N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12

Section 10:5-12(e) does not impose individual aiding-and-abetting liability on supervisors for their own direct acts of discrimination.

O'SHEA v. TOWNSHIP OF HILLSIDE · filed 2022-12-21(e)

As alleged, these are all direct acts by Vertreese and Smith acting on behalf of Hillside, and not acts aiding and abetting another actor.

An aiding and abetting claim under § 10:5-12(e) requires knowing and substantial assistance with the underlying violation; advising against an investigation after the alleged discrimination does not satisfy that requirement.

PEZZA v. MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 2023-02-15(e)

Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint does not contain any allegation that Merlino participated in Plaintiff’s termination. Instead, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint only contains proposed allegations that Merlino participated in the decision to not investigate Plaintiff’s termination, an event that occurred after the alleged wrongful act (Plaintiff’s termination). ... Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim because it does not allege that Merlino “knowingly and substantially assisted with the main violation.”

Section 10:5-12(e) allows individual liability for aiding and abetting only when the employer is also liable under the NJLAD.

K.J. v. TOWNSHIP OF GALLOWAY · filed 2023-03-07(e)

Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs NJLAD claim against K.M.’s employer/principal at the relevant time — the Township of Galloway — that claim necessarily fails against K.M.

Section 10:5-12(e) does not impose aiding and abetting liability on individual state employees in federal court when their employer has Eleventh Amendment immunity.

CORRY v. THE NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY · filed 2023-05-31(e)

Here, because all of the allegations against Cohen, Baehr, and Gardner Duncan are alleged to have occurred as employees of the New Jersey Judiciary and because it is undisputed that the New Jersey Judiciary cannot be held liable because it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment ... immunity, the individual Defendants cannot be said to have aided or abetted, or “acted in relation” to the principal.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits an aiding-and-abetting claim against a supervisor based on the supervisor’s own alleged discriminatory conduct.

BLOUNT v. TD BANK NA · filed 2023-07-19(e)

Because the Court has declined to dismiss Count 2 based on Plaintiff’s termination, it will further decline to dismiss Plaintiff’s aiding-and-abetting claim as to Carroll with respect to the same conduct.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows a supervisor to be liable for aiding and abetting discrimination by delaying an employee’s promotion because of military service.

PATTI v. IBARRONDO · filed 2023-08-01(e)

We find these allegations are sufficient to state a claim under NJLAD against Moffa for aiding and abetting the CCPD, and himself as a supervisor, in delaying Plaintiff’s promotion due to his military service.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows aiding and abetting liability even when the defendant was not the plaintiff’s direct supervisor.

WARK v. J5 CONSULTING, LLC · filed 2023-09-29(e)

But Cichetti does not dictate that a defendant must be the plaintiffs direct supervisor to face individual liability as an aider and abettor.

Section 10:5-12(e) prohibits aiding or abetting unlawful discrimination; a claim against an individual must allege such conduct.

MURRAY v. COUNTY OF HUDSON · filed 2023-10-13(e)

While Count Twelve is captioned under the NJLAD, the Court notes that Plaintiffs do not allege in the Amended Complaint that any individual Defendant aided or abetted any conduct forbidden by N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e). Therefore, this Count as to any individual must be dismissed.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting only when the employer can first be found liable for the underlying violation.

DAVENPORT v. NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES · filed 2024-01-30(e)

Here, the personal capacity NJLAD claims fail because, as the Court has explained, the ... NJBPU is immune from suit in federal court.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting employment discrimination only when an underlying NJLAD violation is sufficiently alleged.

BARKER v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. · filed 2024-02-01(e)

These allegations alone do not give rise to an aiding and abetting claim because they are subject to the same legal deficiencies as Plaintiff’s principal NJLAD claims.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires an underlying wrongful act for an aiding and abetting claim.

Reid v. City of Plainfield · filed 2024-03-15(e)

Because we determined above, based on the same allegations, that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment and finding defendants did not engage in any wrongful discrimination, plaintiff cannot satisfy the first Tarr factor.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires active and purposeful conduct for aiding-and-abetting liability, including knowing and substantial assistance in discrimination.

Cutri v. Tec-Cast, Inc. · filed 2024-04-18(e)

The "aiding and abetting" analysis under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) requires a finding of "active and purposeful conduct."

Section 10:5-12(e) requires underlying discrimination or retaliation for an aiding-and-abetting claim.

