N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2

Section 56:8-2 requires a consumer fraud claimant to allege that she purchased merchandise from the defendant.

OTERO v. CVS PHARMACY INC. · filed 2020-01-21

To state a claim under the NJCFA, a plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that she is a “consumer” and that she purchased “merchandise” from the defendant. ... Here, there is no allegation that Plaintiffs purchased merchandise from Sedgwick, and Plaintiffs’ NJCFA claim is therefore dismissed.

Section 56:8-2 does not give a plaintiff standing as a commercial competitor without evidence that it competes commercially with the defendants.

General Development Corp. v. Binstein · filed 1990-07-30

Clearly then, the plaintiff, not having pointed the court to evidence buttressing its argument that it has standing as a competitor in the commercial sense, cannot evade summary judgment on the issue of standing to sue under N.J.Stat.Ann. § 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 supplies substantive state tort law but does not independently confer subject matter jurisdiction or waive sovereign immunity.

Mill Creek Group, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 2001-04-10

This statute is substantive state tort law. It does not form an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant, nor is it a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 56:8-2 allows a claim based on a public advertisement only by a bona fide consumer of the advertised product.

Grauer v. Geo · filed 1998-07-27

Neither logic nor common sense would allow us to conclude that everyone who sees this sign possesses a grievance. The cause of action is created only as to bona fide consumers of the product.

Section 56:8-2's coverage of a commercial transaction depends on the nature of the transaction, including the buyer's sophistication and use of professional advisers.

RDM CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC VS. SURFSIDE CASUAL FURNITURE (L-2182-13, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-08-04

In our analysis of the All the Way Towing factors, we turn first to the second factor by noting that defendant, through its president, Himmelstein, was a sophisticated party that chose to engage in a sophisticated endeavor.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat awarded chess tournament prize money as merchandise supporting a consumer fraud claim.

D'Agostino v. Goichberg · filed 2024-11-14

The awarded prize money was not merchandise to support a cognizable claim under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 permits a business that uses purchased goods in its operations to claim an ascertainable loss caused by misrepresentations about the goods’ net weight.

CALABRIA RISTORANTE, INC. v. RUGGIERO SEAFOOD, INC. · filed 2023-12-14

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that: (i) it is a consumer because it does “not wholesale or resell the calamari in its original packaging and frozen form”; (ii) calamari is “merchandise” under the CFA; and (iii) Plaintiff “suffered a cognizable ascertainable loss[] [b]ased” on Performance Food’s “manipulation and misrepresentation of the net weight of frozen calamari,” causing Plaintiff to “receive[] less than what was promised.”

Section 56:8-2 requires a consumer transaction between the parties to state a Consumer Fraud Act claim.

ACOSTA v. FARAONES NIGHTCLUB · filed 2023-08-03

However, to adequately state a claim under the NJCFA, there must be a consumer transaction between the parties.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to a day camp website advertising camp services rather than merchandise or real estate.

Yohananov v. Bris Avrohom of Fair Lawn · filed 2022-08-02

A plain reading of this statute makes it clear that it is directed solely towards the advertisement of merchandise and real estate, not services such as those provided by a day camp. The Act is therefore inapplicable to the camp’s website, which neither advertises nor sells merchandise or real estate.

Section 56:8-2 requires evidence of a sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate, or a misrepresentation concerning the defendant’s subsequent performance, to sustain a consumer fraud claim.

SCALERCIO-ISENBERG v. TRANSUNION, LLC · filed 2022-07-11

Plaintiff’s opposition brief disputes Defendant’s assertion that she has abandoned her NJCFA claim, but it does not point to any evidence that Defendant sold or advertised merchandise or real estate or that Defendant made a misrepresentation with respect to its own subsequent performance.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim based on specific misrepresentations made while offering interior design services when they are connected to the consumer’s loss and substantially aggravate a contract breach.

LUKACS v. PURVI PADIA DESIGN LLC · filed 2022-06-13

However, the Complaint alleges that Defendants made other misrepresentations that are more specific, more directly connected to Plaintiff’s alleged losses, and substantially aggravating. ... This Court will therefore allow Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim to proceed against all Defendants.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a custom car made through individualized negotiations because it is not merchandise under the NJCFA.

WAY v. ARETE AUTOMOBILI CORPORATION · filed 2022-01-20

Here, the LRD is not a consumer good that is “generally standardized” or available for “mass distribution.” ... Thus, Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim fails because the LRD is not “merchandise” under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover alleged fraud or misleading conduct in the sale of a franchise.

BAYMONT FRANCHISE SYSTEMS, INC. v. THE BERNSTEIN COMPANY, LLC · filed 2021-07-13

Insofar as Defendants may be claiming that they were defrauded or misled in connection with their purchase of the franchise from BFS, the CFA does not provide redress for such alleged misconduct.

Section 56:8-2 permits a claim based on an alleged misrepresentation of expertise in providing processing services when the pleaded facts plausibly bring those services within the Consumer Fraud Act.

COLD STAR SALES AND LEASING, INC. v. TRU ASEPTICS, LLC · filed 2020-04-17

These allegations, when accepted as true, state a valid prima facie case under the CFA. ... Rather, it is Defendant’s aseptic processing services that is the “merchandise” Plaintiff alleges was offered “directly or indirectly to the public,” which Plaintiff alleges constitutes unlawful conduct by Defendant.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover the sale or acquisition of a franchise because a franchise purchase is not a consumer transaction covered by the Consumer Fraud Act.

J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. California Smoothie Licensing Corp. · filed 1994-08-04

However, we conclude that when an individual or a corporation purchases a franchise, it is not a person in a "consumer oriented situation," and thus the transaction is not covered by the Act.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to the sale of a franchise, even when it is offered to the general public, because a franchise is a business rather than consumer merchandise.

Christy v. We the People Forms & Service Centers, USA, Inc. · filed 2003-03-06

Where franchises are available to the general public, their purchase remains excluded from the Act because the item for sale is a business, and not consumer goods and services.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a trustee’s failure to diversify trust assets.

Robertson v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1995-02-06

We agree with the district court that a claim for failure to diversify trust assets is not among the fraudulent acts proscribed by the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 56:8-2 covers insurance policies, and whether a title insurer’s delayed disclosure of a perceived title defect violates it can be a question for the trier of fact.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Greenlands Realty, LLC · filed 1999-07-20

The NJUTPA covers insurance policies. ... If Stewart Title did believe that it had erred in issuing the policy, then it is for the trier of fact to decide whether Stewart Title’s failure to inform Green-lands of this alleged error until days before the scheduled closing date violated the NJUTPA.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to insurance agency relationships because they are business arrangements rather than consumer merchandise.

A.H. Meyers & Co. v. CNA Insurance · filed 2004-01-29

Even without repeating the extensive analysis in J & R Ice Cream, it should be clear that there is no meaningful way to distinguish a franchise arrangement from an agency arrangement. ... The same can surely be said of insurance agency relationships. Thus we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Meyers’s CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover complex employee welfare benefit plans marketed to a discrete class of investors rather than goods or services sold to consumers generally.

