N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23

Section 2A:34-23 does not authorize alimony after an out-of-state divorce when the rendering state's law ends the former spouse's support obligation.

Newgard v. Newgard · filed 1970-07-31

The wife contends that New Jersey permits alimony to a divorced wife whether the divorce is obtained by her in this State "or elsewhere," citing as her authority N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. In other words, despite Pennsylvania's prohibition of alimony following a divorce, the public policy of New Jersey, by reason of our statute, permits it. This contention goes contra the duty imposed upon states by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution to respect the judgments and laws of our sister states. Art. IV § 1. This court is bound to give that respect and to grant no more or no less relief than would be afforded in the rendering state. Roskein v. Roskein, 25 N.J. Super. 415 (Ch. Div. 1953). What the Pennsylvania law does not permit, New Jersey will not grant.

Section 2A:34-23 allows equitable distribution of marital property after a divorce obtained in another state.

Woliner v. Woliner · filed 1975-02-10

Hence, a foreign divorce may serve as the basis for an equitable division of marital property in addition to a grant of alimony or maintenance, and we so hold.

Section 2A:34-23 does not allow equitable distribution of New Jersey property when a valid out-of-state divorce has already changed the parties' ownership interests under that state's law.

Woodruffe v. DeMola · filed 1976-11-30

As to real property located in this State, does the full faith and credit clause, U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1, mandate that this court recognize the conversion of estates achieved pursuant to Florida law and preclude the court from applying New Jersey's equitable distribution statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23? The court answers this question in the affirmative.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a spouse to seek equitable distribution of marital property after an out-of-state divorce that did not adjudicate that property, regardless of marital fault.

Pierrakos v. Pierrakos · filed 1977-03-21

Therefore, the New York judgment of divorce resting on defendant's culpability did not by implication or otherwise raise a barrier to consideration of her claim for equitable distribution in this State.

Section 2A:34-23 cannot be enforced in a way that denies full faith and credit to a final judgment from another state.

Manfrini v. Manfrini · filed 1975-10-15

The enforcement of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 is subject to the limitations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a New Jersey court to award child support after a valid foreign divorce if the evidence justifies it.

Chaudry v. Chaudry · filed 1978-06-05

We hold that the court erred in refusing to consider evidence with respect to that issue. It had jurisdiction to award such support, if justified by the proofs, even after a valid foreign divorce. See Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599 (1956); Conwell v. Conwell, 3 N.J. 266, 273 (1949); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits New Jersey courts to decide financial matters after a foreign divorce when they have personal jurisdiction over both spouses.

Squitieri v. Squitieri · filed 1984-05-31

If not, and given a Florida dissolution judgment, our statutes permit our courts to determine financial aspects if in personam jurisdiction of both parties is present. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of support, but a party seeking to increase support set by a negotiated divorce judgment must clearly prove changed circumstances.

Gulick v. Gulick · filed 1971-02-09

For plaintiff to prevail upon her application for an increase in support, she bears the burden of demonstrating, by "clear proof," that circumstances have so altered since the entry of the judgment nisi that the relief she seeks is warranted.

Section 2A:34-23 permits an increase in child support when the children's needs and the parent's ability to pay make the award fit, reasonable and just.

Shaw v. Shaw · filed 1976-01-16

The support awarded was "fit, reasonable and just" in the circumstances. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to modify divorce decrees providing for alimony and child support as circumstances require.

Salmeri v. Salmeri · filed 1976-10-13

N.J.S.A. § 2A:34-23 provides that a divorce decree providing for alimony and child support “may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require.” ... We conclude, then, that under New Jersey law the judgment nisi as amended, providing for alimony and child support, was modifiable.

Section 2A:34-23 applies to alimony and maintenance in original divorce judgments and later modification orders.

Horesta v. Horesta · filed 1971-12-15

The statute applies to original divorce judgments providing for alimony or maintenance and to subsequent orders modifying judgments or subsequent orders for alimony or maintenance.

Section 2A:34-23 keeps alimony subject to modification by Chancery, and an arbitration agreement cannot impair the court’s power to modify it.

Wertlake v. Wertlake · filed 1974-04-03

... alimony under our statutes remains perpetually subject to modification by Chancery. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. To effectuate this purpose the court's power to act on modification must not be impaired.

Section 2A:34-23 permits alimony modification when a recipient does not rebut a presumption that a cohabitant contributes to household expenses and reduces the recipient's financial need.

Grossman v. Grossman · filed 1974-04-05

Orders of alimony may be revised and altered by the court as circumstances may require. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... The court holds, therefore, that the former husband is entitled under such circumstances to the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that a new adult member of his former wife's household is contributing to the expenses of that household, thus reducing her needs. ... The obligation of the defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff, pursuant to the judgment of divorce, will be suspended until further order of the court.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony when changed circumstances affect the recipient’s need, including support from a cohabiting partner.

Garlinger v. Garlinger · filed 1975-11-03

The court, in doing so, is required to consider, among other things, the actual need of the party to whom the award is to be made. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Such order may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require. Id.

Section 2A:34-23 gives New Jersey courts continuing jurisdiction to enter judgments for accrued and unpaid alimony after a divorce decree.

Fox v. Fox · filed 1975-06-30

This continuing jurisdiction is not limited to orders from the court which simply alter or modify a previously entered alimony decree. It also extends to a judgment of the chancery court for the payment of accrued and unpaid alimony ordered by a preceding divorce decree.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to revise alimony and child support orders when circumstances change.

Winter v. Winter · filed 1978-09-13

Orders for alimony and child support may be amended from time to time. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides: "Orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." Such orders are deemed to operate in praesenti and are always subject to review on a showing of changed circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 allows alimony to be modified upon changed circumstances, but payments that transfer marital property through equitable distribution are not modifiable as alimony merely because the agreement labels them alimony.

Mendell v. Mendell · filed 1978-09-27

In conclusion, the supplemental agreement did not convert the Regency Park mortgage provision into an alimony payment. In view of this conclusion, it follows that defendant had no right to the modification sought by him and the trial judge correctly denied such relief.

Section 2A:34-23 permits alimony only in divorce or nullity actions and equitable distribution only in divorce actions.

Kozlowski v. Kozlowski · filed 1979-06-25

Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony or equitable distribution. Alimony may be awarded only in actions for divorce or nullity, and equitable distribution is awarded only in actions for divorce. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, et seq.

Section 2A:34-23 limits alimony to divorce or nullity actions and equitable distribution to divorce actions; an unmarried partner cannot obtain those remedies in a support contract action.

Crowe v. De Gioia · filed 1981-05-05

Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony or equitable distribution. Alimony may be awarded only in actions for divorce or nullity, and equitable distribution is awarded only in actions for divorce.

Section 2A:34-23 permits alimony in divorce or nullity actions and equitable distribution only in divorce actions.

Zaragoza v. Capriola · filed 1985-02-21

Neither is plaintiff entitled to alimony or equitable distribution. Alimony may be awarded in actions for divorce or nullity, and equitable distribution is awarded only in actions for divorce. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 et seq.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony when circumstances change and generally does not support an arbitrary termination date set in advance.

