N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

The six-year limitations period for a breach of contract claim begins when the contract is breached.

Soufer v. Baroukhian · filed 2020-04-29(2)

As noted by the defendants, the six-year statute of limitations for a breach of contract cause of action begins to run at the time of the contract's breach, not at the time the contract was entered into ( see CPLR 213[2]; Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal , 81 NY2d 399, 402).

CPLR 213(2) gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the breach occurs, even if the claimant discovers it later.

Hernandez Tech., Inc. v. Rivera · filed 2025-06-06(2)

We reject defendant's contention that the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract ( see CPLR 213 [2]) did not accrue until after he received the May 13, 2015 spreadsheet and discovered the 30% keep. That cause of action accrued upon the alleged breach by First Capital ( see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal , 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]), regardless of whether defendant was unaware of the breach at the time it occurred ( see Marrow v Brighthouse Life Ins. Co. of NY , 200 AD3d 1622, 1623 [4th Dept 2021]; Brooks v AXA Advisors , LLC [appeal No. 2], 104 AD3d 1178, 1180 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 858 [2013]).

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a breach-of-contract claim begins when the contractual obligation is breached, not when the obligation first arises.

Energy Transportation Group, Inc. v. Borealis Maritime Limited · filed 2025-07-08(2)

As Borealis recognizes in its briefing, the rule in New York, as elsewhere, is that the statute of limitations begins to run when the contractual obligation is breached, not when the obligation first arises.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a breach-of-contract claim begins when the contractual obligation is breached, including when a contingent payment becomes due and is withheld.

Energy Transportation Group, Inc. v. Borealis Maritime Limited · filed 2025-08-07(2)

Even if Borealis’ obligation to pay ETG a portion of Borealis’ carried interest arose upon securing a “Financing,” as Borealis contends, it could not have breached that obligation until it accrued carried interest and refused to share it with ETG. As Borealis recognizes in its briefing, the rule in New York, as elsewhere, is that the statute of limitations begins to run when the contractual obligation is breached, not when the obligation first arises.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for breach-of-contract claims runs from the breach; a procedural prerequisite to suit does not defer accrual.

ACE Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products, Inc. · filed 2015-06-11(2)

Accordingly, the Trust's claim, subject to the six-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract actions, accrued on March 28, 2006, when the MLPA was executed.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for contract claims runs from completion of work required by the contract, including required corrective work.

Pigott Construction International, Ltd. v. Rochester Institute of Technology · filed 1981-10-30(2)

The parties agree that the dispute is contractual in nature and that the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2) is the applicable statute under subparagraph 7.10.2 of the construction contract. ... Article 13 thereof required the general contractor promptly to correct all work rejected by the architect as defective or as failing to conform to the contract documents, and such work was not completed until 1976. Thus arbitration was timely demanded.

Section 213(8) allows a fraud action to be commenced within two years after the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered through due diligence.

Craven v. Rigas · filed 2011-06-30(8)

As relevant here, the laws of both New York (the forum) and Virginia (plaintiffs residence) (see CPLR 202; Global Fin. Corp. v Triarc Corp., 93 NY2d 525, 528 [1999]) provide that an action for fraud is timely if commenced within two years after the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence (see CPLR 213 [8]; Va Code Ann § 8.01-243 [A]; § 8.01-249 [1]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims a two-year discovery period; a claim filed after that period expires is untimely.

Soward v. Deutsche Bank Ag · filed 2011-09-01(8)

For example, when addressing New York’s section 213, Becnel only analyzes dates under the accrual prong and not the discovery prong. ... Even if that date is used, Becnel’s Complaint was still filed well after the two-year state of limitations expired.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant six years from accrual or two years from when reasonable diligence could have discovered the fraud, whichever is later.

Craig v. Craig · filed 2011-11-22(8)

Therefore, plaintiff had until 2001 to assert her present claim (see CPLR 213 [8]). ... As she could with reasonable diligence have discovered in 2003 that defendant had divorced her some time before his remarriage, she had until 2005 to assert her claim (see id.).

Section 213(8) bars fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims brought more than two years after discovery of the alleged defects.

14 Bruckner LLC v. 14 Bruckner Blvd. Realty Corp. · filed 2010-11-09(8)

Indeed, plaintiff waited more than two years after its February 2007 discovery of the alleged latent defects to bring the fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action (see CPLR 213 [8]).

Under CPLR 213(8), disputed facts about when a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered alleged fraud can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

Financial Structures Ltd. v. AG · filed 2010-10-07(8)

We agree with the motion court that the fraud cause of action was not conclusively barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [8]) because the parties’ competing factual contentions render it impossible to determine, at this stage of the proceedings, when plaintiffs first became—or should have become—aware of the alleged fraud (see Saphir Intl., SA v UBS PaineWebber Inc., 25 AD3d 315 [2006]; Ghandour v Shearson Lehman Bros., 213 AD2d 304, 305-306 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 710 [1995]).

CPLR 213 (8) applies a six-year limitations period to intentional misrepresentation claims sounding in fraud.

Pyramid Brokerage Co. v. Zurich American Insurance · filed 2010-03-19(8)

Contrary to defendants’ contention, that cause of action sounds in fraud (see New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 308, 318 [1995]) and, accordingly, is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (8) (see Old Republic Ins. Co. v Hansa World Cargo Serv., Inc., 51 F Supp 2d 457, 470 [1999]; see also Fandy Corp. v Lung-Fong Chen, 262 AD2d 352 [1999]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim to proceed when there is a triable issue whether the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence more than two years before filing suit.

Dischiavi v. Calli · filed 2009-12-30(8)

With respect to the fraud cause of action, there is a triable issue of fact whether plaintiffs could have, with reasonable diligence, discovered the alleged fraud more than two years prior to commencement of this action (see CPLR 203 [g]; CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) requires reasonable diligence in discovering fraud; circumstances that should arouse suspicion can make a fraud claim time-barred when the plaintiff fails to investigate.

Gordon v. Curtis · filed 2009-12-15(8)

Plaintiffs fraud cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs claim that they did not discover the alleged fraud until late 2006 or early 2007 and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered it sooner (see CPLR 213 [8]). However, only a few months after their application to purchase a cooperative apartment was rejected, in 1998, plaintiffs were approved for the purchase of another apartment in the building. Although this sequence of events should fairly have aroused their suspicion, plaintiffs, who as shareholders in the cooperative were in a position to try to discover the reason for the rejection, apparently made no such effort in the nine years between that rejection and the return of the original apartment to the market in 2007 (see Higgins v Crouse, 147 NY 411, 415-416 [1895]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within six years of the fraud or two years of when it was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is later.

Parrish v. Unidisc Music, Inc. · filed 2009-12-17(8)

“A cause of action based on fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is later” (DeLuca v DeLuca, 48 AD3d 341 [2008]; see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]). Here, the record shows that plaintiff was put on notice of the alleged fraud in 1998, when he learned that based on the termination agreement signed by him, defendants claimed a right to his work, but plaintiff failed to further investigate their claim at that time, and did not file suit within two years of when the alleged fraud should have been discovered (see Prestandrea v Stein, 262 AD2d 621, 622 [1999]).

The two-year fraud discovery period begins when reasonable diligence could reveal facts of the particular fraudulent act.

CSAM Capital, Inc. v. Lauder · filed 2009-09-22(8)

Because even those parties who exhibited “reasonable diligence” and commenced arbitration proceedings did not learn of the fraudulent misrepresentation of the directors’ expertise until November 7, 2006, it is apparent that the appellants could not have discovered this information prior to that date. Therefore, when they filed their demand for arbitration five months later on April 9, 2007, they were well within the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(8) bars a common-law fraud claim commenced more than two years after the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

People v. Ben · filed 2008-10-03(8)

Because plaintiffs discovery of the alleged fraud occurred no later than June 2003 and the action was not commenced until June 20, 2006, more than two years later, the common-law fraud cause of action is untimely pursuant to CPLR 213 (8).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered to bring a fraud claim.

Bryant v. Damiano · filed 2009-01-08(8)

The time in which an action based on fraud must be commenced is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]; see CPLR 203 [g]; Georgiou v Panayia of Mtns. Greek Orthodox Monastery, Inc., 16 AD3d 998, 999 [2005]).

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery exception requires the plaintiff to establish that reasonable diligence would not have revealed the fraud earlier.