Perry v. New Jersey Department of Corrections · filed 2024-07-12(e)

Even assuming the NJDOC cannot invoke sovereign immunity, in other words, there was no discrimination or retaliation to aid or abet. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 928–29 (N.J. 2004).

Section 10:5-12(e) permits personal liability for aiding and abetting unlawful discrimination, but that claim fails when the employer’s conduct was lawful.

Gomez v. Intertek Testing Services, Na, Inc. · filed 2024-10-03(e)

Plaintiff has not established a prima facie showing that Kopacz and Keating committed wrongful acts aiding Intertek. As we have concluded ... dismissal of the gender discrimination claim against Intertek was warranted, we need not further address plaintiff's LAD claim for individual liability against Kopacz and Keating for aiding and abetting. See ibid. It is clear neither Kopacz nor Keating have been shown to have participated in a tortious activity, as plaintiff's termination was lawful under the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires an underlying act of discrimination or retaliation for aiding and abetting liability.

Dillon v. State of New Jersey · filed 2024-10-09(e)

Dillon's claims alleging aiding and abetting regarding gender and age discrimination against Fell, Krietzman, Strapp, Kennedy, Padilla, Hernandez, DiMartino, Wilson, Cushman, Aviles, and Doughty and retaliation against Fell, Krietzman, Strapp, Kennedy, Padilla, and Hernandez fail because he has not established facts supporting a prima facie showing of a wrongful act.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires active and purposeful conduct for aiding-and-abetting liability.

Hutchinson v. State of New Jersey · filed 2024-10-29(e)

Aiding-and-abetting liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) "require[s] active and purposeful conduct."

Section 10:5-12(e) allows an employee without supervisory authority to be liable for knowingly and substantially assisting an unlawful act.

Andreula v. the Board of Education of the Township of Nutley · filed 2024-12-26(e)

Thus, an individual need not be a supervisor for aiding and abetting liability to attach ... under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability for common-law invasion of privacy.

KERTESZ v. COLONY TIRE CORPORATION · filed 2025-09-30(e)

Common law invasion of privacy does not arise under the NJLAD and therefore the Creightons cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting alleged common law privacy violations pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12(e).

Section 10:5-12(e) requires active and purposeful assistance in an underlying act of discrimination for aiding and abetting liability.

Al Tabei v. Bally's Park Place, LLC · filed 2026-01-22(e)

Aiding and abetting liability requires a plaintiff to show "active and purposeful conduct." ... As we recounted with each plaintiff, there was no evidence of aiding or abetting by Edley and Giunta.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discrimination when the person knowingly and substantially assists the violation.

HAMARNEH · filed 2026-01-23(e)

The NJLAD makes it unlawful “[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so.” N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e). ... Plaintiff fails to state a claim for aiding-and-abetting liability.

An aiding and abetting claim under § 10:5-12(e) fails when the underlying NJLAD discrimination claim fails.

JUSSEN · filed 2026-03-19(e)

Because the Court concludes that AHS is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’ s NILAD discriminatory discharge claim, Defendants Acevedo and Moran are likewise entitled to summary judgment for Plaintiff's NJLAD aiding and abetting claims.

Section 10:5-12(e) does not impose individual aiding and abetting liability based on supervisory status alone.

Cline v. City of Paterson · filed 2026-03-25(e)

At best, Cline seeks to impose individual liability based on Mungo's supervisory status, which does not satisfy the requirements for aiding and abetting liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e).

An aiding-and-abetting claim under § 10:5-12(e) fails when the evidence does not support an underlying NJLAD violation by the employer.

Crawford v. Wozniak · filed 2026-04-16(e)

Because we hold that Crawford’s evidence failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact that Zales violated the NJLAD, ... Crawford’s aiding-and-abetting claim against Wozniak must also fail.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows a supervisor to be personally liable for aiding and abetting the supervisor's own discriminatory conduct.

Salvero v. City of Elizabeth · filed 2026-06-17(e)

Based on well-settled case law, we conclude the judge did not err in determining a jury could find Cosgrove, as plaintiff's supervisor, liable for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory conduct.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not permit a spouse’s derivative claim for loss of consortium arising from employment discrimination.

Murphy v. Housing Authority & Urban Redevelopment Agency · filed 1999-01-27(a)

In addition, I shall grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count III of the Amended Complaint, because per quod claims are not cognizable in cases involving claims of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII and the NJLAD, and the underlying claim upon which it is based has been dismissed.

