N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims that begins when the breach occurs.

St. George Hotel Associates v. Shurkin · filed 2004-11-01(2)

The plaintiffs’ cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrued, and the relevant six-year statute of limitations began to run, upon the breach, not when the plaintiffs allegedly sustained damages arising therefrom (see CPLR 213 [2]; Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]; National Life Ins. Co. v Hall & Co. of N.Y., 67 NY2d 1021 [1986]; Mauro v Niemann Agency, 303 AD2d 468 [2003]).

Section 213 applies a six year limitations period to an accounting proceeding, beginning when the fiduciary’s account is judicially settled or the fiduciary openly repudiates the obligation with the beneficiary’s knowledge.

Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP · filed 2007-09-13

The time within which a proceeding seeking an accounting must be commenced begins to run either when the fiduciary’s account is judicially settled or when there is an open repudiation by the fiduciary of his obligation to administer the estate to the knowledge of the beneficiary (Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80 [1972]; Matter ofWinne, 232 AD2d 956 [1996]).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud claim to be brought within six years of the fraud or two years after it was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Giarratano v. Silver · filed 2007-12-13(8)

A fraud cause of action must be commenced within six years from the time the fraud was committed or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence (see CPLR 213 [8]). ... She could have discovered any alleged fraud at least by that time, making her 2004 filing of this action untimely.

Section 213(1) gives actions for rescission a six-year limitations period.

Hosseiniyar v. Alimehri · filed 2008-02-19(1)

Actions for rescission are governed by the six-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 213 (1).

An alleged partial payment and written acknowledgment promising to pay a contract balance can restart the six-year limitations period for a contract claim.

Island ADC, Inc. v. Baldassano Architectural Group · filed 2008-03-25(2)

However, the plaintiff alleged that the statute of limitations started running anew in January 2001 when the defendants made a partial payment on the balance due on the contract, and wrote to the plaintiff acknowledging that an additional balance was due and promising to pay the same in monthly installments (see Stern v Stern Metals, Inc., 22 AD3d 567 [2005]). Thus, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Section 213(1) gives a claim to impose a constructive trust six years from the wrongful act that creates a duty of restitution.

Reiner v. Jaeger · filed 2008-04-08(1)

A cause of action to impose a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations and begins to accrue “upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered” (Soscia v Soscia, 35 AD3d 841, 843 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim six years from the fraud, or two years from when it reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is longer.

Kuslansky v. Kuslansky · filed 2008-04-29(8)

Furthermore, the counterclaim is untimely since, as of the date that the action was commenced ... the counterclaim was barred by the applicable limitations period, i.e., the longer of six years from the alleged fraud, or two years from when the fraud reasonably could have been discovered (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to begin within six years of the fraud or two years after it could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is later.

Sargiss v. Magarelli · filed 2008-04-29(8)

A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years of the commission of the fraud, or two years from the date the fraud could reasonably have been discovered, the expiration of whichever is later (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or could reasonably have been discovered to bring a fraud action.

Marasa v. Andrews · filed 2010-01-05(8)

An action to recover damages for fraud must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]; see CPLR 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim to be brought within six years of the fraud or two years from when it could have been discovered, whichever is later.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Rabiner · filed 2010-11-04(8)

As Plaintiff and defendants correctly note, the statute of limitations for a fraud or unjust enrichment claim is six (6) years in New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (Consol.2004) (effective Aug. 17, 2004). A cause of action based upon such claims must be brought within six years of the commission of the fraud, or two years from the date the fraud could have been discovered, whichever is later.

A negligent misrepresentation claim accrues on the date of the alleged misrepresentation and has a six-year limitations period.

Marchig v. CHRISTIE'S INC. · filed 2011-02-01(1)

Under New York law, this cause of action accrues on the date of the alleged misrepresentation, and the statute of limitations is six years.

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to sue for breach of contract, beginning with the first alleged breach even if damages arise later.

Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. v. Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Co. · filed 2011-06-06(2)

In New York, the statute of limitations with regard to a contract action is six years. CPLR § 213(2) (McKinney). The statute of limitations for contract actions begins to run from the date of the first alleged breach, even in the event that damages do not accrue until a later date.

Section 213(8)'s six-year period generally applies when the injury would not exist but for fraud; a fraud claim incidental to legal malpractice is subject to the three-year malpractice period.

Scott v. Fields · filed 2011-06-07(8)

Pursuant to CPLR 213 (8), a six-year statute of limitations period is generally applicable where there would be no injury but for the fraud (see New York Seven-Up Bottling Co. v Dow Chem. Co., 96 AD2d 1051 [1983], affd 61 NY2d 828 [1984]; see also Ruffing v Union Carbide Corp., 308 AD2d 526 [2003]). Here, however, the gravamen of the plaintiffs allegations against Weaver is that Weaver did not fulfill her professional duty to protect the plaintiff in the real estate transaction at issue. Thus, the fraud cause of action asserted as against Weaver is merely incidental to the negligence cause of action. Since, in reality, the plaintiffs claims against Weaver allege professional negligence, the fraud cause of action is subject to a three-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice (cf. Klein v Gutman, 12 AD3d 417 [2004]).

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a claim to compel uninsured motorist arbitration begins when the claim accrues, which may be when the PMV Fund denies coverage.

Progressive Northeastern Insurance v. Rogers · filed 2011-12-06(2)

On appeal, the parties do not dispute that the six-year statute of limitations for contract claims (see CPLR 213 [2]) governs the respondents’ proceeding against Progressive to compel arbitration of their claim under the policy (see Jenkins v State Farm Ins. Co., 21 AD3d 529 [2005]). ... Therefore, the respondents’ claim against Progressive for UM benefits did not accrue until December 30, 2009, and, accordingly, the limitations period did not begin to run until that date.

CPLR 213’s six-year limitations period governs actions to recover unpaid employer contributions under Retirement and Social Security Law § 17 (e).

DiNapoli v. Town of New Scotland · filed 2011-12-22

Preliminarily, we agree with Supreme Court’s determination that this action is governed by the six-year limitations period established by CPLR 213.

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff six years to bring a fraud claim, or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or could with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud.

Levermore v. Jackson · filed 2012-02-16(8)

Under New York’s statute of limitations, a fraud claim is time-barred if it is brought more than six years after the commission of the fraud unless it is brought within two years from the time the plaintiff “discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.”

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when it could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

US Bank National Ass'n v. Gestetner · filed 2013-02-14(8)

The limitations period for a fraud claim is the greater of six years after the cause of action accrued or two years after it could have been discovered with reasonable diligence (see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered to bring a fraud claim.

House of Spices (India), Inc. v. SMJ Services, Inc. · filed 2013-02-27(8)

A fraud cause of action must be interposed within the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued, i.e., when the plaintiff was damaged by the alleged misconduct, or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, the fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009]; Shalik v Hewlett Assoc., L.P., 93 AD3d 777, 778 [2012]; Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc. v Mansir, 90 AD3d 888, 889 [2011]). Here, because the action was commenced against SMJ on December 16, 2009, the fraud cause of action was timely interposed.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

BROOKS, III, LLORD BYRON v. AXA ADVISORS, LLC · filed 2013-03-15(8)

The statute of limitations for fraud is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff[s] . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]; see CPLR 203 [g]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive fraudulent conveyance claim six years from the conveyance to be brought.

Jaliman v. D.H. Blair & Co. · filed 2013-04-25(1)

“New York law provides that a claim for constructive fraud is governed by the six-year limitation set out in CPLR 213 (1), and that such a claim arises at the time the fraud or conveyance occurs” (Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 530 [1999]). The conveyance occurred in 1992. Thus, the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ fraudulent conveyance claim ran in 1998, more than a decade before they moved to amend their complaint in 2009.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or could reasonably have discovered the fraud.

Matana v. Merkin · filed 2013-07-30(8)

Under New York law, an action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years of the date the cause of action accrued, or within two years of the time the plaintiff discovered or could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence, whichever is greater.

