Statute Annotations › New Jersey › N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2

Actions for injury to person: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
New Jersey
Case notes
479
Cited in passing
205
Citing cases indexed
769
Case dates
1956–2026
Screened through
2026-05-29
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

684 citing cases reviewed of 769 in the citation index: 479 interpreted the section (annotated below), 205 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-29 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1993-07-27 Montells v. Haynes adopted § 2A:14-2’s two-year limit for LAD claims whose operative facts arise after that date, leaving earlier claims under prior law. Source
  • 2000-11-30 Ali v. Rutgers set a transition deadline for LAD claims with pre-1993 facts that accrued after Montells and confirmed a two-year period for claims accruing after its decision. Source

Tolling and estoppel

Section 2A:14-2 gives plaintiffs two years to bring a personal injury claim; substantial compliance did not excuse a plaintiff who delayed refiling in the proper forum.

Walter Vargo, Jr. v. D&M Tours Inc · filed 2024-01-25

Accordingly, the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply here. The Appellant’s complaint, filed after the expiration of New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations, was therefore properly dismissed.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives personal injury negligence claims a two-year filing period that may be equitably tolled, but tolling was unwarranted when plaintiffs knew jurisdiction was in doubt and could have filed in New Jersey.

Carlson v. Aristacare at Cherry Hill, LLC · filed 2023-12-06

The personal injury claim sounding in negligence is a common law claim, subject to the limitation period set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which can be adjusted when necessary to preserve "individual justice" in the face of "the harsh approach of literally applying the statute of limitations." Galligan, 82 N.J. at 192. ... We conclude there is no equitable reason to toll based on plaintiffs' arguments of substantial compliance.
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Section 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years after the claim accrues; equitable tolling requires extraordinary circumstances.

SOUMPHONPONPHAKDY v. GEICO · filed 2021-02-17

Plaintiff’s initial complaint was properly dismissed as time-barred under New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2 (providing that “[e]very action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued”).
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for personal injury claims; a plaintiff who lacks diligence in identifying and naming a defendant cannot use fictitious party practice to avoid that limit.

JOHN DELLIGATI VS. SUMMIT OAKS HOSPITAL (L-0539-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-23

Following expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, plaintiff learned Invacare's identity and was granted leave to file and serve a second amended complaint naming Invacare as a defendant. ... Simply put, plaintiff's lack of diligence was solely responsible for the delay in filing a timely complaint against Invacare, and, as a result, plaintiff neither is entitled to the protection afforded by Rule 4:26-4 nor relaxation of the Rule on equity grounds.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims in New Jersey.

IBRAHIM v. DEFILIPPO · filed 2021-02-26(a)

In New Jersey, that statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a). ... Plaintiff filed his originally complaint on February 7, 2019, within two years of September 18, 2018. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are timely.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to federal civil rights claims arising in New Jersey.

Edwards v. Hillman · filed 2021-03-01

Because Edwards’ federal civil rights claims against Judge Hillman stem from conduct that ended when his prior case concluded in April 2018, more than two years ago, they would now be time-barred. See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[a] section 1983 claim is characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims,” which in New Jersey is two years); ... see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) gives plaintiffs two years to file NJCRA claims.

BESSASPARIS VS. THE TOWNSHIP OF BRIDGEWATER (L-1419-17, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-06(a)

Like § 1983 claims, the timeliness of NJCRA claims is governed by the two-year statute-of-limitation period of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).
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Section 2A:14-2 provides the two-year personal injury limitations period that governs § 1983 claims in New Jersey.

SPANN v. CUMBERLAND/SALEM MUNCIPAL COURT · filed 2021-06-01

Accordingly, New ... Jersey's two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2, governs Plaintiff's claims. ... As Plaintiff’s allegations stem from an incident that occurred in 2016, the two-year limitations period has long passed.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to file a personal injury action; filing an earlier action does not toll that period when the earlier action was dismissed for failure to comply with court requirements rather than lack of jurisdiction.

Soumphonphakdy v. Walilko · filed 2021-08-17

Soumphonphakdy filed his complaint about six months after the two-year limitations period expired (absent tolling). See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. ... Unlike in the cases where the New Jersey courts have applied this tolling doctrine, Soumphonphakdy’s initial complaint was not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ... He is thus not entitled to toll the statute of limitations, and as a result, his claim is untimely.
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Section 2A:14-2 requires personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey, to be filed within two years after accrual.

CARIFI VS. TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY (L-1681-18, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-08-23

In New Jersey, that statute is N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which requires that a suit for personal injury be commenced within two years from the accrual of the cause of action. ... These claims were clearly time-barred and correctly dismissed on that basis.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions, which the court applied to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3).

TRUDNOS v. STRADA · filed 2021-08-30

In New Jersey, “there is a two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. § 2A:14–2, and thus a two-year statute of limitations on Section 1983 actions.” Blow v. Paterson Police Dep’t, No. 11-2128, 2012 WL 368206, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2012) (citations omitted). Courts also apply “the two-year, personal injury statute of limitations to Section 1985(3) violations.” /d. at *6 (citations omitted). ... Therefore, Plaintiffs claims, filed on February 14, 2019, are barred by the statute of limitations as they were brought more than two years after Plaintiffs alleged injury.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

ELLAISY v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY · filed 2021-09-30

Plaintiff does not dispute that a two-year statute of limitations governs their claims against Harris and Rogers. ... Thus, the amended complaint, which became the operative complaint once it was filed,9 “relates back” to the original complaint - i.e., the amended complaint is deemed to have been filed at the time the original complaint was filed, which was before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims that borrow New Jersey’s limitations period.

MCKINNEY v. LANIGAN · filed 2021-12-21

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal- injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) gives plaintiffs two years to file a personal injury action; a late filing requires a sufficient equitable reason to excuse it.

RAMROOP VS. STEVEN A. RAMROOP (L-2353-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-10-11(a)

Even though defendants did not contend the late filing prejudiced them, plaintiffs' tardy filing cannot be overlooked absent a sufficient equitable reason. None of the cases cited by plaintiffs afford them relief from the application of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) under the circumstances of this case. Simply put, there is no grace period that allows a delay in the enforcement of the statute and the unfortunate effect of dismissing plaintiffs' complaint because it was filed a day late.
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The two-year limit for personal injury actions is tolled while a defendant resides outside New Jersey, even if the defendant can be served through the state’s motor vehicle director.

Blackmon v. Govern · filed 1956-03-09

Therefore, since, in the case at bar, plaintiff is a resident entitled to a cause of action accruing in New Jersey, against the defendants who were nonresident when the “cause of action accrues”, under New Jersey law, binding on this Court, the two-year statutory bar is tolled by such non-residence of the defendants, despite the service on them through the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles in New Jersey.
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Section 2A:14-2's two-year limit for a personal injury action is tolled when the defendant moves out of New Jersey before the period expires.

Guas v. Guas · filed 1977-01-11

Thus, when defendant Guas moved to Florida on August 23, 1974, the limitations of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 were tolled.
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The two-year limit for personal injury suits is not barred by equitable estoppel when the defendant did not mislead the plaintiff into filing late.

Tantum v. Binz · filed 1981-05-13

Defendant pleaded the two-year statute of limitations in bar. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Plaintiff rejoined, claiming that defendant was equitably estopped to plead the bar of the statute. ... In the adversarial context presented by a third-party auto claim, the judge found factually that plaintiff was not misled into a tardy assertion of his claim. Rather, the judge found that plaintiff slept on his right to file suit on a very doubtful claim which had never been accepted for payment by the alleged tortfeasor's insurer. The evidence supports the finding. We affirm.
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A defendant who contributes to delay after a timely first complaint may be equitably estopped from asserting the two-year limitations period against a second complaint.

Zaccardi v. Becker · filed 1982-01-27

Thus, if that fact alone were determinative, the second complaint would be barred by the statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. However, under the cases noted above, defendant's conduct is relevant to the availability of a statute of limitations defense. ... Under the unique circumstances of this case, we hold that defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
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The two-year period for a personal injury claim is tolled during infancy, but a person injured before age 18 must sue by their 20th birthday.

Seibert v. Cathey · filed 1987-03-26

Plaintiff appeals from an order of September 16, 1985 granting summary judgment to defendants on the ground that plaintiff's action is barred by the two years' limitations period in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... Plaintiff became 18 years old on September 9, 1982 and thus this action should have been brought by September 9, 1984. As it was brought on January 21, 1985 it is barred.
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The two-year limitations period for personal injury claims may be tolled when a defendant's coercion deprives the plaintiff of the freedom to sue on time.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1990-06-29

We are, nevertheless, of the view that, within certain limits, a prospective defendant's coercive acts and threats may rise to such a level of duress as to deprive the plaintiff of his freedom of will and thereby toll the statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2’s two-year period for § 1983 claims is not tolled while related criminal proceedings are pending because the section has no exhaustion requirement.

Byrd v. Manning · filed 1992-01-29

Generally, a statute of limitations governing timeliness of an action will not be tolled for a pending determination in another tribunal absent an exhaustion requirement in the statute. W.V. Pangborne & Co., 116 N.J. at 556, 562 A. 2d 222. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 has no such requirement.
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Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limitations period continues to run against an absent nonresident defendant when the pre-1992 nonresident tolling provision is unconstitutional.

Crespo v. Stapf · filed 1992-06-25

Thus, we conclude that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22 also fails the balancing test and that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 continued to run against Stapf although he was not physically present in the state.
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Section 2A:14-2 allows two years to file a personal injury action; for a plaintiff injured before Green who reasonably relied on prior tolling law, the court measured that period from June 3, 1992.

