N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23

A movant must make a prima facie showing of cohabitation before obtaining the alimony recipient's financial information.

Poller v. Poller · filed 2024-04-02(n)

First, Susana had no obligation to produce her financial information until Gary established a prima facie showing of cohabitation.

Section 2A:34-23(n) permits suspension or termination of alimony when the recipient cohabits with another person, as determined under the statute’s listed factors.

Sherman v. Sherman · filed 2024-12-18(n)

We need not resolve the ambiguity in the MSA because we agree with the trial court's determination that defendant failed to prove plaintiff was cohabiting with her boyfriend under the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).

The 2014 cohabitation amendment to § 2A:34-23(n) does not apply retroactively to a divorce judgment entered before the amendment.

Winner v. Walter D. Winner, Jr. · filed 2025-02-21(n)

Plaintiff's contention the court improperly applied the 2014 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) lacks merit. The court repeatedly advised the parties it was not applying the 2014 amendment because the amendment did not apply ... retroactively to the 2011 FJOD in this case. Rather, the court correctly applied the standard applicable prior to the 2014 amendment.

Section 2A:34-23(a) permits modification of child support when changed circumstances warrant it.

Cafferata v. Abdalla · filed 2025-12-12(a)

Child support orders may be amended by the court as circumstances may require.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony and child support when circumstances change; the party seeking modification must first make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances before the other party must provide updated financial information.

Jahan v. Karim · filed 2026-03-18

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes the Family Part to modify alimony and child support awards when circumstances warrant. ... Thus, having found defendant did not establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances, the court properly denied defendant's application for a ... modification of his support obligations without requiring plaintiff to submit updated financial discovery.

Section 2A:34-23 permits modification of alimony and child support when the movant establishes changed circumstances.

Balyan v. Dhamija · filed 2026-04-22

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes the Family Part to modify alimony and child support awards when circumstances warrant modification. ... Having found plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances, the judge properly denied his motion for a modification of his support obligations and properly interpreted the MSA.

Section 2A:34-23(a) makes a parent's income and ability to pay relevant to a request to modify child support.

Cafferata v. Abdalla · filed 2026-05-15(a)

Defendant's wife's unemployment began in October 2023, after the most recent recalculation, but defendant did not present evidence of a substantial change in his own income or ability to pay. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

Section 2A:34-23(k) supplies the factors for deciding whether unemployment warrants modification of alimony after a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.

Salome Montes Ward v. Vollaro · filed 2025-06-11(k)

With defendant having established a prima facie case of changed circumstances, the trial court was compelled to order discovery to review whether defendant has employed his best efforts to find comparable employment, and whether he was entitled to modification of alimony pursuant to the factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k).

Section 2A:34-23(k) requires consideration of both parties' financial circumstances once a party seeking to modify alimony makes a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.

Young v. Young · filed 2026-02-03(k)

In fact, the language in the addendum solely eliminates defendant's remarriage as a condition of termination of plaintiff's alimony obligation while expressly maintaining plaintiff's right to seek a modification or termination of alimony in the event of a change of his circumstances "in accordance with current statutory and case law standards," which necessarily includes an evaluation of both parties' financial circumstances once a prima facie change has been shown. See Beck, 239 N.J. Super. at 190; N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k).

Section 2A:34-23(n) permits suspension or termination of alimony when the payee cohabits, but does not require termination.

J.S. v. J.E.S. · filed 2025-06-16(n)

Termination due to cohabitation is not required by statutory or case law or the terms of the parties' MSA.

Sharing some meals each week does little to establish shared living expenses for a prima facie showing of cohabitation under subsection (n)(2).

Van Houtte v. Van Houtte · filed 2025-07-23(n)(2)

On these asserted facts, we are not persuaded that sharing some meals each week established sharing living expenses, which might include rent or mortgage payments, utilities, and similar recurring household expenses. Thus, on these facts, this factor does little to support a prima facie showing of cohabitation.

Section 2A:34-23(j)(1) does not prevent a court from considering a party’s impending retirement when it first awards open durational alimony.

Pisano v. Pisano · filed 2025-10-10(j)(1)

Nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1) restrains the Family Part's ability to consider that its award of open durational alimony may be impacted by a party's retirement soon after the award is made.

Section 2A:34-23(j) does not automatically terminate alimony when the paying spouse retires; termination requires an application and the court’s findings.

Coleman v. Coleman · filed 2026-04-30(j)

Alimony does not automatically terminate upon an obligor's retirement or early retirement. Indeed, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1) merely creates a rebuttable presumption for termination and requires the trial court to make a written finding whether the presumption has been overcome. In the context of an early retirement, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(2) requires the obligor to file an application showing the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith. The court is then obligated to make the necessary findings. Ibid.

Section 2A:34-23(k)(4) and (7) make the obligee’s income and changes in the parties’ financial circumstances factors in an alimony modification inquiry; an increase in the supported spouse’s income may constitute changed circumstances.

Lea M. Prendergast v. Prendergast · filed 2026-05-04(k)(4), (7)

An increase in the dependent spouse's income may constitute a changed circumstance. See Quinn, 225 N.J. at 49 (citing J.B., 215 N.J. at 327); Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J. Super. 35, 42 (App. Div. 1997) ("A change in circumstances warranting modification of support may thus result from an alteration in the fortunes of either party."); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(k)(4), (7) (listing "[t]he income of the obligee" and "[a]ny changes in the respective financial circumstances of the parties" as factors to consider in modification inquiry).

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court, when circumstances warrant, to order support for minor children after their father's death and require life insurance to secure that support.

Grotsky v. Grotsky · filed 1971-05-24

For present purposes it is sufficient to hold, as we now do, that the comprehensive terms of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 are not to be narrowed but are to be applied liberally to the end that, where the circumstances equitably call for such action, the court may enter a support order for minor children to survive their father's death and may direct the father to maintain his insurance, naming the minor children as beneficiaries, for the purpose of securing due fulfillment of the support order during their minority.

Section 2A:34-23 allows a court to use a parent's capital assets to support children when the parent voluntarily reduces income, even for a good-faith career change.

Lynn v. Lynn · filed 1977-10-25

The statute speaks of his "ability to pay." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Generally, in determining support courts consider the potential or ability of a husband to earn, rather than his actual income. ... Equity dictates that a trust be impressed upon the husband's share of equitable distribution and used to supplement support payable from his now reduced income.

Section 2A:34-23 permits courts to consider a parent's capital assets as well as current income when setting child support.

Lynn v. Lynn · filed 1979-01-24

The controlling statute does not restrict the court to a consideration of current income alone but states that the court make such order for the care of the children "as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just, and require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to require college support for a child previously declared emancipated when the circumstances warrant it.

Sakovits v. Sakovits · filed 1981-02-03

It is now elementary that a duty is imposed by statute upon a parent to support a child. In addition to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 provides in pertinent part that the parents are "equally charged with their care, nurture, education and welfare...." ... This court, therefore, finds that upon an affirmative determination of the heretofore-mentioned considerations, and regardless of the fact the child may have been formally declared emancipated, the parents may in a given case be called upon to contribute to the college education of such child.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to consider modifying a divorce judgment to provide support and college expenses for a child who has reached the age of majority.

Wanner v. Litvak · filed 1981-07-27

It is clear that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 grants jurisdiction to a court to entertain, in circumstances such as presented here, a motion to modify the original judgment of divorce to seek payment of support and expenses for a child attending college, and the mere fact that such child is at the age of majority is no bar.