Section 10:5-12(a)'s protection against affectional or sexual orientation discrimination concerns a person's relations with others, not the person's own sexual identity.

Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys. · filed 2001-07-03(a)

We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for discrimination based on her affectional or sexual orientation because she was not a homosexual or bisexual or perceived to be homosexual or bisexual. This portion of the statute refers to one's relations with others and not to his or her own sexual identity, and plaintiff presented no evidence that she was discriminated against because of her "affectional, emotional or physical attraction" to others.

For employment discrimination claims based on Armed Forces service under § 10:5-12(a), the USERRA burden-shifting framework applies.

Hart v. Hillside Twp · filed 2007-04-10(a)

Accordingly, we agree with Hart that, in addressing his NJ LAD claim, the District Court should have employed USERRA’s burden-shifting framework, as enunciated in Sheehan, rather than the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Each paycheck reflecting discriminatory pay starts a new two-year limitations period, even if the pay decision was made earlier.

VICTORIN v. LASALLE · filed 2021-02-18(a)

The Equal Pay Act, and Alexander before it, allow claims to accrue based on each discriminatory paycheck—even if the underlying decision to underpay an employee occurred earlier. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a); Alexander, 8 A.3d at 206. Victorin alleges just that, so his claim is colorable and timely.

Section 10:5-12(t) prohibits paying a protected-class employee less than other employees for substantially similar work; disputed evidence about the employer’s reasons for a pay gap can preclude summary judgment.

ADAMS v. CITY OF NEWARK · filed 2024-08-29(t)

It is a violation of the LAD for an employer to “pay an[] . . . employee[] who is a member of a protected class [which includes age] at a rate of compensation . . . which is less than the rate paid by the employer to employees who are not members of the protected class for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort and responsibility.” N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(t). ... In short, neither of the Defendants’ arguments is convincing; their motion for summary judgment is therefore denied as to the Plaintiff’s pay disparity claim.

Section 10:5-12(a) and (t) require a comparison between an employee’s work and proposed comparators’ work in these pay discrimination claims.

SCHULMAN v. ZOETIS, INC. · filed 2025-05-06(a), (t)

This is because, under somewhat different verbal formulations, each of the statutes cited above requires a “substantially equal”-style comparison between the Plaintiff and her comparators.

Section 10:5-12(t) allows discovery of comparator pay data from an employer’s offices throughout the country.

Affrunti v. Reed Smith LLP · filed 2025-11-20(t)

There is no indication in the Allen Act that prevents Affrunti from obtaining the FSP data for FSPs who worked in Reed Smith offices throughout the country.

A pay discrimination claim under § 10:5-12 cannot survive summary judgment without sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for the pay difference were a pretext for intentional discrimination.

Stanziale v. Lester Jargowsky, Public Health Coordinator County of Monmouth Monmouth County Board of Health · filed 2000-01-10

Notwithstanding Stanziale's contentions as to what he was asked prior to his hiring, he has not presented sufficient evidence such that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Muscillo's superior qualifications, particularly her qualifications as to lead poisoning, pesticides, and public health and law, are so unrelated to her employment as a Sanitary Inspector as to be a pretext for intentional discrimination. ... Summary judgment was therefore proper as to the ADEA and Title VII claims, and the corresponding state claims under N.J.S.A. S 10:5-12.

Section 10:5-12(p) permits reasonable workplace appearance standards, including standards with sex-specific terms, when they comply with laws prohibiting discrimination.

Schiavo v. Marina District Development · filed 2015-09-17(p)

When an employer's "reasonable workplace appearance, grooming and dress standards" comply with State or federal law prohibiting discrimination, even if they contain sex-specific language, the policies do not violate Title VII, and by extension, the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(p) permits reasonable workplace dress standards that comply with other state and federal laws, even if they use sex-specific language.

COHEN v. BH MEDIA GROUP, INC. · filed 2019-11-14(p)

Moreover, “[w]hen an employer’s ‘reasonable workplace appearance, grooming and dress standards’ comply with State or federal law prohibiting discrimination, even if they contain sex-specific language, the policies do not violate Title VII, and by extension, the [NJ]LAD.” Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC, 123 A.3d 272, 291 (N.J. App. Div. 2015). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to show Defendants’ policy was discriminatory.

Section 10:5-12(q)(1) requires an employer to make a bona fide effort to accommodate an employee’s sincerely held religious practice unless accommodation would cause undue hardship.

