N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims, with a new claim accruing each time a payment becomes due and is not made.

Mullin v. WL Ross & Co. LLC · filed 2019-06-18

For purposes of a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(5), defendants failed to establish that the claims for breach of contract against defendant Ross CG Associates, L.P. (Ross CGA) are untimely to the extent they are based on allegations that Ross CGA failed to make payments to plaintiff to which he was allegedly entitled as a partner on or after December 30, 2010, within the applicable six-year limitation period before the commencement of this action in December 2016 ( see CPLR 213). Assuming, as we must, that the allegations of the complaint are true, a new claim would have accrued each time Ross CGA failed to make a payment to plaintiff when it became due ( see Lebedev v Blavatnik , 144 AD3d 24, 28-29 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring a contract claim for payment, measured from when the creditor has the right to demand payment.

Fairlane Fin. Corp. v. Scipione · filed 2019-07-10(2)

This action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]). ... In other words, the statute of limitations is triggered when the party that is owed money has the right to demand payment, not when it actually makes the demand ( see Hahn Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v American Zurich Ins. Co. , 18 NY3d at 771).

Section 213(2) gives a breach-of-contract claim six years from accrual; an improper certification claim accrues when the certification is issued.

The Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch v. CART 1, LTD. · filed 2019-09-09(2)

Because dismissing a claim as time-barred at the pleading stage is “appropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time,” and DB has failed to demonstrate that this condition has been satisfied, the Court declines to dismiss CRC’s improper certification claim as untimely.

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to bring a contract claim for failure to procure required insurance, measured from when the obligation to procure coverage first attaches.

Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Brickman Group Ltd., LLC · filed 2019-12-12(2)

First, contrary to the Port Authority's argument that a failure to procure contractually required insurance is a continuing breach, a claim for such a breach accrues upon the failure to procure the coverage when the obligation to do so first attaches ( see Wright v Emigrant Sav. Bank , 112 AD3d 401, 402 [1st Dept 2013]; Polat v Fifty CPW Tenants Corp. , 249 AD2d 163, 163-164 [1st Dept 1998]; Sloniger v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. , 306 AD2d 842, 842 [4th Dept 2003]; see generally Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal , 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]). Accordingly, any claim based on a failure to procure the insurance required by the maintenance contract, which was assigned to Brickman Group in 2007, was already barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213[2]) when the Port Authority commenced this action in 2017.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for a quasi-contract claim seeking a conditional finder's fee begins when the condition for payment is fulfilled.

Cohen v. 212 W. 93 Owner LLC · filed 2024-11-04(2)

Thus, the statute of limitations for those claims did not begin to run until the condition that the agreement was subject to (the title passing) occurred.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a contract claim begins when performance is due if the injured party elects to await performance despite an earlier repudiation.

Rachmani Corp. v. 9 East 96th Street Apartment Corp. · filed 1995-05-16(2)

Even if it were to be assumed, as defendant suggests, that the filing of the amended plan constitutes a repudiation of the contract, plaintiff may nevertheless wait until closing, the time set for performance in the agreement, before regarding it as breached.

Section 213(8) allows six years or two years after discovery for a fraud claim, but a fraud claim incidental to a contract claim cannot use that limitations period.

ITT Corp. v. Lee · filed 2016-10-18(8)

Under New York law, actions based on fraud have a limitations period of six years or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). However, “[w]hen a fraud claim is incidental to another asserted claim, the claim does not sound in fraud for purposes of taking advantage of the longer limitations period.” ... Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to take advantage of the longer limitations period for fraud claims.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a declaratory claim challenging the constitutionality of legislation when the claim cannot be brought under CPLR article 78.

New York Insurance Association, Inc. v. State of New York · filed 2016-10-27(1)

Thus, Supreme Court should have applied the residual six-year statute of limitations to plaintiffs' second cause of action (see CPLR 213 [1]).

CPLR 213(2) gives a party six years to enforce a separation agreement, measured from when the contractual obligation becomes due.

Svatovic v. Svatovic · filed 2018-11-20(2)

A separation agreement is a separate, enforceable contract, like any other, and it is subject to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213(2) ( Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596, 598 [1985] [superceded by statute with respect to support payment arrears]; Allard v Allard , 145 AD3d 1254, 1256 [3d Dept 2016]; Matter of Scola , 118 AD3d 895, 896 [2d Dept 2014], citing Fade v Pugliani/Fade , 8 AD3d 612 [2d Dept 2004]; Chayes v Chayes , 28 AD3d 355, 356-357 [1st Dept 2006]).

Section 213’s limitations period runs from the breach of an alleged agreement; a later demand for performance does not extend it.

Gad v. Almod Diamonds Ltd. · filed 2017-02-02(1), (2)

The motion court correctly determined that plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and breach of fiduciary duty are time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1], [2]; 214 [4]). ... Thus, plaintiff’s claims accrued upon execution of the letter (see Castlestone Mgt. LLC v Diamond, 140 AD3d 551 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 903 [2016]). Plaintiff’s subsequent demand for shares in 2013, which was refused, did not extend the statute of limitations (see ACE Sec. Corp., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-SL2 v DB Structured Prods., Inc., 25 NY3d 581, 594 [2015]).

Section 213(8)'s fraud discovery period does not save a claim filed more than two years after the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Matter of Hersh · filed 2021-10-13(8)

Based upon this evidence, the Surrogate's Court properly held that the discovery provision in CPLR 213(8) could not save the petitioner's fraud cause of action, or the related breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract causes of action, all of which were time-barred.

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery period begins as to a defendant when the plaintiff knows facts suggesting that defendant’s participation.

Skatteforvaltningen v. Raubritter LLC Pension Plan · filed 2021-06-30(8)

However, to trigger the discovery period with regard to SKAT’s claims against Burns, SKAT must have been aware of facts suggesting that Burns participated in this scheme.

Section 213(8)'s two-year discovery period does not apply when the evidence was available to the plaintiff more than a decade earlier.

Siegel v. Dakota, Inc. · filed 2019-06-13(8)

Despite plaintiff's discovery of an alleged scheme by the former board members to deprive him of use of his apartment in December 2015, there was no basis for tolling the statute of limitations or to apply the two-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8) since plaintiff admits he discovered this alleged new evidence by reviewing board minutes from more than a decade ago that were available to him at the time ( Lim v Kolk , 111 AD3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 213(8)’s two-year discovery period runs when the plaintiff has enough facts to discover the alleged fraud.

Graham v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation · filed 2019-07-12(8)

Under the two-year statute of limitations, even construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiffs had all the information necessary to discover their causes of action on December 9, 2010, when DOB issued its Notice of Violation, and the statute of limitations expired December 9, 2012.

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is later; once a defendant shows six years have passed, the plaintiff must establish that the discovery period applies.

Beacon Estates, LLC v. Ingrassia · filed 2019-11-08(8)

The statute of limitations for fraud is "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff[s] . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213 [8]; see Boardman v Kennedy , 105 AD3d 1375, 1376 [4th Dept 2013]; Rite Aid Corp. v Grass , 48 AD3d 363, 364 [1st Dept 2008]). Here, defendants established that the action was commenced more than six years from the dates of the alleged acts of fraud, thus "shifting the burden to plaintiffs to show that the two-year discovery exception applies" (Brooks v AXA Advisors, LLC [appeal No. 2], 104 AD3d 1178, 1180 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 858 [2013]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim to proceed within two years of when the fraud was discovered or could reasonably have been discovered; disputed evidence of earlier discovery can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

Girozentrale v. Tilton · filed 2017-02-23(8)

Thus, Supreme Court properly declined to dismiss the fraudulent misrepresentation complaint on statute of limitations grounds, and the viability of the defense must await a fully developed factual record, at which point it can be either decided as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment, or at a trial.

CPLR 213(8) bars a fraud claim when disclosures put the claimant on inquiry notice and the limitations period has expired.

Kany v. Kany · filed 2017-03-23(8)

Since, at the very least, the disclosures in defendant’s net worth statement and in the benefits booklet issued by his employer put plaintiff on inquiry notice that defendant was entitled to supplemental retirement benefits, the complaint is time-barred (see DeLuca v DeLuca, 48 AD3d 341 [1st Dept 2008]; CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim when the plaintiff was on inquiry notice more than two years before filing and fails to show that the fraud could not have been discovered earlier.

