence claim over a returned settlement check.

Konigsberg v. State · filed 1998-12-24(8)

Although certain exceptions exist when the date of accrual is measured from the date of the discovery of the wrong (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 214-a, 214-b, 214-c), none of the exceptions is applicable here.

Section 213(8)’s discovery accrual rule does not extend the time to sue when the plaintiff knew bonuses were being paid and failed to diligently investigate their amounts.

Tatko v. Sheldon Slate Products Co. · filed 2003-12-11(8)

Further, inasmuch as plaintiff was aware that bonuses were being given each year and his lack of knowledge of the specific amounts was a result of his own lack of diligence, we are unpersuaded by his argument that a discovery accrual rule should be applied to his earlier claims (see CPLR 203 [g]; 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) allows an actual fraud claim to be brought within two years after the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Transport Workers Union of America Local 100 v. Schwartz · filed 2006-09-14(8)

Thus, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, TWU could have discovered its claim against O’Hara more than two years before it commenced its action against him.

Section 213(1) provides a six year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims, tolled until reasonable diligence gives the plaintiff actual or constructive knowledge of the breach.

Menke v. Glass · filed 1995-09-25(1)

While the parties agree that the CPLR provides a six year statute of limitations for the fiduciary duty claim (see CPLR § 213(1); see also CPLR § 213(2)), the parties disagree as to whether a “discovery rule” should apply: defendants argue that it does not; plaintiffs contend that it does and that the six year period does not begin running until they had actual or constructive knowledge of the breach. I agree with plaintiffs’ position and consequently hold that the limitations period for the fiduciary duty claim is tolled until, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, plaintiffs had actual or constructive knowledge of the breach.

Section 213(7) gives a corporation's breach of fiduciary duty claim against an officer or director a six-year limitations period, generally accruing at breach, with actual fraud accruing at discovery.

In Re Fischer · filed 2004-04-07(7)

Where a corporation sues a former or present officer or director for breach of fiduciary duty, CPLR § 213(7) provides a six-year statute of limitations. The Derivative Actions are governed by this limitations period. The general rule is that breach of fiduciary duty claims under CPLR § 213(7) accrue upon breach rather than on plaintiffs imputed or actual discovery of the breach. However, New York courts have held that, in the case of actual fraud, a breach of fiduciary duty claim accrues upon discovery of the fraud, rather than upon the breach itself.

CPLR 213 (1) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Serio v. Rhulen · filed 2005-12-22(1)

The applicable statute of limitations for a claim of a breach of fiduciary duty (first cause of action) is six years (see CPLR 213 [1]), and the complaint includes allegations of conduct by defendants occurring within six years prior to commencement of this action.

Section 213(8) gives a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on actual fraud a six-year limitations period regardless of the remedy sought.

Scantek Medical, Inc. v. Sabella · filed 2008-10-17(8)

However, “[where], as here, the breach of fiduciary duty involves allegations of actual fraud, the statute of limitations is six years regardless of the remedy sought.” ... Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) applies.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims where fraud is not merely incidental, even if the plaintiff seeks money damages.

Barnard v. Joffe (In Re Inflight Newspapers, Inc.) · filed 2010-01-06(8)

Thus, where fraud is not merely incidental to plaintiffs cause of action, the statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is six years under N.Y. Civil Procedure Law § 213(8) (2009) even if the relief sought is money damages.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim when fraud is essential to the claim.

Monaghan v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2010-03-16(8)

We agree with the plaintiff that, here, the breach of fiduciary cause of action asserted against the defendant Ford Motor Company (hereinafter FMC) states an actual claim of fraud, which is not merely incidental to the breach of fiduciary duty claim and, therefore, it is subject to a six-year statute of limitations and is not time-barred.

Section 213(8) supplies a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim when fraud is essential to the claim.

Oxbow Calcining USA Inc. v. American Industrial Partners · filed 2012-06-26(8)

As to the AIP defendants, “where an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, courts have applied a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (8)” (IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]). Here, the essence of plaintiffs’ claim is that AH] as the holder of a controlling interest in GLC, breached its fiduciary duty to ensure that any self-dealing transaction between GLC and PASE would be entirely fair to GLC and its shareholders, by employing bait-and-switch tactics and making numerous misrepresentations to GLC’s independent committee and management in order to fraudulently induce GLC to enter into the HEA (see Carbon Capital Mgt., LLC v American Express Co., 88 AD3d 933 [2011]; Monaghan v Ford Motor Co., 71 AD3d 848 [2010]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim arising from a contractual relationship.

Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA, Inc. · filed 2014-10-10(2)

Because the fiduciary duty alleged by plaintiffs arises from a contractual relationship, the six-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs’ claim.

CPLR 213 (1) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking equitable relief.

Torrance Construction, Inc. v. Jaques · filed 2015-04-02(1)

The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty differs depending on whether the substantive remedy sought is purely monetary – giving rise to the three-year period applicable to injuries to property (see CPLR 214 [4]) – or is equitable in nature – giving rise to a six-year period pursuant to CPLR 213 (1) (see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]).

Section 213(8)’s limitations period applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim when actual fraud is essential to the claim.

DiRaimondo v. Calhoun · filed 2015-09-30(8)

In this case, the allegations of actual fraud are essential to, not merely incidental to, the breach of fiduciary duty causes of action ... Consequently, the limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (8) applies.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim premised on fraud, including intentional concealment.