Arnold v. Arnold · filed 1979-04-12

Such a time-oriented automatic termination is unwarranted in view of the fact that our law permits an award of alimony to be increased or decreased in the future upon a showing of change of circumstances. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to require life insurance or a trust fund as reasonable security for alimony when the circumstances warrant it.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1982-04-27

The requirement that defendant obtain life insurance on his life or create a trust fund to guarantee future alimony payments is appropriate and plainly within the broad authority conferred upon a judge in a matrimonial action by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to make such order as to alimony and maintenance of the wife, either before or after judgment, as the circumstances of the parties and nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just, and to require reasonable security for the due observation of such order.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony based on cohabitation only when the arrangement changes the recipient's economic need.

Gayet v. Gayet · filed 1983-02-14

In short, this scheme permits modification for changed circumstances resulting from cohabitation only if one cohabitant supports or subsidizes the other under circumstances sufficient to entitle the supporting spouse to relief. We believe that this test best balances the interests of personal freedom and economic support and comports with the principles of Lepis v. Lepis, supra , and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to modify child support orders as circumstances change; an income escalation clause cannot be enforced without assessing whether its terms remain fair, just and equitable.

Dunne v. Dunne · filed 1986-05-06

The power of the courts to modify alimony and support orders stems, not only from inherent equitable powers, but also from the authority granted under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23: "Orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." ... We are satisfied that the escalation clause is "not enforceable according to its terms in the absence of an inquiry and determination by the trial court as to whether under changed circumstances the enforcement of those terms would be fair, just and equitable." Petersen, 85 N.J. at 646.

Section 2A:34-23 permits an increase in child support when changed circumstances, including children’s maturation and the loss of a contribution to household expenses, justify it.

Chobot v. Chobot · filed 1988-05-02

We find this argument unpersuasive. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 145-146 (1980), changed circumstances may include ... the maturation of the children. ... Defendant's submissions established the maturation of the children (aged 14, 12, 8 and 5 at the time of divorce and 17, 15, 11 and 8 at the time of the hearing) and her $400 a month loss of outside contribution to her fixed expenses.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to revisit and modify alimony and support orders as circumstances require.

Weitzman v. Weitzman · filed 1988-10-27

Wholly apart from these considerations, the court's determination was plainly inconsistent with the broad equitable powers of trial judges to review and modify alimony and support orders at any time, as recognized by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to appoint a receiver to collect rents for support or alimony; funds held by that receiver are beyond a judgment creditor’s reach.

Culp v. Culp · filed 1990-06-11

When a court has appointed a custodial receiver under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to collect rents to be applied toward satisfaction of court-ordered support or alimony, those funds are beyond the reach of a judgment creditor because the funds are in custodia legis.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of an agreed child support order when circumstances require it, but the party seeking modification must establish the circumstances warranting a change.

Zazzo v. Zazzo · filed 1990-12-28

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, "Orders [for support] ... may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require," including an order resulting from an agreement. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. at 146, 416 A. 2d 45; Dunne v. Dunne, 209 N.J. Super. 559, 565, 508 A. 2d 273 (App.Div. 1986), but the moving party has the burden of establishing the circumstances that warrant the change.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to revise a child support order when circumstances change.

Italiano v. Rudkin (Italiano) · filed 1996-10-31

Further, orders for support "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... The evidence that plaintiff's income had increased from $17,500 in 1981 to approximately $80,000 in 1994, that the children had matured, and that the cost of living had increased constituted change of circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 excludes the return of previously equitably distributed principal from income considered for alimony modification, but income generated by that principal may be considered.

Flach v. Flach · filed 1992-03-12

Therefore, this court holds that, on an alimony modification application, all previously equitably distributed assets and all assets acquired with, by or through equitably distributed assets, when repaid, are not to be deemed to be income for the purpose of determining alimony, as that is actually the return of principal, although all income generated by that principal is to be considered.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to secure alimony payments with a trust funded to cover the obligation and authorized to pay arrears from principal and income upon default.

Jacobitti v. Jacobitti · filed 1993-04-27

To secure enforcement of alimony awards, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 permits the trial judge to "require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders, including, but not limited to, the creation of trusts or other security devices, to assure payment of reasonably foreseeable medical and educational expenses." (Emphasis added). It is appropriate to establish a trust to assure that these payments will be made during the lifetime of the parties, one of whom is old and the other infirm. On remand, the trial judge shall establish a trust sufficiently funded to secure payment of plaintiff's alimony obligations while both parties are alive. The trust shall provide that in the event of plaintiff's default, the trustee is authorized to withdraw the necessary principal and income to satisfy arrearages.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court that reduces alimony because the payer’s income fell to require financial disclosures so the recipient can seek restoration if that income rises.

Walles v. Walles · filed 1996-12-04

We do conclude, however, that where the standard of living of an obligee has been established by a divorce judgment or by an agreement incorporated within a divorce judgment, and where the obligor seeks a modification predicated on a reduction in income, a mechanism must be created in order to monitor reliable evidence and to determine whether the need which necessitated the modification is on-going.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to secure marital obligations with a trust, but the trust must attach only to the obligor's property and must define its amount and property.

McCarthy v. McCarthy · filed 1999-03-05

We recognize that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 permits the trial court to require security for the payment of marital obligations. ... What we do hold, however, is that such a trust may attach only to property of the obligor and must be definite as to its amount and as to the res.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to modify an agreed child support order, including its emancipation terms, when circumstances warrant a change.

Dolce v. Dolce · filed 2006-02-07

To be sure, given the inherent equitable powers of the Family Part, support orders, including those setting emancipation events, "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require," including an order resulting from an agreement. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146, 416 A. 2d 45 (1980); W.S. v. X.Y., 290 N.J.Super. 534, 541, 676 A. 2d 179 (App.Div.1996); Dunne v. Dunne, 209 N.J.Super. 559, 565, 508 A. 2d 273 (App.Div.1986).

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires consideration of factors relevant to alimony, including the spouses’ earning capacities and contributions to the marriage.

Robertson v. Robertson · filed 2005-11-09(b)

We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the Family Part judge, whose findings of fact, discussion of the factors relevant to an award of alimony mandated by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b (see Crews, supra, 164 N.J. at 25, 751 A.2d 524), and consideration of controlling legal principles were meticulous in nature and fully supported by the evidence contained in the record.

Section 2A:34-23(b)'s alimony factors guide whether an obligor's career change justifies reducing support, including the obligor's earning capacity and the supported spouse's need.

Storey v. Storey · filed 2004-12-15(b)

In evaluating reasons and balancing relative advantages, courts should be guided by the factors the Legislature has identified as relevant to alimony. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b(1) to -23b(13). A focus on the statutory criteria will guide the exercise of discretion and promote predictability in decision making.

Section 2A:34-23 allows the Family Part to enter or revise child support orders as circumstances require, even after an earlier request for support was denied.

COLCA v. Anson · filed 2010-05-21

During that time, the inherent equitable powers of the Family Part allow the court to enter, revise or alter support orders "from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; see also Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 146, 416 A. 2d 45. Therefore, notwithstanding the denial of defendant's prior motion for child support, the court may enter an appropriate support order after examining the current facts and circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony and child support when circumstances change.

