N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:18-61.1

Section 2A:18-61.1 treats a two-family home purchased for immediate occupancy by its owner as owner-occupied and exempt from its good-cause eviction requirement.

Bradley v. Rapp · filed 1975-02-24

Accordingly, we conclude that one who purchases a two-family premises for the express purpose of immediately residing therein renders the premises "owner-occupied" within the meaning and intendment of that phrase as used in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.

Section 2A:18-61.1’s owner-occupied premises exception applies when the landlord and tenant live under the same roof, but not when they live in separate dwellings on the same tract of land.

Reggiori v. Petrone · filed 1981-10-07

Therefore, this court is of the opinion that the "owner-occupied premises" exception applies only to landlords and tenants who reside under the same roof, and does not include separate dwellings on the same tract of land.

Section 2A:18-61.1’s owner-occupied premises exception can cover a rental unit in a separate building on the same property as the landlord’s home.

Fresco v. Policastro · filed 1982-07-20

It is the opinion of this court that the word "premises" should be given the broad meaning of "land and its appurtenances." ... The landlord's enjoyment of his home is equally impaired whether he lives above, below, in front of or behind, or alongside an unfavorable tenant.

An owner seeking to evict a tenant to personally occupy a unit must intend to use it for residential purposes.

Gross v. Barriosi · filed 1979-05-10(l)(3)

It would thus seem that the act's intent and purpose dictate that "to personally occupy" be interpreted to mean for residential purposes.

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not treat a landlord’s good faith intention to occupy a rented apartment as grounds for eviction.

Stamboulos v. McKee · filed 1975-06-17

The statute does not permit the good faith intention of the landlord to occupy the rented premises to serve as a reason for terminating the tenancy or obtaining possession.

Section 2A:18-61.1(l)(3)'s personal occupancy ground does not permit a condominium buyer to evict an existing tenant from a converted apartment building with more than three units.

Fishman v. Pollack · filed 1979-01-08(l)(3)

Plaintiff then claims that an exception, namely N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1( l )(3), is applicable. This section establishes as a ground for good cause: The owner of a building of three residential units or less seeks to personally occupy a unit, or has contracted to sell the residential unit to a buyer who wishes to personally occupy it and the contract for sale calls for the unit to be vacant at the time of closing. The court finds that this section does not apply to the situation at bar, i.e., conversion of an apartment building to a condominium.

Section 2A:18-61.1(l)(2) does not permit owner-occupancy eviction when the tenant’s initial tenancy began before condominium conversion.

Kabakian v. Kobert · filed 1983-03-01(l)(2)

Subparagraph (2) is inapplicable because while plaintiffs qualify as owners of three or fewer condominium units, defendants' "initial tenancy" began before, not "after," conversion. Also, their initial tenancy began by rental from the owner of a 194-unit building, not from "an owner of three or less units."

Landlord-occupied units count as rental units when determining whether an owner may evict a tenant for personal use; the owner of a four-unit residential building cannot do so.

Manning v. Hancher · filed 1986-10-28(l)(3)

The fact that the landlord's family occupies two rental units does not make them any the less a rental unit. Because it is a four unit residential building, the landlord must satisfy the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, rather than 2A:18-53. ... Based on N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, the landlord cannot evict a tenant from a residential four unit building for his own use.

Section 2A:18-61.1 continues to protect a tenant when a landlord converts a four-unit building to three units to avoid its requirements.

Chambers v. Nunez · filed 1986-11-19

A landlord cannot convert a building from four units to three units in an effort to avoid the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 in derogation of a tenant's statutory rights.

Section 2A:18-61.1’s owner-occupied premises exception applies when the owner occupies a unit and the building has no more than two other rental units, even if one is commercial.

Couey v. Sterling · filed 1988-01-25

In using the same class of structures in both statutes to define "premises", the Legislature clearly manifested its intention not to limit the "owner-occupied premises" exception to residential dwellings.

Section 2A:18-61.1’s owner-occupied exception requires residential occupancy; an owner’s use of a unit as a dental office does not qualify.

Pappas v. Huezo · filed 1989-07-19

Since plaintiff-dentist (it should be noted here that neither plaintiff "occupys" the dental office) does not use the office to live there, plaintiffs are not exempt from the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.

Section 2A:18-61.1 exempts a building with no more than two rental units when an occupant has a bona fide ownership share, even if a tenant moved in before that occupant became an owner.

Dempsey v. Mastropasqua · filed 1990-07-05

Consequently, when a bona fide percentage of ownership exists, the person possessing it qualifies for owner-occupier status under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. ... Hence, the exception applies to a building with three residential units, one of which is occupied by an owner personally. ... Finally, the act does not set forth any language that suggests the exemption is preempted by a "pre-conversion" tenant as held in Surace and as found here.

A landlord cannot use the owner-occupied premises exemption to remove an existing tenant’s good-cause protection by reducing the number of rental units.

Surace v. Pappachristou · filed 1990-10-15

Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs, having taken title to the property knowing that the tenants were protected by the Anti-Eviction Act, cannot now remove that protection by deleting just enough units from the rental market to render the premises exempt from the "good cause" provisions of the Act.

Section 2A:18-61.1(l)(3) allows a joint tenant with a 25% ownership interest to seek possession of a unit for personal occupancy.

Cima v. Elliott · filed 1988-01-25(l)(3)

Accordingly, this court holds that the concept of "owner", as expressed in subsection l (3) of the Act, includes a joint tenant seized with a 25% interest in real estate.

An owner may invoke the personal occupancy ground for removal when a building has no more than three residential units, even if it also contains commercial space.

Durruthy v. Brunert · filed 1988-10-19(l)(3)

We therefore conclude that the owner of a building containing three residential units or less may invoke N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1( l )(3) even though his building also contains commercial space.

Subsection (l)(3) permits removal for personal occupancy, but a landlord relying on a buyer’s occupancy must have a qualifying sale contract when it gives notice to quit.

Weise v. DOVER GENERAL HOSP. · filed 1992-06-26(l)(3)

We also reject Dover's contention that even if it should have notified plaintiffs of its intention not to convert the property, it matters not because it could have evicted plaintiffs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1l(3). Eviction pursuant to that subsection is permitted where the owner "seeks to personally occupy a unit, or has contracted to sell the residential unit to a buyer who wishes to personally occupy it and the contract for sale calls for the unit to be vacant at the time of closing...." Dover did not seek to personally occupy the house and at the time it gave plaintiffs the statutory notice to quit, it did not have a contract to sell to the Mays providing for the vacating of the premises upon closing.

A limited liability company that owns a building cannot invoke the personal-occupancy ground to evict a tenant because its member wishes to live in the unit.

XXXX-XXXX REALTY, LLC v. Law · filed 2009-04-08(l)(3)

We reject appellant's argument that the construction adopted by the trial court leads to an absurd result. Rather, were we to adopt the appellant's approach, and overlook the distinction between Realty and its member Rosenberg, we would be construing the statute in a manner at odds with its purpose because we would be expanding the universe of parties entitled to dispossess blameless tenants from their residence. ... We cannot so easily disregard the fact that Rosenberg is not the owner of the building; his limited liability company is the owner.

An owner’s intent to personally occupy the unit is good cause for nonrenewal and removal.

N'Jie v. Cheung · filed 2012-11-20(l)(2)

However this is not indicative of their breach of the lease agreement itself, and indeed, the Statute contemplates the owner’s intent to personally occupy the premises as “good cause” for non-renewal and the basis of a removal proceeding.

An owner of a building with no more than two rental units qualifies for the owner-occupied exception by personally occupying a unit part-time in good faith; it need not be the owner's principal residence.

