N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23

Equitable distribution under § 2A:34-23 is subject to existing liens and cannot extinguish a creditor’s properly perfected prior lien.

Interchange State Bank v. Riegel · filed 1983-06-28

Although, as appellant argues, "the matrimonial court is charged with ... making equitable distribution of property, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23," such equitable distribution is subject to existing liens. The power to order equitable distribution may not be used to deprive the nonparty claimant of its prior lien claim.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of incentive compensation that vested between the marriage and the filing of a separate maintenance complaint, even if payment comes later.

Tucker v. Tucker · filed 1972-12-11

Defendant should participate in the proceeds of the stock units and cash credits under the incentive compensation plan that vested between the date of the marriage and the date of filing the complaint in separate maintenance when those proceeds are made available to plaintiff, subject to income and any other taxes in her hands.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of an unliquidated workers' compensation claim that arose during the marriage.

Hughes v. Hughes · filed 1975-02-24

This court therefore holds that an unliquidated workmen's compensation claim, where the claim arose during coverture, may properly be reached for equitable distribution upon the dissolution of the marriage.

Section 2A:34-23 makes stock options acquired during marriage subject to equitable distribution, even when exercising them requires payment.

Callahan v. Callahan · filed 1976-05-18

Defendant contends that the stock options do not constitute "property" which is subject to equitable distribution under the statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Therefore, following the reasoning expressed in the pension cases and the factors cited herein, these options are subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court to value a spouse's distributable interest in a closely held corporation before allocating it between the parties.

Gerson v. Gerson · filed 1977-02-16

Under the principle set down in Scherzer v. Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 1975), at least a portion of that stock interest will be subject to equitable distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Once an asset falls within the bounds of the statute the court must of necessity be able to appraise the value of such an asset in order to make a fair allocation between the parties.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts to identify and value distributable marital assets, including a spouse's interest in a business, before allocating them equitably.

Lavene v. Lavene · filed 1977-03-14

We are thus satisfied from our review of the record that the business interest is not without value. What its value is, what plaintiff's allocated share thereof should be, and the manner in which she should receive that share will have to be determined on the remand. The obvious impact of the equitable distribution provision of the 1971 amendment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 was to add to divorce actions a dimension of commercial litigation. Where there are marital assets the trial judge must determine which are distributable, what the value of the distributable assets is, and how, under all the circumstances, they are to be equitably distributed between the parties.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes compensation for personal injury and loss of consortium from equitable distribution, but permits distribution of recovered wages and medical expenses that diminished the marital estate.

Amato v. Amato · filed 1981-08-05

Thus, we hold that where one spouse has a claim for personal injury which occurred during marriage, monies realized by way of settlement or judgment from a tortfeasor as compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability or other debilitation of the mind or body, represent personal property of the injured spouse not distributable under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Likewise, monies realized for a claim of loss of consortium must in fairness be so treated. Losses, such as past wage and medical expenses, which have diminished the marital estate, are distributable when recovered.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes professional licenses, degrees, and the enhanced earning capacity attributable to them from property available for equitable distribution.

Mahoney v. Mahoney · filed 1982-02-09

In considering the question of whether the license or degree or its enhanced income potential constitutes distributable property, we are aware of the generally expansive construction of the term "property" as used by the equitable distribution statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... For the foregoing reasons we hold that neither a professional license, a degree, nor the enhanced income capacity fairly attributable thereto constitutes property available for equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 treats a spouse’s minority interest in a family corporation as property that must be valued for equitable distribution, with a discount reflecting the minority interest.

Merns v. Merns · filed 1982-06-22

Even though defendant's interest is a minority interest, and must therefor be discounted to so reflect, it nevertheless must be evaluated.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court to consider the parties’ financial situation after a bankruptcy discharge and permits it to account for exempt property when distributing marital assets.

Schell v. Schell · filed 1986-02-10

This court therefore holds that in making a fair, just and equitable distribution of property, the court can and must consider the parties realistic financial situation after a discharge in bankruptcy. In doing so, the court can therefore and indeed should take into account in effectihg an equitable distribution of property subject to such distribution also that property titled in the debtor/defendant’s name which the bankruptcy discharge exempts from actual distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court distributing marital property to require a resisting spouse to participate in a fair and reasonable sale proposed by the other spouse.

Roselin v. Roselin · filed 1986-03-17

We have no doubt that in appropriate circumstances the court may not only direct a sale in general terms but may also direct that a recalcitrant party participate in a fair and reasonable sale proposed by the other party.

Celebrity goodwill acquired during marriage can be marital property subject to equitable distribution.

Piscopo v. Piscopo · filed 1989-05-01

We agree with the Family Part that the goodwill value of plaintiff's business was a distributable marital asset and affirm that part of the judgment.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to order the sale of marital property during a pending divorce when equity requires it, with the proceeds held in escrow.

Glatthorn v. Wisniewski · filed 1989-08-24

As provided by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, a court is not restricted from directing pendente lite relief when the law of equity so dictates. This decision is well in accordance with the Grange rule which continues to protect parties from unnecessary sale of marital real property and proceeds distribution during the pendente lite period. Therefore, I hereby direct the present real estate to be sold pursuant to the June, 1989 contract, and proceeds of the closing sale to be held in escrow pending further order of the court.

Equitable distribution under § 2A:34-23 limits a creditor who levied on one spouse’s interest before divorce to the interest awarded to that spouse in the divorce judgment.

Daeschler v. Daeschler · filed 1986-12-31

We, therefore, decline to follow Interchange State Bank, and hold that the creditor's post-divorce rights are defined and limited by the equitable distribution scheme incorporated into the judgment of divorce.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of personal injury settlement proceeds that replace lost earnings or reimburse medical expenses, but excludes compensation for pain, suffering, disability, or a spouse’s loss of consortium or services.

Landwehr v. Landwehr · filed 1988-08-01

This appeal requires us to determine whether all or part of the settlement proceeds that a spouse receives during a marriage for claims arising out of his or her personal injuries constitutes a marital asset subject to equitable distribution pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. We hold that the portion of the settlement that is intended to compensate for lost earnings and the medical expenses of the injured spouse is subject to distribution, but the remainder of the settlement, which is intended to compensate for personal pain, suffering, and the mental and physical disabilities of the injured spouse or for the loss of consortium or services suffered by the uninjured spouse, are not distributable.

Celebrity goodwill acquired during marriage is a distinct asset subject to equitable distribution.

