N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12

Section 10:5-12(n) prohibits a person acting with discriminatory intent from interfering with another person's property transaction, including by trying to induce the seller to breach the agreement.

OASIS THERAPEUTIC LIFE CENTERS, INC. VS. PETER G. WADE (L-1287-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-10(n)

We conclude, as the LAD makes clear, that it is, in fact, unlawful to discriminate against a buyer because of the disability of a person intending to live on the premises, even if the buyer does not fit within the protected class, N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, and that it is, with a discriminatory intent, unlawful to interfere with another's transaction, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(n).

Section 10:5-12(g)(2) allows a disabled condominium resident to sue an association that fails to provide a reasonable parking accommodation needed for equal use and enjoyment of the unit.

Estate of Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condominium Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2006-11-16(g)(2)

Based on the reasoning employed in the federal cases and consistent with our own case law, we hold that N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1 and N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g) provide a cause of action for disability discrimination to a resident of a multiple unit condominium building for the failure of the condominium association to provide a reasonable parking space accommodation in the parking lot common element sufficient to afford her an equal opportunity to the use and enjoyment of her condominium unit.

Section 10:5-12(g)(4) prohibits rejecting a rental applicant because of a lawful source of rent payment, but permits landlords to consider a Section 8 applicant's creditworthiness if it is not a pretext for discrimination.

Pasquince v. Brighton Arms Apts. · filed 2005-06-30(g)(4)

Obviously, the language in N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(4) is not an exact replica of the repealed statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100, because it does not state that, notwithstanding the non-discrimination provision, landlords may still consider creditworthiness as a criteria for accepting or rejecting rental applicants. Nevertheless, as discussed hereinafter, it is well established that creditworthiness is a legitimate, non-discriminatory criteria which landlords are permitted to consider when evaluating prospective tenants, including recipients of Section 8 housing assistance.

Section 10:5-12(g)(1) prohibits selectively discouraging a prospective tenant because of race, even without an outright refusal to rent.

Wilson v. Sixty-Six Melmore Gardens · filed 1969-06-20(g)(1)

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12( g )(1) is not confined to refusals to sell or lease real property. It also makes it unlawful "otherwise to deny to or withhold from" (emphasis added) any person real property on a discriminatory basis related to race.

Section 10:5-12(h)(1) prohibits a real estate broker from refusing to rent to two unmarried women because of their sex or marital status.

Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency · filed 1973-03-19(h)(1)

In addition, the Examiner expressed the view, with which we agree, that the statutory provision, as last amended in 1970 ( N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(h)(1)), prohibiting a real estate broker or its employee from refusing a rental to any "person or group of persons" because of "marital status or sex" clearly negates the respondents' contention.

Section 10:5-12(g)(2) makes a landlord liable for discrimination when the landlord knows a tenant belongs to a protected class and intentionally acts against the tenant because of that membership.

KRAVITS v. ROYAL OAKS APARTMENTS, LLC (L-5207-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-01-27(g)(2)

To be liable under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g)(2), a defendant must both: (1) know the plaintiff is a member of a class protected by the NJLAD; and (2) have acted in a purposeful or intentional way adverse to the plaintiff's benefit because of plaintiff's class.

Subsection (g)(1) does not cover a municipality or zoning board that has no ownership, possession, or right to sell or rent the property.

THE HANSEN FOUNDATION, INC. v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY · filed 2023-03-21(g)(1)

With respect to Subsection (g)(1), none of the defendants can be deemed a “[p]erson, including but not limited to, any owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee or managing agent of, or other person having the right of ownership or possession of or the right to sell, rent, lease, assign, or sublease any real property or part or portion thereof, or any agent or employee of any of these[.]”

Section 10:5-12(g)(2) prohibits disability discrimination in housing. A resident seeking an emotional support animal must show a disability and that the accommodation may be necessary to use and enjoy the dwelling; the housing provider must then prove the accommodation unreasonable.

Players Place II Condominium Association, Inc. v. K.P. and B.F. · filed 2024-03-13(g)(2)

We hold that requests for reasonable accommodations like the one here should be assessed under the following framework: Individuals who seek an accommodation must show that they have a disability under the LAD and demonstrate that the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford them an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”

Section 10:5-12(g)(2) prohibits disability discrimination in housing; a resident seeking an animal accommodation must show that it is necessary for equal use and enjoyment of the home.

Amherst Farms Homeowners Association, Inc. v. D.M. and L.S. · filed 2025-12-19(g)(2)

After reviewing the record, we conclude under the FHA and LAD that defendants failed to show a genuine material issue of fact supporting that the six chickens ameliorate L.S.'s disability and afford her an equal opportunity to use her home.

Section 10:5-12(g) supports a judicial cause of action for racial discrimination in renting housing despite the availability of nonexclusive administrative remedies.

Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc. · filed 1970-04-30(g)

However, to hold the existence of nonexclusive administrative relief is a bar to judicial relief would conflict with the intent if not the letter of N.J.S.A. 10:5-27, and I take the view that plaintiff has a cause of action based upon paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article I of New Jersey's Constitution and upon N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(g).

Section 10:5-12(a) does not prohibit applying a no-relatives employment policy to spouses merely because they are married.

Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc. · filed 1977-12-22(a)

The mere fact that in the course of enforcing its "no relatives" policy a particular excluded relative happens to be married does not constitute unlawful discrimination because of marital status within the intendment of N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 and N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 (a).

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits a discharge under a policy based in significant part on an employee’s marital status.

Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. · filed 1984-02-06(a)

We hold that if an employer's discharge policy is based in significant part on an employee's marital status, a discharge resulting from such policy violates N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 a.

Section 10:5-12(a) protects employees from marital-status discrimination beyond whether they are single or married, including when they are separated or involved in divorce proceedings.

Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad(074685) · filed 2016-06-21(a)

Despite the absence of a definition of “marital status” or legislative history demarcating the boundaries of this protection, the stated purpose and goals of the LAD strongly suggest that we should consider “marital status” as more than the state of being single or married.

Section 10:5-12(e) reaches newspapers that aid employment discrimination by maintaining sex-seregated advertising columns or publishing discriminatory job advertisements.

The Passaic Daily News v. Blair · filed 1973-08-08(e)

It seems to us that the prominent, if not indispensable place of newspaper classified advertising in the employment recruiting field is such that it is unrealistic to contend that a publisher of a paper who either initiates or acquiesces in advertising publication practices which discriminate or encourage or facilitate discrimination in employment is not “aiding” in such discrimination within the meaning of the statute.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to allege membership in a class protected by state antidiscrimination law.

Chavarria v. State of New Jersey · filed 2021-11-23(f)(1)

Yet Chavarria’s complaint never said that he is part of a class protected by state antidiscrimination law. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(f)(1).

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) prohibits creed discrimination in access to prison religious services, including imposing hurdles on one faith that prisoners of other faiths do not face.

SANTIAGO v. ELCHEBLI · filed 2021-09-30(f)(1)

From these allegations, accepted as true, a reader of the Complaint could plausibly infer that this refusal to place Plaintiff on the Native American service list was discriminatorily motivated. ... Accordingly, the Court will allow Plaintiff’ s NJLAD claim to proceed past this screening stage.

A public accommodation discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(f)(1) requires facts supporting an inference of discriminatory motive.

PHILLIPS v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT · filed 2021-04-28(f)(1)

To meet the second element, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to create an inference that the State Defendants’ actions were motivated by racial discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) covers racial discrimination in services provided aboard a commercial flight.

