N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3

Section 34:19-3(a) requires an employee’s belief that illegal activity occurred to have an objective basis in fact, which may be circumstantial.

Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1989-03-30(a)

Although the “reasonable belief” requirement must take into account that most plaintiffs are unschooled in the law and, furthermore, that exigencies of the circumstances usually bar the employee from further investigation, plaintiff’s belief cannot be without any objective basis — whether circumstantial or direct.

Section 34:19-3(c) does not require an employee to prove that the employer actually broke the law when alleging retaliation for refusing to participate in conduct the employee believed was illegal.

SAFONOF v. DIRECTSAT USA · filed 2020-12-03(c)

Plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that illegal activity occurred; he simply must show that he believed the conduct to be illegal. He has done that in the Amended Complaint.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires an objectively reasonable belief that the practice an employee objects to violates law or contravenes a clear mandate of public policy.

Houston v. Township of Randolph · filed 2013-03-21(c)(1), (c)(3)

This claim fails because Houston has not raised a triable issue that he had an objectively reasonable belief that Chief McAndrew’s RIC deployment practice violated a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or contravened a clear mandate of public policy.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires an objectively reasonable belief of employer wrongdoing; disagreement with a patent-filing objective alone cannot sustain a claim.

TRZASKA v. L'OREAL USA, INC. · filed 2020-10-23(c)

Important here, Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with Defendants’ desire to file a specific number of patent applications per year—irrespective of whether that objective is characterized as a “quota,” “target,” or “goal”—cannot, without more, sustain a CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3(c)(1) protects an employee who objects to a practice they reasonably believe is unlawful; the employee need not prove an actual violation.

Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden · filed 2016-11-17(c)(1)

They need not prove an actual illegality.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires facts supporting an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct violates a law or public policy; dissatisfaction with a teaching assignment alone does not suffice.

Cuff v. Camden City School District · filed 2019-12-05(c)

We agree with the District Court that Dr. Cuff does not allege any facts showing that she reasonably believed that the defendants committed a crime in reassigning her to a shared classroom to teach a subject in which she did not specialize. Dr. Cuff’s complaint does not allege that she voiced concerns to her superiors about what she believed was James’s criminal behavior. Rather, Dr. Cuff’s expressions of opposition to James’s reassignments and to the withholding of textbooks revolved around her opinion that she was overqualified for a shared classroom and was not teaching her preferred subjects. Dr. Cuff cannot sustain a CEPA claim on this basis.

Section 34:19-3(a)(1) requires evidence substantially connecting the conduct an employee reports to an identified law, rule, regulation, or public policy; increased project costs alone do not establish that connection.

DAHROUG v. CHICAGO BRIDGE AND IRON COMPANY · filed 2022-06-21(a)(1)

Here, neither Plaintiff’s testimony nor the CSRs establish a substantial nexus between Defendants’ conduct and a violation of law, rule, or policy, let alone the laws that Plaintiff cites.

Section 34:19-3 requires facts supporting a reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct violated a law or public policy or was criminal or fraudulent.

LEE v. ELECTRIFAI, LLC · filed 2024-09-13(a)(1), (a)(2), (c)(1), (c)(2)

Here, because Plaintiff appears to raise claims under Sections (a)(1) and (c)(1), and (a)(2) and (c)(2), the Court will address each pair of provisions separately. With respect to each set of provisions, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first element of a CEPA claim – namely, her reasonable belief that Defendants’ actions violated a law or public policy, or that they were criminal or fraudulent.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a CEPA retaliation plaintiff to plead facts supporting a reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct violated a law or clear public policy closely related to that conduct.

AVETZUK v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION · filed 2025-02-20(c)

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to adequately identify a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy that bears a “substantial nexus” to his claim.

A CEPA claimant need not prove an actual violation of law; a reasonable belief in a violation is sufficient.

BERNDT v. HEYCO PRODUCTS CORPORATION · filed 2025-06-17(c)

Therefore, Plaintiff is not required to show an actual violation of law.

A claim under subsection (a) based on a threatened disclosure requires evidence supporting the employee’s reasonable belief that the employer engaged in illegal activity.

Catalane v. Gilian Instrument · filed 1994-03-09(a)

The record will not support a finding that plaintiff reasonably believed that Gilian was engaged in illegal activity. There is no evidence that plaintiff suspected or was aware of any illegal acts committed by Gilian. No evidence was presented at trial to provide any basis for plaintiff's alleged "threats." Therefore, it was error for the trial judge to submit this claim to the jury.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct threatens the public and likely conflicts with a recognized source of public policy; the employee need not know the precise source.

Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1998-03-26(c)(3)

In our view, the sensible meaning of CEPA is that the objecting employee must have an objectively reasonable belief, at the time of objection or refusal to participate in the employer's offensive activity, that such activity is either illegal, fraudulent or harmful to the public health, safety or welfare, and that there is a substantial likelihood that the questioned activity is incompatible with a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, code of ethics, or other recognized source of public policy. Specific knowledge of the precise source of public policy is not required.

Section 34:19-3(c)(1) protects an employee who refuses an order based on a reasonable belief that obeying it would violate a law or regulation.

Delran Ed. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. · filed 1994-12-06(c)(1)

The new N.J.A.C. 6:3-6.5(c)5 demonstrates that more specific definitions of the agencies to whom access to pupil records may be given was necessary because the prior regulation, in effect at the time of Johnson's order to Roth, was either unclear or not sufficiently comprehensive. The arbitrator could find that either deficiency led Roth to believe reasonably that to obey Johnson's order would be a violation of the law.

Section 34:19-3 protects an employee who complains about workplace conditions based on a reasonable belief that they conflict with a clear mandate of public policy concerning health or safety.

Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Board of Education · filed 1994-12-22(c)(3)

In addition, the record supports the finding that plaintiffs complaints were, as required under CEPA, based on a reasonable belief that the conditions in the metal shop were in violation of an administrative “regulation promulgated pursuant to law” and were contrary to “a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.”

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires the employee to reasonably believe that the employer's conduct violates a clear mandate of public policy.

Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1996-06-13(c)(3)

CEPA mandates only that the employee reasonably believe that a violation of public policy has occurred, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3a and 34:19-3c.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects an employee who reasonably believes the conduct they oppose falls within the statute; the employee need not prove an actual violation.

Gerard v. CAMDEN COUNTY HEALTH SERV. CENTER · filed 2002-03-06(c)

To be sure, there must be some identifiable law, rule, public policy or fraudulent or criminal activity to which a plaintiff is "whistle blowing", but a CEPA plaintiff need not prove an actual violation thereof.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires facts supporting an objectively reasonable belief that a law or clear mandate of public policy was violated; an actual violation is unnecessary.

Dzwonar v. McDevitt · filed 2003-08-12(c)

We therefore conclude that N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c does not require a plaintiff to show that a law, rule, regulation or clear mandate of public policy actually would be violated if all the facts he or she alleges are true. Instead, a plaintiff must set forth facts that would support an objectively reasonable belief that a violation has occurred.