Neogenix Oncology, Inc. v. Gordon · filed 2015-09-30(8)

Given these allegations, plaintiff has adequately pled a plausible claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Mintz, which is governed by the six-year statute of limitations period and, thus, timely.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim of this kind.

TROMBLEY, THOMAS F., MTR. OF · filed 2016-03-25(1)

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty such as the one asserted herein is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; Bouley v Bouley, 19 AD3d 1049, 1051), and the claim accrues when the fiduciary openly repudiates his or her obligation or the fiduciary relationship has otherwise been terminated (see People v Ben, 55 AD3d 1306, 1308).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim of this kind.

In re Estate of Trombley · filed 2016-03-25(1)

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty such as the one asserted herein is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; Bouley v Bouley, 19 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2005]), and the claim accrues when the fiduciary openly repudiates his or her obligation or the fiduciary relationship has otherwise been terminated (see People v Ben, 55 AD3d 1306, 1308 [2008]).

CPLR 213(8)’s six-year limitations period applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim when allegations of fraud are essential to the claim.

Matter of Imperato · filed 2017-04-26(8)

Furthermore, contrary to the appellants’ contention, the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (8) applies to the cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, since the allegations of fraud are essential to, and not merely incidental to, the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action (see DiRaimondo v Calhoun, 131 AD3d 1194, 1196-1197 [2015]).

Section 213(8) applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim only when fraud is essential to the claim.

Spinnato v. Unity of Omaha Life Ins. Co. · filed 2018-06-19(8)

In order for CPLR § 213(8) to apply, the fraud claim must be "essential" to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on fraud.

Pereira v. Lin · filed 2020-04-24(8)

Here, the breach of fiduciary duty claim is governed by a six-year statute of limitations because the claim is based on the theory that Lin defrauded the Debtor.

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking equitable relief or requiring proof of fraud.

Roumi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. · filed 2021-02-17

"Where, however, the relief sought is equitable in nature, the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213(1) applies" ( id. at 139). "Moreover, where an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, courts have applied a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8)" ( id. at 139). The plaintiffs commenced this action on October 6, 2016, more than six years after they allegedly were induced by Zelcer to purchase the Nessim policy and the Claudine policy. Therefore, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the causes of action alleging violations of the Insurance Law and breach of fiduciary duty were time-barred ( see id. at 139).

Section 213(7)’s six-year limitations period applies to a derivative claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty when it applies to the underlying breach.

In re Lifetrade Litigation · filed 2023-09-25(7)

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ derivative claim against Wells Fargo for aiding and abetting Smith and Marcum’s breach of fiduciary duty is also subject to the six-year limitations period under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(7) and is not time- barred.

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year period for a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim seeking equitable relief, but an incidental request for equitable relief does not extend a claim primarily seeking damages to six years.

Board of Mgrs. of the Promenade Condominium v. Eshaghpour · filed 2024-08-20(1)

When the relief sought is equitable, a six-year limitation period applies. (CPLR 213 [1].) ... A request for equitable relief does not extend the limitations period to six years if the primary objective of the claim is to recover monetary damages. ... Defendants thus prioritize monetary relief over injunctive relief on their breach-of-fiduciary-duty counterclaim. For this reason, the three-year limitation period applies.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims under New York law.

Potter v. Arrington · filed 2006-02-06

While under New York law the statute of limitations for the breach of fiduciary duties is six years (CPLR 213), under Delaware law it is three years (Del Code Ann, tit 10, § 8106).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not bar a foreclosure pursued as HUD’s assignee or agent because the plaintiff receives HUD’s immunity from the state statute of limitations.

RCR Services Inc. v. Herbil Holding Co. · filed 1996-07-01[4]

Accordingly, in view of, inter alia, the goals and principles upon which it is premised, we hold that the plaintiff, as assignee / agent of HUD, is entitled to HUD’s immunity from the State Statute of Limitations (see, 6 NY Jur 2d, Assignments, §§ 49, 71; cf., Travelers Indem. Co. v Agoli, 151 Misc 2d 947; Federal Ins. Co. v United States Port Serv. Co., 23 Misc 2d 142, affd 12 AD2d 905; F.D.I.C. v Bledsoe, 989 F2d 805; Williams v Globe Indem. Co., 507 F2d 837, cert denied 421 US 948).

Section 213(4)'s six-year foreclosure limitations period does not apply to an assignee of a federal agency.

Duran v. FLA Mtge. Capital 2 LLC · filed 2025-01-13(4)

That rule applies equally to an assignee of a federal agency, including a commercial lender, and includes the benefit of immunity from a state limitations period (id.; see Windward Bora, LLC v Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc., FSB, 982 F. 3d 139 [2d Cir. 2020]). Here, the defendant has established that it is an assignee of HUD, and thus, there is no applicable statute of limitations for it to commence a mortgage foreclosure action.

Section 213(4)'s limitation period does not bar the United States from foreclosing a mortgage to collect a tax assessment.

United States v. Freidus · filed 1991-07-15(4)

S.L. Building has moved to dismiss the Government’s action to foreclose on the Mortgage as time barred under state law or as a contract action under Federal law, relying upon, respectively, Section 213(4) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) and 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) for that proposition. ... As a general rule, and as S.L. Building concedes, “the United States is not subject to any statute of limitations in enforcing its rights unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise.”

