N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

CPLR 213(1) gives a proceeding to compel a fiduciary to account a six-year limitations period, which runs after open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or judicial settlement of the account.

Campbell v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2017-11-15(1)

“A proceeding to compel a fiduciary to account is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1)” (Matter of Hiletzaris, 105 AD3d 740, 741 [2013]). “[C]laims for an accounting accrue when there is either an open repudiation of the fiduciary’s obligation or a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account” (Incorporated Vil. of Muttontown v Ryba, 121 AD3d 757, 759 [2014]). ... The fiduciary obligations of HSBC and Hazard were openly repudiated in 2006, more than six years prior to the commencement of this action (see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for a cause of action seeking an accounting.

Matter of Ardalan v. Safaie · filed 2025-06-27(1)

It is undisputed that "[t]he statute of limitations for a cause of action seeking an accounting is six years" ( id. ; see CPLR 213 [1]; Matter of Rodken , 270 AD2d 784, 785 [3d Dept 2000]).

Under CPLR 213(2), the six-year limitations period for an unaccelerated installment debt begins separately when each installment becomes due and payable.

Cadlerock, L.L.C. v. Renner · filed 2010-04-06(2)

Contrary to plaintiffs contention, the promissory note, which required defendant to pay principal and interest payments monthly for 20 years, after which the loan would have self-liquidated, was an installment contract (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 141-142 [1993]), and, since the debt was not accelerated while defendant was making the monthly payments, the applicable six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) began to run on the date on which each installment became due and payable (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. at 141).

Section 213(2) gives six years to sue on a promissory note; for a note payable in installments, the period runs separately from each installment’s due date and default unless the debt is accelerated.

Sce v. Ach · filed 2008-11-05(2)

The statute of limitations for an action to recover on a promissory note is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]). ... However, with respect to a note payable in installments, such as the one at bar, there are separate causes of action for each installment accrued, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date each installment becomes due and is defaulted upon, unless the debt is accelerated (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 141 [1993]; Fulgenzi v Rink, 253 AD2d 846 [1998]; Pagano v Smith, 201 AD2d 632, 633 [1994]).

Section 213 gives a creditor six years to sue for the full balance of an installment contract, measured from the date the creditor exercises an optional acceleration clause.

Breeden v. Erie Islands Resort & Marina (In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc.) · filed 2003-04-28

CPLR § 206(a) is inapplicable and this matter is governed by CPLR § 213, which provides for a six year statute of limitations that under the facts of this case accrued from the date the acceleration clause was exercised, i.e. April 12, 1996.

Section 213(1) gives quantum meruit claims a six-year limitations period.

Tarquino v. Muse Enterprises Inc. · filed 2020-07-09(1)

Under New York law, a quantum meruit claim is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) bars a quantum meruit claim for services when the work was completed more than six years before the action began.

Petracca v. Petracca · filed 2003-05-19(2)

However, they demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the second counterclaim to recover damages in quantum meruit for services rendered by submitting documentary evidence that the defendants had completed the work in question by the end of 1993, more than six years before this action was commenced (see CPLR 213 [2]; Stewart v Stuart, 262 AD2d 396 [1999]; Moors v Hall, 143 AD2d 336, 339-340 [1988]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for account stated and quantum meruit claims for legal services.

Erdheim v. Gelfman · filed 2003-03-31(2)

In 1998 the plaintiff commenced the instant action to recover payment for legal services, having completed performing those services for the defendant and having provided the defendant with a statement of the account more than seven years earlier. The statute of limitations for both the account stated and quantum meruit causes of action is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]; Stewart v Stuart, 262 AD2d 396 [1999]).

Section 213(2) gives a quantum meruit claim a six-year limitations period, barring recovery for services performed more than six years before the action commenced.

Rauch v. Ciardullo · filed 2015-04-02(2)

Inasmuch as the quantum meruit cause of action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations, however, plaintiff's claims are barred to the extent that they allege the performance of services prior to April 25, 2007, which is six years from the commencement of the action (see CPLR 213 [2]; Donahue-Halverson, Inc. v Wissing Constr. & Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95 AD2d 953, 953 [1983]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for quantum meruit claims.

Leib-Podry v. Gates III · filed 2025-06-30(2)

As for a quantum meruit claim, New York’s six-year statute of limitations would require her to have brought such a claim by 2002.

CPLR 213 can time-bar affirmative defenses and counterclaims in a partition action.

Shui Ying Lee v. Jing Ting Lee · filed 2010-12-28(1), (8)

As the Supreme Court properly determined, the defendants’ affirmative defenses and counterclaims are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (see CPLR 213 [1], [8]; 203 [g]; Coombs v Jervier, 74 AD3d 724, 724 [2010]; Moreau v Archdiocese of N.Y., 261 AD2d 456, 456 [1999]; Myers v Myers, 2010 NY Slip Op 31965[U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2010]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to actions commenced, not to a defense to a petition.

New York State Crime Victims Board v. Zaffuto · filed 2003-06-20

The statute of limitations applies to “actions” sought to be commenced (see CPLR 213), and Cristal Zaffuto’s defense to the instant petition is not such an action.

Section 213(2) time-bars an unrelated offset claim based on expenditures made outside its six-year limitations period.

Robson & Miller, LLP v. Sakow · filed 2014-10-23(2)

... and, in any event, such proposed, unrelated offset claim would be time-barred (see CPLR 213 [2]; 203 [d]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period, but permits defensive reliance on equitable recoupment for claims arising from the same transactions.

Fortin v. Hill & Markes, Inc. · filed 2003-12-04(2)

However, given that defendants’ counterclaim—and their affirmative defenses—clearly arise out of the same transactions that form the basis of the claims asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants’ claims are not barred to the extent that they seek no more than to rely upon the equitable doctrine of recoupment (see Enrico & Sons Contr. v Bridgemarket Assoc., 252 AD2d 429, 430 [1998]; Town of Amherst v County of Erie, 247 AD2d 869, 869-870 [1998]; Katz v Bach Realty, 192 AD2d 307, 308 [1993]; Bendat v Premier Broadcast Group, 175 AD2d 536, 538-539 [1991]).

Section 213(2) bars a claim dependent on a superior right of possession when the plaintiff fails to pursue the remedy within the applicable three or six year period.

Leventritt v. Sotheby's, Inc. · filed 2004-03-16(2)

Her failure to do so for more than three or six years—in this case, over 30 years— bars any claim she may have, including that asserted for property damage to the painting, dependent upon a superior right of possession (CPLR 213 [2]; 214 [3], [4]).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraudulent conveyance claims.

Schneider v. Barnard · filed 2014-04-02(8)

The DCL allows for the avoidance of transfers made up to six years before the petition was filed.

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitations period makes a fraudulent conveyance claim filed almost nine years after the alleged transfers untimely unless a saving provision applies.

Ray v. Ray · filed 2021-12-27(1)

If the 2020 Action had been commenced at that time, almost nine years after Christina’s allegedly fraudulent transfers, it would have been untimely.

Section 213(8) sets the limitations period for fraudulent conveyance claims, measured from the conveyance or when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Financial Assistance, Inc. v. Graham · filed 2021-02-24(8)

The fraudulent conveyance causes of action were shown to be time-barred, as they were asserted more than six years after the allegedly fraudulent conveyance or the time that such alleged fraud was discovered or could have been discovered, with reasonable diligence ( see CPLR 213[8]; Island Holding v O'Brien , 6 AD3d 498, 500).

CPLR 213(1) gives a constructive fraudulent conveyance claim six years from the conveyance to be filed.

Ray v. Ray · filed 2021-03-25(1)

The statute of limitations for fraudulent-conveyance cases under § 273 is six years. See Jaliman v. D.H. Blair & Co. Inc, 105 A.D.3d 646, 647 (1st Dep’t 2013) (“New York law provides that a claim for constructive fraud is governed by the six-year limitation set out in CPLR 213(1), and that such a claim arises at the time the fraud or conveyance occurs.”). The allegedly fraudulent conveyance at issue here took place in 2008 and 2009. This action was filed in July 2020, far more than six years later.

Section 213(8) gives fraud causes of action a six-year limitations period, subject to a two-year period after discovery or when discovery should have occurred with reasonable diligence.

Island Holding, LLC v. O'Brien · filed 2004-04-12(8)

A cause of action by a judgment creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is governed by the six-year statute of limitations for causes of action alleging fraud, which commences to run at the time the allegedly fraudulent conveyance occurs: where actual fraud is alleged, the statute of limitations is six years from the fraudulent transfer or two years from the time the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence (see Matter of Gaglione v Sam’s Bargain Ctr., 283 AD2d 645 [2001]; Liberty Co. v Boyle, 272 AD2d 380, 381 [2000]; CPLR 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period, measured from the challenged transfer, for a New York fraudulent-transfer claim.