Whether an employee’s complaints are reasonable under § 34:19-3(c)(3) is a question of fact for the jury.

No. 04-2600 · filed 2005-08-26(c)(3)

However, the District Court overstepped its bounds by deciding for itself whether the complaints were "trivial" or "reasonable." This is an issue of fact that has been specifically reserved for the jury under New Jersey case law.

Under § 34:19-3(c)(3), whether an employee’s complaints were reasonable is a question for the jury.

Caver v. City of Trenton · filed 2005-08-26(c)(3)

However, the District Court overstepped its bounds by deciding for itself whether the complaints were “trivial” or “reasonable.” This is an issue of fact that has been specifically reserved for the jury under New Jersey case law.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct violates or is incompatible with a law or clear mandate of public policy; an actual violation is unnecessary.

Maimone v. City of Atlantic City · filed 2006-07-20(c)(3)

To prevail on a CEPA claim under 3c(3), plaintiff is not required to show that defendants' alleged policy decision to cease enforcement of the provisions of the Code prohibiting the promotion of prostitution and restricting the location of sexually-oriented businesses actually violated or was incompatible with a statute, rule or other clear mandate of public policy. ... Plaintiff only has to show that he had an "objectively reasonable belief" in the existence of such a violation or incompatibility.

An employee objecting to suspected illegal conduct must have an objectively reasonable belief grounded in an existing law, regulation, or policy; the employee need not prove an actual violation.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHINUA S. ANDERSON(11-10-1720, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-08(c)

The objectively reasonable belief of illegal conduct must be grounded upon a law, regulation, or policy. A plaintiff does not ultimately need to be correct to prove the conduct was illegal, only show his or her belief was reasonably based upon an existing law or regulation.

An employee’s reasonable belief that a supervisor submitted a subordinate’s work as her own can satisfy CEPA’s fraudulent activity requirement, regardless of how the employee described the conduct.

HERBE VS. RUTGERS UNIVERISTY, ETC. (L-1191-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-29(a)(2)

Under these circumstances, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to determine whether it was reasonable for plaintiff to believe Rosenberg and Druist had engaged in a fraudulent act regardless of the nomenclature used to describe it.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires an employee to actually believe the objected-to conduct violates law or public policy; the reasonableness of that belief is judged objectively.

CZUKERBERG VS. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ETC. (L-8847-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-03-26(c)

Although the reasonableness of a plaintiff's belief in a CEPA case is an objective standard, the underlying belief itself is one that the plaintiff must have subjectively held.

Section 34:19-3 requires an employee to reasonably believe the reported conduct violates a law; the employee need not prove an actual violation.

ANDERSON v. CITY OF EAST ORANGE (L-7691-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-03-15

To satisfy CEPA's first prong, a plaintiff does not need to establish his or her employer or other employee "actually violated" a law but instead must demonstrate his or her own reasonable belief that a law was violated.

Section 34:19-3 protects whistleblowing based on an objectively reasonable belief that the employer's conduct violates the law.

MIN AMY GUO v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION (L-1486-14, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-25

The trial judge correctly concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that plaintiff's belief had been objectively reasonable.

Section 34:19-3(a) and (c) require an employee to have a reasonable belief that the reported or objected-to conduct violates a law, regulation, or applicable public policy; proof of an actual violation is unnecessary.

Hussain v. Allies, Inc. · filed 2025-04-21(a), (c)

We conclude plaintiff's complaint has sufficiently pled that she held a reasonable belief defendants were "violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy" to satisfy prong one of CEPA based on her belief defendants had violated then-current N.J.A.C. 10:44A-2.7(a).

Section 34:19-3(a)(2) protects an employee's disclosure of suspected criminal conduct only when the employee's belief that a crime occurred is objectively reasonable.

Forty v. Inspira Health Network/nancy Karnuk v. Inspira Health Network/rachel Jenkins v. Inspira Health Network · filed 2025-06-17(a)(2)

Because Forty cannot prove he had an objectively reasonable belief Conicello violated the criminal harassment statute, he also cannot prove he engaged in whistleblowing.

Section 34:19-3 allows a retaliation claim to proceed when pleaded facts support an objectively reasonable belief that the reported conduct violated HIPAA or its regulations.

Granados v. Pan American Life Insurance Co. · filed 2026-04-30

Finally, plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleges that she held a reasonable objective belief defendants were "violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy" to satisfy the first prong of a prima facie claim under CEPA, in light of her allegations that defendants had violated HIPAA and its related federal regulations.

Section 34:19-3 does not require the reported activity to actually violate a law or regulation if the employee reasonably believes it does.

Ham v. Novartis International Ag · filed 2026-05-07

In determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pleading, CEPA does not require that the activity complained of actually violates a law or regulation, only that the employee has a reasonable belief that such is the case.

Evidence supporting an employee’s reasonable belief that the employer violated labor laws is relevant to a CEPA retaliation claim; a court must weigh its probative value before excluding it as unduly prejudicial.

GREENFELD VS. B.C.T. IMPORTS, INC., D/B/A TOYOTA UNIVERSE, INC. (L-1826-13, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-25(c)(1)

The audit file was clearly prejudicial as it ... supported plaintiff's claim that she had a reasonable belief that Toyota Universe was violating labor laws or regulations, but without weighing the audit file's probative value against its prejudicial effect, the trial judge mistakenly exercised his discretion in excluding it based solely on its prejudicial nature.

A fraud-related retaliation claim under § 34:19-3(a)(2) requires alleged conduct that bears some resemblance to fraud, including some form of misrepresentation.

Daniels, C. v. Atlantic Comm Bank · filed 2019-09-10(a)(2)

They, however, must allege conduct which bears ... some resemblance to fraud, which under any definition—even a lay definition—would require some sort of misrepresentation.

Section 34:19-3 requires a substantial nexus between the complained-of conduct and an identified law or clear mandate of public policy.

PASKAS v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1), (c)(1), (c)(3)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately identify a identify a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy that bears a “substantial nexus” to his claim.

ERISA does not preempt a § 34:19-3 whistleblower claim arising from objections to an employer’s policies for an investment fund in which ERISA plans invest.

Jorgensen v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1994-04-29

Thus, applying the analysis set forth in United Wire, I conclude that ERISA does not preempt plaintiffs cause of action under CEPA. CEPA is a statute of general application which does not single out benefit plans for special treatment and which does not confer rights predicated upon the existence of such plans. Its effects in the present case in no way dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans with respect to their benefits, structure, reporting, and administration.

A retaliation claim under § 34:19-3 is not subject to the Tort Claims Act's notice-of-claim requirement.

Brennan v. Norton · filed 2003-12-05

Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the notice of claim requirement of the TCA applies to claims under the CEPA, our examination of relevant precedent convinces us that the TCA's notice of claim requirement does not apply to actions brought under the CEPA.

Section 34:19-3(a) does not require a pension plan for liability, so ERISA does not preempt a retaliation claim based on reporting non-ERISA violations merely because retirement benefits are involved.