LEONE v. ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE · filed 2021-09-23(q)(1)

Here, Defendants made a bona fide effort to meet with Plaintiff and brainstorm accommodations that could assist him in finding the solitude he required for prayer.

Section 10:5-12(q)(1) requires an employer to make a bona fide effort to accommodate a sincerely held religious practice and to demonstrate undue hardship if it cannot reasonably do so.

ROSEUS VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (L-0116-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-09-10(q)(1)

In summary, when a religious practice or observance is at issue, LAD requires the employer to demonstrate both (1) a bona fide effort to accommodate; and (2) that an accommodation would cause an undue hardship. ... Here, there was no record of either.

Section 10:5-12(q)(1) permits an employer to deny a religious accommodation that would impose an undue hardship on its operations.

Tisby v. Camden County Correctional Facility · filed 2017-01-18(q)(1)

Moreover, the employer's reasons for denying an accommodation were not pretextual. Therefore, plaintiff failed to overcome the finding of a hardship to defendants.

Subsection (s) makes undue hardship an affirmative defense to a pregnancy accommodation claim, and the employer bears the burden of proof.

Delanoy v. Township of Ocean (084022) (Monmouth County & Statewide) · filed 2021-03-09(s)

It is the employer’s burden to prove, as an affirmative defense, that providing a reasonable accommodation causes an undue hardship.

A religious accommodation imposes an undue hardship when it would interfere unreasonably with safe operations or violate a bona fide collective bargaining agreement.

IN THE MATTER OF CLINTON BLOOMFIELD, CITY OF NEWARK (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) · filed 2021-05-28(q)(3)(a)

Therefore, contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is substantial credible evidence supporting the Commission's finding that respondent made a bona fide effort to accommodate petitioner's religious beliefs and respondent demonstrated that providing an accommodation would constitute an undue hardship under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(q)(3)(a).

Section 10:5-12(q)(1) requires a religious accommodation claimant to allege facts identifying a sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement.

MCKINLEY v. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY · filed 2023-04-28(q)(1)

Without Plaintiff providing facts showing what sincerely held religious belief she holds that prevented her from complying with the COVID-19 Policies, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a cognizable claim for religious discrimination, therefore, Defendant’s motion is granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of Counts I and III.

Claims under these provisions based on a religious objection to vaccination require a belief rooted in religion; medical concerns or an isolated moral teaching do not suffice.

ALIANO v. TOWNSHIP OF MAPLEWOOD · filed 2023-07-07(a), (q), (r)

Beliefs that are effectively medical in nature or amount to an “isolated moral teaching” are insufficient to state a religious belief for purposes of Title VII and NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(p) permits reasonable workplace grooming standards, but those standards remain subject to the religious accommodation requirement in subsection (q).

Roseus v. State of New Jersey · filed 2024-03-20(p)

Section 12(p) allows employers to have reasonable appearance, grooming, and dress standards. Section 12(q), nevertheless, directs that grooming standards are still subject to a reasonable accommodation for an employee's religious practice, unless the employer can demonstrate that that accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

An accommodation creates an undue hardship under § 10:5-12(q)(3)(a) if it unreasonably interferes with safe or efficient workplace operations.

Zapata v. Fellowship Village Senior Living · filed 2024-11-18(q)(3)(a)

The LAD proceeds to define undue hardship as "an accommodation requiring unreasonable expense or difficulty, unreasonable interference with the safe or efficient operation of the workplace or a violation of a bona fide seniority system or a violation of any provision of a bona fide collective bargaining agreement." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(q)(3)(a). ... Based on the entirety of this record, the Division found Fellowship declined to grant appellant's request for a religious accommodation because it would interfere "with the safe and efficient operation of the workplace" and increase the risk that appellant could transmit COVID-19 to Fellowship's vulnerable elderly residents. ... We are satisfied the record provides "sufficient credible competent evidence" to support the Division's findings.

Section 10:5-12(a) covers racial harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.

Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc. · filed 2018-06-29(a)

The Court disagrees and finds that a reasonable finder of fact could (but need not) conclude that the harassment to which Plaintiff was subjected was severe.

Section 10:5-12 requires a hostile work environment plaintiff to show intentional discrimination based on protected status that is severe or pervasive, harms the plaintiff and would harm a reasonable person in similar circumstances, and is attributable to the employer.

