N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts to consider statutory factors when setting or modifying alimony, including rehabilitative alimony.

SOUFANATI VS. ABELHAMID S. SOUFANATI (FM-16-0748-12, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2017-10-06(b)(d)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(d) requires the court to consider a number of factors in setting any alimony award or in modifying an existing award, including modification of an award of rehabilitative alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts to consider the listed factors when deciding alimony, including each party's earning capacity.

FEINSTEIN VS. MILES FEINSTEIN (FM-02-1292-95, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-21(b)

We determine plaintiff's argument that the motion judge's findings regarding the alimony factors were inadequate is meritless.

Section 2A:34-23(b) permits open durational alimony after a marriage lasting over twenty years.

MILCARSKY VS. MARK v. MILCARSKY (FM-01-0344-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-20(b)

Therefore, the parties were married for over twenty years, which qualified plaintiff for an award of open durational alimony. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).

A premarital relationship alone is not an exceptional circumstance that permits alimony to last longer than a marriage of less than twenty years.

B.G. VS. E.G. (FM-20-1592-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-08-31(c)

Although we agree with defendant that the parties' relationship ... prior to marriage in itself was not an exceptional circumstance under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c), we nonetheless agree with the trial judge that exceptional circumstances were demonstrated on this record without consideration of the pre-nuptial relationship.

Section 2A:34-23 requires findings on the statutory factors, marital lifestyle, and ability to pay before setting limited duration alimony.

FRYDRYCH VS. IWONA KOLUS (FM-20-1673-15, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-13

No analysis was undertaken as to equitable distribution of plaintiff's garment business (potentially now bankrupt) in the face of defendant's deficient CIS; no explanation was provided for awarding carte blanche defendant's limited duration alimony award in the amount of $135,000 annually for a term of twelve years without consideration of the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1) factors; no lifestyle analysis was made; $131,652.78 was ordered to be paid by plaintiff to Friedman, LLP (plus trial testimony fees), and $50,000 in counsel fees to defendant, wholly lacking in particularized findings.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires a court setting the payment rate for a fixed sum in lieu of support to consider the statutory alimony factors, including need and ability to pay.

WORRELL VS. JUNE KINGMAN (FM-13-0229-05, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATWIDE) · filed 2018-09-28(b)

The same analysis is required when modifying the payment rate of a sum certain in lieu of support. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).

Section 2A:34-23(b)'s factors guide a judge's discretion in setting alimony, including consideration of a spouse's earning capacity.

COLARUSSO VS. DAVID COLARUSSO (FM-02-0308-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-10-01(b)

"Of course, [as to alimony] the exercise of this discretion is not limitless[,]" and is "frame[d]" by the statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). ... We conclude that plaintiff's claims of error regarding the equitable distribution award and the amount of alimony, in light of the record, reveal nothing "so wide of the mark" that a clear mistake was made that warrants our intervention.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts to consider income from assets when awarding alimony; stock options that have not increased in value add no income.

B.H.M. VS. L.E.P.-M. (FM-13-0363-12, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-02-20(b)(10) and (11)

We reject defendant's claim the income from the stock options should have been considered as part of the alimony award. Although income from assets is a statutory consideration, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(10) and (11), the options plaintiff acquired were worth one penny each and did not increase in value.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts to consider its statutory factors when awarding alimony.

L.S. VS. M.S. (FM-14-0531-13, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-17(b)

Furthermore, the judge carefully reviewed the statutory factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and there is sufficient credible evidence to support the judge's findings regarding these factors.

Section 2A:34-23(b) gives the trial court discretion to weigh the alimony factors when setting an award.

DAVIS VS. EDGAR K. DAVIS (FM-08-0719-16, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-23(b)

In essence, defendant quarrels with the weight the court gave to the respective factors enumerated in the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). ... Weighing the various factors and considerations concerning alimony is a task vested solely within the trial court's discretion. ... Considering defendant's arguments in view of the record and our standard of review, we find no basis for disturbing the trial court's alimony award.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires specific written findings supporting an alimony decision; a supported decision to deny a motion to reduce or terminate alimony may be affirmed.

CARR VS. HARRY CARR (FM-18-0937-06, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-29(b)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) provides that in any divorce action a court may award alimony. When doing so, the court must consider the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c) and "make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons" and "evidence" for its decision to award alimony. ... We therefore conclude the judge did not err by denying defendant's motion to reduce or terminate alimony. The judge made the required findings of fact, and her findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.

Section 2A:34-23(b) sets out non-exhaustive factors for alimony awards and requires written findings when a court gives one factor more or less weight than another.

GIRGIS VS. RAGAEY GIRGIS (FM-12-2632-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2020-01-23(b)

Alimony awards are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), which sets forth a list of non-exhaustive factors for a court to consider. If the court determines ... that one factor is more or less relevant than the other factors, or that one factor should be given more weight over another factor, the court must "make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law." The trial judge's award of open durational alimony was appropriate. Each of the statutory factors was analyzed in his written decision.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires a judge setting alimony to consider its listed factors and any other relevant factors.

MCBOYLE VS. DEANNA MCBOYLE (FM-07-0773-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-13(b)

In determining an award of alimony, the judge must consider the thirteen factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b, as well as any other factors deemed relevant.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts to analyze the statutory factors, including marital lifestyle, when awarding alimony.

L.G. VS. L.G. (FM-14-0488-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-17(b)

"Any award of alimony requires an analysis of the statutory factors[,]" as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). ... We note, however, that the trial judge provided a thorough and detailed analysis of the evidence pertaining to the marital lifestyle. The court's findings in this regard are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(4) requires a judge setting alimony to describe and quantify the marital standard of living.

S.W. VS. G.M. (FM-20-2163-11, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-24(b)(4)

To the extent Crews and Hughes implicitly required that marital lifestyle be determined numerically, we now explicitly state a finding of marital lifestyle must be made by explaining the characteristics of the lifestyle and quantifying it.

Section 2A:34-23(c) calls for the marital lifestyle to be quantified and the marital expenses attributed to each spouse when setting alimony.

J.P. VS. M.P. (FM-18-0919-18, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-29(c)

Defendant's alimony-related arguments in I(A) and I(B) are misplaced. Contrary to her claims, the judge followed the law in describing the marital lifestyle, quantifying it, and attributing the marital expenses to the appropriate party.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts awarding alimony to consider its factors and make specific findings.

A.T.M. VS. S.M. (FM-18-0540-16, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-11-10(b)

Alimony awards are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), which sets forth a list of non-exhaustive factors for a court to consider.

Section 2A:34-23(c) requires findings on the relevant alimony factors, but the court need not analyze them one by one if its opinion addresses each factor.

T.J. VS. M.J. (FM-18-0468-18, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-02(c)

In its written opinion, the trial court did not conduct a factor-by-factor analysis of the statutory factors, but the court did discuss each of those factors in the opinion and it did make an award consistent with the statutory fact ors.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts to consider the statutory factors when setting an alimony award.