Piscopo v. Piscopo · filed 1988-08-24

The foregoing analysis compels the court to conclude that celebrity goodwill is a distinct asset susceptible of evaluation which is distributable if acquired during the marriage in accordance with the factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (1988).

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of a passive asset acquired during marriage in one spouse’s name, with its increase in value determined as of trial.

Scavone v. Scavone · filed 1988-11-09

Since evolvement of matrimonial law has been towards concepts of sharing and includibility, this court holds that the incremental value of a passive asset acquired in one name during the time of the marriage shall be determined as of the date of the trial.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of workers' compensation proceeds that replace lost marital income or assets, but excludes compensation for the injured spouse's pain, suffering, and disability.

Lentini v. Lentini · filed 1989-07-12

These same principles can be applied equally well to a Workers' Compensation claim. ... Thus, that portion of the final judgment of divorce which equitably distributed the proceeds of defendant's future compensation award is reversed and the matter is remanded for the trial court's reconsideration in light of the holding in Landwehr.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to value a marital business at trial when it has become worthless and to share a loss from a spouse's good-faith investment of marital funds in that business.

Goldman v. Goldman · filed 1991-01-31

Based upon the facts before the court, it would be unfair to charge plaintiff with an asset having a value of $294,000 at the time of the complaint when that asset has no value at the time of trial. Accordingly, the car dealership will be valued as of the trial date. ... A transfer of funds from one marital asset to another by plaintiff, in good faith, does not constitute a dissipation of assets that should result in an imposition of the loss solely upon him after the business failed.

Section 2A:34-23 bars equitable distribution of marital property acquired with illicit or illegal funds.

Sheridan v. Sheridan · filed 1990-11-21

Accordingly, this court concludes that a fair and common sense interpretation of the statutory purpose in permitting the division of "legally and beneficially acquired" property bars the equitable division of property obtained with illicit or illegal funds.

Section 2A:34-23 makes employment payments attributable to work during the marriage subject to equitable distribution even when received after the divorce complaint.

Ryan v. Ryan · filed 1992-06-01

If the payment was intended to replace post-marital earnings, it would warrant a separate property characterization. If, however, it has some other purpose relating to compensation for work performed during the marriage, it would qualify as marital property for the purpose of equitable distribution, regardless of the timing of the divorce complaint.

Section 2A:34-23 makes lottery winnings acquired during marriage subject to equitable distribution.

DeVane v. DeVane · filed 1992-09-29

As a matter of statutory construction, the clear and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 mandates a determination that the lottery winnings in the instant case are a marital asset subject to equitable distribution since they were acquired by a party during the marriage and this fortuitous event has not been specifically excepted by Legislature from the statute.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of an attorney spouse’s unrealized contingency fees to the extent earned during the marriage.

Erlanger v. Erlanger · filed 2003-05-30

There are no New Jersey cases addressing the issue of whether an attorney's contingency fee that has not yet been realized is subject to equitable distribution. I conclude that it is. The principle of equitable distribution envisions the fair division of all property legally and equitably acquired during the marriage. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to order joint, divided, or split custody when the circumstances make that arrangement fit, reasonable, and just.

Mayer v. Mayer · filed 1977-05-24

Further, the legislature has vested in this court the authority to make such order, after judgment of divorce or maintenance, "as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just * * *." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Clearly, this legislative grant of authority would include the authority to order "joint," "divided" or "split" custody.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes courts to decree joint custody in divorce proceedings.

Beck v. Beck · filed 1981-07-02

The language of the statute is sufficiently broad to include the authority to decree joint custody.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to make a custody determination for an unemancipated child who has turned 18.

Quinn v. Johnson · filed 1991-01-30

I conclude, not without substantial pause, that the mere attainment of the age of 18 does not deprive this court, acting as it does under the authority of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, of making a custody determination.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes orders in matrimonial actions where subject matter jurisdiction already exists; it does not itself confer original jurisdiction over international custody disputes.

Ivaldi v. Ivaldi · filed 1996-03-15

We are convinced that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 simply authorizes the courts to enter various orders in matrimonial actions where subject matter jurisdiction otherwise exists.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes New Jersey courts to modify custody orders.

Bless v. Bless · filed 1998-12-31

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes the court to modify custody orders. Thus, New Jersey had, and continues to have, subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute, whereas the UCCJA controls the "`exercise'" of its jurisdiction.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to reinstate parenting time after a divorce judgment while a custody hearing is pending.

C.S. VS. J.L-S. (FM-20-0386-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2021-03-26

See also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (stating "after judgment of divorce . . . the court may make such order as to the . . . care [and] custody . . . of the children . . . as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just . . . ."). Therefore, the reinstatement of parenting time pending the hearing was well within the judge's power to grant.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a Family Part court to restrict access to the marital home when exercising its authority over children's care and custody.

E.L.C. v. D.M.F. (FV-03-1688-21, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2022-10-21

Furthermore, we have upheld restrictions on access to the marital home under a Family Part court's statutory power to "make such order . . . as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or of any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; Burger v. Burger, 6 N.J. Super. 52, 54 (App. Div. 1949); Degenaars v. Degenaars, 186 N.J. Super. 233, 235 (Ch. Div. 1982).

Equitable distribution under § 2A:34-23 does not bar an award of counsel fees and costs; the property received bears on the need for an award and its amount.

Shaffer v. Shaffer · filed 1977-12-09

Accordingly, we hold that a court is not precluded from awarding counsel fees and costs to a wife in an appropriate case merely because she has received her fair share of the marital property following a divorce.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a counsel fee award based on a spouse's bad faith and the parties' financial circumstances.

Dilger v. Dilger · filed 1990-02-23

Defendant's bad faith, superior economic status before retirement and plaintiff's limited liquidity justify the imposition of a counsel fee. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 232-234, 281 A. 2d 273 (1971). Of the $5,000 sought by plaintiff's counsel, defendant shall be required to pay 80% or $4,000.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a judge deciding a matrimonial counsel fee request to consider each party's good or bad faith.

Salch v. Salch · filed 1990-05-01

In addition to these financial considerations, the trial judge must take into account the good or bad faith of either party. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees based on financial disparity or bad faith; an unreasonable position alone does not support fees when the parties are in economic parity.

Kelly v. Kelly · filed 1992-06-18

Thus, under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 the court may award fees for "bad faith" positions or "unreasonable" positions while under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 only "bad faith" positions (in the absence of financial inequality) support an award of fees.

A counsel fee award under § 2A:34-23 is improper when the recipient’s financial condition is at least equal to the payer’s and the payer has not acted in bad faith.