McQueen v. Brown · filed 2001-07-10(1)

Based on this legislative history and the plain language of the statute, we construe the "owner-occupied premise" exception as not requiring an "owner-occupier" to permanently occupy or use the unit as the owner's principal residence to qualify for the exception under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(1).

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not give tenants vested protection when a building is converted into an otherwise exempt owner-occupied dwelling.

Osoria v. New York Rent Cont. Bd. · filed 2009-11-16

Because we find no pre-conversion vested rights in the language of the Anti-Eviction Act, except where the Act itself or another statute explicitly establishes such rights, and also because creating such rights judicially is inconsistent with other parts of the Act, we conclude that no pre-conversion rights are established by the Anti-Eviction Act where a building is converted to an otherwise exempt owner-occupied dwelling.

An owner may evict a tenant to personally occupy a unit in a separate building with no more than three residential units, even if other buildings on the same parcel contain additional rental units.

Cashin v. Marisela Bello(073215) · filed 2015-10-07(l)(3)

We find that N.J.S.A. 2A:18- 61.1(l)(3) unambiguously permits the owner of a particular structure that contains no more than three residential units to oust a tenant from that building so that the owner may occupy the tenant’s unit, even when other structures on the owner’s property contain additional rental units.

An LLC landlord cannot invoke subsection (l)(3) to evict a tenant so that one of its members can personally occupy the unit.

Gensroad Ishmael LLC v. Wallace · filed 2024-07-02(l)(3)

Plaintiff as an LLC cannot ... invoke N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(3) to occupy defendants' unit.

Section 2A:18-61.1’s good-cause requirement does not apply to owner-occupied premises with no more than two rental units.

CAMPANIELLO-CASON v. O'REILLY · filed 2021-07-13

However, as noted by Defendant, the “good cause” requirement set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 does not apply to “owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units.”

Section 2A:18-61.1(l)(3) does not permit eviction based on a sale to an LLC whose member intends to occupy the property, because the LLC cannot personally occupy it.

76 Berlin Road, LLC v. Gormley · filed 2026-06-04(l)(3)

Thus, because Finest Address will hold title to the property, and an LLC cannot "personally occupy" a property, plaintiff has not established "good cause" under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(3).

Section 2A:18-61.1(e) permits dispossession for violating a reasonable lease covenant that forbids dogs in an apartment.

Housing Auth., Atlantic City v. Coppock · filed 1975-10-08(e)

We have no doubt of the reasonableness of the covenant forbidding dogs in the leased apartment within the meaning of the dispossess provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(e). Accordingly, a dispossess action will lie, as here, for a plain violation thereof.

A lease change prohibiting pets is reasonable under subsection (i), even if the landlord previously allowed pets, when the landlord gives proper notice.

Courts v. Sgambati · filed 1978-10-13(i)

Accordingly, it is the holding of this court that a change in a lease which prohibits pets is reasonable within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(i).

Subsection (i) treats a requirement that a tenant pay the full rent as an unreasonable lease change when the landlord ends an assisted lease without good cause while rental assistance remains available.

R & D REALTY v. Shields · filed 1984-05-31(i)

The court holds that said change is reasonable if the landlord has shown good cause for nonrenewal of the assisted lease under the United States Housing Act. To hold otherwise would mean that a landlord would be locked into the Section 8 Program ad infinitum and this would be contrary to the provisions of the United States Housing Act. Here, however, the plaintiff has failed to show good cause for nonrenewal of the leases, and this change in the new lease is therefore unreasonable under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(i).

Subsection (i) requires courts assessing a lease change's reasonableness to consider tenants' attachment to their home and pets, rather than defer to a landlord's whim or caprice.

Royal Associates v. Concannon · filed 1985-03-27(i)

What is "reasonable" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(i) should be analyzed with a recognition that personal affinities towards both living quarters and pets should not be required to be sacrificed on the basis of a landlord's whim or caprice.

A lease restriction on washing machines can be reasonable grounds for possession when their use causes drainage backups, health hazards, and water damage.

Housing Auth. of City of E. Orange v. Mishoe · filed 1985-05-20(e)

The uncontroverted evidence in this case indicated that defendant's use of her washing machine caused a back up in the kitchen sinks in the apartments beneath defendant, causing health hazards and water damage. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that plaintiff's policy of prohibiting the use of washing machines in the project was unreasonable.

Section 2A:18-61.1(i) requires a new no-pets term in a renewal lease to be reasonable in light of both the landlord’s and the tenant’s circumstances.

Young v. Savinon · filed 1985-04-09(i)

These restrictions could be placed in the rules and regulations promulgated by the landlord, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(d), in the lease covenants themselves, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(e), or in changes in the terms and conditions contained in a renewal lease, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(i). These sections all require, however, that the provisions be "reasonable." ... Since the "no pets" provision may be enforced in a summary dispossess or declaratory judgment proceeding, if a tenant claims special circumstances, the reasonableness of the prohibition relating to both the landlord and the tenant in his or her particular circumstances should be inquired into by the court.

Section 2A:18-61.1(i) requires notice terminating the existing tenancy and an opportunity to accept reasonable lease changes before refusal to accept them can support eviction.

Lowenstein v. Murray · filed 1988-11-15(i)

The effect of this opinion is to require a minimum of three months to evict a tenant entitled to the protection of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 in a summary dispossess proceeding. When the proposed lease changes are submitted to the tenant, a one-month notice must be served to terminate the pre-existing tenancy and give the tenant an opportunity to accept the proposed changes. If the tenant refuses to accept them within that one month (which a fortiori extends to the first day of the new term), then a full month's notice must be given to terminate the resulting month-to-month tenancy, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2e prior to the institution of the action.

Section 2A:18-61.1(i) requires a landlord seeking eviction over a proposed lease change to prove that the change is reasonable.

Village Bridge Apts. v. Mammucari · filed 1990-03-14(i)

The provision does not, however, state clearly whether landlord or tenant has the burden of proof with regard to the reasonability of any lease changes. We hold that the burden rests with the landlord.

A landlord cannot evict a tenant for a lease violation once the tenant has corrected it, whether the correction occurs before or after suit is filed.

Jijon v. Custodio · filed 1991-02-28(e)

Once the alleged violation of the terms of a lease has been abated, the landlord loses his authority to evict the tenant.

A lease covenant can support removal of a residential tenant only if it is reasonable; a guest restriction that interferes with quiet enjoyment cannot support removal.

Ashley Court Enterprises v. Whittaker · filed 1991-07-10(e)

Moreover, paragraph 38 cannot be a basis for judgment of possession because it is not a reasonable lease provision. Violation of a lease covenant or agreement may be the basis for removal of a residential tenant "provided that such covenant or agreement is reasonable." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. This is not a reasonable lease provision because it interferes with the covenant of quiet enjoyment set forth in paragraph 8 of the lease.

Subsection (i) permits a tenant to be required to sign a lease containing a termination upon death clause, while leaving the clause's legal effect to be determined at the tenant's death.

Riverview Realty v. Williamson · filed 1995-10-25(i)

One of the statutory grounds occurs if a landlord proposes "at the termination of a lease, reasonable changes of substance in the terms and conditions of the lease, including specifically any change in the term thereof, which the tenant, after written notice, refuses to accept...." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(i). ... Consequently, we affirm the judge's ruling that the defendant sign a lease containing the termination upon death clause, but we hold that her signing is without prejudice to a determination at the time of her death of the legal effect, if any, of that clause.

Section 2A:18-61.1(i) does not allow a court to reject a federally mandated public housing lease provision as an unreasonable change.