Kaye v. Nath Companies (In re Duke & King Acquisition Corp.) · filed 2014-03-31(8)

Whether Minnesota or New York law applies, the minimum limitations period is six years from the date of the challenged transfer. ... This much of the argument is not in controversy, and can not be. ... N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) gives a fraudulent inducement claim a six-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Barnett v. Countrywide Bank, FSB · filed 2014-11-20(8)

As the Plaintiffs allege that they were fraudulently induced to obtain that loan, this claim necessarily arose on or before that date. Accordingly, the six-year statute of limitations expired on December 26, 2013. However, the Plaintiffs did not commence this action until April 23, 2014.

Section 213(2) gives a creditor six years from a subordinated note’s maturity to sue for collection when the subordination terms do not defer the obligor’s duty to pay.

Nordberg v. South Street Seaport Corp. · filed 2007-09-27(2)

The causes of action seeking collection on a subordinated note from the South Street Seaport Corporation, as obligor, or by piercing the corporate veil from its affiliate, the South Street Seaport Museum, are time-barred (CPLR 213 [2]) because plaintiff did not sue within six years from the date the note matured on May 31, 1998 (see Scionti v Reid, 238 AD2d 496 [1997]).

Section 213(2) gives six years to sue on a promissory note; for an unaccelerated installment note, each unpaid installment accrues separately when due.

Morrison v. Zaglool · filed 2011-10-18(2)

For purposes of the statute of limitations, a cause of action to recover on this first promissory note, based on a default in the payment of any one installment due under the note, accrued on the first day of each month of the 48 months at issue, and expired, respectively, six years thereafter.

CPLR 213(2) gives a claim on a promissory note six years from accrual; for a note payable upon written request, the period begins when the request is made.

Minihane v. Brown · filed 2026-03-18(2)

A cause of action to recover on a promissory note has a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]; Carpenito v Linksman , 197 AD3d 553, 554). ... Here, under the specific terms of the promissory note at issue, repayment was not due until the plaintiff requested repayment, and the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain relief in court until she made such a request. Thus, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until September 11, 2023, and this action was timely ( see Hahn Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v American Zurich Ins. Co. , 18 NY3d at 770-772; Morrison v Zaglool , 88 AD3d at 858).

CPLR 213 (1) supplies a six-year limitations period for a claim seeking a permanent injunction, and a defendant seeking dismissal must establish that the period expired.

Meyer v. Stout · filed 2007-11-23(1)

Defendant failed to establish that the action was commenced after the applicable six-year statute of limitations had expired (see CPLR 213 [1]; see also Filby v Brooks, 105 AD2d 826, 828 [1984], affd 66 NY2d 640 [1985]; Rahabi v Morrison, 81 AD2d 434, 439 [1981]).

CPLR 213 (2) gives a claimant six years to bring a claim for no-fault first-party benefits against a self-insured motor vehicle rental company.

Pinnacle Open MRI, P.C. v. Republic Western Insurance · filed 2008-01-03(2)

Accordingly, it is the holding of this court that a claim for no-fault first-party benefits against a self-insured motor vehicle rental company will be subject to the six-year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213 (2), and the motion of Republic Western to dismiss this action as untimely is denied.

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period applies to actions to recover first-party no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity.

Spring World Acupuncture, P.C. v. NYC Transit Authority · filed 2009-05-22(2)

Accordingly, we hold that an action to recover first-party no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity is subject to the same six-year statute of limitations as an action against an insurer pursuant to the policy.

CPLR 213(2)’s six-year limitations period governs claims for no-fault benefits against self-insurers.

Denise v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2009-07-22(2)

Since we find no basis in law or compelling reasons of policy to distinguish between the right to uninsured motorist benefits and the right to no-fault benefits, we hold that a claim for no-fault benefits against a self-insurer, such as defendant here, is governed by a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) gives a claim for assigned no-fault benefits a six-year limitations period.

New York Medical Rehab., P.C. v. Travelers Insurance · filed 2013-06-17(2)

Since the six-year statute of limitations applies to the claim involved herein (CPLR 213 [2]; ...), in order for plaintiffs action to be timely, it had to have been commenced by January 14, 2009.

Section 213(2)'s limitations period for an action to recover assigned no-fault benefits runs from 30 days after the insurer receives the claim.

Sheepshead Bay Oral Surgery, PLLC v. Unitirin Direct Ins. Co. · filed 2019-12-13(2)

Defendant demonstrated that plaintiff's cause of action accrued 30 days after defendant received plaintiff's claim and plaintiff did not rebut that showing ( see DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. , 32 Misc 3d 129 [A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). As a result, plaintiff's cause of action was not timely commenced ( see CPLR 213 [2]; DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. , 32 Misc 3d 129[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51304[U]).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits.

Vincent Med. Servs., P.C. v. Omni Indem. Co. · filed 2022-02-18(2)

Plaintiff did not commence this action until 2017, after the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions, which is applicable to this cause of action ( see CPLR 213 [2]; Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. , 37 AD3d 775 [2007]), had expired.

Section 213(2) gives a claimant six years to sue for no-fault benefits; when an insurer denies the claim before the claim determination period expires, the claim accrues when the claimant receives the denial.

New Millennium Med. Imaging, P.C. v. GEICO · filed 2022-09-23(2)

It is well settled that the six-year statute of limitations applies to the claim involved herein (CPLR 213 [2]; see Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. , 37 AD3d 775 [2007]; Cautious Care Med., P.C. v Omni Indem. Co. , 69 Misc 3d 145[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51384[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]). ... we hold that, where a no-fault claimant receives a denial of claim form prior to the expiration of the claim determination period, the claimant's right to recover upon that claim accrues upon its receipt of the denial.

Section 213(2) gives a claimant six years from accrual to bring a no-fault benefits claim against an insurer.

ZZ Acupuncture, P.C. v. Kemper Ins. Co. · filed 2024-08-30(2)

A no-fault cause of action against an insurance company must be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues ( see CPLR 213 [2]; Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. , 37 AD3d 775 [2007]), and the cause of action accrues when payment of no-fault benefits becomes "overdue" ( see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; see also Matter of Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v Glenwood Med., P.C. , 48 AD3d 319, 320 [2008]; Mandarino , 37 AD3d 775; Acupuncture Works, P.C. v MVAIC , 27 Misc 3d 131[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50646[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contribution claims.

Ruiz v. Griffin · filed 2008-04-22

Further, contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court, a claim for contribution, whether asserted in a third-party complaint or a separate action, accrues at the time of payment of the underlying claim (see Bay Ridge Air Rights v State of New York, 44 NY2d 49 [1978]; Blum v Good Humor Corp., 57 AD2d 911 [1977]; CPLR 1401) and is subject to a six-year limitations period, which had not run (see CPLR 213).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contribution claims, running from payment of the primary liability.

Liskiewicz v. Hameister · filed 2010-07-27

Inasmuch as the counterclaim seeks relief in the nature of contribution, the statute of limitations, which is six years, would not begin to run until the primary liability is paid (see Tavernier v Toner, 155 AD2d 948 [4th Dept 1989]; Allen v Town of Hempstead, 145 AD2d 588, 589 [2d Dept 1988]; Blum v Good Humor Corp., 57 AD2d 911 [2d Dept 1977]; see also State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83, 88-89 [1984]; Bay Ridge Air Rights v State of New York, 44 NY2d 49, 54-56 [1978]; see generally CPLR 213).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contribution and contractual indemnity claims, which accrue when an underlying claim is paid.

Vidal v. Claremont 99 Wall, LLC · filed 2015-01-21

Such a claim accrues at the time of payment of an underlying claim and is subject to a six-year limitations period (see CPLR 213, 1401; Tedesco v A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 8 NY3d 243 [2007]; Bay Ridge Air Rights v State of New York, 44 NY2d 49 [1978]; Ruiz v Griffin, 50 AD3d 1007, 1010 [2008]).

Section 213 (1) gives six years to bring an action for an accounting of partnership interests.

Leonard v. Cummins · filed 2021-07-08(1)

Given that the complaint clearly states that it is an action for an accounting and the partnership dissolved on December 1, 2018, the complaint was brought well within the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [1]; Partnership Law § 74; compare Schultz v Sayada , 133 AD3d at 1017).

Section 213(1) requires a partnership accounting action to be commenced within six years after dissolution.

Mashihi v. 166-25 Hillside Partners · filed 2008-05-13(1)

A cause of action for an accounting accrues upon dissolution of a partnership (see Partnership Law § 74; Allied Bingo Supplies of Fla., Inc. v Hynes, 27 AD3d 597, 598 [2006]; Posner v Posner, 280 AD2d 318 [2001]), and must be commenced within six years of the dissolution (see Sagus Mar. Corp. v Rynne & Co., 207 AD2d 701, 702 [1994]; CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on a partnership accounting claim, running from dissolution of the partnership.