Section 2A:34-23 permits child support until emancipation, and voluntary drug addiction does not prevent emancipation that would otherwise occur.

Baldino v. Baldino · filed 1990-04-25

The duty of a parent to support a child is imposed by statute. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides for the "care, custody, education and maintenance of the children ... as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just." ... This court therefore finds that voluntary drug addiction will not prevent a declaration of emancipation which would otherwise be made.

Section 2A:34-23 gives courts general continuing authority over child custody and support, subject to the specific rules of URESA and UCCJA in interstate matters.

Kaplan v. Kaplan · filed 1986-08-29

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 speaks of this court's jurisdiction to enter orders as to custody and maintenance of children "as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just." This general legislative pronouncement must yield to the specific uniform laws on the same subjects.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts setting child support outside the guidelines to consider the child’s needs, each parent’s finances, and other relevant factors.

Walton v. Visgil · filed 1991-06-12(a)

In those cases in which the guidelines did not technically apply, child support was to be determined under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 which provides in pertinent part: ... a. In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, the court in those cases not governed by court rule shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors: ... (10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider all of a parent's income and assets when setting child support, including personal injury settlement proceeds.

Cleveland v. Cleveland · filed 1991-06-25(a)

Clearly the Legislature intended that child support be based upon total family resources.

Section 2A:34-23 requires parents to support a financially dependent child who has not become emancipated, including while the child completes a rehabilitation program and earns a GED.

Ld v. Kd · filed 1998-03-25

By state statute, both parents shall provide for the "care, custody, education and maintenance of the children ..." as is fit, reasonable and just based upon the totality of the circumstances of the case. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... The court finds that based upon the circumstances of this case, Kelly continues as a financially unemancipated child of the parties in need of support while she completes her residency program and earns her GED.

Section 2A:34-23(a) calls for consideration of a parent's inheritance, including assets purchased with it, when calculating child support beyond the guideline award.

Connell v. Connell · filed 1998-07-01(a)

The court should then undertake an analysis of the factors contained in N.J.S.A 2A:34-23a, considering the inheritance, to determine an amount to supplement the guidelines award. This approach permits the court to reasonably consider the existence of the inheritance, its current form, as well as all the circumstances bearing on the best interests of the children.

Section 2A:34-23(a)(5) permits courts to consider educational costs at all levels, including private school tuition, when setting child support.

Hoefers v. Jones · filed 1994-04-29(a)(5)

To interpret otherwise would be to ignore the precise language of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(5) allowing support for all levels of education, "including" college education, Cf., State in Interest of S.Z., 177 N.J. Super. 32 (App.Div. 1981) (words of relation prima facie refer to nearest antecedent), and Court Rule Appendix IX-A(3)(a) i.e., child support guidelines do not take into account economic impact of private, parochial, trade school, secondary school where there are tuition costs (the Family Part Case Information Statement, Part D, Schedule C, Personal Monthly Expenses, includes children's private school costs as part of cost of support or obligation incurred. Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix V).

For combined parental income above $52,000, child support on the excess income must be determined using the statutory criteria rather than by extrapolating the guidelines.

Pascale v. Pascale · filed 1994-06-22(a)

Those guidelines must be utilized up to $52,000 in combined income. Combined income in excess of $52,000 per annum must be allocated utilizing the criteria delineated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a. The court may not simply extrapolate the guidelines to the combined income in excess of $52,000 per annum.

Section 2A:34-23 supports a child's right to support based on the parents' resources, including consideration of a child in an intact second family when modifying an earlier support order.

Martinez v. Martinez · filed 1995-02-21

They have a right to a standard of living, of care, of maintenance, commensurate with the collective incomes and best efforts of their parents. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; ... In furtherance of these principles, this court holds that plaintiff's petition for child support reduction is not plaintiff's right per se "because" he is the father of a newly-born son, but is, in effect, an action brought derivatively "on behalf" of his son to fairly share with his brother and sister a portion of his father's income, to be likewise supported by his father.

Section 2A:34-23(a)(5) allows an award for higher education expenses when the child's choice of college is reasonable under the circumstances.

Black v. Walker · filed 1996-11-25(a)(5)

Finally, we conclude that there is ample credible evidence in the record to support the judge's finding that (1) Hazel's decision to matriculate at Syracuse University was reasonable under the circumstances, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(5); Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 443 A. 2d 1031 (1982) and (2) the award of counsel fees also was reasonable under the circumstances, which included defendant's persistent and intractable resistance to Hazel's claim and her limited resources to pay counsel to press her case.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts setting a parent's contribution to a child's college costs to consider all relevant support factors, including the child's assets and income and the parents' financial circumstances.

Raynor v. Raynor · filed 1999-03-29(a)

The judge had an obligation under Newburgh and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) to consider all the enumerated factors, including the financial resources of the children and plaintiff's financial circumstances, in rendering a decision.

Section 2A:34-23(d) requires a parent who maintained life insurance to continue that coverage when child support is at issue after a divorce complaint is filed, while allowing the court to adjust or release the obligation.

Capaccio v. Capaccio · filed 1999-04-23(d)

Courts have statutory authority to require the maintenance of insurance coverage. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23d, effective January 19, 1998, provides that after filing a complaint for divorce, where the support of a child is at issue, the parent who maintained existing life insurance coverage must continue to maintain that same coverage. Additionally, the court may reallocate financial responsibilities by ordering a parent to obtain comparable insurance or may release a party from the obligation to maintain insurance. Here, the judge was advised that defendant had applied under the terms of the existing insurance policy for a waiver of premiums due to his disability. Ordering defendant to maintain the existing policy will not pose an economic detriment to defendant.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to suspend child support payments during a parent's lengthy incarceration without assets and determine support and arrears after release based on ability to pay.

Halliwell v. Halliwell · filed 1999-12-17

Our courts are authorized to modify alimony and support orders "as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case" require. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Suspending the payment of support and postponing a decision as to future support eliminates the accrual of arrears, yet does not reward the criminal who is fully apprised that upon release the support obligation will be reinstated and, based upon his ability to pay, he will be required to pay an arrearage which will be established commensurate with his income.

Section 2A:34-23 treats court-ordered reimbursement of child support wrongfully received by a parent as child support.

Leonardis v. Woodruff · filed 2001-09-21

This court cannot imagine that our legislature, through its enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and related legislation, [11] intended that court-ordered reimbursement of child support wrongfully yet knowingly received by a parent unentitled thereto should or does lose its status as "support" through the restitutional process of reimbursement to the innocent parent.

When parents’ income exceeds the child support guidelines, the court supplements the guidelines’ maximum award by applying § 2A:34-23(a)’s factors, with particular attention to the children’s reasonable needs and the parents’ standard of living.

Isaacson v. Isaacson · filed 2002-03-08(a)

In such circumstances, the maximum amount provided for in the guidelines should be "supplemented" by an additional award determined through application of the statutory factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). ... Where our attention is focused on the unique circumstances of the high-income earner whose ability to pay increased child support is not in issue, the dominant guideline for consideration is the reasonable needs of the children, which must be addressed in the context of the standard of living of the parties.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to add ordinary extracurricular expenses to a high-income parent's child support obligation after considering the statutory factors.

Accardi v. Accardi · filed 2004-05-17

Obviously, the expenses described here do not fit the category of extraordinary expenses contemplated in the Guidelines but may, in the discretion of the trial court with proper consideration of the statutory factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, be added to the support obligation of a high income earner.

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts to review its statutory factors when determining the proper level of child support.