Housing Authority v. Spratley · filed 1999-12-30(i)

By enacting N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(e)(2), however, our Legislature implicitly gave effect to federal primacy in defining the rights of tenants in federally funded housing projects. We are obliged to construe our statute accordingly. We thus conclude that the trial court erred by finding the federally-mandated accountability clause unreasonable under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(i).

Subsection (i) allows eviction when a tenant refuses reasonable changes to a lease at its termination; reasonableness depends on the totality of the circumstances, including both parties’ interests.

40 WASHINGTON, LLC VS. SCOTT DIROMA (LT-023982-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-21(i)

When interpreting the reasonableness of a proposed lease change, courts consider the totality of the relevant circumstances, including the interests of both the landlord and the tenant. The trial court did so here, and we find no error in its conclusions.

Section 2A:18-61.1 allows a tenant to avoid eviction for lease or rule violations by curing them, but brief compliance may not cure recurring hazardous conditions.

WESTFIELD SENIOR CITIZENS HOUSING CORP. VS. PATRICIA LYTELL (LT-002242-19, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-28(d), (e)(1)

A tenant in a federally subsidized rental unit may avoid eviction by curing violations of the landlord's rules and regulations or lease terms beforehand. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12. ... We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Substantial, credible evidence supported the conclusion that defendant did not cure the hazardous conditions in her unit.

Section 2A:18-61.1(e)(1) permits eviction for a continuing substantial violation of a reasonable lease term after the tenant receives written notice to cease.

MONTGOMERY STREET HOUSING URBAN RENEWAL, LLC VS. ZAINAB SHERIFF (LT-27289-19, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-06-25(e)(1)

A continuing substantial violation of a reasonable lease term, after the tenant has received a written notice to cease, is ... one of the statutory good causes for eviction.

Subsection (i) requires the existing tenancy to be terminated when a landlord offers a rent increase, and proposed lease changes must be reasonable, including respect for the warranty of habitability.

Ktwe Group, LLC v. Balaj · filed 2025-09-18(i)

Plaintiff thus failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(i) because the ground for eviction codified in that subsection required the tenancy to be terminated when the landlord offered the rent increase. ... Plaintiff failed to establish that the terms of its proposed lease were reasonable, as those terms essentially required defendants to waive the protections afforded to tenants under the Marini doctrine.

Section 2A:18-61.1 enumerates grounds for eviction and preempts municipal ordinances that set forth grounds for eviction or dispossession.

Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford · filed 1975-12-11

With the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 in 1974, which sets forth specific enumerated grounds of eviction, there can no longer be any doubt that the Legislature intended to preempt this area of the law. Consequently, we hold that provisions in municipal ordinances which set forth grounds for eviction or dispossession are invalid as having been preempted by state enactments.

Section 2A:18-61.1(f) calls for consideration of whether an increased rent shocks a reasonable person's conscience and whether the increase was intended to make the tenant leave.

Edgemere at Somerset v. Johnson · filed 1976-03-23(f)

In the context of such definitions and the general knowledge of the court as to prevailing rents in the area of plaintiff's project, we cannot say that the rent increases effective December 1, 1975 are unconscionable within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f). Although the percentage of the increase is large, the determinative factors are whether the resulting rent is so great as to shock the conscience of a reasonable person and was effected for the purpose of compelling the tenant to vacate.

Section 2A:18-61.1(f) does not allow tenants to challenge an HFA-approved rent increase as unconscionable in a summary eviction action.

Marine View Housing Co. v. Benoit · filed 1982-11-19(f)

This case poses the previously unanswered question of whether tenants of a New Jersey Housing Finance Agency (HFA) residential project who fail to pay an agency-approved rent increase may, in a summary dispossess action instituted because of their failure to pay the increase, assert as a defense that the increase was "unconscionable." They may not.

Section 2A:18-61.1(f)'s unconscionability review is preempted for rents approved by HUD for a subsidized insured housing project.

Hill Manor Apartments v. Brome · filed 1978-11-06(f)

N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) merely requires a finding that the increase in rents charged by the landlord is not "unconscionable" as a prerequisite to summary eviction. ... I, therefore, conclude that 24 C.F.R. § 403.1(a) and (b) serve to bar state judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of rents established by HUD pursuant to its legislative mandate.

Section 2A:18-61.1(f) requires a proposed rent increase to comply with local rent ordinances, including a valid 60-day notice requirement.

Associates v. Rent Leveling Bd. · filed 1986-12-29(f)

There is no conflict between Franklin Township's Ordinance and State law. The very language of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, requiring proposed rental increases to comply "... with any all other laws or municipal ordinances governing rent increases[,]" envisions that both State and local regulatory schemes may co-exist.

Section 2A:18-61.1(f) requires a landlord seeking eviction for nonpayment after a rent increase to prove that the increase is not unconscionable.

Fromet Properties, Inc. v. Buel · filed 1996-11-06(f)

The language of the statute places the burden of establishing one of the possible grounds for eviction upon the landlord. Thus, a court should not dispossess a tenant from a residential unit unless it has been established by the landlord that one of the enumerated criteria exists (in this case that the rent increase was not unconscionable).

Subsection (f)'s protection against unconscionable rent increases applies when a tenant receives a valid notice to quit and a rent increase.

BURROUGH'S MILL APARTMENTS VS. RYAN ARMSTRONG (LT-008859-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-21(f)

We also conclude that the judge was unquestionably correct in finding that the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f), prohibiting unconscionable increases in rent "after a valid notice to quit," simply do not apply because there was no notice to quit and there was no increase in rent after defendant voluntarily entered into a lease agreement at the monthly rate of $1810.

Under subsection (f), rising property costs and four years without a rent increase can support finding a nine-percent increase conscionable.

AMIT RAY VS. ALPER TORUNOGLU (LT-4014-19, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-04(f)

In this case, Judge Corman's conclusion that the $180 rent increase was not unconscionable is amply supported by plaintiff's testimony that since 2014 there have been increases in real estate taxes, property insurance, and condominium fees.

When the lawful amount of an increased rent is unresolved before a rent control board, a landlord must exhaust its remedies before seeking removal for failure to pay the increase.

119 59 WNY, LLC VS. GUSTAVO MARTINEZ (LT-012328-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-15(f)

The judge correctly decided that plaintiff should exhaust its administrative remedies before the RCB before seeking to remove defendant from the premises.

Section 2A:18-61.1(f) permits removal when a tenant fails to pay increased rent after valid notices to quit and of increase, provided the increase is not unconscionable and complies with applicable rent laws.

MARIA DE MATOS VS. VINCENT M. FAZZARI (LT-001228-19, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-14(f)

Defendant's argument that plaintiff lacked statutory authority to seek his removal lacks merit. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) establishes that a tenant may be removed if the tenant "has failed to pay rent after a valid notice to quit and notice of increase of said rent, provided the increase in rent is not unconscionable an d complies with any and all other laws or municipal ordinances governing rent increases."

Section 2A:18-61.1(f)’s unconscionability defense to eviction for nonpayment of a rent increase is preempted when HUD approves the increase for a Section 8 project covered by a housing assistance contract, even if the tenant no longer receives assistance.

SUMMIT PLAZA ASSOCIATES VS. RAGEE KOLTA (LT-007691-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-20(f)

Here, we agree with the judge's determination that N.J.S.A. 2A:18- 61.1(f) is preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, § 2.

A notice of rent increase under subsection (f) requires a one-month notice period.

THE VILLAGE APARTMENTS VS. DAVID MACALL (LT-008654-19, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-30(f)

The law requires a one-month notice period in these circumstances.