THOMAS VS. SHEYEAST THOMAS (FM-12-2371-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-03(b)

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a mistaken exercise of discretion. The trial judge correctly applied and considered the relevant statutory factors in rendering an alimony award that was within his discretion and supported by evidence in the record.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(11) requires courts setting alimony to consider available investment income, but does not require assuming a five-percent annual return.

A.J.V. VS. M.M.V. (FM-14-1402-14, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-14(b)(11)

Neither the alimony statute nor case law requires application of a five- percent annual return on investment income when calculating alimony, as Alan urges. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(11) requires a consideration of "[t]he income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party."

Section 2A:34-23(b)(4) requires courts to consider the marital lifestyle when calculating pendente lite spousal support, including a retroactive adjustment after trial.

WEIDEL VS. RICHARD A. WEIDEL, JR. (FM-11-0161-13, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2021-11-18(b)(4)

The marital lifestyle is the yardstick to measure and establish appropriate spousal support, whether pendente lite or post-judgment. ... Therefore, the judge was required to start with the marital lifestyle in calculating the reasonable and appropriate amount of the Mallamo credit.

Section 2A:34-23(b) sets out factors for determining alimony, and an award grounded in those factors receives appellate deference.

STEINER VS. ANN E. STEINER (FM-18-0541-17, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-11-23(b)

Although our deference is not "limitless," we will not intervene if the judge has "frame[d]" his rulings with the statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). ... The judge systematically and carefully addressed all the ... appropriate statutory factors and considered the parties' case information statements, their testimony about lifestyle and financial matters, and all the written evidence in determining the parties' lifestyle.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(13) requires courts to consider the nature, amount, and length of pendente lite support when awarding alimony, even if the support was not court-ordered.

CHARLES SMITH VS. DANIELLE SMITH (FM-14-0192-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-11-29(b)(13)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(13) requires a court to consider "[t]he nature, amount, and length of pendente lite support paid" when awarding alimony. The language of the statute does not require that the "pendente lite support" must be court-ordered to be considered in determining alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(5) allows a court setting alimony to consider each spouse’s earning capacity, including realistic potential earnings.

GIUNTA VS. SHANNON FAHEY (FM-18-0851-19, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-06(b)(5)

The alimony statute authorizes a court to consider the "earning capacity" of each party to a divorce or dissolution. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(5). ... Viewed through this prism of appellate deference, we affirm the trial court's assessment of the parties' earning capacities and its resultant alimony award.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(4) requires a court setting alimony to determine and quantify the marital standard of living.

EISINGER v. DOUGLAS HERMAN (FM-20-0523-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-04-04(b)(4)

This contention has merit, as "[a]n alimony award that lacks consideration of the factors set for th in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) is inadequate, and one finding that must be made is the standard of living established in the marriage." Crews, 164 N.J. at 26 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4)).

When determining the amount of alimony, a court must consider the parties' financial circumstances and the factors in subsection (b) to enter an order that is fit, reasonable, and just.

Jani v. Jani · filed 2024-10-23(b)

In determining the amount of alimony, the court must consider the parties' financial circumstances, and the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23(b) to enter an order that is "fit, reasonable, and just." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts considering alimony to address parental responsibilities and the time and expense needed for education or training.

Dong v. Li · filed 2024-02-23(b)

We conclude the judge did not accord appropriate consideration to the factors ... established in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) as she did not sufficiently address "(7) [t]he parental responsibilities for the children" or "(8) [t]he time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment."

Subsection (b) permits an alimony award based on factors including the marriage’s duration, prior support, the parties’ earning capacity, and equitable distribution.

Li v. Liu · filed 2024-04-03(b)

Additionally, we conclude the judge considered the factors detailed in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), and acted within his discretion in ordering defendant pay $700 per month in alimony for twelve months as such was based on the limited duration of the marriage, defendant's pendente lite support since 2014, the parties' earning capacity, and the equitable distribution of the home.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires the court to consider the relevant statutory factors when awarding alimony; an award without that analysis must be remanded.

Ivanovs v. Ivanovs · filed 2024-08-12(b)

In fact, the record is silent on any analysis conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) to explain how the court arrived at its $60,000 alimony determination, requiring our remand of the issue of alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts awarding alimony to consider all relevant statutory factors.

J.Z. v. Y.C.L. · filed 2024-09-10(b)

In each case where the court is asked to make an award of alimony, the court shall consider and assess evidence with respect to all relevant statutory factors. ... Contrary to defendant's claim, the judge employed the methodology we endorsed in S.W., 462 N.J. Super. at 531, and we discern no basis to intervene.

Section 2A:34-23(k) does not require an express citation when the court's reasons address the relevant factors for modifying alimony.

Oletu v. Oletu · filed 2025-03-14(k)

In determining nine months was not a sufficient length of time to deem the change in income "permanent," the motion court did not abuse its discretion in declining to modify defendant's alimony obligation without explicit reference to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k). The motion court's articulated reasons, not all of which were recorded herein verbatim but are in the record, encompassed factors in subsections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10.

In setting alimony, courts must consider the statutory factors, including the marital standard of living; an award may exceed the payor's prior contribution to the mortgage.

Remy v. Remy · filed 2024-07-08(b)

The court correctly considered the alimony factors and the mere fact that it awarded alimony in excess of defendant's prior contribution to the ... mortgage—$1,100—is not indicative of any error warranting reversal.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(1) requires consideration of a spouse’s current ability to pay alimony; averaging income over the entire marriage may fail to reflect that ability.

Simmons v. Kurt Simmons, Jr. · filed 2025-01-17(b)(1)

To the extent defendant argues the court should have considered the average of his income over the entire duration of the marriage, rather than his more recent income, the result would not have reflected his current actual ability to pay alimony, see N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(1).

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires an alimony award to be supported by specific findings on relevant factors, including the parties' needs, ability to pay, earning capacities, and marital standard of living.

S.M. v. S.L. · filed 2025-05-06(b)

We were unable to discern from the court's written opinion whether it considered: (1) the $87,000 per year income disparity; (2) defendant's assertion that she had no ability to earn income during the marriage because she did not have a green card and because she was responsible for caring for the children; (3) defendant's ability to earn income based on her experience and education level; and (4) defendant's ability to meet her needs while only earning a $46,000 per year gross income without the payment of any actual "in pocket" alimony. We conclude a detailed consideration of these facts is necessary in order to set an appropriate alimony amount and its effective date.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires trial courts to consider its listed factors when awarding alimony.

Tafro v. Tafro · filed 2025-05-22(b)

Trial courts must consider the factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) when awarding alimony.

Section 2A:34-23 does not require an independent analysis of the parties’ circumstances when a court enforces a carefully drafted alimony agreement that addresses continuation of payments.

Brodzik v. Brodzik · filed 2025-06-18

The carefully drafted PSA, expressly agreed upon by the parties with the advice of experienced counsel, makes an independent analysis of the parties' relative circumstances under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 unnecessary.

An alimony award must address each statutory factor and connect the court’s factual findings to its legal conclusions.