MORCOS VS. GEORGE MORCOS (FM-02-936-08, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-05-31

Alimony and child support "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23(a)'s child support factors guide courts considering a support reduction after a parent's voluntary career change.

Lanzana v. Debelle Duplan · filed 2017-07-13(a)

The court should also be guided by the statutory factors governing child support.

Section 2A:34-23(b) bars counting an equitably distributed pension share as income for alimony, but an increase attributable to post-divorce efforts may be considered income if proved.

Kathleen Krupinski N/K/A Kathleen Gocklin v. Krupinski · filed 2014-09-02(b)

Specifically, the court must discern what part of the $1,871 monthly pension benefits plaintiff has been receiving since defendant's retirement in 2010 is attributable to defendant's post-dissolution efforts, and thus may be considered income to plaintiff for purposes of determining alimony, outside the bar imposed in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).

Section 2A:34-23(n)'s cohabitation provisions do not apply to post-judgment alimony orders finalized before the amendment took effect.

Spangenberg v. Kolakowski · filed 2015-10-14(n)

We reject defendant's argument to apply N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) as the statutory provisions are inapplicable to post-judgment orders finalized before the statute's effective date.

For alimony orders established before the 2014 amendments, subsection (j)(3) requires the obligor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that retirement warrants modification or termination, considering the listed factors and the obligee's ability to save for retirement.

Landers v. Landers · filed 2016-02-22(j)(3)

Accordingly, we vacate the March 27, 2015 order and remand to the Family Part judge to conduct proceedings as he deems necessary and to apply the burden of proof and specific standards defined in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3).

Subsection (j)(3) governs retirement-based requests to modify alimony orders entered before the 2014 amendment, including orders entered after trial; the termination presumption in subsection (j)(1) does not apply.

Rivera v. Rivera-Torres · filed 2017-05-23(j)(3)

Accordingly, plaintiff is incorrect when he argues that the court here should have applied subsection (j)(1) and the rebuttable presumption.

When a non-self-employed party seeks to reduce alimony after an involuntary loss of employment, the court must consider all the factors in subsection (k), not just the length of unemployment or reduced income.

Signore v. Signore · filed 2017-06-26(k)

Where, as here, a non-self-employed party moves for a reduction of alimony based upon an "involuntary loss of employment," the court "shall not" only consider "the length of time [the] party has been involuntarily unemployed or has had an involuntary reduction in income" but instead is required to "determine the application based upon all of the enumerated factors." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k).

Section 2A:34-23(n)'s cohabitation factors can warrant limited discovery when the alimony payer presents evidence of a long-term relationship, shared building, joint vacations, and public presentation as spouses.

KLYACHMAN VS. MICHAEL J. GARRITY(FM-02-1642-12, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-26(n)

The parties further agree that the phrase "applicable New Jersey law" refers to the standards established by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). ... Based on this record, we are satisfied the motion judge erred in not affording defendant the opportunity to conduct limited discovery to develop competent evidence to prove his case in a plenary hearing.

Retirement does not automatically entitle an obligor to a plenary hearing on an alimony modification request.

HENNEBERRY VS. RICHARD HENNEBERRY (FM-20-1195-06, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-07-10j(3)

Further, under the current alimony statute, the relevant provision, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23j(3), does not provide for an automatic plenary hearing upon retirement.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes courts to modify post-divorce support as circumstances require.

WISOFF VS. BARBARA WISOFF (FM-20-1693-03, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-08-29

Courts have statutory authority to modify post-divorce support "as circumstances may require," N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and equitable authority to modify such obligations "in response to changed circumstances [that] cannot be restricted," Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 149.

Section 2A:34-23 requires reassessment of child support when unemancipated children move from one parent's home to the other's.

MIRMAN VS. BRIAN F. MIRMAN (FM-07-2348-03, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-02-21

Plaintiff has an obligation to contribute to the basic support needs of her unemancipated children. Thus, their relocation to defendant's residence constitutes a change in circumstances requiring a reassessment of the child support obligations of the parties.

Section 2A:34-23 permits child support to be revised when the party seeking modification shows a change of circumstances from those in the existing order.

S.W. VS. E.W. (FM-12-0214-10, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-07

Child support may be revised when the party seeking modification satisfies the burden of showing a change of circumstances from those defined in an existing order. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980); Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App. Div. 1990).

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to modify alimony when the party seeking modification shows changed circumstances.

FRANGIPANE VS. RICHARD FRANGIPANE (FM-02-1092-96, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2017-09-01

Alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." ... Applying these principles, we are satisfied the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding there was a change in circumstances sufficient to modify defendant's alimony obligation.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification or termination of alimony when circumstances change, including when the original award was based on imputed income, unless the parties clearly agreed to limit modification.

D v. VS. S.J.S. (FM-10-0239-12, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-11

Second, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... The words "imputed income" do not establish an anti-Lepis clause because imputed income can change, and thus is subject to review based on a change of circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23(n) authorizes suspension or termination of alimony once cohabitation is established.

CASO VS. FERNANDO GUERRERO(FM-02-2622-11, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-09-13(n)

The 2014 amendment to the alimony statute, that sets forth considerations that bear upon cohabitation issues, authorizes suspension or termination of alimony once cohabitation is established.

The 2014 alimony standards in subsection (k) do not apply to a motion to modify agreed alimony terms in a divorce judgment entered before the amendments.

S.O. VS. M.O.(FM-04-1788-02, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-10-20(k)

In supplemental briefs requested by this court, both parties have now acknowledged that the revised alimony standards adopted by the Legislature in 2014, as now codified in subsection (k) of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, do not retroactively apply to the ex-husband's motion to modify the agreed-upon alimony obligation that was set forth in the parties' 2003 DFJD. ... Hence, the motion judge appropriately did not apply new subsection (k) to the ex-husband's motion.

The 2014 cohabitation amendment to section 2A:34-23 does not govern a marital settlement agreement entered before its enactment.

T.L.H. VS. M.H. (FM-20-0910-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-11-14

Because this law was enacted after the MSA in this case was entered, it does not govern this case, and, in any event, the terms of the MSA apply.

Subsection (n)'s cohabitation amendment does not apply to agreements executed before the statutory amendments were adopted.

JOHN W. SALVATORE VS. STACEY SALVATORE N/K/A STACEY ADUBATO (FM-14-0990-11, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-28(n)

We agree with the trial judge that "[t]he newly amended N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) does not apply," an argument not raised on appeal.

When an obligor seeks to retire before full retirement age, subsection (j)(2) requires proof that retirement is reasonable and made in good faith, and requires the court to consider the listed factors before deciding whether to modify or terminate alimony.

BARBARA A. MASON VS. THOMAS W. MASON (FM-08-0399-12, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-08-21(j)(2)

Because the court failed to conduct an analysis under this statute, we remand for the court to do so. Should the court determine that termination of alimony is appropriate, it must also determine the effective date of the termination.

Section 2A:34-23(a) and (b) requires the court to address the parties' current financial situations and the statutory factors when determining alimony and child support.

RICHARD PRICE VS. NATALYA PRICE (FM-20-0511-16, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-18(a), (b)

As required by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and (b), on remand the trial court must also address the parties' current financial situations, and the other statutory factors for determining alimony and child support.