Section 2A:18-61.1(f) permits a court to determine an appropriate rent increase when the proposed increase is unconscionable and no rent leveling board is functioning.

Cande Land 2020, LLC v. Diaz · filed 2023-11-14(f)

In these circumstances, we conclude the trial court has the authority to determine an appropriate rent considering all relevant factors, including "rate shock."

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not provide good cause to evict a tenant for refusing a further security deposit after the tenant lawfully applied the earlier deposit to rent.

Delmat Corporation v. Kahn · filed 1977-02-09(i)

Beyond this, "good cause" for eviction under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 has not been shown.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) does not permit summary eviction for failure to pay the double-rent penalty under section 2A:42-5 because the penalty is not rent due under the lease.

Parkway, Inc. v. Mabel Briggs Curry · filed 1978-09-11(a)

So posited, it can hardly be argued that the liability imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:42-5 constitutes "rent due and owing under the lease," as that phrase is employed in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a).

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) permits a judgment for possession when a tenant fails to pay lawful rent increases.

BH ASSOCIATES v. Brudner · filed 1982-04-26(a)

In light of the fact that defendant has refused to pay either of these allowable rent increases, a judgment for possession will be entered with arrearages in the amount of $434., calculated as follows: ... Because of the unique nature of this case and the amount of arrearages, the court will suspend the operation of the judgment for possession for a period of thirty (30) days.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) permits eviction without statutory notice when rent remains unpaid; subsection (j) covers habitual, unjustified late payment and requires notice.

Scugoza v. Stockton · filed 1979-02-15(a), (j)

We read subsection 61.1(j) as authorizing eviction of a tenant who has been habitually and unjustifiably late in his rent payments after written notice to cease late payment has been given, and after the landlord "has made written demand and given written notice for delivery of possession of the premises." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2. Hence, in such cases the tenant has paid his rent, albeit on a routinely late basis. In such cases, notice is required. Where, however, the tenant has failed entirely to pay the rent due and owing, as is the case here, eviction is available under section 61.1(a) and notice complying with N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2 is expressly excused thereby.

Habitual late payment is a ground for removing a residential tenant only when more than one late payment follows written notice to cease.

534 Hawthorne Ave. Corp. v. Barnes · filed 1985-04-15(j)

We therefore hold that habitual late payment of rent, to constitute a ground for removal of a residential tenant under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1j, requires more than one late payment following a written notice to cease.

Section 2A:18-61.1 permits a residential lease to treat tenant-inflicted damage as rent, so failure to pay it may support eviction for nonpayment of rent.

Fargo Realty, Inc. v. Harris · filed 1980-03-18

We think that a clause defining rent to include tenant-inflicted damages should be treated in the same manner. We fail to see how it would conflict with the purpose underlying the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq. to give effect to such a clause.

Section 2A:18-61.1 requires a statutory good cause ground to remove a protected residential tenant; equitable considerations alone do not suffice.

Chau v. Cardillo · filed 1990-10-02

In utilizing equitable concepts to grant a judgment of possession the court below exceeded its jurisdiction because equitable principles are not recognized as "good cause" for a tenant's removal under any of the provisions of the Anti-Eviction Act.

Subsection (j) requires consideration of the tenant’s payment history and circumstances when deciding whether late payments amount to habitual failure to pay rent.

Tower Management Corp. v. Podesta · filed 1988-06-22(j)

We, therefore, will review the circumstances of the case before us to determine whether the facts of this case permit a determination that defendant "habitually and without legal justification failed to pay rent" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1j. ... Considering the substantial rights which would have been forfeited and the history of payments since the June notice (one late, one four days late, but with an explanation, and two on time), would it be equitable to determine that defendant had evinced an "habitual" failure to pay his rent under these circumstances? We think not.

A landlord who grants a new lease and accepts rent under it waives the right to remove the tenant for earlier rent defaults.

Gateway v. Herrera · filed 1992-12-30(a)

However, the granting of a new lease and acceptance of rent in that new term is so inconsistent with an intention to require a surrender of possession of the premises as to amount to an election to waive the right to terminate the tenancy because of the past rent defaults.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) does not permit eviction for nonpayment when a Section 8 tenant paid her share of the rent and the housing authority withheld its share because the landlord failed to make repairs.

Soliman v. Cepeda · filed 1993-07-20(a)

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Cepeda has violated New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a), which provides that non-payment of rent constitutes good cause for eviction. However, for the reasons already discussed in this opinion and because finding "good cause" under the Anti-Eviction Act results in a conflict with Section 8, defendant Cepeda has not violated the Anti-Eviction Act.

A landlord who accepts late rent after a Notice to Cease must continue to tell the tenant that late payment breaches the lease or risk waiving eviction for habitual lateness.

Ivy Hill Park v. Abutidze · filed 2004-07-09(j)

Rather, we interpret the language in A.P. Development to mean that the landlord, following a Notice to Cease, may not thereafter accept further late payments in silence, but must continue to alert the tenant that the late payments are made in breach of the lease in order to avoid imposition of the waiver analysis. While we do not understand A.P. Development to require service of an additional Notice to Cease, we interpret it to mean that the landlord will continue to notify the tenant, when further late payments are accepted, that the breach has not been cured thereby.

A tenant with reasonable grounds to withhold rent because of a habitability problem may raise that justification as a defense to eviction for habitual late payment, even after paying once the problem is fixed.

279 4TH AVE. MANAGEMENT. LLC v. Mollett · filed 2006-05-31(j)

A tenant may be evicted for habitual late payment of rent "without legal justification." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(j). If a tenant has reasonable grounds to withhold rent at the time the rent is due (e.g., no heat), the fact that the tenant eventually pays the rent once the landlord fixes the problem does not deprive the tenant of the Marini defense to a charge of late payment.

Section 2A:18-61.1(j) requires a fact-sensitive assessment of whether late rent payments after a notice to cease are habitual; two late payments do not automatically establish grounds for eviction.

MG CARTER APT. v. Richardson · filed 2010-11-24(j)

We do not foreclose the possibility that in the specific circumstances presented, two late rental payments after the service of a notice to cease would amount to "habitual" late payment, thus, giving the landlord a cause of action under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(j). In each case, the trial judge must assess the evidence as to the "time and circumstances" of the late payments to determine whether a cause of action for eviction has been proven. In this case, it was not.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) does not permit eviction for nonpayment of utility charges that federal law prevents a Section 8 landlord from treating as rent.

Sudersan v. Royal · filed 2005-12-23(a)

We, therefore, conclude that the water and sewage charges in this case cannot be considered or treated as rent, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for plaintiff's summary dispossess action for non-payment of rent.

An S-RAP tenant cannot be evicted for nonpayment of rent solely for failing to pay additional rent charges under the lease.

175 Executive House, LLC v. Elesha Miles · filed 2017-03-10(a)

The nonpayment of rent that is "due and owing under the lease" is good cause for eviction. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a). ... As such, we hold that a tenant with an S-RAP voucher cannot be evicted for non-payment of rent based solely on the failure to pay additional rent charges under the lease.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) permits eviction when a tenant fails to pay rent due under an oral or written lease.

CHANCELLOR ARMS TWO REALTY GROUP, LLC VS. OMAR CLYBURN (LT-038324-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-08(a)

N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a) permits an eviction when a tenant "fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease whether the same be oral or written . . . ." Here, the uncontroverted evidence presented by plaintiff proved the existence of a written lease; that defendant took possession of the apartment; and that he failed to pay rent and additional rent as described herein.

Continued rent payments do not affect a valid judgment of possession based on a tenant’s lease violation under subsection (d).