S.S. v. A.T.S., Jr. · filed 2025-11-25(b)

In addition to addressing the issues specifically identified in this opinion, on remand the court shall set forth how it considered each of the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), state clearly its factual findings, and correlate those findings with the relevant legal conclusions.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(4) requires courts setting alimony to consider the marital standard of living and each spouse’s ability to maintain a reasonably comparable standard.

A.P. v. D.P. · filed 2026-02-23(b)(4)

S.W. elaborates as to what an analysis of factor four under the statutory alimony factors requires. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4). This factor requires a judge to consider "[t]he standard of living established in the marriage . . . and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living, with neither party having a greater entitlement to that standard of living than the other." ... Further, the second judge considered the contributions made to the marital lifestyle by plaintiff's parents and quantified it numerically.

Section 2A:34-23 permits alimony in annulment actions involving either void or voidable marriages.

Richards v. Richards · filed 1976-01-15

The statute makes no distinction between a voidable and a void marriage. The language of the provision clearly provides that in all actions brought for annulment, an alimony award is proper.

Section 2A:34-23 permits temporary alimony in annulment actions, including those involving void marriages, when the circumstances make an award fit, reasonable and just.

Callaghan v. Leonard · filed 1977-07-14

After reviewing the total scheme of relief in matrimonial actions afforded by N. J. S. A. 2A:34-23, this court holds that it has the power to award alimony pendente lite in all annulment actions where the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case render such an award fit, reasonable and just.

Section 2A:34-23 allows pendente lite alimony in divorce and nullity actions, and an unproven allegation of adultery does not bar an interim award.

Smith v. Smith · filed 1977-05-24

Until the plaintiff establishes by competent evidence his cause of action for divorce, his allegation of adultery is merely that, an unsubstantiated allegation, and thus defendant's alleged fault may not defeat the application for alimony pendente lite.

Section 2A:34-23 permits pendente lite support from interest earned on marital assets awaiting equitable distribution when no other source of support is available.

Samuelson v. Samuelson · filed 1984-12-05

Therefore, this Court finds that the limitations and restrictions set forth in Grange v. Grange, supra , are inapplicable to the factual posture of this case, and further finds that it has jurisdiction and authority to order pendente lite support payable from interest accumulations of otherwise equitably distributable assets when no other source of support is available.

Section 2A:34-23 permits reimbursement alimony to be revised as circumstances require.

Reiss v. Reiss · filed 1985-10-17

Although we concur with the result reached in Reiss II, we believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court used the term advisedly when it introduced the concept of reimbursement alimony in Mahoney, supra 91 N.J. at 501. As such, it is alimony — subject to revision and alteration "from time to time as circumstances may require" as provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and not dischargeable in bankruptcy (see Lynn, supra 91 N.J. at 515, n. 1.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony that provides support; proven tradeoffs between support and property distribution may affect whether it is modified.

Hurley v. Hurley · filed 1988-12-02

Even though alimony ordinarily is subject to modification, see Lepis, supra at 145; Lynn v. Lynn, 153 N.J. Super. 377, 382 (Ch. Div. 1977), rev'd 165 N.J. Super. 328 (App.Div. 1979); and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, the court may consider the tradeoffs that are shown to have occurred between support and equitable distribution as a factor in modifying alimony.

Section 2A:34-23 exempts an inheritance from equitable distribution, but income generated by it may be considered when deciding whether to modify alimony.

Aronson v. Aronson · filed 1991-01-16

Although the inheritance itself is exempt from distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, the income generated by it is no different from income generated by any other asset, exempt or otherwise, for an alimony analysis. It may thus be used for the purpose of determining changed circumstances to the extent that it constitutes an increase in plaintiff's "income and aggregate resources."

Section 2A:34-23(c) applies to motions to modify term alimony regardless of the award’s date, unless the term substituted for permanent support based on an unfulfilled promise or expectation.

Gordon v. Rozenwald · filed 2005-08-31(c)

Because retroactive application is consistent with the most reasonable interpretation of the Legislature's intention in supplementing the alimony law and because the curative amendment reflects decisional law, we hold that courts should apply N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23c to all motions to modify term alimony, unless the moving party establishes that the term is a substitute for permanent alimony premised upon a promise or an expectation that has not been fulfilled or realized.

Section 2A:34-23(c) requires unusual circumstances to extend the term of limited duration alimony.

JONES VS. ANDREW VIOLA, ESQ. (L-4285-16, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-27(c)

To some extent, Viola did negotiate a benefit for appellant by obtaining the husband's agreement to a standard of "changed" circumstances under Lepis and Crews, rather than the harsher "unusual" circumstances imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c).

Section 2A:34-23(c) permits a court to extend limited duration alimony in unusual circumstances and applied when these parties executed their settlement agreement.

CERTO VS. ANTHONY C. CERTO (FM-11-1025-05, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-11(c)

While it is true that the alimony statute has been amended multiple times since then, the then-current statute provided for the type of relief plaintiff seeks.

Section 2A:34-23(b) directs courts to weigh the relevant factors when deciding whether to award open durational alimony.

IPPOLITO VS. TOBIA IPPOLITO (FM-14-0147-13, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-08(b)

The judge weighed the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), and concluded that open durational alimony was appropriate. This was a sound determination when considering the parties' ages, the length of the marriage (twenty-three years), Tobia's superior economic position because of his earning capacity, Lisa's absence from the workplace outside the home for more than ... twenty years while attending to parental responsibilities, and the fact that, when employed outside the home, Lisa never earned more than $50,000 annually.

Section 2A:34-23(b) frames alimony awards through statutory factors that guide the amount and duration of limited duration alimony.

LOPEZ VS. LORRAINE CUTILLO (FM-15-0436-18, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-22(b)

In this case, the trial judge's decision to award defendant limited durational alimony was supported by substantial, adequate, credible evidence. The judge considered the financial needs and circumstances of both parties, their testimony regarding the marital lifestyle and financial matters, the duration of the marriage, and all of the documentary evidence when she carefully and systematically analyzed each of the alimony factors. That analysis led her to conclude that limited durational alimony, in the amount of $400 per week for a period of forty-two months, was necessary in order for defendant to maintain the marital lifestyle. We discern no abuse of discretion in either the amount or duration of alimony ordered.

For a marriage lasting less than twenty years, section 2A:34-23(c) generally limits alimony to the length of the marriage unless exceptional circumstances justify a longer award.

J.T.S. VS. S.R. (FM-14-1195-15, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-08-19(c)

A three-and-a-half-year period of economic dependency does not present exceptional circumstances warranting alimony for a duration which exceeds the life of the marriage.

Section 2A:34-23 does not change the requirement that a separation agreement be just and equitable to be enforceable.

Carlsen v. Carlsen · filed 1974-11-06

We conclude that the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 does not affect that standard of enforceability.

Section 2A:34-23’s equitable distribution provisions do not reopen an unappealed divorce judgment incorporating a property settlement because of a later judicial interpretation concerning inherited property.