Standard v. Vas · filed 1995-02-02

In the present case, this would fix June 3, 1994, as the last day for commencing an action, rather than January 13, 1995, as urged by plaintiff. In either event, the plaintiff's November 12, 1993, filing falls safely within the two-year limitations period, warranting reversal of the summary judgment afforded to defendants.
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Section 2A:14-2 bars damages for assaults outside its two-year period, but the period may be tolled for continuous abuse causing battered woman's syndrome if expert evidence shows the victim was unable to act to change her situation.

Giovine v. Giovine · filed 1995-08-11

The component of the order striking all tortious claims occurring prior to June 30, 1992, based upon N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, is modified. Plaintiff is barred from pursuing a claim for damages for assault and battery on any battery occurring prior to June 30, 1992, but she is permitted to assert a claim for battered woman's syndrome attributable to acts occurring after October 25, 1982, when plaintiff's prior counterclaim for divorce was dismissed with prejudice.
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The two-year limit for a personal-injury survivorship claim may be equitably tolled when an alleged murderer evades identification and apprehension for decades.

Bernoskie v. Zarinsky · filed 2001-06-14

Plaintiff's survivorship claim for the pain and suffering experienced by her husband during the short time between the shooting and his death is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which provides that "[e]very action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued." ... However, the trial court correctly concluded that this may be an appropriate case for equitable tolling.
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Section 2A:14-2 requires personal injury actions to be filed within two years after accrual, but a defendant may waive the limitations defense through litigation conduct.

White v. Karlsson · filed 2002-10-03

Plaintiffs' action is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which requires the filing of personal injury actions within two years after accrual, but defendant's reliance on that statute is also subject to the common law of limitations. ... Of course, neither Williams nor Zaccardi is directly on point, but their principles justify rejection of defendant's reliance on the statute of limitations in this case.
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The two-year personal injury limitations period may be equitably tolled while an action is pending in a court lacking personal jurisdiction over the defendant, if tolling does not offend the statute’s goals.

Jaworowski v. Ciasulli · filed 2007-06-18

Therefore, we predict that if given the opportunity to rule on this issue, the Supreme Court of New Jersey would allow the equitable tolling of the New Jersey personal injury statute of limitations during the pendency of an action brought in a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant in those instances in which to do so would not offend the goals of the limitations statute.
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Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limitations bar does not defeat a timely filed personal injury action if the plaintiff substantially complied with AICRA’s physician-certification requirement.

Casinelli v. Manglapus · filed 2003-02-07

Here, since the physician certification is a procedural requirement, substantial compliance with that requirement in an action timely filed should preclude a dismissal of the action or application of the statute-of-limitations bar.
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Maritime tort claims

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limit may guide a laches analysis for a maritime tort claim, but it does not automatically bar the claim.

Thomas Finley, Libellant-Appellant v. United States of America, Todd Shipyards Corporation, Impleaded · filed 1957-05-13

It argues that Section 13 of the New York Civil Practice Act would require the application of the New Jersey two-year statute of limitations (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2) to the action against the general agent, since the cause of action arose in New Jersey. ... The applicability of admiralty principles compels us to test the timéliness of the general agent action not by an arbitrary enforcement of the statute of limitations, but rather by the equitable doctrine of laches. While the analogous statute of limitations may be used as a yardstick, passage of time alone will not bar an action for a maritime tort if the delay is excusable and the defendant is not prejudiced thereby.
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Section 2A:14-2 may guide a federal admiralty court’s assessment of delay, but it does not bind the court in a maritime injury suit.

Terhune v. Prudential Steamship Co. · filed 1959-07-20

The district courts frequently follow the analogy of state statutes of limitation, but they are clearly not bound by such statutes.
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Two-year period for personal injury claims

Section 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years.

ATAMAN v. PARRIS · filed 2024-09-25

In actions alleging a personal injury under New Jersey law, Plaintiff must file within two years, which Plaintiff has done.
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A personal injury action must be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Zucco v. Walgreen Eastern Co. Inc. · filed 2023-11-16(a)

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) requires an action for personal injuries to be filed within two years after the accrual of the cause of action.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year filing period for NJLAD claims, with earlier conduct potentially included in a continuing hostile work environment claim.

THEODORE v. NEWARK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND COMMUNITY WELLNESS · filed 2022-02-16(a)

Section IILD, of the Court’s March 25, 2020 Opinion, ECF No, 17, is amended to state that those allegations that occurred before September 6, 2017 (instead of November 28, 2016) are dismissed with prejudice except to the extent the conduct is part ofa hostile work environment continuing beyond that date. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 (requiring “action at law” to be commenced within two years of accrual of cause of action).
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Section 2A:14-2 gives plaintiffs two years to bring personal injury claims, including negligence claims.

VARGO, JR. v. D&M TOURS, INC. · filed 2022-02-23

The Complaint plainly demonstrates that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. New Jersey’s statute of limitations governing personal injury claims, including claims sounding in negligence, is two years. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for medical negligence and battery claims.

SANDOVAL v. DR. MARC A. COHEN, M.D. (L-3274-15, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-02-25

While we recognize battery and negligence share the same two-year SOL under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, and both sides could be faulted for failure to move the case more expeditiously, plaintiff does not challenge the motion judge's factual findings that his claims as pled in the complaint and his later-asserted contentions of battery are time-barred.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

SEARS v. DELLAVALLE · filed 2022-03-30

The limitations period for Plaintiffs claims is therefore two years.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which also governs Section 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

MCMILLAN v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2022-07-29

“In New Jersey . . . personal injury claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.” Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Off., 769 F.3d 850, 859 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2). ... It is clear to the Court that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the four-year and two-year statute of limitations for claims brought under RICO and Section 1983 respectively.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year period for personal-injury claims, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

Coello v. DiLeo · filed 2022-08-08

The amount of time a § 1983 claimant has to bring suit is determined by the personal-injury law of the state where the alleged harm occurred, Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010), and the parties agree that New Jersey law gives litigants two years to file a personal-injury claim, see id.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. ... Coello brought this suit within two years of that date; so, under Heck’s deferred-accrual rule, her § 1983 claims were timely.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for New Jersey personal injury torts.

SIMS v. THE CITY OF TRENTON · filed 2022-08-25

In New Jersey, personal injury torts have a two- year statute of limitations. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2).
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Section 2A:14-2 gives tort claims a two-year statute of limitations.

NASH v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2022-09-08

New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for tort claims applies to any claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for actions for injury to a person.

PATTERSON v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY · filed 2022-10-06

Consequently, New Jersey’s general two-year limitations period still applies to the § 1983 claims in this case.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, with applicable New Jersey deadline extensions included when calculating timeliness.

Afanassieva v. Page Transportation, Inc. · filed 2022-10-13(a)

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint as time-barred under New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a) (West 2022). ... It arrived at this deadline by adding the 56-day extension for New Jersey filing deadlines to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims under New Jersey law. ... Plaintiffs may not avoid New Jersey’s shorter statute of limitations—and its shorter pandemic tolling period—by filing in New York.
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Section 2A:14-2 requires a product liability suit to be brought within two years of the accident.

POWASNICK v. BEITZEL CORP · filed 2022-10-31

In New Jersey, a suit for product liability must be brought within two years of the date of the accident. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

MEYER v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2022-11-21

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal-injury torts is two years. N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 requires an action for personal injury caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default to be filed within two years of accrual.

OUAZIZ v. CITY OF JERSEY · filed 2022-12-02

Similarly, N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2 provides that an action for an injury to the person caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default must be commenced within two years of accrual of the action. ... Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims arising from incidents that occurred in 2016 and 2019, his claims are time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1986, N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2, and other applicable statutes.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury torts in New Jersey.

BROWN v. QUINN · filed 2022-12-27

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal-injury torts is two years. N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury tort claims, including medical malpractice.

PAGLIAROLI v. AHSAN · filed 2023-01-31

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts, including medical malpractice. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) provides a two-year limitations period for NJLAD claims.

PAREDES v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. · filed 2023-02-06(a)

Additionally, the Court notes that many of these events took place between 2014-2018, years before Plaintiff's 2020 termination, and therefore time barred under the NILAD, which is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which governs § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

SLATER v. METRO SOUTH N.J. STATE POLICE · filed 2023-02-08

New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury governs Plaintiff’s complaint. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

CASON v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE · filed 2023-02-27

In New Jersey, personal injury actions are subject to a two-year limitations period. N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim brought in the federal courts in New Jersey is two years.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which the court applied to Bivens claims brought in New Jersey.

RICHARDSON v. ORTIZ · filed 2023-03-09

The statute of limitations for Bivens claims is taken from the forum state's personal injury statute. See Hughes v. Knieblher, 341 F. App'x 749, 752 (3d Cir. 2009). New Jersey's statute of limitations for personal injury causes of action is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) gives personal injury claims a two-year limitations period, but the discovery rule may delay accrual when the injury or its cause was not reasonably discoverable.

SAUNDERS v. NJ DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2023-05-16(a)

Accordingly, Plaintiff must assert each of these claims within two years of the accrual date. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a). ... Consequently, viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Amended Complaint leads to the reasonable inference that the discovery rule may apply. The Court, therefore, will not dismiss Counts I, III, IV or V on statute of limitations grounds at this stage.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives plaintiffs two years from accrual to bring § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

DUARDO v. CITY OF HACKENSACK · filed 2023-07-10

This claim must be dismissed as untimely. Pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiff had to bring this claim within two years of when the cause of action accrued. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2; Dique, 603 F.3d at 185.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which the court applied to this Bivens action.

RICHARDSON v. ORTIZ · filed 2023-07-12

New Jersey's statute of limitations for personal injury causes of action is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. ... Even if this Court were to presume that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of Petitioner’s habeas action, he still waited more than two years (or the applicable statute of limitations to bring his civil rights claims) in initially filing this civil rights complaint.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) gives IIED claims a two-year statute of limitations.

BLOUNT v. TD BANK NA · filed 2023-07-19(a)

IIED claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to Section 1983 and NJCRA claims arising in New Jersey.