Brooks v. Haidt · filed 2009-02-17(1)

Plaintiffs accounting cause of action accrued upon the dissolution of the subject partnership (Partnership Law § 74) and is barred by the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (1) (see Sagus Mar. Corp. v Rynne & Co., 207 AD2d 701, 702 [1994]).

Section 213(1) gives a claim for an accounting of a joint venture interest a six-year limitations period that begins to run no later than dissolution of the venture.

Schultz v. Sayada · filed 2015-11-12(1)

Finally, we reject plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to an accounting of his interest in the joint venture, as such relief is time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations which began to run no later than December 31, 2003, the date on which Supreme Court properly determined that the joint venture was dissolved (see Mashihi v 166-25 Hillside Partners, 51 AD3d at 739; Mills v O'Donnell, 188 AD2d 692, 693 [1992]; see also CPLR 213 [1]; Partnership Law § 74).

Section 213(2) bars a tenant’s challenge to a continuously applied lease escalation calculation method if the tenant sues more than six years after gaining constructive knowledge of that method.

J.C. Penney Corp. v. Carousel Center Co. · filed 2008-07-08(2)

Where a plaintiff brings a claim alleging an overcharge of lease escalation payments, he is barred from attacking the method for computing those payments if (1) he does not file his complaint within six years after he obtained constructive knowledge of the method of computation and (2) the method of computation at issue was continuously applied during that time period.

Section 213(2) gives a breach of warranty of habitability claim a six-year limitations period.

Gross v. 420 East 72nd Street Tenants Corp. · filed 2008-09-15(2)

The second cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability is governed by the six-year statute of limitations and is not time-barred (CPLR 213 [2]; Witherbee Ct. Assoc. v Greene, 7 AD3d 699 [2d Dept 2004]; see also Solow v Wellner, 86 NY2d 582 [1995]).

Section 213(2) allows six years to bring a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

Roman v. Emigrant Savings Bank-Brooklyn/Queens · filed 2013-11-13(2)

The alleged breaches of the implied warranty of habitability that occurred within the six-year period prior to the commencement of the action, including the alleged water leak and mold infestation in 2010, are not time-barred (see CPLR 213 [2]; Witherbee Ct. Assoc. v Greene, 7 AD3d 699, 701 [2004]; Sprague v Luna Park Co-op, 83 AD2d 877 [1981]).

Section 213(2) gives a lender six years from each demand loan advance to sue for repayment.

Seattle Pacific Industries, Inc. v. Golden Valley Realty Associates · filed 2008-09-23(2)

Although the claims regarding four of the advances, totaling $37,877.70, were not time-barred, since they were made within six years of the commencement of the action, issues of fact exist as to the extent of the defendants’ liability for those advances.

For loans with no specified repayment date, the six-year limitations period begins when the obligation is created.

Vitale v. Giaimo · filed 2013-02-27(2)

Thus, pursuant to CPLR 213 (2), the six-year statute of limitations on these causes of action began to run on the date the obligations were created (see Seattle Pac. Indus., Inc. v Golden Val. Realty Assoc., 54 AD3d at 931-932; Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d at 319).

Section 213(4)'s six-year period is satisfied when a timely CPLR 3213 motion commences the action, even if a later summary judgment motion is filed after the period expires.

Dyck-O'Neal, Inc. v. Thomson · filed 2008-11-21(4)

The court denied plaintiffs second motion and granted defendants’ cross motions to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs second motion was made after the six-year statute of limitations had expired (see CPLR 213 [4]). That was error. ... Thus, plaintiffs June 2006 motion papers were converted to a complaint pursuant to the express terms of CPLR 3213, and the March 2007 motion should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment within the existing June 2006 action, which was timely commenced (see generally Schulz v Barrows, 263 AD2d 565, 571 [1999], affd 94 NY2d 624 [2000]).

Section 213 bars untimely claims that an elective-share waiver resulted from fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.

In re Estate of Doman · filed 2009-01-13(1), (8)

The court also correctly determined that such claims, as well as the claim of coercion (see Pacchiana v Pacchiana, 94 AD2d 721 [1983]), were time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1], [8]; DeMille v DeMille, 5 AD3d at 429).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not apply to a negligent misrepresentation claim that alleges neither fraud nor constructive fraud.

Colon v. Banco Popular North America · filed 2009-02-24

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the action is not governed by a six-year limitations period (CPLR 213), since they neither alleged fraud nor constructive fraud against defendant (see e.g. Fandy Corp. v Lung-Fong Chen, 262 AD2d 352 [1999]).

Section 213(1) gives a negligent misrepresentation claim six years from the plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentation to be commenced.

ENZINNA, NICOLE M. v. D'YOUVILLE COLLEGE · filed 2011-05-06(1)

The cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is governed ... by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to equitable actions in general (see CPLR 213 [1]; Fandy Corp. v Lung-Fong Chen, 262 AD2d 352; Milin Pharmacy v Cash Register Sys., 173 AD2d 686). We conclude that this action was commenced within six years of the accrual of that cause of action, i.e., the dates on which plaintiffs relied upon defendant’s alleged misrepresentation (see Lasher v Albion Cent. School Dist., 38 AD3d 1197, 1198).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for negligent misrepresentation claims closely aligned with intentional fraud claims.

Maverick Fund, L.D.C. v. Comverse Technology, Inc. · filed 2011-07-12

Regardless of which subsection of § 213 provides the limitations period for negligent misrepresentation claims, the six-year limitations period applies to plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claims because the claims are closely aligned with plaintiffs’ intentional fraud claims.

Section 213(8) makes cross claims based on events no later than 1999 untimely when first proposed in 2007.

B.B.C.F.D., S.A. v. Bank Julius Baer & Co. · filed 2009-05-05(8)

In any event, the new cross claims are untimely (see CPLR 213 [8]), and the “relation back” provision of CPLR 203 (f) does not apply because “the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.”

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims based on constructive fraud, even when they seek money damages.

Balta v. AYCO COMPANY, LP · filed 2009-05-20(1)

Accordingly, the breach of fiduciary duty claims that are based on a failure to disclose information (i.e. constructive fraud) are subject to a six-year limitations period, even though they demand money damages.

Section 213(2) bars claims for unpaid rent and lease charges that accrued before the applicable limitations cutoff.

Realty v. Lanaj Home Furnishings · filed 2009-09-29(2)

The plaintiffs claims to recover unpaid rent and other charges pursuant to the 1991 lease that accrued prior to April 19, 1998, and unpaid rent for rooms 212A and 213 that accrued prior to April 19, 1998, are barred by the statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; 833 N. Corp. v Tashlik & Assoc., 248 AD2d 664 [1998]).

Section 213(4) generally gives a mortgagee six years to bring a foreclosure action, but the limitations period does not run against a mortgagee in possession.

LaPlaca v. Schell · filed 2009-12-24(4)

An action to foreclose on a mortgage is generally governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [4]). ... However, the statute of limitations will not run against a mortgagee in possession, the theory being that the mortgagor’s acquiescence to that possession is a continuing acknowledgment of the debt (see Holman v Newton, 275 App Div 513, 517 [1949]; Becker v McCrea, 149 App Div 211, 214-215 [1912], affd 214 NY 632 [1915]; 78 NY Jur 2d, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust § 470).

Section 213(4)’s six-year period for mortgage foreclosure is not tolled when a lender merely takes measures to protect the property under the mortgage, without taking possession by agreement with the mortgagor.

Mardenborough v. U.S. Bank N.A. · filed 2022-01-05(4)

Contrary to U.S. Bank's contention, the mere fact that it took measures to protect its rights in the property under paragraph nine of the mortgage does not establish that the parties reached an agreement for U.S. Bank to take possession of the premises with all the rights and obligations that possession entails. Paragraph nine of the mortgage merely allows the mortgagee to take measures to protect its rights in the property ( see Gasco Corp. & Gordian Group of Hong Kong v Tosco Props. , 236 AD2d 510), but the exercise of those rights cannot be construed as the mortgagor's continuing acknowledgment of the debt so as to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not apply to Sex Offender Registration Act classification proceedings because Article 6-C of the Correction Law has its own time limits.

People v. Gregory · filed 2010-03-26(1)

We reject defendant’s contention that the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 applies to this SORA classification proceeding.

Section 213’s contract and fraud limitations do not govern an action to enforce a judgment against alleged corporate alter egos.

County of Suffolk v. Love'M Sheltering, Inc. · filed 2010-04-19(2), (8)

The court finds, however, that the defendants’ reliance upon the provisions of CPLR 213 is misplaced and it thus rejects the defendants’ demands for dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5).

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitations period does not apply to enforcement of a child support arrears judgment.