Morris v. Morris · filed 1993-03-26

In view of the facts that plaintiff's financial condition was at least equal to defendant's, and there was apparently no bad faith on defendant's part, no counsel fee should have been awarded. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (second paragraph). That aspect of the order appealed from is hereby vacated.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in matrimonial actions based on the parties' financial circumstances and good or bad faith.

Marx v. Marx · filed 1993-03-26

Defendant's prolonging the litigation for almost 2 years without any expert or legal opinion to support his position warrants the imposition of counsel fees under the factors set forth in Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A. 2d 273 (1971), and in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel fee awards to consider the parties' financial circumstances.

Chestone v. Chestone · filed 1995-11-27

It is apparent that the trial court may have failed to consider that plaintiff's income was not disproportionate to defendant's income and that no evidence exists in the record to justify an award to defendant encompassing the entire expense incurred by defendant for attorney and accountant services. Because the trial judge may have reached the counsel fee decision predicated upon an erroneous conclusion as to plaintiff's income, we reverse that award and remand that issue for reconsideration predicated upon the principles discussed in this opinion.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes counsel fees in matrimonial actions and requires consideration of the parties’ finances and good or bad faith, but bad faith does not justify a grossly disproportionate award.

Chestone v. Chestone · filed 1999-06-17

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes an award of counsel fees in a matrimonial action and further requires the judge to "consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good faith or bad faith of either party". ... Nevertheless, those findings do not permit the trial judge to punish plaintiff by an award of counsel fees which is grossly disproportionate to the amount in dispute.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court deciding counsel fees to consider the good or bad faith of the party against whom fees are sought.

Kothari v. Kothari · filed 1992-04-15

Effective September 1, 1988, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 was amended to provide that on counsel fee applications the court shall consider, in addition to the financial circumstances of the parties, "the good or bath faith of either party." (Emphasis added). ... The statutory amendment was an obvious response to the holding of Darmanin and in unmistakable terms authorizes a trial court to take into consideration the good or bad faith of the party against whom counsel fees are sought to be assessed.

Section 2A:34-23 allows courts to consider either party’s bad faith when awarding counsel fees in a matrimonial matter, including deliberate evasion of support obligations.

Borzillo v. Borzillo · filed 1992-05-19

One standard the court may now factor to determine whether a counsel fee shall be awarded is the good or bad faith of either party.

Section 2A:34-23’s traditional attorney’s fee analysis does not apply to fees awarded as compensatory damages under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.

Schmidt v. Schmidt · filed 1992-11-19

Because they are viewed as compensatory damages, attorney's fees are not subject to the traditional analysis contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A. 2d 273 (1971).

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fee awards in family actions, but an award between spouses does not determine what a client owes counsel under a retainer agreement.

Rosenberg v. Rosenberg · filed 1995-12-15

In this appeal brought by plaintiff Rose & DeFuccio, Esqs. (Rose) [1] , a Bergen County law firm, we shall review the relationship of R. 4:42-9(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, which permit an award of counsel fees in a family action, to the independent right of attorneys to sue a former client for breach of the client's contractual obligations delineated within a fee retainer agreement. ... Although there may have been an adjudication as to the responsibility of Ira Rosenberg for a portion of Rose's legal fees and costs, there clearly was no adjudication of Nina Rosenberg's responsibility to fulfill her contractual obligation encompassed within the fee agreement with her former counsel.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel-fee awards to consider the parties’ finances and good or bad faith; a party’s obstruction of discovery weighs against awarding that party fees.

Yueh v. Yueh · filed 2000-04-04

The counsel fee award here strikes us as patently outrageous and unduly punitive to the defendant, particularly where the record reflects that for the most part, contrary to the judge's opinion, she appeared to have acted in relative good faith, and for the most part plaintiff acted in relative bad faith by his recalcitrance and excessive delaying tactics.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fee awards and requires judges to consider the court rule factors, the parties’ finances, and either party’s good or bad faith.

Loro v. Colliano · filed 2002-06-06

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides for the award of counsel fees. In considering such an application, a judge must examine the "factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 makes the parties' financial circumstances and ability to pay relevant to an award of counsel fees.

Diehl v. Diehl · filed 2006-12-21

The financial circumstances of the parties and their respective ability to pay fees are relevant to an award of counsel fees and favor a modest award for plaintiff. See R. 5:3-5(c)(1)-(2); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23’s matrimonial attorney-fee analysis does not govern attorney-fee awards under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.

McGowan v. O'ROURKE · filed 2007-04-03

The court noted that the "statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning" and because this statute sets forth attorney's fees as compensatory damages, "attorneys' fees are not subject to the traditional analysis contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 281 A. 2d 273 (1971)." Ibid. ... We concur with the reasoning in Schmidt, Grandovic and Wine and disapprove that in Pullen, supra .

Section 2A:34-23 makes good or bad faith one factor in assessing counsel fees; bad faith is not required.

Harte v. Hand · filed 2013-12-18

We note that bad faith is not the sole requirement for an assessment of fees. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (noting that good or bad faith of the party is just one of the factors a trial judge may consider when assessing counsel fees).

Section 2A:34-23 requires the court to make findings supporting an award of attorney's fees in a matrimonial case.

SECK VS. THEODORE R. SHALACK (FM-12-1303-11, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-05-31

The court did not award plaintiff all of the fees sought, and did not explain the reasons for the award. Furthermore, the court did not relate the award to specific tasks or results, and did not make the necessary findings required by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Rule 5:3-5(c). In view of our decision reversing the court's order in part, we are convinced that the award of counsel fees must be reversed as well.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel fees in family actions to consider the spouses’ finances, their good faith, and counsel’s expectation of a fee award.

H.S. VS. D.S. (FM-12-1381-13, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-09-29

Lastly, the judge denied Dawn's application for attorneys' fees without examining the statutory factors typically considered on a fee application. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; see also R. 5:3-5(c). The following factors are to be considered in determining an award of counsel fees in family actions: whether one spouse lacked independent financial means; the spouses' financial ability to pay; whether the action was instituted in good faith; and whether counsel incurred attorneys' fees in expectation of an award.

Counsel fees under § 2A:34-23 require a complete certification of services so the court can assess whether the amount awarded is reasonable.

JONES-MUHAMMAD VS. KRISTINE OTT (FM-07-1350-11, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-10-11

Here, a certification detailing services and a discussion of legal principles relied upon to award a counsel fee in excess of the flat fee charged were essential. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; R. 4:24-9 (b)-(d); R. 5:3-5(c); Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 93-95 (2005).