Grossberg v. Hudson County Dept Human Ser · filed 2018-07-06

Her hostile work environment claims were made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12; and we presume without deciding that the ADEA also supports such a claim. The elements are common to each claim are: “1) [T]he employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her [protected status], 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.”

Section 10:5-12(a) covers sex-based hostile work environment harassment when the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions.

PAIGE v. ATRION COMMUNICATION RESOURCES INC. · filed 2019-11-07(a)

Consequently, because there are genuine disputes of fact concerning whether Grillo’s alleged behavior was severe or pervasive enough to satisfy the second element of a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, as well as whether Paige, herself, engaged in sexually explicit and racist behavior, summary judgment must be denied.

A hostile work environment claim under the NJLAD requires conduct tied to membership in a protected class.

IWU v. VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA DELAWARE VALLEY · filed 2020-03-31

Absent any indicia of discriminatory animus, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against her employer under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a hostile work environment claim based on even one or two national origin epithets when the surrounding circumstances make the workplace hostile.

ARMANDO RIOS, JR. VS. MEDA PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. (L-0763-17, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-01(a)

The word "spic" is a national origin epithet that under Taylor, even if only uttered twice, could have met the severity requirement for harassment, and the two uses of the word "spic," could, as a matter of law, sustain a hostile environment claim.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not require a separate adverse employment action for a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim; sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment can itself alter employment conditions.

SHANIQUE WELLS VS. AAA NORTH JERSEY (L-3338-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-08(a)

We conclude a jury should decide if such alleged conduct over the course of two-and-a-half-years is deeply offensive and sexually harassing enough to make a reasonable woman believe her workplace environment is hostile. Wells did not have to prove that her employment was adversely affected beyond the fact that Hughes' behavior was severe and pervasive sexual harassment. Thus, the judge erred in finding Wells did not prove a prima facie LAD claim to avoid summary judgment.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits sex discrimination through a hostile work environment when severe or pervasive conduct alters the conditions of employment.

KC DYER VS. NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY (L-1273-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-24(a)

We reject plaintiff's contention that she showed by a preponderance of the evidence that McGrath engaged in severe or pervasive conduct that would cause a ... reasonable woman to believe she was subjected to a hostile or abusive work environment, such that her conditions of employment were altered.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits an age and gender hostile work environment claim when the combined conduct could reasonably be found severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions.

ANN FOX VS. DGMB CASINO, LLC (L-1029-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-08-17(a)

When we consider that in a thirty-two day period of time, plaintiff's ability to hire staffing was removed from her, her long term parking spot was changed to an area that was less secure, she now was more regularly supervised—even though she had no disciplinary history—and older and heavier women were to be weeded-out, we think a reasonable person could conclude that the conditions were severe or pervasive and that plaintiff's conditions of employment were altered.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a hostile work environment claim when discriminatory conduct is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment; alleged slurs by a direct supervisor may meet that standard.

Armando Rios, Jr. v. Meda Pharmaceutical, Inc. (084746) (Morris County & Statewide) · filed 2021-06-16(a)

In other words, a rational factfinder could conclude the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. Rios’s claim, as a result, was entitled to survive summary judgment and proceed to a jury.

A single incident in which a supervisor sexually assaults an employee can be severe enough to create a hostile work environment under § 10:5-12(a).

THOMPSON v. SOUTH AMBOY COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT CENTER · filed 2021-08-27(a)

If any single incident constitutes a rare and extreme case, it is when a supervisor rapes a subordinate.

Section 10:5-12(a) allows a race-based hostile work environment claim even when the employee was not the direct target of the harassment.

CRUZ v. TRANE INC. · filed 2022-05-05(a)

A plaintiff need not be the target of harassing conduct for a hostile work environment claim to be actionable under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires sexual harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions for a hostile work environment claim.

LOGAN v. MILLSTONE MANOR LLC · filed 2022-05-27(a)

Again, this conduct is insufficient, alone or in combination with the first two allegations, to constitute conduct so severe or pervasive as to change Logan’s workplace into an offensive or abusive environment.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires a hostile work environment claim to be based on severe or pervasive discrimination because of sex.

POWER v. BAYONNE BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2022-08-19(a)

Although the record is clear that Power and Coach Rodriguez had a number of conflicts, that Power generally found him vulgar and unpleasant, and that she complained about his allegedly giving painkillers to the players, the record does not reveal any severe and pervasive harassment based on Power’s gender. I must therefore grant summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count 3.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a hostile work environment claim when a plaintiff plausibly alleges repeated sex-based harassment and employer notice.