Lewis v. New Jersey Department of Children and Families · filed 2023-07-24(a)

The District Court correctly determined that a two-year statute of limitations applies to Lewis’s Section 1983 and NJCRA claims. ... New Jersey, where Lewis’s claims arose, has a two-year statute of limitations for claims of “injury to the person.”
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims in New Jersey.

PALLIPURATH v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2023-07-31

Accordingly, New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983. See id.; N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) generally gives plaintiffs two years to bring intentional tort claims for personal injury.

BERNARD v. COSBY · filed 2023-08-17(a)

Plaintiff’s claims are generally subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a); Jones v. Fox Rothschild LLP, No. 20-6312, 2020 WL 6156774, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2020) (“Under New Jersey law, claims for intentional torts including assault & battery and IIED are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.”). Therefore, without the benefit of the revival statute, Plaintiff’s claims would be barred by the statute of limitations – a complete defense for Defendant.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1983 and New Jersey Civil Rights Act claims.

VALENTINE v. MONROE TOWNSHIP · filed 2023-08-31

Therefore, in New Jersey, Section 1983 claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims; the discovery rule does not toll that period when the plaintiff knew of the injury and its basis.

DOOLEY v. DASHER · filed 2023-09-06(a)

Indeed, there is no dispute that Plaintiff’s claims have a two-year statute of limitations. ... Thus, the Court finds that the Discovery Rule does not toll the statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which also governs Rehabilitation Act claims in New Jersey.

CAMPFIELD v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT · filed 2023-09-29(a)

In New Jersey, the applicable state law in this matter, personal injury claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2(a).
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

SEXTON v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2023-12-22

To the extent Plaintiff is asserting an ITED claim against CBIZ Defendants, an ILED claim has a two-year statute of limitations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period on invasion of privacy, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

BARKER v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. · filed 2024-02-01

Under New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for torts, Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy, negligence, and IIED claims expired on March 28, 2023.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for New Jersey personal injury claims, which the court applied to the alleged intentional tort claims.

BYRD v. INVENTIV HEALTH · filed 2024-04-29(a)

“The statute of limitations for . . . state-law personal injury claims . . . [in New Jersey] is . . . two [2] years.” Bullock v. Cabasa, Civ. No. 10–1412, 2013 WL 6253432, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2013); see also N.J. Stat. 2A:14-2(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.”) ... As such, Plaintiff’s state law allegations relating to Defendants’ post-employment communications between October 2017 and March 2018 and the Syneos Defendants’ March 2019 email, are time barred under New Jersey law.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) gives a person two years to bring a personal injury claim.

Malik v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company · filed 2024-05-13(a)

The statute of limitations applicable to a personal injury claim is two years. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a). Malik, therefore, had two years from July 18, 2016, to assert a personal injury claim against the Crawfords.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Demby v. County of Camden · filed 2024-05-17

We will affirm because the District Court correctly concluded that Demby’s claim was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

Stampone v. Amann · filed 2024-05-21(a)

In § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the forum state’s limitation period for personal injury actions. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 (1989). In New Jersey, the applicable period is two years. See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A] section 1983 claim arising in New Jersey has a two-year statute of limitations.”); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a). The Stampones’ claims, which are based on events occurring in 2019 and 2020, would thus be time-barred.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

ACUNA-VIALES v. PASQUALE · filed 2024-07-02

“The amount of time a § 1983 claimant has to bring suit is determined by the personal- injury law of the state where the alleged harm occurred,” Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)), and “New Jersey law gives litigants two years to file a personal-injury claim.” Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). ... Here, after giving Plaintiff the benefit of the “prison mailbox rule,” see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–71 (1988), his § 1983 claims are largely barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including Bivens claims brought in New Jersey.

Alexis v. Connors · filed 2024-07-25

New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims thus applies to Alexis’ Bivens claims. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2; Dique, 603 F.3d at 185.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Bivens claims arising in New Jersey.

Fisher v. Hollingsworth · filed 2024-08-15

Even if Fisher had a cognizable Bivens claim, we agree with the District Court that such a claim would be untimely under New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for NJCRA claims.

DOE v. HILLSBOROUGH TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2024-08-30(a)

“New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims also applies to claims under the NJCRA.” ... Here, because First Amendment retaliation claims under § 1983 and the NJCRA are “construed in parallel” and follow the same statute of limitations analyses, the Court will consider the timeliness of Counts One, Three, Five, and Six together. ... All of the alleged retaliatory conduct occurred on or before September 27, 2021, which is more than two years before Plaintiff filed his Complaint on November 22, 2023.
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Section 2A:14–2(a) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

GITTENS v. PEPPER · filed 2023-09-05(a)

The applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims is two years. See Vickers v. Childs, 530 F. App'x 104, 105 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (stating that a § 1983 claim is governed by the applicable state's personal injury statute of limitations and New Jersey has a two-year statute of limitations for such claims) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2(a)). Dropping claims poses a genuine risk of dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. That outcome is unjust.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for Bivens personal injury claims brought in New Jersey.

DEBBLAY v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · filed 2023-11-27

New Jersey law provides that a Plaintiff has two years from the time a claim accrues to initiate a lawsuit. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2. ... In sum, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred because he failed to pursue this action within the statute of limitations and is not entitled to equitable tolling.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

DUNNIGAN v. ORTIZ · filed 2023-12-15

New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See N.J. Stat. § 2A:14–2. ... Consequently, the statute of limitations on these claims began to run at the latest, on February 28, 2021, and expired two years later on February 28, 2023.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which also governs § 1983 claims filed in New Jersey.

JOHNSON v. GALKIN · filed 2024-04-01

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See Cito, 892 F.2d at 25.
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Personal injury actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, unless another law provides otherwise.

WILLIAMS v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY · filed 2023-09-05(a)

Personal injury tort actions in New Jersey are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for LAD claims, regardless of the facts underlying the claim.

COVINGTON VS. CENTRAL JERSEY DISTRICT BOARD 193 OF I.A.A.B.O. CORP. (L-1674-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-01

Despite its silence as to a limitations period, it is now well-settled that the two-year limitations period of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 applies to LAD claims, "regardless of the underlying factual nature of the particular LAD claim." Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co. Inc., 225 N.J. 343, 357 (2016) (citing ... Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 291-92 (1993)).
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Section 2A:14-2(a) requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years after the claim accrues, subject to applicable tolling.

Afanassieva v. Page Transportation, Inc. · filed 2021-09-29(a)

Under New Jersey law “every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect[,] or default of any person within [New Jersey] shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a). In the present case, the personal injury cause of the action accrued on April 5, 2018, and the deadline to file suit was two years later, on April 5, 2020.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to commence a personal injury suit.

MALDONADO VS. DRAYTON CORPORATION (L-3021-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-11

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, plaintiff had two years to commence her personal injury suit.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

CENGIZ VS. DR. IMAD K. SAEDELINE (L-1391-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-07(a)

An action alleging personal injuries due to a wrongful act or neglect of a person must be "commenced within two years . . . after the cause of . . . action shall have accrued." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a). ... The amended complaint, filed eight months after the expiration of the statute of limitations naming Dr. Bikkina as a defendant, was properly dismissed as untimely.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) bars a personal injury claim against a property owner after the two-year limitations period when the plaintiff cannot use fictitious-party substitution to add that owner.

ROBINSON VS. 78 MALLORY STREET, LLC (L-1244-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-28(a)

Plaintiff has not identified any reversible error in the court's dismissal of Jersey City, or any other defendant, and any claim that plaintiff had against 80 Mallory Corp. was time barred for the reasons we have expressed. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2(a).
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including Bivens claims arising in New Jersey.

Roy DePack, Jr. v. Gilroy · filed 2019-03-13

In New Jersey, personal injury claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2; Dique, 603 F.3d at 185.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury claim, with accrual postponed under the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of a possible claim.

DIDIO VS. ORTHOPAEDIC AND SPORTS MEDICINE, LLP (L-8030-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2019-03-22

A two-year statute of limitations applies to claims for personal injuries. ... It is therefore clear that plaintiff and his wife were aware of material facts relating to the existence and origin of his injuries by September 3, and certainly no later than September 5, significantly before the September 9 filing of plaintiff's complaint two years later.
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Personal injury actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

NEHMAD v. BJ'S WHOLESALE CLUB, INC. · filed 2019-06-28

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions, such as the one at issue in this case, is two years.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims in New Jersey, including § 1983 claims arising there.

TRANSFERRED TO TRENTON - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-02519 · filed 2019-07-29

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal-injury torts is two years. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) bars a personal injury complaint filed more than two years after the injury.

DERRICK J. EUTSEY VS. RINALDO M. DARGENIO (L-1284-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-08-21(a)

Complaint III is time barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a), because it was filed more than two years after plaintiff's alleged injury in 2004.
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Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period on New Jersey personal injury claims, including claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and false arrest.

ST. FLEUR v. CITY OF LINDEN, NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-08-30

New Jersey places a two-year statute of limitations on common law personal injury torts. See N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2. In this case, Plaintiff was arrested on March 18, 2012, and arraigned on March 23, 2012. However, Plaintiff failed to file his initial Complaint until February 26, 2015, nearly three years after the date of his arrest and arraignment. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions in New Jersey bars any claims against Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress or false arrest.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including the Section 1983 claims addressed by the court.

LLOYD v. OCEAN TOWNSHIP COUNSEL · filed 2019-08-31

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Therefore, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims of false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence are subject to this two-year statute of limitations period.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

CARRILLO v. OWEN · filed 2019-09-05

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal-injury torts is two years. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. ... Accordingly, because it is apparent that Plaintiff’s excessive force claims are time-barred as they arose prior to January 31, 2017, the Court will dismiss such claims as untimely.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which governs § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

BUTU v. BERGEN COUNTY / CITY OF HACKENSACK · filed 2019-09-30

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. Thus, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) requires an action for injury to a person to be filed within two years after the claim accrues.