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for unjust enrichment claims; an obligation on a guaranty accrues when the borrower defaults.

Whittemore v. Yeo · filed 2013-12-12

In any event, even assuming Yeo Farms had timely asserted a statute of limitations defense, plaintiffs obligations on the guaranty did not accrue until Yeo Farms defaulted on the loan in May 2009, and plaintiff commenced the instant action in March 2010, well within the applicable six-year “catchall” statute of limitations for bringing an unjust enrichment claim (see generally CPLR 213; Maya NY, LLC v Hagler, 106 AD3d 583 [1st Dept 2013]; Parrish v Unidisc Music, Inc., 68 AD3d 566 [1st Dept 2009]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud action within the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery of the fraud.

Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A. · filed 2014-03-30(8)

Under New York law, in “an action based upon fraud[,] the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud....” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). ... The Court thus grants Citizens’ Motion to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action with prejudice.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud plaintiff the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or could reasonably have been discovered; inquiry notice can establish when that discovery period begins.

Gander Mountain Co. v. Islip U-Slip LLC · filed 2014-04-01(8)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for fraud is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. CPLR § 213(8). Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court correctly concluded that Gander was on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud in 2006.

For claims governed by Section 213, accrual may occur when defendants take title solely in their names or refuse a proposed agreement recognizing another person’s interest.

Hinz v. Hinz · filed 2014-11-05

The defendants established that the accrual date for these causes of action was either the date that they acquired the property in their names only in March 1998, or when they refused to sign the written agreement proposed by the plaintiff’s estate planning attorney in March 2001 (see CPLR 213, 214; Quadrozzi v Estate of Quadrozzi, 99 AD3d 688, 690 [2012]; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]). Since the defendants demonstrated that the plaintiff did not commence this action until February 2012, the defendants established, prima facie, that these causes of action were time-barred.

Section 213(2) gives an action to recover on a promissory note six years from the date the note becomes payable.

CF Notes, LLC v. Goldman · filed 2015-05-21(2)

Thus, as the motion court determined, defendant’s note was payable upon his resignation from Cantor Fitzgerald on October 22, 2007, and it was on this date that the statute of limitations began to run (see DDS Partners v Celenza, 6 AD3d 347, 348 [1st Dept 2004]; Pine v Okoniewski, 256 App Div 519, 521 [4th Dept 1939]). Accordingly, the complaint was timely filed on October 21, 2013 — one day prior to the expiration of the six year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 gives unjust enrichment claims six years from the wrongful act to be filed.

Merced Irrigation District v. Barclays Bank PLC · filed 2016-02-29

Merced’s state law claims are similarly subject to statutes of limitations: the UCL bars claims brought more than four years after the cause of action accrued, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17208; and New York law establishes a six-year statute of limitations for unjust enrichment claims, accruing at the time of the wrongful act.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the fraud.

Sejin Precision Industry Co. v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2016-06-26(8)

In New York, the limitations period for a fraud claim is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Under CPLR 213(1), the six-year limitations period for a disputed ownership interest begins when the claimant receives definitive notice that the other party rejects that interest.

Wasay v. Alvi · filed 2017-03-22(1)

The applicable six-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the defendant received definitive notice that the plaintiff did not believe that the defendant had an interest in Sparklean (see Zwarycz v Marnia Constr., Inc., 102 AD3d 774, 776 [2013]; Morris v Gianelli, 71 AD3d 965, 967 [2010]). The plaintiff failed to establish that he directly and definitively repudiated the defendant’s alleged ownership interest in Sparklean prior to January 2013. Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the five subject counterclaims as time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1]; Zwarycz v Marnia Constr., Inc., 102 AD3d at 776; Morris v Gianelli, 71 AD3d at 967).

A fraud claim must be brought within six years of the fraud or within two years after it was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Celestin v. Simpson · filed 2017-08-16(8)

A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years after the commission of the fraud, or within two years after the date the fraud was discovered or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

D. Penguin Bros. Ltd. v. City Natl. Bank · filed 2018-02-01(8)

The limitations period for fraud is "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213[8]).

Section 213(8)'s fraud limitations period applies to conversion claims based on fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims for which fraud is essential.

Monteleone v. Monteleone · filed 2018-06-13(8)

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, since the cause of action for conversion is based upon fraud, it is governed by the statute of limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8) ( see Loeuis v Grushin, 126 AD3d 761, 765; Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d 806, 808; Petrou v Ehmer Intl. Foods, 167 AD2d 338, 339). The limitations period for fraud under CPLR 213(8) also applies to the breach of fiduciary duty causes of action inasmuch as the allegations of fraud are essential to those claims ( see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 119).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim to be filed within the later of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Seidenfeld v. Zaltz · filed 2018-06-20(8)

An action for fraud must be commenced within "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213[8]; see CPLR 203[g]; Coleman v Wells Fargo & Co. , 125 AD3d 716; House of Spices [India], Inc. v SMJ Servs., Inc ., 103 AD3d 848, 849; Benedict v Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan , 77 AD3d 867, 869; Oggioni v Oggioni , 46 AD3d 646, 648).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff alleging fraud the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

O'Reilly v. Klar · filed 2018-12-19(8)

Actions based on fraud, including the fraudulent conduct alleged in this lawsuit, are subject to the statute of limitations of "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213[8]; see Carbon Capital Mgt., LLC v American Express Co. , 88 AD3d 933, 939; Percoco v Lesnak , 24 AD3d 427, 428).

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action a six-year limitations period; an attempted acceleration does not start that period unless the party accelerating the debt had standing to do so.

U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Sopp · filed 2019-03-06(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... The record is clear that, as of August, and indeed, October, of 2006, the plaintiff had not yet been assigned the note and mortgage. Accordingly, just as it lacked standing to accelerate the debt in October 2006, when it commenced the 2006 action, it lacked standing to do so in August 2006, when it sent the notice of default letter.

Section 213 gives contract and quasi-contract claims a six-year limitations period that begins at breach, not discovery of the breach.

Gabayzadeh v. Global Equipment and Machinery Sales Inc. · filed 2019-11-21(1), (2)

The Copy Paper Machine claim is subject to New York’s six-year statute of limitations for contract or quasi- contract claims, which begins to accrue at the time of breach, and not at the time of discovery of a breach.

A claim to reform an instrument because of a mistake has a six-year limitations period that begins when the mistake was made.

Investors Sav. Bank v. Cover · filed 2020-10-14(6)

A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213(6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made ( see Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co. , 86 NY2d 543, 547; Taintor v Taintor , 50 AD3d 887, 888).

Section 213(8)'s six-year fraud limitations period applies to an unfair competition claim sounding in reverse passing off when the claim more closely resembles fraud than injury to property.

Harris v. American Accounting Association · filed 2021-11-24(8)

In this case, this Court finds that Plaintiff's unfair competition claim sounding in reverse passing off more closely resembles that of fraud, rather than an injury to property, and, accordingly, holds that the most appropriate statute of limitations period is the six-year period for fraud claims pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") § 213(8).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period for a strict foreclosure action begins when the property is sold at the foreclosure sale.

517-525 W. 45 LLC v. Avrahami · filed 2022-02-24(1), (4)

Contrary to defendant's argument, Supreme Court correctly found that the six-year statute of limitations that applies to this action did not begin to run until the property was sold at the foreclosure sale in July 2014 (CPLR 213[1], [4]).

Section 213(6) gives a party six years from the date of a mistake to seek reformation of an instrument; the court applied a 228-day COVID-19 executive-order toll to that period.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Kocak · filed 2024-09-09(6)

Defendant is correct that "[a] cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake, including an alleged scrivener's error, is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made" (Lopez v Lopez, 133 AD3d 722, 723 [2d Dept 2015)). In this case, the mortgage was executed on September 14, 2016, and this action was commenced on October 18, 2022, ostensibly 34 days late. However, Defendant overlooks that the running of statute of limitations in this case was tolled for 228 days by operation of "Executive Order 202.8 and seven subsequent executive orders" which were issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Trento 67, LLC v OneWest Bank, NA., 214 AD3d 689 [2d Dept 2024]; Wilmington Trust, NA v Fife, 212 AD3d 550 [15 1 Dept 2023)). As such, Defendant's statute of limitations affirmative defense to the cause of action to reform the mortgage fails as a matter of law.