ROTH v. CLEARCHOICE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC · filed 2022-09-02(a)

Although she does not articulate her allegations under specific statutes or legal theories, her Complaint can be construed to plead under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, or the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... Given this, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for a NJLAD claim to survive at this stage.

Age-related comments support a hostile work environment claim under § 10:5-12(a) only if the harassment is severe or pervasive.

RUGGIERO v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY · filed 2022-11-18(a)

But even comments that improperly reference Ruggiero’s (or any other employees) age are not necessarily enough to sustain an age discrimination claim under the NJLAD if they do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive.

Section 10:5-12 permits a hostile work environment claim when the plaintiff plausibly alleges the elements of a Title VII hostile work environment claim.

MICHAEL v. BRAVO BRIO RESTAURANTS LLC · filed 2024-06-10

As a result, this Court proceeds with the Title VU analysis, and does not discuss the NJLAD separately, except to note that Plaintiff has adequately alleged an NJLAD claim because she has pleaded one under Title VIL.

Section 10:5-12 permits hostile work environment and retaliation claims to reach a jury when the evidence supports sex-based harassment and a causal link between complaints and adverse employment action.

CESPEDES v. HARRISON HOTEL 1 URBAN RENEWAL, LLC · filed 2024-12-18(a), (d)

The Court will address the discrimination and retaliation claims in turn, analyzing the materially identical state and federal claims simultaneously. ... Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's sex discrimination claims against Harrison Hotel. ... Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Harrison Hotel.

A hostile work environment claim under § 10:5-12(a) requires conduct tied to protected status that is severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions.

Ford v. Edwards · filed 2025-01-29(a)

Even broadly reading this count, it fails to allege the complained-of conduct would not have occurred but for her protected status, nor does it claim severe or pervasive conduct as to plaintiff.

Section 10:5-12 supports a hostile work environment claim when severe or pervasive sexual harassment detrimentally affects an employee and there is a basis to hold the employer liable.

HERRERA v. QUALITY CHEVROLET GMC OF ENGLEWOOD, INC. · filed 2025-06-30

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action for a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment under Title VII and the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a hostile work environment claim based on a single sufficiently severe act of sex-based harassment.

Burga v. Unifirst Corp. · filed 2025-08-18(a)

A jury could reasonably find Gomez's lewd gesture, directed at plaintiff during a meeting with her coworkers present, standing alone, created a hostile work environment.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires a hostile work environment claim to show that the challenged conduct would not have occurred but for the employee’s protected status.

Hesselbirg v. Borough of Roseland · filed 2026-01-20(a)

Here, the trial judge correctly dismissed the hostile work environment claim because plaintiff did not show defendants' conduct would not have occurred but for his gender.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires a hostile work environment claimant to allege conduct tied to a protected status that is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions.

STANGL · filed 2026-03-10(a)

Here, Plaintiff has neither specified what protected class she belongs to, nor has she provided any indication that the alleged attack by her Preceptor, or her treatment by the Company, was motivated by her membership within any class. ... Even applying the liberal construction afforded to complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a hostile work environment claim.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) does not support a hostile work environment claim arising from a homeowner’s encounter with a city inspector when they have no working relationship.

McDermott v. City of Plainfield · filed 2026-03-11(f)(1)

Plaintiff cannot prevail on her hostile work environment claim under the LAD because she lacked a work relationship with the City or Longo at the time of the alleged assault. To establish a hostile work environment claim, there must have been a working relationship. Because there was no working relationship between plaintiff and the City or between plaintiff and Longo, the judge did not err in rejecting plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.

Section 10:5-12 protects employees against hostile work environments based on sexual orientation; the alleged hostility must be linked to that protected status.

MATEO v. FIRST TRANSIT INC. · filed 2020-07-16

Here, the Amended Complaint does not state a LAD hostile work environment claim, because it contains no mention of a protected status. Indeed, although sexual orientation is a protected status under the LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, and Plaintiff states that he is a “conservative homosexual,” such allegations are not included in his Amended Complaint. ... Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff had pled his sexual orientation in the Amended Complaint, his LAD claim would still fail, because the Amended Complaint includes no factual allegations that connect Plaintiff’s sexual orientation to Defendant’s alleged hostile actions.