TROOPER BRETT BLOOM, ETC. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-542-12, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-08-02(d)

A tenant's continued compliance with another condition of the tenancy is immaterial, once a landlord has obtained a valid judgment for possession based on one of the enumerated statutory grounds of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.

Section 2A:18-61.1 requires a landlord to establish good cause to evict a protected residential tenant.

NORMAN OSTROW, INC. VS. FAWZY MEGALLA GAD (DC-001286-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-01-15

Because Fawzy was considered a tenant with rights under the Act, the Landlord had to establish good cause for his eviction. Harris, 155 N.J. at 239-40. The court found that the Landlord had established none. Thus, dismissal logically followed. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.

A tenant's failure to comply with a separate settlement agreement is not a ground for removal under § 2A:18-61.1.

HILTON GARDENS LLC VS. ANNA UJHELYOVA (LT-003850-19, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-08

Her failure to abide by the terms of a separate settlement agreement is simply not one of the "good causes" listed in the Act that permit removing a tenant.

Subsection (a) permits eviction for nonpayment only when the rent is legally owing; rent for an illegal apartment is not legally owing.

AGARWAL VS. MARVIN SIMMS (LT-007386-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-25(a)

Here, plaintiff cannot evict defendants from an illegal apartment for nonpayment of rent because the rent is not "legally owing." Because the matter was filed as a non-payment of rent case under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a), we dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) permits eviction for nonpayment only when the claimed rent is legally owed under the lease.

Ortiz v. Figueroa · filed 2024-09-06(a)

Under the Act, a landlord may evict a tenant from a residential apartment if the tenant "fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease whether the same be oral or written . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a). ... Accordingly, plaintiff's claim that defendants "legally owed" a light bill expense is not supported by the record.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) permits a landlord to seek possession when a tenant fails to pay rent due and owing, including an increase the tenant accepted by remaining in possession after notice.

Coventry Place Owner LLC v. Goodmann · filed 2025-06-18(a)

Coventry was therefore entitled to summary possession of the apartment under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a) based on Goodmann's failure to pay the increased rent.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) permits eviction of a residential tenant who fails to pay rent due under an oral or written lease.

McIntyre v. Peterkin · filed 2026-02-09(a)

Under the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, a landlord can evict a tenant from a residential apartment if the tenant "fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease whether the same be oral or written." N.J.S.A. 2A:18- 61.1(a).

Hoarding, a significant bed-bug problem, and refusal to allow landlord entry can support eviction under subsections (c), (d), and (e).

FLEMINGTON SOUTH GARDENS, INC. VS. JEFFREY MINTS (LT-0230-19, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-11(c), (d), and (e)

Whatever definition he used, based on the credible evidence before him regarding the condition of the apartment, the bed-bug issue, and his refusal to allow entry, the judge did not err in finding violations of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), (d), and (e).

Section 2A:18-61.1 requires a landlord to plead and prove good cause to remove a protected residential tenant; expiration of a month-to-month lease is not a qualifying ground.

76 Berlin Road, LLC v. Gormley · filed 2024-11-14

The sole basis articulated for notice in the underlying complaint was the purported expiration of a month-to-month lease term. That event is not a recognized cause of action supporting the termination of residential tenancies under the Act.

Section 2A:18-61.1(j) requires more than one late rent payment after written notice to cease; a lease’s grace period for late fees does not change when rent is due.

Grier v. Gibson · filed 2025-07-22(j)

To be sure, to assert a claim of habitual late payment of rent pursuant to N.J.S.A. ... 2A:18-61.1(j), a plaintiff must prove "more than one late payment following a written notice to cease."

Section 2A:18-61.1(e) does not permit eviction of a Section 8 tenant for unpaid utility charges treated as rent under the lease.

Hh Northridge LLC v. Alexander · filed 2025-12-10(e)

Against this backdrop, we are satisfied defendant, a recipient of Section 8 benefits, is not subject to eviction for non-payment of rent, including the gas charges at issue here, even though those charges were included in the operative lease. As it is not disputed that defendant was current on his rental payments, the court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint asserting a breach of lease terms solely related to the non-payment of utility charges as a basis for eviction.

Section 2A:18-61.1(a) permits removal for unpaid rent due under an oral or written lease; rent reduced by agreement is not due and owing.

88-90 Pulaski LLC v. Altamirano · filed 2025-12-12(a)

Therefore, the court did not err in finding tenant's rent for the three months in 2022 was not "due and owing," see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, because tenant paid the agreed upon amount.

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not bar temporary relocation needed for a HUD-approved rehabilitation project when tenants can return after the work.

Floral Park Tenants Ass'n v. Project Holding, Inc. · filed 1977-07-06

Since the Anti-Eviction Act deals with the permanent removal of tenants, the precise situation before this court is not dealt with therein. In fact, the statute was not intended to and does not apply to the instant case where temporary relocation of tenants is necessary to perform certain rehabilitation work which is brought about by a HUD-approved project.

Section 2A:18-61.1(g) does not extend the Relocation Assistance Act to people displaced by zoning ordinance enforcement.

Herrera v. Township of South Orange · filed 1993-12-28(g)

We consequently conclude none of the 1972 Act's provisions encompass persons displaced as the result of zoning ordinance enforcement. ... The language of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1g does not expand the Act's scope.

Section 2A:18-61.1 requires judicial eviction procedures for covered residential tenants but excludes hotel, motel, and guest house rooms rented to transient guests or seasonal tenants.

Poroznoff v. Alberti · filed 1978-07-13

A dispossess action is initially governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., which establishes guidelines for the removal of resident tenants "from any house, building, mobile home * * * or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than * * * a hotel, motel or other guest house or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) If the Y.M.C.A. were deemed to be a multiple-dwelling apartment operation falling within N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, then any lawful lock-out must conform to the appropriate judicial procedures provided by statute. Inasmuch as counsel for both parties conceded that the Y.M.C.A. was not an apartment house, further inquiry into this status is unnecessary.

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not protect transient or seasonal tenants residing at a hotel, motel, or other guest house.

Poroznoff v. Alberti · filed 1979-05-15

The protections afforded by N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 expressly do not apply to transient or seasonal tenants residing at a hotel, motel or other guest house.

Section 2A:18-61.1 applies to residential tenants, not commercial tenants.

Salb v. Lemoine Ave. Associates · filed 1981-02-18

It should be noted that N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 bears the heading: "Removal of residential tenants." It has no application to commercial tenants.

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not protect a tenant who leases an entire 100-acre farm with two dwellings and a barn merely because the tenant lives on the property.

Harden v. Pritzert · filed 1981-03-16

We do not believe that the Legislature contemplated 100-acre farms, with more than one dwelling unit and a barn, as that type of rental housing space in such short supply as to compel enactment of the Anti-Eviction Act.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects leases whose purpose is primarily residential, but excludes leases that substantially serve the primary tenant's nonresidential purposes.

Morristown Mem. Hosp. v. WOKEM MTGE. & REALTY CO. · filed 1983-12-20

We are therefore satisfied that the definitional phrase of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 limiting the act's applicability to premises "leased for residential purposes" means a lease whose purpose is fundamentally and primarily residential and excludes leases which, like these, serve to a substantial degree nonresidential purposes of the original, primary tenant.

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not permit a cooperative apartment association to bring a summary dispossess action against a cooperator-shareholder because their relationship is not that of landlord and tenant.

PLAZA ROAD CO-OP., INC. v. Finn · filed 1985-05-13

We are in accord with Judge Sween's conclusion that a cooperative is a unique form of property ownership and the relationship between the association and a cooperator-shareholder is not that of landlord and tenant for the purpose of a summary dispossess action.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects hotel residents whose extended occupancy and intent to remain indefinitely establish a tenancy.