Moses v. Dunlop · filed 2017-11-14(8)

The fraud claims, to the extent they arise from conduct that occurred in 2006, are time-barred (see CPLR 213 [8]). Plaintiffs failed to establish that the fraud could not have been discovered earlier (see CSAM Capital, Inc. v Lauder, 67 AD3d 149, 156-157 [1st Dept 2009]). At the very latest, they were on inquiry notice by January 2007, when Dunlop presented Moses and Kaufman with the settlement and release agreement—more than two years before the commencement of this action (see CPLR 213 [8]; Bezoza v Bezoza, 83 AD3d 578, 580 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 213(8)’s fraud discovery period can begin when inquiry notice calls for a reasonable investigation that would reveal the fraud.

Liveintent, Inc. v. Naples · filed 2018-02-23(8)

Defendants were on inquiry notice of the fraud they now allege in April 2010, at which point New York law imputed knowledge of the alleged fraud to them.

CPLR 213(8) can bar a fraud counterclaim when the claimant had sufficient information to be on inquiry notice of possible fraud.

S.T.A. Parking Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co. · filed 2026-03-17(8)

However, because any counterclaim by Federal for fraud would be untimely, the court properly denied it leave to interpose that cause of action. The record establishes that Federal had sufficient information to be on inquiry notice of the possibility of fraud by 2015 ( see CPLR 213[8]).

Section 213(8) allows two years from when reasonable diligence would reveal fraud if that is longer than six years from accrual; inquiry notice starts the discovery period.

TrustCo Bank · filed 2015-01-22(8)

Accordingly, I conclude that Plaintiffs were ... on inquiry notice by July 2010 at the latest and that the statute of limitations began running at that time. Because Plaintiffs filed suit in March 2013, their claims relating to the ITRAX Transfers are untimely even under New York‟s statute of limitations.

CPLR 213 (2)’s six-year limitations period permits a timely breach-of-contract claim based on a violation of a continuing property-use restriction.

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y. v. Christ the King Regional High School · filed 2017-04-19(2)

Furthermore, the defendant failed to establish that the action was barred by the six-year limitations period provided by CPLR 213 (2). The provision imposed a continuing duty not to use the premises for purposes other than to operate a Catholic high school. Since the second cause of action was based on the use of the premises as a charter school and also sought to recover damages for breach of contract, it was timely interposed within the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (2) (see Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Assn., Inc. v JZG Resources, Inc., 105 AD3d 820, 822 [2013]).

CPLR 213(6)'s six-year limit applies to a claim to expunge a mortgage satisfaction filed by mistake when the satisfaction is voidable.

Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v. KeyBank N.A. · filed 2019-11-08(6)

Plaintiff seeks to counter the contention that the action is time-barred on the theory that any error in the recording of the assignment and satisfaction renders the documents voidable and subject to the now-passed six-year statute of limitations found in CPLR 213 (6). We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish as a matter of law that the assignment was invalid or that KeyBank lacked the authority to execute and record the satisfaction so as to avoid application of the statute of limitations. ... Where, as here, a document is filed by mistake as opposed to by forgery or lack of authority, the document is voidable and thus subject to the statute of limitations ( see Faison , 25 NY3d at 224-225).

An action to vacate a mortgage satisfaction filed by a party that had already assigned away its interest is not time-barred under CPLR 213(6).

Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Claypoole · filed 2017-05-16(6)

The satisfaction of mortgage was void ab initio, because the party that filed it had already assigned away its interest under the mortgage. Consequently, this action seeking to vacate the satisfaction of mortgage pursuant to RPAPL article 15 is not time-barred under CPLR 213 (6) (see Faison v Lewis, 25 NY3d 220, 224 [2015]; see also Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18, 24 [2008]).

CPLR 213(6) does not bar an action to cancel a mortgage discharge that was void at its inception.

LNV Corp. v. Sorrento · filed 2017-10-18(6)

The discharge of mortgage executed and recorded by MERS was void at its inception since MERS had no interest in the mortgage it purported to discharge, having already assigned it to American Home Mortgage prior to executing the discharge of mortgage (see Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v Claypoole, 150 AD3d 505, 506 [2017]; cf. Faison v Lewis, 25 NY3d 220, 223 [2015]). Since “a statute of limitations cannot validate what is void at its inception,” the statute of limitations did not act as a bar to this action (Faison v Lewis, 25 NY3d at 230; see Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v Claypoole, 150 AD3d at 506).

Section 213’s time bar on a contract claim does not extinguish the parties’ underlying interests in the property.

DeFlora Lake Development Associates, Inc. v. Hyde Park (In re DeFlora Lake Development Associates, Inc.) · filed 2017-07-19

The time-barred nature of the contract claim does not extinguish rights in the property, otherwise neither party would be able to negotiate any release of the funds.

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitation applies to eviction proceedings based on breach of lease, but does not require the court to exclude older nonpayment proceedings offered as evidence of chronic late payment.

Flatbush Builders, Inc. v. Dubresil · filed 2017-07-27(2)

The six-year statute of limitations for an action based on breach of contract also applies to an eviction proceeding premised on breach of lease (see CPLR 213 [2]; Westminister Props. v Kass, 163 Misc 2d 773 [App Term, 1st Dept 1995]). ... Based on the limited appellate authority available and Judge Wendt’s reasoning in Chelsea, the court is not persuaded that the statute of limitations operates so as to require the relief requested by respondent.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for equitable subrogation claims.

Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Virgil Resort Funding Group, Inc. · filed 2020-02-27(1)

The statute of limitations for an equitable subrogation claim is six years ( see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) gives a claimant six years to bring an action to establish an equitable mortgage or equitable subrogation lien.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke · filed 2017-11-01(1)

A cause of action seeking to establish a lien pursuant to the doctrine of equitable mortgage or the doctrine of equitable subrogation is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; US Bank N.A. v Gestetner, 103 AD3d 962, 963 [2013]; see also Roslyn Union Free School Dist. v Barkan, 16 NY3d 643, 650 [2011]). Those causes of action accrued no later than June 16, 1997, when the mortgage and note were made (see Ponnambalam v Sivaprakasapillai, 35 AD3d 571, 574 [2006]) and, therefore, those causes of action, commenced in 2014, are untimely.

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on an equitable subrogation claim relating to mortgage foreclosure.

Patmos Fifth Real Estate Inc. v. Mazl Bldg. LLC · filed 2019-02-07(1)

Defendants' proposed counterclaim for equitable subrogation relates to their counterclaim for foreclosure of a consolidated mortgage and is barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[1]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 155 AD3 668, 670 [2d Dept 2017]).

Section 213(2) gives a creditor six years to sue for each missed installment on a promissory note, measured from when that installment became due.

Cannell v. Grail Partners, LLC · filed 2020-02-11(2)

The statute of limitations for breach of a promissory note payable in installments is six years (CPLR 213[2]; see Cadlerock, L.L.C. v Renner , 72 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2010]). A default on a single installment payment does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations on the entire debt ( see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc. , 81 NY2d 138 [1993]). Rather, "separate causes of action accrued as installments of the loan indebtedness became due and payable" ( id . at 141). Installment payments that have accrued more than six years prior to commencement of the action are time-barred ( see Cadlerock, L.L.C. , 72 AD3d at 454).

Section 213(2) gives six years to sue on a promissory note; when an installment debt has not been accelerated, the period runs separately from each installment’s due date and default.

Amrusi v. Nwaukoni · filed 2017-11-15(2)

Applying the six-year statute of limitations to each installment which became due and was defaulted upon, the Court should have granted dismissal of only so much of the first cause of action as sought to recover unpaid installments accruing under the note more than six years prior to March 3, 2016, as time-barred (see Morrison v Zaglool, 88 AD3d 856 [2011]).

Under § 213(8), actual notice can start the limitations clock; inquiry notice is not the only form of notice.

In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig. · filed 2018-02-28(8)

Even assuming inquiry notice operates on a classwide basis,... inquiry notice is of course only one form of notice; actual notice is no less effective at starting the limitations clock.

Section 213(8)'s fraud limitations period does not apply when the fraud claim is merely incidental to a conversion claim; the shorter conversion period governs both.

Rachunow v. Jamieson · filed 2021-05-11(8)

Typically, the statute of limitations for a New York “action based upon fraud” is the longer of either “six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” CPLR 213(8). ... The Court concludes that plaintiffs’ fraud claim is merely incidental to their claim of conversion. ... Accordingly, the Court will apply the three-year statute of limitations to both plaintiffs’ fraud and conversion claims.

Section 213(8)'s longer fraud limitations period is unavailable when the fraud claim is incidental to a personal injury claim.

Trisvan v. Heyman · filed 2018-03-30(8)

A plaintiff, however, may not "tak[e] advantage of the longer limitations period" "[w]hen a fraud claim is incidental to another asserted claim." ... Plaintiff's fraud claims are incidental to his personal injury claims.

Section 213(2) gives a claim for money had and received a six-year limitations period.