For alimony orders or agreements predating the amendment, subsection (j)(3) requires the court to consider the obligee’s ability to save for retirement and the listed factors when deciding whether the obligor has proved that retirement warrants modifying or terminating alimony.

FRANGIPANE VS. RICHARD FRANGIPANE (FM-02-1092-96, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-09(j)(3)

The decision to terminate alimony on the basis of defendant's retirement was supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. The motion judge's application of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3) was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of custody and child support orders upon a showing of changed circumstances.

M.H.-S. VS. S.S. (FM-10-0197-03, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-14

Custody and child support orders "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time," N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, on "a showing of 'changed ... circumstances.'" Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980).

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when circumstances change; a prima facie showing of changed ability to work and a genuine factual dispute warrant a plenary hearing.

M.R. VS. E.G., JR. (FD-07-3602-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-19

Orders for child support "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Those documents provided a sufficient basis for defendant to carry his prima facie showing of a change in his ability to work. ... Accordingly, defendant was entitled to a plenary hearing on that issue.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to modify child support as circumstances require, but a court must make findings of changed circumstances before changing an agreed support amount.

INZITARI VS. LIZBETH INZITARI (FM-12-2038-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-01

Here, in addressing the child support issues, the judge did not make the requisite findings about changed circumstances. As a result, the judge did not determine whether those changes were sufficient to warrant a deviation from the child support amount that the parties had agreed to less than two years earlier.

When parents' income exceeds the child support guidelines, an increase in child support requires consideration of the statutory factors and evidence of the children's reasonable needs.

IANNIELLO VS. JENNIFER M. PIZZO (FM-18-0939-09, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-07(a)

We are satisfied the court correctly engaged in the requisite analysis of defendant's burden, including its consideration of the factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), and that its findings of fact are supported by sufficient credible evidence.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support upon a showing of changed circumstances.

T.A.B. VS. E.H. (FD-06-1696-03, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-27

Having carefully reviewed the record, we are satisfied that the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining defendant failed to establish a substantial change of financial circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23(l) calls for an analysis of a payor's self-employment when the payor seeks to reduce alimony.

C.J. VS. D.J. (FM-20-0002-10, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-01(l)

In connection with the plenary hearing, the family court ... can allow appropriate discovery and should require defendant to file an analysis concerning his self-employment. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(l).

Section 2A:34-23(n)'s cohabitation factors help determine whether a payor has made a prima facie showing sufficient to obtain discovery on an alimony claim.

MENNEN VS. JOHN H. MENNEN (FM-14-0384-02, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-02(n)

Regardless of whether the criteria expressed in prior case law or codified in subsection (n) are applied, the record amassed by the defendant was reasonably deemed insufficient by the motion judge to rise to the level of a prima facie case that would justify the additional discovery he sought.

Section 2A:34-23 permits alimony modification as circumstances require, but a temporary change in income does not support modification.

VISCONTI VS. LISA VISCONTI (FM-14-0005-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-04

The trial court may modify alimony awards "from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34–23. ... This is significant because a temporary change in income does not support a modification of alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(k) and (l) identifies factors courts must consider when modifying alimony, including the parties’ finances, the nature and motivation of changed circumstances, and the payor’s ability to meet the obligation.

M.S. VS. M.A.S. (FM-18-0670-15, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-07(k) and (l)

Similarly, in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k) and (l), the Legislature identified factors a court needs to consider when a party seeks to modify alimony. Those factors include, among other things, the financial circumstances of the parties; whether the change in circumstances is temporary or permanent; whether the change was voluntary; whether it was motivated by bad faith or a desire to avoid payment; and whether the change in circumstances renders the payor unable to meet the alimony obligation.

Living together and having a child does not alone establish cohabitation under subsection (n); courts must consider factors including finances, social recognition, household chores, and promises of support.

M.M. VS. J.Y. (FM-18-0536-09, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-13(n)

Cohabitation extends beyond simply living together and having a child together. The statute requires analysis of several factors, including finances, social perception, household chores, and other promises of support.

Section 2A:34-23(c) permits modification of limited-duration alimony based on changed circumstances; the party seeking modification must make a prima facie showing supported by full financial disclosure.

L.S. VS. M.S. (FM-14-0531-13, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-27(c)

Defendant had the burden of establishing a prima facie case of changed circumstances in his income, and this change warranted a modification of his alimony obligation. ... Here, defendant failed to make complete disclosure of material facts concerning his income.

A spouse challenging alimony based on cohabitation bears the initial burden of showing cohabitation; occasional overnight stays and limited household help did not establish the required economic relationship.

B.S. VS. A.S. (FM-18-0527-17, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-09-20(n)

Here, plaintiff's evidence if accepted as true, established only that defendant's friend spent some overnights at defendant's home, assisted in caring ... for the children, and provided limited physical household assistance on occasion. Those allegations did not establish that the required economic relationship existed between defendant and her friend.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of support orders as circumstances require, but an enforceable anti-Lepis agreement may bar alimony modification.

ROSENBERG VS. REESA ROSENBERG (FM-03-0463-11, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-23

A court has the authority to modify or alter support orders "from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... As such, we agree with the trial court that the PSA's anti-Lepis provision precluded the requested modification.

An alimony payor seeking modification based on cohabitation must first make a prima facie showing; sharing a residence alone does not establish one or entitle the payor to discovery.

WENDY S. WOOD VS. ALAN R. WOOD (FM-13-1788-15, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-16(n)

While our Supreme Court has characterized "a common residence" as "an important factor" in establishing cohabitation, it has not determined that a common residence alone establishes a ... prima facie case, and we reject defendant's invitation to do so here.

Section 2A:34-23(k) applies to a non-self-employed party seeking to modify alimony.

WEINBAUM VS. BARBARA T. WEINBAUM (FM-12-0682-09, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-19(k)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k) applies to a "non-self-employed party."

Section 2A:34-23(n) requires a prima facie showing of cohabitation before a court orders discovery on a motion to modify alimony.

LANDAU VS. STACY LANDAU (FM-14-1196-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-09-12(n)

We determine the party seeking modification still has the burden of showing the changed circumstance of cohabitation so as to warrant relief from an alimony obligation, see Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 353 (1956), and hold the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute did not alter the requirement that "[a] prima facie showing of changed circumstances must be made before a court will order discovery of an ex-spouse's financial status." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157.

For an alimony agreement established before the amendment, an obligor seeking to end alimony upon retirement must provide evidence needed to assess the statutory factors and meet the burden of proof.

PAMELA PAGAN VS. DAVID PAGAN (FM-12-2110-05, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-02(j)(3)

The record on appeal lacks any CIS or other objective evidence to discern defendant's age, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3)(a), and the financial circumstances, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3)(f), (g), or (h), to enable us to determine if the judge erred. ... The failure to produce this information in this one-sided appeal, as it was on the motion for reconsideration, demonstrates the judge did not err when he concluded defendant failed to meet his burden to establish a good-faith retirement.

For an alimony order entered before September 10, 2014, subsection (j)(3) requires the court to weigh the statutory retirement factors when deciding whether to modify or terminate alimony.