GIBBS, PAULA L. v. GIBBS, ROBERT LEE · filed 2016-11-18(1)

We agree with the mother that the Support Magistrate erred in determining that the six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies to the 1986 judgment.

Section 213(1) gives a party six years to demand arbitration, measured from when the right to compel arbitration accrues.

424 West 33rd Street, LLC v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. · filed 2010-11-16(1)

Accordingly, all of the facts necessary to the cause of action such that tenant would be entitled to relief in court did not occur, and thus the claim did not accrue, until there existed a disagreement between the parties over a specific term of the contract. Because the parties’ negotiations were ongoing over a period of seven years, and no such disagreement arose until February of 2010, tenant’s right to compel arbitration is clearly not barred by the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) gives a claimant six years to demand arbitration for underinsured motorist benefits, measured from when the right to payment accrues; a claimant demanding arbitration after six years must prove a later accrual date.

Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pascarella · filed 2025-10-15(2)

"Generally, a demand for arbitration is subject to a six-year Statute of Limitations, which begins to run 'when all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court'" (Matter of Continental Ins. Co. v Richt, 253 AD2d 818, 819 [citation omitted], quoting Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175; see CPLR 213[2]; Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Hill, 107 AD3d 897, 898). ... Since Pascarella's demand for arbitration was not filed until November 16, 2023, more than six years after May 16, 2014, Pascarella was required to come forward with sufficient proof that a later accrual date applied (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Morrison, 267 AD2d 381, 382; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Torrales, 186 AD2d 647, 648).

Section 213(2)’s six-year limit applies to actions on contractual obligations, but does not bar a motion to enforce a matrimonial settlement in the underlying action.

Uzzo v. Hoth-Uzzo · filed 2011-07-19(2)

Former husband’s postjudgment order to show cause, which was not instituted as an action (i.e., plenary action), is not time-barred as the statute of limitations does not apply to motions filed in a matrimonial action. ... Pursuant to CPLR 213 (2), an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, must be commenced within six years.

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitation applies to actions, not motions to enforce a separation agreement.

Fragin v. Fragin · filed 2011-01-25(2)

Although we affirm the order of the Supreme Court, we do so on a ground different from that articulated by that court, as only actions are subject to a six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (2). Here, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to enforce the parties’ separation agreement is not subject to a statute of limitations defense.

Section 213(2)’s six-year limit for contract actions does not bar a tenant from challenging an apartment’s deregulated status during the tenancy.

Gersten v. 56 7th Avenue LLC · filed 2011-08-18(2)

Under the circumstances, a tenant should be able to challenge the deregulated status of an apartment at any time during the tenancy.

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to sue for breach of a settlement agreement; an unfulfilled one-time obligation does not restart the period each day it remains unfulfilled.

Robles v. Cox & Co. · filed 2012-01-10(2)

Under New York law, a settlement agreement is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. ... Thus, the breach of the provision to place the Plaintiff on the third floor occurred on January 28, 2002, and the statute of limitations for asserting this breach expired on January 28, 2008.

Section 213(1) and (2) impose a six-year limitations period on an action to enforce an IRA obligation under a matrimonial stipulation incorporated into a divorce judgment.

Boardman v. Kennedy · filed 2013-04-26(1) and (2)

The first cause of action, for enforcement of decedent’s obligation with respect to the IRA under the matrimonial stipulation and the judgment of divorce, is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) and (2), not by the 20-year statute of limitations for an action to enforce a money judgment set forth in CPLR 211 (b) (see Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596, 598 [1985]; Woronoff v Woronoff, 70 AD3d 933, 934 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 713 [2010]).

CPLR 213 sets a six-year limitations period for an action to enforce a matrimonial distributive award, but does not bar an application or motion for a QDRO.

Kraus v. Kraus · filed 2015-07-08(1), (2)

An action to enforce a distributive award in a matrimonial action is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1], [2]; Bayen v Bayen, 81 AD3d 865, 866 [2011]). However, this Court, in both Bayen and Denaro, made clear that since a QDRO is derived from the bargain struck by the parties, there is no need to commence a separate, plenary action to formalize the agreement, and that “an application or motion for the issuance of a QDRO is not barred by the statute of limitations” (Denaro v Denaro, 84 AD3d at 1149; see Bayen v Bayen, 81 AD3d at 866; Duhamel v Duhamel, 4 AD3d 739, 741 [2004]).

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitations period does not apply to a motion under Domestic Relations Law § 244 to enforce a separation agreement because the motion is not an action.

Holsberger v. Holsberger · filed 2017-10-26(2)

Here, however, the wife’s motion to enforce the terms of the separation agreement pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 244 is not an action and thus not subject to the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see Denaro v Denaro, 84 AD3d 1148, 1149 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 921 [2011]; Bayen v Bayen, 81 AD3d 865, 866 [2011]; Fragin v Fragin, 80 AD3d 725 [2011]; but cf. Allard v Allard, 145 AD3d 1254, 1256 [2016]).

CPLR 213(1)’s six-year limitations period applies to claims for a former spouse’s share of pension benefits, and a new period begins with each missed payment.

BIELECKI, INEZ v. BIELECKI, RICHARD · filed 2013-05-03(1)

Because defendant’s obligation to pay plaintiff her share of the pension was ongoing, the statute began to run anew with each missed payment (see Patricia A.M., 24 Misc 3d at 1015-1016; see generally Medalie v Jacobson, 120 AD2d 652). Thus, plaintiff’s claim is timely to the extent that it seeks payments missed within six years prior to her motion filed on October 21, 2010.

Section 213(1) allows six years to claim each missed pension payment because the limitations period begins anew with each missed payment.

Bielecki v. Bielecki · filed 2013-05-03(1)

Thus, plaintiffs claim is timely to the extent that it seeks payments missed within six years prior to her motion filed on October 21, 2010. To the extent that plaintiff sought her share of pension payments made more than six years prior to October 21, 2010, however, plaintiffs claim is untimely.

Section 213(2) gives a claim for uninsured motorist benefits against a self-insurer a six-year limitations period.

New York City Transit Authority v. Hill · filed 2013-06-19(2)

Hill’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits against the NYCTA, a self-insurer, is subject to the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (2) (see Matter of ELRAC Inc., v Suero, 38 AD3d 544, 545 [2007]; CPLR 213 [2]; see also Jenkins v State Farm Ins. Co., 21 AD3d 529 [2005]).

Section 213(2) gives claims under an uninsured motorist endorsement a six-year limitations period, which begins when the accident occurs or the offending vehicle later becomes uninsured.

Haggerty v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 2021-06-11(2)

"Claims made under the uninsured motorist endorsement of automobile insurance policies are governed by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract actions" ( Jenkins v State Farm Ins. Co. , 21 AD3d 529, 530 [2d Dept 2005]). "The claim accrues either when the accident occurred or when the allegedly offending vehicle thereafter becomes uninsured" ( id .).

CPLR 213 (1) applies a six-year limitations period to claims for attorney deceit because that liability existed at New York common law.

Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP · filed 2014-04-01(1)

As a result, claims for attorney deceit are subject to the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(1) gives Judiciary Law § 487 attorney deceit claims a six-year limitations period that begins when damages can reasonably be inferred.

Jacobson v. Fein, Such & Crane, LLP · filed 2026-06-03(1)

Claims for attorney deceit brought under Judiciary Law § 487 are subject to the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1) ( see Melcher v Greenberg Traurig, LLP , 23 NY3d 10, 15; Catsiapis v Pardalis & Nohavicka, LLP , 219 AD3d 563, 563). ... The court properly determined that the Judiciary Law § 487 causes of action accrued no earlier than October 15, 2018, the date the judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered in the foreclosure action, as such was the date from which damages could be reasonably inferred.

The six-year period for a mortgage foreclosure action begins when the loan is accelerated.

JP Morgan Chase, National Ass'n v. McDonald · filed 2014-10-21(4)

The court agrees with the temporary administrator that the mortgage was necessarily accelerated at the time of the commencement of the 2007 action, and that the statute of limitations began running at that time.

Section 213(4)’s six-year period for foreclosing this reverse mortgage began when the borrower died and the debt became due, even if the lender did not know of the death.

WENDOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES v. RIDGEWAY, JO-ANN · filed 2016-03-25(4)

Thus, the cause of action accrued on May 12, 2006, even if plaintiff was unaware that the event entitling it to relief had occurred (see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 403; Gower v Weinberg, 184 AD2d 844, 845).

Section 213’s six-year period bars a mortgage foreclosure action brought more than six years after the debt was accelerated when the lender has not timely revoked acceleration or qualified for a statutory saving period.

Bank of New York Mellon v. Slavin · filed 2016-11-21

the instant action, commenced in 2015, is time-barred because it was commenced after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, which occurred in 2012.

CPLR 213’s limitations period begins to run on the entire mortgage debt when the lender accelerates it, even if the debt was previously payable in installments.