Section 213(8) makes a fraud claim timely when it accrues upon discovery of the fraud.

Cromwell v. New York City Department of Social Services · filed 1997-05-29(8)

Accordingly, the date of such decision marked the accrual of both the aunt’s section 1983 (see, Eagleston v Guido, 41 F3d 865, 871, cert denied 516 US 808) and common-law fraud claims (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]), rendering both timely, as well as her notice of claim (see, Matter of Orsell v Board of Educ., 23 AD2d 703).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims, running from when the fraud was discovered or could reasonably have been discovered.

Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc. · filed 2000-08-29(8)

The limitations period for fraud claims runs for six years from the time plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Id.; Fourth Toro Family Ltd. Partnership v. PV Bakery, Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 188 (S.D.N.Y.2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims, accruing when the fraud was discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

Carell v. Shubert Organization, Inc. · filed 2000-06-27(8)

Under CPLR § 213(8), a cause of action under the Lanham Act accrues at the time the plaintiff “discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” CPLR § 213(8).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitation period for fraud claims.

Heffernan v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. · filed 2001-05-29(8)

Since the surviving conversion cause of action against the bank is therefore based solely on Helliwell’s deposits and/or withdrawals of plaintiffs’ funds, and not on Helliwell’s acts of actual fraud inducing plaintiffs to entrust their money to him, there is no basis for application of the six-year limitation period for fraud claims (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213 applies a six-year limitations period to a guaranty claim beginning when the underlying debtor defaults.

Haber v. Nasser · filed 2001-12-03

The six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to a guaranty begins to run when the debtor defaults on the underlying debt (see, Gazza v United Cal. Bank Intl., 88 AD2d 968; Orix Credit Alliance v Horten, 965 F Supp 481; CPLR 213).

Section 213(8) bars fraud claims when the plaintiff could reasonably have discovered the fraud.

Fixler v. Fixler · filed 2002-01-22(8)

The plaintiff’s fraud claim is also time-barred. He could reasonably have discovered the defendant’s true financial condition by reviewing their 1987 joint tax returns. Similarly, he could have reasonably discovered the defendant’s alleged failure to provide the required insurance policy by requesting proof of such a policy shortly after the defendant allegedly was supposed to have provided the policy (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; see also, Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum, 271 AD2d 427; Prestandrea v Stein, 262 AD2d 621; Hoffman v Cannone, 206 AD2d 740; Garguilio v Garguilio, 201 AD2d 617).

The six-year limitations period for the Fund’s indemnification claim runs separately from each payment for cleanup and removal costs.

State v. Speonk Fuel, Inc. · filed 2003-07-03(2)

As such, Supreme Court correctly determined that plaintiff is barred from recouping any payments made by the Fund prior to September 26, 1990, i.e., more than six years before plaintiffs September 26, 1996 commencement of this action.

Section 213(8) provides that a fraud claim accrues when the fraud is discovered or could reasonably have been discovered.

Shaw v. Shaw · filed 2005-02-17(8)

So far as the limitations argument is concerned, Stuart overlooks entirely the fact that fraud claims, under New York law, accrue when the' fraud is, or with reasonable diligence could have been, discovered. The complaint alleges that the fraud was discovered in 2004, well within the limitations period. The attack on the fraud claims therefore fails.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years after it could reasonably have been discovered.

County of Ulster v. Highland Fire District · filed 2006-05-11(8)

A cause of action for fraud must be commenced within six years of the date the fraud occurred or within two years of the date such fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence (see CPLR 213 [8]).

CPLR 213 gives a six-year limitations period for a joint-venture accounting claim; the claim accrues upon open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or judicial settlement of the account.

Evangelista v. Mattone · filed 2007-10-09

The defendants made a prima facie showing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]) because the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (see CPLR 213 [1], [7]). Claims such as those at issue here accrue when “there is either an open repudiation of the fiduciary’s obligation or a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account” (Matter of Meyer, 303 AD2d 682, 683 [2003]; see Matter of Rodken, 270 AD2d 784, 785 [2000]; Westchester Religious Inst. v Kamerman, 262 AD2d 131, 131-132 [1999]; see also Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80).

Section 213(7) gives shareholders six years to bring a derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty, with the period running when the corporation suffers injury sufficient to complete the claim.

Guthartz v. Goldrick · filed 2008-04-03(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 213 (7) a derivative action must be brought within six years. ... However, it is not, and the shareholders’ cause of action against the corporation’s officers and directors accrued when the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could be pleaded. ... The corporation, State Bank, and, therefore, its shareholders, did not suffer damages until the settlements with Household Commercial Financial Services and Matrix Capital Bank in November of 2005, and the verdict in January of 2006, and then the postverdict settlement with RMST.

Section 213’s six-year period for an unjust enrichment claim runs from the wrongful retention of a benefit when its initial receipt was lawful.