Ryan v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority · filed 1994-03-31(a)

Since the existence of a pension plan is not required for liability under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, the Court finds that the Conscientious Employee Protection Act is not preempted by ERISA.

A retaliation claim under § 34:19-3 based on reporting a pilot’s safety qualifications is not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act when the report has only a remote connection to air carrier services.

Gary v. Air Grp Inc · filed 2005-02-03

We hold Gary’s claim is not expressly preempted by the ADA because its connection to The Air Group’s “service of an air carrier”, actual or potential, is simply too remote and too attenuated to fall within the scope of the ADA, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).

A retaliation claim under § 34:19-3 is preempted by federal labor law when resolving it requires interpreting seniority rights in a collective bargaining agreement.

Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc. · filed 2014-10-10

Following our review, we cannot accede to plaintiff's request to allow the CEPA claim to proceed. Judge McMaster fully analyzed the facts and law applicable to this issue, and properly determined plaintiff's complaint contained allegations inextricably intertwined with his rights delineated in the CBA. Therefore, the claims were properly held preempted by federal law.

Section 34:19-3 permits employees to complain to any public body about a broad range of wrongdoing; those protections cannot be applied to Federal Reserve Banks because of conflict preemption.

Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank · filed 2006-08-03

By contrast, CEPA permits an employee to complain to any public body, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3 (West 2006), about virtually any topic, even those within the employee’s own control.

A CEPA retaliation claim must allege a causal connection between whistleblowing activity and an adverse employment action; alleging both events alone is insufficient.

FIDAN v. MARBA PRODUCT, LLC · filed 2025-09-03

Plaintiff effectively asks the Court to conclude a causal connection exists simply from her allegations of whistle-blowing activity and an adverse employment action, which the Court cannot do.

Section 34:19-3 retaliation claims use the burden-shifting analysis applied to federal discrimination claims involving pretext.

Blackburn v. United Parcel Service, Inc. Patricia Knowles · filed 1999-06-07

In addition to the prima facie case, the well-established burden-shifting analysis that is used in federal discrimination cases involving “pretext” claims is appropriately used in a CEPA case.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a causal link between an employee’s protected refusal and the employer’s adverse action; a factual dispute about the supervisor’s knowledge can preclude summary judgment for the employee.

Worbetz v. Ward North America, Inc. · filed 2002-12-05(c)

This reading of CEPA is contrary to the express terms of the statute, which forbids an employer from taking retaliatory action against an employee “because” he engages in one of the specified acts.

Section 34:19-3 requires a causal link between protected activity and discharge for a retaliatory discharge claim.

Thomas v. Town of Hammonton · filed 2003-12-04

A cause of action for retaliatory discharge under both the LAD and CEPA requires the showing of a causal link between the protected activity and the discharge. These claims accordingly fail for the same reason that Thomas's federal, free expression claim fails.

Section 34:19-3 requires facts connecting protected whistleblowing to an adverse employment action; close timing alone may be insufficient when the allegations support a nonretaliatory explanation.

HENSON v. DAIMLER TRUCK NORTH AMERICA LLC · filed 2023-04-25

Because the allegations here support a non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse action taken against Plaintiff, we conclude that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to meet the final element of his CEPA claim.

A CEPA retaliation claim fails when the employee offers no evidence of retaliatory motive or that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for retaliation.

Estate of Oliva Ex Rel. McHugh v. New Jersey · filed 2010-05-04(c)(1)

Therefore, Oliva’s failure either to put forth evidence that a desire to retaliate against him for his complaints about racial profiling motivated Appellees or that their stated reasons for their actions were a pretext for retaliation dooms Oliva’s CEPA claims.

Section 34:19-3 retains the retaliatory-discharge claim’s proof burdens: the employee establishes that reporting a violation of law caused the firing, and the employer must show another, non-pretextual reason.

Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. · filed 1991-08-01

In LePore, the Appellate Division outlined the premises of a common-law retaliatory-discharge claim, noting that "the trial would simply consist of plaintiff's establishing that he was in fact fired for [reporting a violation of the law] and [the employer] would then have to demonstrate he was fired for another, non-pretextual reason." 224 N.J. Super. at 473, 540 A. 2d 1296. Those burdens are no different now that the cause of action has been codified. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 236 N.J. Super. 451, 460, 566 A. 2d 215 (App.Div. 1989); N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.

A claim under § 34:19-3 requires a causal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment decision.

Fioriglio v. City of Atlantic City · filed 1998-03-05

Although we disagree with defendant Brenner’s arguments that plaintiff’s campaign comments against the Mayor were not made to a public body and therefore do not come within the protection of CEPA, we agree with the defendants that plaintiff has failed to show that the adverse employment action he suffered was causally connected to his campaign comments.

Section 34:19-3(a) requires the employee to show that retaliation was a motivating factor in the firing; it need not have been the only factor.

Donofry v. AUTONOTE SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2001-09-27(a)

While in many cases there will be little difference, we decline to require that the trial judge find any more than that retaliation was a motivating factor.

Section 34:19-3 requires a causal connection between protected activity and retaliatory conduct; temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish causation.

Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn · filed 2002-02-05

Plaintiffs also fail to establish a factual nexus between their protected activity under CEPA and the alleged retaliatory conduct. Temporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation.

Section 34:19-3 requires a causal connection between protected whistleblowing and an adverse employment action.

Espinosa v. County of Union · filed 2007-01-09

Because Espinosa did not produce sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between his expression and his termination, we find he failed to establish an essential element of his case.

CEPA retaliation requires a causal connection; temporal proximity alone did not establish causation where the employee testified between July and October and faced adverse action in December.

Smith v. Township of East Greenwich · filed 2007-10-30

While Smith contends that the temporal proximity establishes a causal connection, this is not the sole factor to consider in determining causation. ... Smith testified at some point between July and October, 2004. The adverse employment action occurred in December, 2004. This, alone, is insufficient to establish causation.

Section 34:19-3(c)(1) requires a causal connection between an employee’s protected objection and an adverse employment action; complaints that are too minor or too remote from termination may fail that requirement as a matter of law.

Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine · filed 2007-12-12(c)(1)

When we view these incidents, they are either too minor or too far- removed from the date of termination for there to be, as a matter of law, a causal connection between the “whistleblowing” activity and the termination.

A CEPA retaliation claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer's stated reasons for termination were a pretext for retaliation.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. FRANKLIN D. NICOLOUDAKIS(07-08-0842, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-29

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer's reasons for terminating her were not true or that they were merely an excuse to retaliate against her.

Once an employee presents a prima facie CEPA wrongful termination claim, the employer must produce evidence of a legitimate reason for the discharge.

JOHN P. MCGOVERN VS. CITY OF ORANGE (L-1596-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-07-21

However, where the plaintiff asserts a claim of wrongful termination under CEPA, and the plaintiff presents a prima facie case under CEPA, the defendant has the burden of coming forward with evidence showing that it discharged the plaintiff for a legitimate reason.