Tretola v. Tretola · filed 2006-11-28

We conclude only that the trial court should have reviewed the statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to determine the proper level of support under the facts and circumstances of this case considering, as the guiding principle, Daniel's best interests.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a New Jersey court to order child support beyond age eighteen, including until age twenty-two.

State Ex Rel. Harnes v. Lawrence · filed 2000-12-05

The New Jersey court had the authority to order child support until the age of twenty-two under its state law.

Section 2A:34-23(a)'s child support factors guide whether a parent's voluntary retirement justifies reducing support, with the child's needs given paramount weight.

Lissner v. Marburger · filed 2007-02-16(a)

The court must determine whether the benefits to the voluntarily retiring parent substantially outweigh the disadvantages to the recipient of support — in this case, the children. In making that determination, drawing on both the Deegan-Silvan factors and statutory child support factors, the court must consider the (1) the benefits to the retiring parent, based on his or her age, health, timing, finances, assets, reasons for retiring, and whether the parent can control the disbursement of retirement payments to enable him or her to maintain support for the child despite retirement; (2) the impact on the child of reduced support, based on his or her needs, age, health, assets, and standard of living to which he or she has grown accustomed, and any proffered advantages to the child from the parent's retirement; (3) the fairness of the decision, based on the obligor's motivation, good faith, and voluntariness of the retirement; and (4) and other factors.

When parents’ income exceeds the child support guidelines’ maximum, subsection (a) requires the court to consider its statutory factors when allocating the children’s remaining needs between the parents.

Caplan v. Caplan · filed 2003-11-12(a)

Then, the court must analyze the factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and determine each party's responsibility for satisfying those remaining needs. It is the result of that analysis that is to be utilized when determining the fair and equitable allocation of the remaining needs of the children between the parties.

Section 2A:34-23(a)(3) requires child support determinations to consider each parent’s income and assets; the ability to exercise a stock option alone does not create income, but exercising it may create income if the stock’s fair market value exceeds the option price.

Heller-Loren v. Apuzzio · filed 2004-08-03(a)(3)

New Jersey statutes require determinations of child support to be based on "[a]ll sources of income and assets of each parent," N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a(3), and we have held that child support is to be based on the earning capacity that can be imputed to the parents rather than solely on "his or her actual" income. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the ability to exercise stock options does not by itself give rise to "income" for purposes of defendant's child support obligation, but that the actual exercise of the options may give rise to income if there is a demonstrated fair market value of the stock above the option price.

Section 2A:34-23(a)(9) requires courts setting child support outside the guidelines to consider reasonable debts and liabilities, which can include student loans reasonably and necessarily incurred to improve earning capacity.

Lozner v. Lozner · filed 2006-10-30(a)(9)

Moreover, in instances where the guidelines do not apply, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) requires the court in establishing "the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child," to consider among several other items the "[r]easonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent." Id. at (a)(9). Therefore, we hold that substantial loan debt can constitute a factor to be considered in determining whether alteration of a guidelines-based support award is warranted, provided the parent reasonably and necessarily acquired the loan for educational purposes with the goal of improving his or her earning capacity.

Section 2A:34-23 requires a trial court to secure child support in a reasonable manner.

Strahan v. Strahan · filed 2008-08-26

If a trial court intends to secure child support pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, it must do so in a reasonable manner.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court setting child support above the guidelines to consider the children's needs and each parent's income and earning ability.

Musico v. Musico · filed 2012-05-11(a)

The court has further considered the other multiple factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. These factors include but are not limited to the children's needs, which in this case can be better met with the influx of additional support monies into their primary custodian's home. ... The court has also considered that defendant's income and earning ability has significantly increased, while plaintiffs income has essentially stayed the same since the divorce.

Section 2A:34-23(a) permits courts setting child support to consider each parent's income and economic circumstances, along with other relevant factors.

REAGAN VS. JENNIFER L. RYAN (FM-01-995-11, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-06(a)

Among the factors that may be considered by the family court when establishing a child support award are: the "[s]tandard of living and economic circumstances of each parent," "[a]ll sources of income and assets of each parent," the "[e]arning ability of each parent," and "[a]ny other factors the court may deem relevant." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). ... The judge exercised his discretion and deviated from the Guidelines based upon the disparity in the parties' income as well increased travel distance required to enjoy parenting time with Z.R.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts deciding parents' contributions to college expenses to consider all the listed factors.

Gotlib v. Gotlib · filed 2008-03-27(a)

In arriving at his decision, the motion judge did not address the Newburgh and statutory factors reflected in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). The court simply appears to have divided the expenses equally. This approach is not sustainable.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider its support factors and the Newburgh factors when allocating both incurred and future college expenses.

WAINER VS. MIGUEL A. WAINER(FM-02-1405-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-07-13(a)

Here, the trial court failed to address either the Newburgh or the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). In particular, the court treated the incurred college debt as a liability subject to equitable distribution, like any other marital debt. This was mistaken, as the college expenses — whether prospective or incurred — should have been analyzed within the Newburgh-Gac framework.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes the Family Part to create a trust to secure reasonably foreseeable educational expenses for children.

Sauro v. Sauro · filed 2012-05-14

In a pending matrimonial action, the Family Part judge has the statutory authority to enter orders providing for the "care, custody, education and maintenance of the children," and to ensure that funds will be available to cover the costs for these concerns. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The court's power in this respect includes, but it is not limited to, "the creation of trusts or other security devices, to assure payment of reasonably foreseeable medical and educational expenses." Ibid.

Section 2A:34-23 permits child support to be redirected into a trust for a dependent, disabled child when the plan serves the child’s best interests.

J.B. v. W.B. (069972) · filed 2013-08-20

The redirection of a child support obligation from a parent to a trust designed to meet the present and future needs of the dependent, disabled child should not be considered exceptional or extraordinary relief, if such a plan is in the best interests of the unemancipated child.

When imputing income for child support, a court must weigh the child's needs, including how those needs affect a parent's employment options.

Elrom v. Elrom · filed 2015-02-23(a)(1)

The first factor listed by the Legislature in guiding a judicial determination of a fair child-support award is serving the "[n]eeds of the child . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23(a)(1).

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider its factors when calculating child support for a college student living away from home.

Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran · filed 2016-06-16(a)

Here, the court was required to consider the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) when calculating support for Catherine, as she was a college student living away from home.

Section 2A:34-23(a) permits college support for an unemancipated child, but pursuing college alone does not establish that the child remains unemancipated.

Maura Ricci, N/K/A Maura McGarvey v. Michael Ricci and · filed 2017-02-09(a)

A child's decision to seriously pursue a college education alone does not create the required dependency allowing him or her to be unemancipated.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider its factors when setting child support for college students.

H.B. VS. P.S. (FM-02-2624-11, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2019-01-09(a)

In determining child support for college students, the court must consider the factors provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). ... The trial court properly analyzed the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) factors when establishing defendant's modified child support obligation.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires the court to consider its listed factors, including a disabled child’s eligibility for public benefits and services, when calculating financial maintenance.

M.R. VS. F.B., AND K.B., LEGAL GUARDIAN FOR S.R. (FM-18-0003-11, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-13(a)

However, the court simply adopted the award previously calculated with the Guidelines, rather than recalculating a financial maintenance obligation utilizing the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 factors, including S.R.'s eligibility for public benefits and services for people with disabilities. In so doing, we agree with plaintiff that the court erred, and we reverse that provision of the order and remand to the trial court for consideration of the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 factors.