McQueen v. Bank of New York · filed 2017-06-14

Once the debt was accelerated, however, the statute of limitations began to run on the entire debt, even where that debt was previously based on installments.

Section 213(4)’s six-year period runs from each unpaid mortgage installment unless the debt is accelerated; a letter that does not clearly demand immediate payment of the full debt does not trigger the period for the entire mortgage.

Bank of Am., Natl. Assn. v. Luma · filed 2018-01-11(4)

The letter accordingly failed to "clearly and unequivocally advise defendant . . . that all sums due under the note and mortgage were immediately due and payable" so as to accelerate the debt and trigger the running of the statute of limitations ( Chase Mtge. Co. v Fowler , 280 AD2d 892, 893 [2001]; see Goldman Sachs Mtge. Co. v Mares , 135 AD3d at 1122-1123). Thus, we agree with Supreme Court that the present foreclosure action is not time-barred.

Under CPLR 213(4), a foreclosure action brought by a party without authority to accelerate the debt does not start the six-year limitations period on the entire mortgage debt.

21st Mortgage Corp. v. Adames · filed 2017-08-02(4)

Further, the commencement of the 2007 action was ineffective to constitute a valid exercise of the option to accelerate the debt since the plaintiff in that action did not have the authority to accelerate the debt or to sue to foreclose at that time (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke, 94 AD3d at 983; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Suarez, 49 AD3d 592 [2008]).

Section 213(4)’s six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure begins when the lender accelerates the debt.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Kess · filed 2018-03-07(4)

In support of his motion, Kess demonstrated that the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on May 6, 2008, when the plaintiff accelerated the mortgage debt and commenced the 2008 foreclosure action ( see Albertina Realty Co. v Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 NY 472, 476; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Gambino, 153 AD3d 1232, 1233; U.S. Bank N.A. v Martin, 144 AD3d 891, 892; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Smith, 18 AD3d 602, 603).

An attempt to accelerate a mortgage debt by an entity that holds neither the mortgage nor the note does not start the six-year limitations period for the entire debt.

Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Gustafson · filed 2018-04-27(4)

Here, defendants' own submissions in support of the motion establish that, although another entity purported to accelerate defendants' entire debt in 2010 and 2012, that entity was not the holder or assignee of the mortgage and did not hold or own the note. Thus, the entity's purported attempts to accelerate the entire debt were a nullity, and the six-year statute of limitations did not begin to run on the entire debt ( see EMC Mtge. Corp. v Suarez , 49 AD3d 592, 593 [2d Dept 2008]; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980, 982-983 [2d Dept 2012]) .

Section 213(4)'s six-year limitations period begins to run on an entire installment mortgage debt when the debt is accelerated.

Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Unknown Heirs at Law of Danny Higdon · filed 2018-05-04(4)

Further, defendants failed to establish that plaintiff accelerated the debt by demanding payment of the entire loan or by commencing a prior foreclosure action. Thus, the action was timely commenced inasmuch as the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the entire debt until the instant action was commenced on February 20, 2015.

Section 213(4)'s six-year period for foreclosing on the full mortgage debt begins when the lender accelerates the debt by filing a foreclosure complaint demanding the full balance.

Milone v. US Bank Natl. Assn. · filed 2018-08-15(4)

An acceleration of the full amount of the debt occurred in this instance upon the filing of the summons and complaint in the foreclosure action. We therefore measure the applicable six-year statute of limitations from the date the foreclosure action was commenced, January 13, 2009.

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action a six-year limitations period; a notice describing acceleration as a possible future event does not accelerate the debt or start the period on the entire debt.

Fbp 250, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2018-09-19(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... Here, it is clear from the record that FBP cannot establish that the notice of default letter was a clear and unequivocal acceleration of the mortgage ( see Southwell v Middleton , 67 AD3d at 669). The notice of default "was nothing more than a letter discussing acceleration as a possible future event, which does not constitute an exercise of the mortgage's optional acceleration clause" ( 21st Mtge. Corp. v Adames , 153 AD3d 474, 475; see Goldman Sachs Mtge. Co. v Mares , 135 AD3d 1121).

The six-year limitations period for a mortgage debt does not begin to run on the entire debt when a foreclosure complaint purporting to accelerate it was filed by a party without authority to do so.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Gordon · filed 2018-02-28(4)

As relevant here, "an action upon a bond or note, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage upon real property, or upon a bond or note and mortgage so secured, or upon a mortgage of real property, or any interest therein" "must be commenced within six years" (CPLR 213[4]). ... Accordingly, service of the 2007 complaint was ineffective to constitute a valid exercise of the option to accelerate the debt, since the prior plaintiff did not have the authority to accelerate the debt or to sue to foreclose at that time ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke, 94 AD3d at 983; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Suarez, 49 AD3d 592, 593).

Under § 213(4), a foreclosure action brought by a party that did not hold the note and mortgage does not accelerate the debt for purposes of the six-year limitations period.

US Bank Trust, N.A. v. Williams · filed 2019-01-30(4)

Since HSBC was not the holder of the note and mortgage at the time of the commencement of the prior mortgage foreclosure action, it lacked the authority to accelerate the debt through the complaint in that action ( see Milone v US Bank National Association , 164 AD3d 145; U.S. Bank N.A. v Gordon , 158 AD3d at 836; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d at 983; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Smith , 18 AD3d at 603).

Section 213(4)'s six-year period for mortgage foreclosure begins to run on the entire debt when the lender validly accelerates it; a borrower's contractual right to reinstate does not delay that start.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Dieudonne · filed 2019-03-13(4)

Ultimately, we conclude that the reinstatement provision contained in the subject mortgage was not a condition precedent to the acceleration of the mortgage and did not prevent the plaintiff from validly exercising its option to accelerate. Accordingly, the statute of limitations started to run when the plaintiff exercised its option to accelerate.

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action after the mortgage debt is accelerated.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gold · filed 2019-04-17(4)

In support of his motion, the defendant demonstrated that the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on the entire debt on June 24, 2009, when HSBC Mortgage accelerated the mortgage debt by commencing the prior foreclosure action ( see Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel , 163 AD3d at 632; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Kess , 159 AD3d 767, 768; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Gambino , 153 AD3d 1232, 1233).

CPLR 213(2)’s six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure begins when the mortgage debt is validly accelerated.

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Onuoha · filed 2019-05-22(2)

The second foreclosure action against the defendant, which was commenced by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, on September 22, 2010, validly accelerated the mortgage debt and triggered the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Joseph , 159 AD3d 968; 53 PL Realty, LLC v US Bank N.A. , 153 AD3d 894, 895). Therefore, the instant, third foreclosure action against the defendant, which was commenced on March 16, 2015, is not time-barred.

Section 213(4)'s six-year period runs on the entire mortgage debt when the lender accelerates it by commencing a foreclosure action.

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Schmitt · filed 2019-05-29(4)

Here, the defendant established that the six-year statute of limitations began to run on the entire debt on January 12, 2010, when the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, OneWest Bank, accelerated the mortgage by commencing the prior foreclosure action ( see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Craig , 169 AD3d at 628; Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel , 163 AD3d 631, 632-633).

When a mortgage debt is accelerated, the six-year limitations period begins to run on the entire debt.

MTGLQ Invs., LP v. Wozencraft · filed 2019-05-30(4)

Once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount becomes due and the six-year statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt ( see Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980, 982 [2d Dept 2012]; CPLR 213[4]).

A mortgage foreclosure action has a six-year limitations period; a prior action dismissed because the plaintiff lacked standing does not accelerate the debt or start the period on the full balance.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Auguste · filed 2019-06-12(4)

Where, as here, the prior action is dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing, the purported acceleration is a nullity, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run at the time of the purported acceleration ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d at 983; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Suarez , 49 AD3d 592, 593).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years from acceleration of a mortgage debt to bring a foreclosure action on the entire debt.

Ditech Fin., LLC v. Naidu · filed 2019-09-18(4)

Here, the appellant established that the six-year statute of limitations began to run on the entire debt on July 28, 2009, when BAC accelerated the mortgage debt by commencing a foreclosure action and declaring therein that BAC "elect[ed] to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage." Calculating from July 28, 2009, the statute of limitations expired on July 28, 2015.

The six-year limitations period runs on the entire mortgage debt when the lender accelerates it by commencing a foreclosure action.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Alli · filed 2019-09-25(4)

Here, in support of his cross motion, the defendant established that the the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on the entire debt on March 27, 2008, when the plaintiff's predecessor in interest commenced the prior foreclosure action ( see Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel , 163 AD3d at 632; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Kess , 159 AD3d 767, 768; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Gambino , 153 AD3d 1232, 1233).

Section 213(4)'s limitations period accrues separately for each unpaid mortgage installment; a bankruptcy discharge alone does not accelerate the entire debt.

Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Fernandez · filed 2019-11-15(4)

Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the discharge in bankruptcy did not automatically accelerate the debt, plaintiff's complaint is not time-barred because separate causes of action accrued for each installment payment that was not made, and therefore, upon reargument, the court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

A foreclosure action brought by a party lacking standing does not accelerate the mortgage debt or start the six-year limitations period.

Onewest Bank FSB v. Psp-nc, LLC · filed 2020-03-11(4)

However, the commencement of a foreclosure action by a plaintiff lacking standing does not serve to accelerate the debt ( see Herzl Dev. Group, LLC v Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. , 175 AD3d at 666; 21st Mtge. Corp. v Adames , 153 AD3d at 475; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980 , 983). Here, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that GMAC's commencement of the foreclosure action in August 2006 accelerated the mortgage such that the statute of limitations then began to run.

Section 213(4)'s six-year period runs from each unpaid mortgage installment until acceleration makes the entire debt due and starts the period for the whole mortgage.

MTGLQ Invs., LLP v. Lunder · filed 2020-05-07(4)

"The six-year statute of limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action begins to run from the due date for each unpaid installment unless the debt has been accelerated; once the debt has been accelerated by a demand or commencement of an action, the entire sum becomes due and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire mortgage" ( Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v DeGiorgio , 171 AD3d 1267, 1268 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see CPLR 213 [4]; Bank of Am., N.A. v Luma , 157 AD3d 1106, 1106-1107 [2018]). ... As such, plaintiff was required to commence the current action prior to January 21, 2017, which it failed to do.

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action six years from a valid acceleration of the debt; an earlier foreclosure action dismissed for lack of standing does not start that period.

Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Marous · filed 2020-08-19(4)

Actions to foreclose upon a mortgage are governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... However, because the 2008 foreclosure action was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing, "the purported acceleration [was] a nullity, and the statute of limitations [did] not begin to run at the time of the purported acceleration" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Auguste , 173 AD3d 930, 932; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980, 983). Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the commencement of the second foreclosure action, on August 27, 2010 (hereinafter the 2010 foreclosure action), which was discontinued, in 2016, upon motion by the plaintiff. Since the instant action was commenced on July 22, 2016, a little over a month before August 26, 2016, when the six-year period would have expired, it was not barred by the statute of limitations.

The six-year limitations period for an accelerated mortgage debt begins when a foreclosure action is commenced.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. Ams. v. Bernal · filed 2020-09-23(4)

In this mortgage foreclosure action, in support of his motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him, the defendant Jhon Bernal (hereinafter the defendant) established that the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on the entire debt on July 14, 2009, when Aurora Loan Services, LLC (hereinafter Aurora), commenced an action (hereinafter the prior action) to foreclose the mortgage ( see Milone v US Bank N.A. , 164 AD3d 145, 152).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action; acceleration starts that period for the entire debt.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Blank · filed 2020-12-30(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... Here, the defendant demonstrated that the six-year statute of limitations began to run on the entire debt on December 10, 2009, when the plaintiff accelerated the mortgage debt by commencing the prior action ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Gold , 171 AD3d at 1030-1031).

Section 213(4)'s six-year period for mortgage foreclosure begins to run on the entire debt when the mortgage is accelerated.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Rivera · filed 2021-12-22(4)

The defendant demonstrated that the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]) began to run on January 25, 2010, when the plaintiff accelerated the mortgage debt and commenced the 2010 foreclosure action.

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action a six-year limitations period; unpaid installments accrue separately unless the mortgage debt is accelerated, causing the period to run on the entire debt.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Mor · filed 2022-01-12(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). With respect to a mortgage debt payable in installments, separate causes of action accrue for each installment that is not paid, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date each installment becomes due ( see Citibank, N.A. v Kletzky , 196 AD3d 459; U.S. Bank N.A. v Singer , [*3]192 AD3d 1182, 1185-1186). However, even if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt ( see Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Rashed , 195 AD3d 774; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Corrales , 194 AD3d 1023, 1025).

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action six years; when a noteholder validly accelerates the debt, the period begins to run on the entire debt.

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Metz · filed 2023-03-08(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). Even if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a noteholder elects to accelerate the debt, the entire amount is due and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt ( see Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel , 37 NY3d 1, 21; U.S. Bank N.A. v Doura , 204 AD3d 721, 723). ... Here, contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the record failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that a valid election to accelerate the entire balance of the subject debt was made in conjunction with the commencement of the 2009 foreclosure action, so as to start the statute of limitations running at that time.

Section 213(4) sets a six-year limit for mortgage foreclosure; a prior foreclosure action dismissed because its plaintiff lacked standing did not validly accelerate the debt and start that period running.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Pearl-Nwabueze · filed 2023-07-26(4)

A mortgage foreclosure action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum , 143 AD3d 866, 867). ... Here, the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, that the debt was never validly accelerated, as the prior action to foreclose the subject mortgage, commenced in 2008, was dismissed upon the Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiff in that action lacked standing to commence that action ( see Mejias v Wells Fargo N.A. , 186 AD3d 472, 474; Herzl Dev. Group, LLC [*2]v Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. , 175 AD3d at 666; U.S. Bank N.A. v Gordon , 158 AD3d at 836).

A mortgage foreclosure action has a six-year limitations period that begins to run on the full debt when the debt is accelerated.

U.S. Bank Trust N. A. v. Holmes · filed 2024-12-20(4)

"An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six year statute of limitations" ( Citibank, N.A. v Gifford , 204 AD3d 1382, 1383 [4th Dept 2022]; see CPLR 213 [4]) which begins to run on the full amount due once the debt has been accelerated by a demand ( see Business Loan Ctr. Inc. v Wagner , 31 AD3d 1122, 1123 [4th Dept 2006]; Lavin v Elmakiss , 302 AD2d 638, 639 [3d Dept 2003], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 577 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 703 [2004]; Loiacono v Goldberg , 240 AD2d 476, 477 [2d Dept 1997]) or by commencement of an action ( see Lavin , 302 AD2d at 639). We agree with plaintiff that the court erred in concluding that defendants met their burden of establishing that the debt was accelerated by commencement of a foreclosure action in December 2009.

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action after the mortgage debt is accelerated.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Mohammed · filed 2024-12-24(4)

Here, in support of her cross-motion, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the six-year statute of limitations began to run in April 2007, when the plaintiff commenced the 2007 action and elected to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Doura , 204 AD3d 721, 723; Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Iqbal , 195 AD3d 772, 773).

Section 213(4)(a) estops a foreclosure plaintiff from denying that a prior action accelerated the debt unless that action was dismissed on an express judicial determination that the acceleration was invalid.

Wells Fargo v. Ferrato · filed 2025-05-01(4)(a)

Thus, plaintiff is estopped under FAPA's clarifications to CPLR 213(4) from contending that its commencement of the 2009 foreclosure action did not validly accelerate the debt ( see Genovese v Nationstar Mtge. LLC , 223 AD3d 37, 46 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 213(4)(a) permits a foreclosure plaintiff to contest a prior acceleration when the earlier action was dismissed for lack of standing, even if the dismissal did not expressly say the acceleration was invalid.

MTGLQ Invs., LP v. Carmody · filed 2025-10-23(4)(a)

Although Supreme Court, in dismissing the first action, did not specifically state that "the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213 [4] [a]), its dismissal of that action for lack of standing is substantively the same thing ( see Cohen v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , 229 AD3d 758, 760-761 [2d Dept 2024]; Reinman v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , 215 AD3d 704, 707 [2d Dept 2023]) and defendant's argument concerning the precise words used by Supreme Court amounts to little more than semantics.

Section 213(4)’s six-year period for mortgage foreclosure begins to run on the full debt when the lender accelerates it by commencing foreclosure and demanding the full balance.

US Bank N.A. v. Livoti · filed 2025-11-12(4)

Considering that FAPA applies under the circumstances presented, the defendant established that the mortgage debt was accelerated in August 2009 when CitiMortgage commenced the prior action and elected to call due the entire amount secured by the subject mortgage, thus triggering the accrual of the six-year limitations period ( see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Norton , 219 AD3d 680, 682). Since this action was not commenced until May 2016, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that this action was time-barred ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Jarrett , 233 AD3d 731, 732).

Section 213(4)(b) bars a defendant in a mortgage discharge action from challenging a prior loan acceleration unless the prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination that the acceleration was invalid.

Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn. · filed 2025-11-25(4)(b)

The affirmed summary judgment order and so-ordered stipulation did not relevantly determine anything; thus, they do not trigger FAPA § 7's estoppel exception. Because the six-year limitations period triggered by Mellon's 2009 acceleration had expired when plaintiff commenced this action, and because FAPA § 7 estops defendant from challenging that acceleration's validity, Supreme Court correctly granted judgment in plaintiff's favor.