A retaliation claim under § 34:19-3(c) requires evidence connecting the employee's protected objection to the adverse employment action.

TROOPER BRETT BLOOM, ETC. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-542-12, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-08-02(c)

In short, there were no genuinely disputed issues of fact establishing a causal connection between the 2007 incident and Bloom's 2011 transfer, and, as the motion judge observed, defendants' articulated reasons for Bloom's transfer were "unassailable."

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a causal connection between whistleblowing and retaliation.

KELLY VS. JAMES SIMPSON (L-0667-14, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-04(c)

However, a causal connection between the whistleblowing activity and the retaliation is required. ... Further, as Judge Hurd found, the record does not support a causal connection between the alleged whistleblowing and plaintiff's termination.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the employer terminated an employee in retaliation for protected whistleblowing.

MCCAW VS. VERNON TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-0113-13, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-07-25(c)

Based on our review of the record, we are convinced the court correctly determined plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude defendants terminated plaintiff's employment in retaliation for plaintiff's filing of the 2007 PEOSHA complaint.

A CEPA claimant must be able to perform the essential functions of the job; a termination caused by inability to perform them lacks the required causal connection to whistle-blowing.

JERRY DEAN RIVERA VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-0946-16, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-28(c)

Such a requirement indeed appears to be implicit in the fourth prima facie element, because there would be no causal connection between a termination and whistle-blowing if a plaintiff were terminated because he or she could not perform the essential functions of the position.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires evidence of a causal connection between protected whistleblowing and the adverse employment action.

OLIVA VS. SAINT JOSEPH'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER (L-9920-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-16

Here, plaintiff's claim fails because she had no evidence to support the fourth prong needed to establish a prima facie case under CEPA.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires a causal connection between whistleblowing activity and an adverse employment action.

BYRUM VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (L-0586-13, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-22

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that her termination was causally connected to her 2011 whistleblowing activity of reporting a medical error.

Section 34:19-3 requires a causal connection between protected whistleblowing and an adverse employment action.

TIMOTHY G. COOK VS. BALLY'S PARK PLACE, INC., ETC. (L-5339-12, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-03

Nonetheless, to prevail on a retaliatory discharge claim under CEPA, a causal connection between the whistleblowing activity and retaliation must be established. ... As the motion judge properly found, there was no competent evidence to prove Bally's was improperly motivated by a retaliatory desire to terminate plaintiff for reporting a mini-baccarat scam a year prior to his termination.

When an employer offers a legitimate reason for an adverse action, a CEPA retaliation plaintiff must raise a genuine factual dispute about pretext or whether retaliation was more likely than not a determinative factor.

ALLEN VS. CAPE MAY COUNTY (L-0131-15, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-17

If a legitimate reason is proffered, the "plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the employer's proffered explanation is pretextual or whether, the 'retaliatory discrimination was more likely than not a determinative factor in the decision.'" Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 479 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255, 262 (D.N.J. 1998)).

Section 34:19-3 requires a causal connection between an employee’s whistleblowing and an adverse employment action.

MARTONE v. JET AVIATION FLIGHT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2020-07-13

Here, Martone does not meet her burden to establish a prima facie case because she fails to demonstrate a causal connection between her whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.

A gap of more than two years between protected activity and an adverse employment action, without more, does not establish causation under CEPA.

DILLARD v. MORRIS COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE · filed 2020-08-24

The only timely alleged adverse action, however, occurred more than two years later in October 2019, when King was suspended without pay. These events, without more, are too temporally distant to support a finding of causation.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires competent evidence of a causal connection between protected whistleblowing and an adverse employment action.

ARMANDO RIOS, JR. VS. MEDA PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. (L-0763-17, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-01(c)

Here, while plaintiff may have reasonably believed Meda was violating the Sunshine Act; the meeting with Holley was a whistle-blowing activity; and he was terminated, there is no competent evidence in the record to support a causal relationship.

Section 34:19-3 requires a causal link between whistleblowing and an adverse employment action; a genuine factual dispute about that link defeats summary judgment.

WILLIAMS v. TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD · filed 2020-12-09

Applying those principles, Plaintiff must raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to each element of a CEPA claim; namely, that (1) she reasonably believed Lakewood discriminated against her and other Latinas; (2) she performed a “whistle-blowing” activity; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. ... Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the causal link between Plaintiff’s EEOC charge and her termination, summary judgment is denied as to Count XIII.

A claim under subsection (c) requires prima facie evidence of a causal connection between protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Allen v. Cape May County (083295) (Cape May County & Statewide) · filed 2021-05-12(c)

The trial court should decide whether plaintiff has presented prima facie evidence of a causal nexus between any CEPA-protected activity, as defined by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c), and the County’s decision not to reappoint her.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a causal connection between protected whistleblowing and an adverse employment action.

ANNE K. BROWN VS. REGINA FOLEY (L-7442-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-20(c)

We reject plaintiff's claims that defendants purported retaliatory conduct leading up to, and after her termination was causally related to her CEPA allegations.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires a causal connection between protected whistleblowing and an adverse employment action; a long gap without other supporting evidence may fail to establish that connection.

LAWANDA KITCHEN VS. SPRINGPOINT SENIOR LIVING (L-5826-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-09-28

This lack of temporal proximity militates strongly against inferring retaliatory action. In sum, Kitchen has not satisfied the fourth prong of the prima facie case for retaliation under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 permits a retaliation claim to proceed when disputed evidence supports an inference that protected whistle-blowing caused the employee’s termination.

GATHMAN v. CARE ONE MANAGEMENT, LLC (L-5015-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-02-22

Due to genuine issues of material facts, the court should not have made credibility assessments of the proffered facts and applied those findings more favorably to defendants to find that Gathman did not establish a prima facie CEPA claim of retaliation.

A jury may decide whether a causal connection exists between alleged retaliation and conduct protected by CEPA.

BENNETT VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-1774-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-20

Asking the jury here whether a causal connection existed between the alleged retaliation and conduct protected under the LAD or CEPA was not a legal error.

Section 34:19-3(c) applies a burden-shifting framework: after an employee establishes a prima facie retaliation claim, the employer must give a legitimate reason for the adverse action, and the employee must show that retaliation was the actual reason.

SOSINAVAGE v. THOMSON · filed 2022-11-02(c)

Therefore, once the employee establishes a prima facie retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action and, if such a reason is provided, the burden shifts once more to the employee to show that the actual reason for the adverse action was retaliation.

A retaliation claim under § 34:19-3(c)(3) requires evidence connecting the employee’s protected objection to the decision to terminate employment.

Ugarte v. Barnabas Health Medical Group Pc · filed 2024-02-16(c)(3)

Even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case sufficient to create a fact question as to whether Salese's recommendation to transfer plaintiff was motivated by retaliatory animus, her claim would still fail because there is no evidence to suggest that the decisionmakers based their decision to fire plaintiff on Salese's recommendation rather than their investigation into the altercation.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires a causal connection between whistleblowing and an adverse employment action; when the employer offers a legitimate reason for its action, the employee must show that reason was a pretext.