Section 2A:34-23(a) permits continued support after age twenty-three when a severe mental or physical incapacity leaves the child financially dependent on a parent.

S.E. VS. B.S.B. (FD-13-2846-94, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-10-03(a)

Read together, these provisions mean that "by operation of law," a parent has no continuing obligation to support an adult child after age twenty-three, unless the child or the moving parent overcomes that presumption and demonstrates the child's continuing "severe mental or physical incapacity causes" his continued financial dependence.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires a court deciding a parent's contribution to college expenses to consider all the Newburgh factors, even when a settlement agreement addresses those expenses.

LANDRE VS. LAURA LANDRE (FM-13-0321-02, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-19(a)

When making a decision regarding the obligation of a parent to contribute to college expenses, "the judge has 'an obligation under Newburgh and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) to consider all the enumerated factors'" and should not base its decision on any single factor. ... As a result of the judge's failure to apply the Newburgh factors, we are constrained to remand the issue of plaintiff's obligation to contribute toward the oldest child's college expenses.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts deciding a parent's contribution to post-secondary education expenses to consider its statutory criteria alongside the Newburgh factors and other relevant circumstances.

QUERRY VS. MARY K. QUERRY (FM-10-0097-03, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-19(a)

We are satisfied that Judge Marino properly "balance[d] the statutory criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)[5] ... as to defendant's obligation to contribute towards the younger son's post-secondary school expenses and correctly determined the "amount, [defendant] must contribute to [her] child's educational expenses." Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 543 (2006); see also Avelino-Catabran, 445 N.J. at 591 n.8.

Section 2A:34-23(a) supplies the factors for a discretionary child support award when the parents' combined income exceeds the Child Support Guidelines maximum.

A.K. VS. D.G. (FM-16-0820-02, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-14(a)

Thus, by agreeing to recalculate defendant's child support obligation using the Guidelines, the parties bound themselves to using the Schedule of Child Support Awards up to the maximum level of their combined income and then applying the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to determine an additional discretionary amount if their combined net income exceeded the maximum under the Schedule.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts calculating child support to consider each parent's financial circumstances, income, earning ability, and other support obligations.

L.P. VS. M.P. (FM-02-0445-07, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-04-03(a)

We reverse the order fixing child support and remand for additional proceedings to complete the required calculation under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

Section 2A:34-23(a) supplies factors courts must consider when setting child support for a college student living away from home.

ROBIN KOVAL VS. CLIFFORD STERN (FM-02-0473-05, BERGEN COUNTY AND SATEWIDE) · filed 2019-08-01(a)

With regard to child support, the trial court shall consider the factors set forth in Jacoby and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and make findings.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires the court to consider its enumerated factors when deciding child support.

POLIMENI VS. GREGORIO POLIMENI (FM-07-2836-04, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-10(a)

Both N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) require the judge to consider enumerated factors. The statutes say the court "shall consider" the factors. This statutory obligation is not optional.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider the Newburgh factors when determining parents’ contributions to a child’s college expenses.

ROBINSON VS. ARMANDO ONORATI (FM-11-0489-03, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-14(a)

These factors were reflected in later legislation concerning the parents' child support obligations. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a); see Kiken v. Kiken, 149 N.J. 441, 449-50 (1997). ... Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse and remand for the judge to address the parties' obligations to G.O.'s college expenses applying the Newburgh factors.

When parents have not agreed on how to divide college expenses, subsection (a) requires the court to consider the statutory and Newburgh factors in setting each parent's contribution.

ZEGARSKI VS. KELLEEN ZEGARSKI (FM-20-0444-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-21(a)

Since the PSA did not allocate college expenses absent the parties' agreement, the trial court was obliged to determine each parent's respective obligation according to the Newburgh and statutory factors.

Section 2A:34-23(a) calls for courts to weigh its criteria, the Newburgh factors, and other relevant circumstances when deciding a parent's contribution to a child's college expenses.

CALBAZANA VS. EVRON COOPER, JR. (FM-04-1249-13, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-31(a)

Subsequently, an amendment to the child-support statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23(a), codified this list of factors. ... In deciding the initial October 2018 motion, Judge Rodriguez expressly considered and appropriately weighed factors one, four, nine and eleven, among others, to reach a fair and just decision.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider its listed factors when assessing a parent's financial obligation for a child with a severe mental or physical incapacity.

J.L. VS. B.L. (FM-15-1058-96, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-19(a)

When assessing a parent's financial obligation for a child who suffers from a severe mental or physical incapacity, the court must consider the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

When parents’ combined net income exceeds the Child Support Guidelines limit, subsection (a)’s factors guide the supplemental support award.

FLOCKHART VS. KAREN FLOCKHART (FM-19-0224-13, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-24(a)

In considering the above-Guidelines amount, the law calls for the court to "consider the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) to determine the amount of the supplemental support award and then combine that amount with the [G]uidelines-based award." Caplan, 182 N.J. at 271. ... Here, the court did not apply the law in its calculation of child support. It neither calculated a supplemental amount for support nor did it explain why it did not follow the requirements for high-income families. Under these circumstances, we are constrained to remand for reconsideration of child support to determine the amount of a supplemental award, if any.

When parental income exceeds the Child Support Guidelines maximum, courts apply the Guidelines up to that maximum and determine additional support using the factors in subsection (a).

C.P. VS. M.A.P. (FM-10-0282-08, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2019-08-01(a)

In such circumstances, trial courts should apply the guidelines up to the maximum and then to make an additional award, the amount of which should be determined by considering the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). Connell v. Connell, 313 N.J. Super. 426, 431 (App. Div. 1998). That is precisely what the judge did here.

Section 2A:34-23(a) supplies factors a court must apply when setting child support after departing from the Child Support Guidelines.

JOSEPH J. GORMLEY, III VS. SUSAN CANNAVO GORMLEY (FM-03-1232-15, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-26(a)

In any event, once the judge deviated from the Guidelines, she was required to establish the Guideline amount, apply the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 or N.J.S.A. 9:17-53, and then explain her reasons for deviating in writing. That did not occur here.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to use its statutory factors when redetermining child support for a college student living away from home.

ZAPATA VS. MONICA ZAPATA (FM-16-0252-10, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-01-29(a)

It was error for the court not to redetermine plaintiff's support obligation based on the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

When modifying child support outside the Guidelines, a court must consider the statutory factors, including the parents’ income and their prior agreement.

DAVIS VS. ASHLEY SARDONI-DAVIS (FM-05-0062-18, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2020-02-25(a)

Here, the trial court did not consider these factors when it calculated the modification award. It was obliged to do so, along with giving appropriate ... weight to the parties' prior agreement. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(10).

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider its support factors when calculating child support for a college student living away from home.

C.A.F. VS. H.F. (FM-04-0535-06, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-03(a)

On remand, the court shall consider the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23(a) when calculating support for Carl, as he was a college student living away ... from home.

When a child attends college away from home, the court must set child support by weighing the applicable factors in subsection (a).

FRANCHAK VS. A. STEVEN FRANCHAK (FM-18-0158-04, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-17(a)

Furthermore, to establish the appropriate child support amount, the court may not resort to the Guidelines if the child attends college away from home; rather the court "must assess all applicable facts and ... circumstances, weighing the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23[a]." Ibid.

When parents' combined income exceeds the child support guidelines' maximum, subsection (a)'s factors govern any additional support award.

