N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213(4)(b) bars a mortgage holder from denying that a prior foreclosure action accelerated the debt unless that action was dismissed on an express judicial determination that the acceleration was invalid.

Article 13 LLC v. Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank · filed 2025-11-25(4)(b)

If a prior such action was discontinued for any other reason, FAPA bars the holder of a note or mortgage from claiming that the statute of limitations has not expired "because the instrument was not validly accelerated" ( id. ).

Section 213(4)(a) estops a foreclosure plaintiff from disputing acceleration in a prior action unless that action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination that acceleration was invalid.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Bookspan · filed 2026-03-11(4)(a)

Since the 2003 action was not dismissed based upon an expressed judicial determination that the instrument was not validly accelerated, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2003 action ( see U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Reizes , 222 AD3d at 910).

Section 213(1) gives an insured six years to challenge an insurer’s disclaimer as untimely, beginning when the insured has enough information to assert the challenge.

Kent Ave. Prop. 3, LLC v. Allied World Natl. Assur. Co. · filed 2024-06-06(1)

When Allied disclaimed in September 2013, plaintiffs "possessed sufficient information . . . to formulate the factual basis for [the] assertion" that the disclaimer was untimely under Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), and thus, the statute of limitations began to run (2016 WL 4097847, *5, 2016 US Dist LEXIS 101925, *14; see also Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex. , 87 NY2d 34, 43 [1995]). Accordingly, plaintiffs' action commenced on October 29, 2021 is time-barred under the six-year (CPLR 213[1]) statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) allows a claim for a successive breach of a contract requiring continuing performance if that breach occurred within six years before suit.

Johnson v. Giles · filed 2024-09-19(2)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim is six years and begins to run when the breach occurs or the claim otherwise accrues such that the plaintiff could bring suit. ... Accordingly, Giles’ motion to dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the alleged written agreement (Claim 2) with respect to any alleged new breaches of the agreements to pay royalties and provide credit on new distributions of Touch It Or Not and Triple Up within the six years before Plaintiff filed this action.

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years to bring a contract claim; when a contract requires continuing performance, each successive breach may start a new limitations period.

Bella v. Wilton Reassurance Life of New York · filed 2025-06-05(2)

Under New York law, a cause of action upon a contract must be commenced within six years, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2), and a cause of action for breach of contract “ordinarily accrues and the limitations period begins to run upon breach,” Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007). ... Under the continuing-breach doctrine, where “a contract requires continuing performance over a period of time”—as the Contract requires—‘each successive breach may begin the statute of limitations running anew.” Gardner, 480 F.3d at 150. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim is not time barred.

Section 213(2)’s six-year limit may bar a remedy for an earlier contract breach without barring relief for a separate, later breach.

Bischoff · filed 2025-11-07(2)

Frank and Todd’s argument elides the distinction between two breaches: the attempted disposition and the failure to sell Eric the shares. While the statute of limitations bars the Court from remedying the former, it does not prevent the Court from providing a remedy for the more recent breach of the Shareholder’s Agreement.

CPLR § 213(1) and (2) provide a six-year limitations period for actions to enforce distributive awards in matrimonial cases.

MF v. PF · filed 2024-09-23(1), (2)

The Second Department's holdings have been clear and consistent in holding in actions such as this one to enforce distributive awards in matrimonial actions is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR § 213 [1] and CPLR § 213 [2] . Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 007 is DENIED in its entirety with prejudice.

Section 213(4) sets the limitations period for foreclosure actions but does not itself provide a procedure to dismiss an action or vacate a prior order or judgment.

Palm Ave. Hialeah Trust v. Knowles · filed 2025-05-16(4)

As mentioned above, the defendant specified in his order to show cause that he was seeking dismissal of the action, based upon the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), CPLR 213(4), and RPAPL §1501. Plaintiff correctly notes that these statutes do not provide mechanisms for dismissal or relief from prior orders and judgments.

Section 213(6) gives six years to seek reformation for a mistake, measured from the date of the mistake, but a limitations period cannot bar a claim to declare a deed void from its inception.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Katz · filed 2026-01-28(6)

"'A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213(6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made'" ( Johnson v Broder , 112 AD3d 788, 788, quoting Taintor v Taintor , 50 AD3d 887, 888). Here, however, the deed, insofar as it purported to convey an interest in the property from Gold to the LLC, was void at its inception, since it is undisputed that the LLC did not exist at the time the deed was executed ( see Matter of Hausman , 13 NY3d 408, 413). Since "a statute of limitations cannot validate what is void at its inception," the statute of limitations cannot act as a bar to the cause of action for a judgment declaring the LLC's purported interest in the property null and void ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 230; see OneWest Bank v Schiffman , 175 AD3d 1543, 1545).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on an action to recover unpaid condominium common charges, with a separate claim accruing when each monthly charge becomes due.