Campione v. Campione · filed 2013-04-20

As an initial matter, neither party disputes that the statute of limitations governing the Plaintiffs claims is six years. Thus, the only issue presented to the Court is when the claims for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, and reformation accrued. ... Accordingly, while the Defendant originally received that stock in 1973, that retention did not become wrongful until October 2012. The Defendant was not unjustly enriched when he was originally listed as a joint tenant on the Sysco account as that was what all the involved individuals intended. Instead, the wrongful act giving rise to the claim here occurred when he refused to sign over his tenancy when requested to do so pursuant to his understanding with Sister Pia Marie.

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim brought more than six years after the fraud and more than two years after the plaintiff could have discovered it through reasonable diligence.

BOARDMAN, HARRIET v. KENNEDY, KATHERINE D. · filed 2013-04-26(8)

The second cause of action, alleging fraud, is also time-barred inasmuch as this action was commenced more than six years after the alleged fraud was committed and more than two years after plaintiff, acting with reasonable diligence, could have discovered the alleged fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; see also CPLR 203 [g]; see generally Rite Aid Corp. v Grass, 48 AD3d 363, 364).

Under Section 213, a claim to establish ownership of a co-op accrues when a dispute over ownership arises.

Eisenhauer v. Bruno · filed 2013-09-04

However, contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, there was no dispute regarding ownership of the co-op until plaintiff asserted a claim against it, thus, the cause of action for ownership interest in the co-op did not accrue until 2010. Accordingly, Richard N. Bruno’s claim of sole ownership of the co-op is timely (see CPLR 213).

Section 213(8) provides the limitations period for fraud claims.

Anthony Tranchina General Contracting Corp. v. Greco Bros. Ready Mix Concrete Co. · filed 2016-04-06(8)

The defendant thus failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on this issue, as its arguments were based on the one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts (see CPLR 215 [3]), not the longer limitations period applicable to fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the greater of six years from accrual or two years from discovery of the fraud.

NYAHSA Services, Inc., Self-Insurance Trust v. Recco Home Care Services, Inc. · filed 2016-07-07(8)

Actions based on fraud are subject to the statute of limitations of "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213 [8]; see Abele Tractor & Equip. Co., Inc. v Balfour, 133 AD3d 1171, 1171 [2015]).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for an aiding-and-abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim when allegations of fraud are essential to the claim.

New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. Fuller & LaFiura, CPAs, P.C. · filed 2017-01-12(8)

Inasmuch as "the allegations of fraud perpetrated by [Fuller] are essential to this claim, a six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (8) is applicable" (New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v SGRisk, LLC, 116 AD3d at 1154; see D. Penguin Bros. Ltd. v National Black United Fund, Inc., 137 AD3d 460, 461 [2016]).

Section 213(2) gives a landlord six years from when rent becomes due to bring a claim for unpaid rent.

Dee Cee Associates LLC v. 44 Beehan Corp. · filed 2017-03-30(2)

Moreover, this claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations, which began to run from the date on which the rent payments became due — September 30, 2006, at the latest (see Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 87 NY2d 36, 45 [1995]; Arnav Indus., Inc. v Pitari, 82 AD3d 557, 558 [1st Dept 2011], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 949 [2012]; CPLR 213 [2]). This suit was not commenced until more than six years later.

Section 213 gives an action on a guaranty six years from the underlying debtor's default.

Encore Nursing Ctr. Partners Ltd. Partnership-85 v. Schwartzberg · filed 2019-05-22

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the action is not time-barred. "The six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to a guaranty begins to run when the debtor defaults on the underlying debt" ( Haber v Nasser , 289 AD2d 199, 200; see CPLR 213). ... Here, the remaining principal balance of $1,378,000, which the borrowers' failed to pay, was not due and payable until December 31, 2009. Therefore, this action, which was commenced in October 2015, was timely.

Section 213 gives a claimant six years from the principal's default to bring an action on a guaranty.

Chicago Tit. Ins. Co. v. Brookwood Tit. Agency, LLC · filed 2020-01-22

The six-year statute of limitations applicable to a guaranty begins to run when the principal is in default ( see CPLR 213; Haber v Nasser , 289 AD2d 199, 200; Bayside Fuel Oil Depot Corp. v Savino Oil & Heating Co. , 133 AD2d 658, 660).

Section 213(8)’s six-year limitations period for fraudulent investment claims runs from the date of each investment.

Panos v. Universal Forest Products Inc. · filed 2020-01-27(8)

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims of fraudulent inducement would accrue on the dates of Plaintiff’s respective investments in VCH, HSD, WOHTV, and Wappinger.

Section 213(4)’s six-year period for foreclosing on the entire mortgage debt begins when the loan is accelerated.

Freedom Mortgage Corporation v. Herschel Engel , Ditech Financial v. Santhana Kumar Nataraja Naidu, Juan Vargas v. Deuts · filed 2021-02-18(4)

Accordingly, a cause of action to recover the entire balance of the debt accrues at the time the loan is accelerated, triggering the six-year statute of limitations to commence a foreclosure action (see CPLR 203[a], 213[4]; Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 143 [1993]; Lubonty, 34 NY3d at 261; see also CDR Créances S.A. v Euro-American Lodging Corp., 43 AD3d 45, 51 [1st Dept 2007]; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Patella, 279 AD2d 604, 605 [2d Dept 2001]; Lavin v Elmakiss, 302 AD2d 638, 639 [3d Dept 2003]; Business Loan Ctr., Inc. v Wagner, 31 AD3d 1122, 1123 [4th Dept 2006]).