Cetel v. Kirwan Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2006-08-28

These facts are insufficient to establish that the plans at issue, and the transactions by which they were sold, qualify as “products and services sold to consumers in the popular sense[,]” such that they fall within the ambit of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 covers fraud connected with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate, and does not cover a transaction involving an investment interest in a business.

Waterloov Gutter Protection System Co. v. Absolute Gutter Protection, L.L.C. · filed 1999-09-28

Even if this Court were to agree with the Defendants that Knight’s compensation in the WIC transaction amounted to something other than securities, this Court would still find that the transaction was one not within the ambit of the CFA. The CFA regulates fraud “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover alleged misrepresentations in an industry standard-setting process that are not consumer transactions or intended to induce purchases.

Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL · filed 2010-09-27

The court finds no application of § 56:8-2 to the conduct at issue. ... None of the alleged misrepresentations regarding the HEAI project or ultimate standard adoption show any intent to induce consumers to buy Nonprofit Defendants’ services. ... The alleged misrepresentations in question simply cannot be characterized as consumer transactions, and thus fall outside of the Act.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a highly particularized service agreement when the services are not sold to the general public.

James T. Scatuorchio Racing Stable, LLC v. Walmac Stud Management, LLC · filed 2013-04-19

The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved.

Section 56:8-2 applies to claims relating to the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate.

Torsiello v. Strobeck · filed 2013-06-27

A claim alleging a violation of the CFA, N J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2, must relate to the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.

Section 56:8-2 covers a medical practitioner who buys a vaccine for use in his practice and consumes its utility, rather than reselling it.

United States v. Merck & Co. · filed 2014-09-05

Plaintiff Suter purchases the vaccine for his own private use which results in its total loss of utility. Thus, the Court finds that he is a consumer within the meaning of the statute.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover the tender of investments.

LEEDER v. FEINSTEIN · filed 2019-06-28

Moreover, Leeder has not set forth a viable NJCFA claim, as the tender of investments does not fall within the purview of the statute.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover specialized fitness-system licensing services that are unavailable to the public at large and are not consumed by the licensee.

ACHIEVE 24 FITNESS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY v. ALLOY PERSONAL TRAINING SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2023-02-28

Like in J & R Ice Cream Corp, and BOC Group, the service that Achieve contends it “consumed”—access to Alloy’s System, which included “(a) System Training materials,° (b) System Design Principles, (c) Standard Equipment List, and (d) advice with respect to [fitness] programs”—is neither available to the public at large nor consumable in the context of the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a franchise purchase that is a substantial commercial transaction rather than a consumer-oriented sale.

Fabius v. Medinexo USA, LLC · filed 2020-04-03

The Court agrees with Defendants that this sequence of events hardly qualifies as a financial transaction that was either mass-produced or consumer-oriented.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a mortgage servicer’s creation of an improper escrow account and addition of unwarranted mortgage payment fees outside the formation or modification of the loan.

SCALERCIO-ISENBERG v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC. · filed 2020-09-30

The NJCFA only covers unlawful conduct “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2. Plaintiffs’ claim—that a mortgage servicer created an improper escrow account and added unwarranted fees to their mortgage payments— is not in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate.

Section 56:8-2 applies only to unlawful conduct connected with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate.

SCALERCIO-ISENBERG v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC. · filed 2021-01-27

The NJCFA only covers unlawful conduct “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2. The Amended Complaint does not allege conduct in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate. Accordingly, the NJCFA is not applicable, and Count 2 of the Amended Complaint is dismissed.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a casino promotion matching a customer’s deposit with bonus wagering money when the promotion is not for the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate.

MILLS v. GOLDEN NUGGET ATLANTIC CITY, LLC · filed 2021-08-18

Although plaintiffs argue that the promotion Golden Nugget was running constitutes fraud under this act, the promotion was not for “the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.” See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.

Whether a business-to-business transaction involves merchandise covered by Section 56:8-2 requires a fact-sensitive inquiry that is generally better resolved after discovery than on a motion to dismiss.

CEM BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, INC v. BHI ENERGY · filed 2022-12-27

This is a fact sensitive analysis that is more appropriate for resolution through a motion for summary judgment, not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. ... Consequently, the Court will not dismiss BHI’s NJCFA claim on these grounds at this time.

Section 56:8-2 does not categorically exclude alleged fraud in an agreement to procure financial services when the relationship and transaction require further factual development.

TWIN CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC v. WICKSTROM · filed 2023-02-27

The Court finds that the cases cited by Movants are inapposite to the present alleged facts. ... Here, Wickstrom’s claims arise out of the Agreement between the parties related to the procurement of financial services. ... In doing so, however, Movants gloss over the applicable clause, “services or anything offered.” ... The Court finds the Andreotta court’s decision persuasive and adopts its reasoning for purposes of this Opinion. The Court, therefore, similarly declines to dismiss the CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 covers standardized mumps vaccines as merchandise when they are sold in uniform packages and doses without individualized bargaining.

CHATOM PRIMARY CARE, P.C. v. MERCK & CO., INC. · filed 2023-08-03

However, looking at the character of the transaction rather than the identity of the purchaser, the Court finds that Merck’s mumps vaccines are standardized and not the result of individual bargaining. ... The mumps vaccines are not customized to each patient, but rather are sold in a uniform package and administered in a uniform dose. Id. Additionally, Merck has not demonstrated that the transaction was subject to individualized negotiations. Therefore, the Court finds that Merck’s mumps vaccines are “merchandise” under the NJCFA and thus will deny summary judgment on this ground.

Section 56:8-2 requires a covered consumer transaction involving the defendant’s goods or services; alleging that the defendant held a person’s data without a purchase or use of its goods or services does not suffice.

ROBINSON v. MAINTECH INC. · filed 2024-04-12

However, the Complaint fails to state a claim under either pleading standard because it is unclear on the face of the Complaint whether Plaintiff has standing as a consumer as captured by the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover private investment dealings when the services were neither marketed to the public nor of a type typically sold to the public.

KLAPPER v. SULLIVAN · filed 2024-04-16

Since Klapper has not provided any evidence that Defendants marketed their services to the public as applied to the China Project and the TPH Project, or that these were the types of transactions that Defendants typically sold to the public, Klapper’s NJCFA claim cannot stand.

Section 56:8-2 covers deceptive conduct involving online savings accounts because opening an account purchases a service, making the account merchandise under the NJCFA.

Savett v. Capital One N.A. and Capital One Financial Corp. · filed 2024-11-12

The Court also has determined that Plaintiffs’ opening of their 360 Savings accounts qualifies as a purchase of a “service,” as they sought out the service of obtaining “high interest” on their funds. See supra Section III.D.1.c. Thus, the 360 Savings accounts constitute “merchandise” sufficient to trigger this statute.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a data breach claim by a person who neither purchased nor used the defendant’s goods or services and was not drawn into a purchase by its selling or advertising practices.