Skillman v. Skillman · filed 1975-10-06

We perceive no justification for a retroactive application of the Supreme Court's determination in Painter with respect to equitable distribution of inherited property where, as here, the parties have agreed to the terms of the property distribution and incorporated such agreement in an unappealed judgment of divorce.

Section 2A:34-23 permits spouses to exclude property acquired during marriage from equitable distribution through a fair reconciliation agreement made when the marriage has deteriorated to the brink of separation or divorce.

Nicholson v. Nicholson · filed 1985-03-22

Property acquired during a marriage may, however, be distributed by agreement. ... Where, however, the marital relationship has deteriorated at least to the brink of an indefinite separation or a suit for divorce, a spousal promise that induces a reconciliation will be enforced if it is fair and equitable.

Section 2A:34-23 permits later revision of alimony orders but does not permit equitable distribution judgments to be amended because circumstances have changed.

Rosen v. Rosen · filed 1988-05-18

Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 empowers the court to effectuate an equitable distribution of property only upon the entry of a judgment of divorce. In contrast, the statute provides that alimony orders may be revised and altered "from time to time as circumstances may require." There is no provision in the statute for the amendment of equitable distribution judgments upon changed circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony and support for changed circumstances, but that standard does not permit modification of an equitable distribution payout after divorce.

Schwartzman v. Schwartzman · filed 1991-05-07

We hold that Lepis does not apply to such agreements and, although, R. 4:50-1(f) affords an avenue of review, defendant's proofs are insufficient to afford him relief under that rule. In Lepis, supra, the Supreme Court held that alimony and support agreements are always subject to review and modification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Id. at 145, 416 A. 2d 45. To obtain a modification, the party requesting it must demonstrate "changed circumstances." Id. at 146-147, 416 A. 2d 45. However, it is settled law in New Jersey that, unlike an award of alimony or support, property division or equitable distribution provisions may not be adjusted after divorce to reflect unanticipated changes in the parties' circumstances, because the finality of a property division precludes any modification based on such changed circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 gives judges discretion to interpret marital agreements and modify support when the circumstances warrant it.

Guglielmo v. Guglielmo · filed 1992-01-21

The law grants particular leniency to agreements made in the domestic arena, and likewise allows judges greater discretion when interpreting such agreements. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Therefore, the agreement must be modified.

Section 2A:34-23 gives the court power to set a reasonable level of current alimony payments based on the obligor’s income, assets, and reasonable access to credit, even when the agreement bars modification.

A.T.M. VS. R.P.M. (FM-04-0337-05, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-06

The motion judge "has both the power and duty to establish a reasonable level of current payment based upon defendant's income, assets, and reasonable resort to credit." Ibid.; N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits consideration of post-judgment alimony despite a prior waiver when an unforeseeable loss of a bargained-for pension benefit substantially and permanently changes the circumstances.

FATTORE VS. FRANK FATTORE (FM-11-0224-97, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-02-05

Here, we hold the alimony waiver was not a bar to a consideration of a post-judgment award of alimony to plaintiff.

The 2014 amendments to subsection (b) do not apply retroactively to modify an enforceable written agreement made before the amendments.

L.S. VS. J.S. (FM-14-1170-13, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-25(b)

We note that the fourteen enumerated factors were part of the amendments to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), enacted on September 10, 2014, over three months after the execution of the MSA and the entry of the final judgment of divorce in this case. Because the Legislature specified that the amendment would not be applied retroactively to modify "any enforceable written agreement between the parties" in effect prior to the amendment, L. 2014, c. 42, § 2, it is not applicable to this case.

Subsection (n)'s 2014 cohabitation amendment does not modify agreements executed or final orders filed before its adoption.

TIMOTHY J. PETERS VS. MARSHA W. PETERS (FM-18-0237-09, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-05(n)

This subsection of the statute was added in 2014, but it does not modify "prior agreements executed or final orders filed before the adoption of the statutory amendments." See Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 538 (App. Div. 2015) (citing L. 2014, c. 42, § 2). The parties finalized the MSA in 2011.

The 2014 amendments to § 2A:34-23(b) do not authorize a court to shorten an alimony term agreed to before the amendments took effect.

MARIE ELLEN WEAVER VS. JOSEPH R. YOVANOVITCH (FM-13-1012-13, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-09-30(b)

Judge Butehorn denied the motion, finding neither the marital settlement agreement nor the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute provided defendant grounds for relief. We agree and affirm. ... The judge found that as the 2014 amendments did not provide any mechanism or authority for review of a marital settlement agreement incorporated into a judgment of divorce before the new law's effective date, "there is no authority under that new law for the court to order defendant's requested outcome" of reducing the length of the alimony term.

Section 2A:34-23(k)'s 2014 alimony amendments do not override specifically bargained-for modification terms in preexisting divorce agreements.

FREYDONT VS. RICHARD M. LENCHNER (FM-02-1384-04, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-02(k)

Although N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k) became effective on September 10, 2014, its application to provisions of pre-existing orders and agreements – like the PSA – is guided by the bill adopting the alimony amendments. ... The bill adds a provision that declares the new law non-retroactive with respect to certain prior judicial orders and alimony agreements.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of property acquired during marriage even if it was considered one spouse’s separate property.

Berle v. Berle · filed 1976-02-18

Thus it is clear from both the statutory and case law of New Jersey, that the property in issue, despite its characterization during the existence of the marriage as respondent’s “separate” property, could be subject to an equitable distribution upon a marital dissolution proceeding brought in that state.

Section 2A:34-23 permits an equitable distribution to stand when omitted assets are too small relative to the marital estate to make the distribution inequitable.

Tassie v. Tassie · filed 1976-04-07

The aggregate value of this property is relatively insignificant when viewed in the light of the total value of the marital property of approximately $2,500,000, and the failure to consider this property could not appreciably affect the distribution made by the trial judge and did not render it inequitable.

Section 2A:34-23 treats trust corpus as acquired for equitable distribution when a spouse gains title with the effective power to control, use, or enjoy it.

Mey v. Mey · filed 1977-04-13

In the sense of these definitions we regard the phrase "legally and beneficially," as did the trial judge, to mean that the spouse acquires the property within the intention of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 when he or she acquires a title which carries with it the effective power to control or use or enjoy.

Section 2A:34-23 provides for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage upon divorce; it does not apply to a widow’s claim to restore pension benefits.

Chausmer v. COMM'R EMP. RETIRE. SYST. NEWARK · filed 1977-06-03

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides for equitable distribution upon divorce of assets acquired during a marriage. This statute is inapplicable to the present case.

Under § 2A:34-23, an equitable distribution claim may survive a spouse’s death before divorce in exceptional circumstances involving the surviving spouse’s alleged wrongdoing.

Jacobson v. Jacobson · filed 1976-11-08

I therefore hold that this case presents unusual, tragic facts and circumstances that call out to equity to find a remedy. Equitable distribution is the remedy and I will not abate it.