WRIGHT-PHILLIPS v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. · filed 2021-04-01(f)(1)

Yet, Roe refused for some time to provide Wright-Phillips with supplemental oxygen, thus refusing or withholding from her an accommodation or facility that allegedly should have been, and indeed was, routinely provided. The reader of the Amended Complaint could plausibly infer that this refusal was racially motivated.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) permits a public accommodation discrimination claim against a state police laboratory when a plaintiff alleges unequal treatment because of her gender.

DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE - TRANSFERRED TO CAMDEN - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-1460 · filed 2020-12-30(f)(1)

Here, the NJSP Central Laboratory, like a municipal police department or a police dispatch center, is a public entity and “by [its] very nature” is a public accommodation under the NJLAD. ... Vergara also properly alleges the second and third elements of her public accommodation gender discrimination claim.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) protects students against national-origin discrimination in educational programs; a student alleging discriminatory dismissal must show, among other things, different treatment from similarly situated students outside the protected class.

ALALWAN VS. RUTGERS SCHOOL OF DENTAL MEDICINE (L-4492-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-20(f)(1)

Applying the McDonnell Douglas factors to plaintiff's discrimination claims here – as the motion judge correctly observed – plaintiff was required to demonstrate: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was otherwise qualified for the academic position; (3) he suffered an adverse educational action; and (4) he was treated differently than similarly-situated students, who were not members of the protected class.

Section 10:5-12(f) permits a student to bring a race-based harassment claim against a school district when the district fails to reasonably address harassment that denies the student a school’s accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges.

DICKERSON v. WALLKILL VALLEY REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2020-06-01(f)

As such, the Court finds that plaintiffs have set forth a plausible claim of “discriminatory conduct that would not have occurred ‘but for [Nasir’s] protected characteristic”—his race.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) applies agency principles to a business’s vicarious liability for an employee’s harassment of a patron when the patron seeks monetary damages.

Yucis v. Sears Outlet Stores LLC · filed 2020-06-01(f)(1)

In sum, we conclude that the New Jersey Supreme Court would apply the vicarious liability principles from its employment-discrimination cases under the LAD to a case involving harassment in a place of public accommodations under the same statute.

A student bringing a gender-harassment claim under this section need not prove that the harasser intended to harass her.

C.H., BY HER PARENT AND GUARDIAN, D.H. VS. BURLINGTON COUNTY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (L-2350-15, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-13(f)(1)

We agree that the intent of a harasser is irrelevant in an LAD claim. And the jury was told here that plaintiff did not have to prove intent.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) does not cover discrimination claims against the DCPP because it is not a place of public accommodation.

LASCHE v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-09-26(f)(1)

I am not persuaded that the DCPP constitutes a place of public accommodation.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) requires a customer claiming sex discrimination in a public accommodation to allege that she was denied access because of her sex.

YUCIS v. SEARS OUTLET STORES, LLC · filed 2019-06-18(f)(1)

Dismissal is appropriate for another reason: Plaintiff fails to allege that she could not buy a refrigerator from Defendant or otherwise access its public accommodations, let alone because of her sex.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) does not impose strict or vicarious liability on a public accommodation employer for a single unauthorized comment by an employee that violates the employer's anti-harassment policy when the employer lacked notice of past discriminatory conduct and the comment did not relate to the plaintiff's use of the facility.

N.W. VS. GREATER EGG HARBOR REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT (L-2302-15, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2018-12-05(f)(1)

We decline to read N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1) as imposing strict or vicarious liability on an employer for a single incident of an unauthorized comment by its employee, which violates the employer's anti-harassment policy, where there is no actual or constructive notice that the employee has exhibited discriminatory conduct in the past, and the comment did not relate to the plaintiff's present or future use of school facilities.

Section 10:5-12(f) permits a student to sue a school district for race-based peer harassment when the district knew or should have known of severe or pervasive harassment and failed to respond reasonably.

George v. Board of Education · filed 2014-07-23(f)

Count 4, O.G.’s LAD claim against the Board, survives summary judgment. ... Lastly, a jury could find that the school’s response to the harassment experienced by O.G. was not reasonable.

Section 10:5-12(f) permits a race discrimination claim involving a place of public accommodation, but a plaintiff’s unsupported supposition of racial motive cannot sustain the claim.

Morris v. T.D. Bank · filed 2018-04-10(f)

Undoubtedly, the LAD provides a cause of action for discrimination based upon race in any "place of public accommodation." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) ; Turner v. Wong, 363 N.J. Super. 186, 212, 832 A.2d 340 (App. Div. 2003). However, there is nothing in the record, except plaintiff's supposition that the bank's employee was racially motivated, that supports his LAD claim. The assumption that the man standing in front of the teller, who had the robber's note on her keyboard at the time, was the robber was entirely logical. No reasonable fact finder could conclude otherwise.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) does not require municipalities to provide disabled residents with personalized parking spaces on public streets.

Dial, Inc., a New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation v. City Of · filed 2016-01-14(f)(1)

Although we agree that the City and the State are subject to the NJLAD's anti-discrimination laws covering "public accommodations," N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1), the NJLAD has not been construed to require such an exclusive parking benefit on public streets for disabled residents.

When the extent of a claimant’s disability affects whether an accommodation is reasonable and is not readily apparent, the claimant must establish that extent with expert medical evidence.

Wojtkowiak v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission and New Jersey Division on Civil Rights · filed 2015-01-02(f)(1)

We hold that where the extent of a LAD claimant's disability is relevant to the reasonableness of the accommodations offered or demanded, the claimant must establish it by expert medical evidence.

A person alleging an overall lack of access to a public accommodation need not request an accommodation before suing under Section 10:5-12f(1).

Lasky v. BOROUGH OF HIGHTSTOWN · filed 2012-05-11(f)(1)

On the other hand, where a more generalized claim alleging overall lack of access is made, a plaintiff seeking redress should not be required, as a prerequisite to filing such a claim, to first make a request for a reasonable accommodation. We find nothing in the language of the LAD itself or its legislative history to suggest that notice is an element of the claim in the public accommodation context.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) requires reasonable access for people with disabilities at places of public accommodation; physical inaccessibility without assistance does not necessarily establish discrimination.

Lasky v. MOORESTOWN TP. · filed 2012-05-11(f)(1)

Yet as our earlier discussion well demonstrates, a public facility that is not accessible without assistance does not necessarily violate Title II of the ADA or the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(f) permits a claim against a school district for peer harassment based on sexual orientation when the harassment denies a student the advantages, facilities, or privileges of public school.

LW Ex Rel. LG v. TOMS RIVER REG. SCHOOLS BD. · filed 2005-12-07(f)

We therefore are convinced that a claim against a school district may be brought under the LAD for peer harassment that is based on an individual's "affectional or sexual orientation" if the harassment rises to the level of a denial of the "advantages, facilities or privileges" of a public school. We are further convinced that the principles for determining whether such harassment constitutes a violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) should be substantially the same as those that are employed to determine whether sexual harassment creates a hostile work environment.

Section 10:5-12(f) requires Little League to admit girls ages 8 to 12 because its baseball program is a public accommodation and its restriction to boys is not reasonable.

Nat. Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc. · filed 1974-03-29(f)

In sum, we find no basis in anything argued by Little League to support a determination that, consistent with the underlying purpose of the statutory prohibition against denial of the facilities of places of public accommodation on account of sex, Little League by virtue of its nature may reasonably be permitted to be restricted to boys in the age category under consideration.

Section 10:5-12(f) prohibits a hotel from assigning Black guests to one floor and withholding rooms on other floors solely because of race.