Section 10:5-12(i)(4) does not require a lender reviewing a loan modification application to consider income received by an applicant’s non-borrower spouse.

Rosa v. WELLS FARGO · filed 2020-04-23(i)(4)

Second, the Court finds that the LAD does not require consideration of income received by a non-borrower spouse in a loan modification application.

Section 10:5-12(i)(4) protects against discrimination based on the source of lawful income received by the aggrieved person, but does not extend to income received by a nonparty spouse.

Coppola v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Coppola) · filed 2018-11-01(i)(4)

Thus, the NJLAD claim fails as the provision relied upon by Debtor is not applicable to the income of her nonparty spouse on its face.

A no-probable-cause finding on a source-of-lawful-income complaint requires further analysis when the agency has not addressed the possible discriminatory impact of a landlord’s minimum income policy on Section 8 recipients.

MORAN VS. TOWER MANAGEMENT SERVICES (NEW JERSEY DIVISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS) · filed 2018-12-03(g)(1)

The Director did not address the possible discriminatory impact respondent's income requirement might have on Section 8 recipients. ... Having now had the benefit of all of the parties' briefs, we conclude that a remand is warranted to enable the Director to address, in the first instance, appellant's argument that respondent's minimum income policy has a discriminatory impact on individuals and families who use Section 8 subsidies.

For an LAD claim based on an allegedly discriminatory termination, the two-year limitations period begins when the termination occurs.

DANA S. REGISTER VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND LEON WILLIAMS (L-0303-16, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-28

The record supports plaintiff's contention that summary judgment as to the statute of limitations was inappropriate because an issue of material fact exists as to the purported discriminatory impetus of her termination. Methodically, plaintiff alleges a pattern of discriminatory conduct, such as unauthorized investigations, stalking, and racially based comments, culminating in her termination – the final, discrete act of discrimination that vested her claim and triggered the running of the statute of limitations period.

An age discrimination claim under Section 10:5-12 is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

DETECTIVE SERGEANT FIRST CLASS ROBERT TOBEY, ETC., VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-2720-14, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-06

Further, as plaintiff did not move to file his amended complaint for alleged age discrimination accruing in 2014 until 2018, his proposed LAD claim was past the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations.

Claims under § 10:5-12(l) for discrimination against an independent contractor are subject to a two-year limitations period.

COVINGTON VS. CENTRAL JERSEY DISTRICT BOARD 193 OF I.A.A.B.O. CORP. (L-1674-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-01(l)

We nevertheless affirm the order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's LAD claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. ... We discern no basis to overturn the Law Division's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing as a matter of law plaintiff's claims as an independent contractor under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(l).

Claims under Section 10:5-12 have a two-year limitations period; discrete acts such as demotions and failures to promote do not qualify for the continuing violations doctrine.

Griffin v. Department of Human Services · filed 2021-08-26

However, discrete acts—such as demotions, transfers, and failures to promote—do not fall under the continuing violations doctrine and are subject to the NJLAD’s two-year statute of limitations.

A claim under § 10:5-12 can survive a limitations challenge when the complaint plausibly alleges a continuing discriminatory practice extending into the two-year filing period.

JOEY'S PLACE LLC v. CITY OF CLIFTON · filed 2021-09-14

In reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court finds there are enough facts to plausibly infer that the continuing violations doctrine may be applicable to Plaintiffs’ claims. ... Plaintiffs’ claims, as alleged, are therefore timely.

A constructive discharge claim under § 10:5-12 accrues when the employee feels compelled to stop working and must be filed within two years.

Andriani v. Hudson County Schools of Technology · filed 2024-02-07

Plaintiff's pleadings make clear that the day he felt forced to take terminal ... leave was the day his retirement path began, and the day he no longer intended to work for HCST. ... In sum, plaintiff's deadline to file a CEPA claim expired on December 1, 2020, and his deadline to file an LAD claim expired on December 1, 2021. His complaint filed in October 2022 was manifestly too late.

Claims under § 10:5-12 may accrue when an employee receives notice that an employment contract will not be renewed, but facts affecting how a reasonable person would understand the notice may bear on timeliness.

RICHARDS v. MONMOUTH COUNTY VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2025-03-17

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint but will do so without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to amend her complaint to further articulate the factual bases as to why the Nonrenewal Notice should not be treated as the accrual date of her claims.

Claims for discrimination and retaliation under Section 10:5-12 have a two-year limitations period that begins when the employee receives notice of termination.