Williams v. Alexander Hamilton Hotel · filed 1991-07-12

However, we are satisfied under the aggregate facts of this case, which involve both actual residence for over two years and an intention to remain there for an indefinite period of time until certain contingencies might occur, that a "tenancy" at the time of the "lock out" existed and that the Anti-Eviction Act protects these "tenants" as a matter of law.

Section 2A:18-61.1 provides a summary dispossession action to terminate a residential lease, but that action cannot terminate a cooperative shareholder’s possessory rights.

In Re Robertson · filed 1992-10-07

The statutes provide for: (i) an action for possession for nonpayment of rent pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:42-7; (ii) an action for ejectment or an action for the possession of land pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 et seq; and (iii) to terminate a residential lease, an action for summary dispossession brought in the special civil part for landlord/tenant matters of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. ... The action commenced by Harrison Park was premised on a landlord/tenant relationship, and therefore, just as an action for summary dispossession is not a proper vehicle to terminate the pos-sessory rights of a cooperator, the instant action was not a sufficient vehicle to terminate the Debtor’s rights to her property.

Section 2A:18-61.1 excludes transient motel guests; weekly occupancy as a sole residence for an indefinite period does not by itself establish tenant status.

Francis v. Trinidad Motel · filed 1993-01-06

However, this does not mean that the Act contemplates an expansion of the meaning of "tenant" to include people who pay rent for a motel room on a weekly basis and claim it as their sole residence for an indefinite period.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects the executor of a deceased, protected month-to-month tenant from removal for the period needed to wind up the estate.

Center Ave. Realty, Inc. v. Smith · filed 1993-05-04

We note, at the outset, that the Anti-Eviction Act, by its terms, applies not only to the tenant, but also to the tenant's legal representatives. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. ... We therefore construe the protection afforded by the Act to the executor of a deceased month-to-month holdover protected tenant as limited to the right to retain the premises only for the period required for the winding-up of the estate.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects covered residential tenants from removal without statutory good cause, even when the landlord brings an ejectment action.

316 49 ST. ASSOCIATES LTD. v. Galvez · filed 1994-01-05

Plaintiff does not allege that the premises or the tenancy fall under one of the enumerated exceptions to the act, but rather that the statute is inapplicable to actions for ejectment. This assertion is contradicted by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.3 and 2A:18-61.4 which clearly states that they are applicable to any lease of premises covered by N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. The focus is not on the remedy but on the premises leased.

Section 2A:18-61.1 does not give an occupant family member the right to succeed to a deceased tenant’s tenancy merely because the family member lived in the apartment.

Maglies v. Estate of Guy · filed 2006-07-14

We adhere to this construction of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, and therefore, we conclude that Jennings is not entitled to the protections of the Anti-Eviction Act with respect to the apartment plaintiff leased to her mother.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects functional co-tenants from removal after a named tenant dies unless the landlord establishes good cause for eviction.

KWOK FANG CHANG TRUST VS. ESTATE OF SYLVIA MALAKOFF (LT-3936-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-27

Accordingly, they were permitted to remain in the premises on a month-to-month basis upon Sylvia's death, absent good cause to evict them pursuant to the Act.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects a surviving household member from eviction without cause if she proves continuous residence, a substantial contribution to the tenancy’s financial obligations, and the landlord’s knowledge and acquiescence.

Maglies v. Estate of Guy · filed 2007-12-12

We conclude that New Jersey's anti-eviction law protects the surviving resident of this household from eviction without cause, notwithstanding her label as a family-member occupant, provided she can show that she was the functional equivalent of a co-tenant.

An occupant may be protected from removal as a functional tenant by continuously residing in the premises, substantially contributing to the tenancy’s financial obligations, and having that contribution acknowledged and acquiesced to by the landlord.

GOLDEN APPLE HOLDINGS, LLC VS. GLORIA REYES (LT-013044-19, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-22

The Act provides that a tenant cannot be removed except when the landlord establishes one of eighteen enumerated grounds for a good cause eviction. Id. at 121 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1). ... To be recognized as a functional tenant, an occupant must establish three facts: (1) he or she has continuously resided at the premises; (2) he or she "has been a substantial contributor towards satisfaction of the tenancy's financial obligations"; and (3) his or her "contribution has been acknowledged and acquiesced to by" the landlord. Id. at 126. ... In summary, the trial judge failed to adequately address the evidence that had been presented and the judge's finding that Almonte was not a functional tenant is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.

An occupant may qualify as a functional tenant protected from eviction by continuously residing at the premises, substantially contributing to the tenancy’s financial obligations, and having those contributions acknowledged and accepted by the landlord.

GOLDEN APPLE HOLDINGS, LLC VS. ESTATE OF CARIDAD PEREZ (LT-012202-19, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-22

To be recognized as a functional tenant, an occupant must establish three facts: (1) he or she has continuously resided at the premises; (2) he or she "has been a substantial contributor towards satisfaction of the tenancy's financial obligations"; and (3) his or her "contribution has been acknowledged and acquiesced to by" the landlord. Id. at 126. ... The trial judge failed to adequately address the evidence that had been presented and the judge's finding that Lydecker was not a functional tenant is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects traditional residential tenants from removal unless the landlord establishes an enumerated ground for removal.

Lj's Acquisition Group, LLC v. Cohan · filed 2023-12-12

To fall within the ambit of the protections afforded by the A-E Act, the person seeking to prevent eviction must be a traditional residential tenant or lessee.

Section 2A:18-61.1 covers an apartment in a ninety-nine-unit residential complex.

Fairkings Partners, LLC, Etc. v. Essence L. Daniels · filed 2025-12-08

Daniels' apartment is covered by the A-E Act because it is a unit within a ninety-nine-unit apartment complex. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.

Section 2A:18-61.1 protects residential tenants from removal, but does not protect a property manager who lacks lawful, continuous occupancy as a tenant.

Aisewomhion v. Goel · filed 2026-06-01

Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court's determination plaintiff was not a tenant, entitled to the protections of the Act or any other tenant safeguard, but was, instead, a business associate related to defendant's properties.

Section 2A:18-61.1(h) permits eviction to retire a building from residential use only when the owner retires the entire building, not a single apartment.

Puttrich v. Smith · filed 1979-10-17(h)

In essence it has said that for a landlord to evict a tenant so that the landlord could take control of the apartment, the landlord has to either retire the entire building or the building must have less than four residential units. Since plaintiff does not seek to retire the entire building and the building has four residential units, plaintiff has failed to establish grounds for evicting defendants.

Subsection (h) treats demolition of an apartment building for an addition to a continuing care retirement community as permanent retirement from residential use.

Starns v. American Baptist Estates of Red Bank · filed 2002-06-27(h)

In light of the character of a continuing care retirement community and its substantial difference from a residential unit in a residential building, we hold that the construction of an addition to Navesink House which will include independent living units is not a residential use. Therefore, American Baptist has established that it proposes to retire permanently the Twin Gables from residential use according to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(h).

A permissible rent increase during the notice period for retiring a building from residential use does not invalidate the landlord’s earlier notice to quit.

JMJ PROPERTIES v. Khuzam · filed 2004-01-09(h)

In summary, we disagree with the court's interpretation of the effects of the new tenancies created when defendants held over at an increased rent. We are satisfied that the holdover tenancies were limited in term by the original eighteen-month notice to quit, as extended to December 31, 2002.

Section 2A:18-61.1 requires an enumerated statutory cause to remove a residential tenant; foreclosure alone is not one.