Board of Mgrs. of Grandview Condominiums v. Medina · filed 2026-01-28(2)

However, this action was subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]). Separate causes of action accrued for each monthly common charge that was not paid, and the statute of limitations began to run on the date each monthly common charge became due ( see id. ; Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Assn., Inc. v JZG Resources, Inc. , 105 AD3d 820, 822; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cohen , 80 AD3d 753, 754-755).

Section 213(2)'s six-year contract limitation applies to an attorney-client agreement when the attorney fails to perform a promised service or an explicitly undertaken task; negligent performance under a general retainer is governed by the malpractice limitation.

Brainard v. Brown · filed 1983-01-27(2)

The contract Statute of Limitations has been applied to attorney-client agreements only when there was a promise to perform and no subsequent performance, or when the attorney has explicitly undertaken to discharge a specific task and then failed to do so (Boecher v Borth, 51 AD2d 598). The instant action fits into neither of these categories.

Section 213(2) supplied a six-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims seeking damages recoverable under a contract claim before the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214(6).

Ruffolo v. Garbarini · filed 1998-01-20(2)

Prior to the effective date of the amendment, and at the time the action was commenced, the six-year Statute of Limitations for breach of contract claims (CPLR 213 [2]) governed legal malpractice actions where the action sought damages recoverable under a contract claim.

CPLR 213(1) is a limitations provision that must be affirmatively pleaded and does not defeat a claim on the complaint alone.

People v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1983-07-12(1)

The limitations provisions upon which the TA relies are subdivision 5 of section 297 of the Executive Law, CPLR 214 (subd 2) and CPLR 213 (subd 1). ... Nor do the other cited Statutes of Limitations affect the sufficiency of the first cause of action because they are but statutes of repose which must be affirmatively pleaded (CPLR 3018, subd [b]).

Section 213(1)’s six-year catchall period does not apply to a declaratory claim that could be brought under Article 78’s four-month limitations period.

Davis v. Proud · filed 2014-03-05(1)

Where, as here, a plaintiff challenges a state agency’s administrative determination, as opposed to the validity of any legislation, as arbitrary and capricious, Article 78 review is available to him. Thus, plaintiffs claims that the State defendant’s conduct was arbitrary and capricious are subject to a four (4)-month statute of limitations, ... and should have been raised by commencing an Article 78 proceeding in state court within four (4) months of the OTDA’s October 25, 2012 letter denying his request for a fair hearing, or by February 25, 2013.

Section 213(1)’s six-year limitations period does not govern claims properly brought as an Article 78 proceeding.

Anderson v. County of Suffolk · filed 1983-10-17(1)

Special Term erroneously invoked CPLR 103 (subd c) to convert the proceeding into a plenary action for money damages governed by the residual six-year Statute of Limitations in CPLR 213 (subd 1).

CPLR 213’s six-year limitations period does not govern claims for lost goods transported internationally by air under the Warsaw Convention.

Advance Footwear Co. v. Air Jamaica, Ltd. · filed 1984-04-30

Although plaintiff claims that the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 governs this lawsuit, it is clear that plaintiff is mistaken and that the action is subject to the two-year limitations provision of article 29 of the Warsaw Convention (Convention).

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitation does not apply to rent overcharge claims arising before April 1, 1984.

Charles H. Greenthal Co. v. State Division of Housing & Community Renewal · filed 1984-12-26(2)

One case, however, concludes that a general six-year Statute of Limitations is applicable to such claims (see, Blodgette v Melohn, 124 Misc 2d 736 [NY City Civ Ct 1984]). The court there reasoned that the 1983 amendment to CPLR 213 (2), excepting claims for rent overcharge from the six-year statute, tended to indicate the Legislature’s belief that the six-year statute was theretofore applicable to such claims. Nevertheless, based on the Appellate Division case and RSL § YY51-6.0 (c) (3) and Code § 10 (B), this court concludes that in claims for rent overcharge prior to April 1, 1984, there is no Statute of Limitations and the complete overcharge can be refunded or credited to tenant as directed by the CAB.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to claims for implied indemnity.

Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino · filed 1986-10-01

So viewed, Aquino’s claim sounded in implied contract rather than negligence even though it was the tortious or wrongful act of the notary which gave rise to the implied right of indemnity (cf. 23 NY Jur 2d, Contribution, Indemnity, and Subrogation, § 63). As such, the six-year Statute of Limitations applies (cf CPLR 213).

Section 213(8)’s six-year period for fraud actions does not apply to civil RICO claims, even when they allege mail or telephone fraud.

Getz v. Penthouse International, Ltd. · filed 1987-03-13(8)

Given this conclusion, the Court rejects plaintiff’s suggestion that the Court apply the six-year New York statute of limitations governing actions based on fraud because obviously a garden variety fraud action cannot encompass the myriad of factual predicates which may underlie a RICO claim.

Section 213’s six-year limitation does not apply to the property-damage claim arising from petroleum contamination.

Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny International, Inc. (In Re Allegheny International, Inc.) · filed 1993-07-30(1)

The comments for § 213 suggest generally that the statute applies to those actions: "where not otherwise provided for; on contract; on sealed instrument; on bond or note, and mortgage upon real property; by state based on misappropriation of public property; based on mistake; by corporation against director, officer or stockholder; based on fraud.” None of these applications refer to property damage of the sort involved in the instant case.

Section 213’s six-year period for contract actions does not apply to proceedings to recover unpaid franchise taxes that Tax Law § 219 exempts from CPLR article 2.

Wetzler v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc. · filed 1995-01-10

By statute, proceedings brought to recover unpaid franchise taxes are generally exempt from the operation of ... CPLR article 2 (Tax Law § 219) and, thus, are not subject to either the three-year period of limitation controlling penalties imposed by statute (CPLR 214 [2]) or the six-year period controlling contract actions (CPLR 213).

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for contract actions does not apply to MVAIC's statutory claim for reimbursement of no-fault benefits.

Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1996-11-21(2)

Thus, MV AIC’s obligation to pay the claimants’ first-party benefits and its entitlement to reimbursement from Aetna were both created or imposed by statute, but for which they would not exist. Hence, the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [2]) applies.

The six-year limitations periods in Section 213(1) and (2) do not apply to a conversion counterclaim that fails to allege an attorney’s breach of fiduciary duty to a client.

Rivera v. Viera · filed 1998-01-20(1), (2)

We reject defendant’s argument that his pleading alleges a breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney to his client to which the six-year limitations period of either CPLR 213 (1) or (2) applies.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for contract actions does not govern a public agency's recovery of Medicaid costs when Social Services Law § 104 supplies a ten-year period.

Case v. Fargnoli · filed 1999-12-20(2)

Defendants contend that the plaintiffs claim is barred by the six-year period of limitations applicable to express or implied contracts (CPLR 213 [2]). In particular, defendants claim that the statute began to run when plaintiff, knowing of the trust, authorized the home assistance payments in early 1991, more than six years before this action was commenced. We disagree. Section 104 of the Social Services Law establishes the pertinent period of limitations and provides that the public agency may recover the cost of services rendered during the preceding 10 years.

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for lawsuits seeking additional first-party benefits when New York law governs.

Kaszak v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2002-04-30

There is no dispute that a conflict exists between New York’s six-year statute of limitations for commencing lawsuits for additional first-party benefits (see, CPLR 213; Benson v Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 134 AD2d 214) and Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of limitations for commencing such lawsuits (see, 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1721 [a]). ... Upon application of a “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” analysis, as well as consideration of New York’s strong governmental policy interest in assuring that persons involved in vehicular accidents within its borders receive no-fault benefits based on New York’s minimum financial requirements, we find that New York law controls. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion to strike defendant’s first affirmative defense of the statute of limitations is granted.

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period does not bar entry of judgment under a settlement stipulation when the original action remains pending.

Marine Midland Bank v. Worldwide Industrial Corp. · filed 2003-07-24(2)

Thus, there is no merit to respondents’ assertion of the statute of limitations, which is an affirmative defense (CPLR 3018 [b]; 3211 [a] [5]) that must be asserted either in a responsive pleading or in a motion to dismiss the complaint (CPLR 3211 [e]). The procedural posture of this matter simply affords no opportunity to interpose such defense.

Section 213(2) gives six years to sue on a guarantee, including a guarantee of a contract for the sale of goods.

Movado Group, Inc. v. Caseiko Trading Co. · filed 2012-12-11(2)

In other words, New York courts view guarantees — even those within contracts for the sale of goods — as separate obligations from those present in the underlying agreement, and thus, have held such guarantees to be subject to a six-year limitations period.