BONNIE IMPOSIMATO VS. BIAGIO IMPOSIMATO (FM-13-0397-04, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-11(j)(3)

The court's decision was based upon a thorough analysis of the statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3), with proper consideration given to the entire record.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes courts to modify alimony and support orders as the parties’ circumstances and the nature of the case require.

ROSS VS. GIULIANA ROSS (FM-07-1240-07, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-01-17

The court is "authorized to modify alimony and support orders 'as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case' require." Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 448 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23).

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to modify alimony and child support when a party demonstrates changed circumstances.

BOWENS VS. PETRONILLA BOWENS (FM-20-0090-12, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-03-06

Alimony and child support "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. To warrant such a modification, a party must demonstrate "changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 150-51 (1980). ... We discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of plaintiff's request to modify child support and alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(n) does not make intertwined finances or living together full time prerequisites to a prima facie showing of cohabitation for alimony modification.

GOETHALS VS. JEFFREY J. GOETHALS (FM-14-0109-15, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-01-07(n)

However, by dismissing the substantial evidence amassed by defendant, and requiring evidence of intertwined finances and the couple living together on a full -time basis to establish prima facie evidence of changed circumstances, the judge ... misapprehended the express provision of the MSA and the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).

Section 2A:34-23(n) requires evidence of cohabitation beyond a dating relationship before an alimony payer is entitled to discovery and a hearing.

SMITH-BARRETT VS. MICHAEL SNYDER (FM-10-0329-06, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-05(n)

Plaintiff relies primarily on Facebook posts indicating that defendant and K.R. are in a dating relationship. This is not enough to establish a prima facie case of cohabitation.

Subsection (n) permits discovery when a spouse makes a sufficient showing of possible cohabitation, even if the evidence does not yet establish cohabitation.

WAJDA VS. SYLWIA WAJDA (FM-02-2488-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-23(n)

We disagree with plaintiff's assertion that he demonstrated cohabitation — that defendant and A.S. were in "a mutually supportive, intimate personal ... relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage[,]" N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) — based solely on the documents filed by both sides. The question is whether plaintiff made a sufficient showing to warrant further discovery. We think he did.

Subsection (j)(3) requires the court to consider the listed retirement factors when deciding whether to modify or terminate an existing alimony award.

MELE VS. JOHN MELE (FM-02-19256-90, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-03-05(j)(3)

Only one factor out of the eight the judge considered favored defendant, namely, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3)(h). The judge's decision to maintain alimony was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 2A:34-23(j)(2) applies to alimony orders or agreements established after the 2014 amendments; subsection (j)(3) governs retirement applications involving earlier orders or agreements.

MARK AMZLER VS. AMY AMZLER (FM-12-2131-09, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-02(j)(2), (j)(3)

However, when construed with the entirety of subsection (j), as in Landers, we conclude that the ... Legislature intended subsection (j)(2) to apply only to orders or agreements established after the 2014 amendments became effective.

Subsection (j)(3)(f) requires consideration of an obligor’s ability to maintain alimony payments after retirement, including any part-time work or reduced hours.

LANDERS VS. PATRICK J. LANDERS (FM-08-5949-91, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-20(j)(3)(f)

The focus of the second remand was whether the updated CIS and tax information impacted defendant's alimony obligation under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3)(f). We affirm substantially for the reasons given by the motion judge.

Subsection (j)(3) governs retirement-based requests to modify or terminate alimony obligations established before September 10, 2014.

ROXANNE DUNNING VS. HARRY RITCHIE, JR. (FM-04-1373-13, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-11(j)(3)

Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Yolanda C. Rodriguez analyzed defendant's application under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3), in that defendant's alimony obligation was established prior to the statute's September 10, 2014 effective date. ... Under that limited standard of review, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Rodriguez's cogent oral opinion.

Section 2A:34-23(j)'s retirement modification provisions do not apply when no alimony obligation exists at the time of trial.

ANDERSON VS. MELISSA ANDERSON (FM-18-0959-13, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2020-05-28(j)

At the time of trial, no alimony obligation existed. Therefore, neither subsection (j)(1) nor (j)(3) applied.

Retirement-based requests to modify or terminate alimony orders predating September 10, 2014, must be reviewed under subsection (j)(3).

FIORE VS. PETER FIORE (FM-12-2115-09, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-06(j)(3)

If the alimony order pre-dates September 10, 2014, the request for modification or termination must be reviewed under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3).

Section 2A:34-23(n) requires courts to consider multiple factors when assessing cohabitation; living in separate homes alone cannot rule it out.

GARCIA-TRAVIESO VS. MICHAEL GARCIA- A-4023-18T1 TRAVIESO (FM-02-0737-13, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-14(n)

Thus, even though N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) states that a court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on the grounds that they do not live together, we agree with the court that the other evidence in the motion record was wholly insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances based on cohabitation.

For alimony orders entered before September 10, 2014, subsection (j)(3) requires courts considering termination upon retirement to weigh the statutory factors and give explicit, primary consideration to the recipient’s ability to have saved adequately for retirement.

EDDEY VS. ILENE EDDEY (FM-14-0795-02, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-29(j)(3)

Subsection (j)(3) emphasizes that the court "shall consider the ability of the obligee to have saved adequately for retirement . . . ." ... This consideration is a primary factor in the analysis.

The 2014 amendments to § 2A:34-23 do not govern a changed circumstances request to modify alimony awarded in a 2012 final judgment of divorce.

GIBBONEY VS. CATHERINE VERME (FM-04-0691-11, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-15

Instead, the court should have considered plaintiff's application under the changed circumstances standard memorialized in the 2012 FJOD and in accordance with the earlier iteration of the alimony statute rather than the revised alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support upon a showing of changed circumstances.

KARES VS. MICHAEL KARES (FM-02-2539-19, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-11-12

Child support orders are subject to modification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 upon a showing of changed circumstances.

Subsection (n) permits termination of alimony when the recipient cohabits with another person.

LOGAN VS. RONALD BROWN (FM-04-1571-11, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-22(n)

Applying this standard, we are satisfied defendant made the requisite showing based on plaintiff's cohabitation with A.V. Accordingly, the judge properly terminated defendant's alimony and life insurance obligations as of January 1, 2017.

A party seeking to terminate permanent alimony based on changed circumstances must present competent evidence that the change is permanent.

GALE L. PICCIONE VS. CHARLES S. PICCIONE (FM-21-0304-08, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-23

The party moving for termination of alimony has the burden of presenting competent evidence establishing a prima facie case of changed circumstances.

Subsection (n) requires evidence of statutory cohabitation factors; temporary shelter and bare allegations do not establish cohabitation.

R.J.E. VS. R.I.E. (FM-18-0336-19, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-08-24(n)

Because defendant did not demonstrate plaintiff cohabited with E.S., as contemplated by the Legislature, and she neglected to utilize the discovery tools approved by the court to support her claims of cohabitation, the trial judge was not compelled to accept her bare allegations of cohabitation.

Section 2A:34-23 allows parties’ agreed alimony terms to govern without a separate showing of changed circumstances.

P.J.W. VS. E.B.W. (FM-18-0298-12, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-11-16

Second, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, alimony "may be revised and altered by the family court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Given our interpretation of the Support Agreement, plaintiff did not need to show a change of circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to modify alimony when circumstances change.