County of Suffolk v. Suburban Hous. Dev. & Research, Inc. · filed 2018-04-04(2)

The statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action for money had and received is six years ( see CPLR 213[2]; Matter of City of White Plains v City of New York , 63 AD2d 396, 399).

Section 213 (2) applies to contractual obligations, express or implied, and does not require a detailed written agreement.

MTG Enterprises, Inc. v. Berkowitz · filed 1992-04-02(2)

In his analysis, Justice Sandler saw that the court in Sears, Roebuck (supra) did not limit the applicability of the six-year contract Statute of Limitations to an action for pecuniary damages where the obligations arose out of " 'a detailed written agreement’ ”, but twice referred to a " 'contractual relationship’ ”, which, given its normal and accepted meaning, falls within the ambit of CPLR 213 (2), which applies to " 'an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied’ ” (85 AD2d, supra, at 462).

Section 213(4)'s six-year limitations period begins to run on the entire mortgage debt when the mortgage is accelerated.

Caliguri v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union · filed 2019-01-16(4)

Acceleration of a mortgage starts running the six-year statute of limitations as to the entire debt ( see CPLR 213[4]; NMNT Realty Corp. v Knoxville 2012 Trust , 151 AD3d 1068; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum , 143 AD3d at 867; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Patella , 279 AD2d at 605).

A stipulation discontinuing a foreclosure action does not, by itself, revoke acceleration of the mortgage debt when it is silent about acceleration and does not indicate that the lender will accept installment payments.

Aquino v. Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-R by MCM Capital Partners · filed 2019-05-01(4)

Here, CitiMortgage's execution of the stipulation of discontinuance did not, by itself, constitute an affirmative act to revoke its election to accelerate, since the stipulation was silent on the issue of the election to accelerate, and did not otherwise indicate that CitiMortgage would accept installment payments from the plaintiffs ( see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Craig , 169 AD3d 627, 629; Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel , 163 AD3d 631, 633).

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action six years; a letter discussing acceleration as a possible future event does not start the limitations period on the entire debt.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Morris · filed 2019-05-22(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; NMNT Realty Corp. v Knoxville 2012 Trust , 151 AD3d 1068, 1069). ... Contrary to the defendant's contention, the May 4, 2009, letter was not a clear and unequivocal acceleration of the mortgage ( see FBP 250, LLC v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 164 AD3d 1307, 1309; Southwell v Middleton , 67 AD3d 666, 669). Rather, it "was nothing more than a letter discussing acceleration as a possible future event, which does not constitute an exercise of the mortgage's optional acceleration clause" ( 21st Mtge. Corp. v Adames , 153 AD3d 474, 475; see Goldman Sachs Mtge. Co. v Mares , 135 AD3d 1121).

When a forbearance agreement revokes a mortgage lender's prior acceleration, the six-year limitations period on the entire debt begins no earlier than the borrower's default under that agreement.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Rudick · filed 2019-05-29(4)

Thus, contrary to the defendant's contention, the earliest the six-year statute of limitations could have begun to run on the entire debt is the date on which the defendant defaulted under the terms of the forbearance agreement—a date which could not have been more than six years before this action was commenced.

Section 213(4)’s six-year foreclosure period runs on the entire mortgage debt after acceleration; a timely revocation can affect whether a later action is barred.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Brown · filed 2020-08-20(4)

Moreover, on the limited record before us, we conclude that language of the letters and the surrounding circumstances raised a question of fact whether plaintiff's predecessor in interest validly revoked the prior acceleration of the mortgage and, thus, whether the present action was timely commenced ( see generally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Portu , 179 AD3d 1204, 1206-1207 [3d Dept 2020]; Milone v US Bank N.A. , 164 AD3d 145, 152-154 [2d Dept 2018], lv dismissed 34 NY3d 1009 [2019]).

A foreclosure action that validly accelerates a mortgage starts Section 213(4)'s six-year limitations period, even if the action later fails for a technical reason other than lack of standing.

Avail Holding LLC v. Ramos · filed 2020-09-10(4)

The District Court held that Avail is time-barred because the relevant statute of limitations under New York law—6 years for foreclosure actions, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(4)—began to run in 2011, when the first foreclosure action over the mortgage (“the 2011 action”) was brought by FCDB FF1 2008-1 Trust (“FCDB”), and FCDB notified Ramos it was accelerating the mortgage debt. ... In any case, New York courts have held that where a foreclosure action fails for a technical reason, other than a lack of standing, the action nonetheless serves to accelerate the mortgage. ... Accordingly, as the District Court concluded, Avail’s capacity challenge did not preclude summary judgment.

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years from acceleration of a mortgage debt to commence foreclosure; the lender must affirmatively revoke acceleration within that period to stop the limitations clock.

Windward Bora, LLC v. U. S. Bank National Association as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust · filed 2020-09-15(4)

In New York, the statute of limitations to commence a foreclosure action is six years from the lender’s acceleration of the debt. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(4). ... Neither the defendant’s letter to Allen nor the accompanying notices demonstrate as a matter of law that the defendant intended to decelerate the loan.

CPLR 213(4) gives a lender six years after accelerating a mortgage debt to bring a foreclosure action unless the lender affirmatively revokes acceleration within that period; an internal decision does not suffice.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Maddaloni · filed 2020-09-23(4)

A lender may revoke its election to accelerate the mortgage, but it must do so by an affirmative act of revocation occurring during the six-year statute of limitations period subsequent to the initiation of the prior foreclosure action ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Gold , 171 AD3d 1029, 1030; Milone v US Bank N.A. , 164 AD3d 145, 154). ... Evidence of this "internal" action of the plaintiff was not sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff de-accelerated the mortgage, as it did not constitute an affirmative act of revocation ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Barnett , 151 AD3d 791, 793; see also Christiana Trust v Barua , 184 AD3d 140; Ditech Fin., LLC v Naidu , 175 AD3d 1387, 1389, lv granted 34 NY3d 910; U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Aorta , 167 AD3d 807, 809; Milone v US Bank, N.A. , 164 AD3d 145, 154).

Section 213(4)'s six-year period for mortgage foreclosure continues to run unless the lender clearly and unambiguously revokes acceleration within that period.

U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Catalfamo · filed 2020-12-10(4)

Thus, given the timing and content of the June 3, 2015 de-acceleration letter, as well as the ambiguous nature of the informational statements that were provided to Catalfamo, we find that plaintiff failed to establish that the June 3, 2015 letter to Catalfamo constituted a clear and unambiguous affirmative act of de-acceleration ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Creative Encounters LLC , 183 AD3d at 1087; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Portu , 179 AD3d at 1207; compare Milone v US Bank N.A. , 164 AD3d at 153-154). Accordingly, as plaintiff commenced the second action after the statute of limitations had expired, we find that Supreme Court appropriately granted Catalfamo's motion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint as untimely ( see CPLR 213 [4]; Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v Heirs at Large of Ramona E. Thwaits , 185 AD3d at 1128).

The six-year period for a mortgage foreclosure does not begin with a purported acceleration by a party that lacked standing to accelerate the debt.

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. 4721 Ditmars Blvd, LLC · filed 2021-07-07(4)

Since the 2007 foreclosure action was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing, "the purported acceleration [was] a nullity, and the statute of limitations [did] not begin to run at the time of the purported acceleration" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Auguste , 173 AD3d 930, 932; see Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v Marous , 186 AD3d at 670-671; U.S. Bank N.A. v Gordon , 158 AD3d 832, 836; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980).

Section 213(4) gives six years to foreclose a mortgage; a foreclosure action brought by a plaintiff without standing does not accelerate the debt and start the period on the entire balance.

21st Mtge. Corp. v. Rudman · filed 2022-01-05(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; Kashipour v Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB , 144 AD3d 985, 986; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum , 143 AD3d 866, 867). ... Here, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that Option One lacked standing to commence the 2006 action and, as a result, it did not have authority to validly exercise the option to accelerate the debt ( see J & JT Holding Corp. v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , 173 AD3d at 707; U.S. Bank N.A. v Gordon , 158 AD3d 832, 836).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years after accelerating a mortgage debt to collect it; revoking acceleration after that period expires does not revive the claim.

1042 II Realty, Inc. v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2022-01-31(4)

In sum, under New York law, revocation of acceleration of a mortgage debt is only effective to stop the statute of limitations from running on the underlying debt if that revocation occurs prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In this case, the revocation occurred after the expiration of the statute of limitations, making it ineffective.