ROBINSON v. MAINTECH INC. · filed 2024-12-19

As pled, the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege facts to satisfy the “consumer” requirement. The Amended Complaint still does not allege that Plaintiff Robinson used any good or diminished or used any utility provided by Defendant.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a failure to safeguard customer information that occurs after the transaction and outside any advertising or sale.

Angus v. Flagstar Bank, FSB · filed 2025-03-27

This claim fails because Flagstar’s alleged failure to safeguard Garcia’s PII did not occur in connection with any advertising or sale by Flagstar to Garcia.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover complex, negotiated advertising sales to sophisticated businesses when the record does not show that the ad spots are offered to the public as merchandise.

Unimed International Inc v. Fox News Network LLC · filed 2025-11-13

The Act prohibits unconscionable commercial practices “in connection with the sale . . . of any merchandise.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2. ... Unimed’s purchases of ad spots from Fox were “business-to-business transaction[s],” so we must assess the four factors set out in All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cnty. Int’l, Inc., 200 A.3d 398, 408 (N.J. 2019), to determine whether Fox’s ad spots are “merchandise,” such that NJCFA applies. ... The first three factors here strongly suggest that Fox did not offer ad spots to the public. ... So Unimed’s minimal evidence supporting just one of the four All the Way Towing factors is insufficient to withstand summary judgment.

Section 56:8-2 covers sales of merchandise to businesses for use in their operations.

Coastal Group v. Dryvit Systems · filed 1994-06-23

Nothing in [the] statutory language suggests that the Act is inapplicable to the sale of merchandise for use in business operations. ... Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting Dryvit summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim under the Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 56:8-2 applies to unlawful practices by any person in the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.

In Re National Credit Management Group, L.L.C. · filed 1998-03-25

An “unlawful practice” can be committed by “any person” with respect to the sale or advertisement of “any merchandise.”

Section 56:8-2 applies based on the consumer character of the transaction; an exchange of claims for inventory between businesses is hardly a consumer-oriented transaction.

Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Hosiery · filed 1998-06-29

I note at the outset that one business’ release of claims against another in exchange for inventory is hardly a typical consumer oriented situation.

Section 56:8-2 covers fraud involving services sold to the public, but does not cover services incidental to a manufacturer’s contract with a wholesaler.

Bracco Diagnostics Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co. · filed 2002-09-30

Although Braceo accurately notes that fraud in connection with the sale of services is actionable under the NJCFA, the challenged services generally must be of the type sold to the general public.

Section 56:8-2 protects purchasers of franchises and distributorships offered to the general public when the Franchise Practices Act does not cover them.

Kavky v. HERBALIFE INTERNATIONAL · filed 2003-04-22

The Act creates a cause of action for "unconscionable commercial practice[s]... in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate...." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 ("Section 8-2"). ... The novel issue, at least at the appellate level in this state, is whether the purchaser of a franchise distributorship is protected by the Act, or to put it somewhat differently, do franchises and distributorships come within the Act's definition of merchandise. Our answer is that they are included when they are not covered by the Franchise Practices Act and are offered to the general public.

Section 56:8-2 does not govern a sales representative’s fraud claim against an employer over compensation because the claim does not involve purchasing merchandise.

Winslow v. Corporate Express, Inc. · filed 2003-11-05

Plaintiff's fraud claim against defendant did not involve the purchase of merchandise. Instead, plaintiff was employed as a sales representative to promote the sale of defendant's merchandise. Consequently, plaintiff's relationship *1046 with defendant was not governed by the CFA but rather by the myriad of statutory provisions designed to protect employees, including the section of the Wage Payment Law plaintiff relies upon in support of the claim discussed in section I of this opinion.

Section 56:8-2 requires alleged deception or fraud to be connected with the sale of merchandise or services.

Castro v. NYT TELEVISION · filed 2004-06-29

Thus, to state a cause of action under the CFA, a plaintiff must allege the commission of a deception, fraud, misrepresentation, etc., "in connection with" the sale of merchandise or services.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a wholesale purchase of consumer goods for resale when the buyer is not a consumer and the sale is not a consumer transaction.

Papergraphics Intern., Inc. v. Correa · filed 2006-11-28

In the present matter, although plaintiff purchased a common consumer product, plaintiff was not a "consumer" under the CFA and the nature of this sale demonstrates it was not the type of "consumer transaction" covered by the statute. Plaintiff's total purchase of 9,714 printer ink cartridges was for resale at a significant profit, not for its individual use. The quantity of goods purchased, along with the purpose of the purchase, belies CFA application.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover medical transcription services because they are not sold to the general public and thus are not merchandise under the Act.

South Broward Hospital District v. Medquist Inc. · filed 2007-03-30

Medical transcription services are not services that are sold to the general public. Therefore, those services are not “merchandise” under the NJCFA.

A business that uses a purchased component to make a finished product can be a consumer under Section 56:8-2 even when it sells the finished product.

Viking Yacht Co. v. Composites One LLC · filed 2007-07-26

Thus, due to Plaintiffs’ use of the gel coat prior to sale, we hold that Plaintiffs diminished the value of the gel coat and are “consumers” under the Act.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover an allegedly fraudulent settlement demand sent after a sale when the demand did not induce a purchase.

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills · filed 2008-07-30

Thus, the fraudulent conduct alleged was not done “in connection with” the sale or advertisement of merchandise, and the CFA does not apply.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a heavily negotiated contract between sophisticated corporations for a custom computer system because it is not a sale of merchandise.

Princeton Healthcare v. Netsmart · filed 2011-10-21

This kind of heavily negotiated contract between two sophisticated corporate entities does not constitute a "sale of merchandise" within the intent of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 makes a material misrepresentation about merchandise in connection with its sale an unlawful practice.

G & F Graphic Services, Inc. v. Graphic Innovators, Inc. · filed 2014-05-08

Thus, the Complaint alleges that Kiley himself made a material misrepresentation to Inserts East, which is a violation of the *588CFA. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 (“The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [or] misrepresentation ... in connection with the sale ... of any merchandise ... is declared to be an unlawful practice.”).

Section 56:8-2 does not cover individualized loan administration services that are not offered to the general consumer public as merchandise.

City of Atlantic City v. Zemurray Street Capital, LLC · filed 2016-06-14

Under the facts as alleged in the FAC, the services do not fall within the meaning of “merchandise” un-. der the NJCFA, and so the FAC fails to state a claim under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires the alleged unlawful practice to occur in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate.

IN THE MATTER OF AH'KALEEM FORD, HUDSON COUNTY(CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) · filed 2017-08-28

There is, moreover, no allegation that the statement was made in connection with the "sale or advertisement" of the services covered by the Agreement.

Section 56:8-2 applies to commercial transactions; its use of “person” includes a business harmed by an unlawful practice.

All the Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cnty. Int'l, Inc. · filed 2019-01-24

First, it is well established that the CFA is applicable to commercial transactions.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover an alleged breach of a customized commercial mortgage agreement between sophisticated businesses when the conduct does not plausibly amount to a consumer fraud practice.