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts to consider its factors when awarding counsel fees in a divorce case.

TROFIMOVA VS. IGOR TROFIMOV (FM-14-1538-14, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-12

The court must consider the factors established under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, Rule 5:3-5(c), Rule 4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a). We find that the judge's decision was adequately informed by those factors.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts awarding counsel fees in matrimonial cases to consider the court rule factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and either party's good or bad faith.

BETZ VS. JAMES L. FOTI, III (FM-03-0282-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-10-30

In exercising its discretion, the court must comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, which requires consideration of "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94 (2005) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23).

Section 2A:34-23 requires a judge awarding matrimonial counsel fees to consider the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and either party's good or bad faith.

SGRO-LOFARO VS. DOMENIC LOFARO (FM-02-1003-13, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-05

A judge "shall consider the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5(c)], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Application of these factors and the decision to award fees is within the trial judge's discretion.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a counsel fee award after the court considers the parties’ finances, the applicable court rule factors, and each party’s good or bad faith.

F.N. VS. A.S. (FM-09-0596-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-17

Defendant's claim that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper analysis under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 is equally without merit.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel fees in matrimonial matters to consider its factors, including the parties' good or bad faith.

JOHN M. BALKOVIC VS. MARIANNE BALKOVIC (FM-13-0677-09, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-18

Here, we find no clear abuse of discretion and affirm the judge's denial of counsel fees substantially for the reasons set forth in the judge's written opinion, which analyzed all the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and Rule 5:3-5(c), and considered "the good or bad faith of either party in pursuing or defending the action," as contemplated in Mani, 183 N.J. at 94-95.

Section 2A:34-23’s traditional attorney fee analysis does not govern fees awarded as compensatory damages under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.

E.K.S. VS. A.C.S. (FV-13-0343-16, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2018-06-28

We have said that because attorneys' fees under the Act are part of compensatory damages, "attorneys' fees are not subject to the traditional analysis contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229 (1971)." McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. Super. 502, 507 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Schmidt v. Schmidt, 262 N.J. Super. 451, 453 (Ch. Div. 1992)).

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court deciding attorney's fees to consider the parties' financial circumstances and their good or bad faith.

JAMES VS. TAHIR WHITEHEAD (FD-07-2329-11, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-10-10

A judge must "'consider the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5(c)], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party.'" Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 93-94 (2005) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). ... There is adequate evidence in the record to support the judge's award of $119,000 in attorney's fees. And we see no abuse of discretion.

Section 2A:34-23 allows a court to order an advance of legal and expert fees in a postjudgment support modification proceeding when the parties' finances make the award reasonable and just.

J.L.S. VS. P.W.S. (FM-10-0310-03, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-10-30

The court had the authority under the alimony statute and under Rules 5:3-5(c) and 5:3-3(i) to award an advance of attorney's fees and expert fees, subject to reallocation after or as part of the plenary hearing.

Section 2A:34-23 directs a judge deciding attorney's fees to consider the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and their good or bad faith.

MESSNER VS. MIKLOS HAJDU-NEMETH (FD-18-0340-01, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-02-20

A judge "shall consider the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5(c)], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court considering counsel fees to assess the court rule factors, the parties’ financial circumstances, and their good or bad faith.

G.H., IV VS. C.H. (FM-04-0262-16, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2018-10-25

Here, the trial court initially divided in half defendant's counsel fee request for her motion to enforce litigant's rights, then added an additional sum for fees related to the return date, without analyzing the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c), Rule 4:42-9(a), and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 directs courts deciding counsel fee applications to consider the court rule’s factors, the parties’ finances, and each party’s good or bad faith.

KELLY VS. JOHN KELLY (FM-07-0169-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-24

When reviewing an application for counsel fees, a court is guided by "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The judge properly considered the factors under Rule 5:3-5(c), and found plaintiff acted in bad faith in presenting her motion to modify the agreed-upon custody arrangement.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel fees in matrimonial cases to consider the court-rule factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and each party's good or bad faith.

CRAWFORD VS. PAUL J. MINCH (FM-20-0128-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-09

In exercising that discretion, however, the court must comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, which requires consideration of "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94 (2005) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23).

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes counsel fees in a matrimonial action after the court considers the court-rule factors, the parties’ finances, and their good or bad faith.

A.K. VS. C.G. (FM-02-1718-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-09

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes the Family Part to award counsel fees in a matrimonial action after a judge considers "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good faith or bad faith of either party."

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to award counsel fees after considering the parties’ financial circumstances, the relevant court-rule factors, and their good or bad faith.

DALTON VS. DIANE DALTON (FM-11-0485-08, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-19

The judge next considered N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, which provides: ... The judge indicated he "assign[ed] particular weight to factors" one, two, three, six, seven, eight and nine. He did not state he afforded any one factor more weight than the others, and he detailed the concept of bad faith in his opinion. Plaintiff defaulted on six required payments totaling $70,865.75, which was owed to defendant. Accordingly, the judge properly exercised his discretion in awarding counsel fees to defendant.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in a matrimonial action after consideration of the court-rule factors, the parties' finances, and their good or bad faith; a fee award based chiefly on an unsupported bad-faith finding must be set aside.

KOSTIHA VS. CHAYA GREENSPAN (FM-02-1718-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-14

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes the Family Part to award counsel fees in a matrimonial action after a judge considers "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good faith or bad faith of either party." ... In any event, we are convinced the trial court erred by awarding defendant attorney's fees. That decision was based primarily on the court's finding that plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motions was unreasonable and advanced in bad faith. The record does not support that conclusion.

Section 2A:34-23 allows a court to award attorney's fees to the successful opposing party in a family action, including a parenting-time dispute, in its discretion.

KAMMERMAN VS. PETER KAMMERMAN (FM-15-0285-13, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-09-16

A court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay the successful opposing party's attorney's fees in family actions, including claims for parenting time. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; R. 4:42-9(a)(1); R. 5:3-5(c).

Section 2A:34-23 permits a discretionary award of attorney’s fees incurred enforcing a divorce settlement and related court orders.

D.A.W. VS. W.G.W. (FM-16-1410-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-11-19

The record also supports the award of counsel fees to plaintiff in enforcing the PSA and subsequent court orders.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to order one party to pay a retainer for the other's expert and legal services when their financial circumstances make the award reasonable and just.