Section 2A:34-23 ends the period for acquiring property subject to equitable distribution when the marriage is clearly at an end, even without a separation agreement.

Ross v. Ross · filed 1977-07-12

The rule in Smith should not be limited to a separation coupled with an agreement, but should be reasonably interpreted so as to terminate the acquisition period at such time as the marriage is clearly at an end. ... The home, acquired by the husband seven years after the parties separated, will not be considered an asset subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes equitable distribution when a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is entered, but does not authorize predivorce distribution of property held by the entirety.

Grange v. Grange · filed 1978-06-22

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides that in all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is entered the court may make such award as is necessary to effectuate an equitable distribution of the marital assets. It follows, then, that the court is without authority to order a predivorce distribution of a tenancy by the entirety.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of eligible assets in kind or by monetary award, but the chosen method must be reasonable in light of the parties’ circumstances.

Borodinsky v. Borodinsky · filed 1978-09-27

Equitable distribution following divorce is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. This statute authorizes the court to determine not only which assets are eligible for distribution and their respective values, but also how the allocation of the assets is to be made. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232 (1974). There is no restriction on the court with regard to ordering distribution in kind of the eligible assets or awarding a monetary equivalent thereof. ... The method of distribution, we hold, was an arbitrary and capricious one in the light of the situation of the parties and the distribution techniques which are available in order to achieve a reasonable result.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes assets acquired after an unequivocal separation establishes that the marriage has ended, even without a written separation agreement.

Brandenburg v. Brandenburg · filed 1979-04-03

The basic concept of the equitable distribution statute of 1971 contemplates that the distribution of marital assets shall be made in a manner which is fair and equitable to both parties. With that controlling principle as the polestar, it is evident that an asset acquired by either husband or wife after an unequivocal separation because of a dead marriage should not be shared as a windfall by the other spouse.

For equitable distribution under § 2A:34-23, filing a divorce action in another state can mark the end of the marital partnership for dividing property acquired afterward.

Portner v. Portner · filed 1982-04-05

The subsequent filing of an action for divorce by defendant in Pennsylvania signaled his rejection of marital ties and should be taken to mark the end of the marital partnership for the purpose of sharing in after-acquired property. The reasons given in the cases for using the commencement date of a divorce action in this State apply as well to an action for divorce brought in a sister state.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of assets acquired by either or both spouses during marriage, including the true value of stock fraudulently conveyed by a spouse.

Anzalone v. Anzalone Brothers, Inc. · filed 1982-05-11

The right to enjoy equitable distribution includes division of assets acquired by either or both parties during the marriage. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Hence, as it relates to husband and wife, the fraudulent conveyance claim is a matrimonial issue and fees incurred by the wife in compelling inclusion of the true value of fraudulently conveyed stock for equitable distribution are allowable against the husband.

Section 2A:34-23’s equitable distribution factors do not apply to a wife’s separate property.

Pastre v. Pastre · filed 1984-09-28

These factors, however, are not taken into consideration in distributing what would be the separate property of a wife. The trial court, therefore, correctly determined that the monies realized from the sale of the New Jersey home belonged to plaintiff.

For equitable distribution under § 2A:34-23, a divorce complaint asserting an unripe cause of action does not set the date the marriage ends.

Zappala v. Zappala · filed 1988-01-05

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes equitable distribution of property acquired by the spouses "during the marriage." ... The rationale of Portner thus persuades us that the Portner bright-line rule should not be applied here. ... We thus fix January 25, 1984 as the equitable distribution date.

A debt incurred during marriage is not necessarily a marital debt for equitable distribution; an insurance surcharge arising from one spouse’s driving offenses may remain that spouse’s responsibility.

Clark v. Clark · filed 1999-01-20

The assessment of the surcharge against plaintiff prior to the date on which the divorce complaint was filed does not necessarily render the obligation "marital". ... The insurance surcharge is therefore a non-marital debt for which defendant owes no duty of contribution to the plaintiff.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a divorcing spouse to receive an independent share of the marital portion of a PFRS pension, subject to the same rights and limits as the member's share.

LaSalla v. LaSalla · filed 1999-04-28

What the plaintiff receives at equitable distribution is more than simply a determination of her maximum benefit. Her distributive share is accompanied by the same bundle of rights and limitations the defendant retains as to his share. She, in effect, becomes a limited member of the PFRS. Her share is truly distributed to her.

Equitable distribution under § 2A:34-23 is subject to existing liens and cannot alter a bankruptcy estate’s rights in property the debtor held when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In Re Becker · filed 1992-02-03

Under N.J.Stat.Ann. 2A:34-23, the superior court is authorized in connection with a judgment of divorce to make an equitable distribution of property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage. ... However, transfers of property interests under equitable distribution are subject to existing liens. ... It follows that equitable distribution cannot alter a bankruptcy estate’s rights in property in which the debtor had an interest on the petition date, whether jointly owned or otherwise.

Section 2A:34-23 treats spouses’ interests in marital property as sufficiently like co-ownership that an equitable distribution can divide property they already owned in theory.

Vincent YONADI and Nancy Yonadi, Appellants v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE · filed 1994-04-14

The New Jersey equitable distribution statute and case law convince us that Mollie's interest is qualitatively different from that of the Delaware former wife in Davis. We conclude that Mollie's interest resulted from a division of property that can be characterized as already co-owned by her and Vincent before the divorce.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to order the sale of a marital residence before divorce judgment when keeping it would cause irreparable harm to the parties or their children.

Pelow v. Pelow · filed 1996-11-08

It is abundantly clear that the “common sense of the situation” and the “spirit of the legislative direction,” New Jersey Builders, Owners and Managers Ass’n v. Blair, supra, 60 N.J. at 339, 288 A.2d 855, require the conclusion that the Legislature intended to invest a court with broad discretion under N.J.S.A. 2A34-23 to make such orders as are “fit, reasonable and just” to protect the parties and dependent children during and after the dissolution process. ... Thus, the court will order that the marital residence shall be immediately listed for sale, with the sale expenses divided between the plaintiff and defendant, 48 percent and 52 percent, respectively.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to distribute marital property by granting an ownership interest or ordering a payment of money.

Yonadi v. Commissioner · filed 1994-04-14

When distributing marital property upon a divorce, New Jersey courts have the power to grant an actual (though not necessarily physical) division of property or a payment of money.

A marital home acquired during the marriage is subject to equitable distribution even when one spouse holds sole title when the divorce action is filed.

Cole, Schotz, Bernstein, Meisel & Forman, PA v. Owens · filed 1996-07-16

Thus, at the time the divorce action was filed, Owens was the sole owner of the property pursuant to the agreements and a deed. Because the property had been acquired during the marriage, it was subject to equitable distribution. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 allows the divorce court to determine each spouse’s interest in marital property through equitable distribution even when one spouse has filed for bankruptcy.

Varela v. Varela · filed 2000-06-29

Other cases clarify that a creditor's rights only extend to the interest a debtor has in property, which interest is defined by an equitable distribution award. ... While the context in Vander Weert was that of a voluntary lien by husband's lawyer, the result should be no different in a case involving a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a monetary equitable distribution claim when marital property titled in one spouse’s name cannot be transferred to the other spouse because of bankruptcy.