JOHN DECHIARA VS. STEPHANIE KLAAR DECHIARA (FM-14-0653-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-03

Alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... The judge's statement of reasons for the temporary downward modification of alimony and his imputation of income that plaintiff would earn in the near future is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.

Section 2A:34-23(j)(3) deems an alimony obligor who reaches full retirement age to have retired in good faith when the alimony order or agreement predates the 2014 amendment.

VALSALEN VS. VALSA PAUL (FM-08-0585-06, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-21(j)(3)

Indeed, subsection (j)(3) of the alimony statute declares that a person who reaches "full retirement age" is deemed to have retired in "good faith."

Section 2A:34-23(b) governs initial alimony awards; when modifying alimony, a court considers the relevant factors in the section.

T.S. VS. P.T. (FM-02-1804-07, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-22(b)

Initially, we note that defendant argues that the court failed to consider the factors in subsection (b), which governs an initial award of alimony. More importantly, a review of the family court's comprehensive decision demonstrates that the court considered all relevant factors identified in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and cogently analyzed those factors in modifying plaintiff's alimony obligation.

Subsection (n) requires courts assessing cohabitation to consider factors including shared finances, living expenses, social recognition, living arrangements, household chores, and promises of support.

CLEMAS VS. JOSEPH CLEMAS (FM-18-0370-12, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-03-22(n)

As the motion judge noted, defendant provided no evidence of intertwined finances, shared living expenses, living together, or an enforceable promise of support. Defendant relied on limited evidence of plaintiff and M.M., over several years of dating, somewhat frequently seeing and traveling with one another and their families, sharing four to five pictures on Facebook holding themselves out publicly as a couple, and two instances of sharing responsibilities. This is simply not enough to establish a prima facie case of cohabitation.

Section 2A:34-23(l) requires a self-employed person seeking alimony modification because of an involuntary income reduction to compare current economic and non-economic business benefits with those at the time of the prior order.

COULL VS. NANCY AMSTER-COULL (FM-20-1682-10, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-09-01(l)

As we have noted, and Judge Isenhour properly recognized, the application of a self-employed movant who seeks to modify alimony based on an involuntary reduction in income "must include an analysis that sets forth the economic and non-economic benefits the party receives from the business, and which compares these economic and non-economic benefits to those that were in existence at the time of the entry of the order." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(l).

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony and support when changed circumstances warrant relief; an obligor's voluntary career change and failed business venture do not warrant modification.

GAMBARDELLA VS. SCOTT HERMO (FM-07-1973-06, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-09-09

The trial court is "authorized to modify alimony and support orders 'as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case' require." Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 448 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). ... We have carefully reviewed the record in light of these legal principles and find no basis to disturb the trial court's conclusion that Hermo did not establish changed circumstances after execution of the amended MSA related to his failed business venture and income.

Section 2A:34-23(j)(1) presumes alimony ends when the payor reaches full retirement age, but permits the presumption to be overcome for good cause after consideration of statutory factors.

NEWLAND VS. MARIA A. NEWLAND (FM-03-0966-15, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-01-21(j)(1)

Further, subsection (j)(1) creates "a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor . . . attaining full retirement age," although for good cause and upon consideration of certain factors, "[t]he rebuttable presumption may be overcome[.]" N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1).

Subsection (n) does not require evidence on every listed factor to establish a prima facie case of cohabitation.

JEFFREY J. TEMPLE VS. CYNTHIA G. TEMPLE (FM-18-0710-03, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-06-17(n)

But we reject what seems to be implied in the judge's decision that evidence favorable to movant must be presented on all six statutory considerations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).

Subsection (n) permits a prima facie showing of cohabitation without evidence of every listed factor if the evidence could support a finding of a mutually supportive, intimate relationship with duties and privileges commonly associated with marriage or civil union.

JEFFREY J. TEMPLE VS. CYNTHIA G. TEMPLE (FM-18-0710-03, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-06-30(n)

The judicial task in determining whether a prima facie case has been presented is far less mechanical. It is enough that the movant present evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude the supported spouse and another are in "a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship" in which they have "undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).

Section 2A:34-23(k) permits temporary reductions in alimony payments, but not child support obligations.

K.W. VS. G.Y. (FM-14-0985-14, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-07(k)

The section defendant cites, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k), permits temporary reductions in alimony payments, not child support obligations.

Section 2A:34-23(l) does not require a self-employed party to submit a forensic accountant's report to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances for an alimony modification.

SPIRO VS. SCOTT SPIRO (FM-02-0185-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-16(l)

Neither N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(l) nor Rule 5:5-4(a)(4) requires submission of a forensic accountant's report to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances where the movant is self-employed.

Subsection (l) governs a self-employed party’s request to modify alimony after an involuntary reduction in income.

OLSSON VS. JOHN ROMEO (FM-03-0674-18, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-09-24(l)

The judge's careful scrutiny and well-reasoned analysis of the reports, certifications, CIS's, and documents submitted with the motion and cross-motion support his conclusion that defendant has the ability to pay $150 per week in alimony under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(l), given the disparities in the parties' current income levels.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony and support orders when changed circumstances warrant relief.

K.A. VS. C.E. (FM-20-2069-07, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2021-10-12

A party seeking a modification of his alimony and child support obligations must demonstrate changed circumstances "as would warrant relief."

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when the party seeking it proves changed circumstances.

K.A.A. VS. G.S.A. (FM-02-1580-11, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-16

The statute provides child-support orders "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. "Our courts have interpreted this statute to require a party who seeks modification to prove 'changed circumstances[.]'" Spangenberg, 442 N.J. Super. at 536 (alteration in original) (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980)). ... Based on the motion record and admitted lack of support defendant provided for his change-of-circumstances claim, we see no abuse of discretion in the motion judge's denial of defendant's motion.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when the party seeking it demonstrates changed circumstances.

COLACURTO v. ANTHONY COLACURTO (FM-02-2627-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-03-31

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, the Family Part has the authority to modify child-support "from time to time as circumstances may require." ... Moreover, we conclude there was no need for the judge to address whether the parties anti-Lepis clause pertains to both alimony and child support because defendant did not demonstrate a prima facie case of changed circumstances or other good cause in order to even reach that analysis.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support for changed circumstances, but an enforceable anti-Lepis clause may limit which foreseeable circumstances qualify.

BRENT v. ADAM L. BRENT (FM-08-0392-17, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-06-16

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, the Family Part has the authority to modify child-support "from time to time as circumstances may require." Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). "Our courts have interpreted this statute to require a party who seeks modification to prove 'changed circumstances[.]'" Id. at 536 (alteration in original) (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980)).

Section 2A:34-23 allows child support to be modified when circumstances substantially change, including a significant increase in overnight parenting time.

J.D. v. S.F. (FM-13-1808-13, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-01

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, the Family Part has the authority to modify child-support "from time to time as circumstances may require." ... Absent such language, child support remained modifiable based on substantially changed circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when a party proves changed circumstances.