Royce-George & Associates, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-07-15

Even accepting that Defendants violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when they refused to forward the excess cash flow to RGA, a violation of the Reserve Agreement of the sort alleged here does not plausibly fall within the scope of the NJCFA considering the nature of the parties relationship.

A lease payment misrepresentation made three years after the lease began fell outside section 56:8-2 where it was unconnected to the lease sale and did not induce the transaction.

FOURTE VS. CHRYSLER CAPITAL, ETC. (DC-004207-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-01

Chrysler allegedly made the fraudulent misrepresentations about the $300 payment in September 2016, three years after plaintiff entered into the lease. Thus, the alleged misrepresentations were not made in connection with the sale of the lease, and were not material to the transaction or made to induce plaintiff to enter into the lease.

Section 56:8-2 covers a business’s commercial sale and marketing of notary services to the public, even though individual notaries are public officers.

TRIPICCHIO v. THE UPS STORE, INC. · filed 2023-04-30

Because Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendants are engaged in the commercial sale and marketing of notary services to the public, their conduct is covered by the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 can reach an unconscionable commercial practice even without deceptive conduct.

JAMES v. GLOBAL TELLINK CORPORATION · filed 2020-03-02

Unfairly capitalizing on Plaintiffs’ lack of choice for critical services may be “unconscionable,” even without deception.

Section 56:8-2 can cover predatory lending as an unconscionable commercial practice.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, ETC. VS. JEFFREY MERZ (F-030746-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-08

Indeed, predatory lending may constitute an unconscionable commercial practice under the CFA. See Troup, 343 N.J. Super. at 278-80.

Section 56:8-2 permits a jury to decide whether disputed evidence of deceptive marketing amounts to fraud or an unconscionable commercial practice.

Peterson v. BASF Corp. · filed 2000-11-14

We therefore conclude that the issues of whether BASF’s actions rise to the level of fraud or an unconscionable commercial practice under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act are issues for a jury to decide.

Section 56:8-2 permits an unconscionable commercial practice claim to be considered even when the complaint does not allege fraud or deception.

In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation · filed 2004-12-08

I have ruled that the Second Amended Complaint, as “amended” by oral argument, does not allege fraud or deception. Therefore, I turn to whether the alleged conspiracy is an unlawful “unconscionable commercial practice.”

Section 56:8-2 does not make a self-storage facility’s failure to notify renters of a roof leak an unconscionable commercial practice on these facts.

Kane v. U-Haul International Inc. · filed 2007-02-07

Similarly, the failure to notify the Appellants of the leak does not constitute an unconscionable commercial practice.

Section 56:8-2 permits a claim based on an unconscionable commercial practice without an affirmative statement or representation.

Dewey v. AG · filed 2008-04-01

The CFA does not, however, require an affirmative statement or representation. A CFA claim may proceed based on allegations of an “unconscionable commercial practice.”

Section 56:8-2 prohibits a foreclosure rescuer from exploiting homeowners’ vulnerability to strip equity from their home while leaving them exposed to foreclosure.

O'Brien v. Cleveland (In Re O'Brien) · filed 2010-01-22

Cleveland took unfair advantage of the O’Briens predicament to enrich himself to the tune of $100,000 and potentially much more. The court finds that this is an unconscionable commercial practice in violation of the CFA, entitling the O’Briens to the remedies provided thereunder.

Section 56:8-2 requires a claim for unconscionable commercial practice to allege conduct that is misleading within the meaning of the NJCFA.

KATZ v. AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC. · filed 2021-06-29

Because the Amended Complaint does not allege Ambit’s conduct was misleading within the meaning of the NJCFA, Katz has not adequately stated an NJCFA claim for unconscionable commercial practice.

Section 56:8-2 permits a claim against a mortgage servicer whose unexplained withholding of excess payments can mislead borrowers about how their funds are applied.

LENCHITZ v. FSB · filed 2024-03-11

Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts indicating that Cenlar’s refusal to allocate excess funds towards Plaintiffs’ principal, without explanation or a clear accounting of the excess funds, had the capacity to mislead Plaintiffs as to how their entitled LTRAP funds were being applied.

Overcharging for notary services in violation of the statutory fee cap can be evidence of an unconscionable commercial practice under § 56:8-2.

MCLAREN · filed 2025-11-20

Turning to the merits, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants have engaged in unlawful conduct since overcharging for notary fees in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 22A:4-14 can be “evidence of [an] unconscionable practice[]” that the CFA outlaws.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits a lifetime membership promise as an unconscionable commercial practice, deception, false promise, and misrepresentation when the seller cannot assure performance beyond its shorter merchant contracts.

Hyland v. Aquarian Age 2,000, Inc. · filed 1977-02-15

The D.S.A. promise of a lifetime membership is an unconscionable commercial practice in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 because of the practical one-sidedness of the agreement and the various unforeseeable events and conditions which may be encountered in futuro. Such conduct is also violative of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 in that it is a deception, a false promise and a misrepresentation.

Section 56:8-2's unconscionable commercial practice claim cannot be proved with extrinsic evidence that contradicts the express terms of a lease.

Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal" Z" Ena, Inc. · filed 1991-11-14

Since plaintiffs cannot introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict the express terms of the leasing agreement, they are also precluded from proving the claimed unconscionable commercial practice.

Section 56:8-2 treats rent-to-own agreements charging interest above the 30% annual limit as an unconscionable commercial practice.

Green v. Continental Rentals · filed 1994-03-25

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19 prohibits a loan or forbearance with an interest rate exceeding 30% per annum. The interest rates here far exceed that limitation and constitute an unconscionable practice.

Section 56:8-2 does not invalidate an excessively priced sale without a deceptive practice by the seller.

Kugler v. Romain · filed 1970-06-10

In the absence of any deceptive practice by the seller, the transaction cannot be vitiated under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 treats the sale of a service as fraud when the result it promises is practically worthless to purchasers.

Kugler v. Haitian Tours, Inc. · filed 1972-07-27

In my opinion the sale of the package, the obvious purpose of which is the procuring of a Haitian divorce, is a fraud upon the purchasers, for the divorces they obtain are, for all practical purposes, worthless and do not accomplish the purpose for which they are purchased.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits pyramid sales schemes.

State v. Bey · filed 1992-12-18

Her argument is clearly incorrect. Pyramid sales schemes are prohibited by the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a manufacturer's internal policy for choosing when to replace an engine under its warranty an unconscionable commercial practice.

Palmucci v. Brunswick Corp. · filed 1998-05-21

The fact that Brunswick has an internal policy determining when it will replace an entire engine cannot equate with an unconscionable business practice.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat mere puffery, a higher price than a competitor’s, or minor customer service disagreements as consumer fraud.

Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp. · filed 1995-03-15

Mere puffery does not constitute consumer fraud. Nor does charging five or five-hundred dollars more for an item than the price charged by a nearby competitor amount to consumer fraud. Usually, consumer fraud involves a pattern of repetitive conduct, not separate incidents. Minor disagreements between consumer and business owner over quality of customer service, timing of service, or increased price is not consumer fraud.

Section 56:8-2 protects consumers from unscrupulous merchandising; alleged withholding of discovery in a deficiency action does not qualify.