Grasso v. Grasso · filed 2007-11-08(8)

Although the action was brought long after the expiration of the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213), plaintiff contends that the action is timely under the tolling provision for a fraud claim which permits an action within two years of when the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence (see CPLR 213 [8]; see also CPLR 203 [g]; Fitzgerald v Fitzgerald, 301 AD2d 851, 852 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 707 [2004]). When the earrings were obtained by plaintiff following his mother’s death in 1986, it would have been reasonable to determine their value at that time since such value was relevant to reporting on and dividing the estate. We agree with Supreme Court that, under these circumstances, plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was entitled to the benefit of the discovery exception (see generally Lefkowitz v Appelbaum, 258 AD2d 563, 563 [1999]).

A fraud action may be commenced within two years after the fraud is discovered, subject to the applicable six-year limitation period.

Kramer v. City of New York · filed 1990-05-31(8)

Further, since the action was commenced within two years of March 1986, when she first learned of Lazansky’s fraud concealment, the fraud claim should not have been dismissed as time barred and plaintiff should have her day in court. (Compare, Harkin v Culleton, supra, citing CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [f].)

For fraud claims, Section 213(8) allows an action to be timely when commenced within six years after accrual or two years after discovery, whichever is longer.

City of New York v. Lead Industries Ass'n · filed 1993-05-13(8)

Since plaintiffs cannot be shown conclusively to have had earlier knowledge of the fraud, their action was timely commenced in 1989 (CPLR 213 [8]; Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d 723).

Section 213(8) sets the limitation period for fraud actions and applies a discovery rule based on reasonable diligence.

McGuinness v. Standard Drywall Corp. · filed 1993-05-20(8)

Plaintiffs’ complaint, alleging that funds and property in the possession of defendants are being held for defendant Michael Gedell and/or were fraudulently transferred to avoid satisfaction of two money judgments obtained in Federal court, was timely brought within the applicable Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]). Although the alleged fraudulent transfers commenced in 1983 and the action was not brought until 1990, after investigations in connection with attempts to satisfy the judgments, plaintiffs utilized reasonable diligence in discovering the transfers, which transfers were peculiarly within the knowledge of defendants, and the failure of plaintiffs to ascertain the truth by inspecting public records is not determinative (Azoy v Fowler, 57 AD2d 541, 542).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim to avoid being time barred when the alleged fraud was not discovered until later.

Weinstein v. Pollack · filed 1994-10-11(8)

The first cause of action, which seeks vacatur of the confessed judgment based upon a theory of fraudulent inducement is not time-barred, as the fraud allegedly perpetrated upon the plaintiffs is alleged to have not been discovered until the defendant attempted to enforce the confessed judgment (see, CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) requires fraud actions within six years, with the period running from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

Juman v. Louise Wise Services · filed 1997-08-11(8)

CPLR 213 (8) provides that an action for fraud must be commenced within six years, but that the time begins to run from the time the plaintiff "discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it."

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim to be timely based on when the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Sullivan v. Kodsi · filed 2005-03-25(8)

The legal threshold for this issue is that which either was known to plaintiff, or that which could have been discovered “with reasonable diligence.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery period depends on when reasonable diligence would have revealed the fraud; the issue may remain unresolved at the pleading stage.

Rusyniak v. Gensini · filed 2009-05-05(8)

When viewed in its entirety, it would be improper for the Court to conclude at this stage of the proceedings that due diligence required Plaintiffs to regularly investigate the status of an idle company, whose activity arguably required participation by its President.

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within six years of the fraud or two years after it was or should have been discovered, whichever is longer.

Picard Ex Rel. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC v. Estate of Chais (In Re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securi · filed 2011-02-24(8)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees and finds that since the Trustee filed the Complaint within two years of the announcement of the BLMIS Ponzi scheme, he is entitled to seek recovery for all of the Transfers over the life of the Moving Defendants’ accounts.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years after the plaintiff discovered it or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

Gorelick v. Vorhand · filed 2011-04-19(8)

“[A] fraud-based action must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or ‘could with reasonable diligence have discovered it’ ” (Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009], quoting CPLR 213 [8]; see 203 [g]; Coombs v Jervier, 74 AD3d 724, 724 [2010]).

Section 213(8)'s two-year fraud discovery period does not extend the deadline when reasonable diligence would have revealed the fraud earlier.

Bezoza v. Bezoza · filed 2011-04-26(8)

While the action was commenced on March 17, 2009, the fraud claim accrued when plaintiff resigned his interest in the corporation on February 27, 2003, and the two-year discovery accrual rule does not apply, as he could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence when he, a sophisticated businessman, signed the resignation or when he received the K-l schedule tax form for the tax year 2003 stating that he owned a zero percent interest in WSA (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Under CPLR 213(8), the two-year period for a fraud claim begins when the plaintiff knows facts from which the fraud can reasonably be inferred; recording a deed alone is insufficient notice of a possible fraudulent transfer.

Budhu v. Budhu · filed 2011-08-23(8)

Thus, because no evidence has been presented that Parbatee possessed knowledge of facts sufficient to reasonably infer that fraud had occurred, this court has determined that the two-year time period stipulated in CPLR 213 (8) began running in 2008.

Section 213(8)’s two-year fraud discovery period can expire when facts called for an investigation, even if the plaintiff pursued a different theory of fraud.

Becnel v. Deutsche Bank AG · filed 2011-12-21(8)

Therefore, I find that Becnel should have investigated the modified theory of fraud, described above, that he now seeks leave to plead as early as 2003. He did not do so, and therefore must be charged with knowledge of the fraud as of 2005, by which time the discovery rule period would have elapsed.

Section 213(8) permits a fraud claim within two years of discovery unless the fraud could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence.

JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Kalpakis · filed 2012-01-17(8)

The movants’ claim was asserted within two years of discovery of the fraud (see Piedra v Vanover, 174 AD2d 191, 196 [1992]), and the plaintiff did not establish, as a matter of law, that the fraud could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence (see CPLR 213 [8]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009]; Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB v Makkas, 67 AD3d 950, 953 [2009]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud-based claim within six years of the fraud or two years after the plaintiff discovered it or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

Weisshaus v. State of New York · filed 2012-01-19(8)

“[A] fraud-based action must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or ‘could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.’” Sargiss v. Magarelli, 12 N.Y.3d 527, 532 (2009) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8)). ... Consequently, as she did not commence the present action until April 2008, the district court correctly ruled that her breach of fiduciary duty claim was time-barred even under New York’s discovery rule for claims based on fraud.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be brought within six years of the fraud or two years after the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered it.

Gonzales v. National Westminster Bank PLC · filed 2012-03-06(8)

Under New York law, an action based on fraud must be brought within six years of the commission of the alleged fraud, or two years from when a plaintiff was aware (had specific notice) or should have been aware of enough facts such that they could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence (had “inquiry notice”). ... Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs were on notice of NatWest’s alleged fraud (i.e., its role in providing false loans in furtherance of BLIPS tax shelter structures) more than two years before the Amended Complaint was filed in March 2011.

Section 213(8) allows a fraud action within two years of discovery when the defendant fails to show that reasonable diligence would have revealed the fraud earlier.

Vilsack v. Meyer · filed 2012-06-13(8)

The appellants did not make a prima facie showing that the fraud could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence (see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d at 532; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Kalpakis, 91 AD3d 722, 723 [2012]).

Section 213(8)’s two-year discovery period can bar a fraud claim on a motion to dismiss when the alleged facts establish a duty to investigate that the plaintiff did not pursue.

Koch v. Christie's International PLC · filed 2012-10-04(8)

Thus, while it is true that New York courts will not grant a motion to dismiss a fraud claim where the plaintiff’s knowledge is disputed, it is proper under New York law to dismiss a fraud claim on a motion to dismiss pursuant to the two-year discovery rule when the alleged facts do establish that a duty of inquiry existed and that an inquiry was not pursued.

Section 213(8)'s discovery exception applies to fraud claims and does not extend the limitations period when no fraud is alleged.

Reid v. Incorporated Village of Floral Park · filed 2013-06-12(8)

Further, the Supreme Court improperly relied on the discovery exception to the statute of limitations, applicable to causes of action alleging fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; Percoco v Lesnak, 24 AD3d 427, 428 [2005]), since the plaintiff never alleged any fraud.

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff two years from when the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

SRM Global Master Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Bear Stearns Companies LLC · filed 2014-02-05(8)

SRM fares no better for its claims based on the 2006 audit opinion with the alternative limitations period, which is two years from when the plaintiff “discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). ... Under the two-year discovery rule, SRM’s claims based on the 2006 audit are untimely.