MORIN v. MICHAEL MORIN (FM-08-0701-11, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-08-15

The Family Part has the statutory authority to modify child-support "from time to time as circumstances may require." Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). "Our courts have interpreted [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23] to require a party who seeks modification ... to prove 'changed circumstances[.]'" Id. at 536 (alteration in original) (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980)). ... Applying these principles to the facts in this case, we find that an ongoing substantial change in circumstances warranting a recalculation of child support under the guidelines had occurred.

A supported spouse’s increased income does not warrant reducing alimony when the increase is too modest to justify changing the agreement in light of the marital standard of living.

HYLEMON VS. MICHAEL J. HYLEMON (FM-12-0677-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-10-26(b)

After evaluating the alimony factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), the trial court ordered the reduction of alimony by one-hundred dollars per week. Based on the record before us, we disagree. The record shows plaintiff is unable to live in a financially equivalent manner to the standard of living established during the parties' marriage, even with her present income and support payments. Plaintiff's increase in income is not the "significant" increase envisioned in Glass that would justify a downward modification of the agreement, even when accounting for the reasonable expectations of the parties.

A party seeking to suspend or terminate alimony based on cohabitation must make a prima facie showing of cohabitation before obtaining discovery or a plenary hearing.

J.R. VS. F.R. (FM-02-1533-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2021-10-27(n)

As to defendant's second argument, since he failed to establish a prima facie showing of cohabitation, he is not entitled to discovery or a plenary hearing.

Subsection (j)(3) governs requests to modify or terminate alimony based on retirement when the alimony order predates September 10, 2014.

BRUCE E. KILMER, JR. VS. SHARON A. KILMER (FM-03-1505-08, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-11-24(j)(3)

If the alimony order pre-dates September 10, 2014, ... the request for modification or termination must be reviewed under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3).

Subsection (j)(3) governs alimony modification applications when the obligor has reached full retirement age and the parties made an enforceable written agreement before the 2014 amendment.

ENNICO VS. LOUISE ENNICO (FM-02-1399-95, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-11-29(j)(3)

This section of the statute applies to modification applications where an obligor has reached full retirement age and where the parties' enforceable written agreement was executed before the 2014 amendment to the alimony statute.

Section 2A:34-23(n) permits alimony to be suspended or terminated for cohabitation, but the party seeking relief must make a prima facie showing before obtaining discovery or a plenary hearing.

A.W. v. A.C.W. (FM-11-0373-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-01-04(n)

Since defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or cohabitation, he is not entitled to discovery or a plenary hearing.

Section 2A:34-23(k)’s ninety-day waiting period for seeking alimony modification applies only when the changed circumstances arise from loss of employment.

DOMINGUEZ v. ADRIANA DOMINGUEZ (FM-18-0367-00, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-06-27(k)

By its plain terms, the ninety-day limitation applies solely where a modification of alimony is sought based on movant's loss of employment.

A party seeking to modify alimony must show a substantial change in circumstances before obtaining further discovery or a plenary hearing.

BRIAN J. WELCH v. DONNA L. WELCH (FM-13-1292-08, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-08

Alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... In her renewed motion, defendant fails to proffer any additional information that demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances. The judge's decision is based upon substantial credible evidence in the record and defendant's motion seeking additional discovery from plaintiff was properly denied.

Modifying rehabilitative alimony or the amount of limited duration alimony requires changed circumstances or an expected circumstance that did not occur; extending the term of limited duration alimony requires unusual circumstances.

HORVATH v. SCOTT E. HORVATH (FM-11-1156-07, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-11(c), (d)

To modify rehabilitative alimony or the amount of limited duration alimony, as compared to its duration, a showing of "changed circumstances" or "the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award" is necessary. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c), (d). However, to modify the length of the term of limited durational alimony, a higher statutory showing of "unusual circumstances" is necessary.

Section 2A:34-23 allows modification of agreed alimony and child support obligations on a showing of changed circumstances.

OSIS v. TEOBALDO M. OSIS (FM-16-1242-18, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-28

The child support and alimony provisions of a matrimonial settlement agreement are subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances. Lepis, 83 N.J. at 146; N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Under these circumstances, we conclude the motion judge properly found defendant failed to establish any legitimate reason to review his alimony and support obligations, which were established under the MSA only eight months before defendant filed his cross-motion seeking modification.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes courts to modify alimony and support orders when the parties’ circumstances warrant relief.

ZANGRILLI v. JASON D. ZANGRILLI (FM-16-1553-11, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-29

The court is "authorized to modify alimony and support orders 'as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case' require." Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 448 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). ... We see no basis on which to disturb the trial court's order reducing defendant's financial obligations to plaintiff to reflect the change in his imputed annual income.

Section 2A:34-23(k) requires courts to consider statutory factors when deciding whether to modify alimony.

Bollinger v. Engelsman · filed 2023-12-26(k)

A court must consider statutory factors when a party seeks to modify ... alimony. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k).

Section 2A:34-23(n) requires sufficient evidence under its cohabitation factors to establish a prima facie case before discovery on an alimony termination motion.

MANLEY v. SUZANNE MANLEY (FM-12-0999-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-01-14(n)

The judge properly considered the cohabitation factors and determined plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to warrant discovery even if there had been evidence of financial contribution between defendant and Sam.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to enforce postjudgment alimony obligations by ordering the sale of an obligor's property when the circumstances warrant it.

W.S.H. v. V.L.P. (FM-03-0289-14, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-02-16

While Randazzo involved the sale of real property prior to the final judgment of divorce, V.L.P. makes no convincing argument why the court's ability to fashion appropriate relief in a divorce proceeding should be any less expansive where a party persists, post judgment, in refusing to comply with court orders establishing her equitable distribution and alimony obligations.

For alimony agreements made before September 10, 2014, subsection (j)(3) treats reaching full retirement age as a good faith retirement age, but the obligor must still show that modifying or ending alimony is appropriate when the agreement already addresses retirement.

RAPORTE v. KAREN SARGENT (FM-11-0166-02, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-03-08(j)(3)

By preserving the Lepis standard, the amended statute prevented the evisceration of existing support provisions in marital settlement agreements or consent orders that explicitly contemplated an anticipated event which otherwise might constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification or termination.

Subsection (k)'s alimony modification factors do not apply to a settlement agreement entered before September 10, 2014.

CARDALI v. MICHAEL CARDALI (FM-18-0596-06, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-06-27(k)

Because the parties entered into the PSA well before the effective date of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k), i.e., September 10, 2014, we are convinced the judge correctly declined to analyze defendant's modification request under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k).

Subsection (n) does not require evidence on every cohabitation factor for a prima facie showing; competent evidence on some factors suffices if it would establish cohabitation if unrebutted.

Cardali v. Cardali · filed 2023-08-08(n)

Accordingly, we decline to require a movant seeking to present a prima facie showing to proffer evidence on all of the cohabitation factors in Konzelman, or on all of the cohabitation factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23(n) in cases governed by the statute.

Section 2A:34-23(b) excludes income from a distributed retirement benefit when determining alimony, but does not bar consideration of distributed assets when assessing ability to pay existing support obligations.