Fox v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. · filed 1995-05-22

Plaintiff's proposed amendments lack even marginality. Consumer fraud protects a consumer from unscrupulous merchandising. *484 See Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 379, 358 A.2d 473 (App.Div. 1976). As the recited facts note, unscrupulous merchandising is not a viable issue.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits a dealer from charging a consumer for rejected pre-delivery services that are undisclosed in the final sales agreement as an unconscionable business practice.

Delaney v. Garden State Auto Park · filed 1999-02-02

On this record, as a matter of our original jurisdiction, R. 2:10-5, we can reach no other conclusion than that defendant engaged in an unconscionable business practice in violation of the Act. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26B.2. The fact that the dealer has reaped an enormous profit in causing the consumer to pay for pre-delivery services explicitly rejected by the consumer and not disclosed in the final sales agreement colors the result vividly in this case and reinforces the purpose of the Act in protecting the consumer against abusive automotive sales practices.

Section 56:8-2 can reach unconscionable consumer loan terms and procurement practices when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find an unconscionable business practice.

Associates Home Eq. Servs. v. Troup · filed 2001-07-25

We are satisfied that, considering all of the evidentiary material in a light most favorable to the Troups, a reasonable jury could conclude that Associates and third-party defendants engaged in an unconscionable business practice. Therefore, we reverse the summary judgment order dismissing the consumer fraud claim.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat improper herbicide application as an unconscionable commercial practice when it does not reflect a lack of good faith, honesty in fact, or fair dealing.

Helena Chemical Co. v. Nelson · filed 2002-01-24

The improper herbicide application did not constitute an "unconscionable commercial practice," in part because it did not reflect the lack of "good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing" that Cox requires.

Section 56:8-2 covers an unconscionable home inspection practice when the inspection and report fail to deliver what the service represented to consumers, regardless of the employees' intentions.

Herner v. HouseMaster of America, Inc. · filed 2002-03-11

To the contrary in view of the record taken as a whole, we conclude there was an unconscionable commercial practice. Whatever the intentions of HouseMaster's employees, the inspection and report issued by it failed to deliver what HouseMaster represented to the Herners and what the Herners had a right to expect they would receive.

An unconscionable commercial practice under § 56:8-2 must have a capacity to mislead.

Island Mortg. of New Jersey v. 3m · filed 2004-06-30

Plaintiffs have failed to set forth any factual allegation that would satisfy the requirement that a claim for unconscionable commercial practices demonstrate "a capacity to mislead."

Section 56:8-2 does not treat price fixing or supply control alone as an unconscionable commercial practice without facts showing a capacity to mislead.

Sickles v. Cabot Corp. · filed 2005-07-07

Plaintiff's sole legal theory under the CFA is that defendants' alleged monopolistic conduct constitutes an unconscionable commercial practice. Plaintiff has failed to set forth any factual allegations to demonstrate "a capacity to mislead" as there is nothing inherently misleading in defendants' alleged acts of controlling the supply and overcharging for the price-fixed products.

A disclosed automotive messenger fee that is reasonable in the relevant market does not violate Section 56:8-2 merely because it exceeds the dealer’s cost.

Gross v. TJH Automotive Co. · filed 2005-09-09

Based on the defendants' expert reports[4] and the absence of any expert proofs to the contrary, see Brannam, supra, 287 F.3d at 606, it appears that the messenger fee is both in line with the market price in the region and reasonable in amount.

Section 56:8-2 treats contracting with a homeowner for landscape irrigation work without the required contractor certificate as an unconscionable and unlawful business practice.

ARTISTIC LAWN & LANDSCAPE v. Smith · filed 2005-05-19

Entering into a landscape irrigation contract with a homeowner without complying in every respect with N.J.S.A. 45:5AA-1 is an unlawful and unconscionable *836 business practice fully within the letter and spirit of the Consumer Fraud Act.

An unconscionable commercial practice claim under § 56:8-2 must allege bad faith or dishonesty.

McGarvey v. PENSKE AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC. · filed 2009-06-29

Rather, in order to state an actionable CFR claim, Plaintiffs must allege that Defendants acted in bad faith or were otherwise dishonest in order to satisfy the CFA’s unconscionable commercial practice requirement.

An unconscionable commercial practice claim under § 56:8-2 that does not sound in fraud is subject to Rule 8(a) pleading, rather than Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.

A-1 Advanced Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Norvergence, Inc. (In Re Norvergence, Inc.) · filed 2010-02-24

The Appeals Court’s decision supports Plaintiffs position and compels this Court to agree that Rule 8(a), not Rule 9(b) is to be applied to Plaintiffs claim for unconscionable conduct against Defendant as embodied by Count V of the Second Amended Complaint. ... Here, the latest version of the Complaint clearly connects the taking of the ERA assignment, the enforcement of the ERA with an alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable commercial practices and sharp dealing beyond technical fraud.

Pascarella v. Swift Transportation Co. · filed 2010-03-17

The Court agrees that the NJCFA covers many forms of “unconscionable commercial practice,” see N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, and instances of sharp dealing besides conduct that is “fraudulent” in the technical sense.

Section 56:8-2 does not prohibit a high price alone; a seller must engage in deceptive or other unfair sales practices.

Quigley v. ESQUIRE DEPOSITION · filed 2009-08-12

Sellers of goods and services generally may charge whatever the market will bear so long as they do not engage in deceptive or other unfair sales practices.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable commercial practices that mislead consumers and fall outside reasonable business practice; allegations that a bank manipulated transactions and obscured balances to maximize overdraft fees can state a claim.

Hughes v. TD Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-04-19

Unlawful conduct can include any unconscionable commercial practice, which is defined as “the standard of conduct contemplating good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. The practice must be misleading and outside the norm of a reasonable business practice. ... Plaintiffs allege that TD Bank rearranged debit transactions, and obscured account balance information, in order to maximize overdraft fees. ... Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion will be denied on the CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 requires proof of an unconscionable commercial practice; a private real estate purchase without advertising, a service fee, or deception did not establish one here.

Zaman v. Barbara Felton (072128) · filed 2014-09-09

Accordingly, regardless of whether the trial court determines on remand that the parties’ transactions created an equitable mortgage, we hold that the record does not support a finding that Zaman committed an “unconscionable commercial practice” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat a slight price difference between properly labeled, pharmacologically identical products as an unconscionable commercial practice by itself.

Yingst v. AG · filed 2014-11-24

Such a minor detriment does not rise to the level of unfair dealing: Defendant utilized the market forces present in our capitalist society in order to charge a higher price for Excedrin Migraine. This slight price differential is within the bounds of reasonableness and concomitantly outside the ambit of the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat mistaken overbilling and a delayed refund as an unlawful practice when the evidence does not show conduct with a capacity to mislead or a lack of good faith.