The six-year limitations period for a fraud claim based on inducement to purchase property runs from the purchase date.

Graham v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation · filed 2021-09-24(8)

First, as the Court explained in 2019 and 2020, under the six-year statute of limitations, Plaintiffs’ claims accrued, at the latest, when they were induced to purchase the Property on June 19, 2006, and the six-year statute of limitations expired on June 19, 2012.

Section 213(1) gives a beneficiary six years to seek an accounting, with the period beginning only when the trustee openly repudiates fiduciary obligations.

Massey-Hughes v. Massey · filed 2021-12-23(1)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action seeking an accounting is six years ( see CPLR 213 [1]; Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP , 11 NY3d 195, 201 [2008]). It is well settled that the limitations period begins to run only when " 'the trustee openly repudiates his [or her] fiduciary obligations' " and " 'a mere lapse of time is insufficient without proof of an open repudiation' " ( Matter of Eisdorfer , 188 AD3d 674, 676 [2d Dept 2020]; see Matter of Behr , 191 AD2d 431, 431 [2d Dept 1993]). ... Thus, the cause of action for an accounting had not accrued at the time plaintiffs commenced this action.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud damages claim to be filed within six years of the fraud or two years after the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Mostafa v. Pension Solutions, LLC · filed 2023-11-29(8)

"A cause of action seeking damages based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered" ( Waldman v 853 St. Nicholas Realty Corp. , 64 AD3d 585, 587; see CPLR 213[8]; Seidenfeld v Zaltz , 162 AD3d 929, 934). Here, the alleged fraud occurred in April 2005, and the defendants demonstrated that the plaintiffs had acquired knowledge of the alleged fraud, at the latest, in 2014, as a result of the foreclosure action. Since this action was not commenced until 2019, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the third through sixth causes of action, seeking damages based upon fraud, were time-barred ( see Williams-Guillaume v Bank of Am., N.A. , 130 AD3d 1016, 1017).

CPLR 213(8) imposes a six-year limitations period on fraud claims; a later investigation does not extend an earlier date of inquiry notice.

Lane's Floor Coverings & Interiors, Inc. v. DiLalla · filed 2024-04-25(8)

The record demonstrates that plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud in December 2013 when it conducted its initial investigation concerning the controller's abandonment of his employment ( see Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc ., 137 AD3d 685, 689-690 [1st Dept 2016]; Ghandour v Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc , 213 AD2d 304, 305-306 [1st Dept 1995]). Thus, plaintiff's reliance on the District Attorney's 2016 investigation and its own 2017 examination to extend the time of its inquiry notice for the earlier checks is unavailing. Accordingly, plaintiff's fraud claim is timely under the applicable six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[8]) only to the extent based on checks drawn on or after July 10, 2012.

Section 213(8) applies a six-year limitations period to fraud claims, including those arising from consumer credit transactions.

Citibank, N.A. v. Friedman · filed 2024-08-15(8)

With respect to Citibank’s fraud claims, the court concludes that claims based on fraud are governed by CPLR § 213(8) and are thus subject to the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(4)'s six-year period for a foreclosure action begins when the lender has the legal right to demand payment, even if it demands payment later.

Reverse Mtge. Solutions, Inc. v. Miglucci · filed 2024-10-17(4)

Plaintiff contends that Supreme Court improperly determined the date of accrual of the six-year statute of limitations applicable to its foreclosure action ( see CPLR 213 [4]). ... However, as we have previously held, a cause of action seeking a payment of money pursuant to a contract accrues "when the party making the claim possesses a legal right [*2]to demand payment . . . , not when it actually made the demand" ( Bank of Am., N.A. v Gulnick , 170 AD3d 1365, 1366 [3d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 34 NY3d 908 [2020]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff bringing a fraud claim the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Lam Hong Chan v. New York Life Ins. & Annuity Corp. · filed 2025-09-10(8)

"Actions based on fraud are subject to the statute of limitations of 'the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it'" ( Kotlyarsky v Abrazi , 188 AD3d at 854, quoting CPLR 213[8]; see Matter of Hersh , 198 AD3d 766, 769; Carbon Capital Mgt., LLC v American Express Co. , 88 AD3d 933, 939-940). Here, the defendants met their burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to commence the action had expired. The defendants' submissions demonstrated that the plaintiff was aware of the facts underlying her allegations as of April 22, 2008, when she executed a policy receipt for the subject annuity which provided for a single-life annuity, naming only the plaintiff's mother as the annuitant with no election for a joint-annuitant. The plaintiff did not commence this action until July 2021, more than 13 years later ( see CPLR 213[8]; Matter of Hersh , 198 AD3d at 769; Kotlyarsky v Abrazi , 188 AD3d at 854; see also Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assoc. , 96 NY2d 765, 767).

Section 213(8)'s six-year limitations period applies to breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims when fraud allegations are essential to those claims, rather than merely incidental.

Gam v. Dvir · filed 2024-01-17(8)

In addition, contrary to the defendant's contention, the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8) applies to the causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, since allegations of fraud are essential to, and not merely incidental to, these causes [*2]of action ( see Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v Filardo , 203 AD3d at 867; Monteleone v Monteleone , 162 AD3d 761, 761-762).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for a cause of action sounding in fraud.