PAWELEK VS. MAGDALENA M. PAWELEK (FM-08-0890-17, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-09-27

Finally, we reject plaintiff's argument the judge mischaracterized the litigation fund as a counsel fee award. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 states: "The court may order one party to pay a retainer on behalf of the other for expert and legal services when the respective financial circumstances of the parties make the award reasonable and just." (emphasis added).

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in child support matters and requires the court to consider the court rule factors, the parties’ finances, and either party’s good or bad faith.

P.H. VS. E.M. (FM-02-0793-98, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2020-02-19

N.J.S.A 2A:34-23 provides that when an application is made to the court regarding child support, the court may make an award of counsel fees, and in doing so, the court "shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." ... We are convinced that the judge did not err by denying the parties' motions for counsel fees.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to award counsel fees in Family Part actions.

MBAH VS. DOMINIC MBAH (FM-13-1333-04, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-14

In Family Part actions, a court can award counsel feels pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, Rule 4:42- 9(a)(1), and Rule 5:3-5. We conclude that both Judge McGann and Judge Kondrup-Coyle correctly applied the statute and court rules.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel fees to consider the parties’ finances, their good or bad faith, and the factors in the court rules; it also permits a retainer award when the parties’ financial circumstances make one reasonable and just.

PEPPARD VS. LORI E. PEPPARD (FM-13-0080-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-17

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, when a party makes "an application for . . . counsel fees, the court shall determine the appropriate award for counsel fees, if any, . . . consider[ing] the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." ... Likewise, here, the judge provided adequate support for her determination, which was amply supported by the record.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fee awards in matrimonial matters and requires courts to consider the court rule factors, the parties’ financial circumstances, and their good or bad faith.

CORNETTE VS. TRACY CORNETTE (FM-13-0698-11, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-17

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, a court may award counsel fees in a matrimonial matter and "shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on ... counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party."

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in matrimonial matters and requires courts to consider the court rule factors, the parties’ finances, and their good or bad faith.

KRISTIN COVONE, F/K/A KRISTIN CURRERI VS. PETER CURRERI (FM-08-0208-03, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-22

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, a court may award counsel fees in a matrimonial matter and "shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." ... Here, we discern no abuse of discretion. Significantly, the judge found that neither party acted in bad faith, and neither party prevailed outright.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a Family Part judge to award counsel fees when the circumstances make the award reasonable and just.

MORRIS VS. ASMAR J. CAPERS (FD-02-0898-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-23

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides that a Family Part judge may award counsel fees in a matrimonial case where the circumstances of the case render them reasonable and just. ... The award should be limited to attorney's fees for litigating issues on which defendant prevailed.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in child support proceedings based on the parties’ financial circumstances and good or bad faith.

OLT VS. J. BRIAN OLT (FM-08-0868-05, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-01

Turning to plaintiff's motion for counsel fees, applying N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23, authorizing the award of counsel fees in child support applications based on ... consideration of "the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5(c)2], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party," the judge determined "a counsel fee award . . . [was] warranted." ... by "[in]appropriately weighing" the applicable factors in awarding counsel fees to plaintiff. Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we reject defendant's contentions and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Ziegler in his thoughtful, cogent, and well-reasoned written opinions.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fee awards in matrimonial actions and directs courts to consider the court-rule factors, the parties' finances, and their good or bad faith.

M.B. VS. D.B. (FM-11-0252-09, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-18

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides that in a matrimonial action, the trial court may award counsel fees. In considering an application for fees, the court should consider "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." Ibid. ... The judge did not abuse her discretion by denying plaintiff's application for the award of attorney's fees.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a judge deciding attorney's fees to consider the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and either party's good or bad faith.

CONEY VS. ALYCIA L. BANKS (FD-07-3678-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-08-04

A judge "shall consider the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5(c)], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a party seeking counsel fees to show financial need and good faith, and the paying party must have the ability to pay.

L.L. VS. M v. (FM-02-1788-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2020-08-12

"In addition, the party requesting the fee award must be in financial need and the party paying the fees must have the financial ability to pay, and if those two factors have been established, the party requesting the fees must have acted in good faith in the litigation." J.E.V., 426 N.J. Super. at 493; N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Applying these guiding principles, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff counsel fees rather than defendant, substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a judge deciding counsel fees to consider the court-rule factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and each party's good or bad faith.

K.M.L. VS. R.J.L. (FM-15-1345-15, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-08

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (providing that the judge "shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party").] ... We vacate the counsel fee award and remand as the trial court failed to make the required findings and state its conclusions of law regarding the lodestar and application of the Rule 5:3-5(c) and RPC 1.5(a) factors.

Section 2A:34-23 gives courts broad authority to award expert fees.

THOMAS P. DUFFY, JR. VS. MARIA I. PIERANTOZZI (FD-08-0420-09, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-13

The court has broad authority to make an award of expert fees. ... Given the circumstances, the reasonableness of the parties' positions, the outcome of the trial, and defendant's ability to retain ... her own expert, requiring defendant to bear one-third of the court-appointed expert's fees was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court deciding counsel fees in matrimonial litigation to consider its factors.

CONNORS VS. JAMES A. CONNORS, JR. (FM-10-0130-16, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-23

We therefore remand for the trial court to consider the factors under Rule 5:3-5 and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Rule 1:7-4.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in a matrimonial action after the court considers the court-rule factors, the parties’ finances, and their good or bad faith.

BRIAN LEE ROBBINS VS. CAROLE ANNE DIONNE (FM-03-1098-14, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-26

N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23 authorizes family courts to award counsel fees in a matrimonial action after a judge considers "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good faith or bad faith of either party." Chestone v. Chestone, 322 N.J. Super. 250, 255-56 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23).

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court considering counsel fees in a family matter to assess the court rule factors, the parties’ financial circumstances, and each party’s good or bad faith.

S.K. VS. N.L. (FM-10-0328-16, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-03-10

Here, the judge awarded counsel fees without analyzing the factors set forth in Rules 4:42-9(a), 5:3-5(c), or N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Although all factors should have been considered, particularly relevant here is the judge's finding that plaintiff acted in bad faith and failed "to comply with her duties under the consent order." We therefore reverse the fee award and remand to the Family Part judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court considering counsel fees to weigh the court rule factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and either party's good or bad faith.

KELLY VS. ROLF-DIETER KRENZ (FM-07-0905-12, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-04-21

In addition, the court failed to analyze the required statutory factors and did not proffer any reason for its conclusion that defendant's argument regarding emancipation was unreasonable. Therefore, we reverse the award of fees and instruct the court on remand to consider the request anew, along with any applications concerning appellate fees. ... In doing so, the judge will consider the factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Rule 5:3-5(c) ... and set forth its reasons for any award or its denial as required under Rule 1:7-4(a).