Section 213(2) gives a breach-of-contract claim six years; a claim for failure to procure required insurance accrues when the procurement obligation first goes unmet.

Holness v. 421 Kent Dev., LLC · filed 2025-01-03(2)

The statute of limitations for breach of contract in New York is six years. ( See CPLR 213 [2].) Generally, the statute of limitations for breach of contract begins to run at the time of breach, even if damages do not accrue until a later date and even if the complaining party is unaware of the breach. ( See Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal , 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993].) A cause of action for breach of contract for failure to procure contractually required insurance accrues when the unsatisfied procurement obligation first attaches. ( See Port Auth. Of NY & N.J. v Brickman Group Ltd., LLC , 181 AD3d 1, 11 [1st Dept 2019].) Centrifugal's breach of contract claim accrued when J&Z purportedly failed to obtain the requisite insurance covering it as an additional insured. As the parties entered into the agreement in October 2014, Centrifugal's breach of contract claim accrued no later than October 2014. ( See Wright , 112 AD3d at 402.) Since more than six years have elapsed since the parties entered into the agreement, J&Z's motion for summary judgment dismissing this claim is granted.

Section 213(6) does not time-bar relief that interprets an ambiguous deed by rejecting words to clarify its meaning rather than reforming the deed.

Meyer v. Stout · filed 2010-12-30(6)

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the court did not reform the deed but, rather, “carr[ied] out the intention of [the deed] by . . . rejecting . . . words to make the meaning of the contract more clear” (Wallace, 86 NY2d at 547). Thus, the relief granted by the court was not time-barred (see CPLR 213 [6]).

Section 213(6) generally gives a plaintiff six years from the mistake to sue to reform a deed; possession delays the limitations period only when the plaintiff possesses the property under the instrument sought to be reformed.

Pulver v. Dougherty · filed 2009-01-15(6)

“An action to reform a deed based upon a mistake must generally be commenced within six years after the mistake is committed” (Green Harbour Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v Ermiger, 50 AD3d 1199, 1200 [2008]; see CPLR 213 [6]). ... Therefore, as this action for reformation was not commenced until nearly eight years after the mistake in the deed, it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 213(6) gives a claim to reform an instrument for mistake six years from the date the mistake was made.

Taintor v. Taintor · filed 2008-04-15(6)

A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made (see Amalgamated Dwellings v Hillman Hous. Corp., 299 AD2d 199 [2002]; Ta Chun Wang v Chun Wong, 163 AD2d 300, 301-302 [1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 804 [1991], cert denied 501 US 1252 [1991]).

Section 213(6) generally requires a deed reformation claim based on mistake to be brought within six years of the mistake; possession under an instrument of title can delay the running of that period.

Green Harbour Homeowners' Ass'n v. Ermiger · filed 2008-04-03(6)

An action to reform a deed based upon a mistake must generally be commenced within six years after the mistake is committed (see CPLR 213 [6]). ... Thus, as neither Black nor defendant was in possession of the lots under an instrument of title prior to the time the statute of limitations expired, the exception does not apply and the reformation counterclaims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213 provides six-year limitation periods for reformation claims based on mistake or fraud and for actions on a contract.

Vollbrecht v. Jacobson · filed 2007-05-10(6), (8), (2)

A claim for reformation based on mistake or fraud typically carries with it a six-year limitations period measured from the time of the mistake or discovery of the fraud (see CPLR 213 [6], [8]; Wilshire Credit Corp. v Ghostlaw, 300 AD2d 971, 973 [2002]; see also Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co., 86 NY2d 543, 547 [1995]; Sitkiewicz v County of Sullivan, 256 AD2d 884, 885 [1998], appeal and lv dismissed 93 NY2d 908 [1999]). ... Clearly, any attempt by defendants to enforce the memorandum at this point is untimely (see CPLR 213 [2]), as is a cause of action by defendants to quiet title (see CPLR 212 [a]; Freer v Poncic, 172 AD2d 959, 959-960 [1991]; see also Acres v Hitchcock, 77 AD2d 744, 745 [1980], appeal dismissed 51 NY2d 877 [1980], lv denied 53 NY2d 601 [1981]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for reformation based on mistake, running from when the mistake is committed.

Dubin v. Muchnick · filed 1981-04-14

First, defendants assert that reformation premised on mistake as opposed to fraud is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 which begins to run when the mistake is committed, here sometime in 1973 after the execution of the original stockholders’ agreement. ... With respect to the first tier argument defendants clearly are correct (Nichols v Regent Props., 49 AD2d 847).

Section 213(6) gives an action based on mistake a six-year limitations period.

First National Bank v. Volpe · filed 1995-07-14(6)

CPLR 213 (6) prescribes a six-year Statute of Limitations for "an action based upon mistake”.

Section 213(6) requires a six-year limitations period for reformation claims based on mistake, accruing when the mistake occurs.

1414 APF, LLC v. Deer Stags, Inc. · filed 2007-04-17(6)

The statute of limitations on a claim of reformation based upon mistake is six years, accruing on the date of the mistake (CPLR 213 [6]; see National Amusements v South Bronx Dev. Corp., 253 AD2d 358 [1998]).

Section 213(6) generally requires an action to reform a deed based on mistake to be commenced within six years of the mistake.

Mastropietro v. Lecce · filed 2012-11-01(6)

Plaintiffs commenced this action in 2011 — 23 years after the partial conveyance of Seneca Manor to Rossi and far beyond the applicable six-year statute of limitations.

A claim to reform an instrument for mistake must be brought within six years of the date the mistake was made.

Johnson v. Broder · filed 2013-12-18(6)

“A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made” (Taintor v Taintor, 50 AD3d 887, 888 [2008]). In this case, the defendant Paul G. Broder established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing, as time-barred, so much of the complaint insofar as asserted against him as was predicated upon an alleged mutual mistake by submitting evidence that the alleged mistake occurred in 1979 and the plaintiff did not commence this action until 2011 (see id. at 889).

Section 213(6) gives a claim to reform an instrument for mistake six years from the date the mistake was made.

Lopez v. Lopez · filed 2015-11-18(6)

A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake, including an alleged scrivener’s error, is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made (see Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co., 86 NY2d 543, 547 [1995]; Johnson v Broder, 112 AD3d 788, 788 [2013]; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Five Star Mgt., 258 AD2d 15, 20 [1999]).

Section 213(6) gives a six-year limitations period for reformation based on mistake, generally measured from when the mistake occurred.

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Hilpertshauser · filed 2017-12-07(6)

“Reformation based upon a purported mistake is governed by a six-year statute of limitations that is generally measured from the occurrence of the mistake” (Wilshire Credit Corp. v Ghostlaw, 300 AD2d 971, 973 [2002]; see CPLR 213 [6]; Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co., 86 NY2d 543, 547 [1995]; Pulver v Dougherty, 58 AD3d 978, 979 [2009]). ... The alleged mistake occurred no later than the execution of the mortgage in 2007 and, therefore, this 2015 action was appropriately dismissed against defendant as time-barred.

Section 213(6) governs the limitations period for a claim to reform a mortgage based on mutual mistake.

Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Molini · filed 2019-04-10(6)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the cause of action to reform the mortgage on the ground of mutual mistake was timely, as it was interposed within the two-year discovery window measured from the plaintiff's receipt of the mortgage ( see CPLR 213[6], 203[g][1]; Davis v Davis , 95 AD2d 674, 675).

The six-year limitations period in CPLR 213(2) does not apply to an administrative effort to recoup Medicaid overpayments.

Westledge Nursing Home v. Axelrod · filed 1985-12-05(2)

This court has recently reiterated that the six-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 213 (2) is inapplicable to an administrative attempt to recoup Medicaid coverages (Matter of Blase v Axelrod, 111 AD2d 1015, lv granted 66 NY2d 602).