Director, Div. on Civil Rights v. Slumber, Inc. · filed 1979-02-14(f)

That this conduct, if proved, would constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) is self-evident. [1] The hearing examiner, whose recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law were accepted by the Director, made detailed findings supporting his conclusion that this basic allegation was proved. We are satisfied that those findings were adequately supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record as a whole and hence not subject to appellate interference.

Section 10:5-12(f)’s public accommodation requirement can apply to a club that holds its meetings in public restaurants.

Kiwanis International v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club · filed 1986-02-06(f)

Because Kiwanis conducts its meetings in just such places, — i.e., public restaurants — the court concludes that the New Jersey Supreme Court would be as prepared to find that the statutory “place” requirement has been met here as it was in Little League.

Section 10:5-12(f) bars a public accommodation from denying a member a selectively awarded privilege because of race, creed, or sex.

Brounstein v. American Cat Fanciers Assoc. · filed 1993-12-01(f)

As such, it is clearly a privilege or advantage offered by the ACFA to certain of its members. Thus, although the ACFA could deny a member a judging license because he or she did not meet the qualifications for a license, it cannot deny the license based on that individual’s race, creed or sex.

Section 10:5-12(f) does not prohibit a selectively admitting private club from restricting membership by sex because the club is not a place of public accommodation.

Kiwanis International v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club · filed 1986-12-03(f)

Accordingly, if the standard by which Kiwanis Ridgewood must be measured is the Little League standard which defines "public accommodation," the record establishes conclusively that Kiwanis Ridgewood does not fit within the statutory definition of "public accommodation." It is thus not precluded from restricting its membership to men.

Section 10:5-12(f) prohibits discrimination by places of public accommodation but does not reach a distinctly private club with selective membership practices.

Kiwanis International v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club · filed 1986-12-03(f)

Thus, our reading of the instant record in light of the interpretation of the New Jersey statute as glossed by Little League leads inexorably to the conclusion that Kiwanis Ridgewood, having a selective, nonpublic membership policy, is not a “place of public accommodation” but is rather in its nature distinctly private. It therefore falls without the prohibitions of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(f) applies to owners, managers, and agents of places of public accommodation, and a factual dispute over whether the NCAA had such a role precluded summary judgment.

Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1998-06-08(f)

For the same basic reasons, there is a substantial question of fact as to whether the NCAA is an “owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, [or] agent ... of any place of public accommodation” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f). Accordingly, the NCAA’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on Bowers’ NJLAD claim will be denied.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1)'s prohibition on creed discrimination by public accommodations does not apply to a religious program that falls outside the LAD's definition of a public accommodation.

Wazeerud-Din v. GOODWILL MISSIONS · filed 1999-09-29(f)(1)

We conclude that the Discipleship Program is not covered by the basic definition of a "place of public accommodation" under the LAD because it is a religious program. We also conclude that the Discipleship Program is excepted from the definition of "place of public accommodation" because it is an "educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution."

Section 10:5-12f(1) prohibits a public accommodation from discouraging patronage based on a protected trait, even if it admits the patron; discriminatory oral statements can support a claim.

Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort · filed 2000-07-20(f)(1)

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 not only prohibits the owner or operator of a public accommodation from denying the use of a facility on forbidden grounds, but it also renders unlawful any acts "discriminat[ing] against any person in the furnishing thereof[.]" N.J.S.A. 10:5-12f(1). Although the statute isolates for special treatment written communications of any kind that announce the unavailability of the facility on prohibited grounds, oral communications to the same effect are in no way immune as causes for relief, as defendants contend.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) prohibits discrimination in furnishing a public accommodation, including conduct that discourages a customer from using it because of a protected trait, even when service is not outright denied.

Turner v. Wong · filed 2003-10-02(f)(1)

The LAD is not limited to outright denial of access or service. As noted, it also renders unlawful any acts discriminating against any person in the furnishing of the public accommodation. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1). The statutory protection has been interpreted to reach situations where customers are merely discouraged from using a public facility because of verbal comments made to them about their protected status.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) covers discrimination in services furnished by a county communications center because a government entity is a place of public accommodation.

Thomas v. County of Camden · filed 2006-07-21(f)(1)

Here, of course, we are not required to analyze the extent of public solicitation or the closeness of the relationship with government simply because the Camden defendants are public entities and, by their very nature, constitute a place of public accommodation.

Section 10:5-12 requires a public accommodations claimant to show that the defendant operates a place of public accommodation, the claimant belongs to a protected class, and the defendant denied equal treatment because of that membership.

Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 2006-12-22

Under the NJLAD a plaintiff must show that (1) defendant operates a place of public accommodation; (2) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; and (3) he or she was denied equal treatment on the basis of his or her membership in a protected class.

Section 10:5-12(f) requires a public accommodation, a plaintiff in a protected class, and denial of equal treatment because of that membership.

Islam v. City of Bridgeton · filed 2011-03-28(f)

The elements required for a case like Plaintiffs brought under 10:5—12(f) are that the (1) defendant operates a place of public accommodation; (2) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; and (3) he or she was denied equal treatment on the basis of his or her membership in a protected class.

Section 10:5-12(f) requires a plaintiff bringing a disability discrimination claim concerning a public accommodation to be disabled.

Cottrell v. Rowan University · filed 2011-04-05(f)

Consequently, because plaintiffs are not disabled, they do not have standing to bring a discrimination claim under the ADA or NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(f) requires a person claiming disability discrimination by a public accommodation to show that the denial of equal treatment was based on disability.

PRATT v. ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER · filed 2019-07-25(f)

Like the ADA, the NJLAD also requires a causation element—that the plaintiff “was denied equal treatment on the basis of [his or her disability].” See Islam v. City of Bridgeton, 804 F. Supp. 2d 190, 200 (D.N.J. 2011) (emphasis added) (detailing elements). For the same reasons discussed above, therefore, this claim fails and summary judgment is entered in favor of Defendants.

Section 10:5-12(f) requires a public accommodations plaintiff to plausibly allege discriminatory intent based on a protected status or a disproportionate impact on a protected group.

DESSOURCES v. MANNING · filed 2020-10-16(f)

Plaintiff, however, makes no allegations plausibly showing that ECPO had “discriminatory intent” against him based on these protected statuses, or that its actions had a “disproportionate impact” on these groups.

Section 10:5-12 allows a qualified person with a disability to bring a discrimination claim against private defendants for adverse action because of that disability.

FREEMAN v. MCDONNELL · filed 2021-02-04

The Court finds that Plaintiff adequately alleges NJ LAD claims against Defendants in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Despite its similar nature to the ADA, the NJ LAD does not require that claims be brought against public entities.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination in the furnishing of police services, even when access to a facility is not denied.

YANLEY SANDY VS. TOWNSHIP OF ORANGE (L-2274-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-29(f)(1)

The argument and the court's finding ignore ... that the LAD "not only prohibits the owner or operator of a public accommodation from denying the use of a facility on forbidden grounds, but it also renders unlawful any acts 'discriminat[ing] against any person in the furnishing'" of a public accommodation.

Section 10:5-12(f) requires a public accommodation to provide equal treatment regardless of a person’s protected class; a claim must plausibly allege that the denial of equal treatment was because of that status.

SHAN v. UNITED AIRLINES · filed 2022-09-30(f)

Plaintiffs also assert causes of action for race discrimination under the NJLAD, specifically N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f). To state a claim under this section, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the “defendant operates a place of public accommodation; (2) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; and (3) he or she was denied equal treatment on the basis of his or her membership in a protected class.” ... However, plaintiffs’ NJLAD claims fail for the same reasons as their Section 1981 claim. ... For that reason, the NJLAD claims are also dismissed without prejudice.