Section 2A:34-23 permits discretionary counsel-fee awards in family actions; an award requires evidence of the requesting party's financial need and the other party's ability to pay.

L.M. VS. A.M. (FM-04-1330-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-04-30

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Rules 4:42-9(a)(1) and 5:3-5(c), a judge in his or her discretion may award counsel fees to a party in a family action. ... Without that evidence, the judge erred in granting Adam's cross-motion for counsel fees.

Section 2A:34-23 requires the Family Part to consider the parties' financial circumstances, their good or bad faith, and the Rule 5:3-5 factors when deciding a counsel fee request.

WADHWA VS. AMIT SETHI (FM-12-1299-11, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-06-16

Whenever an application is made in the Family Part for counsel fees, "the court shall determine the appropriate award . . . if any, . . . [after] consider[ing] t he factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... It did not explain what it considered or how it analyzed the applicable factors. We are constrained to reverse the April 4, 2019 and June ... 12, 2019 orders that address attorney's fees and remand that issue to the trial court for further proceedings.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel fee applications to consider either party's good or bad faith.

BYRNE VS. JOHN L. BYRNE (FM-02-0901-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-11-12

On counsel fee applications, the court shall consider "the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The statute "in unmistakable terms ... authorizes a trial court to take into consideration the good or bad faith of the party against whom counsel fees are sought to be assessed." Kothari v. Kothari, 255 N.J. Super. 500, 513 (App. Div. 1992). The motion court properly considered plaintiff's bad faith and the resulting financial impact suffered by defendant.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts to consider each party’s good or bad faith when deciding counsel fee applications.

F.J.C. VS. J.L.C. (FM-16-1419-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-11-18

On counsel fee applications, the court shall consider "the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court considering counsel fees to assess the court-rule factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and either party's good or bad faith.

J.J.R. VS. K.A.R. (FM-08-0542-19, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-11-19

In exercising its discretion, the trial court must abide by N.J.S.A. 2A:34 - 23, requiring consideration of "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." Mani, 183 N.J. at 93-94 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23).

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in a divorce action, but losing at trial alone does not establish bad faith for a fee award.

STEINER VS. DAVID S. STEINER (FM-07-2818-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-15

The bad faith of a matrimonial litigant does not arise merely because that litigant failed at a trial on the merits. It requires that the party against whom fees are sought acted beyond the bounds of proper advocacy by pursuing a claim or defending against a claim without factual support.

Section 2A:34-23 supplies factors for awarding counsel fees in matrimonial actions, including need, ability to pay, and good faith.

LIVINGSTONE v. REUBEN DANIEL (FM-12-2478-07, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-01-04

Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229 (1971), and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 set forth the factors to be applied in awarding counsel fees in matrimonial actions. The motion judge considered all relevant factors, including "the wife's need, the husband's financial ability to pay and the wife's good faith in instituting or defending the action." Williams, 59 N.J. at 233. ... We discern no abuse of discretion.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fees in a divorce action, but losing at trial alone does not establish bad faith for a fee award.

STEINER v. STEINER (FM-07-2818-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-01-12

The bad faith of a matrimonial litigant does not arise merely because that litigant failed at a trial on the merits. It requires that the party against whom fees are sought acted beyond the bounds of proper advocacy by pursuing a claim or defending against a claim without factual support.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts deciding counsel fee awards to consider the Rule 5:3-5 factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and each party's good or bad faith.

Wadhwa v. Sethi · filed 2024-08-06

We reject plaintiff's contentions for the reasons stated by the judge. ... N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 ("[T]he court shall determine the appropriate [counsel fee] award . . . if any, . . . [after] consider[ing] the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party."). ... Applying these principles, we discern no abuse of discretion and no basis in fact or law to intervene.

Section 2A:34-23 requires consideration of the Rule 5:3-5 factors, the parties' finances, and their good or bad faith when deciding whether to award counsel fees.

Feinberg v. Feinberg · filed 2024-12-27

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides that "the [trial judge] shall determine the appropriate [counsel fee] award . . . if any, . . . [after] consider[ing] the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5], . . . the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." ... Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the record reveals that the judge's discretionary order denying plaintiff attorney's fees and costs was based upon consideration of all relevant factors and was not a clear error in judgment.

Section 2A:34-23 permits counsel fee awards in family matters after consideration of court rule factors, the parties' finances, and their good or bad faith.

Lomicky v. Lomicky · filed 2025-02-14

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes a judge to award counsel fees in a family matter after the judge considers "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good faith or bad faith of either party." Chestone v. Chestone, 322 N.J. Super. 250, 255-56 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23).

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts awarding attorney's fees to consider Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, the parties' finances, and either party's good or bad faith.

P.W.B. v. T.R.B. · filed 2024-04-15

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides that a court, when awarding attorney's fees to a party, is required to consider the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c), the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party.

Section 2A:34-23 gives trial courts discretion to award attorney's fees in family actions.

Ivlev v. Ivlev · filed 2025-02-26

In family actions, a trial court has the discretion to award attorney's fees under Rules 4:42-9(a)(1) and 5:3-5(c) and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... We conclude the trial court did not misuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff attorney's fees and costs.

Section 2A:34-23 gives trial courts discretion to award counsel fees in family actions.

Sharyn Primmer v. Harrison · filed 2025-03-03

In family actions, a trial court has the sound discretion to award counsel fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, Rule 4:42-9(a)(1) and Rule 5:3-5(c).

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes a trial court to award attorneys' fees in family actions.

Sanchez v. Vargas · filed 2024-07-05

In family actions, a trial court has the authority to award attorneys' fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, Rule 4:42-9(a)(1) and Rule 5:3-5. ... Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendant attorneys' fees because it carefully considered plaintiff's violation of the court rules and reasonableness of the fees requested.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court deciding counsel fees to consider the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and their good or bad faith.

Chew v. Chew · filed 2025-06-17

It failed to "consider the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5(c)], the financial circumstances of ... the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party" in its decision to deny the parties' requests for counsel fees.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a court deciding counsel fees to consider the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, the parties' financial circumstances, and their good or bad faith.