FORMAN VS. AMY LEVENSON (FM-02-1773-10, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-01-22(a)

When, as in this case, the parties' combined income exceeds $3600 per week, the trial court has to apply the guidelines up to the maximum; when making an additional award, the amount should be determined by considering the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts setting supplemental child support for high-income parents to consider the statutory factors and make specific findings rather than extrapolate from the parents’ income percentages.

RUH VS. JACQUELINE VANCLEEF (FM-18-0793-08, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-14(a)

We are therefore constrained to reverse the order fixing child support and remand this matter to the trial court for a calculation of plaintiff's child support obligation using the Guidelines and statutory factors. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts setting child support to consider its statutory factors; a parent’s payment of substantial additional expenses can support declining an award above the guidelines.

TRONCOSO VS. SAMIRA ZAMEL (FM-07-2327-06, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-09(a)

Furthermore, the trial judge analyzed each N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) factor in detail, considered plaintiff's income in excess of the guidelines, and concluded there was no basis to award support beyond the guidelines because plaintiff paid for many of the above-guideline expenses, "some of which are substantial," without a contribution from defendant.

When setting child support outside the guidelines, a court must consider the factors in § 2A:34-23 and make the required statutory findings.

LIRANZO VS. KEVIN K. GWYN (FD-20-0908-12, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-02

"If the [G]uidelines are found inapplicable . . . the court should consider the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 or N.J.S.A. 9:17-53 when establishing the child support award." ... The motion judge made none of the statutory findings required by Rule 5:6A in order to deviate from the guidelines and misapplied the law.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires a court apportioning a child's college expenses to consider the relevant factors, including the Newburgh factors.

FORMOSO VS. MICHAEL FORMOSO (FM-19-0251-00, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-17(a)

The family court also needs to evaluate the appropriate factors in apportioning the child's college expenses. See Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). The family court did not balance all the factors identified in Newburgh and it needs to do so considering the disputed issues.

Section 2A:34-23(a) provides factors for setting a discretionary child support amount above the Guidelines award for high-income parents.

NABBIE VS. CHRISTOPHER J. O'CONNOR (FD-02-1019-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2020-05-04(a)

Here, the child was over twelve years old at the time of this initial support order, and the court properly considered the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, as well as the reasonable needs of the child in the context of the parents' lifestyles, in determining the additional discretionary amount. We discern no abuse of the court's discretion to supplement the award.

When parents’ combined income exceeds the child support guideline threshold, subsection (a) guides the court’s discretionary supplemental award.

K.S. VS. J.S. (FM-18-0685-15, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-10(a)

Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge's determination that plaintiff was required to pay $900 weekly in child support.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes courts to require life insurance to secure alimony and a child's college expenses.

SHANNON-BEVILAQUE VS. ANTHONY J. BEVILAQUE (FM-20-0843-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-16

The authority of the court to order life insurance to secure alimony and a child's college expenses derives from N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts determining child support to consider each parent's income, assets, and earning ability.

AZIZA ARNETTER HARDY VS. LAHAN AKINOLA (FM-07-0014-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-12(a)

As noted, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) requires the court to consider, among other things, the sources of income and assets of each parent, and their respective "[e]arning ability." Because the trial court's determination that the parties have a combined income of more than $187,200 may have been a factor in the court's decision to supplement the child support for K.A., the trial court should reconsider that determination as well.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts setting child support to consider factors including each parent's income, earning ability, and health.

LEPORE VS. GERARD LEPORE (FM-14-0759-09, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-04-08(a)

The statute recites ten factors a court is to consider in calibrating such child support, including, as is especially pertinent here, the "sources of income and assets of each parent" (factor three), ... and the "[a]ge and health of the child and each parent." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(3), (4), and (6).

Section 2A:34-23(a) provides factors for determining supplemental child support when the parents' combined income exceeds the child support guidelines.

K.W. VS. S.W. (FM-03-0437-11, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-08-17(a)

It is clear that the parties' combined income levels exceed the maximum child support guidelines, and the judge supplemented the support amount by applying the statutory factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts setting support for a college student living away from home to consider the statutory factors because the child support guidelines do not strictly apply.

DALY VS. PETER DALY (FM-16-0073-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-01(a)

Here, as the trial judge recognized, "in such cases as this where the child is living away at college and 18 years of age the guidelines do not strictly apply and the court must, also, consider the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34 - 23(a)." ... In doing so, the judge did not abuse her discretion as her decision was supported by the evidence and consistent with the controlling legal principles.

Section 2A:34-23a requires courts setting child support for a child living away from home to weigh all applicable circumstances under its factors.

DAWN M. BAESZLER VS. WILLIAM J. BAESZLER (FM-13-0473-08, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-06(a)

Because each case must turn on its own facts, courts faced with the question of setting child support for children living away from home must assess all applicable facts and circumstances, weighing the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a.

When parents' combined income exceeds the Child Support Guidelines ceiling, § 2A:34-23(a) requires the court to consider their assets in setting child support.

MARIA D. NEWMAN VS. MARK T. NEWMAN (FM-02-2265-11, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-05(a)

And, since the parties' combined income exceeded $187, 200, under N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23(a), the parties' assets had to be considered in the child support calculation.

Section 2A:34-23(a) supplies the factors for deciding a discretionary child support amount above the Guidelines income ceiling.

SEKHON VS. AMRITA AMY SEKHON (FM-01-0563-11, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-04-30(a)

Specifically, the Guidelines state that under these circumstances, where a paying parent's income is in excess of the maximum Guidelines amount, "the court shall apply the [G]uidelines up to $187,200 and supplement the [G]uidelines-based award with a discretionary amount based on the remaining family income (i.e., income in excess of $187,200) and the factors specified in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23." Ibid. ... Applying these guiding principles to the motion judge's decision here, we discern no abuse in the judge's discretion when she recalculated support first under the Guidelines, and then by applying the statutory factors.

Section 2A:34-23(a) presumptively requires parents to financially support their unemancipated children.

JOHN ORR VS. SYLVANNAH ORR (FM-20-1281-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-10-06(a)

By statute, parents are presumptively required to provide for the financial support of their unemancipated children. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). ... We agree with plaintiff that the court erred in failing to establish a child support award and concur that the record does not support the court's factual and legal conclusions that the parties' oral agreement addressed child support.

Subsection (a) requires consideration of the parents’ income, debts, and earning ability when calculating child support; supported findings may justify imputing income.

J.A.M. VS. S.J.G. (FM-10-0286-19, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2021-10-25(a)

In reaching his final decision after trial, the trial judge specifically considered several of the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). The judge reviewed the parties' debt and both parties' income; in addition, he took these factors into account when calculating alimony. He also considered plaintiff's own testimony in the divorce trial as to how much she would be able to earn after her newly acquired civil service qualification. The motion record does not demonstrate that the trial court's conclusion plaintiff would be able to earn $60,000 was based on a failure to consider controlling legal principles. The court similarly did not rest upon findings inconsistent with or unsupported by ... competent evidence. Thus, we do not consider it an abuse of discretion for the court to deny plaintiff's request to lower her imputed income to $25,000.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to require security for payment of marital obligations, but an additional lien may be denied when support is already secured and no arrears are shown.

HAJJAR VS. SAMER ZEINO (FM-02-0276-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-20

Indeed, "N.J.S.A. 2A:34–23 permits the trial court to require security for the payment of marital obligations," ... Here, because the probation account showed a credit rather than any arrears, and a constructive trust on defendant's IRA to secure plaintiff's support award already existed, we discern no abuse of discretion.

Section 2A:34-23(a) provides factors for setting child support, including when a payment combines a business buyout with support.