GUTTENBERG S. & L. ASS'N v. Rivera · filed 1979-12-11

The statute clearly prohibits judicial removal of residential tenants for all but enumerated causes. Foreclosure is not one of the causes.

Section 2A:18-61.1(k) makes conversion of rental housing to a condominium or cooperative a ground for tenant removal.

Hampshire House Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee · filed 1979-12-20(k)

On February 19, 1976, less than three months after Brunetti, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1-.12 was amended and the door sealed closed on municipal action in this field. The new enactment adds, as a ground for removal, conversion from the rental market to a condominium or cooperative for the first time.

Section 2A:18-61.1(k) permits a landlord to remove a tenant because of a condominium conversion, subject to the statutory procedures.

Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona · filed 1980-01-02(k)

Defendant’s ordinance has the effect of excluding conversion to condominiums as a basis for evicting tenants. However, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 k explicitly allows tenants to be removed from an apartment because of conversion to a condominium.

Section 2A:18-61.1(k) makes condominium conversion a ground for eviction that a municipal conversion moratorium cannot suspend.

Plaza Joint Venture v. Atlantic City · filed 1980-05-19(k)

The Anti-Eviction Act provides in specific terms that conversion of rental units into condominiums is a ground for eviction. The ordinance before us effectively — albeit temporarily — eliminates conversion as a ground for eviction.

Section 2A:18-61.1 continues a preconversion tenant’s tenancy during the three-year notice period, including the benefit of an applicable local rent-leveling ordinance.

GD Management Co. v. Negri · filed 1982-01-13(k), (g)

If he does not purchase, then his tenancy nevertheless continues subject to the owner's right to demand redelivery of the premises on a three-year's written notice. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(k), 61.1(g). ... Implementation of this intention would clearly require that any local rent-leveling ordinance would continue to apply to such pre-existing tenancies.

Section 2A:18-61.1(l)(1) permits a condominium unit owner to evict a tenant whose tenancy began after the master deed was recorded when the unit is sold to a buyer who will occupy it and the contract requires it vacant at closing.

Veltri v. Norwood · filed 1984-08-10(l)(1)

Plaintiffs as owners of a condominium unit under contract of sale to an owner-occupant are thus owners of a building being converted to condominium use and are therefore entitled to possession on two-months' notice under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1( l )(1) and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2(f).

A landlord seeking to remove tenants because of a condominium conversion must fully comply with the conversion statute and its regulations.

Market Dundee Corp. v. Jaramillo · filed 1990-02-07(k)

There must be full and complete compliance with the conversion statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder. This is the requirement of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 k.

Section 2A:18-61.1(k) bars a warrant for possession based on condominium conversion until the landlord strictly complies with the conversion statute and regulations.

Amato v. Pelligrini · filed 1990-03-13(k)

N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(k) mandates that "no warrant for possession shall be issued until this act has been complied with." This means there must be strict compliance with the act and not substantial compliance. Each provision of the statute and of the regulations must be adhered to. There cannot be partial conformity.

Section 2A:18-61.1(k) applies to tenants who occupied a unit before condominium conversion, so a landlord cannot use that ground to evict a post-conversion tenant.

Bayside Condo., Inc. v. Mahoney · filed 1992-02-27(k)

Whatever the reason, the effort must fail. A factual predicate for the application of paragraph (k), the presence of a pre-conversion tenant, does not exist in this case. The complaint, therefore, is formally deficient.

A landlord can waive its right to evict after condominium conversion by collecting rent for two years after the right to possession accrues.

Fairken Associates v. Hutchin · filed 1987-12-18(k)

The landlord, having the right to a timely eviction upon conversion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1k, is now seeking the benefit of that section while ignoring the obligations to the tenant under the act. ... The landlord had the right to summary eviction upon the conversion of this unit, but waived that right by accepting the benefits of collecting rent from a residential tenant for two years after the summary right to possession accrued.

A landlord who fails to give a condominium tenant the required notice at the start of the tenancy cannot evict on sixty days' notice and must instead give the three-year notice described in subsection (k).

Vander Sterre Bros. v. Keating · filed 1995-10-17(l)(1), (k)

Failure to give a tenant such notice bars a court from entering a judgment for dispossession under the provisions for sixty-day notice of eviction under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1( l )(1) and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2(f). We hold that any dispossession action by plaintiff must be preceded by the three-year notice described in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(k) and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2(g) and made applicable in these circumstances by the DCA in N.J.A.C. 5:24-1.9(b).

Section 2A:18-61.1(k) permits a landlord to recover possession when a protected tenancy ends.

WG ASSOCIATES v. Estate of Roman · filed 2000-07-13(k)

Upon the termination of a protected tenancy, the landlord is permitted to remove the tenant. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1k. Applying those principles here, it is clear that upon Matilda Roman's death, her right to a protected tenancy was terminated. This right did not extend to her surviving children, only to a surviving spouse.

An owner of three or fewer condominium units may seek to evict a post-conversion tenant when the unit is sold for the buyer’s personal occupancy; the statement required by § 2A:18-61.9 is not a prerequisite to that action.

Jefferson Street Condominium Ass'n v. Paige · filed 2002-01-10(l)(2)

In sum, we conclude that the Legislative direction regarding notice and the jurisdictional impact of such notice applies, by its terms, to subsection 1 and, by its absence, not to subsection 2.

Section 2A:18-61.1(b) allows eviction when a tenant continues, after written notice to cease, to disturb the peace and quiet of other tenants.

Gottdiener v. Mailhot · filed 1981-06-10(b)

Unquestionably plaintiffs had the power to correct the problem. A good cause for evicting a residential tenant is that the "person has continued to be, after written notice to cease, so disorderly as to destroy the peace and quiet of the occupant or other tenants living in said house or neighborhood." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(b).

A landlord seeking to remove a residential tenant for disorderly conduct must serve a written notice to cease and show additional disorderly conduct afterward.

Georgia King Associates v. Fraiser · filed 1986-05-16(b)

We agree with Judge Simon that the language of the statute is clear and is not such as to afford the landlord relief in the absence of additional disorderly conduct after service of a written notice to cease.

Section 2A:18-61.1(m) requires the building employment and the provision of living space to begin together; a tenant who took on building duties after moving in can bar eviction by offering to pay full rent.

Cruz v. Reatique · filed 1986-06-27(m)

Furthermore, the court is satisfied that the requirement in paragraph (m) that the tenancy be conditioned on the employment in question requires that such employment and the providing of living space be simultaneous. Thus, in the case of a building-related employment that is created with a tenant already in possession of living space that is subsequently sought in a dispossess action under paragraph (m), the offer by such tenant to pay the full rental should bar such an action.

Subsection (m) does not permit removal when a tenant's tenancy began before the tenant's employment as a superintendent.

Kearny Court Associates v. Spence · filed 1993-02-11(m)

The Landlord could not have dispossessed either Spence or Pelley under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(m).

The employment ground for removal includes an independent contractor whose tenancy is incidental to the services provided to the landlord.

The Meadows Foundation, Inc. v. Williamson · filed 2004-04-30(m)

We think it clear, however, that the word "employment" as used in sub-paragraph (m) is broad enough to contemplate the services of an independent contractor whose tenancy is incidental to the employment of his or her services.

Section 2A:18-61.1(m) permits eviction after employment ends only if the landlord proves the tenancy itself was conditioned on that employment.

Jn Equity Perth Amboy, LLC v. Hiraldo · filed 2024-04-22(m)

By its express terms, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(m) applies only if the landlord proves the tenancy itself was conditioned on employment.

Subsection (c) permits removal for property damage when a tenant's gross negligence foreseeably leads to that damage, even if the tenant lacks control during the act of damage.