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff two years from when the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence to bring a fraud claim.

Apt v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. · filed 2014-03-11(8)

Nor is the action timely under the two-year discovery rule. Nellie could have discovered facts constituting the fraud, or could have done so with reasonable diligence, in 2004 or at the latest on August 29, 2005 based on her receipt of the confirmation slips and monthly statements (see Kidder, Peabody & Co. v McArtor, 223 AD2d 502, 503 [1st Dept 1996]).

Section 213(8)’s two-year fraud-discovery period does not wait for a written transcript when the relevant testimony was given publicly.

Abrams v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC · filed 2014-11-19(8)

Appellants’ claim that the limitations period should be measured from the first full day on which a written transcript of Makov’s testimony was available on the court’s docket is without merit. If Makov’s testimony provided the theretofore missing pieces for appellants to sue NatWest, as they argue it did, appellants would have had to file suit no later than November 2010.

Under CPLR 213(8), fraud claims are time-barred when due diligence could have revealed the fraud more than two years before they were brought.

Perini Corp. v. City of New York · filed 2014-11-25(8)

The record amply supports a finding that, with due diligence, defendant could have discovered the fraud more than two years before it brought its fraud counterclaims (see CPLR 213 [8]; Ghandour v Shearson Lehman Bros., 213 AD2d 304 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 710 [1995]).

A fraud claim is timely if commenced within six years of the fraud or two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, it, whichever is later.

Ferdico v. Pabone · filed 2015-02-11(8)

“[A] fraud-based action must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or ‘could with reasonable diligence have discovered it,’ ” whichever is later (Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009], quoting CPLR 213 [8]). ... The defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged fraud could have been discovered by the plaintiffs earlier with reasonable diligence (see Vilsack v Meyer, 96 AD3d 827, 828 [2012]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff bringing a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. Consolidated Risk Services, Inc. · filed 2015-02-26(8)

The "discovery rule" is found in CPLR 213 (8), which provides that claims based on fraud "must be commenced [within] the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time [a] plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it."

Section 213(8)’s two-year discovery rule applies to fiduciary duty claims that sound in fraud.

Cali v. Savino · filed 2015-04-02(8)

The fiduciary duty claims here sound in fraud, and thus the two year discovery rule of CPLR 213 (8) applies to this action (see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 122 [1st Dept 2003]).

CPLR 213(8) requires a plaintiff whose fraud claim arose more than 10 years before suit to show that reasonable diligence would not have uncovered the fraud more than two years before suit.

Stern v. Barney · filed 2015-06-25(8)

Plaintiffs’ fraud claims arose more than 10 years before the commencement of this action. As such, plaintiffs had to show that they could not have discovered the fraud two years prior to this action, by the exercise of reasonable diligence (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim’s limitations period to be tolled until discovery when the plaintiff had no reason to suspect the fraud earlier.

Jacobs v. Halper · filed 2015-07-22(8)

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fraud claim would be tolled under New York’s discovery rule until June 2013, when Plaintiff discovered for the first time that the items he purchased were inauthentic.

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim filed more than six years after the transaction only if the fraud was discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered, within two years before filing.

CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC · filed 2015-05-28(8)

As plaintiff concedes, because it filed its complaint more than six years after the CDO closed, the timeliness of its claims depends on whether it “discovered the fraud ... or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” more than two years before the filing of the complaint on November 15, 2013 (CPLR 213 [8]; see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim to be filed within the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Soghanalian v. Young · filed 2015-08-06(8)

Although we do not discredit plaintiff's assertion that she did not know of the alleged fraud before 2008, her fraud claims are time-barred because the discovery exception allowed plaintiff only two years from the date that she should have reasonably discovered the alleged fraud to commence the action (see Durazinski v Chandler, 41 AD3d 918, 919-920 [2007]; Hoffman v Cannone, 206 AD2d at 741).

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery period can require a trial when the evidence leaves reasonable diligence in dispute.

Abele Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Balfour · filed 2015-11-25(8)

Whether plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in discovering defendant’s fraud must be resolved by the trier of fact (see Mitschele v Schultz, 36 AD3d 249, 255-256 [2006]; Topps Co., Inc. v Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., 380 F Supp 2d at 259-260; see also Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d at 532; Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d at 725; Craven v Rigas, 85 AD3d 1524, 1526 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 932 [2011]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud action within two years after the fraud was or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered, if that period is longer than six years from the fraud.

Abele Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Balfour · filed 2015-11-25(8)

Based upon the evidence proffered, as set forth above, Supreme Court erred in finding that defendant met his initial burden upon his cross motion for summary judgment to establish that the action was untimely (see generally Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503 [2012]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff two years from when fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence to bring a fraud claim after the six-year period.

Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. · filed 2016-03-31(8)

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff’s fraud causes of action were not timely under New York’s six-year limitations period and, to be timely, must have been commenced within two years from the time plaintiff discovered the fraud, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered it (CPLR 213 [8]). ... Accordingly, Deutsche Bank made a prima facie case that Aozora was on inquiry notice of its fraud claims before June 18, 2011 (that is, two years before it filed the summons with notice).

Section 213(8) permits an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim more than six years after a transfer when a qualifying creditor could not have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence until within the two-year discovery period.

Picard v. Avellino (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC) · filed 2016-07-21(8)

Regarding the Defendants’ first point, Judge Lifland previously ruled that N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 213(8) and 203(g) allow the Trustee to bring an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim under N.Y. Debtor & Creditor Law § 276 within two years of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered with reasonable diligence. ... Count Seven, the only avoidance count that reaches back beyond the six year period, seeks to recover intentional fraudulent transfers. The question of whether a creditor exists who could not have discovered Madoffs fraud with reasonable diligence until it was revealed to the public is inherently factual but gives little pause.

Section 213(8) gives a claimant six years from the fraud or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered to bring an aiding-and-abetting fraud claim.

Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc. · filed 2016-09-23(8)

A cause of action for aiding and abetting a fraud must be commenced within six years from the time the fraud was committed or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence ( Giarratano v Silver , 46 AD3d 1053 , 1056 [3d Dept 2007], citing CPLR 213 [8]; see State of NY Workers' Compensation Bd. v Madden, 119 AD3d 1022 [3d Dept 2014]). ... Finally, the two-year discovery rule was triggered no later than December 18, 2009, when the WCB's forensic audit was completed and delivered.

Section 213(8)’s two-year fraud discovery period begins when the claimant has actual knowledge of facts supporting a potential fraud claim.

Yesa LLC v. RMT Howard Beach Donuts, Inc. · filed 2016-10-28(8)

Thus, in the Court’s view, the Defendants had actual knowledge on that date that they potentially possessed a viable fraud-based claim, which is sufficient to trigger the two-year limitations period under the discovery rule. That two-year period expired on April 4, 2015, approximately eight months before the Defendants filed their Third-Party Complaint.

Section 213(8) makes a fraud claim untimely when the claimant could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence more than two years before filing.

Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. AG · filed 2016-11-03(8)

The parties agree that the timeliness of the claims depends on whether plaintiff “discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it,” more than two years before the filing of the complaint on June 18, 2013 (CPLR 213 [8]). The record demonstrates that plaintiff could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the alleged fraud by April 2010, rendering its fraud claims untimely (see Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 137 AD3d 685, 689 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Arnold v. First Citizens National Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.) · filed 2017-02-07(8)

Although the six-year statute of limitations may have run on Counts I and II of both complaints, the discovery rule may save those claims— and that fact question must be left to the trier of fact.

Section 213(8)’s two-year discovery period bars a fraud claim when the claimant could reasonably have discovered the alleged fraud more than two years before filing and the six-year period has expired.

Standard Security Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Berard · filed 2017-03-27(8)

Even viewed in the light most favorable to Berard, the record thus supports the conclusion that he could reasonably have discovered the alleged fraud more than two years before bringing the claim. The district court, therefore, correctly determined that the fraud counterclaim is time-barred.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud plaintiff the longer of six years from the fraud or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, it.

MBI International Holdings Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC · filed 2017-06-01(8)

An action in New York based upon fraud must be commenced within the greater of six years from the date of the fraud or within two years from the time plaintiffs discovered, or with reasonable diligence, could have discovered, the fraud (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) allows two years from when reasonable diligence could have discovered fraud if that is later than the six-year deadline; a recorded deed can give a later creditor reason to discover a transfer before extending credit.