KILLION VS. CHRISTOPHER R. FREDRICKS (L-1282-16, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-21(a)

We agree with the trial court's order of February 2, 2018 that plaintiff's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including negligence claims; that period also applies to Section 1983 and NJCRA claims arising in New Jersey.

LUNA-DIAZ v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2020-01-14

To the extent Count XV can be read as a negligence claim, (see supra note 2 and accompanying text), the Court has already found in the preceding section that it is barred by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

SCANLON v. LAWSON · filed 2020-01-15

Under New Jersey law, personal injury torts are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id. (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2).
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

SCANLON v. LAWSON · filed 2020-01-16

Under New Jersey law, personal injury torts are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id. (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2).
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for negligence claims resulting in personal injury.

WARREN v. STEVEN J. KAY ASSOCIATES · filed 2020-01-17(a)

If New Jersey law applies, the statute of limitations is two years, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a); if New York law applies, the statute of limitations is three years, C.P.L.R. § 214. Either way, the limitations period expired long ago, in 2002 at the latest. This action was filed seventeen years later, in 2019. As to defendant Edison, it must be dismissed.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

SCANLON v. LAWSON · filed 2020-02-06

Under New Jersey law, personal injury torts are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id. (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2).
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to Bivens claims.

JEFFRIES v. ORTIZ · filed 2020-02-27

New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See N.J. Stat. § 2A:14–2. ... As a result, the statute of limitations bars any Bivens claim that arose prior to January 26, 2016, which encompasses a substantial portion of Plaintiff’s allegations.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including negligence; that period also applies to § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

CAMPS v. SCHOLTZ · filed 2020-03-23

Under New Jersey law, personal injury torts, including negligence, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

DORSAINVIL v. PEIM · filed 2020-03-24

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 2019). ... Because Defendant Gallagher does not address the allegation of wrongdoing in December 2013, her request for dismissal of the medical care claim as untimely is denied.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which the court applied to the remaining § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

SZEMPLE v. RUTGERS UNIVERSITY · filed 2020-03-25(a)

the majority of Szemple’s remaining claims have a two-year statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, aside from his breach of contract and fraud claims which have already been dismissed for the reasons discussed supra, Szemple’s claims related to allegations occurring before May, 2017 are also barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims when New Jersey limitations law applies.

AVRAHAM v. GOLDEN · filed 2020-05-07(a)

New Jersey’s statute of limitations for IIED is two years, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2(a), while Florida’s is four years. ... This Court finds New Jersey’s statute of limitations applies.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

MCCRIMMON v. JOHNSON · filed 2020-06-30(a)

In New Jersey, that statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a). ... Accordingly, the complaint is timely in its entirety as all events occurred within two years of November 13, 2018.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) gives a plaintiff two years from the injury to bring a personal injury negligence claim.

HEINRICH v. JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER METROWEST, INC. · filed 2020-07-07(a)

USI moves to dismiss this claim as time-barred under New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a). Before proceeding with its analysis of the motion on the merits, the Court holds that New Jersey’s statute of limitations governs the timeliness of Heinrich’s negligence claim.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for Bivens claims arising in New Jersey.

HUNTER v. IBE · filed 2020-07-16

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations is two years from the claims’ accrual. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... Plaintiff submitted his complaint on July 8, 2018, putting him within the two-year period.
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Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

SANFORD-EL v. MONGALIERI · filed 2020-08-17(a)

Under New Jersey law, personal injury actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitation.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year period for personal injury claims, whether based on tort or contract.

Oroz v. American President Lines, Ltd. · filed 1958-09-30

We agree with the district court, however, that the six year statute does not apply, and that the governing statute is the New Jersey two-year provision, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... In any event, the construction of the New Jersey statutes by the New Jersey courts is determinative, and they have uniformly held that the two-year provision applies to all personal injury claims, whether based upon tort or contract.
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Section 2A:14-2 bars a negligence action filed more than two years after the accident.

Leyden v. Excello Corporation · filed 1960-11-04

This negligence action was filed in this Court more than two years, but less than three years, since the accident. The action is therefore barred by the New Jersey Statute of Limitations, N.J. S.A. 2A:14-2, but not by the New York Statute, Civil Practice Act, § 49.
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Section 2A:14-2 bars a personal injury claim filed more than two years after the plaintiff knew of the injury and a possible cause of action, even assuming a discovery rule applies.

Repass v. Keleket X-Ray Corp. · filed 1962-12-31

However, it is not necessary to decide this particular question because it appears from the undisputed facts in the instant case that, as of February 9, 1959, plaintiff had knowledge of his injury and of a conceivable cause of action for recovery of damages against the defendant but did not file his Complaint until August 7, 1961. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the Fernandi case is controlling, the suit still was not filed within a two-year period from the accrual of the cause of action.
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The two-year limitations period begins when a personal injury claim accrues; once the injured person knows of significant harm, later discovery of a more serious condition does not postpone it further.

Repass v. Albert L. Vreeland and Leonard G. Brown, Individuals, and Vreeland & Brown, Anew Jersey Partnership in · filed 1968-01-31

The New Jersey statute, like many others, makes the period of limitations begin to run at the time that the cause of action 'shall have accrued'. In some exceptional situations the New Jersey courts postpone the running of the statute until the wronged person becomes aware that the wrong has occurred and has caused him harm. Fernandi v. Strully, 1961, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277. However, even if that doctrine is applicable here, there is no suggestion in the New Jersey decisions that, once the injured person is aware that the wrong has occurred and has caused him significant harm, the running of the statute can be further postponed until some unanticipated more serious condition or consequential damage results or is discovered.
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Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury actions in New Jersey.

Carney v. State Of New Jersey Department Of Institutions · filed 1969-12-09

The district court dismissed this action for personal injury sustained in New Jersey on several grounds, among them that the suit is barred by a two-year period of limitations imposed by the applicable New Jersey statute. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. On the undisputed facts we agree with the district court that the New Jersey statute of limitations bars this action.
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Section 2A:14-2’s two-year period for personal injuries does not cover a union fair representation claim alleging injury to rights rather than injury to the person.

Tuma v. American Can Company · filed 1973-04-26

If this Court were to characterize the unfair representation claim as a claim in tort, it would not consider it in the nature of the classical “injury to the person caused by wrongful act,” but rather, more appropriately, a “tortious injury to the rights of another” not included within the above classical personal injury concept.
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Section 2A:14-2 allows two years after a cause of action accrues to file suit.

Searight v. State of NJ · filed 1976-05-06

The applicable New Jersey statute allows 2 years after the cause of action accrues to file suit. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Thus, suit was filed here more than 13 years after the statute had run out.
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Section 2A:14-2 requires personal injury actions to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons · filed 1969-12-15

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 requires that every action at law for an injury to the person be commenced within two years after such cause of action shall have accrued. Clearly, it would cover the claims asserted in both the original and amended complaints filed by plaintiffs.
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Section 2A:14-2's two-year limit governs an action for personal injuries arising from a bailment, even if the claim is treated as one for breach of warranty.

Garfield v. Furniture Fair-Hanover · filed 1971-02-11

On the grounds that this is a bailment situation to which N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 applies, or, alternatively, that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 applies even if this were considered a breach of warranty situation, defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that plaintiffs' suit is barred by the two-year statute of limitations is granted.
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Section 2A:14-2 limits personal injury suits to two years, but it does not extend the separate ten-year deadline for suits arising from defective construction.

O'CONNOR v. Altus · filed 1975-03-11

Hence, this state's two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, does operate to restrict the period in which actions can be initiated for accidents occurring within ten years after construction; but it does not serve to extend beyond ten years from the date construction was completed the time within which suit may be filed.
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Section 2A:14-2 generally requires a personal injury complaint to be filed within two years of the injury-producing accident; reaching an automobile injury monetary threshold later does not postpone accrual.

Cappadona v. Eckelmann · filed 1978-05-04

Because an injury sustained as a result of a negligently caused accident is immediately actionable, it accrues on the date of the accident and, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, will normally be barred if the complaint is filed later than two years from that date.
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Section 2A:14-2’s limitations period begins when an injured spouse’s claim accrues; interspousal immunity does not postpone accrual.

Tevis v. Tevis · filed 1979-04-05

It is our conclusion that the assumed existence of the doctrine of interspousal immunity at the time plaintiff was wrongfully injured by her husband did not, in this case, prevent her cause of action from then and there accruing.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for personal injury claims, including claims for nonpermanent injuries; reliance on a single contrary trial court decision does not justify a late filing.

Manturi v. VJV, INC. · filed 1981-06-12

Although it is true that the Rescigno decision makes such a distinction, it is clear that the court in each case took a different view of whether a modification of the "discovery rule" should be applied to avoid the effect of the normal rules applying to the limiting period of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 in personal injury cases. ... When plaintiff rested on the decision in Montag he took a calculated risk. He cannot be said to have engaged in a step amounting to reasonable and justifiable reliance.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Anastasio v. Holiday Inns, Inc. · filed 1982-02-22

In each case, the amendment to add the party was filed more than two years after the cause of action arose, and a two year statute of limitations applies, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including civil rights claims treated as personal injury claims.

Hauptmann v. Wilentz · filed 1983-08-11

If her claim is viewed as analogous to a wrongful death action, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 allows her two years within which to bring the case; if it is viewed as analogous to a personal injury action, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 also allows two years. In either case, her eighth amendment claim is barred.
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Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limit on a decedent’s surviving personal injury claim, which may be tolled by the defendant’s non-residence.

Holzsager v. Warburton · filed 1978-06-12

This “survival claim”, which is governed by the two-year limitation in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, may be tolled by non-residence under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22. In respect to the survival claim, then, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not well grounded.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to the civil-rights claims.