Bohnyak v. Town of Westfield · filed 2024-05-06

We observe it is Bohnyak's burden to demonstrate defendants' proffered reason was a pretext. Accepting all reasonable inferences in favor of Bohnyak, the record amply supports the judge's conclusion that he failed to factually dispute defendants' nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions was not in violation of CEPA. Thus, summary judgment on his CEPA claim was appropriate.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires evidence connecting the employee’s whistleblowing to the adverse employment action.

Costello v. Myron Corp. · filed 2025-06-26(a)

Absent from the record is any evidence that establishes a causal link between the 2018 objections and defendants' decision to terminate plaintiff in November 2020.

Section 34:19-3 requires competent evidence connecting an employee’s whistleblowing activity to an adverse employment action; speculation alone is insufficient.

Montgomery v. Atlantic City Electric Company · filed 2026-01-13

Because plaintiff failed to present competent evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude his termination was causally related to his whistle-blowing activity, his CEPA claim was properly dismissed.

Section 34:19-3(a) requires a causal connection between an employee’s whistleblowing and the alleged retaliatory employment action.

Coe v. Trenton Board of Education · filed 2025-05-20(a)

Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that there was a causal connection between his alleged whistleblowing activities and his failure to be made a vice principal in June 2018.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires evidence connecting whistleblowing activity to the adverse employment action; a long delay increases the need for other evidence of causation.

Warnet v. Borough of Bergenfield · filed 2025-08-22

The absence of temporal proximity undermines plaintiff's claim of retaliation and heightens his obligation to identify evidence of a causal connection between the two events.

A CEPA retaliation claim fails when the employee offers no competent evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Harrington v. Garden State Nissan, Inc. · filed 2026-04-24

Moreover, even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie CEPA claim, defendants articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Because plaintiff failed to set forth any competent evidence to demonstrate the proffered non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual, her CEPA claim was properly dismissed.

Section 34:19-3 protects an employee from retaliation for disclosing an employer act the employee reasonably believes violates state or federal law.

Palladino Ex Rel. US v. VNA OF SOUTHERN NJ · filed 1999-06-30

To initiate a claim under CEPA, an employee only needs to prove that her employer retaliated against her for disclosing an act of the employer that the employee reasonably believes violates a state or federal law. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3 (West 1999).

Section 34:19-3 requires an employee to prove retaliation for disclosing employer conduct the employee reasonably believes violates state or federal law.

Palladino ex rel. United States v. VNA of Southern New Jersey, Inc. · filed 1999-06-30

To initiate a claim under CEPA, an employee only needs to prove that her employer retaliated against her for disclosing an act of the employer that the employee reasonably believes violates a state or federal law.

A prima facie claim for retaliation under § 34:19-3 requires protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between them.

Bowles v. City of Camden · filed 1998-02-02

In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under Title VII, and therefore-CEPA, Bowles must show “1) that [he] engaged in protected activity, 2) that [his] employer [Mayor Webster and the City of Camden] took adverse action against [him], and 3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and employer’s action.”

Section 34:19-3 requires an employee claiming retaliation to show that the employer retaliated for disclosing conduct the employee reasonably believed violated state or federal law.

Espinosa v. Continental Airlines · filed 2000-01-14

To establish a CEPA claim, an employee must show that the employer retaliated against him for disclosing an act of the employer that the employee reasonably believes violates a state or federal law.

Section 34:19-3 remedies unlawful retaliation against employees, rather than discrimination based on protected status.

Littman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter · filed 2001-02-14

While we have "recognize[d] that CEPA, similar to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, is a civil rights statute," Zappasodi v. State, 335 N.J.Super. 83, 89, 761 A. 2d 96 (App.Div.2000), [8] CEPA embodies a remedy based on unlawful retaliation against any employee, as opposed to one designed to protect against a discriminated class.

Section 34:19-3 requires the court to determine whether the alleged conduct could violate a law or public policy, and whether evidence connects that conduct to the alleged retaliation, before submitting the claim to a jury.

McLelland v. Moore · filed 2001-09-04(a), (c)

Once the plaintiff provides the court with some basis in the proofs to establish the existence of a violation of law or public policy and of a connection between the asserted retaliatory conduct and the violation, it is the court's duty to determine whether the matter should go to the jury, i.e., whether the violation of law or public policy alleged is real and whether there is evidence to support the connection.

For a § 34:19-3(a) claim based on disclosure to a public body, the employee must show that disclosure or a threat to disclose, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection.

Crane v. Yurick · filed 2003-10-28(a)

A Plaintiff must show: (1) that he disclosed or threatened to disclose the disputed activity to a public body; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the two. ... Triable issues of fact remain, particularly as to the third element of the test, and we deny Defendants’ summary judgment motion on this issue.

Section 34:19-3 supports a retaliation claim when an employee reasonably believes the employer's conduct violates law or public policy, engages in protected whistleblowing, suffers an adverse employment action, and shows a causal connection.

Aguerre v. Schering-Plough Corp. · filed 2007-05-25(a), (c)

To establish a prima facie claim under CEPA, a plaintiff must show: (1) a reasonable belief that the employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, regulation or public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle blowing" activity as described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection existed between his whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.

Section 34:19-3 permits a retaliation claim when the alleged facts support a reasonable belief of unlawful working conditions, whistleblowing activity, adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

Matthews v. New Jersey Institute of Technology · filed 2010-06-15

The facts alleged are sufficient to state a CEPA claim. Accordingly, Matthews’ Motion will be granted as to the CEPA claim.

Whistleblowing established in an earlier successful CEPA action may satisfy part of a later retaliation claim against the same employer.

DANIELE VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-0807-12, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (L-10204-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWID · filed 2017-10-17

We see no prohibition under CEPA why that earlier established claim could not satisfy a portion of the prima facie requirements under CEPA for the 2012 complaint.

Section 34:19-3(a) requires a retaliation claimant to show a reasonable belief that the employer violated the law, an objection to that conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the objection and the action.

DURHAM v. CAPITAL ACADEMY · filed 2020-01-31(a)

To prevail on a claim under the relevant provision of CEPA (N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)), a plaintiff must establish that (1) she reasonably believed that her employer’s conduct was violating the law (or a “rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law”); (2) she objected to the conduct; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against her; and (4) a “causal connection exists between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.”

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a plaintiff to show protected whistleblowing, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them, along with a reasonable belief that the employer's conduct violated a law, rule, regulation, or public policy mandate.

PALMER VS. EMPLOYMENT HORIZONS, INC. (L-0358-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-12(c)

To establish a prima facie CEPA claim under this subsection, plaintiff must establish she: (1) reasonably believed defendant's conduct was in violation of a law, rule, regulation, or public policy mandate; (2) performed a whistle-blowing activity identified in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action; (4) which was causally connected to the whistle-blowing activity.

Section 34:19-3(a) permits a retaliation claim to proceed when an employee alleges that he reported unsafe workplace conditions and suffered adverse employment actions as a result.