Section 10:5-12(f) treats sexual touching of a person’s sex-specific anatomy in a public accommodation as conduct occurring on account of sex.

C v. v. Waterford Township Board of Education · filed 2023-09-12(f)

The LAD prohibits discrimination “on account of . . . sex” in places of public accommodation. Under our prior precedent, sexual touching happens “because of” sex, and the words “on account of . . . sex” in the public accommodations provision and “because of . . . sex” in the employment provision, see N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) & (f), mean the same thing. Waterford may therefore be liable under the language of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f).

A claim of racial discrimination by a public accommodation under § 10:5-12(f)(1) requires facts supporting an inference of racial motivation and different treatment of people outside the protected class.

LANGLEY v. UNITED AIRLINES INC. · filed 2024-06-28(f)(1)

To meet the second element, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to create an inference that Defendants’ actions were motivated by racial discrimination. ... Plaintiff has also failed to adequately allege the third element, as he has not alleged sufficient facts to indicate that others outside of his protected class received different treatment from Rivera or anyone else acting on United or UGE’s behalves.

Section 10:5-12(f) prohibits discrimination in a place of public accommodation; allegations of conduct at a plaintiff’s property or in correspondence sent there do not state a claim under that provision.

FOGG v. TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR · filed 2025-05-13(f)

Plaintiff has not alleged that he was discriminated against in a place of public accommodation; he alleges that the discriminatory conduct occurred at his property and/or in written communications sent to his property.

A public accommodation discrimination claim requires facts showing membership in a protected class and unequal treatment because of that membership.

NEIMEISTER · filed 2025-10-31(f)(1)

Even assuming, arguendo, that Neimeister is a member of a protected class, his claim still fails because he does not allege sufficient facts that he was denied equal treatment on the basis of his membership in a protected class.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) applies to employees of correctional facilities as places of public accommodation; a discrimination claim requires facts supporting protected class status and different treatment of people outside that class.

TURNER v. JOHNSON · filed 2024-11-26(f)(1)

Therefore, Defendants are employees of a place of public accommodation. ... Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s NJLAD claims must be dismissed because he has not sufficiently alleged the second and third elements of a claim, i.e., that he is a member of a protected class and that non-members of that class were treated differently from him.

A claim under § 10:5-12(f)(1) based on chemical dependence requires facts showing a demonstrable substance abuse disability.

NEIMEISTER v. THE COUNTY OF SALEM · filed 2024-12-30(f)(1)

The Court will dismiss Count Five because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged Neimeister is a member of a protected class by reason of a demonstrable substance abuse disability.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) requires evidence that a public accommodation denied equal treatment because of a person's protected status.

Epps v. Dgmb Casino, LLC · filed 2026-01-08(f)(1)

Thus, plaintiff's claim rests upon prong three, whether plaintiff was denied equal treatment on the basis of her protected class. We conclude, as did the trial court, that even when viewing all facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the record does not support genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the third prong of the above enunciated test.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) requires a public accommodation discrimination plaintiff to show unequal treatment based on protected status.

ADDISON v. SIGNET JEWELERS LIMITED · filed 2025-06-26(f)(1)

At any rate, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their NJLAD public accommodation claim because they failed to show unequal treatment.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) applies to franchisors only if they directly own, lease, or operate the place of public accommodation.

Arefin v. the Doherty Group, Inc. · filed 2025-11-18(f)(1)

Based on the statutory language, regulatory framework, and case law, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1) does not apply to franchisors unless they directly own, lease, or operate the place of public accommodation in question.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) permits, but does not require, sex-restricted places of public accommodation.

S.G. v. New Jersey Department of Corrections · filed 2026-03-04(f)(1)

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1) clarifies that the LAD does not bar—but also does not compel—the creation of "any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex."

Section 10:5-12(a) allows a gender discrimination claim to reach a jury when the evidence could show that gender played a role in a termination despite the employer’s stated performance reasons.

Meade v. Township of Livingston (085176)(Essex County and Statewide) · filed 2021-12-30(a)

Although the Councilmembers alleged a number of areas of dissatisfaction with Meade’s performance, a reasonable jury could conclude -- in the combined light of Meade’s evidence challenging the legitimacy of the other cited areas of dissatisfaction and the Council’s own focus on the ongoing difficulties with Handschuch -- that Meade’s gender played a role in the Council’s termination of her employment, contrary to the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) allows gender discrimination and harassment claims to survive summary judgment when material facts are disputed about the conduct and the employer’s response.

HELLER VS. MIDDLESEX COUNTY COLLEGE (L-7433-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-29(a)

While many of plaintiff's contentions are vague, they are sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment because they create disputed issues of material fact as to whether Edwards engaged in gender-based discrimination and harassment and whether the college failed to appropriately respond.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not prohibit optional, gender-neutral child-rearing leave absent an adverse impact on a protected class.

Hedges v. BD. OF EDUC. OF, MANCHESTER REGIONAL HIGH SCH. DIST. · filed 2007-08-31(a)

Likewise unavailing is plaintiffs' argument that the maternity leave policy adversely impacts the protected class of women. The child-rearing provision is gender neutral. Even though only women have elected to utilize the leave, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the key element of a disparate impact claim-the adverse impact on a protected class.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits sex-specific hiring as a bona fide occupational qualification when juvenile detainees’ privacy requires same-sex officers and reasonable alternatives cannot avoid the conflict.

In Re Juvenile Detention Officer · filed 2003-12-11(a)

In this case, there is no real dispute that the privacy interests of male juvenile detainees in not being viewed by female JDOs while showering, using the toilet, and being strip-searched are legitimate and would be undermined by failing to place gender-specific requirements on the appointment of JDOs. ... This is particularly so since the County has amply demonstrated that the direct conflict between the juvenile detainees' interest in minimal privacy and the Union members' equal employment opportunities under federal and state law could not otherwise be avoided by resort to less drastic alternatives.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits a promotion denial when sex discrimination played a causal part; it need not be the sole reason.

Harvard v. Bushberg Bros., Inc. · filed 1975-12-11(a)

In order to establish an "unlawful employment practice" or "unlawful discrimination" on the basis of sex within the intent and meaning of the "Law against discrimination," N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., it is not necessary that the sex discrimination be the sole reason for the employment practice under attack. If discrimination on the basis of sex played at least a part and was a causal factor in the failure of complainant to be given the job of credit manager, discrimination in violation of the statute has been established.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits denying an employee a promotion because of her sex.

Flanders v. William Paterson College of NJ · filed 1976-03-25(a)

An unlawful sex discrimination in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) and N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 was clearly established by the proofs before the Division.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits sex discrimination in promotion and requires an employer to explain disparate treatment once an employee establishes a prima facie case.

Peper v. Princeton University Bd. of Trustees · filed 1977-05-04(a)

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) declares it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee in respect of the terms, conditions and privileges of employment for reason of sex where sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification, an exception not here urged. ... In this posture, and in view of plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case, it then became incumbent upon the University to come forward with an explanation at least suggestive that the admitted disparate treatment was not based on her sex. This it utterly failed to do.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits denying equal pay on the basis of sex.