Plain v. Flicker · filed 1986-10-21

In New Jersey the statute of limitations in personal injury actions is two years, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Since plaintiff’s injury occurred in 1968 his cause of action would be barred unless he can allege that the statute was tolled or that his cause of action did not accrue until within two years of filing this action.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including claims arising from a breach of a contract for sale.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. · filed 1988-08-24

The court, in granting plaintiff’s motion, stated, “The parties agree that the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims must be measured by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.” ... Additionally, Liggett’s contention fails on its merits. New Jersey has traditionally applied different statutes of limitation to claims for personal injury and claims for property damage. ... Therefore, N.J.S.A. § 12A:2-725 does not apply to personal injury actions, even if arising out of a breach of contract for sale.
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Section 2A:14-2 governs an action seeking damages for personal injury even when the complaint asserts breach of warranty.

Green v. Auerbach Chevrolet Corp. · filed 1991-05-08

It correctly urged that, notwithstanding the breach of warranty assertions contained in the Complaint, the action is, in essence, one to recover for personal injury and governed by personal injury limitations law.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

Balzano v. Township of North Bergen · filed 1986-12-23

In New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 sets a two year period for personal injury actions. ... He is thus well within the two year statute of limitations, having filed suit on April 3, 1986.
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Section 2A:14-2’s two-year period for personal injuries governs Section 1983 claims in New Jersey.

Craig v. Township of Ewing · filed 1988-02-16

Therefore, it is the two-year period for injuries to the person prescribed by N.J.S. A. 2A:14-2 which governs all Section 1983 claims, including those of the present suit.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to claims under §§ 1981 and 1983.

Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees or Officers · filed 1988-08-31

As we have noted, the district court applied a two-year statute of limitations to the 1986 action. See N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987) (two-year limit for tortious personal injury action). ... These arguments are frivolous and fail to circumvent the two-year statute of limitations bar.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year period for personal injury claims. The court predicted that period would govern NJLAD claims but declined to apply it retroactively.

White v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. · filed 1989-04-28

N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2 provides for a two-year limitations period for tortious injury to the person of another. ... The Court can only assume that if the issue were before the highest court of New Jersey, that court would do as the Superior Court did in Leese and look to federal law for guidance, but would find the current federal guidance (in contrast to what existed at the time of Leese) to favor application of the personal injury statute of limitations to NJLAD claims. ... Nevertheless, based on the nonre-troactivity rationale discussed above with respect to the § 1981 claim, the Court will not apply this holding retroactively, since plaintiff was entitled to rely on Leese, Muc-ci and Skadegaard during the period before she filed her complaint.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for New Jersey personal injury actions, including claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Department · filed 1989-12-18

In light of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s construction of its own state’s statute, New Jersey’s six-year residual statute is not the residual personal injury statute to which the Owens holding must be applied; its two-year residual statute is. We hold that the district court correctly applied the two-year statute.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, subject to New Jersey’s discovery rule.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. · filed 1990-01-05

New Jersey has a two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, see N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2, and has adopted the discovery rule.
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Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Department · filed 1990-01-12

In light of the New Jersey Supreme Court's construction of its own state's statute, New Jersey's six-year residual statute is not the residual personal injury statute to which the Owens holding must be applied; its two-year residual statute is. We hold that the district court correctly applied the two-year statute.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims.

Rodriguez v. City of Passaic · filed 1990-02-21

This case has proceeded from day one on the agreement of the parties that a two year statute of limitations applies. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... That aside, Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23 (3d Cir.1989), leaves no doubt that it is the two year statute which is applicable.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives plaintiffs two years to bring a personal injury action after the limitations period begins to run.

DiFalco v. Subaru of America, Inc. · filed 1990-12-04

Because our determination of unconstitutionality is prospective only as of the date of Bendix, the statute of limitations did not commence running against Takata until June 17, 1988, and the amended complaint against Takata dated October 5, 1989, is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to a federal civil rights claim brought in New Jersey.

Gambrell v. Hess · filed 1991-02-14

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in New Jersey is two years. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... The instant case, filed more than nine years after the dismissal of her Title VII action is thus patently time-barred.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions and Section 1983 claims in New Jersey.

Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp. · filed 1991-07-08

This court subsequently held that New Jersey’s two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, applies to a civil rights claim under section 1983. ... Thus, the district court here correctly applied a two-year limitations period to the Gentys’ section 1983 claim.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives a person two years to bring a claim for personal injuries, including injuries caused by discrimination under the Law Against Discrimination.

Montells v. Haynes · filed 1992-07-31

Thus, we conclude that plaintiff's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained as a consequence of defendant's violation of LAD is governed by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for negligence actions involving personal injury.

Jordan v. Tapper · filed 1992-08-11

The New Jersey limitations period for actions sounding in negligence is two years. N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2. Thus, because plaintiff seeks to add new defendants after the period has run, the court must examine plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine if amendment is permissible.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions; a defendant that had notice and acted as the real party in interest within that period could not defeat the claim because it was not formally named.

Bussell v. DeWalt Products Corp. · filed 1992-10-09

Clearly Black & Decker had notice of the suit and assumed the role of the real party in interest within the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2; Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Co., 76 N.J. 284, 386 A. 2d 1310 (1978).
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Section 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury suit to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues, even when a statute of repose may also apply.

Van Slyke v. Worthington · filed 1992-12-18

Of course, irrespective of the manner in which N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 is applied, the plaintiffs must still have filed their suit within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims; an amendment naming a previously unidentified defendant may relate back if New Jersey's fictitious-party requirements are met.

Bryan v. Associated Container Transportation · filed 1993-11-04

For the reasons which follow, Weddel’s motion will be denied. ... Turning to the application of the New Jersey personal injury statute of limitations at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which plaintiffs and Weddel apparently agree applies here, plaintiffs argue that their claims against Weddel are not barred despite being asserted more than two years from the date of the accident. ... Thus, New Jersey law does provide a mechanism by which the name of a party not known to a plaintiff at the time of instituting a suit may be substituted for a fictitious name after the running of the statute provided that the description of the fictitious defendant was sufficient to identify it.
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Section 2A:14-2's two-year limitations period applies to claims for emotional distress damages arising from intentional and malicious misconduct.

Ruberton v. Gabage · filed 1995-03-10

They also appeal from pretrial determinations that their emotional distress claims were time-barred under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, and denying their motion to amend their complaint to name William V. Webster, Jr., Esq. and his law firm as party-defendants. ... Point III — Plaintiffs' damage claims for emotional distress resulting from the defendants' intentional and malicious misconduct is not subject to a two year statute of limitations. ... We have considered the contentions and supporting arguments and are satisfied they are completely without merit.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period the court applied to the § 1981 claim.

Khair v. Campbell Soup Co. · filed 1995-07-03

The parties agree that the statute of limitations for plaintiffs § 1981 claim is two years. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-62, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2620-21, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Since plaintiff filed his complaint on April 15, 1993 — less than two years after his return from medical leave at the end of April, 1991 — Khair has met the statute of limitations.
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Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period that bars claims based on isolated acts outside that period.

Stewart v. Rutgers · filed 1996-05-10

Only the latter two acts fall within the two-year limitations period of N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2. Accordingly, a cause of action based upon the former two acts is time-barred.
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Section 2A:14-2 gives personal-injury actions, including strict products-liability actions, a two-year limitations period.

Gantes v. Kason Corp. · filed 1996-07-23

New Jersey law provides that personal-injury actions, including those based on strict-products liability, are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. It is clear that under New Jersey's statute of limitations, plaintiff's suit would not be barred because the complaint was filed less than two years after Ms. Gonzalez' accident.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury negligence claims.

Arroyo v. Pleasant Garden Apartments · filed 1998-09-18

Both of these amendments occurred after March 26,1997, when the two-year statute of limitations had expired.
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Section 2A:14-2 applies a two-year limitations period to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Fraser v. Bovino · filed 1998-12-11

The eighth count asserted that Bovino, Coventry and Boswell committed the intentional tort of outrage which inflicted emotional distress upon Fraser; as such, it was subject to the two-year period of limitations of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. It was clearly untimely and summary judgment was proper.
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Section 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Slater v. Skyhawk Transportation, Inc. · filed 1999-05-04

Despite the difference between the Michigan limitations period of 3 years and the New Jersey and Virginia limitations period of 2 years, there is no true conflict of laws. The cause of action accrued on May 8, 1995, the date of the accident. Slater amended his complaint, adding a claim against S.D. Warren on August 14, 1998 — over three years from the date of the accident. Thus, under all three statute of limitations periods, Slater’s claim against S.D. Warren is time-barred, unless the amendment relates back to the filing of the original complaint, pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Otchy v. City of Elizabeth Bd. of Educ. · filed 1999-10-15

The statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claim was two years under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New Jersey; an ongoing violation may extend the period.

Ingalls v. Florio · filed 1997-06-13

Under New Jersey law, the applicable limitation period for § 1983 cases thus would be two years. ... Particularly in view of the fact that Cream’s complaint was filed within a few days of the two-year anniversary of the incident in question, the Court finds that a theory of ongoing violation plausibly applies to extend the limitation period to allow his claim to survive.
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Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including state tort claims.

Newsome v. Administrative Office of the Courts of New Jersey · filed 2000-07-05

Newsome's state tort law claim is also governed by the two-year statute of limitations, and thus would be time-barred as well. See N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2 (two-year statute of limitations for all personal injury actions).
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Notes 1–150 of 479, oldest cases first.