Lawrence v. Lawrence (In Re Lawrence) · filed 1999-08-04

The equitable interest of a nondebtor spouse arising under state law from such spouse’s contribution to the acquisition of property titled in the debtor gives rise to a monetary claim if the property itself cannot be transferred to the nondebtor because bankruptcy has occurred. N.J.Stat.Ann. 2A:34-23 states that “where a judgment of divorce ... is entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties ... [as is appropriate] to effectuate an equitable distribution” of the property acquired during the marriage. It is basic that monetary claims can be awarded in lieu of property distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 gives a spouse an enforceable right to equitable distribution upon entry of a divorce judgment.

Buglione v. Berlingeri (In Re Berlingeri) · filed 2000-02-24

New Jersey statutory and case law is even more clear than Pennsylvania law in finding that a right to payment arises only upon a judgment of divorce.

Section 2A:34-23 makes the right to equitable distribution arise when a divorce judgment is entered.

In Re Howell · filed 2004-07-01

Under state law, the right to equitable distribution does not arise until a judgment of divorce has been entered; thus, Rebecca Howell’s pending state court complaint seeking divorce and equitable distribution is not a claim that arose before commencement of this bankruptcy case.

Section 2A:34-23 does not provide equitable distribution when a marriage ends by death rather than divorce.

Wasserman v. Schwartz · filed 2001-09-14

Because the Schwartz' marriage ended in the death of Roberta Schwartz by homicide, rather than by divorce, the plaintiff cannot directly rely on the equitable distribution provision.

Section 2A:34-23(h) provides equitable distribution of property acquired during marriage on divorce; it does not govern property division between unmarried cohabitants.

Mitchell v. Oksienik · filed 2005-09-02(h)

Among the remedies available on divorce is equitable distribution of both *1199 real and personal property "legally and beneficially acquired by [the parties] or either of them during the marriage." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23h. ... Although distribution of individually owned assets is improper under the rubric of "equitable distribution" where unmarried cohabitating parties are involved, such persons who have engaged in a joint venture to purchase property in which they reside, are entitled to seek a partition, see Olson v. Stevens, 322 N.J.Super. 119, 730 A.2d 432 (App.Div.1999), and the Family Part is the appropriate forum for the resolution of such issues.

Section 2A:34-23(h) allows an earlier equitable distribution cutoff when a contested divorce action and remarriage conclusively show that the marital partnership had ended.

Genovese v. Genovese · filed 2007-04-17(h)

It is well-settled that, upon dissolution of a marriage, New Jersey law allows for "an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by . . . either [party] during the marriage. . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23h. ... No clearer fact of the present marriage's breakdown could be presented than plaintiff's remarriage, such that the mechanical application of the Painter bright-line rule works an injustice. ... We thus conclude that the facts of this case present another exception to the Painter rule and accordingly, we affirm the trial court's opinion.

Section 2A:34-23(h) provides for equitable distribution upon divorce, but statutory equitable distribution is unavailable if a spouse dies while the divorce action is pending.

Kay v. Kay · filed 2009-01-28(h)

When spouses divorce, marital property is distributed equitably between them in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23h and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. But, when one spouse dies during the pendency of an action for divorce, the action is abated and statutory equitable distribution is unavailable.

Section 2A:34-23(h) makes a pending claim for equitable distribution a contingent interest; the right vests upon entry of a divorce judgment.

In Re Kane · filed 2010-12-21(h)

The upshot of this definition is that when Ms. Kane filed for bankruptcy, she had an interest in an equitable distribution of marital property—namely, by virtue of being married to Mr. Kane, and by virtue of having initiated a divorce action in which she was seeking equitable distribution—but she did not have a right to it. Her claim qualified as a contingent, equitable interest in (marital) property that could not ripen into a vested property interest—i.e., a tangible asset—until entry of a judgment of ... divorce.

Section 2A:34-23(h) permits equitable distribution of deferred compensation only to the extent it was earned during the marriage or civil union, excluding the portion earned during premarital cohabitation.

Thieme v. Bernice F. Aucoin-Thieme(076683) · filed 2016-12-12(h)

We concur with the trial judge and the Appellate Division that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h) authorizes the equitable distribution of Thieme’s Closing Bonus only to the extent that the compensation was earned during the parties’ marriage.

Section 2A:34-23(h) limits equitable distribution to disputes between married or civil union couples; it does not govern a property dispute between a couple and one spouse’s judgment creditor.

KOENIG VS. HOFFMAN DIMUZIO (L-5180-13, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-04(h)

The statute's application is limited to disputes between married and civil union couples and does not apply where, as here, the dispute over property is between a married couple and a third-party judgment creditor of one the spouses.

Section 2A:34-23(h) limits equitable distribution to property legally and beneficially acquired by either spouse during the marriage.

FASSETT VS. LISA FASSETT (FM-14-0796-15, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-13(h)

See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h) (explaining equitable distribution is limited to "the property . . . which was legally and beneficially acquired by [the parties] or either of them during the marriage").

Section 2A:34-23(h) excludes inherited property and income generated from it from equitable distribution.

ROSEN VS. JAY ROSEN (FM-02-2767-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-03(h)

Property acquired "by either party by way of . . . devise, or intestate succession" is not subject to equitable distribution. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h). In addition, the income generated from an exempt asset is also not subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23(h) does not provide equitable distribution when a marriage ends by death rather than divorce.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES J. GILLETTE (P-257014, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-22(h)

Here, the marriage was terminated not by divorce, but by decedent's death. ... Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to the statutory remedy of equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23(h)(2) preserves the court's authority to distribute marital property when a party dies during a pending divorce, and applies retroactively to cases pending when the amendment took effect.

Roik v. Roik · filed 2024-01-18(h)(2)

Pursuant to these principles and our reading of the plain language of the new laws and the legislative statement, we conclude the new statutory provisions should apply retroactively to pending cases that were not dismissed prior to the effective date of the new statutes.

Section 2A:34-23(h) gives a spouse an equitable-distribution interest in marital property only upon divorce.

Patricia Cotroneo · filed 2024-06-24(h)

Absent divorce, petitioner simply had no equitable interest in the couple’s marital property.

Section 2A:34-23(h) does not permit equitable distribution of assets titled to a nonparty whose property interests were unrepresented in the divorce.

S. L. v. T. B. · filed 2025-01-28(h)

We thus conclude the mutual fund assets titled in her name were not subject to equitable distribution. Relatedly, the trial judge did not have authority to order a nonparty to transfer assets to plaintiff's name.

Marital property remains eligible for equitable distribution when the federal government releases it to one spouse after seizing it.

Eydelman v. Eydelman · filed 2025-02-18(h)(1)

Because we conclude the watch collection was a marital asset at the time of its seizure, that status cannot be altered or diminished by the federal government's release of the watch collection to plaintiff.