PROFETA VS. TOWN SPORTS INTERNATIONAL LIVINGSTON,ET AL.(DC-6077-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-11-17

Concepcion's testimony, which the court referenced and obviously credited, provided ample evidential support for the court's rejection of this claim. It undercut a finding of an act or omission that had the "capacity to mislead," Fenwick, supra, 72 N.J. at 378, or conduct demonstrating a lack of good faith, honesty and fair dealing, Cox, supra, 138 N.J. at 18, which are the prime ingredients of a CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable commercial practices in a landlord’s performance of a lease, including asserting an improper debt and fraudulently retaining a security deposit.

JOY SYSTEMS, INC. VS. FIN ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (L-1565-14, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-07

We agree with Judge Ramsay's determination FIN asserted an improper debt when it pursued its counterclaim, which constituted an unconscionable commercial practice in violation of the CFA. Additionally, we agree with the judge that Joy's ascertainable loss derived from FIN's unconscionable commercial practice of fraudulently retaining the security deposit and asserting a debt against Joy for a sum greater than the security deposit.

Section 56:8-2 does not support an unconscionable commercial practice claim based solely on an alleged NJLAD violation when that NJLAD claim fails.

Coppola v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Coppola) · filed 2018-11-01

Since the Court has already held that the Debtor's NJLAD claim fails, the NJCFA claim necessarily fails as well as the Debtor has not alleged any "unconscionable commercial practice."

Section 56:8-2 does not treat a recipient's failure to answer a letter as an unconscionable commercial practice when the recipient believes it has no responsibility for the claim.

BJ AMERICA ELECTRIC, LLC VS. BMW NORTH AMERICA, LLC (L-10063-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-08

There is nothing unconscionable under the CFA about not responding to a letter, especially where, as here, the recipient believes it had no responsibility for the subject claim.

Section 56:8-2 can treat unduly restrictive health club cancellation requirements intended to extract extra dues as an unconscionable commercial practice.

ARDINO VS. RETROFITNESS, LLC (L-0362-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-21

The point, of course, is that Membership Agreements that impose unduly restrictive cancellation requirements can readily be viewed as frustrating cancellation, thus evidencing the absence of good faith, honesty in fact, and observance of fair dealing; or, in CFA terms, an unconscionable commercial practice intended to extract extra dues from consumers.

Making loans at usurious rates may violate § 56:8-2 as an unconscionable commercial practice.

MACDONALD v. CASHCALL, INC. · filed 2019-10-31

Defendants have not given the Court any basis to distinguish the sale of credit insurance from usurious loans, thus the Court concludes that Plaintiffs may prove that Defendants violated the CFA by making loans at usurious rates, and may use the same evidence in support of their CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a lease’s early termination options unconscionable when their costs are disclosed and the options are neither contradictory nor unfair.

LITWIN VS. BMW FINANCIAL SERVICES, CORPORATION (L-1484-18, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-05

And we see nothing in plaintiff's allegations that asserts or suggests that these consequences and the available options are unfair or unconscionable within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat a policy based premium revision made in good faith as an unconscionable commercial practice.

FOURNIER TRUCKING, INC. VS. NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY, ETC. (L-2953-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-09

On the whole, NJM's conduct in revising the premium was fair and consistent with the policy agreement. Nothing suggests it engaged in unconscionable practices.

Section 56:8-2 permits an unconscionable commercial practice claim based on allegations that an advertising seller diverted payments meant for purchased airtime and inflated the buyer’s bill.

UNIMED INTERNATIONAL INC. v. FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC · filed 2021-04-06

Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges unconscionable commercial practices by describing a scheme where Plaintiff purchased the Timeslots under the assumption that its funds would be applied to its own advertising campaign, but instead Defendant diverted those funds, announced the Cancellation, and drastically inflated Plaintiff’s bill.

Section 56:8-2 treats business practices that lack good faith, fair dealing, and honesty as unlawful practices under the Consumer Fraud Act.

SHARON S. PARK v. THE KUKEN, LLC (L-7637-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-01-21

For the foregoing reasons, the uncontroverted facts in the record demonstrate that defendants' business practices throughout their deali ngs with plaintiff fail to meet acceptable standards of "good faith, fair dealing, and honesty" expected under the CFA and constituted unlawful acts within the meaning of the CFA. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 requires an alleged unconscionable commercial practice to have the capacity to mislead; accurately described gambling incentives do not satisfy that requirement.

Antar v. BetMGM LLC · filed 2025-04-28

Antar asserts that the defendants engaged in unconscionable business practices but cannot show that the communications from his VIP hosts had “the capacity to mislead” as required by the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires some capacity to mislead for an unconscionable commercial practice claim; a $15 late fee alone does not plausibly establish one.

Ciser v. Nestle Waters North America · filed 2015-01-07

Until the New Jersey Supreme Court decides otherwise, we read precedent as suggesting that the CFA requires some element of deceptive conduct, explicit or implicit, to be actionable as an unconscionable practice. ... Without more information, a $15 late fee on its face does not plausibly suggest an unfair penalty or an unconscionable practice—especially when competitive with an industry standard. Ciser has further failed to provide any information that would suggest a dimension of deception permitting a challenge under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof that a plaintiff actually relied on a deceptive act; a causal connection between the act and the plaintiff’s loss is enough.

In Re Lupron® Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2003-11-25

In contrast to plaintiffs' common-law fraud claims, none of the specified state consumer protection acts (as best I can determine) requires proof of actual reliance on the deceptive act. They require proof only of a causal connection between the deceptive act and a plaintiff’s loss.

Section 56:8-2 does not require a consumer fraud plaintiff to prove reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission.

In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation · filed 2009-04-24

As discussed above, however, the NJCFA does not require Plaintiffs to demonstrate that they relied on Mercedes misstatements.

Section 56:8-2 does not require a consumer to prove actual reliance on a misrepresentation or omission.

In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation · filed 2010-03-15

Under the NJCFA, Plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate that they actually relied on the company’s misrepresentations or omissions.

Section 56:8-2 does not require a plaintiff to prove reliance on a misrepresentation to establish an unlawful consumer practice.

Morgan v. Markerdowne Corp. · filed 2001-07-16

Though a plaintiff need not prove reliance upon a misrepresentation to prevail under the Consumer Fraud Act, ... she must show ascertainable loss that was caused by an unlawful practice of the defendant in order to recover thereunder.

A plaintiff asserting a claim under § 56:8-2 must plead an ascertainable loss causally connected to the alleged unlawful conduct.

WRIGHT v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY · filed 2019-08-26

Additionally, Wright has also failed to plead an ascertainable loss in connection with his NJCFA claim.

A claim under § 56:8-2 must plead facts connecting the unlawful practice to an ascertainable loss; merely asserting that connection is insufficient.

Story v. Heartland Payment Systems, LLC · filed 2020-05-20

But the allegations of a causal connection between the unlawful practice and ascertainable loss are insufficient, merely stating that there is one.

A private claim under § 56:8-2 requires an ascertainable loss; an unpaid improper charge does not establish one.