205 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Albanese v. Ohio River-Frankfort Cooperage Corp., the court cites the New Jersey two-year period while deciding how Kentucky’s limitations statute applies. opinion →
Koeppe v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., the court mentions the section while describing an earlier case and decides this case under Kentucky law and New York's limitations period. opinion →
Repass v. Albert L. Vreeland and Leonard G. Brown, Individuals, and Vreeland & Brown, a New Jersey Partnership i, the court mentions the section while recounting the district court’s limitations ruling, then dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. opinion →
Zelson v. Thomforde, the court cites the section for New Jersey’s ordinary two-year limitations period but reverses on a waived personal-jurisdiction objection without deciding whether the claim is time-barred. opinion →
Teresa Accardi, by Her Guardian Ad Litem, Sam Accardi v. United States, the court reports the district court’s reliance on § 2A:14-2, then applies the insanity tolling rule in § 2A:14-21. opinion →
Schwartz v. US Rubber Corp., the court cites the section to explain why the parents brought no personal injury claims against each other, while deciding whether France applies retroactively. opinion →
Lackovic v. New England Paper Tube Co., Inc., the court cites the two-year deadline in this section but decides whether the separate tolling statute applies to the corporate defendant. opinion →
Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, the court cited the section as New Jersey’s two-year personal injury limit but applied Quebec’s limitations period under New Jersey choice-of-law principles. opinion →
Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., the court cites the section to identify New Jersey’s two-year personal injury deadline, then applies Quebec’s limitation period to dismiss the suit. opinion →
Torres v. Jersey City Medical Center, the court cites the section’s established accrual rule to decide when a claim accrues under the Tort Claims Act. opinion →
Anaya v. Tp. of Vernon, the court cites the section as additional support for the two-year period while deciding the Tort Claims Act’s notice and accrual rules. opinion →
Sheryl Lynne Allen and Edwin Allen v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., a Corporation and Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellchaft, a, the court mentions the section as the limitations period the plaintiffs sought to apply, then holds that California's statute of limitations controls. opinion →
Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., the dissent discusses this section to distinguish the negligence limitations period from the libel statute that the majority applies. opinion →
Cohn v. G. D. Searle & Co., the court cites § 2A:14-2 as the underlying two-year limit while deciding the separate tolling statute, § 2A:14-22. opinion →
Smith v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., the court describes the New Jersey section while using New Jersey law as guidance to decide how North Carolina’s limitation statutes work together. opinion →
Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., the court cites the section for the ordinary personal-injury deadline but denies the limitations defense under a separate tolling provision. opinion →
Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., Justice Pashman cites the section in a concurrence to contrast personal injury claims with the libel claim governed by § 2A:14-3. opinion →
Birotte v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the court cites the section to distinguish the discovery rule for personal injury actions while deciding the limitations period for a securities claim. opinion →
Alfone v. Sarno, the court cites the section while recounting an earlier personal injury appeal; its decision concerns the later wrongful death action. opinion →
Velmohos v. MAREN ENGINEERING CORPORATION, the court cites § 2A:14-2 for the usual two-year deadline while deciding whether § 2A:14-22 tolls it for unrepresented foreign corporations. opinion →
Danilla v. Leatherby Insurance Company, the court cites the section as historical background while deciding the limitation period under the No Fault Insurance Law. opinion →
Montgomery v. Polk County, the court quotes a New Jersey decision mentioning § 2A:14-2 while deciding when the time limit under Iowa’s municipal tort claims statute begins. opinion →
Presslaff v. Robins, the court cites the section to contrast its accrual-based deadline with the Wrongful Death Act deadline that governs the decision. opinion →
O'KEEFFE v. Snyder, the opinion quotes the section's personal-injury deadline in a footnote to a dispute over stolen paintings. opinion →
Trenkamp v. Township of Burlington, the court cites the section as an example while deciding when the appeal period under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-72 begins. opinion →
Burns v. Bell, the court lists the New Jersey section in a footnote surveying other states’ limitations laws while deciding the accrual rule under District of Columbia law. opinion →
McIntyre v. ILB Investment Corp., the court mentions the section while deciding whether the discovery rule applies to the limitations period in the Uniform Securities Law. opinion →
Tyson v. Groze, the court cites § 2A:14-2 as the underlying personal-injury time limit while deciding how the separate minority-tolling provision applies after the age of majority changed to 18. opinion →
A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Building Corp., the court quotes a New Jersey decision discussing the section to support its ruling on Pennsylvania limitations law. opinion →
Velmohos v. Maren Engineering Corp., the court cites the section for the two-year personal injury limitations period but decides whether a separate tolling statute makes the suit timely. opinion →
Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, the court cited the two-year personal-injury limitations period but decided whether a separate tolling provision prevented the defendants from invoking it. opinion →
Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., the court cites the section as the defendants’ limitations defense and decides whether a separate tolling provision applies. opinion →
Donnelly v. DeBourke, the court quotes a New Jersey decision applying the section as support for its ruling on Pennsylvania’s limitations period. opinion →
Coons v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., of Japan, the court cites § 2A:14-2 as the limitations bar Honda invoked, then decides that the separate tolling provision in § 2A:14-22 preserves the claim. opinion →
DeHart v. Bambrick, the court cites the section as an example of an ordinary statute of limitations while deciding the deadline for tax sale foreclosures under N.J.S.A. 54:5-79. opinion →
G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, the court identifies § 2A:14-2 as the limitations period for the suit but decides a challenge to the separate tolling provision. opinion →
Peters v. Township of Hopewell, the court uses the section as an example for a hypothetical personal-injury claim while deciding the limitations period for a property-deprivation claim. opinion →
Erdmann v. BD. OF EDUC. UNION CTY. REG. HIGH SCH., the court mentions the section only when describing a prior assault case while considering limitations periods for the plaintiff's discrimination claim. opinion →
Erdmann v. Board of Education, the court cites the section as an example from an earlier police assault case while considering other limitations periods for the plaintiff’s employment claims. opinion →
Mirza v. Filmore Corp., the court cites the section as an example of a statute of limitations that limits the retrospective effect of its sidewalk liability rule. opinion →
Aitchison v. Raffiani, the court mentions § 2A:14-2 as the borough’s proposed limitations period but applies the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. opinion →
Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Co., the court describes the section’s two-year personal injury limit while applying the six-year property damage limit to this suit. opinion →
Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., the court mentions the section as a defense raised by the defendants while deciding the retroactive effect of a ruling on a separate tolling statute. opinion →
Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., the court leaves the statute of limitations issue undecided; only the dissent applies § 2A:14-2. opinion →
Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., the court mentions the section as the two-year limitations period but decides the constitutionality and retroactive effect of a separate tolling provision. opinion →
Fresca v. Arnold, the court cites the section to explain why dismissal would prevent a new New Jersey action, then orders a transfer under federal law. opinion →
Honda Motor Company, Ltd. v. Coons, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent cites the section as background to the dispute over a different tolling statute. opinion →
Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the court cites the section while recounting its ruling in Heavner, rather than deciding the limitations period in this case. opinion →
Love v. Johns-Manville Canada, Inc., the court cites the section as background to plaintiffs’ reliance on a separate tolling provision. opinion →
Coney v. Coney, the court uses the section as an example of statutory interpretation while deciding which property is subject to equitable distribution. opinion →
Procanik v. Cillo, the court cites the section while treating the Supreme Court's earlier ruling on the parents' time-barred claim as binding under the law of the case. opinion →
Yancsek v. Hull Corp., the court cites the section for the ordinary two-year personal injury deadline while deciding whether tolling and relief from the dismissal allowed the claim to proceed. opinion →
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., a dissent cites the section as an example of New Jersey’s two-year limit for personal injury actions. opinion →
Cowgill v. Raymark Industries, Inc., the court rejected the appellant’s request to apply the New Jersey limitations statute and applied Pennsylvania law instead. opinion →
Nos. 84-1478, 84-1509, the section appears only in a citation in Judge Garth's statement favoring rehearing. opinion →
Brown v. Brown, the court cites the section to describe the limitations ruling in Tevis while deciding whether the entire controversy doctrine bars this tort claim. opinion →
Healey v. Tp. of Dover, the court cites the section while recounting the plaintiff's limitations argument, then decides that the Tort Claims Act's notice requirement applies. opinion →
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Dronebarger, the court cites the section as the limitations period the attorney missed while deciding whether the employer has a lien under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. opinion →
DeHart v. First Fidelity Bank, NA/South Jersey, the court mentions § 2A:14-2 only while discussing an earlier case and applies § 2A:14-1 to the claim before it. opinion →
Garcia v. Gallo, the court cites the section in a footnote as a possible limitations problem but does not decide when the claims accrued. opinion →
Green, Francis v. Humphrey Elevator and Truck Company and Maintenance Company, the court cites the section to identify the limitations period while deciding whether the federal service rules required dismissal. opinion →
Jzm v. Smm, the court mentions the section while recounting an earlier Supreme Court ruling, then decides whether to consolidate or transfer the tort action. opinion →
Cutler v. Raymark Industries, Inc., the court cites the section’s two-year period to explain why it must decide whether a separate tolling statute is constitutional. opinion →
Cano v. Malone, the court quotes another decision's description of § 2A:14-2 while deciding whether the discovery rule extends the fund's 90-day notice deadline. opinion →
Dole v. Local 427, International Union Of Electrical, Radio And Machine Workers, Afl-Cio, the court held that no limitations period ran against the Secretary’s suit; only the concurrence proposed applying this section’s two-year period. opinion →
Dole v. Local 427, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Judge Garth proposed applying the section’s two-year limit in a concurrence, but the majority adopted a different limitations analysis. opinion →
Crespo v. Stapf, the court cites this section as the underlying limitations period while deciding whether the tolling provision in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22 is constitutional. opinion →