Section 213(2) gives an action for money had and received a six-year limitations period.

County of Niagara v. Town of Royalton · filed 2008-02-01(2)

In addition, the six-year statute of limitations applies to this action because it is one for “money had and received [and thus] is one of quasi-contract or of contract implied-in-law” (Board of Educ. of Cold Spring Harbor Cent. School Dist. v Rettaliata, 78 NY2d 128, 138 [1991]; see CPLR 213 [2]; see also Strough v Jefferson County, 119 NY 212, 219-220 [1890]), and this action thus is not time-barred.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for a claim for money had and received.

Vogel v. Tunick · filed 2008-03-14

The other cause of action alleged by plaintiffs is for money had and received. This “is an obligation which the law creates in the absence of agreement when one party possesses money that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain and that belongs to another” (Parsa v State of New York, 64 NY2d 143, 148 [1984]; Matter of Witbeck, 245 AD2d 848, 850 [1997]), and subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213; Board of Educ. of Sachem Cent. School Dist. at Holbrook v Jones, 205 AD2d 486 [1994]; Brewer v State of New York, 176 Misc 2d 337 [1998]).

CPLR 213(1) imposes a six-year limitation on claims for child support arrears when no other statute specifically prescribes a time limit.

Department of Social Services v. Juan B. · filed 1987-05-22(1)

The six-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 213 (1) governs claims for child support arrears based on its clear language and its construction in Tauber v Lebow (65 NY2d 596).

CPLR 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for a counterclaim for equitable distribution.

Marshall v. Bonica · filed 2011-07-19(1)

Here, however, when this action was commenced in 2008, the defendant’s counterclaim for equitable distribution ... was already barred by the six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Walter v Starbird-Veltidi, 78 AD3d 820, 822 [2010]; cf. Young v Knight, 236 AD2d 534, 535 [1997]; Mattwell v Mattwell, 194 AD2d 715, 717 [1993]; Peterson v Goldberg, 180 AD2d 260, 263-264 [1992]).

CPLR 213(1) and (2) impose a six-year limit on actions to enforce matrimonial distributive awards, but motions to enforce settlement stipulations are not subject to that limit.

Bayen v. Bayen · filed 2011-02-22(1) and (2)

An action to enforce a distributive award in matrimonial action is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) and (2) (see Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596 [1985]; Woronoff v Woronoff, 70 AD3d 933 [2010]; Duhamel v Duhamel, 188 Misc 2d 754 [2001], affd 4 AD3d 739 [2004]). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, however, motions to enforce the terms of a stipulation of settlement are not subject to statutes of limitation (see Fragin v Fragin, 80 AD3d 725, 725 [2011]; Cotumaccio v Cotumaccio, 171 AD2d 723 [1991]; but cf. Patricia A.M. v Eugene W.M., 24 Misc 3d 1012 [2009]).

CPLR 213 (1) and (2) impose a six-year limit on a claim to enforce a divorce distributive award that has not been reduced to a money judgment.

Woronoff v. Woronoff · filed 2010-02-16(1) and (2)

Instead, her claim to enforce this award was governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) and (2) (see Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596 [1985]; Duhamel v Duhamel, 188 Misc 2d 754 [2001], affd 4 AD3d 739 [2004]; see also Dolan v Ross, 172 AD2d 1013 [1991]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a separate claim for an injunction, even when the related damages claim is limited to three years.

ABS Entertainment, Inc. v. CBS Corp. · filed 2016-02-18(1)

In this case, the plaintiffs stress the importance of an injunction as a remedy to prevent ongoing copyright infringement including for those plaintiffs who may not have a legal remedy because their claims for damages are time-barred. Hence, while plaintiffs cannot extend the statute of limitations for their damages claims beyond three years, they have a claim for an injunction governed by a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for equitable causes of action, but does not govern a claim involving conversion of property.

Gelwan v. De Ratafia · filed 2025-12-18(1)

The court correctly applied the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(3) applicable to claims involving conversion of property rather than the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(1) applied to equitable causes of action.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year statute of limitations for the applicable action.

Kinns v. Schulz · filed 1987-06-11(2)

Furthermore, we agree with Supreme Court that in the circumstances the applicable Statute of Limitations is six years (CPLR 213 [2]; see, Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs., 58 NY2d 1026; see also, National Life Ins. Co. v Hall & Co., 67 NY2d 1021).

CPLR 213 allows a fraud action within six years of accrual or two years of actual or reasonably diligent discovery, whichever is longer; constructive trust and unjust enrichment claims have six years from the wrongful act.

Coombs v. Jervier · filed 2010-06-01(1), (8)

The time within which an action based upon fraud “must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]; see Piedra v Vanover, 174 AD2d 191 [1992]). Causes of action alleging unjust enrichment and “to impose a constructive trust [are] governed by a six-year statute of limitations and begin[ ] to accrue ‘upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered’ ” (Reiner v Jaeger, 50 AD3d 761, 761 [2008], quoting Soscia v Soscia, 35 AD3d 841, 843 [2006]; see CPLR 213 [1], [8]; Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d 806, 808 [2007]; Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar v 26 Adar N.B. Corp., 192 AD2d 501, 503 [1993]).

Section 213(1) gives unjust enrichment claims involving breach of fiduciary duty a six-year limitations period, running from the wrongful act.

L.I. Head Start Child Development Services, Inc. v. Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau County, Inc. · filed 2008-06-03(1)

New York courts have applied a six year statute of limitations for a claim of unjust enrichment involving breach of fiduciary duty. ... Applying the six-year limitation period, all unjust enrichment claims based on events which occurred prior to December 1, 1994 are barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed.

Section 213 imposes a six-year limit on breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims and permits a fraud action within two years after discovery.

Natimir Restaurant Supply, Ltd. v. London 62 Co. · filed 1988-05-26(1), (2), (8)

Defendant’s motion should have been granted to the extent of barring so much of the claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment as seeks recovery for the alleged improper payments made prior to March 21, 1980, which date marks six years before this action was commenced. Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims are governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 213 [2] and [1], respectively.) Accordingly, under those theories of recovery, plaintiffs are barred from raising claims occurring more than six years before commencement of the action. However, on the fraud cause of action, plaintiffs properly rely on CPLR 203 (f) and 213 (8), which permit commencement of a fraud cause of action within two years of discovery of the fraud.

Section 213(1) requires an unjust enrichment action to be commenced within six years, with the period running from the wrongful act creating the restitution duty.

Helfand v. Sessler · filed 2002-06-26(1)

The applicable statute of limitations for this claim is six years. (CPLR 213 [1]; Chanler v Roberts, 275 AD2d 625 [1st Dept 2000]; Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar v 26 Adar N.B. Corp., 192 AD2d 501, 503 [2d Dept 1993].) A claim for unjust enrichment accrues upon commission of the wrongful act creating a duty of restitution. (Id. at 502-503.)

Section 213(1) gives contract claims a six-year limitations period, with accrual when the plaintiff has the legal right to demand payment.

Swift v. New York Medical College · filed 2006-01-24(1)

“To dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that it is barred by the Statute of Limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie that the time in which to sue has expired” (Savarese v Shatz, 273 AD2d 219, 220 [2000]). ... In order to make a prima facie showing, the defendant must establish, inter alia, when the plaintiffs cause of action accrued. Where, as here, the claim is for payment of a sum of money allegedly owed pursuant to a contract, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff “possesses a legal right to demand payment” (Matter of Prote Contr. Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 198 AD2d 418, 420 [1993]). ... Thus, the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to relief pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), and the fourth cause of action should not have been dismissed.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Precision Valve Corp. · filed 2005-11-30(1)

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1), which provides for a six-year statute of limitations, applies to breach of contract claims.

Section 213 gives contract and quasi-contract claims six years from breach and fraud claims the longer of six years from the fraud or two years from when it was or should have been discovered.