Brick v. Conti (In re Conti) · filed 2017-08-16(8)

Pursuant to New York C.P.L.R. §§ 203(g) and 213(8), the limitations period may be extended for two years after a creditor could with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud. Here, because the deed was duly recorded, reasonable diligence should have discovered the transfer at or before any extension of credit.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims and a two-year period measured from discovery.

Demian v. Calmenson · filed 2017-12-05(8)

Plaintiff’s claims arising from fraud or negligent misrepresentation would be untimely either under the six-year statute of limitations or the two-year discovery rule, since the latest possible fraud, and its discovery, also occurred upon publication (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud-based claim the later of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the fraud.

Krog Corp. v. Vanner Group, Inc. · filed 2018-02-08(8)

Plaintiff's causes of action for aiding and abetting fraud and negligent misrepresentation, both of which sound in fraud ( see State of N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd. v Wang , 147 AD3d at 115-116; NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v People Care Inc. , 141 AD3d 785, 791 [2016]), are subject to a statute of limitations "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time . . . plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213 [8]; see NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v Recco Home Care Servs., Inc. , 141 AD3d 792, 795 [2016]; NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v People Care Inc. , 141 AD3d at 791). Initially, as Supreme Court properly found, plaintiff cannot avail itself of the two-year discovery exception.

Section 213(8)'s two-year discovery provision applies to actual fraud but not constructive fraud.

Berman v. Holland & Knight, LLP · filed 2017-12-05(8)

“[T]he two-year discovery provision [of CPLR 213 (8)] . . . does not apply to constructive fraud” (Monaco v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 213 AD2d 167, 168 [1st Dept 1995], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 86 NY2d 882 [1995]). ... The two-year discovery provision does apply to actual fraud (first cause of action).

Section 213(8)'s two-year discovery rule does not save a fraud claim filed more than two years after the plaintiff was put on inquiry notice.

Essepian v. United Group of Cos., Inc. · filed 2018-07-23(8)

As plaintiff failed to commence this action within two years of being put on inquiry notice, plaintiff's fraud-based claims are not saved by application of the discovery rule.

Section 213(8)'s two-year fraud discovery rule requires a defendant seeking dismissal to show that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice more than two years before suit; the plaintiff must then show that reasonable diligence would not have revealed the fraud by then.

Epiphany Community Nursery Sch. v. Levey · filed 2019-02-05(8)

On a motion to dismiss a fraud claim based on the two-year discovery rule, a defendant must make a prima facie case that a plaintiff was on inquiry notice of its fraud claims more than two years before it commenced the action, in this case, before August 31, 2014. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that even if it had exercised reasonable diligence, it could not have discovered the basis for its claims before that date ( see Berman v Holland & Knight, LLP , 156 AD3d 429, 430 [1st Dept 2017]; Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc. , 137 AD3d 685, 689 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 213(8)’s two-year fraud discovery rule does not make a claim timely when reasonable diligence would have revealed the fraud earlier.

Dowe v. Prudential Financial Inc. · filed 2019-11-22(8)

A reasonably diligent person would have asked to see the first five pages before agreeing to sign such a document; having failed to so inquire, the plaintiffs cannot rely on the two-year discovery rule to render their claims timely.

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery period runs from notice of the injury, even if the plaintiff does not yet know the precise basis for a fraud claim.

Jackson v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA · filed 2021-04-20(8)

But it is well established that the standard for inquiry notice under the discovery accrual rule is notice of the injury, not notice of the claim.

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery period turns on when the plaintiff had notice of the injury, not when the plaintiff learned the precise basis of the claim.

Reyes v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. · filed 2021-04-20(8)

But it is well established that the standard for inquiry notice under the discovery accrual rule is notice of the injury, not notice of the claim.

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery rule applies when a claimant possesses facts from which the fraud could reasonably be inferred.

Rodriguez v. State of New York · filed 2021-09-28(8)

Contrary to claimant's contention, his cause of action for fraud accrued no later than October 6, 2016, when he "possessed knowledge of facts from which the fraud could reasonably have been inferred" ( Town of Poughkeepsie v Espie , 41 AD3d 701, 705 [2d Dept 2007] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv dismissed 9 NY3d 1003 [2007], lv denied 15 NY3d 715 [2010]; see CPLR 213[8]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within two years of when the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence; public reports and similar litigation can put the plaintiff on inquiry notice.

Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2022-02-08(8)

The parties do not dispute that the instant action is not timely under New York's six-year limitations period and, to be timely, must have been commenced within two years from the time plaintiff discovered the fraud, or with reasonable diligence would have discovered it (CPLR 213[8]). Countrywide demonstrated prima facie that Ambac was on inquiry notice of its fraud claims before November 21, 2009, i.e., two years before the parties entered the tolling agreement, based on media reports about Countrywide's fraudulent loan practices, highly publicized litigation between 2006 and early 2009 involving substantially similar claims, and the downgrade of the certificates in the transactions from AAA to junk status by February 2009 ( see e.g. Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc. , 137 AD3d 685, 689 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 213(8)'s two-year fraud discovery rule does not apply when the alleged fraud could have been discovered with due diligence.

Mizrahi v. YMZ Realty LLC · filed 2022-03-15(8)

The amended complaint fails to assert, and plaintiff does not dispute, that the alleged fraud could have been discovered with due diligence, such that the two-year discovery rule tolling causes of action for fraud would not apply (CPLR 213[8]; CPLR 203[g]; see Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc. v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc. , 137 AD3d 685, 689 [1st Dept 2016]; Goldberg v Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. , 242 AD2d 175, 180 [1st Dept 1998], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 92 NY2d 1000 [1998]).

Section 213(8)’s two-year fraud discovery period requires knowledge of facts supporting the fraud; suspicion alone does not suffice.

Koral v. Alsou Saunders, Est. of Gregg Saunders · filed 2022-05-31(8)

The discovery rule is not a tool to aid speculation or to validate a hunch. As Lisa has not shown that she had any “knowledge of facts” supporting the fraud within two years prior to initiating suit, we agree with the district court that she cannot invoke the discovery rule to save her claims.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, the fraud.

Austin v. Fordham University · filed 2022-09-30(8)

In New York, the statutes of limitations for Counts Three and Five, fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, are “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” Deans v. Bank of Am., No. 10 CIV. 9582, 2011 WL 5103343, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2011) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8)); Kampuries v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 204 F. Supp. 3d 484, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim brought more than six years after the fraud if it is filed within two years of when the plaintiff discovered or could with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud.

Lazar v. Mor · filed 2023-02-14(8)

This action was commenced more than six years after the alleged frauds in 2012. Accordingly, plaintiffs' fraud-based claims would be timely only if they were brought within two years of when plaintiffs discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence (CPLR 213[8]).

Section 213(8) permits a fraud claim within two years after the fraud was discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

PC Connection, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2023-08-15(8)

The discovery rule postpones the statute of limitations, making a fraud claim “timely if brought within two years of when the plaintiff ‘discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.’” ... PC Connection argues that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations began running on the May 15, 2020 go-live date. Taking PC Connection’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in PC Connection’s favor, the court agrees that PC Connection had the requisite knowledge to trigger the discovery rule once the go-live occurred, but not prior to that point.

Section 213(8) applies a discovery rule to fraud claims, extending the limitations period for two years from when the fraud was discovered or could reasonably have been discovered.

Doe 1 v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2023-08-18(8)

Both New York and Delaware law recognize that the “discovery rule” applies to claims that allege fraud. This rule extends the statute of limitations for “two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 319 (Del. 2004) (limitations period tolled “where the injury is inherently unknowable and the claimant is blamelessly ignorant of the wrongful act and the injury complained of.”).

Section 213(8) applies a discovery rule that can extend the time to bring an action based on fraud.

Marino v. Weiler · filed 2023-10-06(8)

Plaintiff further contends that her causes of action for aiding and abetting fraud and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty perpetuated through fraud are timely pursuant to the discovery rule for actions based on fraud ( see CPLR 213 [8]; Kaufman v Cohen , 307 AD2d 113, 122-123 [2d Dept 2003]), because she first learned of the alleged fraud in March 2021. We reject that contention. Plaintiff does not allege that any fraudulent statement was made by a representative of defendant-respondent directly to plaintiff or that defendant-respondent itself owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff's fraud-based causes of action against defendant-respondent sound in constructive fraud, not actual fraud, and thus the discovery rule is not applicable to them because it "does not apply in cases alleging constructive fraud" ( Kaufman , 307 AD2d at 126).

Section 213(8)’s two-year fraud discovery period does not begin until the plaintiff knows facts from which the fraud could reasonably be inferred.