Section 213(4)’s six-year period for mortgage foreclosure begins to run on the entire debt when a foreclosure complaint demands payment of the full balance.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Dusowitz · filed 2025-04-07(4)

“As a general matter, an action to foreclose a mortgage may be brought to recover unpaid sums which were due within the six-year period immediately preceding the commencement of the action,” and “‘even if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt’” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke, 94 AD3d 980, 982 [2d Dept 2012], citing CPLR 213 [4] and quoting EMC Mtge. Corp. v Patella, 279 AD2d 604, 605 [2d Dept [2001]). ... The record shows that the subject consolidated mortgage debt was accelerated when the instant action was commenced on July 9, 2008, as Plaintiff’s filed complaint contains a demand for payment of the entire balance due (see NYSCEF Doc. #70 [Exhibit “A”], p. 8 at ¶¶ 13-14).

Section 213(4) bars a mortgage foreclosure plaintiff from disputing an earlier acceleration unless the earlier action was dismissed on an express judicial determination, made upon a timely raised defense, that the debt was not validly accelerated.

Aspen Props. Group, LLC v. Santoro · filed 2025-07-30(4)

Moreover, as the Supreme Court properly determined, the plaintiff was estopped from asserting that the debt in the instant action was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2010 action, since the 2010 action was not dismissed "on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4]; see Reverse Mtge. Solutions, Inc. v Gipson , 230 AD3d at 815-816).

Section 213(4)'s six-year limitations period runs from acceleration of the mortgage debt, even when the foreclosure action containing the acceleration is later deemed a nullity.

US Bank N.A. v. Fisher · filed 2025-08-25(4)

As such, even though the Borrower was deceased when the First Action was commenced, and the Court deemed the case a nullity, the debt was accelerated by the filing of the complaint in the First Action. ... As the Borrower's obligation under the note was accelerated on February 11, 2011, the statute of limitations expired in February 2017, absent the applicability of any tolls or invoking the CPLR § 205-a(a) savings provisions.

CPLR 213(9) gives Executive Law § 63(12) claims a six-year limitations period, and the 2019 amendment adding subsection (9) applies retroactively.

People v. JUUL Labs, Inc. · filed 2023-01-05(9)

The Executive Law § 63(12) claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations, as provided for in CPLR 213(9). We reject their argument that the 2019 amendment to CPLR 213 which added subsection 9 (L 2019, ch 184) should not be applied retroactively, and disagree with their reliance on People v Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC (31 NY3d 622 [2018])( see People v Allen , 198 AD3d 531 [1st Dept 2021], appeal dismissed, lv dismissed 38 NY3d 996 [2022], appeal dismissed, lv denied 39 NY3d 928 [2022]).

CPLR 213(9) provides a six-year limitations period for Executive Law § 63(12) claims and applies retroactively.

People v. Trump · filed 2023-06-27(9)

Defendants' arguments that the Executive Law § 63(12) claims are governed by a three-year limitations period are unavailing ( see CPLR 213[9]). We have already found that CPLR 213(9) applies retroactively ( Matter of People v JUUL Labs, Inc. , 212 AD3d 414, 416-417 [1st Dept 2023]).

CPLR 213 (1) gives a party six years to bring a substantive challenge to the validity of a local law.

Matter of Weikel v. Town of W. Turin · filed 2018-06-29(1)

Contrary to plaintiff's contention and the court's determination, to the extent that plaintiff seeks a declaration that the presumptively valid Local Law is invalid ( see NY Const art IX, § 2 [c] [ii] [6]; Municipal Home Rule Law § 10 [1] [ii] [a] [6]; Holt v County of Tioga , 56 NY2d 414, 417-418 [1982]), plaintiff's challenge is to the substance of the Local Law and is therefore subject to the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (1) ( see Miranda Holdings, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Orchard Park , 152 AD3d 1234, 1235 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 905 [2017]; Matter of McCarthy v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Niskayuna , 283 AD2d 857, 858 [3d Dept 2001]; Almor Assoc. v Town of Skaneateles , 231 AD2d 863, 863 [4th Dept 1996]).

Section 213(1) bars a substantive challenge to a zoning ordinance when the six-year limitations period began at enactment.

Matter of Mimassi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of N.Y. Mills · filed 2023-07-28(1)

We agree with the court that petitioner's substantive challenge to the zoning ordinance is time-barred ( see CPLR 213 [1]; Almor Assoc. v Town of Skaneateles , 231 AD2d 863, 863 [4th Dept 1996]; see generally Westhampton Beach Assoc., LLC v Incorporated Vil. of Westhampton Beach , 151 AD3d 793, 795-796 [2d Dept 2017], lv dismissed 31 NY3d 929 [2018]; Schiener v Town of Sardinia , 48 AD3d 1253, 1254 [4th Dept 2008]). The statute of limitations commenced in 1973 when the zoning ordinance was enacted ( see Matter of McCarthy v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Niskayuna , 283 AD2d 857, 858 [3d Dept 2001]; Almor Assoc. , 231 AD2d at 863; see generally New York Ins. Assn., Inc. v State of New York , 145 AD3d 80, 88-89 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 910 [2017]) and not, as argued by petitioner, when he applied to rezone the property.

CPLR 213(2)'s six-year limitations period does not apply to claims for no-fault benefits against a self-insured entity.

Shirom Acupuncture, P.C. v. NYC Off. of the Comptroller · filed 2018-08-22(2)

The plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that the action was governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213(2) and therefore was timely commenced. The Civil Court denied the defendant's motion, and the Appellate Term affirmed. We reverse. As the Court of Appeals recently determined, a claim to recover no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity such as the defendant is subject to the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214(2) ( see Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. , 31 NY3d 187, 192).

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for contractual claims does not govern a no-fault benefits claim against a self-insurer whose duty to pay arises from statute.

Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2018-05-01(2)

There is no dispute "that it is the gravamen or essence of the cause of action that determines the applicable Statute of Limitations" ( Western Elec. Co. v Brenner , 41 NY2d 291, 293 [1977]), or that a three-year limitations period applies to "an action to recover upon a liability . . . created or imposed by statute" (CPLR 214 [2]; cf. CPLR 213 [2] [imposing a six-year statute of limitations upon actions involving contractual obligations and liabilities]). ... The no-fault benefits in dispute are not provided by a contract with a private insurer. Instead defendant has met its statutory obligation by self-insuring.

For a stock option exercisable at any time, the six-year limitations period does not begin until the option holder demands the stock.

Mindspirit, LLC v. Evalueserve Ltd. · filed 2018-09-30(2)

Where the action is "based on a stock option agreement which provides that plaintiff might exercise the option at any time," however, "the [s]tatute of [l]imitations does not commence to run until the person granted the option demands the [s]tock."

CPLR 213(6) gives a claim to reform an instrument for mistake, including a scrivener's error, six years from the date the mistake was made.

Rely-On-Us, Inc. v. Torres · filed 2018-10-03(6)

Further, "[a] cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake, including an alleged scrivener's error, is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213(6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made" ( Lopez v Lopez , 133 AD3d 722, 723; see Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co. , 86 NY2d 543, 547). Here, the cause of action seeking reformation is time-barred since the note, including the alleged scrivener's error regarding the lender's name, was made in 2006, yet the plaintiff commenced this action in 2015.

Section 213(6) gives a party six years from the alleged scrivener’s error to seek reformation.

LOR, Inc. v. Allied World National Assurance Company · filed 2022-06-07(6)

Allied admits that it issued the Policy no later than July 31, 2010 (Dkt. No. 39 ¶ 2), making its request of reformation untimely under C.P.L.R. § 213 since Allied did not seek reformation until 2020.

Section 213(6) requires actions based on a mistake in a deed or mortgage document to be started within six years of the mortgage's execution.

Rosendale v. Mr. Cooper Group Inc. · filed 2024-04-05(6)

Claimants must initiate actions based upon a mistake in a deed or mortgage document within six years of the execution of the mortgage.

Section 213(6) gives six years to bring an action to correct a mistake in a recorded satisfaction of mortgage, measured from when the mistake was made rather than when it was discovered.

Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Rafuna · filed 2024-11-20(6)

Thus, the six-year limitations period pursuant to CPLR 213(6) is applicable to the second cause of action, seeking to vacate the satisfaction of mortgage ( see id. ; Citibank, N.A. v Horan , 230 AD3d 1216). The six-year statute of limitations begins to run on the date the mistake was made, not when it was discovered ( see Citibank, N.A. v Horan , 230 AD3d 1216).