Gherardy v. Greer · filed 2025-12-01

"[T]he court shall determine the appropriate [counsel fee] award . . . [after] consider[ing] the factors set forth in [Rule 5:3-5(c)], the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Here, the judge's February 12, 2025 order and attached statement of reasons omitted analysis of the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors. Thus, we are constrained to remand to the Family Part to consider the factors under Rule 5:3-5(c) in ... determining whether plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.

Section 2A:34-23 directs courts deciding counsel fee requests to consider the court rule factors, the parties' finances, and either party's good or bad faith.

Ruiz v. Cintron · filed 2026-02-23

We next turn to plaintiff's challenge to the award of counsel fees, which is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23: ... Here, the court's award of counsel fees was based on plaintiff's bad faith in filing the motion for reconsideration, which included his challenge to the child support arrears. Because we reverse on that point, we are constrained to reverse the award of counsel fees and remand for the court to reconsider defendant's request in light of our holding.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts considering counsel fees in family matters to weigh the court-rule factors, the parties' finances, and each party's good or bad faith.

T.J. v. S.K. · filed 2026-06-10

In exercising its discretion, the trial court must abide by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, requiring consideration of "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party."

Section 2A:34-23’s family fee analysis, including consideration of the parties’ finances, does not govern attorney’s fees awarded as damages in domestic violence actions.

H.S. v. R.S. · filed 2025-04-21

Because fees and costs in a domestic violence action are awarded as damages, an award is "not subject to the traditional analysis" for an award of fees in family-type claims pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and the court is not obliged to consider the parties' financial circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23’s traditional attorney fee analysis does not apply to fees awarded as compensatory damages in domestic violence actions.

C.B. v. S.W. · filed 2025-05-27

Because fees and costs in a domestic violence action are awarded as damages, an award is "not subject to the traditional analysis" for an award of fees in family-type claims pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and the court is not obliged to consider the parties' financial circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23’s analysis for fees in family claims does not govern fees awarded as damages in domestic violence actions, so the court need not consider the parties’ financial circumstances.

J.L. v. F.F.-A. · filed 2025-11-03

Because fees and costs in a domestic violence action are awarded as damages, they are "not subject to the traditional analysis" for an award of fees in family-type claims pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and the court is not obliged to consider the parties' financial circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court in a pending divorce to order the sale of a marital home before judgment when both spouses previously consented and delay would dissipate the property.

Witt v. Witt · filed 1979-01-26

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides that in all actions wherein a judgment of divorce is entered, the court may make such award as is necessary to equitably distribute property acquired by one or both of the parties during the marriage. It is clear that had a divorce already been granted, the court could have ordered the sale of the Witt home. But the same statute vests this court, in any pending matrimonial action, with wide discretion in making such orders as are necessary for the maintenance of the parties. ... Noting that the total of liens, judgments and encumbrances against the property far exceeds its worth, and aware that further delay will only result in the dissipation of the asset, this court believes the house should be ordered sold now.

Section 2A:34-23 permits interim orders protecting children's welfare, including an order barring a spouse who voluntarily left from returning to the marital home.

Degenaars v. Degenaars · filed 1982-08-19

The Legislature has vested this court with broad powers under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23: ... This court finds that it has the power and jurisdiction, both by legislative fiat and by invoking the historical equitable jurisdiction inherently possessed by this court, to grant the relief sought. Therefore, this court restrains and enjoins defendant from entering or remaining in the marital residence.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to order the sale of marital assets before a divorce judgment when the proceeds are necessary to maintain a dependent spouse and children.

Graf v. Graf · filed 1985-07-03

And when the support and maintenance of a dependent custodial parent and children are involved, as is the case here, the broad discretionary powers conferred upon the court by the first sentence of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 must apply, and not Grange. This court is satisfied that Grange does not prohibit the pendente lite sale of marital assets when such proceeds are necessary to ensure the continued maintenance of a dependent spouse and children and, at most, should be limited under such circumstances to prohibiting the pendente lite sale of only the marital dwelling.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes pendente lite spousal support, which may be denied when the dependent spouse cohabits with a paramour in a marriage-like relationship.

Rose v. Csapo · filed 2002-04-26

The power of the court to provide interim relief in the form of support in matrimonial actions, arising as it does from statutory authority, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, is well established in practice and precedent. ... Here, in the pendente lite setting, a supporting spouse should not be placed in the untenable position of being required to finance the spouse's new relationship. ... Plaintiff's request for pendente lite spousal support is denied.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes premarital property, gifts, inheritances, and increases in the value of such property from equitable distribution.

Painter v. Painter · filed 1972-02-16

Our Legislature in the statutory provision used the verb "acquired" in relation to the distribution of the marital assets. ... The definition would certainly exclude: (1) property secured by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2) property acquired in exchange for property secured prior to the marriage or in exchange for property secured by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (3) property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; (4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties, and (5) the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage or by gift, bequest, devise or descent.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes property owned by a spouse before marriage from equitable distribution.

D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio · filed 1985-04-03

Second, since it appears that virtually all of the parties' assets were owned by defendant prior to the marriage, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (last paragraph) excludes the equitable distribution of such property.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of property the parties acquired together in contemplation of marriage during premarital cohabitation when they later marry.

Coney v. Coney · filed 1985-07-24

Our equitable distribution statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, gives the court the power to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage. ... I find that the real property in this case was indeed acquired in contemplation of marriage. ... That being so, the real property in question is equitably distributable under our statute.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes property owned before marriage from equitable distribution, but appreciation attributable to the other spouse's efforts may be distributed.

Orgler v. Orgler · filed 1989-11-29

For an asset to be subject to equitable distribution, it must be "property ... legally and beneficially acquired by [the parties] or either of them during the marriage." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Thus, it is settled that property owned by the parties at the time of the marriage remains the separate property of each spouse and, in the event of divorce, will not qualify as an asset eligible for distribution. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214 (1974). However, enhancement in value of a spouse's premarital asset occurring after the marriage is subject to equitable distribution to the extent the increase is attributable to the efforts of the other spouse.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of property acquired before the marriage ceremony when the parties intended it as a marital asset and acquired it in specific contemplation of marriage.

Weiss v. Weiss · filed 1988-07-11

We conclude that the Court's approach to the interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 in Painter and its progeny supports the conclusion that a date prior to the marriage ceremony can, in appropriate circumstances, qualify as the date of commencement of the marriage for the purpose of deciding whether property is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. Just as the Painter line of cases has recognized that the marital partnership may terminate prior to the entry of a judgment of divorce, we believe that for the purpose of triggering a right of equitable distribution a marital partnership may be found to have commenced prior to the marriage ceremony, where the parties have adequately expressed that intention and have acquired assets in specific contemplation of their marriage.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes property separately owned at the time of marriage from equitable distribution, including property acquired during premarital cohabitation.