Skatteforvaltningen v. Headsail Manufacturing LLC Roth 401K Plan · filed 2024-08-26(8)

Section 213, subd. 8’s two-year discovery window does not begin to run until “a plaintiff is possessed of knowledge of facts from which fraud could be reasonably inferred.”

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Weinberg Real Estate Affiliates, LLC v. Weinberg · filed 2024-10-02(8)

An action to recover damages for fraud must be commenced within "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213[8]).

CPLR 213(8)’s fraud limitations period does not apply to a breach of fiduciary duty claim when allegations of fraud are incidental to the claim.

Hammer v. Heller · filed 2024-10-15(8)

Importantly, however, where fraud allegations are only incidental to the claim asserted, courts will not apply the fraud statute of limitations (see Romanoff, 148 AD3d at 616). ... Accordingly, because there is no basis from the pleadings or plaintiffs' supplementing submissions to conclude that their breach of fiduciary duty claim is governed by CPLR 213(8)'s statute of limitations period, Dayna's motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action is granted and the claim is dismissed as time barred.

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery period begins when the plaintiff knows facts from which fraud can reasonably be inferred, even without enough information to plead a fraud claim.

Poulard v. Delphin · filed 2024-10-16(8)

Rather, and as set forth in the January 19 Opinion, the statute of limitations for a § 213(8) cause of action begins running when “the plaintiff was possessed of knowledge of facts from which [the fraud] could be reasonably inferred” (Koral v. Saunders, 36 F.4th 400, 408 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)) and not, as Poulard argues, when “[Poulard] possessed adequate information to plead a claim for fraud.”

CPLR 213(8)'s two-year fraud discovery rule does not apply to a breach of fiduciary duty claim that lacks justifiable reliance and sounds in conversion.

Katzoff v. BSP Agency, LLC · filed 2025-03-21(8)

Plaintiffs nevertheless maintain that their fiduciary duty claims fall within CPLR 213(8)'s two-year fraud discovery rule because the claims are based on Galligan's fraud, which plaintiffs did not discover until responding to Galligan's discovery requests in 2022 or 2023 (see NYSCEF # 257 at 7). However, "to conclude that [plaintiffs'] breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is a sufficiently pleaded fraud action, [the court] would have to discern a claim that [plaintiffs] acted in 'justifiable reliance' on [defendants'] alleged misrepresentation and material omission" (see IDT Corp., 12 NY3d at 140). As explained above, plaintiffs did not rely on Galligan's misrepresentation that any payments from Galligan/BDG Family were "loans" and therefore there is no fraud alleged. Moreover, plaintiffs' claims against Galligan sound in conversion, not fraud. Thus, the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214(4) applies to the fiduciary duty claims. The claims are untimely.

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim filed more than two years after the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence, if the six-year period has also expired.

Poulard v. Delphin · filed 2025-05-16(8)

Because Poulard had access to such facts by November 2020 but waited until January 2022 to request the bank statements, he did not act with reasonable diligence. His fraud-based claims are thus barred by § 213(8).

CPLR 213(8) allows a fraud claim within six years of the fraud or two years of when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered it, whichever is later.

Three C, LLC v. City Settlement Serv., Inc. · filed 2025-08-13(8)

"[A] fraud-based action must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it, whichever is later" ( Vilsack v Meyer , 96 AD3d 827, 828 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 213[8]). ... The facts presented here did not conclusively demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the alleged fraudulent conduct could have been discovered earlier in the exercise of reasonable diligence ( see Trepuk v Frank , 44 NY2d at 725; House of Spices [India], Inc. v SMJ Servs., Inc. , 103 AD3d 848, 849; Vilsack v Meyer , 96 AD3d at 829).

Section 213(8)'s two-year fraud discovery period applies when reasonable diligence would have revealed the alleged fraud.

Milne Travel Agency, Inc. v. Altour Del., LLC · filed 2026-01-29(8)

Milne's fraud claim was untimely under the two-year fraud discovery rule (CPLR 213[8]). The complaint and documentary evidence, specifically a December 2017 email from Milne forwarding the draft demand letter of his counsel, show that Milne had knowledge of facts that would have led to discovery of the alleged fraud if he had acted with reasonable diligence ( see Harbinger Capital Partners II, LP v Apollo Global Mgt., LLC, 236 AD3d 514, 514-515 [1st Dept 2025]).

CPLR 213(8)’s fraud discovery rule applies to actual-fraud claims seeking equitable relief, including rescission.

Abbate v. Abbate · filed 1981-07-27(8)

The reason for the discovery rule is thus to be found in the nature of the wrong and not in the remedy by which the plaintiff has chosen to seek redress for that wrong. It therefore applies in cases of actual fraud whether the requested relief be legal or equitable in nature.

Section 213(8) starts the fraud limitations period when plaintiffs knew or should have known they had been defrauded; knowledge may be imputed when they fail to investigate after inquiry notice arises.

Ayers v. Piaker & Lyons · filed 2018-09-06(8)

The statutes of limitations for fraud in New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and Florida all incorporate a variation of the discovery rule, keying the statute of limitations trigger to the date when plaintiffs knew or should have known they have been defrauded.

Section 213(8) does not supply the limitations period for § 1983 actions in New York; CPLR § 214(2)'s three-year period controls.

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home & Allied Services Union v. C.N.H. Management Associates, Inc. · filed 1990-06-01(8)

Contrary to Neiman’s contention that the court should look to CPLR § 213(8) and 203(f) to determine the appropriate statute of limitation to be applied in this action, the Second Circuit has held that the three-year limitations period of CPLR § 214(2) is the controlling statute of limitations under New York Law for all actions commenced under § 1983.

Section 213(7)’s six-year limitations period for derivative actions against directors does not cover people who oversee a corporation’s board but are not themselves directors.

Steinfeld Ex Rel. Estate of General Vision Services v. Richard A. Eisner & Co. (In Re General Vision Services, Inc.) · filed 2010-02-03(7)

The six-year statute of limitations governing derivative actions against directors, under § 213(7), does not extend to actions against individuals or entities responsible for overseeing the board of directors, but who were not themselves directors.

Section 213(7) applies to shareholder derivative suits seeking damages for waste against former directors.

Purves v. ICM Artists, Ltd. · filed 1990-06-29(7)

We believe that CPLR § 213 does not apply to the trustee’s BCL § 717 claim. CPLR § 213(7) in relevant part provides that the limitations period for an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a former director to recover damages' for waste is six years. However, the Practice Commentaries to CPLR § 213 explicitly state that § 213(7) is a composite of the CPA sections dealing with shareholder derivative actions and is applicable to derivative actions. Practice Commentaries to CPLR § 213 at 450 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is our view that CPLR § 213(7) applies to shareholder derivative suits and does not apply to claims against directors brought by a trustee in bankruptcy.

Section 213(7) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on causes of action in shareholder derivative suits.

Blake v. Blake · filed 1996-03-07(7)

In this shareholder’s derivative action, most of the alleged acts of corporate waste and breach of fiduciary duty occurred prior to August 13, 1975, and accordingly any cause of action with respect thereto is time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [7]).

Section 213(7) gives shareholder derivative actions a six-year statute of limitations.

North Fork Preserve, Inc. v. Kaplan · filed 2006-07-05(7)

The Supreme Court should have dismissed all of the causes of action to the extent that they were based on the allegations set forth in subparagraphs (h), (k), and (n) on the ground that those claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations that governs a shareholder’s derivative action (see CPLR 213 [7]; Toscano v Toscano, 285 AD2d 590 [2001]; Blake v Blake, 225 AD2d 337 [1996]).

Section 213(7) provides a six-year limitations period for derivative breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against present or former directors and officers.

Oasis Invs. II Master Fund Ltd. v. Mo · filed 2024-05-02(7)

This is a derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duty against Messrs. Mo and Dai (present or former directors and officers). As such, the six-year statute of limitations applies (CPLR 213[7]).

Section 213(7) imposes a six-year limitations period on the shareholder derivative claims addressed here.

Celauro v. Celauro · filed 2025-09-10(7)

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted dismissal of so much of the complaint as was predicated on allegations of wrongdoing that occurred more than six years before the commencement of this action ( see CPLR 213[7]; North Fork Preserve, Inc. v Kaplan , 31 AD3d 403; Matter of Skorr v Skorr Steel Co., Inc. , 29 AD3d 594; see also Brash v Richards , 195 AD3d 582).