Roe v. Bonura · filed 1986-06-19(8)

In the alternative, as in Simcuski, it may be concluded that with respect to the cause of action sounding in fraud the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [8]) will govern.

Section 213(8) sets a six-year period for fraud claims; disputed facts about discovery of the fraud can preclude summary judgment on timeliness.

Com-Tech Associates v. Computer Associates International, Inc. · filed 1990-12-31(8)

Again, the Court finds that the conflicting contentions of the parties and evidence presented creates serious questions of material fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of COM-TECH’s discovery of the fraud.

Section 213(8) sets a limitations period that can bar fraud counterclaims.

145 Glen Cove Realty Corp. v. Glen Cove One Stop Realty Corp. · filed 2003-03-03(8)

Its counterclaims alleging fraud failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3016 [b]; Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421 [1996]), and in any event, were time-barred (see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(6) gives actions for rescission based on mistake a six-year limitations period beginning when the mistake or actionable wrong occurs.

Zavaglia v. Gardner · filed 1997-12-15[6]

An action for rescission premised upon mistake is subject to a six-year Statute of Limitations, which begins to run when the alleged mistake or actionable wrong occurred (see, CPLR 213 [6]; First Natl. Bank v Volpe, 217 AD2d 967).

Section 213(6) gives claims for rescission based on mistake a six-year limitations period that is not tolled by discovery of the mistake.

Foxley v. Sotheby's Inc. · filed 1995-06-14(6)

Claims for recision are governed by a six-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR § 213(6). Unlike fraud, there is no tolling provision based on the discovery of mistake. Accordingly, the statute of limitations ran as of December 3, 1993—six years after the auction. Foxley’s recision claim is time-barred.

Section 213(7) requires a corporation’s action against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder for specified claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, to be commenced within six years.

Whitney Holdings, Ltd. v. Givotovsky · filed 1997-12-24(7)

Where, as here, a corporation sues a former officer, director and shareholder for breach of fiduciary duty, CPLR § 213(7) governs. Section 213(7) provides that “an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer or stockholder for an accounting, or to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud, or to enforce a liability, penalty or forfeiture, or to recover damages for waste or for an injury to property or for an accounting therewith” shall be “commenced within six years.” Defendant’s contention that the general provision for “injury to property” found in Section 214(4) controls over this more specific period in Section 213(7) is frivolous. The legislative history of Section 213(7) and principles of statutory construction make clear that Section 213(7) supplants all other statutes of limitation potentially applicable to a suit on a corporation’s claim against its director, officer or shareholder. ... Likewise, because plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim fits squarely within CPLR § 213(7), defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the shorter limitations period in CPLR § 214(4). The Court therefore holds that the six-year period under Section 213(7) applies to plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 213(7) requires an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder for specified relief to be commenced within six years.

Lippe v. Bairnco Corp. · filed 1999-01-06(7)

I conclude that the six-year CPLR § 213(7) limitations period applies.

Section 213(7) applies to actions by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former corporate director or officer and provides a six-year limitations period.

Sardanis v. Sumitomo Corp. · filed 2001-01-09(7)

The allegations of breach and inducement to breach fiduciary duty are both governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations. CPLR 213 (7) applies to actions by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former corporate director or officer.

Section 213(7) gives a school district six years to bring covered equitable or damages claims against a former board member.

Roslyn Union Free School District v. Barkan · filed 2011-05-03(7)

From its plain language, CPLR 213 (7) provides a corporation, such as a school district, with six years to assert both equitable and nonequitable causes of action against a former director, officer or shareholder.

CPLR 213(7) gives a six-year limitations period to the claims against corporate officers and directors addressed here; allegations based on earlier conduct are untimely.

Javaheri v. Old Cedar Development Corp. · filed 2011-05-10(7)

The statute of limitations applicable to the second cause of action in the amended complaint is six years (see CPLR 213 [7]; Toscano v Toscano, 285 AD2d 590, 591 [2001]; Rupert v Tigue, 259 AD2d 946, 946-947 [1999]). Accordingly, allegations related to conduct and events occurring more than six years prior to commencement of this action are untimely.

Section 213(7) gives a corporation six years to bring an injury-to-property claim against a present or former officer, including a claim for conversion.

Rye Police Ass'n v. Chittenden · filed 2014-01-27(7)

However, CPLR 213 (7) explicitly states that it is applicable in actions “to recover damages for waste or for an injury to property” (emphasis added), albeit only actions by corporations against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder. Thus, the court can easily conclude that CPLR 213 (7), rather than CPLR 214 (4), applies in this case.

Section 213(7) gives a corporation six years to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a former director or officer.

Levy v. Young Adult Institute, Inc. · filed 2015-04-30(7)

Here, YAI — a not-for-profit corporation — brings this suit for an injury caused by an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Levy, the corporation’s former Chief Executive Officer. Accordingly, this cause of action falls squarely under the six-year period provided under CPLR 213(7) for the claims of corporations against their former directors or officers. The breach of fiduciary duty claim is therefore timely, and the motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

Section 213(7) provides a six-year limitations period for an action brought on behalf of a corporation against a former officer to recover for waste or injury to property, or for a related accounting.

Paul Schmidt, M.D. v. Stone · filed 2020-03-23(7)

Accordingly, this suit is governed by the six- year statute of limitations in NY CPLR § 213(7).