MORALES v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2023-08-03(a)

Such allegations are sufficient to state a CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3 requires a CEPA claimant to show a reasonable belief that the employer violated a law or clear public policy, protected whistleblowing, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

Olsen v. Zaman Pizza Inc · filed 2024-02-22

A plaintiff bringing a CEPA claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-34 must establish (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a 'whistle-blowing' activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19- 3[]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.

Section 34:19-3 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for protected whistleblowing.

Fulmore v. City of Englewood · filed 2024-08-30

CEPA prohibits an employer from taking "any retaliatory action against an employee" in certain circumstances.

Section 34:19-3 requires a CEPA plaintiff to show a reasonable belief that the employer violated a law or clear mandate of public policy and a causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action.

Bezer v. City of Jersey City · filed 2024-08-23

Bezer, however, did not satisfy the first and fourth requisite elements to establish a CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3(c)(1) requires a reasonable belief that the employer violated a law or rule, a protected objection or refusal, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between the protected activity and that action.

DAVIS v. BENIHANA, INC. · filed 2025-02-20(c)(1)

So, to state a claim under CEPA, the plaintiff must show: that (1) he reasonably believed defendants were violating a law, rule, or public policy; (2) he performed a whistleblowing activity, including objecting to or refusing to participate in, the violation of the identified law, rule, or public policy; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him; and (4) a causal relationship exists between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.

A plaintiff must establish a prima facie claim under the applicable subsection of § 34:19-3 before the burden shifts to the employer.

Willis v. the Housing Authority of the City of Camden · filed 2025-11-19

Plaintiffs are required to satisfy their initial burden of establishing a prima facie claim before shifting the burden to defendants. Moreover, plaintiff has not specified the subsection of CEPA her claim is premised upon, which is integral in determining whether she has engaged in "CEPA-protected conduct" necessary for a prima facie case.

Fraud-based CEPA claims must plead with particularity the facts the employee reasonably believed constituted fraud.

MUNENZON v. PETERS ADVISORS LLC · filed 2021-08-11(a)(2), (c)(2)

Whether or not the employer’s actions turned out to meet the legal definition of fraud, a plaintiff may and must still describe the particular facts he reasonably believed constituted fraud. And under Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard, such facts must be alleged with particularity.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected whistle-blowing activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them.

SEAGULL VS. SARAH CHANDLER (L-1403-15, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-02(c)

A plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or ... regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19–3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action.

Section 34:19-3 requires a retaliation plaintiff to show a reasonable belief that the employer violated a law or regulation, whistleblowing activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

GARCIA v. KNAPP · filed 2020-05-29

However, there are no facts alleged for this Court to determine whether Mr. Garcia possessed the reasonable belief that a practice, activity or policy of his supervisors was in violation of the law or any promulgated regulation.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires a reasonable belief that the employer violated law or public policy, protected whistleblowing activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

Fenyak v. St. Peter's University Hospital · filed 2024-01-25

Pertinent to this appeal, plaintiff was required to demonstrate she reasonably believed defendants' conduct violated a "law, rule, regulation[,] or public policy"; she engaged in whistleblowing activity under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3; defendants took adverse employment action against her; and there existed a causal connection ... between her whistleblowing activity and defendants' adverse employment action. ... We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the motion judge in his well-reasoned amplification statement.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a plaintiff to allege whistle-blowing activity to state a retaliation claim.

JONES · filed 2026-02-03(c)

Plaintiff again fails to allege facts regarding any purported whistle-blowing activity. ... Without such allegations, Plaintiff's NJCEPA claim must be dismissed.

Section 34:19-3(c) treats an employee’s report to HR about conduct she reasonably believes violates the law as protected whistleblowing activity.

CANGO · filed 2026-01-15(c)

Second, Plaintiff adequately alleges that she performed “whistle-blowing” activity by filing a report with HR.

Section 34:19-3 treats a report to HR about reasonably suspected unlawful conduct as protected whistleblowing activity.

CLAUSELL · filed 2026-01-15(a)(1)

Second, Plaintiff adequately alleges that she performed “whistle-blowing” activity by filing a report with HR.

Section 34:19-3(a) requires disclosure to a public body; displaying a sign on a private home does not satisfy that requirement.

Carlino v. Gloucester City High School · filed 1999-08-02(a)

The display of a sign on the front of a private home does not constitute disclosure to a public body.

Section 34:19-3(a) protects disclosures of suspected employer wrongdoing to a supervisor or public body; complaints about unlawful disclosure of medical information can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Brown v. City of Long Branch · filed 2010-05-19(a)

Brown alleged that he complained to Captain Muolo about the “unlawful disclosure of my medical records,” filed a complaint with the DHHS regarding the “violation of my right to medical privacy,” and filed a complaint with the EEOC regarding defendants’ allegedly retaliatory investigation of his background. (Compl. at 7.) Those allegations satisfy the first two elements. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 34:19-3(a) (protected activity includes “disclos[ures] . . . to a supervisor or to a public body”); Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] CEPA plaintiff need not cite ‘any specific statute, rule or regulation which was allegedly violated’ when disclosing employer wrongdoing or even when filing a CEPA action.”) (citation omitted).

Section 34:19-3 does not protect complaints limited to the calculation of an employee’s commission payments.

Flick v. American Financial Resources, Inc. · filed 2012-10-31

Even after two years of discovery, Plaintiff has come forward with no evidence that she made a complaint of any activity that falls within CEPA. Plaintiffs limited complaints about the calculation of her commission payments fall far short of the sort of activity that the statute is entitled to protect.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires whistleblowing connected to employer misconduct; refusing to act without that connection does not state a CEPA claim.

Walter Young, Jr. v. Township of Irvington · filed 2015-10-19(c)

Here Young simply does not allege that he performed, or was penalized for, whistleblowing in connection with any employer misconduct, and this failure prevents him from making any of the four showings required to state a CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a CEPA claimant to identify the law, regulation, or clear public policy underlying the employee’s objection to an employer’s activity.

Parks v. Speedy Title & Appraisal Review Servs. · filed 2018-07-11(c)

Plaintiff's CEPA claim fails because she has not identified the law, rule, regulation, or public policy that supports her claim.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires protected whistleblowing to relate to an identifiable law or rule, or to a clear mandate of public policy; identifying that predicate is a question of law for the court.

NIEVES-HALL v. CITY OF NEWARK · filed 2019-09-26(c)

Nevertheless—and this is an issue of law for the court—the whistleblowing must relate to an identifiable “law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3c(1), or else “a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3c(3); Dzwonar, 828 A.2d at 900-01.

Section 34:19-3 protects an employee who discloses to a supervisor and objects to a workplace policy the employee reasonably believes is unlawfully discriminatory.

COHEN v. BH MEDIA GROUP, INC. · filed 2019-11-14(a)(1), (c)

As such, Plaintiff disclosed to a supervisor that a policy of her employer was in violation of a law, protected under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(a)(1) and objected to said policy, protected under § 34:19-3(c).