Section 213 requires mistake based actions to be commenced within six years of accrual, sets a six year or two year discovery period for actual fraud, and requires constructive fraud actions within six years of the fraud.

Arrathoon v. East New York Savings Bank · filed 1991-01-28(6), (8), (1)

CPLR 213 (6) provides that an action based upon mistake must be brought within six years of its accrual. When applying this limitation period to an action seeking reformation of a lease, it has been held that such an action accrues upon execution of the lease; therefore, an action grounded in mistake and brought more than six years after a lease was executed is time-barred (Black v Mill Rd. Assocs., 86 AD2d 621). Thus, it is clear that the plaintiffs cause of action for reformation is time-barred. With respect to the plaintiff’s cause of action for rescission, assuming, arguendo, that the complaint alleges actual fraud, "the Statute of Limitations would be six years from the commission of the fraud or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the fraud, whichever is later (CPLR 213, subd 8; 203, subd [f])” (Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353, 355-356). However, "[a] cause of action predicated upon the ground of constructive fraud must be commenced within six years from the date of the commission of the fraud (CPLR 213, subd 1)” (Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353, 355-356, supra).

Section 213's six-year limitations period does not govern a statutory cause of action to recover a liability, penalty or forfeiture created by statute when CPLR § 214(2) supplies the applicable period.

NEW YORK ST. DEPT. OF ENV. CONS. v. Dept. of Energy · filed 1991-08-13

EnCon contends that because this complaint seeks injunctive relief, i.e., judgment enjoining the defendant from withholding payment of the regulatory assessments, "[t]he limitations period for [this action] is the six period under CPLR § 213." ... The consolidated cases presently before the court may fairly be read to be actions seeking injunctive, declaratory and other equitable relief, rather than actions at law. ... Thus, it is "an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute", and the governing statute of limitations is accordingly provided in NYCPLR § 214(2). ... Accordingly, any claims brought by the NYDEC for regulatory charges assessed prior to January 18, 1986 are barred by the three year statute of limitations governing actions brought under Article 72 of the NYECL — a statutory cause of action — and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing that portion of plaintiff's complaint seeking such charges must be granted.

CPLR § 213 sets a six-year statute of limitations for an action to set aside fraudulent conveyances.

United States v. Carney · filed 1992-05-19

Under New York law, the statute of limitations in an action to set aside fraudulent conveyances is six years. See CPLR § 213; Dolmetta v. Uintah Nat'l Corp., 712 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir.1983).

CPLR 213(1) requires an action with no specifically prescribed time limit to be commenced within six years, unless exempted by statute or common law.

Cavallo v. Davenport Neck Corp. · filed 1992-11-09(1)

The fact that CPLR 213 (1) provides that any action for which no time limitation is specifically prescribed by law must be commenced within six years clearly reflects a legislative intent that every type of proceeding must be instituted within some prescribed period unless specifically and clearly exempted either by statute or pursuant to the common law.

Section 213's six-year limitations period for contract actions does not apply to indemnification claims.

County of Monroe v. Raytheon Co. · filed 1991-12-12

The Statute of Limitations argument assumes that the first and second causes of action are for breach of contract (CPLR 213). As clarified by Federal’s memorandum, they are not. They are in indemnity, and for purposes of this lawsuit no cause of action for breach of contract shall be deemed to be stated by either the first or second cause of action in the third-party complaint.

Section 213(1) bars an inverse condemnation action filed in 1989 based on conduct occurring in 1981 and injuries sustained in 1982.

Baumler v. Town of Newstead · filed 1993-11-19(1)

Assuming, arguendo, that the Town’s conduct constituted an inverse condemnation of plaintiffs’ properties, that conduct occurred in 1981 and the injuries allegedly were sustained in 1982. This action was commenced in 1989, at which time the inverse condemnation cause of action was time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Matter of Clark v Water Commrs. of Amsterdam, 148 NY 1, 8-9).

Section 213 imposes a statute of limitations that cannot be circumvented by expanding the de facto fiduciary doctrine.

In re the Estate of Sakow · filed 1994-03-18

The court is not willing to stretch the de facto principle to the extent necessary to circumvent the Statute of Limitations imposed on fraud (or conversion) cases (CPLR 213) simply because it is confronted with the proverbial hard case.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year statute of limitations for fraud actions.

Gordon & Breach Science Publishers S.A. v. American Institute of Physics · filed 1994-08-15(8)

For these reasons, we follow PepsiCo and apply the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR § 213(8).

Section 213(1) supplies the statute of limitations applicable to the claim.

Diaz v. Gonzales · filed 1994-10-11(1)

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which sought to dismiss the complaint based on the statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [1]; see also, Mardiros v Ghaly, 206 AD2d 414).

Section 213(2) bars a contract damages action commenced more than six years after the alleged breach.

Dolgoff Holophase, Inc. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. · filed 1995-02-21(2)

Since this action was commenced in March of 1992, more than six years after the alleged breach occurred, the plaintiff’s causes of action for damages for breach of the nondisclosure agreement are barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

CPLR 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years after accrual, while CPLR 213(8) applies the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery or reasonable discoverability of fraud.

Cucchiaro v. Cucchiaro · filed 1995-04-13(2), (8)

Whether plaintiff’s causes of action under counts 1 and 5 are viewed as alleging a breach of that contract in general, or a breach of the warranty provision in particular, CPLR 213 (2) requires that this action have been commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued. As to these claims, the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1982, when the parties executed the separation agreement. Since plaintiff did not institute this action until June 1993, counts 1 and 5 are time barred. ... Under CPLR 213 (8), which must be read in conjunction with CPLR 203 (g) (Garguilio v Garguilio, 201 AD2d 617, 618 [2d Dept 1994]), the period of limitations is the longer of six years from the accrual of the cause of action, or two years from the date when plaintiff discovered the fraud, or, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered it.

Section 213 bars covered causes of action commenced more than six years after accrual.

Local 381 Pension Fund v. Chemical Bank · filed 1995-12-04

Since the instant action was commenced in 1993, any causes of action arising from a failure to properly transmit that stock certificate, whether sounding in breach of contract or negligence, are time-barred (see, CPLR 213, 214).

Section 213 supplies limitations periods used to determine whether the causes of action were timely or barred.

D'Ambrosio v. Abraham Soloman & Co. · filed 1996-01-29(1), (2)

Since the action was commenced in July 1985, these two causes of action were within the applicable Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]; 213 [2]). However, we agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs’ fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action were barred by the Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1], [2]; 214 [6]).

Section 213 bars actions subject to its six-year limitations period when commenced more than six years after the claim accrued.

Investors Insurance of America v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance · filed 1996-10-24

The first three causes of action of the third-party complaint, sounding in professional malpractice, breach of contract and negligence, are barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 213, 214). Indeed, the limitations period began to run in February 1986, when third-party defendant allegedly failed to notify defendant and third-party plaintiff that a claim had been filed against the insured. The third-party action was commenced more than eight years later.

Section 213(4) sets a six-year limitations period for an action on a performance bond.

City of Syracuse v. United States Fidelty & Guaranty Co. · filed 1996-05-31(4)

The Statute of Limitations for an action on a performance bond is six years (CPLR 213 [4]), and plaintiff concedes that the action against defendant accrued upon Breen’s default (see, State of New York v Peerless Ins. Co., 117 AD2d 370, 373; Gazza v United Cal. Bank Intl., 88 AD2d 968).

Section 213(2) subjects unjust enrichment claims to a six-year limitations period, while section 213(8) gives fraudulent inducement claims six years from injury or two years from fraud discovery, whichever is longer.

Plitman v. Leibowitz · filed 1998-01-20(2), (8)

Under CPLR § 213(8), a fraudulent inducement claim must be brought within six years of “when the party alleging fraud has given consideration and thus suffered damage,” ... or within two years of the discovery of the fraud, CPLR § 203(g), whichever is longer. ... Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment is also subject to a six-year limitations period, pursuant to CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims six years from commission or two years from discovery, whichever is longer.

Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. · filed 1998-09-14(8)

The New York statute of limitations for fraud is six years from the date of commission, see CPLR 213(8) (McKinney 1990), or two years from the date the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the fraud, whichever is longer.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action on a demand note, running from execution; an acknowledgment extends it only for the acknowledging party.

Chase Manhattan Bank v. CDC Financial Corp. · filed 1999-09-07

The parties agree that under New York law, the six year statute of limitations for an action on a demand note commences on the date of execution of the note. ... Under New York law, acknowledgment of a debt restarts the limitations period, but only as to the party that made the acknowledgment. ... Acknowledgment of the debt by the borrower does not extend the statute of limitation period as to the guarantors “absent some clear- indication that [the borrower] was acting as the agent of the guarantors.”