Gutkowski v. Steinbrenner · filed 2010-01-26(2), (8)

New York’s statute of limitations for contract and quasi-contract claims is six years, and it accrues upon breach. ... New York’s statute of limitations for fraud claims is the longer of six years from the date on which the fraud occurred, or two years from discovery or the time when the plaintiff should have, with reasonable diligence, discovered the fraud. ... Accordingly, all of Plaintiffs claims are dismissed as untimely under New York’s statute of limitations.

Section 213(1) gives unjust enrichment claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the work for which compensation is sought is performed.

Sirico v. F.G.G. Productions, Inc. · filed 2010-03-04(1)

Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims are time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]) because they accrued in the 1960s, when plaintiffs made the recordings for which they seek compensation (see Petracca v Petracca, 305 AD2d 566, 567 [2003]).

Section 213(1) gives unjust enrichment claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the wrongful act occurs.

Hosking v. TPG Capital Management, L.P. (In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA · filed 2015-01-29(1)

The challenged transfers underlying the Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim occurred in December 2006, well over six years ago. However, the Debtor’s chapter 15 petition was filed in February 2012, before the expiration of the six-year limitations period.

Section 213(1) gives unjust enrichment claims a six-year limitations period that runs from the wrongful act giving rise to restitution.

Yarbro v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-06-30(1)

The legal malpractice claim, which accrued at the time the mortgages were recorded after closing (Benedict v Estate of Noumair, 289 AD2d 71 [1st Dept 2001]) and is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [6]), and the unjust enrichment claim, which accrued “upon the occurrence of the alleged wrongful act giving rise to restitution” (Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 127 [1st Dept 2003]) and is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [1]); see also Maya NY, LLC v Hagler, 106 AD3d 583, 585 [1st Dept 2013]), are time-barred.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract or quasi-contract claims, including an unjust enrichment claim seeking equitable restitution.

Moskovits v. Grigsby · filed 2020-02-20(2)

Therefore, the statute of limitations is six years, and Plaintiff’s action would be timely. In addition, the cases cited by Defendants are inapplicable, as they relate to claims for replevin or conversion of chattels under CPLR § 214(3), not for claims that lie in contract or quasi-contract under CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limit for breach-of-contract claims; section 213(8) sets a six-year limit for fraud claims and also bars a claim brought more than two years after the alleged discovery of fraud.

Rabinowitz v. Grosso · filed 2023-05-10(2), (8)

To the extent that the complaint purports to state a cause of action sounding in breach of contract, this action was commenced more than six years after the wrongdoing alleged in the complaint, and is therefore time-barred ( see CPLR 213[2]). To the extent that the complaint purports to state a cause of action sounding in fraud, this action was commenced more than six years after the wrongdoing alleged in the complaint, and is therefore time-barred ( see CPLR 213[8]). Even accepting the plaintiff's contention that he did not discover the purported fraud until several years after the wrongdoing alleged in the complaint, this action was commenced more than two years after that alleged discovery, and is therefore time-barred ( see id. ; Cusimano v Schnurr , 137 AD3d 527, 531).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions with no specifically prescribed period.

Mahabir v. Snyder Realty Group, Inc. · filed 2023-06-21(1)

A cause of action alleging unjust enrichment is governed by a six-year statute of limitations and begins to accrue upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered ( see CPLR 213[1]; Coombs v Jervier , 74 AD3d 724; Reiner v Jaeger , 50 AD3d 761).

Section 213(8) requires fraud claims to be filed within the greater of six years after accrual or two years after the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

Langhamer v. Johnson · filed 2023-10-12(8)

Under New York law, claims based on fraud must be filed within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an unjust enrichment claim.

Bridgewater Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing v. Dinstber · filed 2024-12-16(1)

The Statute of Limitations for unjust enrichment is also 6 years (Davis v. Cornerstone Tel. Co., 61 AD3d 1315 [3 rd Dept. 2009]; see, Delaware County v. Leatherstocking Healthcare, LLC, 110 AD3d 1211 [3 rd Dept. 2013]; CPLR 213(1)) so the claim for unjust enrichment is timely.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an unjust enrichment claim seeking equitable relief.

Matter of Catapano · filed 2025-03-20(1)

Generally, a cause of action for unjust enrichment has a six-year statute of limitations period ( see CPLR 213 [1]; Matter of Chustckie , 203 AD3d at 822-823; Matter of Trombley , 137 AD3d 1641, 1642 [4th Dept 2016]; see also Matter of Ziv , 80 Misc 3d at 977). ... Here, the Court concludes that petitioner's claim sounding in unjust enrichment is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213 gives breach-of-contract claims six years from the breach and fraud claims the longer of six years from the fraud or two years from when it was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Yudkin v. Evergreen Terrace 888 Corp. · filed 2025-05-28(2), (8)

Here, Doran and 888 Oscar established, prima facie, that the cause of action alleging breach of contract was time-barred, since this action was commenced more than six years after the alleged breach occurred in April 2013 ( see CPLR 213[2]; Kaul v Brooklyn Friends Sch. , 220 AD3d at 941). ... A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer ( see CPLR 213[8]; Seidenfeld v Zaltz , 162 AD3d 929, 934). Here, Doran and 888 Oscar established, prima facie, that the cause of action alleging fraud was time-barred.

Section 213's six-year limitations period does not apply to claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Taylor v. Vassar College · filed 1988-06-16

The Board correctly determined that the CPLR does not apply to section 120 claims. ... Accordingly, Statutes of Limitation set forth in the CPLR will not be applied to claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Section 213(4) requires actions on mortgage debt or a mortgage interest to be commenced within six years.

Saliani v. Amrhein · filed 1988-10-12(4)

CPLR 213 (4) provides that an action upon a bond or note, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage upon real property, or upon a bond or note and mortgage so secured, or upon a mortgage of real property, or any interest therein must be commenced within six years.

Section 213(8) limits a fraud action to six years from the fraud or two years after the plaintiff discovers the concealment.

Harkin v. Culleton · filed 1990-04-12(8)

Since plaintiff does not allege any contact with McMurtry after his last office visit on December 3, 1981, it must be that no affirmative misrepresentations were made by McMurtry to plaintiff after that date, and since the action was not commenced within six years of that date, or within two years after December 5, 1984, when plaintiff allegedly first learned of the concealment, the fraud claim should have been dismissed as time barred (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [f]).

Section 213(4) does not require a junior mortgagee joined in a senior mortgagee’s foreclosure action to commence a separate foreclosure action within six years.

Garcia v. Valdes (In re Garcia) · filed 1994-05-17(4)

This Court finds that under the facts of the instant matter, Valdes was not required commence a separate action to foreclose her Mortgage because she was joined as a party-defendant in the senior mortgagee’s action.

Subsection (4) provides a six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure actions.

United States v. Quaintance · filed 1997-11-19(4)

Plaintiff is not subject to the six-year Statute of Limitations provided in CPLR 213 (4) for mortgage foreclosure actions (see, Cracco v Cox, 66 AD2d 447, 450; Westnau Land Corp. v United States Small Bus. Admin., 785 F Supp 41, 43, affd 1 F3d 112), and the action is time-barred only if the Statute of Limitations had run against Lafayette when the assignment was made (see, United States v Thornburg, 82 F3d 886, 890).

CPLR 213(4) gives mortgage foreclosure actions a six-year limitations period.

Secured Equities Investment, Inc. v. McFarland · filed 2002-12-30(4)

Thus, defendants established as a matter of law that the six-year statute of limitations had run by July 11, 1995 (see CPLR 213 [4]), and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Section 213(4) requires a mortgage foreclosure action to be brought within six years.

Clayton National, Inc. v. Guldi · filed 2003-08-18[4]

We agree with the Supreme Court that this action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to an action to foreclose a mortgage (see CPLR 213 [4]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action to foreclose a mortgage.

LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Gold · filed 2007-10-09

They established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff failed to commence this action within the applicable six-year limitations period (see CPLR 213; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Patella, 279 AD2d 604, 605 [2001]).