Section 34:19-3(c) permits a retaliation claim based on a reasonable belief that conduct violates a statute; the employee need not also show a public policy violation.

MYERS v. ADVANCED STORES COMPANY, INC. · filed 2020-05-27(c)

The CEPA statute is written in the disjunctive; in order to allege a CEPA claim, Plaintiff need only allege facts demonstrating a violation of either public policy or statute -- not both.

Section 34:19-3(b) does not require an employee who testifies before a public body to disclose or threaten to disclose perceived misconduct.

PERRY v. LEE · filed 2020-06-19(b)

While Defendants argue that there is no indication Plaintiff disclosed or threatened to disclose any perceived misconduct to the OCC, there is no such requirement under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(b).

Section 34:19-3(a) does not protect an employee’s disclosure of alleged unlawful conduct to a coworker; disclosure to a supervisor may qualify.

GOINS v. NEWARK HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2021-01-12(a)

However, informing a co-employee that an employer was allegedly violating the law does not constitute whistleblowing activity under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3(a) requires a disclosure or threatened disclosure; reporting an issue the employer already knows about is not protected whistleblowing activity.

Mays v. Toloza · filed 2023-01-05(a)

An employee who reports an issue that the employer is already well aware of has not made any disclosure and therefore has not performed a whistleblowing activity.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a CEPA retaliation claimant to allege that the employee objected to employer conduct reasonably believed to violate law or public policy.

JONES v. EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE · filed 2025-05-30(c)

Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a CEPA retaliation claim. In essence, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that Defendant violated any law, rule, or regulation, or that Plaintiff objected to any such practice.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects an employee who refuses to participate in an employer policy she reasonably believes conflicts with a clear public policy mandate concerning safety or welfare.

Stapleton v. DSW, Inc. · filed 2013-03-20(c)

Because Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for her refusal to participate in DSW’s policy and that she released the Customer’s confidential information because she reasonably believed that her failure to do so would be incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the safety and welfare of children, Plaintiff stated a CEPA claim pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3c.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects an employee who refuses employer pressure to disregard professional ethics rules binding on the employee.

Trzaska v. LOreal USA Inc · filed 2017-07-25(c)

Following these guidelines, an allegation that an employer instructed, coerced, or threatened its patent attorney employee to disregard the RPCs binding him violates a clear mandate of public policy within the meaning of CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 permits a retaliation claim against an employer and its agents when an employee reports the employer’s failure to oversee suspected misconduct and plausibly alleges that they retaliated.

ILLIANO v. WAYNE BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2024-02-20

Here, the SAC alleges facts sufficient to state a CEPA claim against Plaintiff’s employer—the BOE—and its purported agents—Rewick, Toback, DiLollo, and Bubba. According to the SAC, Plaintiff regularly complained to his superiors about the Booster Club’s alleged misconduct and the BOE’s failure to exercise adequate oversight over it. In turn, Plaintiff asserts, members of the BOE—primarily led by Defendant Bubba—retaliated against him, ultimately resulting in his termination.

Section 34:19-3(c) can treat questioning a practice believed to violate the law as an objection, at least when assessing whether a CEPA claim is colorable.

VERDONE v. RICE & RICE, PC · filed 2024-03-20(c)

Given that interpretation, Verdone’s questioning of Rice’s and Quattrone’s accounting practice—which she believed violated the tax code—could be construed as objecting within CEPA’s meaning.

Section 34:19-3(a) does not protect disclosure of conduct that harms only the employer, without injuring others or the public.

Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1989-06-21(a)

It is not actual or potential injury to the interest of his employer from disclosed activity that would prevent a whistle blowing employee from being covered by the statute, but rather the absence of injury to the interest of others or the public at large from the disclosed activity that would bar such coverage.

Section 34:19-3(a) protects disclosures of conduct attributable to the employer or another employer with a business relationship when the employee reasonably believes that conduct violates a law or regulation.

Demas v. NAT. WESTMINSTER BANK · filed 1998-06-24(a)

In conclusion, we are satisfied that plaintiff has failed to make a case under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a), both because the conduct she disclosed was not that of her employer or "another employer," and because she could not cite "a law, or a rule or regulation" or even a clear mandate of public policy, violated by Opong's behavior.

Section 34:19-3(a) protects an employee who discloses a suspected violation to either a supervisor or a public body.

Abbamont v. Piscataway Tp. · filed 1993-11-29(a)

N.J.S.A. 34:19-3a prohibits retaliatory action against an employee for making a disclosure "to a supervisor or to a public body." Either a supervisor or a public body satisfies the statute.

Section 34:19-3(a) requires a protected disclosure to precede the employee’s retaliatory termination.

Boginis v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. · filed 1994-05-26(a)

The statute requires that statements be made prior to an employee’s retaliatory termination.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect an employee’s disagreement with an employer’s lawful research decision when the decision violates neither law nor a clear mandate of public policy.

Young v. Schering Corp. · filed 1994-07-25(c)(1), (c)(3)

Although CEPA protects a broader category of employee behavior than the common law, the Act nevertheless was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer's decision, where that decision is entirely lawful.

Section 34:19-3 protects an employee who reports a reasonably believed legal violation to a supervisor, even if that supervisor is involved in the suspected violation, when the employer fires the employee for the report.

Boginis v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Incorporated · filed 1995-06-08(a), (c)

Under a literal reading of the statute, if Boginis was fired for his actions, he should be protected by the statute. Boginis complained to a "supervisor" about conduct Boginis reasonably believed violated the law. Boginis complained not to Crim, but rather to Crim's supervisor, Cervasio. Because the statutory language is clear, we need go no further in examining the policies behind the statute.

Section 34:19-3(b) protects an employee who testifies before a public body investigating whether the employer violated the law.

Kolb v. Burns · filed 1999-04-27(b)

Here, plaintiff established a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation. She engaged in a protected activity: testifying before a public body investigating whether defendants had violated the law by failing to fulfill their obligations under both the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 to 1485, and N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.1, to provide a disabled child with an appropriate public education.

Section 34:19-3 protects an employee who reports reasonably suspected unlawful conduct to a statutory supervisor, even if the employee bypasses the employer's chain of command.

Fleming v. Correctional Healthcare Solutions, Inc. · filed 2000-06-07(a)

CHS has no right to limit CEPA's definition of "supervisor" by mandating that its employees submit CEPA complaints to their immediate supervisor. Certainly, it could not punish Fleming for submitting her protected complaints to Miers, an individual who fell within CEPA's definition of "supervisor."

Section 34:19-3 protects employee disclosures of possible legal violations and testimony about an employer’s alleged unlawful conduct.

McCullough v. City of Atlantic City · filed 2001-03-21

Plaintiffs’ disclosures regarding possible OSHA violations, and Plaintiffs’ testimony in other lawsuits regarding unlawful or wrongful actions of the ACPD and/or Atlantic City, are clearly “whistle-blowing” activities under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect complaints solely about a coworker’s competence because they do not object to a violation of law, regulation, or clearly mandated public policy.