Section 213(2)'s limitations period for breach of contract cannot be extended by a clause agreed to before breach that postpones accrual to an uncertain future date.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Flagstar Capital Mkts. · filed 2018-10-16(2)

We simply hold that, to the extent the parties intended, "at the inception of the contract" and before the contract had been breached, to postpone accrual of a breach of contract cause of action to a subsequent uncertain date, the accrual clause "may not serve to extend the Statute of Limitations" in that way ( id. at 552).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to bring an action for specific performance of a contract.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mbanefo · filed 2018-11-14(2)

A cause of action for specific performance of a contract is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213(2) ( see Feldman v Teitelbaum , 160 AD2d 832, 833; Lituchy v Guinan Lithographic Co. , 60 AD2d 622).

CPLR 213(2)'s six-year limit for contract actions does not apply to a postjudgment motion to enforce a separation agreement because the motion is not an action.

Sangi v. Sangi · filed 2021-07-08(2)

We disagree. This Court has held that a "motion to enforce the terms of [a] separation [*2]agreement . . . is not an action and thus not subject to the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2)" ( Holsberger v Holsberger , 154 AD3d 1208, 1211 [2017]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for claims under a separation agreement.

Partridge v. Myerson · filed 1990-06-11(2)

Of his nine affirmative defenses and counterclaims, only the defendant’s ninth affirmative defense may be valid as applied to certain claims under the agreement. This affirmative defense alleges that the Statute of Limitations bars claims under the agreement which antedate the service of the summons and complaint by more than six years (CPLR 213 [2]; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596; Story v Brady, 114 AD2d 1026). We note that claims asserted in the amended complaint relate back to the date of commencement of the action (CPLR 203 [e]). The Statute of Limitations issue is remitted to the trial court for determination of which claims, if any, are time barred along with the other related issues of fact.

Section 213 can bar an untimely facial challenge to agency closure regulations.

Berger v. Prospect Park Residence, LLC · filed 2018-11-28

However, this facial challenge to the DOH's closure regulations is time-barred ( see CPLR 213, 217).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to bring an action for breach of a loan agreement.

JNG Constr., Ltd. v. Roussopoulos · filed 2019-03-27(2)

A cause of action to recover damages for breach of a loan agreement is governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of a restrictive covenant not relating to a structure.

Shea v. Signal Hill Rd. LLC · filed 2019-05-09(1)

The limitations period for a breach of a restrictive covenant not relating to a structure is six years ( see CPLR 213 [1]; Rivemont Farms, LLC v Northeast Solite Corp. , 46 [*3]AD3d 1170, 1171-1172 [2007]). Here, the record shows that plaintiffs periodically trimmed the trees on defendants' property until 2013, when defendants refused access. As such, we find plaintiffs' claim to enforce the restrictive covenant to be timely.

CPLR 213(8)'s limitation period for fraud actions does not apply to a proceeding to vacate an acknowledgment of paternity on the ground of fraud.

Matter of Vaskovtsev v. Melska · filed 2019-07-10(8)

Therefore, contrary to the contentions of the mother and the attorney for the child, it would not be appropriate to apply the statute of limitations applicable to "an action based upon fraud" under CPLR 213(8).

Section 213(8) sets a six-year limitations period for common law fraud claims in New York.

Durosene v. Bank Of America, N.A. · filed 2020-06-19(8)

The statute of limitations for common law fraud in New York is six years. NY CPLR § 213(8).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud plaintiff the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery of the fraud, including when reasonable diligence could have revealed it.

Graham v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation · filed 2020-09-23(8)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to cure the deficiencies in their original Complaint and that their claims remain time-barred for the reasons stated in the 2019 Opinion, (2019 Op. 8–12), “regardless [of] whether the six-year limitations period dating from the fraud or the two-year period dating from its discovery applies,” Pirri v. Cheek, No. 19-CV-180, 2019 WL 2472438, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2019).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the later of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the fraud.

Vaughan v. Mouton · filed 2021-02-26(8)

Even if, as defendant's cross motion for summary judgment assumes, plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for fraud ( see 60A NY Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit § 98; Dolan v Cummings , 116 App Div 787 [1907], affd 193 NY 638 [1908]), "the time within which [that cause of] action must be commenced [is] the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably should have been discovered.

Boesky v. Levine · filed 2021-04-01(8)

The statute of limitations for fraud is the greater of six years from when the cause of action accrued or two years from when the fraud was discovered or with reasonable diligence should have been discovered (CPLR 213[8]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Graham v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation · filed 2022-04-28(8)

“[u]nder New York law, the time within which an action based upon fraud must be commenced is ‘the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.’” ... Indeed, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant are similarly time-barred for the same reasons articulated in its prior Opinions.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Jackling v. Brighthouse Life Insurance Company · filed 2022-07-10(8)

The statute of limitations for an action based upon fraud under New York law is six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the date the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, whichever is longer.

Section 213(8) gives claims for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud six years from the fraud or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered it.

Gadzhievich v. Gref · filed 2022-09-13(8)

Under New York’s statute of limitations, claims for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud must be brought within six years from the date of the fraud or two years from the date that the plaintiff discovered or could have reasonably discovered the fraud. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for common-law fraud claims.

Rosado v. K & Y Mgt. Corp. · filed 2023-01-11(8)

However, the elements of common-law fraud, with a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[8]), were established, and the Supreme Court so found.

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

Hardwire, LLC v. Freyssinet International et CIE · filed 2023-02-08(8)

The parties agree that Hardwire’s state law fraud and civil conspiracy claims are governed by New York’s statute of limitations, which is the “greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). Under the New York scheme, Hardwire’s claim would either need to have accrued after December 13, 2015 or Hardwire must show that it did not and could not have discovered the fraud before December 14, 2019.

CPLR 213(8) requires a fraud action to be brought within six years of accrual or two years of when the fraud was or could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is later.

Blizniak v. Fences by Precision, LLC · filed 2024-07-03(8)

A cause of action for fraud must be commenced within six years of accrual, or within two years of the date that plaintiff discovered or could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence, whichever is later ( see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Javino v. Denton · filed 2024-09-13(8)

Under New York law, “an action based upon fraud” must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). ... Because Plaintiff did not file this action until February 2022, his civil RICO, fraud, and civil conspiracy claims against the BNB Defendants are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

A fraud claim must be brought within six years of accrual or within two years of when the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Black v. Phoenix Cayman Ltd. · filed 2025-01-09(8)

The first cause of action for fraud should be dismissed as time-barred. This claim was not asserted within six years of its accrual in 2011, and we find that it was also not asserted within two years of the time when plaintiffs could with reasonable diligence have discovered it ( see generally CPLR 213[8]; Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc. , 137 AD3d 685, 689 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within two years after the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably could have discovered, the fraud.

Chung v. J.H. Whitney Capital Partners, LLC · filed 2025-04-23(8)

The limitations period for fraud here accrues “two years from the time the plaintiff. . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff six years from the alleged fraud to bring a fraud claim, subject to the two-year discovery period under CPLR 203(g).

Alexander v. Alexander · filed 2025-08-27(8)

"Pursuant to CPLR 213(8) and 203(g), an action sounding in fraud must be commenced within six years of the commission of the fraud, or within two years after the fraud was or should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence" ( Matter of Hersh , 198 AD3d 766, 769; see CPLR 203[g]; 213[8]; Pugni v Giannini , 163 AD3d 1018, 1020). As clarified by the plaintiff's affidavit, the complaint alleged that the fraud and undue influence occurred in or around the time that Miriam signed the 2008 will and that the plaintiff discovered the alleged fraud and undue influence shortly before Miriam's death in February 2018. Thus, this action was commenced more than six years after the alleged fraud and undue influence occurred and more than two years after the plaintiff discovered the alleged fraud and undue influence ( see Matter of Hersh , 198 AD3d at 769; Adrian v Canuso , 28 AD3d 691, 692).

Section 213(8)’s six-year fraud limitations period does not apply to claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 because those claims do not require intent to defraud.

Construction Technology v. Lockformer Co., Inc. · filed 1989-01-10(8)

CPLR § 213(8), which governs fraud, is inappropriate for Gen.Bus.Law §§ 349 and 350, because, like the Lanham Act, there is no requirement of intent to defraud under those sections.

Pandemic-related executive orders tolled the limitations period for fraud claims under CPLR 213(8).

Suber v. Churchill Owners Corp. · filed 2024-06-04(8)

Plaintiff is correct that the pandemic-related executive orders "constituted a toll of the applicable statute of limitations" and rendered her fraud claims timely ( Murphy v Harris , 210 AD3d 410, 411 [1st Dept 2022]; CPLR 213[8]).

Section 213(1)’s six-year limitations period does not bar an action to declare a prescriptive easement that has already vested.