TIRENDI VS. THOMAS J. TIRENDI (FM-10-0320-14, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-21(a)

The court here properly considered the factors found in N.J.S.A. 2A:34- 23(a), keeping in mind that the guidelines were not helpful in light of the $200,000 annual payment for the buyout of VM, which encompassed alimony and child support.

A court setting child support under subsection (a) must explain how the statutory factors support its order.

KARAKHANIAN v. NATALIA SHCHUKO (FM-14-0059-15, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2022-08-12(a)

And although the court stated in both decisions that the child support amount was based on the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) factors, it did not adequately explain how they were applied in requiring plaintiff––the custodial parent––to pay weekly child support of $114.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires a judge to consider statutory factors, including the child's needs and each parent's financial circumstances, when setting child support.

C.M.E. v. M.E. (FM-15-0891-19, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-09-29(a)

Here, he made findings about the child's needs, the parties' educational and employment history, and their financial circumstances, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), and he established a child support award pursuant to the Guidelines.

Section 2A:34-23(a) treats contributions toward private schooling as an aspect of child support.

CLARKE VS. WAYNE R. CLARKE (FM-20-0830-08, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-11-30(a)

Contribution towards private schooling is an aspect of child support, which is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to require life insurance to secure child support in an amount reasonable under the parties' circumstances.

TAYLOR VS. JARED TAYLOR (FM-10-0377-16, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-02

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 permits the court to require a child support obligor to secure his or her obligation for the continued payment of child support. ... The judge's decision comports with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and we see no basis to disturb it.

Section 2A:34-23(a)(5) permits courts to order divorced parents to contribute to postsecondary education expenses and survives federal equal protection and due process challenges under rational basis review.

LOPRESTI v. MURPHY · filed 2022-02-17(a)(5)

Plaintiff maintains that two state statutes, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67, violate his rights to equal ... protection and due process by authorizing courts to award support for post-secondary educational expenses against divorced parents but not against those who are still married. ... The challenged laws survive under this liberal standard.

Section 2A:34-23(a)'s college contribution factors do not require a court to consider a child's income when calculating child support owed to the parent of primary residence.

GIPPLE v. MICHAEL W. ROGERS (FD-05-0046-99, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-27(a)

As we have noted, the determination of child support obligations is separate and distinct from the determination whether a parent is obligated to contribute to a child's college education applying the Newburgh factors. Although "the financial resources of the child" and "the ability of the child to earn income" are among the Newburgh factors, 88 N.J. at 545, a court is not required to consider the child's income in calculating the amount of child support owed to the parent of primary residence.

Section 2A:34-23(a) applies to ongoing support for a disabled person after age twenty-three.

TARA WICKER v. JAMES WICKER (FM-03-0028-13, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-10-07(a)

Defendant's reference to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(e) and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) is misplaced as those sections of the statute apply when a parent or guardian seeks lifetime, on-going support for a disabled person who has reached age 23.

Section 2A:34-23(a)(1) requires courts to consider children's needs when determining child support; an agreed income imputation cannot be rejected as inadequate support without evidence supporting that conclusion.

SCHILLER v. CHRISTOPHER JAMES SCHILLER (FM-02-1096-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-10-26(a)(1)

In addition, the needs of the children must be considered by the court when determining the parents' responsibility for child support. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(1). However, there is nothing in the record supporting the trial court's conclusion that the parties' agreement to impute income to Svetlana for purposes of calculating the parties' child support obligations would result in the children receiving insufficient financial support.

Section 2A:34-23(a) permits an adult child with a severe mental or physical incapacity causing financial dependence on a parent to remain unemancipated.

Bencivenga v. Bencivenga · filed 2024-01-08(a)

A child with disabilities will be considered unemancipated "if the child suffers from a severe mental or physical incapacity that causes the child to be financially ... dependent on a parent." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. ... Plaintiff demonstrated prima facie evidence of R.B.'s incapacities triggering consideration and application of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 and 2A:34-23(a) through a ... plenary hearing.

Section 2A:34-23(a) governs the calculation of child support, but its factors do not govern the setting of an arrearage payback amount.

D.W.A. v. A.L.H. · filed 2024-03-20(a)

Initially, defendant's assertion the court was required to apply the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) factors in deciding the arrearage issue is misplaced. That statute governs the calculation of child support, not the setting of an arrearage payback amount.

When calculating child support for a college student, courts must consider the statutory factors and the child's support needs without including college housing and food expenses in the child support calculation.

Roden v. Mistretta · filed 2024-04-02(a)

When determining the ... amount of support, courts should evaluate the parties' circumstances based on the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a, as well as the child's continued need for a local residence during school breaks and between semesters and other "costs associated with supporting a college experience." Id. at 121-22. ... We, however, conclude the trial court mistakenly included A.R's $750 monthly rent for her apartment and her $75 in monthly food expenses in the court's child support calculation.

Section 2A:34-23 requires changed circumstances to modify an existing child support order, but not to establish support when no order has adjudicated it.

Sackstein v. Kukis · filed 2024-04-24(a)

Thus, the condition precedent for a court's ability to determine whether a change in circumstances exists is the existence of an order wherein the court has adjudicated support in initio.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts to consider its listed factors when calculating child support for a college student.

K.F. v. W.F. · filed 2024-07-23(a)

Accordingly, we reverse the judge's child support order and remand to calculate child support under the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) factors. The parties shall submit their required financial information, and plaintiff shall provide updated college information regarding G.F.'s financial needs.

When parents’ combined income exceeds the child support guidelines, Section 2A:34-23(a) calls for an additional discretionary award based on its statutory factors.

Auslander v. Auslander · filed 2024-02-07(a)

Where, as here, the parties' combined income levels exceed the maximum child support guidelines, "the maximum amount provided for in the guidelines should be 'supplemented' by an additional award determined through application of the statutory factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)" in the court's discretion.

When family income exceeds the child support guidelines’ maximum, the court must consider subsection (a)’s factors in deciding whether to increase the base award.

Coleman v. Coleman · filed 2024-09-30(a)

Here, the family's combined income exceeded the maximum amount of the guidelines, yet the court did not deviate from the guidelines. The trial court undertook no analysis of the factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) to determine whether the base award should be increased in light of the family's higher earnings. We conclude the court erred in not conducting a hearing and undertaking this analysis.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires findings on its child support factors when deciding whether to supplement a Guidelines award for a high-income family.

K.O. v. F.O. · filed 2024-11-14(a)

Accordingly, on remand, the judge shall make findings under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and determine whether a supplemental award in light of the parties' earnings is warranted.

Section 2A:34-23(a) permits child support for an adult child with disabilities to be paid directly to providers when that serves the child's needs and preserves public benefits, even if others in the household benefit incidentally.

Lund v. Lund · filed 2024-02-14(a)

We are satisfied the judge's order equitably accomplishes the child support objectives identified in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) based on Matthew's unique circumstances.

Absent an enforceable agreement on college costs, subsection (a)'s child-support factors are balanced with the Newburgh factors and other relevant circumstances to decide a parent's contribution.

Moore v. Terrell · filed 2024-04-29(a)

However, absent an enforceable agreement apportioning child support and college costs, "a trial court should balance the statutory ... criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)[9] and the Newburgh factors, as well as any other relevant circumstances, to reach a fair and just decision whether and, if so, in what amount, a parent or parents must contribute to a child's educational expenses." Gac, 186 N.J. at 543. ... Here, if the trial court on remand determines there was no agreement between the parties to pay for college expenses, it should analyze this case pursuant to Gac and Newburgh.