D.K. v. B.K. (FM-20-1243-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-01-07(b)

The language from N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 the Court interpreted in Innes has no application here. The provision in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 cited by the Court in Innes prohibits consideration of the income generated from a retirement benefit that was treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution only in the determination of alimony. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). In her September 25 and October 14, 2020 orders, the judge did not determine alimony; she directed plaintiff to pay alimony (and child support) as required by the parties' MSA. We reject plaintiff's argument that his assets obtained by way of equitable distribution "are exempt from consideration" vis-à-vis his ability to pay even if his assets have decreased in value.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when the applicant shows changed circumstances; a sustained, significant change in parenting time can satisfy that requirement.

Slosky v. Slosky · filed 2024-07-22

However, the Family Part has authority under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to modify alimony and child support awards. ... "Our courts have interpreted this statute to require a party who seeks modification to prove 'changed circumstances.'" ... We conclude defendant established a prima facie case of changed circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when the moving party shows changed circumstances since the last support order.

F.L. v. E.S.Y. · filed 2024-07-29

The Family Part has authority under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to modify child- support awards. ... Viewed as a motion to modify his child-support obligation, the judge correctly denied the motion. Defendant did not allege, much less demonstrate, that a change of circumstances warranting relief occurred between the April 12, 2023 order and when he filed his motion the following month.

Section 2A:34-23 allows courts to revise support orders as circumstances require.

Jitan v. Jitan · filed 2024-08-01

Nonetheless, a trial court retains the equitable power to modify support provisions at any time. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 145 (1980); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (providing support orders "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require").

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when the moving party makes a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.

J.M. v. M.M. · filed 2024-09-17

Orders for support "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Upon a motion to modify child support, the moving party has the burden to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances warranting relief. ... Because we are persuaded that reconsideration should have been granted based on a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, we reverse and remand the matter to the trial court to establish child support and the effective date in accordance with the Guidelines.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of child support when the party seeking it proves changed circumstances.

Reyes v. Lewis · filed 2025-03-10

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, the Family Part has the authority to modify child support "from time to time as circumstances may require." Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). New Jersey courts "have interpreted this statute to require a party who seeks modification to prove 'changed circumstances.'" Id. at 536 (quoting Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157).

Section 2A:34-23(k) supplies the factors for reviewing an application to modify alimony; subsection (b)'s thirteen factors govern an initial award.

Geary v. Geary · filed 2024-02-21(k)

On an initial award of alimony, the court is required to consider the thirteen factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b. Prior to rendering findings of fact in this matter, the court expressly stated it considered and determined plaintiff's application based on the enumerated factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23k and ... incorporated them in its analysis. Having reviewed the forty-four-page transcript, we are satisfied the trial court's findings are based on substantial, credible evidence and the correct statutory factors were applied.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to revise alimony when circumstances change; a party seeking modification must show a permanent change from when the award was set.

Diblasio v. Diblasio · filed 2024-07-15

Under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." To modify an alimony obligation, the movant must show permanently "changed circumstances" from when the prior alimony award was fixed.

Section 2A:34-23(j)(3) governs retirement-based requests to modify alimony under orders or agreements established before September 10, 2014; a vague plan to retire at a future age does not support modification.

J.S. v. M.S. · filed 2024-08-02(j)(3)

Paragraph (3) of subsection (j) governs a court's review of a request to modify or terminate an alimony award "[W]hen a retirement application is filed in cases in which there is an existing final alimony order or enforceable written agreement established prior to the [September 10, 2014] effective date of this act . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3); see also Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. at 200. ... A vague reference to a plan to retire at some future age with no other information isn't enough to support a modification of alimony.

Section 2A:34-23 permits alimony modification upon a substantial change in circumstances; the 2014 amendment did not remove that requirement.

Oshidar v. Oshidar · filed 2024-08-07

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 was amended in 2014 but did not supersede the basic "changed circumstances" requirement for support modifications.

After a party shows changed circumstances warranting an alimony modification, Section 2A:34-23(b) requires the court to apply the statutory factors and consider both parties' circumstances.

Papadelias v. Papadelias · filed 2024-08-12(b)

Once that burden is met, the court must apply the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) and consider the circumstances of the parties.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony when circumstances change, including termination following a good faith retirement.

Servis v. Halaka · filed 2024-08-21

An alimony order "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. at 197. ... We are satisfied the judge did not abuse his discretion in finding defendant had established a change in circumstances based on his good faith retirement.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to reduce rather than terminate alimony after the paying spouse retires when continued support is fair under the parties’ circumstances.

Rasmussen v. Rasmussen · filed 2024-08-27

Turning to substantive legal principles, in Innes v. Innes, our Supreme Court explained that in divorce actions, courts may award alimony: ... "[A]s the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Applying the foregoing principles to the matter before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to reduce but not immediately terminate defendant's alimony obligations.

Section 2A:34-23(k) requires ninety days of unemployment or reduced income before a party may seek to modify alimony, but passing that threshold does not automatically establish changed circumstances.

Howard v. Howard · filed 2024-10-18(k)

The statute limits a party from seeking modification until they are either unemployed or unable to find employment at prior income levels "for a period of [ninety] days." Ibid. But this does not mean that a period of unemployment greater than ninety days, as defendant experienced here, constitutes an automatic basis for finding a change in circumstances.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts to consider its listed factors when setting alimony, including on a motion to reduce payments after a decrease in income.

Spiro v. Spiro · filed 2024-10-18(b)

Additionally, the trial judge considered the relevant factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). The court appropriately and reasonably modified defendant's alimony payments and reduced the payment from $145,000 to $83,000 annually to reflect defendant's decreased income.

Section 2A:34-23(k) governs applications to modify or terminate alimony by a non-self-employed party and requires the court to consider the listed factors.

J.D. v. C.D. · filed 2024-12-03(k)

Applications to modify (or, by logical implication, terminate) alimony are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k), which provides: ... The court did not abuse its discretion in terminating defendant's alimony obligation after carefully considering these factors.

For alimony orders entered before the 2014 amendment, subsection (j)(3) allows a retiring obligor to show changed circumstances through evidence about the recipient’s retirement savings and continuing need for alimony.

Voynick v. Voynick · filed 2025-03-05(j)(3)

Based on the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3), we conclude the Legislature intended that a prima facie changed circumstance can not only be shown through a change in an obligor's financial circumstances after retirement affecting their continuing ability to pay alimony, but also may be exhibited through an obligee's financial disclosure or other evidence demonstrating a continuing need for alimony, or lack thereof.

Subsection (j)(1) creates a rebuttable presumption that alimony terminates when the obligor reaches full retirement age.

Corzo v. Francisco Corzo, Jr. · filed 2024-02-29(j)(1)

We are convinced that Judge Augostini properly applied the 2014 modified alimony standard following retirement under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1) in considering defendant's request to terminate alimony upon retirement. L. 2014, c. 42, § 1. There is a rebuttable presumption alimony shall be terminated "upon the obligor spouse or partner attaining full retirement age." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1).

Section 2A:34-23(j) permits alimony to be modified or terminated upon prospective or actual retirement; the possibility that an obligor may retire later does not justify limiting the initial award.

Frey v. Frey · filed 2024-03-28(j)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j) permits an award of alimony to be "modified or terminated upon the prospective or actual retirement of the obligor." ... Thus, it was reversible error for the court to award limited durational alimony because defendant "may" seek to retire in the future.