Nolan v. Ho, the court mentions the section while recounting the trial court’s dismissal, then decides whether a hearing was required before vacating the settlements. opinion →
Lawler v. Isaac, the court noted that the limitations defense was preserved but did not decide it on appeal. opinion →
Seals v. Langston Co., the court identifies New Jersey's two-year period but borrows Louisiana's limitation period to dismiss the action. opinion →
Viviano v. CBS, INC., the court cites the section while recounting a limitations defense in an earlier personal injury suit. opinion →
Cockinos v. GAF Corp., the court cites the section only to contrast it with the Wrongful Death Act’s deadline, which is the rule it decides. opinion →
Hummel v. Reiss, the court cites the section in a parenthetical about a possible claim by Kelly's mother, while deciding Kelly's claim on other grounds. opinion →
Theer v. Philip Carey Co., the court cites the section only in a footnote reporting that the personal injury and consortium claims were dismissed as time-barred before trial. opinion →
Lombardi v. Simon, the court cites § 2A:14-2 only to contrast it with the Wrongful Death Act’s deadline, which was the rule it applied. opinion →
Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., the court cites the section’s two-year personal injury period while discussing an earlier ruling that applied a six-year period to this claim. opinion →
Campo v. Tama, the court cited the section while recounting earlier decisions about claims arising from a future disease, without deciding its limitations rules in this case. opinion →
Kisselbach v. County of Camden, the court identifies this section as the limitations bar but resolves the survival claims under the separate insanity tolling provision. opinion →
Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., the court cites the section to identify the limitations period while recounting when the complaint was filed. opinion →
Straley v. United States, the court reports the defendants’ limitations argument but does not decide it. opinion →
Tsr v. Jc, the dissent cites the section as the limitations period behind defendant's proposed dismissal motion. opinion →
Hawes v. Johnson & Johnson, the court cites the section while recounting another court’s limitations analysis and decides whether discrimination claims survive a plaintiff’s death. opinion →
Michaels v. State of NJ, the court cites the section for the two-year period borrowed for § 1983 claims, then addresses accrual under federal law. opinion →
Donohue v. Kuhn, the court mentions the section while recounting the trial court's ruling on when the survivorship claim accrued. opinion →
Oliver v. Ambrose, the court mentions the section while recounting a party's limitations defense and the trial court's hearing, but decides only the entire controversy doctrine issue. opinion →
Mettinger v. Globe Slicing MacH. Co., Inc., the court cites the section while recounting the Appellate Division's ruling on the statute of limitations. opinion →
Brown v. Kennedy Memorial Hospital-University Medical Center, the court cites the section in describing a defendant's limitations argument, then resolves timeliness under the court rules governing relation back. opinion →
Jl v. Jf, the court cites the section as the ordinary two-year limitations period while deciding accrual and tolling under N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1. opinion →
Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E., the court cites the section as a possible source of the limitations period for an IDEA claim but does not decide whether it applies. opinion →
Staub v. Eastman Kodak Co., the court reports defendants' argument that the section bars the suit, but the opinion ends before the court decides that issue. opinion →
Washington v. Systems Maintenance, the court cites New Jersey's two-year period for comparison but applies California's limitation period to dismiss the claim. opinion →
PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department, the court lists the section among possible two-year deadlines, then decides whether the federal claims accrued in time. opinion →
Mullen v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, the court cites the section for the two-year period borrowed for § 1983 claims and resolves the disputed accrual date under federal law. opinion →
Knauf v. Elias, the court uses the section as the ordinary two-year personal-injury deadline while deciding whether the separate nonresident tolling provision applies. opinion →
Prescott v. PNC Bank Corp., the section appears only in a dissent discussing the filing deadline for LAD claims. opinion →
Tune v. Philip Morris Incorporated, the court cites the New Jersey limitations period while applying Florida choice-of-law rules to select Florida’s statute of limitations. opinion →
Laidlow v. Hariton MacHinery Co., the employer raised the section as a statute of limitations defense, but the court did not address it. opinion →
Miller v. Estate of Sperling, the court mentions the section as the basis for a limitations argument made below and decides the case under the wrongful death statute. opinion →
Major Saxton, Jr. v. CSX Transportation, the court cites the section as an example of a state limitations statute while deciding how Federal Rule 15(c)(1) applies to Alabama law. opinion →
LaFage v. Jani, the dissent cites the section as background for its argument about tolling the Wrongful Death Act’s limitation period. opinion →
Major Saxton, Jr., Mary Saxton v. Acf Industries, Inc., the court mentions the section only in a citation to another circuit’s case while deciding how Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1) treats state relation-back rules. opinion →
Villalobos v. Fava, the court cites the section while recounting Fernandi's ruling, then decides whether a CEPA claim was timely. opinion →
Everett v. State Farm Indem. Co., the court cites the section as historical background while deciding the separate limitations period for PIP benefits. opinion →
Matlin v. Langkow, the court cites the section as the defendants’ proposed limitations period, then applies New Jersey choice-of-law rules to select Florida’s statute. opinion →
Berke v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp., the court quotes an earlier decision’s discussion of § 2A:14-2 while deciding whether substantial compliance saves claims subject to a six-year limitations period. opinion →
Cahn v. United States, the court dismissed the claims on res judicata grounds and discussed the section only as a conditional alternative. opinion →
Hayes v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, the court cites the section as the source of the two-year limitations period while deciding whether the amended complaint relates back under Federal Rule 15. opinion →
Derienzo v. Harvard Industries, the court cites the section for the two-year personal injury limitations period while deciding whether the fictitious party rule allowed a late amendment. opinion →
Hardwicke v. American Boychoir, the court cited the section as a possible limitations period to reconsider on remand. opinion →
Ristaino v. D.C. Bates Equipment Co., the court cites the section as the New Jersey deadline urged by the defendant, then applies Massachusetts’ statute of limitations under Massachusetts choice-of-law rules. opinion →
Casinelli v. Manglapus, the dissent cites the section to describe the limitations period in another case while discussing AICRA's physician certification requirement. opinion →
Zelma v. Konikow, the court mentions the section as a possible state limitation period for TCPA claims but applies the federal four-year period. opinion →
Cunningham v. State, the court cites the section to explain the possible effect of dismissing the claims for untimely service. opinion →
Troise v. Extel Communications, Inc., the court compares the section's personal-injury limit with the six-year period it applies to a claim for unpaid prevailing wages. opinion →
Konopka v. Foster, the court cites the section to explain why changing a dismissal to one without prejudice would offer no practical benefit. opinion →
Lafferty v. St. Riel, the court mentions New Jersey’s two-year personal injury limit for comparison while applying Pennsylvania limitations law. opinion →
MANSOUR EX REL. MANSOUR v. Leviton Mfg. Co., the court identifies § 2A:14-2 as the usual two-year deadline but decides that a separate tolling statute extends the time to sue. opinion →
Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School, the court cites the section as background to the enactment of the Childhood Sexual Abuse Act. opinion →
Estate of Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condominium Ass'n, Inc., the court cites the section for the two-year limitations period while deciding whether a separate statute tolls that period because of insanity. opinion →
Warriner v. Stanton, the court considers New Jersey's two-year period but applies Delaware's limitations statute to the malpractice claim. opinion →
Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., the dissent cites the section while recounting the limitations issue decided in Gantes. opinion →
Ahammed v. Logandro, the court cites the section while recounting an earlier case and decides whether the defendant waived a workers' compensation defense. opinion →
Lafferty v. St. Riel, the court mentions the section’s two-year period while deciding which filing date applies after a federal venue transfer. opinion →
Lafferty v. St. Riel, the court cites the section while deciding how a federal venue transfer affects the filing date used to assess timeliness. opinion →
Smith v. Township of East Greenwich, the court cites the section only in a quotation from another decision describing New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions. opinion →
Doe v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, the court cites the section in a quotation from another case while remanding for clarification of the malpractice claim. opinion →
Meyers v. Heffernan, the court compares the section's personal-injury period with the six-year period it applies to unpaid wage and commission claims. opinion →
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Patterson, the dissent cites the section in a footnote without applying or interpreting it. opinion →
Walker v. Choudhary, the court cites the section to identify the medical malpractice filing period while deciding relation back under a court rule and the effect of a limitations dismissal on the employers' liability. opinion →
Grossbaum v. Genesis Genetics Inst LLC, the court cites the section to compare New Jersey’s limitations period with New York’s while deciding that New York law governs the claims. opinion →
Douris v. State of New Jersey, the court cited the section’s two-year limitations period but expressly declined to rely on it to affirm dismissal. opinion →
Peck v. Donovan, the court cites this section while deciding when a breach of contract claim accrued, without deciding its rule for personal injury actions. opinion →
Beery v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., the court cites the section as a comparison when deciding whether an arbitration agreement’s 90-day deadline is enforceable. opinion →
Cumberland County Board of Chosen Freeholders Vs. vitetta Group, P.C., the court quotes an earlier decision about the personal injury limitations period while deciding how different statutes apply to this construction dispute. opinion →
Soliman v. the Kushner Companies, Inc, the court cites the section while recounting the limitations issue decided in Rumbauskas, then addresses damages for an invasion of privacy claim. opinion →
Cherilus v. Federal Express, the court cites the section while recounting LFS's argument, then decides that the separate statute of repose bars the claims. opinion →
Peguero v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Local Chapter, Tau Kappa, the court cites the section while describing a provisional cross-appeal over a denied limitations motion. opinion →
Montgomery v. Aparatis Dist Co, the court cited the section while warning that Montgomery’s dismissed negligence claims might become time-barred if he waited to file in state court. opinion →
Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., the court cites the section while comparing New Jersey and New York limitations periods for its choice-of-law analysis. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture(074603), the court cites the section as the source of the two-year period applied to LAD claims while deciding whether an employment agreement may shorten the time to sue. opinion →
McCarrell v. Hoffman-La Roach, Inc.(076524), the court cites the section while deciding which state’s statute of limitations governs the suit. opinion →