Section 2A:34-23 authorizes Family Part judges to protect funds for children’s care, custody, education, and maintenance, including by requiring advance notice before a party pays counsel or professional fees.

Kunin v. Kunin · filed 2024-07-18

"In a pending matrimonial action, the Family ... Part judge has the statutory authority to enter orders providing for the 'care, custody, education and maintenance of the children,' and to ensure that funds will be available to cover the costs for these concerns." Sauro, 425 N.J. Super. at 572 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). ... We are convinced that that is exactly what Judge Katz was doing when he imposed the notice requirement.

Section 2A:34-23(a) authorizes courts to order support for a child’s education, including college.

Berrios v. Calvin Moffett, Jr. · filed 2025-03-25(a)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) authorizes the court to enter an order for the education of children.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires a fact-sensitive analysis of its factors when setting child support for a child attending college.

R.H. v. M.G. · filed 2025-08-29(a)

Importantly, although there is no presumption that child support lessens when a child begins college, the courts must engage in a fact-sensitive analysis utilizing the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires findings on the statutory factors when setting child support.

Acharya v. Jolly Thakkar · filed 2025-11-17(a)

Additionally, the judge should have included findings of fact as to each of the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) in arriving at the child support amount.

Subsection (a) requires child support for an unemancipated college student to be calculated by evaluating the student's needs and the circumstances of the student and each parent.

Clarence Seals, Jr. v. Mia Moore Seals · filed 2026-04-06(a)

"[T]he calculation of child support for [a college student] must be based on evaluation of the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a." Id. at 122. The family court must determine "the [child's] individual needs and assess the income, assets, debts, earning ability, age, and health of [the] child and each parent to reach an appropriate level of support." Ibid.

Section 2A:34-23(a) requires courts setting child support above the guidelines to consider its statutory factors and the guidelines, while allowing discretion in the calculation method.

Betru v. Firdu · filed 2026-06-08(a)

If the parties' income exceeds the maximum under the guidelines, the trial court has discretion in the methodology it "employ[s] in arriving at a child support award" with the goal of calculating an award "in the best interest of the child after giving due consideration to the [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)] statutory factors and the guidelines." Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 272 (2005). ... The parenting coordinator demonstrated a lack of familiarity with calculating above-the-guidelines support when he averaged the "differential" of ... the parties' earnings and then failed to explain why he was not awarding support above the guidelines.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a judge to require life insurance to secure child support and alimony obligations.

Knoettner v. Knoettner · filed 2025-09-16

Under New Jersey law, a judge may require a party to obtain life insurance particularly to secure a party's child support and alimony obligations. Davis v. Davis, 184 N.J. Super. 430, 439 ... (App. Div. 1982). Doing so is "appropriate and plainly within the broad authority conferred upon a judge in a matrimonial action by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23." Ibid. The trial court's determination of life insurance amounts was well within its discretion and was supported by credible evidence in the record.

In high-income cases, a court must consider subsection (a)’s factors when deciding whether to adjust child support.

Neve v. Livingstone · filed 2025-10-20(a)

On remand, the court shall determine whether an adjustment of plaintiff's child support obligations for the period April 1, 2018, through August 30, 2019, is appropriate. In doing so, the court "must consider" the statutory factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

Section 2A:34-23(a)(7) calls for consideration of a child's income, assets, and earning ability when deciding maintenance.

Connolly v. Jones · filed 2026-04-14(a)(7)

We are unconvinced the court did not consider these factors, particularly N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(7)—the "income, assets[,] and earning ability of the child."

Section 2A:34-23 permits, but does not require, a court to create a trust to secure support obligations.

Burke v. Burke · filed 2026-05-28

The relevant portion of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 is permissive, providing the court "may" require the creation of a trust.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a court to consider evidence of marital misconduct when setting alimony, but does not permit alimony to exceed an amount supported by the usual grounds for support as punishment for that misconduct.

Greenberg v. Greenberg · filed 1973-12-11

We are satisfied that the statutory permission that "the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just," does not bespeak legislative intendment that marital misconduct may generate an award for alimony in excess of that which might be supported by long-established and traditional bases for such grants.

Section 2A:34-23 gives substantial weight to the duration of the marriage when deciding alimony; after a short marriage, alimony should not be awarded if the spouse seeking it suffered no substantial change in position because of the marriage.

Skribner v. Skribner · filed 1977-06-27

This court feels that because the duration of the marriage is a statutory test in the award of alimony, it should be given substantial weight. ... If there is no substantial change in position on the part of the wife because of the marriage, alimony should not be awarded.

Section 2A:34-23 permits rehabilitative alimony for a set period when the recipient can reasonably be expected to support herself afterward.

Turner v. Turner · filed 1978-04-06

Our statute does not mandate alimony. It provides that a "court may award alimony to either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (emphasis supplied). ... This court is satisfied that rehabilitative alimony is a valuable technique and one that is available today in New Jersey. There is no statute or case directly prohibiting its use.

Section 2A:34-23 permits interim alimony only in a matrimonial action, not in a contract action between unmarried cohabitants.

Crowe v. De Gioia · filed 1982-07-08

Under the relevant statute, alimony may be ordered on an interim basis only in a "matrimonial action," N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1981-1982), which does not embrace an action on a contract between unmarried cohabitants.

Section 2A:34-23 bars consideration of fault in alimony after a divorce granted solely on separation grounds, but the court may consider fault when both parties stipulate that it may.

D'Arc v. D'Arc · filed 1978-11-20

Nevertheless, the husband urges that this court cannot deny alimony because the court granted both parties a divorce on no-fault grounds and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 expressly provides that fault may not be considered in awarding alimony where the judgment of divorce "is granted solely on the ground of separation," as occurred here. ... Based on that stipulation alone, this court believes that fault may be, and should be, considered on the issue of alimony.

Section 2A:34-23 requires alimony and support decisions to consider the dependent spouse's needs and ability to meet them, and the supporting spouse's ability to maintain the former standard of living.

Monte v. Monte · filed 1986-07-16

In Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980), the Supreme Court summarized the general considerations in determining alimony and support as stated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23: (1) the dependent spouse's needs, (2) the dependent spouse's ability to contribute to the fulfillment of those needs, and (3) the supporting spouse's ability to maintain the dependent spouse at the former standard.

Section 2A:34-23 permits a divorce court to consider proof of the grounds for divorce when setting alimony, supporting discovery into the economic aspect of alleged adultery.

Ruprecht v. Ruprecht · filed 1991-06-04

Further, see N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23: In all actions for divorce other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation, the court may consider also the proof made in establishing such grounds in determining the amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just. Therefore, this court will allow limited discovery of defendant with interrogatories and depositions within 30 days of this opinion. This discovery will be limited to the economic aspect of defendant's alleged adulterous acts as related to the alimony issue.

Section 2A:34-23’s listed alimony factors are non-exclusive; a court may consider other relevant factors.

Uslar v. Uslar · filed 1992-01-23

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 sets forth criteria for the award of alimony. While nine factors are stated in the statute, the tenth ("any other factors which the court may deem relevant") shows the list to be non-exclusive.

Section 2A:34-23(b) permits courts to consider a payer's share of income and losses from businesses with a new spouse when assessing ability to pay alimony.

Rolnick v. Rolnick · filed 1993-02-18(b)

Moreover, one of the specific factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b, the statute concerning alimony and maintenance, is "[t]he actual need and ability of the parties to pay." These principles clearly serve to justify the inclusion of both the income and losses from defendant's business ventures with his second wife.