Section 213 provides limitation periods that can bar rescission, fraud, and constructive trust claims when they are brought too late.

Silvers v. Silvers · filed 1999-12-13[1], [2], [8]

Additionally, her causes of action for rescission, fraud, and to impose a constructive trust are time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [1], [2], [8]; Fiore v Fiore, 247 AD2d 362; Riley v Riley, 179 AD2d 750; Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801; Frasca v Frasca, 129 AD2d 766; Curry v Chollette, 57 AD2d 604).

Section 213 provides the applicable limitations period, and a claim commenced within months of the relevant notice is timely.

Estate of Gardner v. Carson · filed 2000-04-06

We reject Gardner’s contention that Carson’s claim for enforcement of the withdrawal provision, the only claim presently before this Court, is time barred. The claim was clearly timely because it was commenced within months of Carson’s notice of intent to invoke the provision, well within the applicable limitations period (see, CPLR 213).

Section 213(8) gives fraud causes of action a six-year statute of limitations.

Sferra v. Mathew · filed 2000-06-28(8)

Fraud causes of action are governed by a six year statute of limitations. See CPLR 213(8).

Section 213 gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Jeffries v. Pension Trust Fund of the Pension, Hospitalization & Benefit Plan of the Electrical Industry · filed 2001-04-26

ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations for claims for benefits, and the controlling limitations period is the six-year period prescribed by New York CPLR § 213 for contract actions.

Section 213(4) applies a six-year limitations period to mortgage debt, running from each missed installment when the debt is payable in installments.

Notarnicola v. Lafayette Farms, Inc. · filed 2001-11-05(4)

Here, the six-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 213 (4) began to run upon the plaintiffs’ failure to make each installment payment. Because Turturro never exercised his option to accelerate the entire mortgage debt, the mortgage matured on March 25, 1982, the date of the last scheduled payment. Accordingly, the Statute of Limitations expired on March 25, 1988.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for these breach of contract and fraudulent inducement claims.

J.A.O. Acquisition Corp. v. Stavitsky · filed 2001-11-14

The fraudulent inducement claims are similarly governed by the statutory six-year limitations period (CPLR 213), because they fall under section 12.4 (b) (ii), as breach of representations that were “untrue when made with an intent to mislead or defraud,” and therefore, were also timely.

Section 213(4) imposes a six-year limitations period on foreclosure actions.

Citibank, N.A. v. Park 100 Condominium Board of Managers · filed 2002-03-21(4)

We reject the condominium’s claim that the instant action, which is the result of the bank’s availing itself of the leave it was given to recommence as against the condominium, is itself a foreclosure action time-barred by the six-year limitations period in CPLR 213 (4).

Section 213's statute of limitations does not apply to a rent stabilized tenant's violation of subletting restrictions.

270 Riverside Drive, Inc. v. Wilson · filed 2003-01-06

The right to sublet in a rent-stabilized apartment is not a private right between two parties that is subject to waiver, estoppel, reliance, or the passing of the statute of limitations in bringing an action for violation of lease. Rather, it involves public policy in the application of a rent regulatory scheme which cannot be changed due to the individual acts of parties. Respondent subtenants’ arguments concerning CPLR 213, waiver, estoppel, laches and consent by petitioner to the illegal sublet are not relevant.

Section 213(8) provides a six year statute of limitations for common law fraud actions.

Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v. AAK LTD. · filed 2003-09-08(8)

Plaintiff contends that the most analogous cause of action, consistent with the policies behind the Lanham Act, is the common law fraud action, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) which has a statute of limitations period of six years. ... In this case, this Court finds that Defendants’ behavior more closely resembles that of fraud rather than an injury to property, because the crux of the claim against Defendants involves the surreptitious selling by undisclosed agents of the Semeraro defendants in violation of the exclusive distributorship of Plaintiff by means of false and misleading representations made on behalf of the Semeraro defendants to Plaintiffs customers (i.e. Lord & Taylor and Bloomingdale’s). Pursuant to the body of cases holding that the statute of limitations akin to New York state fraud claims of six years applies in this case, Plaintiffs unfair competition claim is not time-barred.

Section 213(1) generally gives declaratory judgment actions a six-year limitations period.

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Crotty · filed 2006-04-20[1]

Such claims are cognizable in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see CPLR 7803 [3]) and accrued, thereby triggering the four-month limitations period, when the challenged administrative action became final and binding upon petitioners. ... Accordingly, petitioners’ second and third causes of action accrued at that time and, thus, are barred by the applicable four-month statute of limitations and must be dismissed.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year statute of limitations for implied-in-fact contract claims.

Beth Israel Medical Center v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. · filed 2006-05-19(2)

New York law provides a six-year statute of limitations period for implied-in-fact contract claims.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for a breach of contract cause of action.

Cator v. Bauman · filed 2007-04-20(2)

Inasmuch as the statute of limitations for the breach of contract cause of action is six years, that cause of action is not time-barred (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 does not bar a claim filed in 2020 seeking documentation of a bank’s 2018 transfer of funds.

lewy v. JP Morgan Chase Bank & Co. · filed 2021-06-09

Plaintiff’s demand for documentation of the transference of her funds to the state in 2018 is within the statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) and (8) provide the limitations periods that barred these breach-of-contract and fraud claims, respectively.

Wiercinski v. Law Firm of Steven M. Warshawsky · filed 2021-06-11(2), (8)

Plaintiff's claim to recover the retainer fee paid to defendant-law firm, based upon theories of breach of contract and fraud, was time-barred by the respective Statutes of Limitations ( see CPLR 213[2],[8]).

Section 213's six-year limitations periods bar covered claims brought twenty-seven years after they accrued.

Miller v. Hamlett · filed 2022-10-11

Plaintiff brought this action in 2019, some twenty-seven years after his claim began to accrue. None of the applicable statutes of limitations run that long, under either New York or California law.

Section 213 applies six-year limitation periods to fraud-related claims under subsection (8) and breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims under subsection (2).

Cedar Capital Mgt. Group Inc. v. Lillie · filed 2023-08-07(2), (8)

"[A] fraud claim must be brought within the longer of 'six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ...could with reasonable diligence have discovered [the fraud] '" ( Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Credit Suisse Group , 144 AD3d 437, 438 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 914 [2017], quoting CPLR 213 [8]). Claims for aiding and abetting fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud are also governed by CPLR 213 (8) ( Tahair v Narkis , 216 AD3d 557, 559 [1st Dept 2023]). Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [2]; Simon v FrancInvest, S.A. , 192 AD3d 565, 567 [1st Dept 2021], appeal dismissed 37 NY3d 1005 [2021]).

Subsection 213(9) gives the New York Attorney General six years to bring an Executive Law § 63(12) case.

People v. Richmond Capital Group LLC · filed 2023-09-15(9)

Pursuant to CPLR 213(9), the statute of limitations on a case brought by the NY AG pursuant to Executive Law § 63(12) is six years.

Section 213 gives foreclosure actions a six-year limitations period, generally running from each unpaid installment’s due date, but acceleration starts the period for the full amount.

53rd Street LLC v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2023-11-30(4)

In New York, the statute of limitations for foreclosure actions is six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213. Typically, the statute of limitations starts running from the due date of each unpaid installment. Plaia v. Safonte, 847 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (App. Div. 2007). However, once an installment loan is accelerated—for example, when a bank initiates a foreclosure action, see Dagrin, 79 Misc. 3d at 396—the entire amount comes due, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the full amount, EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Patella, 720 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (App. Div. 2001).

A mortgagor may expressly waive the CPLR § 213 statute of limitations defense in the mortgage.

MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v. Harris · filed 2024-10-04

The Court need not analyze the constitutional intricacies of FAPA's retroactive applicability of these amendments as Harris waived the right to assert a CPLR § 213 statute of limitations affirmative defense when she executed her mortgage. Indeed, Clause No. 25 of the mortgage contains an express waiver which states, "[t]he pleading of a statute of limitations as a defense ... is hereby waived." Such a waiver is enforceable in New York.

Section 213(1) generally governs actions for equitable relief and does not supply the limitations period for civil RICO claims.

Terra Resources I v. Burgin · filed 1987-05-29(1)

He rejected the “omnibus” statute of limitations, CPLR § 213(1), because that statute has generally been understood to govern actions for equitable relief only. ... In short, even if Durante did not settle the issue, this court follows Judge Conner’s holding on the statute of limitations in Feldesman, and, accordingly, this RICO action is time-barred.