Sunkett v. Misci · filed 2002-01-24

Plainly, mere complaints about the competency of a colleague do not constitute objections to a violation of law, regulation, or clearly mandated public policy.

Section 34:19-3(a) does not require employees to use specific words when communicating a reasonable belief that their employer is acting unlawfully.

Beasley v. Passaic County · filed 2005-05-26(a)

We reject this argument. CEPA does not require any magic words in communicating an employee's reasonable belief of illegal activity.

Section 34:19-3(c) does not require an employee to complain to an outside regulatory agency to assert a CEPA claim.

Klein v. UMDNJ · filed 2005-04-20(c)

We agree with plaintiff that he need not prove he complained to an outside regulatory agency to assert a CEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c.

Section 34:19-3 protects an employee from retaliation for reporting an extortion attempt and testifying in a political corruption trial.

Stomel v. City of Camden · filed 2007-07-25(a), (e)(1)

Stomel claims that he was removed as municipal public defender for reporting the extortion attempt and for providing testimony in Caruso’s political corruption trial that implicated Milan. Stomel’s speech undoubtedly would qualify as protected conduct under CEPA’s provisions.

Section 34:19-3 protects complaints made to a supervisor; an employee need not report to an external regulatory agency.

Matthews v. NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY · filed 2011-02-24(a)

To the extent that Defendants contend that Plaintiff's complaints were not whistleblowing activity because they were not made to an external regulatory agency, the Court disagrees.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect filing a worker’s compensation claim because seeking benefits for an injury is not whistle-blowing activity.

Morro v. DGMB Casino LLC · filed 2015-06-30

The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs claim because the filing of a worker’s compensation claim does not -fall within the statutory protections of CEPA.

Section 34:19-3(c) can protect an employee who objects to an employer’s conduct by urging affected students to tell their parents and ask them to complain to the school board.

Rivera v. City of Camden Board of Education · filed 2009-07-10(c)

It is plausible that Plaintiff “objeet[ed] to” the disciplinary action when he implored his students to apprise their parents of the punishment, and urge their parents to complain directly to the school board.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects watchdog employees who object during their ordinary job duties and does not require them to exhaust internal remedies.

Joel S. Lippman, M.D. v. Ethicon, Inc. (073324) · filed 2015-07-15(c)

In sum, examination of the Act’s text, structure, and remedial nature provides compelling evidence against finding a legislative intent to exclude watchdog employees from CEPA protection under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c). ... In subsection (c), there is no exhaustion requirement.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects watchdog employees who object to or refuse to participate in covered conduct while performing their regular job duties.

Joel S. Lippman, M.D. v. Ethicon, Inc. (073324) · filed 2015-07-15(c)

In conclusion, we find no support in CEPA’s language, construction, or application in this Court’s case law that supports that watchdog employees are stripped of whistleblower protection as a result of their position or because they are performing their regular job duties.

Section 34:19-3(c) does not protect routine internal disputes over product specifications or labels as whistle-blowing activity.

ABU-ALI VS. PINNACLE FOODS GROUP, LLC (L-0143-13, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-09-26(c)

We agree with the motion judge's conclusion that internal disputes regarding the products or the labels of the sort at issue in this case do not constitute whistle-blowing protected by CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 allows complaints to supervisors about conduct reasonably believed unlawful to qualify as disclosures under subsection (a) and objections under subsection (c).

Tegler v. Global Spectrum · filed 2018-02-14(a), (c)

Such complaints would qualify both as disclosures to supervisors (under § 34:19-3a) and objections (under § 34:19-3c).

Submitting a job application alone does not qualify as whistle-blowing activity under Section 34:19-3.

DANIELS VS. HIGH POINT BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-0152-17, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-11(a) and (c)

Submitting an application for a posted job position does not establish "whistle-blowing" activity.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires an employee claiming protected whistleblowing to identify a law, rule, regulation, or public policy the employee believed was violated.

BERMEK VS. THE CITY OF PASSAIC (L-1450-14, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-25(c)

Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether she engaged in any protected whistleblowing activity. She identified no law, rule, regulation, or public policy she believed was violated by defendants.

Section 34:19-3 requires protected whistleblowing activity and a causal connection between that activity and an adverse employment action. An email expressing an intent to keep concerns private, without disclosing or objecting to the conduct, does not qualify as whistleblowing.

Simons v. Boston Scientific · filed 2019-03-22

The District Court correctly determined that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Simons engaged in whistleblowing activity, or that the activity was causally related to his termination. Simons’ statement that “[t]his e mail [sic] will stay in my files and I would fully expect you and I will continue a strong working relationship,” App. 347, evidences neither an intent to disclose nor object to Lickovitch’s conduct. Rather, it shows an intent to keep it private.

Section 34:19-3(b) protects an employee who provides information during a public investigation even if the employee did not come forward before being questioned by law enforcement.

EASLEY VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (L-0094-13, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-17(b)

Although CEPA's purpose is to encourage employees to report illegal activities of employers, the statute does not expressly require the employee to come forward before being questioned by law enforcement.

Section 34:19-3 requires a CEPA retaliation claimant to plead protected whistleblowing activity.

PBA LOCAL 183 v. COUNTY OF ESSEX · filed 2019-10-15

Similarly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to plead a claim under the CEPA. In their Complaints, neither the PBA I or PBA II Plaintiffs allege that they engaged in any whistleblowing activity, nor do they allege that they engaged in activities that could be considered whistleblowing activities or protected activities under the CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 requires a CEPA retaliation complaint to allege facts showing that the employee engaged in protected whistleblowing activity.

PBA LOCAL 183 v. COUNTY OF ESSEX · filed 2019-10-15

Notably, the Complaints fail to allege that Plaintiffs “performed a ‘whistle-blowing’ activity under the act.” ... A factual allegation pleading this is a required element of a cause of action under the CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 protects complaints about suspected unlawful conduct when they have a substantial connection to an identified law or public policy; complaints about age discrimination made on behalf of other employees can qualify.

GOODE v. CAMDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2019-11-22(a), (c)

There is a substantial nexus between the content of these complaints and laws prohibiting age-discrimination, namely the ADEA and the NJLAD. Consequently, at this stage Pierce has submitted sufficient evidence that she engaged in whistleblowing activity under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect wholly private grievances or vague and conclusory complaints under any of its subsections.

GOODE v. CAMDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2020-01-09

Rather, the Court simply identified and enforced two restrictions on CEPA’s protection that cut across all sections of the statute: (1) that CEPA does not protect wholly private grievances; and (2) that CEPA does not shield “vague and conclusory complaints.”

An employee’s ordinary performance of assigned duties, without a protected disclosure or objection, did not establish a claim under § 34:19-3.

BRIDGEFORTH VS. COMPASS GROUP USA, INC. (L-8477-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-11

The judge correctly concluded that plaintiff did not engage in any CEPA-protected conduct. Plaintiff cites no authority that extends whistle-blower protection for undertaking the very duties of one's job. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to defendants as to plaintiff's CEPA claim.