Section 213(1) gives six years to bring an action to set aside a mortgage, beginning when the mortgage is executed and the claim becomes enforceable.

Booth v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. · filed 2009-06-09(1)

An action to set aside a mortgage is subject to the residual limitations period ... which is now six years (see CPLR 213 [1]). The limitations period does not begin to run until there is a legal right to relief.

CPLR 213(4) gives a lender six years from acceleration of a mortgage debt to commence a foreclosure action.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Martin · filed 2016-11-16(4)

Since the plaintiff did not commence this action until more than six years after April 21, 2006, the defendants sustained their initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that this action was untimely (see Lessoff v 26 Ct. St. Assoc., LLC, 58 AD3d 610, 611 [2009]).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years to commence a mortgage foreclosure action after the mortgage debt is accelerated.

CIT Bank, N.A. v. Nwanganga · filed 2018-09-13(4)

Therefore, whether the statute of limitations began to run on the deadline to cure listed in the last sent notice-September 14, 2016-or at some later point prior to the filing of the Complaint, the acceleration occurred in late 2016 or early 2017 and thus, Plaintiff commenced this Action well within the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action a six-year limitations period.

HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Vaswani · filed 2019-07-03(4)

A mortgage foreclosure action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213(4) sets a six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure actions.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hussain · filed 2020-09-16(4)

However, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that the action was not time-barred. A mortgage foreclosure action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213(4) gives a mortgagee six years from the date it can demand full payment to bring a foreclosure action.

Gurecki v. Gurecki · filed 2020-12-03(4)

Defendants' motion established prima facie that the statute of limitations had run, as the entire debt became due on September 3, 2008. Plaintiff, however, did not seek to foreclose on the mortgage until June 2018, well beyond the six-year limitations period ( see CPLR 213 [4]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Martin , 144 AD3d 891, 891-892 [2016]; see generally McNeary v Charlebois , 169 AD3d at 1296).

Section 213(4) gives a plaintiff six years to commence a mortgage foreclosure action.

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Sajdak · filed 2021-03-10(4)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred. An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Aorta , 167 AD3d 807, 808).

Section 213(4) gives a mortgagee six years to commence a foreclosure action.

128 Skillman St. 4A, LLC v. Nationstar Mtge., LLC · filed 2021-04-28(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213(4) sets a six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure actions.

Retemiah v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon · filed 2021-06-02(4)

A mortgage foreclosure action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... The plaintiff cannot demonstrate as a matter of law that the statute of limitations has expired ( see Bythewood v Renaissance Mtge. Acceptance Corp. , 187 AD3d 1121).

CPLR 213(4) sets a six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure actions.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Wellbrock · filed 2021-06-30(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213(4) sets a six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure actions.

Pennymac Corp. v. Holcomb · filed 2021-10-27(4)

The Supreme Court properly determined that the instant action was timely, and thus, properly granted LII's motion. A mortgage foreclosure action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum , 143 AD3d 866, 867).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years from acceleration of a mortgage debt to commence a foreclosure action.

MLB Sub I, LLC v. Clark · filed 2022-01-26(4)

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that this action is time-barred because U.S. Bank accelerated the debt when it commenced the prior foreclosure action on July 26, 2006, and the plaintiff commenced this action more than six years later, on October 8, 2014 ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years from acceleration of the debt to commence a mortgage foreclosure action.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Sirianni · filed 2022-02-02(4)

In any event, as the present action was commenced on April 25, 2013, it was timely pursuant to CPLR 213(4), even without consideration of the revocation of the prior acceleration.

CPLR 213(4) gives a party six years to commence a mortgage foreclosure action.

J.P. Morgan Mtge. Acquisition Corp. v. Gonzalez · filed 2022-05-04(4)

A action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum , 143 AD3d 866, 867).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action after the mortgage debt is accelerated.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Bajwa · filed 2022-09-14(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that the mortgage debt was accelerated in 2009 when Aurora commenced the prior action and elected in the complaint to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Doura , 204 AD3d at 723). The defendant further demonstrated that this action was commenced in 2019, more than six years later, and thus, was untimely ( see id. at 723).

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action a six-year limitations period, which runs on the entire debt after acceleration.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Baptiste · filed 2022-10-19(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; Scarso v Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB , 200 AD3d 817, 818; U.S. Bank N.A. v Davids , 197 AD3d 1203, 1204). ... However, since this action was commenced within six years of the acceleration of the debt in the second action, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the statute of limitations barred this action ( see e.g. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Boktor , 193 AD3d at 475).

Section 213(4) gives mortgage foreclosure actions a six-year statute of limitations, running on the entire debt after acceleration.

Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Scheinberg · filed 2023-05-03(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213(4) gives mortgage foreclosure actions a six-year statute of limitations.

Sansone v. North Shore Invs. Realty Group, LLC · filed 2023-07-19(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not bar a mortgage foreclosure action when substitution of a later assignee as plaintiff relates back to the timely commencement of the action and causes no prejudice or surprise.

Fairbanks Capital Corp. v. Nagel · filed 2001-12-13

Even if FNB’s status as servicing agent were not sufficient to confer standing upon it, the substitution of Fairbanks, the subsequent assignee of the mortgage, relates back to the original commencement of the action in December 1994 for purposes of the Statute of Limitations, given that the substitution did not result in any prejudice or surprise to Nagel (see, MK W. St. Co. v Meridien Hotels, 184 AD2d 312, 313; Lyall v Grayco Bldrs., 180 AD2d 7, 17; American Home Assur. Co. v Scanlon, 164 AD2d 751, 751-752).

Section 213(1) sets the limitations period, with accrual depending on whether the right-of-way was unopened or already in use.

Rabinowitz v. American Tire Works · filed 1989-01-30(1)

However, we do find that it was error to grant that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time barred under CPLR 213 (1). It cannot be ascertained when the cause of action accrued for the purpose of computing the running of the period of limitation without determining whether at the time of the erection of the fence, the right-of-way was in existence or whether the right-of-way was unopened. If the right-of-way was unopened, then this action did not accrue until the plaintiff demanded the removal of the fence and the opening of the right-of-way (see, Castle Assocs. v Schwartz, 63 AD2d 481).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Rosen v. Spanierman · filed 1989-04-24

The statute begins to run when the cause of action accrues. CPLR § 213. In the present case, the cause of action accrued on December 20, 1968, when plaintiff Lipman purchased the Painting. It is undisputed that, in the absence of a tolling provision, plaintiffs’ claim for professional negligence is time barred.

Section 213(1) allows an action to be timely commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues.

Conway v. Hahn · filed 1994-10-03(1)

Moreover, because the plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until the defendants refused to remove the encroachment, the action was timely commenced (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Rabinowitz v American Tire Works, 146 AD2d 760, 761).

Section 213 does not create an independent cause of action.

Hardy-Graham v. Southampton Police Department · filed 2021-01-25

Insofar as Plaintiff also includes “C.P.L.P. 213”, “Prisoner Reform Laws”, and “466 U.S. 668”, none of these cites provide a cause of action or claim for relief.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for contract actions does not apply to a Section 301 suit seeking to vacate an arbitration award.

Barbarino v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1976-10-28(2)

On the other hand, CPLR § 213(2) provides that an action upon an express or implied contractual obligation must be commenced within six years. ... In the instant case, the application of the six years statute of limitations would undermine the arbitral process by subjecting the joint committee’s decision to the possibility of appeal for an extended length of time.

Section 213's six-year limitation period does not govern a special proceeding to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.

Laborers International Union of North America, Local 210 v. Shevlin-Manning, Inc. · filed 1989-02-03

Special Term erred in concluding that this proceeding merely sought the enforcement of a contract and that the New York Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213) applied.

Section 213 does not govern disciplinary proceedings brought under New York Education Law § 3020-a.