Bekkering v. Christiana · filed 2020-02-27(1)

Garcia Management incorrectly asserts that the six-year catch-all statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [1]) applies to assert an easement by prescription. This assertion is inapt, as an easement by prescription arises when a party's adverse use of the property continues for 10 years, at which point the property right vests without any formal action by a court or party ( see CPLR 212 [a]; RPAPL 501 [2]; Barra v Norfolk S. Ry. Co. , 75 AD3d 821, 825-826 [2010]); thus, an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 seeks a declaration regarding property rights that already exist.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for breach of contract claims does not apply to claims arising from postnuptial agreements; Domestic Relations Law § 250 governs those claims.

Washiradusit v. Athonvarangkul · filed 2020-06-24(2)

Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the six-year statute of limitations that pertains to breach of contract causes of action ( see CPLR 213[2]) is not applicable. Rather, the [*2]applicable statute of limitations is provided for in Domestic Relations Law § 250.

Section 213(1) bars a common-law conflict-of-interest claim brought after the limitations period expires; a conflict that has ended is not a continuing wrong.

Ives Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Watertown · filed 2020-07-24(1)

Any conflict of interest ended in 2006 when the new lease was renegotiated and this lawsuit was not commenced until 2018. Thus, the third cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [1]), and we reject plaintiffs' contention that Butler's alleged conflict of interest constitutes a continuing wrong to which the statute of limitations does not apply ( see generally Matter of Shapiro v Town of Ramapo , 98 AD3d 675, 677 [2d Dept 2012], lv dismissed 20 NY3d 994 [2013]).

Section 213(9) gives the Attorney General six years to bring Executive Law § 63(12) claims; separately actionable wrongs arising from a continuing obligation are timely if they occur within the limitations period.

People v. Trump · filed 2025-08-21(9)

Where a contract imposes a continuing obligation or duty, a cause of action based upon breach of the continuing obligation is not time-barred with respect to claims arising within the statutory period ( see CWCapital Invs. LLC , 195 AD3d 12; Matter of Edelen , 219 AD3d 931, 934 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 41 NY3d 903 [2024]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for these claims; when a contract imposes an ongoing duty and the defendant commits repeated breaches, the continuing wrong doctrine measures the period from the last wrongful act.

Daves · filed 2026-03-26(1)-(2)

New York state law sets a six-year statute of limitations for each of these claims, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1)-(2) (2025). ... Application of the doctrine means that the statute of limitations only began to run on the date of Defendants’ last wrongful act with respect to their failure to post collateral or indemnify Westchester for claims owed under the Bonds.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period for contract claims may be equitably tolled when the defendant’s affirmative misrepresentations prevent a timely suit.

Burlington Packaging, Inc. v. Extra Packaging, Inc. · filed 2020-08-25

Extra invokes New York's six-year limitations period in asking to dismiss as time-barred so much of Burlington's breach of contract claim as seeks damages that accrued before February 6, 2014. See Memo. at 5-6; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213. ... Because Burlington explicitly alleges that Extra made affirmative misrepresentations about the commissions it owed – not simply by omitting information about pressure bag sales but also by writing "No Commission" on invoices, see Am. Compl. ¶ 31 – Extra's defense that part of the contract claim is time-barred cannot be resolved on a motion for dismissal.

Section 213(8) sets the limitations period for fraud claims; a party seeking equitable tolling must identify the acts that would toll the period and when they occurred.

Scott v. AOL Time Warner · filed 2004-09-30(8)

First, to the extent that Plaintiffs asserted claims under statutes that apply to the Defendants and for which there exists a private cause of action, their claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (2003) (fraud); Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440-41 (2d Cir.1998) (breach of fiduciary duty); Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir.1996) (antitrust claims). With respect to Plaintiffs’ attempt to argue that their claims should be deemed timely because of the Defendants’ settlement offers, Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently assert grounds for equitable tolling, as they did not assert when such acts of the Defendants took place or precisely which of their acts would toll the limitations period.

Section 213 gives an action on a guaranty a six-year limitations period that begins when the principal defaults.

Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v. Trombley · filed 2020-12-16

The six-year statute of limitations applicable to a guaranty begins to run when the principal is in default ( see CPLR 213; Chicago Tit. Ins. Co. v Brookwood Tit. Agency, LLC , 179 AD3d 887, 888; Haber v Nasser , 289 AD2d 199, 200; Bayside Fuel Oil Depot Corp. v Savino Oil & Heating Co. , 133 AD2d 658, 660).

Section 213(2) bars a promissory-estoppel counterclaim based on the same old facts as untimely claims.

322 W. 47th St. HDFC v. Tibaldeo · filed 2021-07-06(2)

The motion court properly granted HDFC's motion for summary judgment dismissing as untimely defendant Guarino's first, fourth, and fifth counterclaims in his amended answer relying on correspondence from 1993 and 1994 in order to establish his status as a shareholder in HDFC. ... The motion court properly determined that the same reasoning applied to Guarino's counterclaim alleging the same facts on the theory of promissory estoppel ( MatlinPatterson ATA Holdings LLC v Federal Express Corp. , 87 AD3d 836, 841-842 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 21 NY3d 853 [2013]; CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213(2) gives an action to recover on a promissory note a six-year limitations period.

Carpenito v. Linksman · filed 2021-08-11(2)

The complaint, which, regardless of how the various causes of action therein are delineated, effectively seeks to recover on the promissory note, was not timely commenced within the applicable six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]; Sce v Ach , 56 AD3d 457, 458; see also UCC 3-122[1][a]; Scionti v Reid , 238 AD2d 496, 497; see generally Cabrini Med. Ctr. v [*2]Desina , 64 NY2d 1059, 1061-1062; Maya NY, LLC v Hagler , 106 AD3d 583, 585).

CPLR 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for an action to recover on a promissory note.

Mark v. Trimarco · filed 2026-02-04(2)

The applicable statute of limitations to commence an action to recover on a promissory note is six years ( see CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213 sets a six-year limit for commencing an action to enforce payment on a promissory note.

Muller v. Sturman · filed 1981-03-27

This malpractice action was commenced on April 20, 1978, clearly beyond the three-year period of limitation (CPLR 214, subd 6) if measured from November 8, 1973, when appellants claim the attorney-client relationship ceased, or from May 24, 1974, six years after the due date of the note and the time limited by law for commencing an action on the note (CPLR 213).

Section 213(1) ordinarily gives declaratory judgment claims under the public trust doctrine six years to be brought; the continuing wrong doctrine does not toll that period for a discrete transfer of parkland.

Morris Builders, L.P. v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company · filed 2021-09-07(1)

Declaratory judgment claims brought under the public trust doctrine are ordinarily governed by the six-year statute of limitations provided for by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1). ... Accordingly, the continuing wrong doctrine does not apply to toll the statute of limitations.

CPLR 213(2)'s six-year period for contract claims does not govern a quiet title claim while the claimant is in possession.

Davis v. Augoustopoulos · filed 2021-10-21(2)

Defendant Augoustopoulos moved to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), arguing that the cause of action seeking to quiet title under RPAPL article 15 actually asserted a breach of contract claim, which was barred by the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(2). ... Preliminarily, the motion court correctly found that the claim at issue seeks to quiet title, which can be brought at any time while the claimant is in possession ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 229 [2015]) or within 10 years under CPLR 212(a).

Section 213(1) gives a beneficiary six years to demand a trust accounting after the trustee clearly repudiates the beneficiary’s interest.

Community Service Society v. New York Community Trust · filed 2000-09-21(1)

The Court of Appeals has held that CPLR 213 (1), which provides that six years is the applicable Statute of Limitations for an action for which no limitation is specifically provided by law, governs the time period in which an accounting may be demanded against a trust (Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80). In order for the statute to be triggered, however, “mere lapse of time is not sufficient, but an act of repudiation is necessary” (id., at 80). ... Thus, all of its claims are time barred, since there does not appear to be any reason to distinguish between the more recent claims and those in the prior years.

Section 213(1) gives a breach of trust claim a six-year limitations period beginning at the time of the breach.

Harris v. TD Ameritrade Clearing Inc. · filed 2022-08-18(1)

In New York, a cause of action sounding in breach of trust is subject to a six-year statute of limitations which begins to accrue at the time of the breach.

Section 213(2) gives a breach-of-contract claim six years from the breach, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of it.

Neuman v. Garcia · filed 2022-09-23(2)

As noted, the statute of limitations for breach of contract claims in New York is six years. N.Y. CPLR § 213(2). The statute begins to run at the time of the breach, regardless of whether the plaintiff is aware of the breach at that time.

Section 213(2) generally gives parties six years from a contract breach to file suit.

Romain v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company · filed 2022-11-08(2)

New York law generally affords parties to a contract six years to file suit for an alleged breach of contract, accruing from the date of the breach.