Mangone v. Mangone · filed 1985-05-03

The basis of entitlement to equitable distribution is founded on statute and its application is thus limited. Plaintiff's complaint in this regard fails because such premarital acquired property is immune from equitable distribution. The statute is clear and its application since adoption leaves no doubt that property separately owned at the time of the marriage remains the property of the then owner and is not subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of a home bought just before marriage for the marital household when the parties jointly selected it and both contributed to its costs, even if only one spouse holds title.

Raspa v. Raspa · filed 1985-11-04

This Court recognizes the statutory limitation that only assets acquired "during the marriage" are subject to equitable distribution. Equity, however, dictates that the rule of immunity of assets acquired prior to marriage be excepted where the marital partners jointly select and purchase an asset in contemplation of marriage and for the purpose of the marital enterprise. Designation of title in the name of one of the parties should not bar a determination of the property's intended and active status as a marital asset.

Section 2A:34-23 may permit equitable distribution of an asset’s premarital increase in value when the parties intended a marital partnership concerning that asset and enhanced it in contemplation of marriage.

Berrie v. Berrie · filed 1991-12-31

Furthermore, we see no reason on this record to reject as a matter of law the application of Weiss to the purchase of a new asset. If the parties by their combined efforts work as part of this "partnership" to increase the value of an asset held by one of them, such increase in value under established principles also might be subject to treatment as a partnership interest, which in turn might be subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23(h) excludes an account funded by premarital assets and kept separate from equitable distribution.

Sweeney v. Sweeney · filed 2009-03-12(h)

In fact, Ms. Sweeney's account had been derived from premarital assets and had been maintained separately. Consequently, that account was not subject to equitable distribution. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23h.

Section 2A:34-23(h) permits equitable distribution of appreciation in premarital property attributable to the non-owner spouse’s efforts during marriage.

D.M.H. VS. H.G.H. (FM-09-2148-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-12(h)

The record contains evidence the parties pooled their resources when they lived in the property and paid its mortgage. In addition, plaintiff managed the property for years when it served as an income-producing rental unit. These facts constitute sufficient support for the trial court's conclusion the Hoboken property was an active immune asset of the marriage, subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 limits equitable distribution to property acquired during the marriage; an account funded entirely with premarital assets is excluded.

FERNICOLA VS. ROBERT C. FERNICOLA (FM-15-0587-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-01-11

This was consistent with the general notion that for an asset to be subject to equitable distribution, it must be "property . . . legally and beneficially acquired by [the parties] or either of them during the marriage." Orgler v. Orgler, 237 N.J. Super. 342, 350 (App. Div. 1989) (alterations in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). ... There was no abuse of discretion in determining that these funds were not subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes property received as a gift from marital assets subject to equitable distribution.

Capozzoli v. Capozzoli · filed 1972-11-15

The property having been secured by plaintiff as a gift was not property acquired during marriage which would be subject to equitable distribution as a marital asset following a divorce within contemplation of the statute.

Section 2A:34-23 applies its exclusion of bequests from equitable distribution to divorce actions pending when the amendment took effect.

Bellinger v. Bellinger · filed 1981-01-09

Assembly Bill No. 1229 was a part of the statute law of this State when this case was tried. It applies to this case. Is is clear that bequests are excluded from consideration by the court for purposes of equitable distribution. Defendant's inheritance is so excluded.

Section 2A:34-23 does not exempt property acquired by intestate succession from equitable distribution.

Sleeper v. Sleeper · filed 1982-05-14

Notably absent from the statutory list of exempted property is a reference to assets acquired by intestate succession, i.e., by descent or distribution. ... The Legislature has apparently chosen to exclude from equitable distribution only that property which has been acquired by gift or by will, situations in which the donative intent is unmistakable and unequivocal.

A gift to one spouse remains exempt from equitable distribution despite a brief deposit in a joint account if that spouse did not intend an interspousal gift.

Dotsko v. Dotsko · filed 1990-12-07

He did not intend to make an interspousal gift by merging cash and checks in the joint account over the holidays while waiting for a new gift in the new year. We find that the exempt gifts did not become subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes inherited property from equitable distribution when the amendment applies to a divorce judgment, even if an earlier settlement agreement included that property.

Edgerton v. Edgerton · filed 1985-04-17

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the matter is remanded to the trial judge with instructions to declare those assets included in the property settlement agreement which had been acquired by the former wife by way of inheritance to be solely her property and not subject to equitable distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23(h) excludes property acquired by gift, devise, or intestate succession during marriage from equitable distribution.

A.P.T. VS. L.C.T. (FM-03-0589-15, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-24(h)

Additionally, the PSA was not unconscionable because it failed to recite and consider assets "[p]laintiff inherited from her father . . . during the marriage[.]" Property "acquired during the marriage . . . by either party by way ... of gift, devise, or intestate succession shall not be subject to equitable distribution[.]" N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h).

Section 2A:34-23(h) generally excludes property received as a gift during marriage from equitable distribution, except for interspousal gifts.

SHABESTARI VS. REZA FARHADI (FM-18-0817-16, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-18(h)

All property "legally or beneficially acquired during the marriage . . . by either party by way of gift, devise, or intestate succession" except interspousal gifts is generally excluded from equitable distribution. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h). ... Consequently, defendant failed to defeat the presumption that the monies from his parents were a gift.

Property gifted from one spouse to the other during marriage is subject to equitable distribution under subsection (h).

MARK J. MOLZ VS. THERESA D. MOLZ N/K/A THERESA D. MITCHELL (FM-11-0626-12, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2020-05-01(h)

Indeed, interspousal gifts are subject to equitable distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h).

Section 2A:34-23(h) exempts a spouse's inheritance from equitable distribution.

KAROON VS. LISA KAROON (FM-02-1549-19, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-07(h)

According to the testimony, at least $185,000 in the Bank of America account represented plaintiff's inheritance to which defendant was not entitled.

A gifted ownership interest is excluded from equitable distribution when the recipient spouse neither shares nor commingles the gift with marital funds.

Hendrie v. Hendrie · filed 2025-04-29(h)(1)

We agree plaintiff's share in the BKLM Entities were Scavone category one assets not subject to equitable distribution. There was no evidence in the record demonstrating plaintiff's intent to share the gift with defendant, nor did she commingle the gift with marital funds.