Demichele v. Greenburgh Central School District No. 7, and Arnold B. Green, Individually · filed 1999-02-17

Second, to the extent that DeMichele argues that CPLR § 213 should apply to a proceeding brought pursuant to § 3020-a, he has cited no cases, and we have found none, in support of that proposition. The legislative history of § 3020-a is devoid of any suggestion that § 3020-a is to be read with reference to the CPLR. Accordingly, we decline DeMichele’s invitation to impute a statute of limitations into § 3020-a where that section specifically eschews a statute of limitation for conduct which constituted a crime when committed.

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to claims in equity, while an owner in possession may wait until possession is threatened to vindicate property rights.

Schlotthauer v. Sanders · filed 1989-08-28[1]

While the plaintiff’s claims for rescission and vacatur of the Sheriff’s deed will presumably be determined with respect to his affirmative defense in the partition action, they are not barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations which applies to claims in equity (CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213's six-year limitations period applies to a fiduciary-duty claim arising from an express or implied contractual relationship.

Frank Management, Inc. v. Weber · filed 1989-09-13(1)

Here, the six-year period is applicable, as it is claimed that the fiduciary obligation allegedly breached in this case had its genesis in a contractual relationship, expressed or implied, between the parties.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud-based breach of fiduciary duty claim six years from the fraudulent act or two years from when the fraud was or could have been discovered with due diligence.

Valentini v. Citigroup, Inc. · filed 2011-12-27(8)

Plaintiffs’ claim will therefore be time-barred only if more than six years have passed since the date of the fraudulent act, or if more than two years have passed since the plaintiffs “discovered the fraud or could, with due diligence, have discovered it.”

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an equitable judicial-dissolution claim based on breach of fiduciary duty; the period begins upon open repudiation or clear termination of the fiduciary relationship.

In Re Dissolution of Twin Bay Village, Inc. · filed 2017-08-03(1)

In light of this, and the fact that the remedy of a judicial dissolution is equitable in nature, we find that “the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) applies” ... and it does not commence “until there has been an open repudiation by the fiduciary or the relationship has otherwise been clearly terminated” ... [2009]).

Section 213's limitations period may be tolled by part payment when the creditor shows payment of an admitted debt accompanied by an unqualified acknowledgment that more is due.

Commissioners of the State Insurance Fund v. Warner · filed 1989-12-05

It is well settled that part payment of a debt does not, by itself, toll the Statute of Limitations, but that the burden rests upon the creditor to show that it was a payment of a portion of the admitted debt, paid to and accepted by him as such, accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder.

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitations period for actions on promissory notes is not tolled by payments unless they are shown to relate to the notes or clearly demonstrate an intent to pay the balance.

Empire Purveyors, Inc. v. Weinberg · filed 2009-10-15(2)

The trial court’s determination, that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the applicable six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) was tolled on the basis that the inflated invoice payments defendant made were referable to the subject notes or that they amounted to a clearly demonstrated intention by defendant to pay the balance on the notes (see Bernstein v Kaplan, 67 AD2d 897, 898 [1979]), was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see e.g. Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495 [1992]; Aryeh v Altman, 36 AD3d 492, 493 [2007]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limit for breach of contract claims; evidence of partial payment and a promise to pay more can support tolling at summary judgment.

Stroll v. Epstein · filed 1993-04-15(2)

Initially, we note that Epstein contends that this action is time-barred pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (McKinney 1990), which provides a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. ... Because all reasonable inferences on a summary judgment motion are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986), we hold that the present action is not time-barred for the purposes of this motion.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of contract claim, running from accrual upon substantial completion when the owner took occupancy.

Bayridge Air Rights, Inc. v. Blitman Construction Corp. · filed 1990-04-24

Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of contract, brought in April 1981, was time barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 since plaintiffs cause of action against the defendants for construction defects accrued upon substantial completion of construction when the owner took occupancy of the building in April of 1972.

Section 213's six-year limitations period turns on when construction work was substantially complete; occupancy alone does not establish that date.

Trustees of Columbia University v. Siegel & Associates Architects · filed 1991-05-21

At the very least, there exists an unresolved question of fact as to whether the work on the East Campus was substantially complete prior to March 28, 1982, the relevant date insofar as the Statute of Limitations is concerned, and whether the university ever accepted that work.

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years, with timeliness depending on when the claim accrued.

Nigro, D'Anna & Utrecht, P. C. v. Collard · filed 1994-10-31(2)

The defendant failed to sustain this burden, since the papers submitted in support of his motion did not indicate when he received payment from the client and when he failed to share the fee with the plaintiff. Therefore, the date of accrual of the plaintiff’s contract claim and the issue of whether the action was timely commenced cannot be determined as a matter of law on this record (see generally, Airco Alloys Div. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 76 AD2d 68).

Section 213 requires a construction contractor’s claim to be brought within six years of substantial completion of the work.

645 First Avenue Manhattan Co. v. Silhouette Drywall Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-02-09

The claim accrues when the construction work is substantially complete.

Section 213(2) gives a claim for breach of a construction contract a six-year limitations period.

Animal Protective Foundation of Schenectady, Inc. v. Bast Hatfield, Inc. · filed 2003-06-12(2)

Since this action was commenced more than six years after construction was completed and the statute of limitations for breach of a construction contract is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]), the action should have been dismissed as time-barred (see Middle Country Cent. School Dist. v O’Healy Constr. Corp., supra at 778; Scheinberg v Samuels, supra at 857).

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims a six year limitations period that accrues when the policy at issue is procured and issued.

Kurt Wayne, Inc. v. Lead Underwriters at Lloyds London · filed 2006-12-06(2)

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the causes of action asserted against defendants sound in breach of contract, the applicable six-year limitations period prescribed by CPLR 213 (2) accrued when the policy was procured and issued (see St. George Hotel Assoc. v Shurkin, 12 AD3d 359, 360 [2d Dept 2004]). ... Therefore, the limitations period for plaintiffs’ claims against defendants AIB and Manham accrued when the policy in effect from March 2004 through March 2005 was issued, rather than when defendants first procured jeweler’s block coverage for plaintiffs in 1999 (see Vic Char Realty, Inc. v Alliance Plus, Inc., 26 AD3d 278, 279 [1st Dept 2006] [insured’s breach of contract claim against broker for failing to secure adequate property insurance not time-barred, as claim accrued when broker obtained replacement cost insurance, notwithstanding fact that same error had been made earlier by the broker when it procured different coverage for the plaintiff]).

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for a breach-of-contract claim does not begin upon a change in employment position that is not a termination under the contract.

Garrigan v. Incorporated Village · filed 2009-02-24(2)

On this appeal, we explicitly reject the defendants’ contention that the breach of contract causes of action are time-barred because the plaintiff did not commence this action within six years after his June 1, 1973 appointment as Chief of Police.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for contract claims begins when a party could demand performance and the failure to perform could be construed as a breach, rather than when the party actually demands performance.

Sutton v. Burdick · filed 2010-07-15(2)

There is no dispute that the six-year statute of limitations relating to contractual claims is applicable here (see CPLR 213 [2]). However, defendant asserts that the statute of limitations did not begin to run because his demand was a prerequisite to the performance of plaintiff and Burdick. We disagree. Defendant’s claim accrued not, as he asserts, at the time he actually demanded and was refused performance, but rather at the time he could have done so; namely, when the failure of the parties to perform could be construed as a breach of the agreement (see Woodlaurel, Inc. v Wittman, 199 AD2d 497, 497-498 [1993]; Braunwarth v Wellington, 48 NYS2d 159, 161-163 [1943], affd 269 App Div 747 [1945]; cf. Lopez v Highmount Assoc., 101 AD2d 618, 619 [1984]; Rossi v Oristian, 50 AD2d 44, 46-47 [1975]).

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years to bring a contract claim, beginning when the alleged breach occurs even if the plaintiff learns of it later.

de Hernandez v. Bank of Nova Scotia · filed 2010-09-30(2)

Plaintiffs’ contract claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]). Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the limitations period did not begin to run in January 2004 when the Mexican government declared plaintiffs eligible to receive a 9% share, but in March 2000 when, as plaintiffs allege, BNS breached the guidelines by providing the false information (see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]). “Knowledge of the occurrence of the wrong on the part of the plaintiff is not necessary to start the Statute of Limitations running in a contract action” (id. at 403 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]).