Decker v. Bd. of Education of City of Elizabeth · filed 1977-11-14(a)

Our review of the record in its entirety establishes that, contrary to the board's contentions, the hearing examiner conducted the hearing in a fair and impartial manner and the Director's finding that complainant was denied equal pay on the basis of sex, in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a), is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record as a whole.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits paying women less than men for substantially identical work, even when the pay difference carries over from earlier positions.

Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. · filed 1988-07-15(a)

Where, as here, people with comparable skills, experiences and responsibilities are transferred into a new position where they will perform substantially identical tasks for two years, the Equal Pay Act and our Law Against Discrimination impose upon management an affirmative obligation to make certain that similarly situated women are not paid less than their male counterparts.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not prohibit separate eligibility lists for qualified male and female police applicants when neither sex is excluded.

Ass'n v. East Brunswick Tp. · filed 1981-07-23(a)

Additionally, the establishment of two separate lists for qualified male and female candidates did not constitute an unlawful or discriminatory practice contrary to N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 and N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). This is not the use of a quota system to remedy past discrimination, nor is it sexual classification irrespective of qualification.

Section 10:5-12(a) treats unequal pay during employment as the alleged discrimination; hiring a higher-paid male replacement after the employee leaves is not a separate act of discrimination against her.

Healey v. Tp. of Dover · filed 1986-03-20(a)

Plaintiff's argument, however, proves defendants' ultimate point that the act of hiring her male replacement was not an act of discrimination against her. If there was discrimination regarding the level of her salary, the discrimination occurred, as plaintiff says in her brief, when "she was not equally paid." That was during her employment, and any claim based on that discrimination is already comprehended by the claims in the first six counts of the complaint.

Section 10:5-12 prohibits employment discrimination against either sex, and a white male plaintiff must show intentional discrimination despite his majority status.

Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., Inc. · filed 1988-08-03

While the NJLAD prohibits discrimination against either sex, a white-male-majority plaintiff who asserts sex discrimination in employment bears the burden of demonstrating he was intentionally discriminated against despite his majority status.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employer invoking customer privacy as a sex-based occupational qualification to prove that no reasonable alternative to its policy exists.

Spragg v. Shore Care · filed 1996-07-19(a)

Moreover, and most significantly in the present case, where the BFOQ is based on customer preferences, the employer has the additional burden to prove that there are no reasonable alternatives to the sex-based policy.

Under Section 10:5-12(a), an employee must offer evidence that the employer’s stated reason for firing them was a pretext for discrimination; knowledge of a disability and a harsh disciplinary decision alone do not suffice.

Klimek v. United Steelworkers Local 397 · filed 2015-06-17(a)

The District Court correctly concluded that Klimek’s evidence of pretext falls short. To start, Gray’s mere knowledge of Klimek’s gout is insufficient to show pretext.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age and race discrimination in employment; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for discipline, the employee must present evidence of pretext.

ESKRIDGE-JOSEPH VS. NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS (L-1606-15, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-11(a)

LAD makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on his or her age or race. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... Here, the AOC was entitled to summary judgment because it articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its disciplinary actions and plaintiff failed to present any evidence that those reasons were pretextual.

Section 10:5-12 permits employment discrimination and retaliation claims when the alleged facts plausibly link adverse action to a protected trait or opposition to discrimination; vague or isolated disability-related conduct does not suffice.

RIOS v. CITY OF PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY · filed 2020-07-31(a), (d)

In turn, this Court applies its Title VII, § 1983, and ADA analysis to Plaintiff’s NJLAD claims, and similarly finds her discrimination and retaliation claims, except as to her disability, sufficiently stated.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits race discrimination in the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

ARKU-NYADIA v. LEGAL SEA FOODS, LLC · filed 2020-10-16(a)

Under the NJLAD, employers are prohibited from discriminating against individuals with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, based on race. ... As such, this Court finds that Plaintiff has raised material issues of fact that preclude summary judgment as to Count One.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employers from discriminating in the terms and conditions of employment based on protected characteristics such as race and age.

THEODORE v. NEWARK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND COMMUNITY WELLNESS · filed 2021-02-10(a)

Under the NJLAD, it is unlawful for employers to discriminate against an individual with respect to the terms and conditions of his/her employment on the basis of a protected characteristic, such as race, religion, age, sex and disability. ... For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendants did not satisfy their heavy burden to declare Plaintiff’s proposed claims under the NJLAD futile for purposes of this motion.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin; a complaint must allege enough detail to make disparate treatment plausible.

ORTIZ v. WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2021-02-22(a)

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not include sufficient details to plausibly allege discrimination claims under Title VII or the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees because of race or age.

HANKERSON v. LEGACY TREATMENT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2021-10-20(a)

The NJLAD similarly makes it unlawful for any employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee based on that employee’s race or age. N.J. Stat. 10:5-12(a).

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics; a claimant must allege facts supporting membership in a protected group and discriminatory conduct.

LARSON v. TWO FARMS/ROYAL FARMS 330 · filed 2022-07-08(a)

The NJLAD prohibits employers from discriminating based on race, creed, color, national origin, age, and a variety of other protected characteristics. N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a). ... Plaintiff alleges no facts (1) identifying himself as a member of a group protected under the NJLAD, or (2) identifying discriminatory conduct on behalf of Defendant.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not support an employment discrimination claim when the employee was not meeting the employer’s legitimate expectations and offers no evidence that its stated reason for termination was pretextual.

SHAH v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. · filed 2022-08-04(a)

Nor can he meaningfully dispute that by being out of position, he did not perform his job at a level that met American’s expectations. The record likewise shows that since 2018, at least 14 other American employees have been terminated for this reason. Shah, moreover, has not provided any colorable basis for the Court to conclude that the reason given by American for its termination of him, i.e., for being out of position while on reserve duty basis, is pretextual.

Section 10:5-12(a) generally applies to workplace discrimination; allegations unrelated to employment do not state a claim under it.

IDUMONYI v. BERGEN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT · filed 2022-11-16(a)

The NJLAD is an anti-discrimination statute that generally applies in the workplace. ... In this instance, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not relate to their employment. Consequently, Plaintiffs fail to state a NJLAD claim and Count Two is dismissed.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits an inference of sex discrimination when an employer eliminates a woman’s position but assigns some of her duties to a man in a newly created role.

GUPTA v. SIEMENS HEALTHCARE DIAGNOSTICS INC. · filed 2022-03-17(a)

Again, the prima facie case is flexible. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that although it was a new position (at least on paper), Plaintiff was in fact replaced by a male.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits employment discrimination claims based on disparate treatment or disparate impact.

River Edge Police Sergeant C.E.W. v. Borough of River Edge · filed 2025-08-05(a)

In LAD cases, a plaintiff may plead either a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact.

State agencies are subject to § 10:5-12’s prohibition on sex discrimination in hiring.

Kiss v. Community Affairs Dep't · filed 1979-11-14(a)

Her reliance upon these laws and upon Civil Service's statutory obligation as an employer under N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(e) and N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 not to discriminate in employment is not unjustified or unreasonable.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires proof that an employment decision was discriminatory, and subsection (l) requires proof that a refusal to contract or do business was discriminatory.

CPM Consulting LLC v. Capsugel US LLC · filed 2021-09-28(a), (l)

We therefore conclude no reasonable jury could render a verdict for Rivaplata on his employment discrimination claim under LAD § 10:5-12(a) because he cannot establish ... his engagement ended for discriminatory reasons. For the same reason, Rivaplata cannot prevail on his refusal-to-deal claim under § 10:5-12(l).

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits disability-based discharge, but a claim fails without evidence supporting an inference of discrimination or showing that the employer's stated reason was pretext.