Section 2A:34-23 does not allow an equitable distribution judgment to be modified because circumstances have changed.

Gionco v. Gionco · filed 2026-02-03

We note "[t]here is no provision under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 for the [modification] of equitable distribution judgments upon changed circumstances."

Section 2A:34-23(h) requires the court to identify marital assets and debts and divide them fairly, including the marital portion of a military pension.

Gilbert v. Fitzgerald · filed 2026-06-15(h)

In addition, the judge failed to identify assets and debts subject to equitable distribution and divide them fairly and equitably in derogation of the equitable distribution statute and established case law.

Property legally and beneficially acquired during marriage is subject to equitable distribution even if titled in a third party’s name.

Myronova v. Malhan · filed 2025-08-20(h)(1)

The units were legally and beneficially acquired during the ... marriage, as they were obtained via the parties' joint efforts and funds and merely titled to Viktoriya. Defendant's individual purchase of these units after the divorce filing does not defeat their status as marital assets.

Section 2A:34-23(h)(2) permits a deceased spouse's estate to seek equitable distribution when a divorce action was pending at the spouse's death.

In the Matter of the Estate of Agnieshka Burke · filed 2026-06-29(h)(2)

In sum, we affirm the court's interpretation of subsection (h)(2) that an estate acting on behalf of a decedent can seek equitable distribution under the statute, in light of its plain language and our Supreme Court's holdings in Carr and Kay.

Section 2A:34-23 treats a spouse’s pension contributions from earnings during the marriage as property acquired during the marriage and subject to equitable distribution.

Pellegrino v. Pellegrino · filed 1975-06-09

In approaching the problem in this manner, we first note that Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 215-217 (1974) mandates that the word "acquired," as used in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, must be construed in a "comprehensive sense." So viewed, we conclude that the $5917.26 contributed by defendant from his earnings during the marriage to plaintiff (up until the date of the filing of the complaint herein) is property "acquired" during the marriage and subject to equitable distribution under the statute.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes a contingent right to future benefits under an employer-funded, noncontributory pension plan from equitable distribution when the employee has not met the plan's eligibility requirements.

White v. White · filed 1975-10-24

Accordingly, we are satisfied that Judge Ruggiero properly held that whatever right plaintiff presently has under the pension plan, it does not constitute property acquired during his marriage to defendant within the intendment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and was not subject to equitable distribution under that statute.

Section 2A:34-23 makes a pension or profit sharing interest acquired during marriage subject to equitable distribution when the employee has complete control over it, even if payment is postponed.

Blitt v. Blitt · filed 1976-01-22

In short, the portion of a pension plan, whether contributory or noncontributory, acquired during marriage and over which an employee has complete control, even though enjoyment may be postponed, should be an asset subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of military retirement pay and disability benefits to the extent the entitlement was earned through service during the marriage.

Kruger v. Kruger · filed 1976-02-23

We therefore conclude that both the retired pay and disability benefits which defendant husband has become irrevocably entitled to receive for the balance of his life constitute assets subject to equitable distribution to the extent that his entitlement thereto is based upon military service rendered during the existence of the marriage.

Section 2A:34-23 treats military retirement pay and disability benefits acquired during marriage as property subject to equitable distribution.

Kruger v. Kruger · filed 1977-07-06

Once all eligibility requirements have been met, the interest in the pension has become fixed and is property subject to equitable distribution. ... The statute contemplates that the property which is acquired during the marriage shall be subject to equitable distribution, irrespective of the reason for the payment. By this standard the disability benefits are in the same category as the retirement pay.

Section 2A:34-23 treats pension benefits earned during marriage as property eligible for equitable distribution, even if payment is uncertain.

Mc Grew v. Mc Grew · filed 1977-07-13

We conclude, therefore, that the retirement benefits provided for by the defendant's pension plan constitute property acquired within the intent of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes an alternate pension death benefit from equitable distribution when the employee has only the power to designate its beneficiary.

Corrigan v. Corrigan · filed 1978-06-22

The court thus holds that a power to designate a beneficiary of an alternate death benefit, which is payable from an employee's pension reserve, does not constitute property within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and that any benefits payable through exercise of such a power are, therefore, not subject to equitable distribution should the employee die before he retires.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of a pension interest acquired during marriage even when future payments are uncertain; vesting is not required.

Weir v. Weir · filed 1980-02-21

The fact is that the concept of vesting, though embodied in the plan document itself, really has little meaning from the standpoint of the ultimate decision which must be made under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Our equitable distribution statute requires that property be acquired during marriage to be subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. There is no requirement of vesting.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of pension benefits earned during marriage when the employee has qualified for benefits, even if payment depends on surviving to retirement age.

Kikkert v. Kikkert · filed 1981-02-10

Hence, equitable considerations mandate its inclusion for distribution where, as here, the employee has already qualified for benefits and the other spouse, during the marriage, has foregone enjoyment of that additional compensation represented by the cost of the plan whether or not it requires employee contributions.

Vested but unmatured private pension rights acquired during marriage are subject to equitable distribution.

Kikkert v. Kikkert · filed 1981-12-01

Thus, in keeping with the legislative intent and the important policy goals underlying equitable distribution, I join the Court in subjecting to equitable distribution the “vested” but unmatured pension benefits which Martin Kikkert acquired during his marriage to Elizabeth Kikkert.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes a wholly contingent pension interest from equitable distribution when the employee has not met the plan's eligibility requirements.

Barba v. Barba · filed 1985-01-17

However, we decline to consider such interests as acquired property rights eligible for equitable distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 in the light of our established case law and, of equal importance, because of the potential problems arising from including as a distributable asset an interest which is so contingent as not to be subject to an acceptable statistical valuation, or from enforcing a long term sharing of financial interests despite the changed relationships and circumstances of the parties.

Section 2A:34-23 does not subject Railroad Retirement Act pension rights to equitable distribution.

Hipsley v. Hipsley · filed 1978-07-13

Accordingly, this court holds that husband's pension rights under the Railroad Retirement Act are not subject to equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to count pension benefits accrued after the divorce complaint as income when determining alimony, but not benefits already subject to equitable distribution.

Staver v. Staver · filed 1987-03-11

Therefore, this court, in considering plaintiff's pension benefits that have accrued since the final judgment as income, is acting in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, which provides, in part, that after a judgment of divorce the court may make such order as to the maintenance of the parties as the case shall render fit, reasonable and just.

Section 2A:34-23 includes pension rights earned during marriage in the marital estate even if the pension has neither vested nor matured.

Whitfield v. Whitfield · filed 1987-12-18

The issue before us is whether that portion of a pension which was earned during coverture but which is neither vested nor matured is subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. We hold that such a pension is "property" acquired during the course of the marriage within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and that the practical difficulties inherent in its valuation in no way affect its includability in the marital estate.

Section 2A:34-23(b) bars courts from considering income generated by a retirement share already treated as an asset in equitable distribution when setting or modifying alimony.