Section 213(8)'s limitations period did not bar the RPAPL article 15 action.

Coon v. Coons · filed 1994-03-28(8)

We agree with the Supreme Court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ action is not barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [8]; cf., Garlick v Tarenzi, 152 AD2d 721).

For a fraud or misrepresentation claim, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers the fraud.

First Bible Baptist Church, Inc. v. Gates-Chili Central School District · filed 1991-04-26[8]

Whether viewed as a cause of action for fraud, for negligent misrepresentation or, as suggested by the School District, for injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to asbestos, the cause of action accrued in March of 1985 when plaintiff discovered the presence of asbestos in the building (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 214-c [3]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six year limitations period for arrears claims, and partial payment does not restart it without an unconditional acknowledgment of the debt.

Flynn v. Flynn · filed 1991-07-18(2)

The defendant does not dispute the determination that the six year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) governs as to her claim for arrears from 1979 to 1983. However, she asserts that plaintiff made partial payment of the antecedent debt in 1982, which tolled the statute of limitations. "It is well settled that part payment of a debt does not, by itself, toll the statute of limitations, but that the burden rests upon the creditor to show that it was a payment of a portion of the admitted debt, paid to and accepted by him as such, accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder” (Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v Warner, 156 AD2d 131, 132). Here, plaintiff denied that the two payments were arrears payments, there were no indications on the face of the checks to establish that proposition and there was no writing acknowledging a larger debt which the plaintiff intended to pay. Under these circumstances, defendant failed to meet the requisite burden of proof and the Referee properly found that the part payments did not revive the claimed debt.

Partial payments can revive CPLR 213’s six-year limitations period for a demand loan.

Schleifer v. Schlass · filed 2003-03-11

Contrary to plaintiffs contention, no triable issue has been raised as to whether there were partial loan payments by defendants that revived the statutory period.

CPLR 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period, and a partial payment restarts the period only when it is an admitted, acknowledged portion of the debt.

Stern v. Stern Metals, Inc. · filed 2005-10-11(2)

“In order [for] a part payment [to] have the effect of tolling a time-limitation period, under the statute or pursuant to contract, it must be shown that there was a payment of a portion of an admitted debt, made and accepted as such, accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder” (Lew Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d 516, 521 [1976]). ... In this case there was no admitted debt. ... This payment is not referable to the debt alleged in the complaint arising from the defendants’ failure to make certain repairs as allegedly required by the lease. ... Accordingly, the action was properly dismissed as time-barred.

CPLR 213(1) gives claims for constructive trust and unjust enrichment six years from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Saddharma Cakra Buddhist Assn., Inc. v. Chen · filed 2020-01-08(1)

The causes of action to impose a constructive trust and to recover damages for unjust enrichment are governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[1]) that begins to run at the time of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution ( see Mannino v Passalacqua , 172 AD3d 1190, 1194; Vitarelle v Vitarelle , 65 AD3d 1034, 1035; Maric Piping v Maric , 271 AD2d 507, 508).

CPLR 213 (1) gives an action to impose a constructive trust a six-year limitations period that runs from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Tornheim v. Tornheim · filed 2009-11-10(1)

Accordingly, based on this 1997 date, as the first date on which Joseph began to avoid discussions concerning the subject property, the plaintiffs action, which was commenced on or about January 2, 2008, is time-barred by the six-year limitations period applicable to actions to impose a constructive trust (see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) gives an equitable constructive trust claim a six-year limitations period, running from the wrongful act that creates a duty to make restitution.

Sitkowski v. Petzing · filed 1991-08-05(1)

The equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1) (see, Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262, 267; Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447), which starts to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution (see, Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555, 556-557; Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954).

Section 213(1) requires an equitable constructive trust claim to be brought within six years, measured from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Starkey v. Starkey · filed 1993-04-15(1)

It is well settled that a claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable cause of action governed by the CPLR 213 (1) six-year Statute of Limitations, which begins to "run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution” (Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801, 802; see, Ta Chun Wang v Chun Wong, 163 AD2d 300, 302, lv denied 77 NY2d 804, cert denied — US —, 111 S Ct 2893).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period for a constructive trust claim, running from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Lucci v. Lucci · filed 1996-05-06(1)

The wife’s cause of action to impress a constructive trust upon the property located on Sagamore Road, Long Lake, New York, is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations found in CPLR 213 (1), which starts to rim upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution (see, Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262, 267; Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar v 26 Adar N.B. Corp., 192 AD2d 501, 503; Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801).

For a constructive trust claim, CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period that begins when the wrongful act creating the restitution duty occurs.

Krauss v. Iliescu · filed 1999-03-01(1)

“The equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1) * * * which starts to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution” (Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801, 802; see, Matter of Wallace, 191 AD2d 638, 639; Matter of Sakow, 219 AD2d 479, 482). Thus, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiffs second and third causes of action are time-barred to the extent that they seek to impose a constructive trust for acts which occurred prior to November 5, 1991.

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on constructive trust claims, accruing when the alleged transfers occurred.

Elghanayan v. Elghanayan · filed 1999-10-28(1)

Also time-barred (CPLR 213 [1]) is the constructive trust cause of action, which accrued at the time of the alleged transfers to defendants-respondents (Matter of Sakow, 219 AD2d 479, 482).

For an equitable constructive trust claim, the six-year limitations period begins when the wrongful conduct or event creates the duty to make restitution.

Dombek v. Reiman · filed 2002-10-01(1)

“The equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1) * * *, which begins to run at the time of the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution” (Maric Piping v Maric, 271 AD2d 507, 508).

Under section 213(1), a constructive trust claim based on a later refusal to convey a property interest may turn on when that breach occurred.

Panish v. Panish · filed 2005-12-19(1)

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1]; Jakacic v Jakacic, 279 AD2d 551 [2001]; Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801, 802 [1991]). The gravamen of the complaint is not that the defendant acquired the property wrongfully, but rather, that the defendant breached the trust relationship at some later date by refusing to convey the plaintiffs interest in the property to her after its acquisition (see Mardiros v Ghaly, 206 AD2d 414 [1994]; Sitkowski v Petzing, supra). Thus, there are questions of fact as to when the statute of limitations began to run (see Marie Piping v Marie, supra; Delango v Delango, 203 AD2d 319 [1994]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a constructive trust claim, running from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Ponnambalam v. Sivaprakasapillai · filed 2006-12-12(1)

To the extent that it seeks to impose a constructive trust on the Wagon Wheel property, this cause of action is governed by the six-year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213 (1), which “commences to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution” (Mazzone v Mazzone, 269 AD2d 574, 574-575 [2000], quoting Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555, 556-557 [1986]; see Panish v Panish, 24 AD3d 642 [2005]; Pisciotto v Dries, 306 AD2d 262 [2003]).

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for claims to impose a constructive trust.

DeLaurentis v. DeLaurentis · filed 2008-01-22(1)

In either case, the cause of action to impose a constructive trust is time-barred pursuant to the six-year statutory limit set forth in CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an equitable claim to impose a constructive trust.

Zane v. Minion · filed 2009-06-30(1)

The equitable claim to impose a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; Auffermann v Distl, 56 AD3d 502 [2008]; Reiner v Jaeger, 50 AD3d 761 [2008]; Jakacic v Jakacic, 279 AD2d 551 [2001]).

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust and conversion claims a six-year limitations period that begins with the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Goco v. Ramnani · filed 2009-08-25(1)

Constructive trust and conversion claims are governed by the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (1) (see Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262, 267 [1987]; Auffermann v Distl, 56 AD3d 502 [2008]; Pisciotto v Dries, 306 AD2d 262, 263 [2003]; Mazzone v Mazzone, 269 AD2d 574, 574-575 [2000]; Krauss v Iliescu, 259 AD2d 468 [1999]), which begins to run at the time of the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution (see Reiner v Jaeger, 50 AD3d 761 [2008]; Maric Piping v Marie, 271 AD2d 507, 508 [2000]; Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801, 802 [1991]; Dybowski v Dybowska, 146 AD2d 604, 605 [1989]).

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust claims a six-year limitations period that begins when wrongful conduct creates a duty of restitution.

Vitarelle v. Vitarelle · filed 2009-09-08(1)

A claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year statute of limitations found in CPLR 213 (1) and “begins to run at the time of the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution” (Maric Piping v Maric, 271 AD2d 507, 508 [2000]).