Section 213’s six-year period bars a contract claim for payment when the right to demand payment arose more than six years before the action began.

HAHN AUTOMOTIVE WAREHOUSE, INC. v. AMERICAN ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2011-02-10(2)

Here, the court properly determined that the counterclaims for payment of the debts at issue were time-barred because defendants had the right to demand payment for those debts more than six years prior to the commencement of this action.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a claim under an option to purchase runs from the missed time-of-the-essence closing when that is when the claim accrues.

Cartalemi v. Garone · filed 2011-03-08(2)

Rather, the plaintiffs’ submissions demonstrated that the defendant’s counterclaims accrued no earlier than December 3, 2002, when Morabito failed to appear at the time of the essence closing (see Martin v Burns, 77 AD3d 633, 634 [2010]; Zullo v Varley, 57 AD3d 536, 537 [2008]). As the plaintiffs commenced this action in October 2008, and the defendant asserted his counterclaims on November 14, 2008, the counterclaims were timely.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a contract claim begins upon breach; a trust member did not breach by failing to pay an assessment before one was levied.

State of New York, Workers' Compensation Board v. A & T Healthcare, LLC · filed 2011-06-16(2)

Although the Trust was operating with deficiencies, the members themselves did not owe anything until an assessment was ordered or demanded. Defendant did not breach the contract by not paying extra amounts in 1999 through 2002, as assessments had not been levied in those years. It appears that no breach arose until defendant refused to pay the assessment levied in 2008. As plaintiff commenced this action within a few months of defendant’s refusal, Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the breach occurs.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Patchogue associates, LLC · filed 2011-08-16(2)

A breach of contract cause of action accrues, and the relevant six-year statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the breach (see CPLR 213 [2]), which, as a general rule, “occurs when all of the factual elements necessary to maintain the lawsuit and obtain relief come into existence” (HP Capital, LLC v Village of Sleepy Hollow, 68 AD3d 928, 929 [2009]; see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]).

A breach of construction contract action must be commenced within six years of substantial completion of the work.

Mendelsohn v. City of New York (19th Precinct) · filed 2011-11-17(2)

The court correctly determined that, pursuant to CPLR 213 (2), this action for breach of a construction contract had to be commenced within six years of substantial completion of the work and was time-barred (see Phillips Constr. Co. v City of New York, 61 NY2d 949, 951 [1984]; 645 First Ave. Manhattan Co. v Silhouette Dry wall Sys., 212 AD2d 394 [1995]).

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the claimant has the legal right to demand payment, even if it sends the demand later.

Hahn Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. American Zurich Insurance · filed 2012-03-29(2)

Under CPLR 213 (2), a claim for breach of contract is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. ... We agree with Hahn and the Appellate Division majority that it is reasonable to apply this accrual principle to the insurance contracts at issue here and therefore conclude that the statute of limitations on Zurich's counterclaims began to run when it acquired the right to demand payment of the various amounts owed under the policies.

Section 213(2) gives a breach of contract claim six years from the alleged breach.

Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Ass'n v. JZG Resources, Inc. · filed 2013-04-10(2)

A cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrues, and the relevant six-year statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the alleged breach (see CPLR 213 [2]; Senter v Gitlitz, 97 AD3d 808, 808 [2012]).

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a contractual repurchase claim begins when the seller fails to honor a timely repurchase demand.

ACE Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products, Inc. · filed 2013-05-13(2)

The statute of limitations began to run when DBSP improperly rejected the trustee’s repurchase demand. Ergo, the breach is the failure to comply with the demand.

Under CPLR 213(2), a construction contract claim is subject to a six-year limitations period measured from completion of performance; work remaining after that date may affect when performance was complete if it was more than incidental.

New York City School Construction Authority v. Admiral Construction, LLC · filed 2014-02-26(2)

Here, in opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing that the construction project was completed on June 29, 2006, more than six years prior to the commencement of the action (see CPLR 213 [2]), the plaintiff raised an issue of fact as to whether certain work that remained uncompleted until after six years prior to the commencement of the action was not merely incidental to the project.

A breach of contract claim challenging a consistently used rent computation method accrues when that method is first used; later uses do not restart the six-year limitations period.

K-Bay Plaza, LLC v. Kmart Corp. · filed 2015-10-29(2)

In Goldman Copeland, this Court squarely held that a claim for breach of contract based on an allegedly erroneous computation of rent accrues upon the first use of that computational methodology, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run anew each time the same formula is used. ... Its holding applies to this case, as Tenant consistently paid, and Landlord accepted, rent based on two successive 500-per-square-foot escalations from 1999 through 2009, when this action was commenced.

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring a breach of contract claim, beginning when the obligation becomes due and payable.

Wald v. Graev · filed 2016-03-17(2)

Accepting these allegations as true, affording the pleading a liberal construction, and giving plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that Supreme Court properly held that the claim was barred by the applicable six year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) to the extent it was based on the promise to immediately vest warrants on April 12, 2006, and to vest an additional 100,000 warrants on March 31, 2007. However, the right to sue on an obligation does not accrue until an amount is due and payable (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 141 [1993]; Cadlerock, L.L.C. v Renner, 72 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2010]). To the extent plaintiff alleges breach of an agreement to vest a final 100,000 warrants on March 31, 2008, the claim did not accrue until approximately April 2008; hence, the July 2013 complaint was timely as to that particular claim.

Section 213(2) gives a breach of contract claim six years from when the claimant has a legal right to demand payment.

NEM Re Receivables, LLC v. Fortress Re, Inc. · filed 2016-03-24(2)

In New York, an action for breach of contract has a six-year statute of limitations, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2). The statute of limitations begins to run when the party making the claim “possesses a legal right to demand payment.”

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for a contract payment claim runs from when the payment obligation becomes due, even if a separate deposit obligation arose earlier.

Golden Technology Management, LLC v. NextGen Acquisition, Inc. · filed 2016-04-28(2)

Nevertheless, although it is not time-barred (CPLR 213 [2]), the cause of action for breach of the payment obligation must be dismissed because defendants are not responsible for that breach; the payment obligation belongs to nonparty NextGen Fuels, Inc.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for breach of contract claims based on false mortgage loan representations runs from when the representations were made.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Flagstar Capital Mkts. Corp. · filed 2016-08-11(2)

Therefore, plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract accrued, at the latest, on May 31, 2007, and this action, commenced more than six years later on August 30, 2013, is barred by the statute of limitations (CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years from completion of construction work to bring a contract claim for defective construction.

Fallati v. Concord Pools, Ltd. · filed 2017-06-22(2)

“As a general rule, a breach of contract action for defective construction and design accrues upon completion of performance, i.e., the completion of the actual physical work” ... and a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) is properly granted where “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied,” is not commenced within six years (CPLR 213 [2]).

Under § 213(2), each refusal to pay an assessment under a continuing contract starts a new limitations period for that breach.

NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Insurance Trust v. People Care Inc. · filed 2017-11-09(2)

Thus, the relevant alleged breaches of contract occurred and the claims accrued each time that People Care refused to pay an assessment levied against it (see State of N.Y., Workers’ Compensation Bd. v A & T Healthcare, LLC, 85 AD3d 1436, 1438 [2011]; see also Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]).

For a defective-construction breach of contract claim subject to the six-year limit, the parties may agree that the claim accrues on the date of substantial completion determined by the project architect.

Board of Educ. of Palmyra-Macedon Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Flower City Glass Co., Inc. · filed 2018-04-27(2)

Thus, pursuant to the contract, the parties agreed that substantial completion as determined by the project architect was the accrual event. We thus conclude that the breach of contract cause of action accrued on the date of substantial completion, which the architect determined to be October 1, 2008 ( see Putrelo Constr. Co. v Town of Marcy , 105 AD3d 1406, 1407 [4th Dept 2013]).