Section 213(4) gives a mortgagee six years to bring a foreclosure action after acceleration makes the entire debt due.

Cunningham · filed 2025-11-26(4)

Therefore, plaintiff’s acceleration of the Mortgage by commencing this action triggered the statute of limitations on the entire debt, and the instant action is not time-barred.

Section 213(4)'s six-year period for foreclosing on the entire mortgage balance begins when the debt is accelerated by commencement of a foreclosure action.

U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v. Chambers · filed 2025-12-18(4)

Accordingly, in this case, the statute of limitations was not triggered until the debt was accelerated by the commencement of the action in July 2014 ( see CPLR 213 [4]; GMAT Legal Tit. Trust 2014-1, US Bank N.A. v Wood , 192 AD3d at 1287).

Section 213(4)’s six-year limitations period begins to run on the entire mortgage debt when the lender accelerates it.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Hillaire · filed 2026-01-28(4)

Here, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the mortgage debt was accelerated and that the six-year statute of limitations began to run on July 12, 2013, when the plaintiff commenced the 2013 action and elected to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage ( see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Wong , 218 AD3d 742, 743-744).

Section 213(4)(a) does not let a lender dispute acceleration in a prior foreclosure action dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction when there was no express judicial determination that the mortgage was not validly accelerated.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Donaldson · filed 2026-06-11(4)(a)

Plaintiff is estopped by the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821) (FAPA) from asserting that the prior foreclosure action did not accelerate the underlying loan ( see GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d 915, 916 [2d Dept 2023]). The prior action was dismissed based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and there was no "expressed judicial determination" that the mortgage was not validly accelerated based on the prior action (CPLR 213[4][a]; cf. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gruen , 237 AD3d 996, 998-999 [2d Dept 2025]).

A mortgage foreclosure action must be commenced within six years after the debt is accelerated.

Cohanim v. Sachar · filed 2004-05-25

Here, the statute of limitations began to run as of the date of the assignor-bank's letter, April 9, 1992, declaring the defendants in default and accelerating payment of all monies due upon the note and mortgage. See Loiacono v. Goldberg , 240 AD2d 476, 477 (2d Dep't 1997). The applicable statute of limitations is six years [FN7] and defendants have properly asserted the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in their answer to the instant complaint.

CPLR 213(1) gives a client six years to seek a refund of a gift to an attorney; continuous representation does not toll that period for a dispute over the gift.

Lawrence v. Miller · filed 2014-10-28(1)

These claims are therefore time-barred unless the statute of limitations is tolled by the continuous representation rule or doctrine. ... We have never endorsed continuous representation tolling for disputes between professionals and their clients over fees and the like, as opposed to claims of deficient performance where the professional continues to render services to the client with respect to the objected-to matter or transaction.

Section 213(1) gives six years to bring an equitable rescission claim; continuous representation concerning the same matter can defer accrual until the attorney-client relationship ends.

Greene v. Greene · filed 1982-05-18(1)

The Appellate Division also correctly held that the cause of action is not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Initially we note that all parties agree that the six-year Statute of Limitations applies to this action for rescission (CPLR 213, subd 1; Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn v Rochester Tel. Corp., 63 AD2d 244). The only dispute concerns the point at which the cause of action accrued. ... In neither instance can the client be expected, in the normal course, to oversee or supervise the attorney’s handling of the matter, and thus in neither case is it realistic to say that the client’s right of action accrued before he terminated the relationship with the attorney.

Section 213(1)’s six-year residual period does not apply to common law copyright infringement claims, which are subject to a three-year period as injuries to property.

Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc. · filed 2015-01-15(1)

For that proposition I cited the recent opinion in Capitol Records, LLC v. Harrison Greenwich, LLC (“Harrison Greenwich”), 44 Misc.3d 428, 986 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup.Ct.NY.County 2014), in which the New York Supreme Court held that the residual six-year limitations period contained in CPLR § 213(1) applied to claims of common law copyright infringement because “no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.” ... After thinking about the issue, I conclude that three years is the correct limitations period for Flo and Eddie’s common law copyright claims. I disagree with the court in Harrison Greenwich; copyright infringement is an “injury to property.”

Section 213(1)’s six-year limitations period does not bar an owner in possession from seeking to remove an apparent cloud on title.

CRAIN, ROGER D. v. MANNISE, BILL E. · filed 2015-02-06(1)

“It is well settled that an owner in possession has a right to invoke the aid of a court of equity at any time while he is so the owner and in possession, to have an apparent, though in fact not a real incumbrance discharged from the record and such right is never barred by the [s]tatute of [l]imitations. It is a continuing right which exists as long as there is an occasion for its exercise”

Section 213(8) supplies the limitations period for a conversion claim based on fraud.

Loeuis v. Grushin · filed 2015-03-11(8)

The fourth cause of action, alleging conversion based upon fraud, is not time-barred, since it is governed by the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (8) (see Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d 806, 808 [2007], citing Petrou v Ehmer Intl. Foods, 167 AD2d 338, 339 [1990]).

Section 213(8)’s fraud limitations period governs a conversion claim based on actual fraud.

Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v. Filardo · filed 2022-03-09(8)

However, when the allegations of fraud are essential to a cause of action alleging conversion based upon actual fraud, the cause of action is governed by the limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8).

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years to bring a breach of bailment contract claim; the period begins when the plaintiff demands the property’s return and the defendant fails to deliver it.

Lyman v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2021-12-14(2)

While the three-year statute of limitations for conversion (CPLR 214 [3]) accrued on the date the conversion occurred, not from the discovery of the conversion or the exercise of due diligence to discover ( see Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex. , 87 NY2d 36, 44-45 [1995]), the six-year statute of limitations for breach of the bailment contract (CPLR 213 [2]) began to run when plaintiff demanded return of the stocks and defendants did not deliver them ( see CPLR 206 [a][2]; Ganley v Troy City Natl. Bank, 98 NY 487, 494 [1885] [the defendant bank was bound to keep the treasury notes safe for the plaintiff, and to deliver them up to her upon her demand; "[s]he could not put the defendant in default upon its contract until a demand."]; see also Stephens v Crawford , 209 AD 142, 150 [2d Dept 1924], affd 239 NY 535 [1924]).

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years from each missed promised pension payment to sue for breach of contract.

Hartshorne v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y. · filed 2021-12-23(2)

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim is six years and, although many of the alleged actions that eventually led to the termination of the plan payments occurred beyond that period, each failure to make promised pension payments to plaintiffs was itself a breach "actionable for six years from [its] occurrence" ( Bulova Watch Co. v Celotex Corp. , 46 NY2d 606, 612 [1979]; see CPLR 213 [2]; Medalie v Jacobson , 120 AD2d 652, 652 [1986]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, measured from the breach.

Morrow v. Brighthouse Life Ins. Co. of NY · filed 2021-12-23(2)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action for breach of contract is six years ( see CPLR 213 [2]). ... Inasmuch as plaintiff commenced this action more than six years after the policy was issued, the breach of contract cause of action is untimely.

Section 213’s six-year period for contract claims does not apply to a bailment claim arising from police seizure when the parties had no contractual relationship.

Wikiert v. City of New York · filed 2015-04-08

Thus, as General Municipal Law § 50-i (1) applies to all causes of action against the City seeking to recover damages for injury to property because of negligence or a wrongful act, and the complaint asserts that the City destroyed the plaintiff’s property, the one-year-and-90-day statute of limitations, not the six-year limitations period, applies to this action.

CPLR 213(8) does not time-bar a claim to invalidate a forged deed or a mortgage based on it.

Faison v. Lewis · filed 2015-05-12(8)

Therefore, the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (8) does not foreclose plaintiff's claim against defendant.

Section 213(8)’s limitations period for fraud does not apply to a claim that a deed was forged.

Mazo v. Mazo · filed 2015-10-22(8)

While the limitations period for a cause of action sounding in fraud is the greater of six years after the cause of action accrued or two years after it could have been discovered with reasonable diligence (see CPLR 213 [8]), the Court of Appeals has recently held that this period does not apply when the particular species of fraud alleged is the forgery of a deed.

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on a claim seeking to rescind a lease.

North Oyster Bay Baymen's Ass'n v. Town of Oyster Bay · filed 2015-07-22

To the extent that the first cause of action was based on the allegation that the lease extension was issued without the benefit of an “accurate map,” any such claim should have been dismissed as barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to causes of action seeking to rescind a lease (see CPLR 213; 35 Park Ave. Corp. v Campagna, 48 NY2d 813, 814 [1979]).

Section 213(4)’s foreclosure limitations defense may be raised by parties in privity with the original debtor or by judgment creditors with a lien on the property.