KALIM VS. URBAN OUTFITTERS, INC. (L-2319-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-03-04(a)

The LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, prohibits employment discrimination based on an employee's disability. ... Under these facts, we conclude that no reasonable jury could conclude that defendant's complaints about her performance, many of which plaintiff admits, were a pretext for disability discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age and sex discrimination in employment; a discrimination claim requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

SMITH v. CHASE BANK · filed 2021-02-25(a)

“The ADEA and Title VII prohibit discrimination on the basis of age and sex, respectively,” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013), as does the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). ... Thus, the evidence contains no suggestion of circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination at step one. ... Chase is entitled to summary judgment on Counts 1 through 4, the discrimination claims.

Section 10:5-12 requires evidence supporting an inference that age or disability motivated an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim.

DVOSKIN v. BIO-REFERENCE LABORATORIES, INC. · filed 2021-05-26

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has not presented evidence creating an inference of intentional, class-based discrimination to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADA, ADEA, or NJLAD.11 The Court agrees.

A plaintiff claiming disability-based discharge under § 10:5-12(a) fails to establish a prima facie case when the employer does not seek to replace the plaintiff and leaves the position unfilled.

MCNICHOL VS. ROUTE ONE CORP. (L-4514-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-06-24(a)

However, defendants never sought to replace plaintiff after his termination and the sales manager position remained unfilled throughout the litigation. Accordingly, plaintiff did not satisfy the fourth prong of the Viscik test. Because plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the judge properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff to allege an adverse employment action that affects the terms of employment; a vague allegation of discipline is insufficient.

PERRY v. LEE · filed 2020-06-19(a)

Making all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged she suffered an adverse action related to the alcohol violation. The Amended Complaint on this issue is vague and conclusory and does not indicate that the terms of Plaintiff’s employment were in any way affected by the discipline she received.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment; a temporary removal from a call schedule without a change in pay, benefits, rank, or title was not an adverse employment action.

JANAK SARKARIA, M.D. VS. SUMMIT ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, P.A. (L-6481-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-01-22(a)

The LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, prohibits employment discrimination based on an employee's age. ... Applying our standard of review, we conclude that the motion judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant was proper because plaintiff failed to show she suffered an adverse employment action or that age played a role in her termination.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to allege an adverse employment action, such as economic harm or a significant, non-temporary change in employment conditions.

DOMINO v. ESSEX · filed 2021-02-11(a)

Thus, Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim is dismissed for failure to sufficiently allege an adverse employment action.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee based on race, national origin, religion, or creed; an employee challenging stated legitimate reasons for discharge must produce evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.

Ali v. Woodbridge Township School Dis · filed 2020-04-22(a)

NJLAD makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and creed. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). ... Since Ali has not presented a genuine dispute of material fact that two of Defendants’ rationales were a pretext for discrimination, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on both the NJLAD and § 1981 discrimination claims.

A temporary reassignment that leaves pay and benefits intact and causes no significant, lasting change in employment status is not an adverse employment action under § 10:5-12(a).

ZOIS VS. KEAN UNIVERSITY (L-2741-15, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-01-06(a)

Plaintiff's temporary reassignment was not an adverse economic action because his salary remained the same and he kept his benefits. See Victor, 401 N.J. Super. at 615-16. The reassignment also was not an adverse non-economic action because it was not "a significant, non-temporary adverse change in employment status." Ibid.

Section 10:5-12(a) employment discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

PENN v. EXXONMOBIL RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING COMPANY · filed 2019-09-30(a)

Workplace discrimination claims brought under the NJLAD are analyzed under the flexible burden-shifting framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

An age or national origin discrimination claim under subsection (a) fails on summary judgment when the employee lacks evidence of a prima facie case and does not rebut the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.

ARYEE VS. NEWARK BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER (L-0124-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-02-20(a)

Plaintiff also did not rebut defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a racial discrimination claimant must show that he met his employer’s legitimate job expectations to establish a prima facie case.

THOMAS v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. · filed 2019-08-12(a)

Here, Plaintiff fails to make a sufficient showing that he was performing his job at a level that met his employer’s expectations. ... The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's NJLAD racial discrimination claim.

A failure-to-hire discrimination claim does not require the applicant to show that the position sought offered better pay or benefits than her current job.

Wolpert v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 2011-09-12(a)

Thus, the Court holds, Plaintiff need not point to a dispute of fact over whether the Cardiac Therapies position to which she applied was superior in terms of compensation or benefits to state a prima facie case for discrimination.

A failure-to-promote claim under § 10:5-12(a) fails when the applicant did not earn a high enough examination score and does not challenge the examination.

Vulcan Pioneers v. City of Newark · filed 2010-03-31(a)

As we have explained, the failure to promote claim fails because she quite simply did not achieve a high enough score on the examination for the position she wanted, an examination she does not itself challenge.

An investigation of employee misconduct is not an adverse employment action under § 10:5-12 unless it results in a real detriment, such as suspension, demotion, or termination.

Spinks v. Township of Clinton · filed 2008-09-11

We agree with the trial judge. An employer must be free to investigate complaints of employee misconduct without fear of LAD liability. Only when the investigation results in some real detriment, such as a suspension, demotion, or termination, should the aggrieved employee be able to invoke the protection of the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show an adverse employment action.

Ivan v. County of Middlesex · filed 2009-01-21(d)

The Court concludes, however, that the Burlington Northern standard does not apply to the LAD retaliation provisions. Under the LAD a plaintiff must do more than show that adverse actions would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a complaint: a plaintiff must allege she has suffered an “adverse employment action.”

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment, and subsection (d) prohibits retaliation for opposing discrimination; the same adverse action standards used for the corresponding federal claims apply to both.

Swain v. City of Vineland · filed 2012-01-11(a), (d)

Like the ADEA, the NJLAD prohibits discrimination “in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” against an individual because of his age, as well as retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a), (d). ... they apply the same definition of adverse action that federal courts do in discrimination and retaliation claims See, e.g., ... Accordingly, our analysis applies equally to Swain’s state law claims, and we reach the same result as to them.

Section 10:5-12(a) uses USERRA’s burden-shifting framework for claims of discrimination based on military service.

Hart v. Township of Hillside · filed 2007-07-01(a)

When analyzing cases under the NJ LAD, courts look to the closest analogous federal statute and adopt its evidentiary framework. ... The federal statutory analog to Hart’s NJ LAD claim is the USERRA.

Section 10:5-12(a) can be violated when an employer disciplines Black employees more harshly than White employees for similar infractions.

Jason v. Showboat Hotel & Casino · filed 2000-03-28(a)

Plaintiff's theory is viable. Treating white employees more leniently than black employees for similar infractions can be a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. But plaintiff's proofs are insufficient to withstand summary judgment under the Brill [5] standard.

Section 10:5-12 requires intent to discriminate for a finding of unlawful discrimination.

Parker v. Dornbierer · filed 1976-01-22

The act of discrimination requires intent since it in itself is a mental process under which one willingly chooses one or another of alternatives.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires proof that an employer's hiring decision was motivated by a prohibited form of discrimination.

Jones v. College of Med. & Dent. of NJ, Rutgers · filed 1977-12-29(a)

The statute does not proscribe all discrimination, but only that which is bottomed upon specifically enumerated partialities and prejudices. Thus, we have held that in discrimination cases an intent to discriminate must be proved. Parker v. Dornbierer, 140 N.J. Super. 185, 189 (App. Div. 1976). Obviously, this means an intent to discriminate for the prohibited purpose charged.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires proof of intent to discriminate for a prohibited purpose.