RICHARDS · filed 2025-12-16

As such, an employee’s cause of action for an NJLAD claim begins to accrue upon the employee’s receipt of a termination notice. ... As such, even when taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Counts Two and Three are time barred.

Discrete acts of discrimination under § 10:5-12 cannot be combined as a continuing violation to revive untimely claims.

Lieutenant Dawn Shyner v. State of New Jersey · filed 2025-12-08

Moreover, the continuing violation doctrine does not permit "the aggregation of discrete discriminatory acts for the purpose of reviving an untimely act of discrimination that the victim knew or should have known was actionable." Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 569 (2010).

A hostile work environment claim under Section 10:5-12(a) is time-barred when filed more than two years after the alleged conduct ended.

De Oliveira v. Summit Health · filed 2026-06-24(a)

She admitted that those duties ended in March 2020, "[i]mmediately" after she complained about those duties to the human resources department. Her first complaint, however, was not filed until more than two years later on June 24, 2022. Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the hostile work environment claim against Summit Health based on the statute of limitations.

In a retaliation claim under section 10:5-12(d), a jury may consider an upper manager’s willful indifference to reprisals when deciding punitive damages, even if the manager did not aid and abet them.

DIAZ VS. CITY OF TRENTON (L-1058-14, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-07(d)

Even if Bashir did not aid and abet in the reprisals, the jury was entitled to consider whether Bashir was willfully indifferent to reprisals that other members of upper management were directing at plaintiff.

An employee can obtain lost pay and emotional distress damages from an employer under § 10:5-12(a) without also bringing an aiding and abetting claim against an individual.

PETRICORENA v. WALMART INC. · filed 2025-09-16(a)

Her existing NJLAD claims allow her to obtain full relief for any lost pay or emotional distress damages from defendant Walmart, regardless of whether she also asserts an NJLAD aiding and abetting claim against Tanksley.

Section 10:5-12(a) gives a religious employer an affirmative defense when its challenged employment decision relied solely on criteria adopted under its religious tenets.

Crisitello v. St. Theresa School 085213) · filed 2023-08-14(a)

In LAD cases where a religious employer invokes the religious tenets exception, the employer must demonstrate that the challenged employment decision relied solely on employment criteria adopted pursuant to the tenets of its religion. If the plaintiff employee fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the challenged employment decision relied solely on the religious tenets of the employer, then the affirmative defense stands as an absolute bar to liability.

Section 10:5-12(f) cannot be applied to force an expressive association to abandon leadership selection practices that convey its commitment to diversity when doing so would significantly burden its First Amendment rights.

Saadeh v. New Jersey State Bar Association · filed 2024-12-20(f)(1) and (f)(2)

We conclude that notwithstanding the LAD's prohibitions against discrimination in places of public accommodation and private associations, the Bar Association has a First Amendment right of expressive association that permits it to select the membership of its governing bodies through intentional inclusion of specified underrepresented groups, in furtherance of the ideological position it expresses in numerous ways: that it is necessary and beneficial to promote diversity and inclusion in New Jersey's legal profession.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) prohibits schools from discriminating based on gender identity or expression through disparate treatment or disparate impact.

Platkin v. Middletown Township Board of Education · filed 2025-02-10(f)(1)

The LAD expressly bars discrimination based on "gender identity or expression." ... That prohibition applies to disparate treatment and disparate impact.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) prohibits schools from treating students differently based on gender identity or expression, including through a parental notification policy.

Platkin v. Hanover Township Board of Education · filed 2025-02-10(f)(1)

The LAD expressly bars discrimination based on "gender identity or expression." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1). That prohibition applies to the disparate treatment that would result from the Revised Policy.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) prohibits schools from discriminating based on gender identity or expression without requiring a gender dysphoria diagnosis.

Hyland v. State Board of Education, Etc. · filed 2025-09-09(f)(1)

We reject Hyland's argument that the LAD only protects persons who have obtained a diagnosis of gender dysphoria. ... The LAD makes it unlawful for schools to subject individuals to discrimination on the basis of their "gender identity or expression." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1).

Section 10:5-12(a) prevents an agreement from waiving LAD protections or shortening the time to bring an LAD claim.

Graziadei v. Capital Health System, Inc. · filed 2025-05-23(a)

However, there can be no waiver of "any of the protections provided by the" LAD or "consent to a shortened [fifteen -day] statute of limitations period." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a).