Lapolla v. County of Union, the court cited the section for the NJCRA limitations period but did not decide the plaintiff's timeliness argument. opinion →
The Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisades, LLC, the court cites the section as a comparable accrual statute while deciding when construction-defect claims accrue under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. opinion →
UDOH VS. ENTERPRISE RENTAL CAR INC. (L-4335-12, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court cites the section only when recounting the trial court's dismissal of the negligence claims, which plaintiff did not properly challenge on appeal. opinion →
HAWKINS VS. BRANT QUICK(L-2658-15, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court expressly declined to decide whether the section would bar a new complaint. opinion →
PINO VS. JOSE R. POLANCO (L-1744-13, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court cites the section to explain a date in the insurer's correspondence while deciding the timeliness of its lien claim under a different statute. opinion →
Harty v. State of New Jersey, the court recounts the District Court’s limitations ruling but lacks jurisdiction to review it. opinion →
A.T.M. VS. R.P.M. (FM-04-0337-05, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court cites the section to explain the value of a personal injury claim the plaintiff gave up in the divorce settlement. opinion →
SPECIAL POLICE ORGANIZATION OF NEW JERSEY v. CITY OF NEWARK, the court cited the section for the two-year limitations period but only suggested the claims were likely time barred; it dismissed them on other grounds. opinion →
ZORICA DIMITROV, ETC. VS. SAINT MARY'S HOSPITAL (L-2241-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court discusses the section as the former limitations rule for Survivor Act claims but decides the case under the Survivor Act's own deadline. opinion →
GRANT v. UNITED STATES POST OFFICE, the court cites the section only to suggest that Bivens claims raised for the first time in a brief might be time-barred. opinion →
VAN VALEN v. LANIGAN, the court cites the section only to advise Plaintiff to address the statute of limitations if he seeks to amend his complaint again. opinion →
In Re: The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., the court cites the section to identify the ordinary deadline for the underlying injury claim, while deciding the appeal under bankruptcy law and the briefing rules. opinion →
REPKO VS. OUR LADY OF LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER, INC. (L-3559-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court cites the section to identify the two-year deadline while deciding whether the estate's amended complaint could relate back to one filed after the plaintiff's death. opinion →
GARTEN v. INTERMIN AMUSEMENT RIDES INT, the court quotes a prior decision mentioning § 2A:14-2 while deciding whether a separate statute of repose applies. opinion →
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF JOHNNIE Q. WADE, ETC. (L-2996-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court mentions the section as background to the attorney's advice and decides whether pre-suit discovery was proper under Rule 4:11-1. opinion →
CHOKAS VS. MAST CONSTRUCTION (L-2267-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court cites the section’s two-year deadline as background while deciding whether the plaintiffs exercised due diligence under the fictitious pleading rule. opinion →
DONELL L. PRINCE VS. CITY OF ENGLEWOOD (L-1679-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court quotes the trial court’s limitations ruling but affirms summary judgment without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
PRESTOL VS. HENPAL REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC (L-3643-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court recounts the trial court's limitations ruling against Suez but does not decide that issue. opinion →
S.Y. v. ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PATERSON, the court addresses the revival window in Section 2A:14-2b and mentions Section 2A:14-2 only as a limitations provision that the revival statute overrides. opinion →
E.C. VS. LEO INGLIMA-DONALDSON (L-1419-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED), the court cites the section as background to its interpretation of a different statute governing public-entity liability. opinion →
ESTATE OF MICAH SAMUEL TENNANT DUNMORE v. PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION ANGELA TENNANT v. PLEASANTVILLE BOARD OF EDUC, the court cites the section as background while deciding whether the deadline for a parent's tort claims notice was tolled. opinion →
Howard v. Ethicon Inc, the court mentions the section in a footnote but applies Oregon’s statute of repose to dismiss the claims. opinion →
OKEYO v. USCIS, the court cites the section as an example of a limitations period that might bar some claims, but dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim. opinion →
BELSKIS v. ORTIZ, the court cites the section to estimate when the plaintiff’s Bivens claims might have expired while deciding a separate FTCA claim. opinion →
Bartley v. State of New Jersey, after finding that Bartley forfeited appellate review, the court cites the section in a conditional discussion of the time bar. opinion →
DERRICK FOSTER v. TROY D. FRYE (L-3062-20 and L-7029-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court cites § 2A:14-2 only when comparing its decision to a prior case about the statute of limitations. opinion →
MARTINEZ v. SAFARILAND, LLC, the court cites the section while recounting Defendants’ limitations argument, then grants leave to amend under the federal relation-back rule. opinion →
MCKINNEY v. LANIGAN, the court cites the section for New Jersey’s two-year personal-injury limitations period but leaves the timeliness of the federal claims unresolved. opinion →
DOE v. WALGREEN NATIONAL CORPORATION, the court mentions § 2A:14-2(a) while recounting Walgreens’ argument, then decides whether the separate extended limitations statute covers the claims. opinion →
BERNARD v. COSBY, the court cites Section 2A:14-2 only as a statute of limitations provision while deciding the revival statute in Section 2A:14-2b. opinion →
DOE v. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, the court applies the separate revival provision in § 2A:14-2b and mentions § 2A:14-2 only in the quoted text of that provision. opinion →
HIGGS v. LANIGAN, the court cites the section’s two-year period as background when assessing prejudice from the plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting a timely filed action. opinion →
Doe v. the Estate of C.V.O., Jr., the court mentions the section as the basis of defendants' limitations argument but decides timeliness under the separate revival statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b. opinion →
Angrisani v. Kevin M. Costello, Esq., the court mentions § 2A:14-2 only in a quotation of § 2A:14-1 while applying the six-year limit to a legal malpractice claim. opinion →
Ouaziz v. El Ghazoini, the court mentions the section only while recounting a federal court's ruling that separate claims were time-barred. opinion →
Washington v. Newark Board of Education, the court mentions the section in the Board's limitations argument but decides only that the fictitious party rule does not apply. opinion →
Bridgeforth v. City of Newark, the court cites the section in a conditional footnote after rejecting the due process claim because the plaintiff had actual notice of his termination. opinion →
- TRANSFERRED TO CAMDEN - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-20270, the court mentions this section as the general limitations period while deciding whether § 2A:14-2b’s revival window applies. opinion →
L.W. v. JERSEY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, the court cites the section as a conditional alternative after deciding that the IDEA limitations period bars the ADA and RA claims. opinion →
Hornor v. Upper Freehold Regional Board of Education, the court quotes an amendment to the Charitable Immunity Act that lists this section among applicable statutes of limitations, without deciding this section’s rules. opinion →
SABETPOUR v. MARTINEZ, the court cites the section as a possible consequence of outright dismissal, then vacates the dismissal because of an address mixup. opinion →
Cappello v. Restaurant Depot, LLC, the court mentions the section to give background on New Jersey's filing deadline, then decides whether New Hampshire courts have personal jurisdiction. opinion →
Williams v. Quick Check, the court reports the trial judge's application of the section's two-year limit but treats the limitations issue as waived on appeal. opinion →
Rk Newark 2 Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, the court applied the CVA’s separate two-year revival provision to claims otherwise barred by the personal-injury limitations period in section 2A:14-2. opinion →
P.C. v. Driscoll, the court cited the section as a possible bar to refiling when it decided to transfer the claims to New Jersey. opinion →
Collucci v. Cassese, the court found the statute-of-limitations cross-appeals moot after affirming summary judgment on other grounds. opinion →
J.H. v. Warren Hills Board of Education, the court cites the section as background on the former limitations period while deciding the effect of other statutes' 2019 amendments. opinion →
Digiesi v. Township of Bridgewater Police Department, the court cites the section for the two-year limitations period but decides when the § 1983 claim accrued under federal law. opinion →
Anthony v. County of Morris, the court mentions the section as a limitations issue sent to the trial court on remand, but decides this appeal on immunity grounds. opinion →
Graziadei v. Capital Health System, Inc., the court cites the section as background for the filing period for LAD claims while deciding whether the Law Division had jurisdiction. opinion →
PACIULLI v. INDIA GARMENTS, INC., the magistrate judge cited the section’s limitations period in a transfer recommendation that the district judge had not yet adopted. opinion →
Mohamad Khodair, Etc. v. Llanfair House Care & Rehabilitation Center, the court cites the section while recounting defendants' limitations argument, then resolves the appeal under the Wrongful Death Act and Survivor's Act. opinion →
Hahn v. the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, the court mentions the section only while recounting an earlier trial court ruling; it decides this appeal on the finality of the prior dismissals. opinion →
A.Z. v. A.R.P., the court cites § 2A:14-2 as the general two-year limit but decides that the separate child sexual abuse provision in § 2A:14-2a governs the claims. opinion →
Dalnoky v. Ess Support Services, LLC, the court reports the trial judge's application of the section to the emotional distress claim and treats the issue as waived on appeal. opinion →
A.M. v. Millville Board of Education, the court mentions § 2A:14-2 among amended statutes but applies the discovery rule in the separate § 2A:14-2a(a)(1). opinion →
Thorpe v. Rosemarie Cipparulo, Esq., the court mentions § 2A:14-2 only as an exclusion in § 2A:14-1(a) while applying the latter section’s six-year limit. opinion →
A-2404-24/a-0338-25 – Jessica Garcia v. Union City Board of Education, the court cites this section as an existing limitations provision while deciding whether § 2A:14-2b revives LAD claims. opinion →
Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc., the court recounts an earlier decision about later-discovered toxic injury while addressing recovery for enhanced risk. opinion →
HOJNOWSKI EX REL. HOJNOWSKI v. Vans Skate Park, the court cites the limitations period and minority tolling as background in a dispute over the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. opinion →
SANG PARK VS. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY (L-4045-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), the court cites the personal-injury limitations period while deciding whether the insured forfeited underinsured-motorist coverage by defeating subrogation. opinion →
HERRERA v. GOYA FOODS INC., the court contrasts New Jersey and Connecticut discrimination law in considering an amended complaint, without deciding the scope of this section. opinion →
REAVES v. MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY, the court provisionally describes several limitations periods while construing the complaint, without deciding this section’s application. opinion →
WILCOX v. WARREN, the court cites the borrowed two-year period as background but resolves the dismissal motion under the relation-back doctrine. opinion →

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