KEARNY GENERATING SYS., PUB. SERV. DIV. v. Roper · filed 1982-03-16(a)

In order to sustain a claim of unlawful discrimination under our New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. 10:5-4, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, there must be proof of an intent to discriminate for an unlawful purpose.

The court applies its Title VII analysis to the discrimination claim under section 10:5-12.

Baxter v. AT & T COMMUNICATIONS · filed 1989-05-02

Thus, the legal analysis which follows is applicable to plaintiffs NJLAD claim as well as his Title VII claim.

Section 10:5-12 discrimination claims may be evaluated under federal standards, so a claim can survive summary judgment when the corresponding Title VII claims survive.

Porta v. Rollins Environmental Services (NJ), Inc. · filed 1987-03-06

Plaintiff alleges that Rollins’ actions violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12. New Jersey Courts have adopted federal law standards in evaluating many actions under the New Jersey statute. ... Therefore, since we deny the motion for summary judgment as to the Title VII claims, we deny summary judgment as to this state claim.

Section 10:5-12 claims require the same factual showing as Title VII claims.

Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp. · filed 1990-09-26

A plaintiff must make the same factual showing in order to prove a claim under either Title VII or the NJLAD.

An employee claiming discrimination under Section 10:5-12 must show she was qualified for her position to establish a prima facie case.

Gorham v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1991-02-04

Likewise, the New Jersey courts have adopted the McDonnell Douglas rationale to establish a prima fa-cie case under the NJLAD. ... This court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish the second part of her prima facie case, i.e., that she was qualified for the position that she held.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff to prove unlawful discrimination; a prima facie case and a false employer explanation do not automatically entitle the plaintiff to judgment.

McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service · filed 1994-08-17(a)

As we explain more fully below, because the New Jersey legislature intended to protect and compensate victims of discrimination but not to relieve them of the burden of proving unlawful discrimination, and because the New Jersey rule regarding presumptions parallels the federal rule on presumptions upon which the Hicks Court based its decision, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would endorse Hicks's view that a plaintiff in a discrimination case is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law simply because he or she proves a prima facie case and that the reason or reasons asserted by his or her employer for the challenged action were false.

A plaintiff claiming employment discrimination under § 10:5-12(a) is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law merely by proving a prima facie case and showing that the employer’s stated reasons were false.

McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service · filed 1994-09-27(a)

As we explain more fully below, because the New Jersey legislature intended to protect and compensate victims of discrimination but not to relieve them of the burden of proving unlawful discrimination, and because the New Jersey rule regarding presumptions parallels the federal rule on presumptions upon which the Hicks Court based its decision, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would endorse Hicks 's view that a plaintiff in a discrimination case is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law simply because he or she proves a prima facie case and that the reason or reasons asserted by his or her employer for the challenged action were false.

An age discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(a) can survive summary judgment when a plaintiff with a prima facie case presents sufficient evidence to discredit the employer's stated reason for termination, without additional evidence of discrimination.

Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-05-26(a)

The district court in this case predicted that, after St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), we would require a plaintiff at summary judgment in a suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq., to prove both that his employer's reasons for terminating him were false and that the real reason for termination was discrimination. Recent decisions of this court, including Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825 (3d Cir. 1994), and Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, No. 94-5208 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 1995), have established that this prediction was inaccurate.

Section 10:5-12(a) allows an age discrimination plaintiff to survive summary judgment with evidence supporting an inference that the employer did not act for its stated reasons.

Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc. · filed 1995-11-20(a)

We hold that plaintiff need not provide direct evidence that the employer acted for discriminatory reasons in order to survive summary judgment. She need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered non-discriminatory reasons.

An NJLAD failure-to-hire plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination and offer evidence of pretext when the employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision.

Dungee v. Northeast Foods, Inc. · filed 1996-10-03

In order to succeed on a Title VII, NJLAD or ADEA claim, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. ... Because the defendants have articulated a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason, the burden switches back to plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants’ proffered reason was pretextual.

Section 10:5-12 employment discrimination claims follow the same burdens of proof as federal Title VII claims.

Silvestre v. Bell Atlantic Corp. · filed 1997-08-21

The New Jersey courts have interpreted the proofs and burdens of persuasion for discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) in the same manner as that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.2000(e) et seq. ... Thus, both federal and New Jersey discrimination cases are applicable to Silvestre’s claims.

Section 10:5-12 requires evidence supporting an inference that an employer treated employees differently because of race; a pay schedule applied to employees of all races did not support that inference.

Vega v. City of New Brunswick · filed 2006-02-28

A fair assessment of Appellants’ claim requires a consideration of the City’s evidence as to how it applied its salary structure to firefighters of all races under both the old and new CBAs. That evidence reveals no triable issue on the question whether the City purposefully delayed hiring Appellants in order to pay them less because of their race. Summary judgment was properly entered on the LAD claim.

Section 10:5-12 requires a prima facie showing of discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

DESSOURCES v. MANNING · filed 2021-08-31

Here, Plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination that would fall within the statute’s meaning. See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12.

A denial of promotion within the two-year limitations period can be an adverse employment action for discrimination, retaliation, aiding and abetting, and disparate treatment claims under § 10:5-12.

WARRICK v. NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL · filed 2022-05-31

What is actionable (at least at this stage) are Defendants’ post-October denials of Warrick’s promotion to a PAI position. Those discrete acts serve as an adverse employment action for the discrimination, retaliation, aiding and abetting, and disparate treatment theories under the NJLAD.

A plaintiff claiming race discrimination under § 10:5-12(a) cannot establish an inference of discrimination through a proposed comparator who is not similarly situated.

Langley v. UPS Inc · filed 2023-02-01(a)

NJLAD makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee on the basis of race. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). ... McNeil is not a valid comparator because he is not similarly situated.

Claims under subsections (d) and (e) require factual allegations; conclusory assertions of violations are insufficient.

F.V. v. CHERRY HILL TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION MEMBERS · filed 2023-03-31(d), (e)

Here, Defendants’ Motion seeking to dismiss the LAD claim is granted because Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual allegations to sustain the LAD claim. ... Plaintiffs similarly set forth conclusory violations of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) and (e).

Section 10:5-12(a) uses the same burdens of proof and production for discrimination claims as Title VII.

OKPARAEKE v. DUKE-JACKSON · filed 2023-07-10(a)

The burdens of proof and production for discrimination claims arising under Title VII and the NJLAD are the same.

Employment discrimination claims under subsection (a) use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applied to Title VII claims.

THOMAS v. KEOUGH · filed 2024-02-05(a)

Accordingly, the Court will adopt the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework from Section III.A.1, supra, for the Title VII claim in analyzing Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim.

For a discriminatory discharge claim under § 10:5-12(a), a plaintiff must show protected status, qualification and job performance, termination, and that the employer then sought similarly qualified individuals for the job.

HAINES v. TAKEDA PHARMACUETICALS USA, INC. · filed 2023-08-31(a)

The prima facie standard of a discriminatory discharge claim under the NJLAD is “(1) that plaintiff is in a protected class; (2) that plaintiff was otherwise qualified and performing the essential functions of the job; (3) that plaintiff was terminated; and (4) that the employer thereafter sought similarly qualified individuals for that job.” Kirschling, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 594 (quoting Victor, 4 A.3d at 141).

An employee claiming discriminatory discharge based on disability must show that she could perform her job, with a reasonable accommodation if needed.