Stuyvesant Assocs. v. Doe · filed 1987-10-05(c)

This court rejects that defense in the facts presented, and finds that defendant did “cause or allow,” through his willfulness or gross negligence, damage to the landlord's premises.

Subsection (c) requires actual damage to the landlord's property as a ground for eviction; theft without physical damage to the premises is insufficient.

Les Gertrude Associates v. Walko · filed 1993-03-08(c)

The legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c) requires actual damage to the landlord's property for there to be a cause of action for eviction.

Section 2A:18-61.1(c) permits eviction for damage to the premises; stopping the conduct does not bar eviction.

Muros v. Morales · filed 1993-12-08(c)

In the present case, the landlord's proofs showed a violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1c, in that the tenant drilled holes in the floor to pass electric wires to her landlord's basement outlets. That is plainly causing damage or injury to the premises.

Section 2A:18-61.1(c) requires damage to tangible property; a noxious odor alone does not qualify as damage to the premises.

Ivy Hill Park Section III v. Smirnova · filed 2003-03-03(c)

I find that an adverse affect to the human senses was not in the contemplation of the Legislature as damage or destruction, but that the Legislature contemplated that the damage would be to tangible property only.

Section 2A:18-61.1(c) requires a landlord seeking eviction to prove actual physical damage to the premises caused willfully or by gross negligence.

B.J. FUNK REALTY COMPANY, LLC VS. SAHAR ELSADANI (LT-5584-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-08-14(c)

However, plaintiff proceeded in this eviction action under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c) and is required to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that defendant willfully or by gross negligence damaged the smoke detectors. Plaintiff showed evidence of damage to the smoke detectors (because they were disabled) but not that defendant did this willfully or by gross negligence, given her allegation regarding disability.

Section 2A:18-61.1(c) requires more than ordinary negligence to evict a tenant for damage to the landlord's property.

ORANGE SENIOR CITIZENS RESIDENCE, LLC VS. PAULETTE DAVIS (LT-32251-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-11(c)

Applying these principles to the evidence in this record, we are satisfied that plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's conduct was "grossly negligent" to meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), and the judge's contrary conclusion was erroneous.

Section 2A:18-61.1(c) permits eviction of all occupants when one occupant causes damage that ends the tenancy.

RAMPERSAUD VS. RONALD A. HOLLINGSWORTH (LT-015717-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-01(c)

In affirming a judgment of possession, we reject the tenant's strained interpretation of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), and conclude that an act of one permits the eviction of all.

Section 2A:18-61.1(d) requires a notice to cease before a tenant may be evicted for continuing to violate a landlord's rules and regulations.

RWB Newton Associates v. Gunn · filed 1988-05-09(d)

Hence, neither letter satisfies the requirement of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(d) that a tenant be given a "notice to cease" before being subject to eviction for violating a landlord's rules and regulations.

For eviction based on a lease violation, notices to cease and quit must be understandable to the tenant; English-only notices were insufficient for a Spanish-speaking tenant who could not read English.

5000 Park Associates v. Collado · filed 1991-10-08(e)

The notice to cease and the notice to quit not being in the Spanish language are not "suitable notices." They are legally insufficient and void.

For eviction under subsection (j), a landlord need not provide notices to cease or quit in a tenant's native language.

NY EAST COAST MGMT. v. Gonzalez · filed 2004-11-08(j)

More specifically, as argued by plaintiff, there is no requirement, either by rule of court, nor by legislation, requiring that a notice to quit (or notice to cease) be in any foreign language, except for the Administrative Code relating to evictions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1g(1) and g(3).

When a landlord proposes a rent increase together with substantive lease changes, subsections (f) and (i) require two separate notices before an eviction action.

Prospect Point Gardens Inc. v. Timoshenko · filed 1996-04-12(f), (i)

Therefore, to maintain an action for eviction where there are substantive changes and a rent increase in a single integrated proposal, the landlord must first serve a one month notice to terminate the preexisting tenancy and give the tenant the opportunity to accept all the changes, and then give a full month’s notice to terminate.

Section 2A:18-61.1(e) requires a reasonable opportunity to cure a substantial lease breach after notice to cease; five days was insufficient for unauthorized occupants to move out.

Brunswick Street Associates v. Gerard · filed 2002-10-31(e)

Simply stated; I find that a notice that requires occupants to move their residences within a five-day period does not comply with the spirit of the anti-eviction act and I will dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

Section 2A:18-61.1(e) requires a landlord seeking eviction for a lease violation to serve a notice to cease and allow the tenant an opportunity to cure before seeking possession.

J. Allen Nimmo Apartments v. Martinez · filed 2024-11-21(e)

An action alleging a tenant's violation ... of subsection (e) requires the landlord serve a notice to cease and allow a tenant an opportunity to cure prior to seeking a judgment for possession. Plaintiff's failure to comport with the notice requirements under the Act divested the trial court of jurisdiction to issue the judgment for possession.

A guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance does not establish good cause for eviction under subsection (n).

Housing Authority v. Williams · filed 1993-02-11(n)

For the following reasons it is concluded that a conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance is not a violation of 2A:18-61.1(n), and therefore does not constitute good cause for removal.

Subsection (n) permits, but does not require, a landlord to seek a tenant’s removal after a qualifying drug conviction or guilty plea; the authorized removal is remedial rather than punishment.

Taylor v. Secretary HUD · filed 1996-12-06(n)

To the contrary, inasmuch as the legislature authorized, but did not require, the landlord to bring removal proceedings under subsection 61.1n when the tenant was convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense under the drug laws it did not intend to punish tenants by authorizing such proceedings. Rather, it merely permitted the landlord to protect its property from a tenant violating the law on the property.

Subsection (n)’s drug-related eviction ground is remedial and does not impose a second punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Taylor v. Cisneros · filed 1995-11-29(n)

The Court holds that subsection “n” does not impose a second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Subsection (n) permits, but does not require, a landlord to seek removal after a tenant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a qualifying drug offense; authorizing removal is remedial rather than punitive.

Taylor v. Cisneros · filed 1996-12-06(n)

To the contrary, inasmuch as the legislature authorized, but did not require, the landlord to bring removal proceedings under subsection 61.1n when the tenant was convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense under the drug laws it did not intend to punish tenants by authorizing such proceedings.

Subsection (p) permits eviction for a drug offender’s occupancy only when the tenant knowingly tolerates that occupancy.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF JERSEY CITY v. Thomas · filed 1999-02-11(p)

In Housing Auth. of City of Hoboken v. Alicea, 297 N.J.Super. 310, 688 A. 2d 108 (App.Div.1997), we held that "to justify the ultimate sanction of eviction under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(p), a tenant must not only `permit' a drug offender to occupy the leased premises, but must also tolerate the offender's occupancy of the premises knowing that such person has violated the [Comprehensive Drug Reform Act]." Id. at 313, 688 A. 2d 108. The evidence presented below fully supports the Special Civil Part's conclusion that defendant was an "unknowing" and "innocent" tenant, and that it would be unfair to remove her from her residence based solely on the criminal act of another.

Subsection (p) permits eviction when a tenant assaults or makes terroristic threats against a landlord’s employee, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

NEWARK HOUSING AUTHORITY WYNONA LIPMAN GARDENS VS. TONI MURPHY (LT-036910-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-11(p)

We have no reason to disturb the judge's findings, and she applied the law correctly. ... And the judge relied on N.J.S.A. 2A:18- 61.1(p), which provides for eviction if the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a tenant engaged in assault or terroristic threats against an employee of the landlord. Here, the judge believed the manager's testimony and made those findings.