Section 213(7) gives a corporation six years to bring covered claims against its present or former directors and officers, whether the claims seek legal or equitable relief.

Sama v. Mullaney · filed 2020-12-19(7)

Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(7), a six-year period of limitations applies to “an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer or stockholder for an accounting, or to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud, or to enforce a liability, penalty or forfeiture, or to recover damages for waste or for an injury to property or for an accounting in conjunction therewith.”

Section 213(8) requires fraud claims to be brought within the greater of six years after accrual or two years after discovery, or when discovery should have occurred with reasonable diligence.

PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. v. ROYAL BANK OF CANADA · filed 2023-03-31(8)

Under New York Law, causes of action predicated on fraud “must be commenced . . . [within] the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under who the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2010) (“NYCPLR”). This “discovery rule” allows the Trustee to seek recovery of additional initial transfers within two years of the discovery of such transfers. The discovery rule only applies to initial transfers.

Section 213(7) requires actions by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder in the listed categories to be commenced within six years.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Oberting, III · filed 2023-11-21(7)

New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 213 provides, in relevant part: The following actions must be commenced within six years . . . [including] an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer or stockholder for an accounting, or to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud, or to enforce a liability, penalty or forfeiture, or to recover damages for waste or for injury to property or for an accounting in conjunction therewith. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(7) (CONSOL. 2023). Notably, this New York statute does not distinguish between claims seeking equitable relief versus monetary relief as Gregory asserts is the dispositive question. Hence, the Court determines a six-year statute of limitations applies here and any amount of Gregory’s Compensation which was distributed prior to August 26, 2014, is barred from recovery.

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims a six-year limitations period or a two-year discovery period, whichever is longer.

Pare v. Pare · filed 2023-12-13(8)

"A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer" ( Coleman v Wells Fargo & Co. , 125 AD3d 716, 716; see CPLR 203[g]; 213[8]).

Section 213(7) provides a six-year limitations period for certain corporate claims against officers; disputed officer status may prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

Universal Remote Control, Inc. v. ADP Totalsource, Inc. · filed 2025-07-07(7)

Naturally, plaintiff disagrees, contending that the operative statute of limitations is actually CPLR § 213(7). ... Marmo argues that this section does not apply because she was not a corporate officer. Plaintiff disagrees, and submits to the Court multiple documents that Marmo signed as an officer of plaintiff. Whether this qualifies her as an officer under this section of the CPLR cannot be resolved on this motion to dismiss.

Section 213(7)’s six-year limitations period applies to claims against actual corporate officers, directors, or shareholders, but not de facto officers or directors.

Steinfeld Ex Rel. Estate of General Vision Services, Inc. v. Richard A. Eisner & Co. (In Re General Vision Services, Inc · filed 2006-06-12(7)

Central to the Court’s holding was the determination that § 213(7) applied only to actual officers, directors, or shareholders.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitation period for contract claims, but it does not control claims arising from a utility's applicable rate tariff.

Glens Falls Communication Corp. v. New York State Public Service Commission · filed 1998-01-15(2)

Inasmuch as petitioner’s claim to recoup NYT’s overcharges, like the claims in the foregoing case, arises from the applicable rate tariff, CPLR 213 (2) is not controlling.

Under § 213(4), a qualifying partial payment renews the six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure, including for a spouse who implicitly authorized payments benefiting her.

Citibank, N.A. v. Gifford · filed 2022-04-22(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [4]), which "begins to run on the date on which the mortgagee is entitled to demand [*2]full payment of the loan" ( McNeary v Charlebois , 169 AD3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2019]). ... Thus, any payments made by Thomas Gifford that inured to Marlene Gifford's benefit were implicitly authorized by Marlene Gifford and worked to renew the statute of limitations as to both defendants ( see Clute v Clute , 197 NY 439, 447 [1910]; Ricci v Perrino , 285 App Div 502, 504-505 [3d Dept 1955]).

Regular payments after a note’s end date that unequivocally show an intent to satisfy the debt cause the six-year limitations period on the remaining balance to run from when payments cease.

Chiu v. 1-9 Bond Street Realty, Inc. · filed 2010-12-02(2)

Thus, the limitations period as to the balance, if any, on the note began to run when 1-9 Bond Street Realty ceased making payments in December 2005 (see Lew Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d 516, 521 [1976]; Roth v Michelson, 55 NY2d 278, 281 [1982]; National Heritage Life Ins. Co. in Liquidation v Hill St. Assoc., 262 AD2d 378 [1999]).

A voluntary partial payment of principal or interest that acknowledges the debt can renew the six-year limitations period.

Skaneateles Savings Bank v. Modi Associates · filed 1998-02-04(2)

We are not persuaded that, because the UCC is silent on whether any payment of interest or principal on the demand note tolls the statute, the common-law rule has been abrogated. ... Because the record establishes that the payments implied "a promise to pay the remainder of the debt”, they revived the debt "for limitations purposes” (Matter of Flaum v Birnbaum, 177 AD2d 170, 180, lv dismissed sub nom. Matter of Flaum v Puedo, 80 NY2d 925; see, 5A Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-122:22, at 435 [3d ed]).

A partial payment on a demand note restarts the six-year limitations period under CPLR 213.