WONG v. RWJ BARNABAS HEALTH · filed 2023-09-07

Turning back to Wong’s claims related to discriminatory discharge, asserted in Counts 1 and 4, I find for similar reasons that she has failed to show that she was able to perform her job or was prevented from doing so by lack of a reasonable accommodation.

Section 10:5-12(a) covers discharge because of sex; an alleged discriminatory termination is a discrete act that can support a timely claim.

Youngclaus v. Residential Home Funding Corp. · filed 2024-03-05(a)

This claim qualified as a discrete alleged act of discrimination under LAD, which states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an employer, because of the . . . sex . . . of any individual . . . to discharge . . . from employment such individual . . . ." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a).

Section 10:5-12 employment discrimination claims follow Title VII analysis; a complaint must plausibly allege supporting facts but need not prove a prima facie case.

NAGGAYI v. EMR USA HOLDING, INC. · filed 2023-09-26

Courts analyze Title VII and NJLAD claims the same way. ... The elements of the prima facie claim do not have to be proven, but merely must be plausible.

Under § 10:5-12(a), a resignation supports a sex discrimination claim as an adverse employment action only when discriminatory working conditions would compel a reasonable person to resign.

AYALA v. VOLKSWAGEN OF UNION LLC · filed 2023-10-19(a)

In short, they do not amount to a constructive discharge. Plaintiff has not pled an “adverse employment action” in the form of constructive discharge for purposes of her sex discrimination claim under Title VII and NJLAD.

A negative performance review alone is not an adverse employment action under the LAD.

Goode v. Camden City School District · filed 2024-01-10(a)

However, even if Gehring did so intervene, it is of no consequence because a negative performance review is not itself an adverse employment action under the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin; a failure-to-promote plaintiff must show they were qualified for the position sought.

Nicolas v. Trenton Board of Education · filed 2024-01-17(a)

It is a violation of the LAD "for an employer, because of the race, . . . [or] national origin . . . of any individual . . . to refuse to hire or employ . . . such individual or to discriminate against [them] in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... Here, we are satisfied plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on any of his claims. Further, and as detailed in our opinion, defendants presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions—plaintiff's lack of qualifications for the positions he sought and the relatively stronger qualifications of the successful candidates identified.

A failure-to-promote claim under subsection (a) requires evidence of discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

CURTIS v. CITY OF NEWARK · filed 2024-07-31(a)

But Plaintiff fails to provide any substantive evidence that suggests he was discriminated against based on his religion or any other protected characteristic.

Section 10:5-12 prohibits religious discrimination in employment, and a claim fails at summary judgment when the employee lacks evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretext.

Restorative Care of America, Inc. v. Josloff · filed 2025-03-31

Because Josloff has not produced evidence showing that RCAI’s reasons for terminating him contained “implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions,” RCAI is entitled to summary judgment on the NJLAD claim.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires a reassignment to tangibly change an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to qualify as an adverse employment action.

FIDAN v. MARBA PRODUCT, LLC · filed 2025-09-03(a)

As such, the reassignment is not an adverse employment action.

Subsection (a) requires a discrimination plaintiff, after the employer gives a legitimate reason for its action, to show that the reason was pretext for discrimination.

Omojola v. Arc of Ocean County · filed 2025-11-14(a)

Plaintiff, principally focused on establishing a prima facie case, fails to rebut this legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or demonstrate “that discrimination was the real reason for” her termination.

Section 10:5-12(a) pregnancy discrimination claims follow the federal employment discrimination framework when proved through circumstantial evidence.

Catherine A. MARZANO, Appellant, v. COMPUTER SCIENCE CORP. INC.; CSC Partners Inc. · filed 1996-07-31(a)

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted the methodology governing federal employment discrimination law for state claims of a similar nature.

Section 10:5-12(f)–(k) does not prohibit age discrimination in housing and real property transactions.

TAXPAYERS ASSN. OF WEYMOUTH TP. INC. v. Weymouth Tp. · filed 1976-09-28(f)-(k)

Prohibited forms of discrimination in housing and real property transactions are set forth in N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f) - 10:5-12(k). None of these provisions bars discrimination on the basis of age.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employee alleging age discrimination in a termination to show that age played a determinative role in the decision.

Pepe v. Rival Co. · filed 1999-12-15(a)

To prevail on an NJLAD claim, Pepe must establish the discriminatory consideration, his age, played a determinative role in his termination.

An age discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(a) can survive summary judgment when indirect evidence creates a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext.

Wright v. L-3 Communications Corp. · filed 2002-10-21(a)

Wright has not presented direct evidence that L-3 discriminated against him on the basis of age, but Wright has presented sufficient indirect evidence of pretext to create a genuine issue of material fact that withstands L-3’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 10:5-12 requires a plaintiff alleging age discrimination in a reduction in force to show that younger workers were treated more favorably; avoiding pension costs alone does not establish age discrimination.

Jakimas v. Roche · filed 2006-06-06

But, even if Roche terminated the Appellants, specifically Meechan, to avoid paying future pension benefits, under Hazen Paper this does not prove that age was a determinative factor in Roche's decision. Absent proof that younger employees were treated more favorably, Meechan has not proved his prima facie case. Therefore, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Roche.

Section 10:5-12 requires an age-discrimination plaintiff challenging a reduction in force to show that younger workers were treated more favorably.

Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. · filed 2007-05-14

In the context of a reduction in force, which is a similar context to this case, the elements of a prima facie case are (1) the plaintiff is a member of the protected class, (2) the plaintiff was laid off from a job that he was qualified for, and (3) “other, younger, workers were treated more favorably.” Murray, 709 A.2d 340 at 344 (internal citations omitted); see also Monaco, 359 F.3d at 304-05.

An age discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(a) fails when no reasonable jury could find that age was a determinative factor in the employer’s decision.

Dorfman v. Pine Hill Board of Education · filed 2009-09-30(a)

Even considering the totality of circumstances, however, Dorfman has failed to show that a reasonable jury could find that age discrimination was a determinative factor in appellees’ decision not to renew her contract.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits discharge because of age; a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by raising a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason was pretext.

Buchholz v. Victor Printing, Inc. · filed 2012-06-29(a)

The NJLAD prohibits employers from discharging an individual from employment because of the individual’s age. ... In sum, plaintiff has proffered enough facts to support a reasonable inference that defendants did not act for its stated non-diseriminatory reason.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits an age-discrimination claim after a reduction in force when an older employee is laid off while younger employees earning as much or more are retained.

Lamont W. Garnes and Robert A. Klein v. Passaic County And the Passaic County Sheriff's Department · filed 2014-10-24(a)

Adapting that case to account for the fact that the LAD does not identify a protected age group, we conclude that Klein, a fifty-seven year old and of an age sufficient to warrant an inference that his age was relevant, had to show that he was laid off while other younger employees earning as much or more than he were carried.

Section 10:5-12 prohibits discharge because of age, and age discrimination claims under it generally follow federal standards.

Palmer v. Britton Industries Inc. · filed 2016-11-07

Palmer does not advance any distinctive arguments under New Jersey as opposed to federal law, so we will analyze both claims under the federal standards.

Under § 10:5-12, an age discrimination plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons for termination are pretextual.

Caserta v. Intercall Inc · filed 2016-12-08

At that point in the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Caserta needed to persuade the Court that the three articulated reasons for his termination were no more than made-up reasons for discrimination. Id. He failed to carry that burden, as he did not present any evidence tending to show that InterCall’s termination was age-related or a ruse to disguise its intentional discriminatory motive.