Section 213 gives a plaintiff six years to bring a breach of contract claim.

Gorokhovsky v. Stefantsova · filed 2022-12-07

Because the alleged breach occurred more than six years before Plaintiffs initiated this action, the breach of contract claim must be dismissed as time-barred.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims in New York a six-year statute of limitations.

Mhina v. Bank of Am., N.A. · filed 2023-10-18(2)

Breach of contract claims in New York have a six-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213(1) gives a claim for an imposed constructive trust six years from the wrongful act creating a duty to restitute.

Martinez v. Iqbal · filed 2024-11-20(1)

Relevant here, FLSA claims have a two or three year statute of limitations, depending on whether a defendant’s conduct was willful (see 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)), NYLL claims have a six-year statute of limitations (see N.Y. Lab. L. § 198), conversion claims have a three-year statute of limitations following the alleged theft (see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3)), and imposed constructive trust claims have a six-year statute of limitations following the occurrence of the wrongful act creating a duty to restitute (see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1)).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

Board of Mgrs. of the Blackfriars Condominium v. AG Ebenezer LLC · filed 2024-12-03(2)

The statute of limitations on a breach of contract case is six years under CPLR § 213(2), and the present suit was brought in December of 2023. Therefore, the second installment fee claim is time-barred.

Section 213(2) bars a breach of contract claim brought more than six years after the breach.

Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Citi Abstract Inc. · filed 2024-12-17(2)

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim based on Citi’s breach of its contractual standard of care because it failed to include the Prior Mortgage as an exception to the Policy in 2014, such claims are time-barred (see CPLR 213[2]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Flagstar Capital Mkts., 32 NY3d 139, 145 [2018] [breach of contract claim accrues at time of breach]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not apply to a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking only monetary relief when fraud is not essential to the claim.

Dixie v. Scheer · filed 2025-01-11(1), (8)

However, the only relief sought in the complaint is monetary. ... Also unavailing is Dixie's assertion that the breach of fiduciary claim is rooted in fraud. ... Thus, the three-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 213(1)'s six-year period applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking equitable relief; a claim seeking only money damages without an essential allegation of fraud has a three-year period.

Berejka v. Huntington Med. Group, P.C. · filed 2025-02-19(1)

Generally, "[a] cause of action [alleging] breach of fiduciary duty is governed by a six-year statute of limitations where the relief sought is equitable in nature ( see CPLR 213[1]), or by a three-year statute of limitations where the only relief sought is money damages ( see CPLR 214[4])" ( Wiesenthal v Wiesenthal , 40 AD3d 1078, 1079; see Weiss v TD Waterhouse , 45 AD3d 763, 764). ... Here, the sixth cause of action was subject to a three-year statute of limitations since the relief sought was monetary in nature and was not based on an allegation of fraud.

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years to file a breach-of-contract claim after the limitations period begins to run.

Roldan v. Lewis · filed 2025-03-03(2)

As previously explained, Plaintiff’s claims from childhood began to run in 2010 when she turned eighteen, meaning that a breach of contract claim arising from that time period needed to be brought no later than 2016.

Section 213(2) gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Actava TV, Inc. v. Joint Stock Company "Channel One Russia Worldwide" · filed 2025-03-28(2)

Therefore, the Amended Counterclaim is untimely because it fell outside of the six-year statute of limitations on breach of contract claims.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

Okafor v. Okafor Bldg. Corp. · filed 2025-06-18(2)

"The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging breach of contract is six years" ( Filasky v Andover Cos. , 230 AD3d 1297, 1299-1300, citing CPLR 213[2]). ... Here, contrary to the defendants' contentions, the Supreme Court, in effect, correctly determined that the breach of contract cause of action was not time-barred ( see Morrow v Vibration Mountings & Controls, Inc. , 223 AD3d 736, 738; Trujillo v Collado , 217 AD3d 891, 893).

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring a breach of contract claim; a claim based on an insurer’s disclaimer of coverage generally accrues when the insurer disclaims coverage.

New York Bus Operators Compensation Trust v. American Home Assur. Co. · filed 2025-08-06(2)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging breach of contract is six years ( see CPLR 213[2]). ... Absent clear language to the contrary in the parties' insurance contract, the statute of limitations period on a breach of insurance contract cause of action premised upon an alleged improper disclaimer of coverage generally starts to run on the date that coverage is disclaimed by the insurer ( see Anderson v Allstate Ins. Co. , 171 AD3d 1331, 1332-1333; Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA, LLC v Allstate Ins. Co. , 162 AD3d 1183, 1184). Here, American Home established, prima facie, that the limitations period for NYBOCT to assert the breach of contract cause of action began to run, at the latest, when American Home disclaimed coverage for the underlying workers' compensation claim on May 18, 2012, and, therefore, that the breach of contract cause of action was untimely commenced more than six years later, in 2020 ( see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal , 81 NY2d at 403).

Section 213(2) gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period; when a contract requires continuing performance, each breach starts a new limitations period.

Gehring · filed 2026-01-30(2)

The statute of limitations for breach of contract under New York and Connecticut law is six years. ... Under the continuing-performance doctrine recognized in New York and Connecticut, each alleged underpayment may constitute a separate breach triggering a new limitations period.

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years from the breach to bring a breach of contract claim; later work does not revive the limitations period.

Pratt Paper (NY), Inc. v. Atlanta Gear Works, Inc. · filed 2026-02-18(2)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging breach of contract is six years ( see CPLR 213[2]). ... Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the statute of limitations was not revived upon the installation of the lubrication nozzle in January 2017 ( see Cabrini Med. Ctr. v Desina , 64 NY2d 1059, 1061).

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years from the breach to bring a breach-of-contract claim.

Breslin Brookhaven, LLC v. Rose · filed 2026-03-25(2)

"The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging breach of contract is six years" ( Filasky v Andover Cos. , 230 AD3d 1297, 1299-1300; see CPLR 213[2]). Generally, "'[a] breach of contract cause of action accrues at the time of the breach'" ( Filasky v Andover Cos. , 230 AD3d at 1300, quoting Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal , 81 NY2d 399, 402). Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged breaches of the operating agreement occurred more than six years before the commencement of this action ( see id. ).

Section 213(8)'s six-year period does not apply to a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking monetary relief when the complaint fails to allege all elements of fraud, including justifiable reliance.

Jadidian v. Goldstein · filed 2022-11-23(8)

Here, the cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty was subject to a three-year statute of limitations since the relief sought was monetary in nature and the complaint failed to allege all the requisite elements of fraud, including justifiable reliance ( see Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP , 12 NY3d 553, 562; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. , 12 NY3d at 140; Oppedisano v D'Agostino , 196 AD3d 497, 499).

For a breach of fiduciary duty claim, CPLR 213(8)’s six-year period applies when fraud is essential to the claim; fraud incidental to the underlying injury does not qualify.

William F. Nicklin · filed 2024-05-08(8)

“Where an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, [New York] courts have applied a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (8).” ... Applying the test provided in Harkin, fraud is incidental to the breach of fiduciary duty claim as it did not occur separately and subsequently from the injury forming the basis of the breach of fiduciary duty claim nor were the caused by fraud distinct from the injuries caused by the breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 213(8) supplies a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim when allegations of fraud are essential to the claim.

South Shore Estates, Inc. v. Guy Friedman Realty Corp. · filed 2024-08-07(8)

Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the six-year statute of limitations governing actions based on fraud applies ( see CPLR 213[8]). ... The allegations of fraud are thus essential to the breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim, and the six-year statute of limitations applies. Inasmuch as the 2016 action was commenced on March 9, 2016, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary as was based on events that occurred before March 9, 2010.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim based in fraud, but the plaintiff must plead fraud with the required specificity to invoke it.

Finkel v. Dwyer · filed 2024-09-17(8)

If a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based in fraud, however, the statute of limitations is six years. CPLR § 213(8). ... Plaintiff has failed to plead fraud with the required specificity and therefore the applicable statute of limitations is three years, not six.

Section 213(1) gives six years for an equitable breach of fiduciary duty claim, including one seeking recovery through a turnover proceeding.

Matter of Sandler · filed 2025-09-15(1)

If the relief sought is equitable in nature, the six-year period set forth in CPLR 213(1) applies (see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 118 [1st Dept 2003] [citations omitted]). ... Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the "gravamen" of the relief sought in the petition was equitable in nature and thus a six-year limitations period applies to Petitioner's turnover claim.

Section 213(1) subjects a claim to rescind a voidable conveyance to a limitations period.