Grant v. Marshall · filed 2003-07-14

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, while this action was not commenced until February 9, 1999, it is not barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213), as the defendant’s partial payment on the note made in May 1995 started the statute of limitations running anew (see Roth v Michelson, 55 NY2d 278, 281 [1982]; Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d 516, 521 [1976]).

Partial payments on a debt can restart the limitations period under § 213(4).

Dominion Financial Corp. v. Haimil Realty Corp. (In re Haimil Realty Corp.) · filed 2016-02-16(4)

In the Joint Pretrial Order, Haimil asserted that the debt owed to Dominion is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR § 213(4). ... The partial payments made by Haimil to Dominion in 2008-2010 effectively reinstated the statute of limitations such that the state court litigation that Dominion filed in August 2012 was plainly within the limitations period.

CPLR 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on debt claims, which may be renewed by partial payment.

Schwartz v. Abbatine · filed 2026-03-25(2)

Here, the defendants contended that the plaintiff failed to commence this action within the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]). The defendants met their prima facie burden because neither party disputed that the time within which to commence this action had expired ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Macaulay , 187 AD3d 721, 723). However, in opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was renewed with respect to the note and the loans by partial payments made by Anthony.

Section 213(1) requires an action to rescind property allocating marital agreement provisions to be commenced within six years of execution.

Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum · filed 2000-04-03(1)

A cause of action to rescind the provisions of a marital agreement which allocates property must be commenced within six years of the execution of the agreement (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Djavaheri-Saatchi v Djavaheri-Saatchi, 236 AD2d 583; Anonymous v Anonymous, 233 AD2d 350; Pacchiana v Pacchiana, 94 AD2d 721).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period, but a continuing wrong accrues anew each day or for each injury.

1050 Tenants Corp. v. Lapidus · filed 2001-12-20(2)

The alleged violation of defendants’ contractual obligations to comply with the law and refrain from interfering with the rights of other lessees amounts to a continuous or recurring wrong ... In such circumstances, the wrong is not referable exclusively to the day the original wrong was committed; rather, a cause of action accrues anew every day, and for each injury (75A NY Jur 2d, Limitations and Laches, § 265, at 82).

Section 213(1)’s six-year limitation does not bar a challenge to an ongoing violation of the public trust doctrine while the violation continues.

Capruso v. Village of Kings Point · filed 2014-06-12(1)

In sum, under the continuing wrong doctrine, plaintiffs are able to challenge defendants’ ongoing violation of the public trust doctrine at any time while the violation lasts, without being barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 213(5) gives the State six years, or two years from discovery, to sue over the spoliation or misappropriation of public property.

State v. Seventh Regiment Fund, Inc. · filed 2002-06-04(5)

Under the CPLR, the limitations period for an action by the State based on the spoliation or misappropriation of public property is six years — or two years from the time of discovery — in contrast to the three-year period, with no discovery rule, now generally applicable to actions for conversion (see CPLR 213 [5]; 203 [g]; cf. CPLR 214 [3]; General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125, 127 [1966]).

The six-year limitations period for an action to recover on a demand note begins when the note is executed.

Shelley v. Shelley · filed 2002-11-12(2)

Because this was a demand note, the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]) began to run from the date of execution of the note (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Wickwire, 81 NY2d 138, 143; Pomaro v Quality Sheet Metal, 295 AD2d 416, 418).

Section 213(1) gives a fiduciary accounting proceeding a six-year limitations period, which begins when the fiduciary openly repudiates the obligation or the account is judicially settled.

Matter of Eisdorfer · filed 2020-11-04(1)

A proceeding to compel an accounting by a fiduciary is governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[1]). ... Here, the respondents failed to sustain their burden of establishing that the trustees had openly repudiated their fiduciary obligations to the petitioners so as to start the statute of limitations clock ( see Matter of Barabash , 31 NY2d at 81; Matter of Meyer , 303 AD2d at 683; Matter of Behr , 191 AD2d at 432).

CPLR 213 (1) gives beneficiaries six years to compel a former trustee’s accounting, beginning when the trust relationship ends and the trustee turns the estate over to a successor.

Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP · filed 2008-10-16(1)

The parties agree that an accounting proceeding against a former trustee is governed by CPLR 213 (1), which lists “an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law” among actions that “must be commenced within six years.” ... For all these reasons, we reaffirm the rule of Spallholz: running of the statute of limitations on a proceeding to compel an accounting begins when “the trust relation is at an end, and the trustee has yielded the estate to a successor” (216 NY at 209).

Section 213(1) gives a proceeding to compel a fiduciary accounting a six-year limitations period that begins when the fiduciary openly repudiates the obligation or judicially settles the account.

In re the Estate of Meyer · filed 2003-03-24(1)

A proceeding to compel an accounting by a fiduciary is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]). The claim does not begin to accrue until there is either an open repudiation of the fiduciary’s obligation or a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account (see Matter of Rodken, 270 AD2d 784 [2000]; Matter of Winne, 232 AD2d 956 [1996]; see also Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76 [1972]).

CPLR 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for a proceeding to compel a fiduciary to account.

In re Hiletzaris · filed 2013-04-03(1)

A proceeding to compel a fiduciary to account is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80 [1972]; Matter of Sbuttoni, 16 AD3d 693, 694 [2005]; Matter of Meyer, 303 AD2d 682, 683 [2003]).