TOBING v. PARKER MCCAY, P.A. · filed 2020-12-30

Courts have interpreted this section to require the following three elements to state a cause of action under the NJCFA: “1) unlawful conduct by defendant; 2) an ascertainable loss by plaintiff; and 3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.” ... Here, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not suffered an ascertainable loss under the NJCFA if they have not paid for anything.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits unconscionable commercial practices without requiring proof of reliance.

Fresh Start Industries, Inc. v. ATX Telecommunications Services · filed 2003-12-11

New Jersey’s explicit exclusion of reliance as an element to be proven under the NJCFA, indicates that New Jersey has an interest in remedying deceptive business practices in cases where common law fraud may not be present.

Section 56:8-2 makes deceptive practices actionable without proof that anyone relied on them or was misled, deceived, or damaged.

Union Ink Co., Inc. v. AT&T CORP. · filed 2002-06-28

There is no reliance requirement for Consumer Fraud Act liability, however. The Act establishes deceptive practices as actionable even if no person "has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not require a consumer to prove reliance on an unlawful practice.

Heindel v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2004-06-07

First, reliance is an element of claims arising under the UTPCPL, but not the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof that anyone relied on an unlawful practice.

Peterson v. BASF Corp. · filed 2004-02-19

The NJCFA provides that an offense arises “whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-2. Consumer fraud in New Jersey, in contrast with common law fraud, does not require a showing of reliance, merely a “causal relationship.”

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof that a consumer was actually misled by an alleged misrepresentation.

Tubbs v. N American Title Agency Inc. · filed 2013-07-19

Such conduct could be unlawful regardless of whether the Tubbs were actually mislead by the alleged misrepresentation because the CFA expressly provides for liability “whether or not any person has in fact been mislead, deceived or damaged there by.” N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2.

A consumer fraud claim under Section 56:8-2 does not require each purchaser to prove individual reliance on a uniform product-label misrepresentation.

Elias v. Ungar's Food Products, Inc. · filed 2008-06-30

Plaintiffs do not have the burden of proving reliance in the manner proposed by the defendants. They need only establish the causal nexus element, and, as discussed by the foregoing, they have met that threshold.

A buyer claiming an ascertainable loss based on a price premium must allege that the product failed to meet a reasonable expectation induced by the seller’s representations.

BROWN v. SHARKNINJA OPERATING LLC · filed 2024-10-23

However, if it was plaintiff’s expectation that the pans would not chip, flake, or lose their nonstick properties due to defendant’s claims to that effect, “Neverstick” brand name, purported 30,000-degree manufacturing process, or the like, the complaint does not allege that that expectation was unmet.

A claim under § 56:8-2 based on a contract breach requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond the breach.

AJAYI · filed 2026-02-02

For a breach of contract to violate the CFA, Plaintiff must show “substantial aggravating circumstances . . . in addition to the breach.” Id. ... As Plaintiff failed to show substantial aggravating circumstances, unlawful conduct, or an ascertainable loss, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count V.

Retaining a customer's deposit in a contract dispute does not establish an unlawful practice under § 56:8-2 without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Rukaj v. Puccio · filed 2024-07-12

Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude there is insufficient evidence of substantial aggravating circumstances to support plaintiff's claim that defendants' actions in retaining her deposit—based on alleged misrepresentations about their ability to host her wedding and reception during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic—constituted unlawful conduct under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 covers misrepresentations about refunding an undelivered merchandise purchase as an unlawful practice.

VASWANI, INC. v. MANJUNATHAMURTHY · filed 2023-08-16

Accordingly, Vaswani has shown that Bangalore misrepresented the circumstances surrounding his refund of the undelivered PPE, resulting in an ascertainable loss.

Section 56:8-2 requires more than a breach of contract alone to establish unlawful conduct.

CORPORATE INCENTIVES, INC. v. UNIFIED SAFE GUARD, LLC · filed 2021-06-29

Breach of contract, alone, does not qualify as unlawful conduct, and therefore, is not sufficient to state a claim under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits a repair shop from making a warranty promise in the sale of merchandise and then failing to honor it.

LESTER VS. RAYMOND ZOLA (L-0432-18, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-24

In any event, defendants' own warranty was not honored, and plaintiffs were clearly deprived of its promised benefits. This alone is a violation of the CFA's statutory prohibition on deceptive practices in the sale of merchandise, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, and of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2(a)(5) ("Making deceptive or misleading statements or false promises of a character likely to influence, ... persuade or induce a customer to authorize the repair, service or maintenance of a motor vehicle.").

Section 56:8-2 requires something more than a breach of contract or warranty to state a consumer fraud claim.

LEVARI ENTERPRISES, LLC v. KENWORTH TRUCK COMPANY · filed 2021-02-22

Plaintiffs’ CFA claims as currently pleaded are simply breach of contract and warranty claims repackaged as fraud claims. They fail to comply with the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard, and they fail to articulate the “something more” required to support viable CFA violation claims.

Section 56:8-2 covers deceptive practices connected with a seller’s subsequent performance of a merchandise sale, including statements concealing a product substitution.

FLINT GROUP PACKAGING INKS NORTH AMERICA CORP. v. FOX INDUSTRIES INC. · filed 2020-10-20

The Court finds that the CFA is not as limited as Cenotec argues. In addition to capturing fraudulent practices “in connection with the sale of . . . merchandise” the CFA also explicitly covers deceptive practices made “in connection with . . . the subsequent performance of” a sale of merchandise.

Section 56:8-2 covers fraud in a seller’s subsequent performance, including an insurer’s fraudulent denial of benefits after selling a policy.

Weiss v. First Unum Life Insurance · filed 2007-04-03

The CFA covers fraud both in the initial sale (where the seller never intends to pay), and fraud in the subsequent performance (where the seller at some point elects not to fulfill its obligations).

Section 56:8-2 covers fraud in the subsequent performance of an insurance contract, including misrepresenting a claims release as paperwork needed to advance payment.

Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero · filed 2018-11-15

These facts, taken together, amount to an allegation of fraud in connection with the subsequent performance of a consumer contract, a situation explicitly covered by the language of the CFA, sanctioned by this Court in Weiss, and supported by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s broad statements regarding the application of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a title insurer’s lack of diligence in bringing a quiet title action because that conduct does not concern the sale or advertisement of the policy.

Granelli v. Chicago Title Ins Co · filed 2014-06-17

To the extent the Granellis’ NJCFA claim is premised upon Chicago Title’s lack of diligence in bringing a quiet title action, such a claim is also not actionable under the NJCFA, as it does not pertain to the “sale or advertisement” of the policy.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable commercial practices connected with the performance of a service to a plaintiff, including where the plaintiff has an indirect relationship with the service provider.

Barry v. Santander Bank, N.A. (In re Liberty State Benefits of Delaware, Inc.) · filed 2015-10-26

Accordingly, the court finds that the Trustee’s Complaint adequately pleads that Santander’s unconscionable commercial practices occurred “in connection with” the performance of a service to the Debtors and therefore constitutes an unlawful practice for purposes of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not provide a Consumer Fraud Act remedy for an insurer’s refusal to pay benefits in an initial coverage dispute.

Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Caris · filed 2016-03-15

In predicting how the New Jersey Supreme Court would decide this issue, this Court finds Myska well-reasoned and persuasive: the CFA does not provide Plaintiffs a remedy for Nationwide’s failure to pay benefits.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a claim arising from an insurer’s denial of an appraisal benefit under a policy.

FOX v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY · filed 2021-09-24

Since Plaintiff is seeking damages under the CFA arising from State Farm’s denial of Plaintiff’s appraisal benefit (ECF No. 31 ¶¶ 93, 96), the CFA is not applicable.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover an insurer’s mere denial of benefits under an existing insurance policy.

SNOWDEN v. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2024-03-18

It is well-settled in this Circuit that “payment of insurance benefits is not subject to the CFA.”

A Consumer Fraud Act claim based on denial of insurance benefits must allege specific facts showing fraud or deception; an allegedly incorrect denial alone is insufficient.

KOUSIS v. FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC. · filed 2023-09-20

The complaint supplies no specific facts to support the conclusion that the denial of benefits in this instance was fraudulent or deceptive, as opposed to merely incorrect. It therefore does not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard and must be dismissed.

Section 56:8-2 does not categorically bar consumer fraud claims based on mortgage servicer conduct after a foreclosure judgment.

BROUILLETTE v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. · filed 2024-05-31

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NJCFA claims are not barred merely because they relate to conduct that occurred after a foreclosure judgment was entered in state court.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable commercial practices during subsequent performance, not just the initial transaction.

Dreier Co., Inc. v. Unitronix Corp. · filed 1986-11-10

"Unconscionable commercial practice" or other conduct condemned by the act is not limited to the initial transaction but extends to "the `subsequent performance' of such person [involved in the transaction]." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2; see also D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., supra 206 N.J. Super. at 25.

Section 56:8-2’s subsequent-performance language requires an affirmative representation of a future act by the promisor; friendly assurances about the future of a pet cemetery do not qualify.

Annunziata v. Millar · filed 1990-02-14

The “subsequent performance” language of the statute refers to an affirmative representation of a future act by the promisor. On the facts of this case, the “friendly assurances” made by the Millars do not fall within the ambit of the statute.

Section 56:8-2 treats misleading assurances about the cost of repairs after an estimate overrun as deception and misrepresentation.

Hyland v. Zuback · filed 1976-07-13

Zuback's act in this case went beyond that of mere omission. He actually lulled Roome into a false sense of calm concerning what the job would actually cost. Thus, under the statute's broad definitions Zuback engaged in deception and misrepresentation and that conduct constituted a violation of the act.

Section 56:8-2 applies to a custom home builder’s use of substandard materials during construction because it covers subsequent performance as well as the initial sale or advertisement.

New Mea Const. Corp. v. Harper · filed 1985-08-06

We also note here that the Act relates not only to any unconscionable practices relating to the initial sale or advertisement but also to "the subsequent performance." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. ... Against the background of these findings, we conclude that the Consumer Fraud Act is applicable to a custom builder who uses substandard material in the construction of a house.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a breach of warranty alone an unconscionable commercial practice, though a breach may violate the section under other circumstances.

D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp. · filed 1985-11-21

There is no question but that when Fruehauf "disowned the problem," it breached its warranty but this does not equate with a consumer fraud. This is not to say, however, that a breach of warranty under a sales agreement may not, under given circumstances, also violate the Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 56:8-2 makes a repair contract unenforceable by a repairer who violates the Consumer Fraud Act’s automotive repair regulations, even through technical noncompliance.

Huffmaster v. Robinson · filed 1986-03-30

The New Jersey act, while silent as to its effect upon the contract, must be read as depriving a technically violating repairman of any enforcement capacity. Otherwise, the act would make no sense.

Section 56:8-2 requires more than a mere breach of contract to establish a violation.

Barry v. NJ STATE HWY. AUTHORITY · filed 1990-04-01

If the intent is to protect consumers from fraud and fraudulent practices in the sale of goods and services, as has been stated, then certainly something more than a mere breach of contract is required.

Section 56:8-2 requires substantial aggravating circumstances when a consumer fraud claim is based on breach of warranty.

Suber v. Chrysler Corporation · filed 1997-01-15

Because this holding seems unexceptionable, uncontroversial, and altogether sensible, we predict that D’Ercole Sales would be followed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and hence we find that the District Court correctly concluded that the NJCFA requires that substantial aggravating circumstances be shown when the basis for the NJCFA claim is breach of warranty.

Section 56:8-2 requires substantial aggravating circumstances when a consumer fraud claim is based on breach of warranty.

Suber v. Chrysler Corporation · filed 1997-02-18

Because this holding seems unexceptionable, uncontroversial, and altogether sensible, we predict that D'Ercole Sales would be followed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and hence we find that the District Court correctly concluded that the NJCFA requires that substantial aggravating circumstances be shown when the basis for the NJCFA claim is breach of warranty.

Section 56:8-2 did not cover the alleged misrepresentations made after the funeral-services contract because they were not made to induce the purchase.

Cole v. Laughrey Funeral Home · filed 2005-03-22

A crucial factor required by Gennari not present here is that the alleged misrepresentations (the publication of the obituary, the response to the telephone query concerning a viewing, the recommendation against an open casket and the failure to *463 inform of the private viewing) were all acts done after the contract for funeral services was entered into between Tracy and Laughrey. The misrepresentations alleged here were, therefore, not misrepresentations made to induce the buyer to make the purchase of funeral services from Laughrey.

Section 56:8-2 permits liability against an assignee of a retail installment sales contract for its own unconscionable commercial practices during subsequent performance, including repossession and collection activities.

Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session · filed 2008-01-15

We conclude that an assignee of a RISC can be held liable under the CFA, for its own unconscionable commercial activities in the subsequent performance of the assigned contract.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim based on knowingly selling a defective product that will not meet its advertised performance when substantial aggravating circumstances take the conduct beyond a warranty breach.

Kuzian v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc. · filed 2013-03-28

These allegations also demonstrate the “substantial aggravating circumstances” that permit their claims to proceed under the CFA rather than for simply a breach of warranty action.

Section 56:8-2 covers unlawful conduct related to subsequent performance, as well as the sale or advertisement of real estate.

FARRINGTON v. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION · filed 2022-10-31

To the contrary, the NJCFA does not limit liability to only unlawful conduct in connection with the sale or advertisement of real estate, but also encompasses conduct relating to the subsequent performance of same.

Section 56:8-2 covers unlawful practices in the subsequent performance of real estate transactions, including residential lease transactions.

GABLE v. HOMETOWN AMERICA, LLC · filed 2022-11-30

The CFA applies to the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate but also to the subsequent performance relating to same.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a broken contractual promise actionable as a false promise unless the promisor intended to breach when the contract was formed.

PAGE v. GPB CARS 12, LLC · filed 2019-10-17

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that either Defendant NESNA or Defendant NSD entered into the contracts with Plaintiff with an intent to breach the cancellation provisions within those contracts. Thus, Plaintiff cannot characterize the contracts at issue as false promises or misrepresentations actionable under the CFA.