Rockwell v. Despart · filed 2022-12-08(1)

Accordingly, we find that the 2013 conveyance of parcel B, held by the Audubon Society in fee simple absolute, was not void but instead merely voidable for any resultant diversion of the subject gift. The Attorney General's recission claim was thus required to be brought within the applicable limitations period. It was not. We therefore agree with Supreme Court that this challenge to the validity of the 2013 conveyance is time-barred ( see generally CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(4)(b) bars a defendant from challenging a prior acceleration unless the prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination that the debt was not validly accelerated.

UGH Mazing, LLC v. 21st Mtge. Corp. · filed 2023-10-04(4)(b)

There was no expressed judicial determination in the 2010 action that the note was not validly accelerated. Thus, the defendant is estopped from challenging the validity of the prior acceleration ( see CPLR 213[4][b]).

Section 213(4)(a) estops a foreclosure plaintiff from disputing acceleration in a prior action based on lack of standing unless that action was dismissed on an express judicial determination that acceleration was invalid.

GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v. Kator · filed 2023-02-22(4)(a)

However, the 2007 action was voluntarily discontinued; it was not dismissed "based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4][a]). Therefore, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2007 action based on Saxon's lack of standing ( see id. ).

Section 213(4)(a) estops a foreclosure plaintiff from denying that a prior action accelerated the debt unless that action was dismissed after an express judicial determination that acceleration was invalid.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Wong · filed 2023-07-26(4)(a)

Here, since the 2008 action was voluntarily discontinued, and therefore was not "dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated," the plaintiff is estopped under FAPA from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2008 action based on the plaintiff's lack of standing (CPLR 213[4][a]).

Section 213(4)(b) estops a defendant from claiming that the foreclosure limitations period has not expired because the mortgage was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination that the instrument was not validly accelerated.

Genovese v. Nationstar Mtge. LLC · filed 2023-12-19(4)(b)

CPLR 213(4)(b)'s potent estoppel bar will not be imposed, and a defendant will be free to assert that the debt secured by the mortgage was not validly accelerated in connection with a prior action, if, and only if, the prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.

Section 213(4)(a) estops a foreclosure plaintiff from disputing a prior acceleration based on lack of standing unless the prior action was dismissed on an express determination that the acceleration was invalid.

MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v. Lila · filed 2024-04-17(4)(a)

As the 2009 action was not dismissed based upon an expressed judicial determination that the instrument was not validly accelerated, pursuant to FAPA, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2009 action based on lack of standing ( see GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d at 917).

Section 213(4)(b) permits a lender to dispute acceleration when a prior foreclosure action was dismissed after a timely standing defense and a judicial finding that the lender lacked standing.

Cohen v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. · filed 2024-07-31(4)(b)

CPLR 213(4)(b) provides that "[i]n any action seeking cancellation and discharge of record of an instrument described under [RPAPL 1501(4)], a defendant shall be estopped from asserting that the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action upon the instrument has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" ( see UGH Mazing, LLC v 21st Mtge. Corp. , 220 AD3d 686, 688; Reinman v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , 215 AD3d 704, 707). ... However, in opposition and in support of its cross-motion, Deutsche Bank demonstrated that the debt was never validly accelerated, as the foreclosure action was dismissed upon the Supreme Court's determination after trial that Deutsche Bank lacked standing to commence that action ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Pearl-Nwabueze , 218 AD3d at 826-827; Reinman v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , 215 AD3d at 707; Mejias v Wells Fargo N.A. , 186 AD3d 472, 474).

Section 213(4)(a) generally prevents a foreclosure plaintiff from disputing an earlier acceleration when the limitations defense rests on that acceleration, unless the prior action was dismissed after an express determination that the acceleration was invalid.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Unger · filed 2024-08-28(4)(a)

Further, CPLR 213(4)(a) provides that "[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" ( see GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d at 916-917). Therefore, the plaintiff is estopped from contesting that the mortgage debt was not validly accelerated.

Section 213(4)(a) estops a foreclosure plaintiff from denying that a prior action accelerated the debt unless that action was dismissed on an express judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that acceleration was invalid.

Reverse Mtge. Solutions, Inc. v. Gipson · filed 2024-08-28(4)(a)

Here, the prior action was not dismissed "on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4][a]; see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v DeMatteis , 222 AD3d at 8; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Wong , 218 AD3d at 744). Thus, under FAPA, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the prior action ( see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Wong , 218 AD3d at 744).

Section 213(4)(a) estops a foreclosure plaintiff from denying that a prior action accelerated the debt unless that action was dismissed after an express judicial determination that the acceleration was invalid.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Edwards · filed 2024-10-30(4)(a)

Therefore, Wells Fargo is estopped under FAPA from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2005 action based on lack of standing ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Medianik , 223 AD3d 935; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v MS Global Group, LLC , 222 AD3d 821; MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Singh , 216 AD3d 1087, 1088; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Stewart , 216 AD3d at 723).

Section 213(4)(b) prevents a lender from disputing a prior foreclosure action’s acceleration of a loan absent an express judicial determination that the acceleration was invalid.

Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · filed 2025-02-18(4)(b)

Defendant is estopped from arguing that its predecessor-in-interest, Bank of New York (BNY), did not validly accelerate plaintiff's loan, as there has been no "expressed judicial determination" that plaintiff's loan was not validly accelerated through BNY's commencement of a foreclosure action concerning the same note and mortgage in 2009 (CPLR 213[4][b]).

Section 213(4)(a) does not treat a prior foreclosure action as accelerating the debt when that action was dismissed on a judicial finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to accelerate it.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Atedgi · filed 2025-03-05(4)(a)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... Here, although the complaint in the 2009 action expressly elected to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage, the Supreme Court determined that JPMorgan Chase lacked standing in the 2009 action and thus, did not have the authority to accelerate the debt at that time ( see Cohen v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , 229 AD3d 758, 761; U.S. Bank N.A. v Pearl-Nwabueze , 218 AD3d 824; Reinman v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , 215 AD3d 704, 707; Mejias v Wells Fargo N.A. , 186 AD3d 472, 474).

Section 213(4)(a) bars a foreclosure plaintiff from denying that a prior action accelerated the debt unless that action was dismissed upon an express judicial determination that the acceleration was invalid.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. DiGiorgio · filed 2025-04-16(4)(a)

As the 2009 action was not dismissed based upon an expressed judicial determination that the instrument was not validly accelerated, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2009 action based on lack of standing ( see US Bank Trust, N.A. v Reizes , 222 AD3d at 910).

Section 213(4)(a) allows a foreclosure plaintiff to dispute acceleration in a prior action when that action was dismissed after an express judicial determination, on a timely defense, that acceleration was invalid.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Gruen · filed 2025-04-16(4)(a)

Contrary to the defendant's contention, U.S. Bank is not estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2009 [*3]action, as that action "was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4][a]; see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Treitel , 217 AD3d at 913; cf. Everhome Mtge. Co. v Aber , 195 AD3d at 686; Capital One, N.A. v Saglimbeni , 170 AD3d at 509).

Section 213(4)(b) prevents a defendant in a mortgage cancellation action from disputing the expiration of the foreclosure limitations period on invalid acceleration grounds unless the prior action was dismissed on an express determination that the debt was not validly accelerated.

Brennan v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. · filed 2025-04-23(4)(b)

The mailing of a RPAPL 1304 notice, while a condition precedent to commencing a foreclosure action, is not a precondition for acceleration of the debt ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Gifford , 224 AD3d 447), and thus, the 2013 action was not dismissed upon an expressed judicial determination that the debt was not validly accelerated.

Section 213(4)(a) estops a mortgage foreclosure plaintiff from denying a prior acceleration when the earlier action was dismissed for failure to prosecute without an express judicial determination that acceleration was invalid.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Vesely · filed 2025-07-24(4)(a)

Having determined that FAPA applies to this foreclosure action and turning to the [*3]merits underlying defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations, plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the mortgage debt was not validly accelerated pursuant to CPLR 213 (4), since the 2015 action was dismissed for plaintiff's failure to prosecute and was not dismissed based upon an expressed judicial determination that the debt was not validly accelerated ( see MTGLQ Invs., L.P v Lila , 226 AD3d 889, 891 [2d Dept 2024]).

Under § 213(4)(b), failure to satisfy a condition precedent to maintaining a foreclosure action does not itself invalidate the acceleration of the mortgage debt.

Tomala v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2025-11-05(4)(b)

Although the July 2015 action may have been dismissed upon a determination of the Supreme Court that the defendant failed to comply with 24 CFR 203.604, such compliance was merely a condition precedent to maintaining that July 2015 action and was not a precondition for acceleration of the mortgage debt ( see Brennan v Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. , 237 AD3d 1027, 1029-1030).