Section 2A:34-23(b) bars using income generated by a distributed share of retirement benefits to determine alimony, but permits consideration of current earnings from a distributed business.

Steneken v. Steneken · filed 2004-03-15(b)

But even assuming otherwise, there is no prohibition in this State against double counting other than the statutory proscription with respect to pension benefits, an asset materially different than the "excess earnings" capitalized in this case.

In calculating alimony, a court must consider income available from inherited assets but should not impute returns that require an imprudent risk to principal.

Overbay v. Overbay · filed 2005-03-18(b)(11)

During the trial, defendant claimed that she had engaged in appropriate investment practices throughout the marriage; however, even if this were so, the court must still consider "[t]he income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(11). ... If the trial court determines that defendant's investments provide a prudent balance between investment risk and investment return, then additional income should not be imputed even though a more aggressive investment strategy might provide additional earnings. Defendant is not required to put her capital at risk, or to jeopardize her inheritance, by pursuing an investment strategy that is neither reasonable nor prudent.

Marital fault may affect the amount of alimony only when it has economic consequences; exceptionally egregious fault may affect whether alimony is awarded at all.

Mani v. Mani · filed 2005-04-06(g)

We hold that marital fault is irrelevant to alimony except in two narrow instances: cases in which the fault has affected the parties' economic life and cases in which the fault so violates societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple justice. The former may be considered in the calculation of alimony and the latter in connection with the initial determination of whether alimony should be allowed at all.

Section 2A:34-23(b) calls for consideration of the paying spouse’s actual income when setting alimony, even if a normalized salary is used to value a closely held business for equitable distribution.

Steneken v. Steneken · filed 2005-05-18(b)

Under those circumstances, the trial court should consider the paying spouse's actual income for alimony purposes, and not a valuator's normalized salary expense figure generated for equitable distribution valuation purposes.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(12) requires courts to consider the tax consequences of alimony rulings.

Bursztyn v. Bursztyn · filed 2005-07-22(b)(12)

First, there was a significant financial benefit to filing joint returns and the Chancery Division had an obligation to consider the tax implications of its decision. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(12); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1(j).

Section 2A:34-23 gives Family Part judges discretion to consider actual need, ability to pay, and other relevant factors when setting spousal support; Medicaid’s exceptional circumstances standard does not govern that decision.

Mef v. Abf · filed 2007-06-13(b)

We read N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 as offering more discretion to the Family Part judge than does comparable New York law, even if the court decision serves to decrease assets otherwise available to the institutionalized spouse for payment of medical costs.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires consideration of statutory factors when setting alimony, including the marital standard of living and the parties’ earnings and earning potential.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2002-02-28(b)

With respect to alimony, the judge properly considered the statutory factors, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b; the parties' marital standard of living, consistent with the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 751 A.2d 524 (2000); the parties' projected budgets; and their respective earnings and earnings potential.

Section 2A:34-23 does not automatically terminate alimony when a former spouse criminally causes the death of the parties’ child; whether noneconomic fault warrants termination depends on the circumstances.

Calbi v. Calbi · filed 2007-11-21(b)

Nothing in this opinion prevents the Legislature from amending the alimony statute to specify that a former spouse's criminal act in taking the life of one of the parties' children per se disqualifies the ex-spouse from receiving alimony. But we do not read the present statute nor the analogous case law to create that automatic disqualification. Rather, whether non-economic fault constitutes "egregious circumstances" sufficient to deny or terminate alimony must be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(10) requires courts to consider equitable distribution when fixing final alimony, so final alimony cannot be decided before the property division is resolved.

Clark v. Pomponio · filed 2008-01-28(b)(10)

When fixing final alimony awards, the equitable distribution of property must be considered. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(10). Thus, a final decision on alimony cannot be made independently of the equitable distribution award. As a result, when faced with a bankruptcy stay, a trial court is unable to make a final decision on alimony claims, and hence final resolution of those claims must also be stayed.

Section 2A:34-23(c) allows modification of the amount of limited duration alimony upon changed circumstances, but extending its term requires unusual circumstances; diminished earning capacity alone does not meet that standard.

Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli · filed 2009-11-09(c)

On this score, we do not view defendant's changed circumstances as any more unusual than the ordinary case of diminished earnings capacity. While that fact might well meet the Lepis standard to warrant a reduction in the quantum of alimony, we find it falls short of the heightened statutory standard required to expand its durational term.

Section 2A:34-23(c) permits limited duration alimony when permanent alimony is unwarranted; a supporting spouse’s high income affects the term and amount of the award but does not itself require permanent alimony.

Jev v. Kv · filed 2012-06-21(c)

Judge Jacobson also properly rejected the implicit, if not explicit, argument that the magnitude of plaintiff's earnings during the last three years of the marriage that funded an affluent lifestyle requires an award of permanent alimony. The trial judge properly decided that plaintiff's ability to earn a handsome income was a consideration only as to the term and the amount of the limited duration alimony award.

A beneficiary’s interest in a discretionary trust is not an asset held by her for alimony purposes when she cannot compel distributions, so the trust’s income cannot be imputed to her.

Tannen v. Tannen · filed 2010-08-31(b)(11)

We conclude that under the existing law of this state, defendant's beneficial interest in the WTT was not an "asset[ ] held by" her. It was, therefore, improper to impute income from the WTT to defendant in determining plaintiff's alimony obligation.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires courts setting alimony to consider regular marital savings as part of the marital lifestyle, even when savings are unnecessary to protect future support.

Lombardi v. Lombardi · filed 2016-09-12(b)

We disagree with the court's decision and hold that regular savings must be considered in a determination of alimony, even when there is no need to create savings to protect the future payment of alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(b) requires a court deciding alimony to assess evidence on all relevant statutory factors.

DATTOLI VS. SCOTT A. DATTOLI(FM-16-1428-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-09(b)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) requires the trial court to consider fourteen factors in making an award of alimony, specifically stating "[i]n each case where the court is asked to make an award of alimony, the court shall consider and assess evidence with respect to all relevant statutory factors."

Section 2A:34-23(b)(13) directs courts setting alimony to consider the nature, amount, and length of support paid while the divorce is pending.

CATCHPOLE VS. HUI ZHANG (FM-07-1130-12, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-08-09(b)(13)

We find no error in the court having considered that Catchpole had already paid pendente lite support for three and a half years in setting alimony in this five-and-a-half-year marriage. Zhang does not dispute that the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, L. 2014, c. 42, § 1, apply here. The 2014 amendments added a new factor for courts to consider in fashioning an alimony award, "[t]he nature, amount, and length of pendente lite support paid." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b(13).

Section 2A:34-23 requires courts to consider pendente lite support when setting alimony, but does not require reducing the alimony term by the time that support was paid.

K.C. VS. D.C. (FM-13-1782-11, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2017-09-29(b)

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 does not require the length of an alimony period to be reduced by the number of years the paying party has paid pendente lite support, and instead states only that the payment of pendente lite support must be "consider[ed]" when making decisions as to alimony.

Section 2A:34-23(b)(13) requires the court to consider pendente lite support already paid when calculating limited duration alimony.

D.C. VS. J.C. (FM-14-1272-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2019-02-07(b)(13)

The judge considered the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(13) by explaining in her decision that pendente lite support paid had to be considered before calculating the limited duration alimony prior to the DFJD. ... Judge Nergaard's analysis was based on the applicable statutory factors and the evidence presented by the parties.