Stewart Title Insurance v. Wingate, Kearney & Cullen · filed 2015-12-16(4)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff’s insureds were permitted to raise the statute of limitations defense, as they were either in privity with the original debtor (see 328 Owners Corp. v 330 W. 86 Oaks Corp., 8 NY3d 372, 384 [2007]; Matter of Juan C. v Cortines, 89 NY2d 659, 667 [1997]; Parolisi v Slavin, 98 AD3d 488, 490 [2012]), or were judgment creditors with a lien secured against the subject property (see Matter of Rosevele Frocks, Inc. v Sommers, 191 Misc 614 [App Term, 1st Dept 1948]; see also 75 NY Jur 2d, Limitations and Laches § 33).

The property owner when a mortgage foreclosure action is commenced may assert the statute of limitations defense under CPLR 213(4).

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Manno · filed 2025-09-10(4)

Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, as the owner of the property at the time this action was commenced, MCN had standing to assert a statute of limitations defense ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Steward , 219 AD3d 862, 863; U.S. Bank N.A. v 32-49 107 St., Inc. , 219 AD3d 777, 777; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Conforti , 209 AD3d 942, 945; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v MacPherson , 200 AD3d 647, 649).

Section 213(2) gives a contractual indemnification claim a six-year limitations period that begins when the party seeking indemnification pays the injured person.

Myers Industries, Inc. v. Schoeller Arca Systems, Inc. · filed 2016-03-21(2)

In New York, a contractual indemnification claim is governed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2)’s six-year statute of limitations. An indemnification claim accrues only when the party seeking indemnification has made payment to the injured person.

CPLR 213’s six-year period for indemnification does not apply to community college chargeback claims created solely by statute; the three-year period in CPLR 214 applies.

Town of North Hempstead v. County of Nassau · filed 2016-05-26

The Town suggests that the six-year limitations period contained in CPLR 213 relating to actions seeking indemnification is applicable. ... Here, the obligation of the Town to reimburse the County for chargebacks is solely a creature of statute, with no counterpart or precedent in the common law. ... The three-year period contained in CPLR 214 to recover upon liabilities created by statute, therefore, is the more appropriate period.

Section 213(2) gives a contractual indemnification claim a six-year limitations period that accrues upon payment.

WSA Group, PE-PC v. DKI Eng'g & Consulting USA PC · filed 2019-12-26(2)

With regard to plaintiff's claim for the reimbursement it paid to DOT for Ahmad's work, Supreme Court determined that defendant's voluntary contractual agreement to indemnify plaintiff was not an "ordinary professional obligation" of an engineer ( Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.] , 3 NY3d at 542) and that this claim was thus governed by a six-year limitations period that accrued upon that payment and was not time-barred ( see CPLR 213 [2]; McDermott v City of New York , 50 NY2d 211, 217-218 [1980]). We agree.

Section 213(2)'s limitations period for a contractual indemnification claim begins when the indemnitee pays the underlying claim and suffers a loss.

Govea v. Albert · filed 2025-06-26(2)

Similarly, any claim for contractual indemnify under the insurance policy does not accrue until Albert makes payment on plaintiffs' claims because the cause of action is notcomplet~ Wltil the lossis suffered (Tedesco vA.P. Green Indus., Inc., 8NY3d.243, 247 [2007]; McDermottvNew York; SONY2d211, 217 [L980]; CPLR §213 [2]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year period for unjust enrichment claims; for a loan payable on demand, the claim accrues when repayment is demanded and refused.

Gamer v. Myaskovsky · filed 2022-09-23(1)

While the six-year statute of limitations is applicable, the contract claim and the unjust enrichment claim do not necessarily accrue at the same time. The cause of action for the unjust enrichment cannot begin to accrue at the time the loan was made because the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution—the failure to repay in response to a demand—had not yet occurred.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an equitable unjust enrichment claim seeking disgorgement.

In re Lamictal Indirect Purchaser & Antitrust Consumer Litigation · filed 2016-03-22(1)

When, as here,- plaintiffs assert an “equitable claim for disgorgement,” see ECF No. 38 ¶ 202, the limitations period is six years.

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitations period applies to an unjust enrichment counterclaim based on an alleged breach of an agreement.

California Capital Equity, LLC v. IJKG, LLC · filed 2017-06-29(2)

The six-year statute of limitations applies to IJKG’s unjust enrichment counterclaim, since it is based on allegations that Abraxis breached the Note Agreement (Maya NY, LLC v Hagler, 106 AD3d 583, 585 [1st Dept 2013]; CPLR 213 [2]).

CPLR 213(1) gives an unjust enrichment claim six years from the alleged wrongful act giving rise to the duty of restitution.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Salem · filed 2018-09-12(1)

A cause of action alleging unjust enrichment is also governed by the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213(1) and begins to run upon the occurrence of the alleged wrongful act giving rise to the duty of restitution ( see Williams-Guillaume v Bank of Am., N.A. , 130 AD3d 1016).

CPLR 213(1) gives an unjust enrichment claim six years from the wrongful act giving rise to the duty of restitution.

Mannino v. Passalacqua · filed 2019-05-22(1)

The parties agree that the unjust enrichment cause of action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[1]). Such a cause of action accrues "upon the occurrence of the alleged wrongful act giving rise to the duty of restitution" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Salem , 164 AD3d 1289, 1290). Here, the amended complaint alleges that the plaintiffs' payment to Wells Fargo was necessitated by the Passalacquas' default in making payments on the consolidated note, which resulted in Wells Fargo's acceleration of the debt and the threat of a foreclosure action. Accordingly, this cause of action accrued, at the earliest, in late 2010, when the Passalacquas stopped making payments on the Wells Fargo consolidated mortgage.

Section 213 gives quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims a six-year limitations period.

Sahebdin v. Khelawan · filed 2022-09-24

The statute of limitations for a quantum meruit/unjust enrichment claim is six years.

Section 213(2) gives a quasi-contract unjust-enrichment claim a six-year limitations period.

Ghost in the Machine, Inc. v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. · filed 2025-01-21(2)

Because Snake Nation’s claim for unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract claim, the six-year limitations period in Section 213(2) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules applies.

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for unjust enrichment claims.

Oppedisano v. Zur · filed 2025-09-19(1)

The statute of limitations in New York for an unjust enrichment claim is six years.

A complaint can survive a § 213(2) limitations defense when it plausibly alleges grounds for equitable estoppel.

City of New York v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc. · filed 2016-03-31(2)

In sum, the Court denies FedEx’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ AOC claim because: (i) the AG had authority to enter into the AOC, (ii) the AOC did not lack consideration, (iii) the AOC’s penalty provision is enforceable, and (iv) the allegations make it plausible that equitable estoppel will apply to untimely violations of the AOC.

Section 213’s limitations periods bar untimely claims when the defendant establishes the time bar and the plaintiff cannot raise a triable issue of equitable estoppel.

Newman v. Greystone & Co., Inc. · filed 2018-12-19(2), (8)

However, there can be no reasonable reliance where, as here, the plaintiff had the means to ascertain the facts from available public records, but failed to do so ( see Picard v Fish , 139 AD3d 1331, 1333-1334; Arfa v Zamir , 76 AD3d 56, 59, affd 17 NY3d 737). Since the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the causes of action are time-barred, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint ( see CPLR 213[2], [8]; Chi Kee Pang v Synlyco, Ltd. , 89 AD3d 976, 977; Tornheim v Tornheim , 67 AD3d 775, 776).

Section 213(7) limits a corporation’s fiduciary-duty claims against its directors, and equitable estoppel does not extend the filing period without proof of its required elements.

Marincovich v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, Inc. · filed 2007-06-14(7)

Next, addressing the dismissal of defendant’s counterclaims alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, there is no dispute that these claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [7]). ... Finding a failure to demonstrate the essential elements for the invocation of this equitable relief, defendant’s counterclaims were properly dismissed.

Section 213’s six-year period for these reimbursement claims began when the claimant paid the underlying settlement.

Castlestone Management LLC v. Diamond · filed 2016-06-21(1), (2)

Since it did not file the complaint until more than six years after making that payment, its claims are time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1], [2]; Maya NY, LLC v Hagler, 106 AD3d 583, 585 [1st Dept 2013]).

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for a claim seeking the return of a security deposit.

Sharaf v. Younger · filed 2016-09-07

With regard to plaintiff's cause of action for the return of his security deposit, the applicable statute of limitations is six years ( see CPLR 213). Defendant has failed to establish that this claim is time-barred or that she is otherwise entitled to summary judgment dismissing this claim.

Section 213(2) gives six years to sue for breach of contract or joint venture; a new claim accrues when a recurring payment obligation is breached.

Lebedev v. Blavatnik · filed 2016-10-04(2)

The statute of limitations on a breach of contract or joint venture cause of action is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]; Eskenazi v Schapiro, 27 AD3d 312, 315 [1st Dept 2006]). ... A new claim accrued when the obligation to do so was allegedly breached in 2013.