Innes v. Innes · filed 1990-01-17(b)

What the trial court can no longer do, however, is determine alimony by considering income generated by a retirement share that has been equitably distributed, either at the time of divorce or when it considers a modification application.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of a 401(K) plan acquired during marriage even if it has not vested.

Winer v. Winer · filed 1990-06-07

Therefore, since these funds were acquired during the course of the marriage, regardless of their vesting, they are subject to equitable distribution.

For equitable distribution of a pension enhanced by early retirement credits, the coverture fraction uses actual years worked; the credits increase the benefit shared but do not change the fraction.

Eisenhardt v. Eisenhardt · filed 1999-11-17

The coverture fraction is the proportion of years worked during the marriage to total number of years worked. ... Here, neither spouse contributed to an additional three years of work. The incentive credit is a gift. They both share in this gift because it is included in the total benefit. But, because it is a gift, it does not change the proportion between what was acquired by their mutual effort to what was acquired by his effort alone.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of a spouse's pension but does not authorize a court to require the pension fund to pay benefits before the member becomes entitled to them.

La Sala v. La Sala · filed 2000-11-03

In this case, we conclude that the trial court's form of immediate distribution is not legally possible. Plaintiff has no right through the guise of equitable distribution to have any marital asset enhanced.

Section 2A:34-23 bars considering income from an equitably distributed retirement benefit when setting alimony; that rule does not restrict payment of existing alimony arrears from bankruptcy estate assets.

Galtieri v. Galtieri (In Re Galtieri) · filed 2006-02-16

The state statute contains a codification of ... the holding of D’Oro, specifically, that “[w]hen a share of a retirement benefit is treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider income generated thereafter by that share for purposes of determining alimony.” See Innes v. Innes, 569 A.2d 770, 774-75 (N.J. 1990) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). ... More importantly, the Bankruptcy Court did not make or modify an alimony determination in distributing assets of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 2A:34-23(h) subjects the portion of a pension earned during marriage to equitable distribution, including the retirement component of an accidental disability allowance.

Sternesky v. Salcie-Sternesky · filed 2007-10-22(h)

In general, the portion of a pension that is "legally or beneficially acquired" during a marriage is subject to equitable distribution. Larrison, supra, 392 N.J.Super. at 14, 919 A. 2d 852; see N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h). ... In summary, we hold that in the absence of specific evidence or official guidance permitting a more precise segregation of the components of an accidental disability pension awarded by PFRS, a court should utilize the formula discussed above to segregate the marital portion of the allowance from the portion best viewed as compensation to the individual for the disabling injury.

Section 2A:34-23(h) excludes pension increases attributable solely to post-divorce efforts from equitable distribution; the spouse claiming exclusion must precisely calculate the amount.

Barr v. Barr · filed 2011-01-19(h)

From these authorities we conclude that there are some extraordinary post-judgment pension increases that may be proven to be attributable to post-dissolution efforts of the employee-spouse, and not dependent on the prior joint efforts of the parties during the marriage. In such instances, these sums must be excluded from equitable distribution and the application of the coverture fraction may be insufficient to accomplish this purpose. When a claim is made to exclude post-dissolution sums, the employee-spouse seeking exclusion bears the burden of proving with calculable precision what portion of the increase in the pension's value is immune from equitable distribution.

Section 2A:34-23 permits equitable distribution of an attorney's practice goodwill when it exists, but the value must be supported by factual findings.

SLUTSKY VS. KENNETH J. SLUTSKY (FM-14-1535-08, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2017-08-08

If found, the value of goodwill is subject to the equitable distribution claims of the non-titled spouse.

Section 2A:34-23(j)(4) bars counting a pension divided as marital property when determining a retired alimony payor’s ability to pay.

STANSBURY VS. JOHN M. STANSBURY (FM-08-0736-98, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-29(j)(4)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(4) provides, "[t]he assets distributed between the parties at the time of the entry of a final order of divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall not be considered by the court for purposes of determining the obligor’s ability to pay alimony following retirement." ... We agree ... with defendant that the judge erred in including defendant's pension in computing his income because defendant's pension was equitably distributed during the final judgment of divorce.

Assets distributed at divorce cannot be considered when determining an obligor's ability to pay alimony after retirement.

SOWELL-ZAK VS. GARY ZAK (FM-13-1164-09, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-08(j)(4)

As part of the equitable distribution of the property in the judgment of divorce, plaintiff had been paid for her share of defendant's interest in Global Essence, and therefore the court was precluded from considering defendant's payment for his interest in Global Essence in its determination of defendant's ability to pay following his retirement.

Section 2A:34-23(b) bars consideration of income from a retirement share previously distributed as marital property when determining alimony, but permits consideration of benefits earned after divorce.

WILLIAM J. ENGELHARDT, JR. VS. DIANA ENGELHARDT (FM-15-0658-04, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-24(b)

We, likewise find meritless husband's argument that in determining the alimony award, the trial court contravened N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j) by erroneously considering both the retirement fund that was equitably distributed to wife and income derived therefrom. ... Although the court was aware of the prohibition against considering pre-divorce contributions that were subject to equitable distribution and the gains derived from same—explicitly saying so in its initial decision and further explained in its reconsideration decision—it should have set forth the considered amounts.

Section 2A:34-23(b) bars consideration of income from a retirement benefit distributed as an asset when determining alimony, but does not bar its consideration when awarding attorney's fees.

GALE L. PICCIONE VS. CHARLES S. PICCIONE (FM-21-0304-08, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-04-09(b)

The provision in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 cited by the Court in Innes prohibits consideration of the income generated from a retirement benefit that was treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution only in the determination of alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(h) permits deferred distribution of a pension without expert testimony about its present value when the pension is the only marital asset.

JOHN A. VARGAS v. MARIA E. COLON (FM-12-1425-19, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-03-10(h)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h) authorizes the trial court to divide marital assets by "mak[ing] such award or awards to the parties, . . . to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property . . . ." ... Because plaintiff's pension was the couple's only asset at the time of the divorce proceeding, the judge should have considered distribution of that asset without expert testimony, allocated a percentage share of the pension to defendant, and signed a COAP to effectuate deferred distribution of plaintiff's pension.

Section 2A:34-23(h) permits equitable distribution of pension benefits acquired during marriage; a spouse claiming a premarital portion must provide evidence of it.

KNAUST v. JESSICA KNAUST (FM-03-0338-12, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-08-30(h)

But only the portion of the pension acquired during the marriage or civil union will be subject to distribution ... between the parties. ... The plaintiff failed to produce evidence of his premarital contributions. We discern no basis to disturb the court's findings on this important point. In light of the record, the court's award of one-half of the value of plaintiff's pension and rejection of the coverture fraction was appropriate and not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2A:34-23(j)(4) excludes the value of assets distributed at divorce from the alimony calculation after retirement, but permits consideration of income those assets generate.

Ferraro v. Ferraro · filed 2024-10-15(j)(4)

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(4), the court may not consider the value of the assets—the properties—as income, however, the court may consider the income derived from the properties in the calculation of alimony.