N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between them; a transfer without reduced pay or status is not an adverse employment action.

Scott v. State of NJ · filed 2005-08-01(d)

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either Title VII or LAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d) (2005), a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment actions; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. ... Accordingly, we find as a matter of law that the transfers were not adverse employment actions.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to practices or acts forbidden by the NJLAD.

Sunkett v. Misci · filed 2002-01-24(d)

“Protected activities” include “opposing] any practices or acts forbidden under this act.” N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12(d). ... Primas, however, has sufficiently established that he complained about an act covered under the NJLAD, that is, the firing of Fisher, and that a reasonable juror could find that Misci and Milan knew of his opposition.

Section 10:5-12’s anti-retaliation provision does not treat mere shunning or lack of civility between neighbors as unlawful interference.

Sporn v. Ocean Colony Condominium Ass'n · filed 2001-10-29(d)

... the Court would simply be stretching the definition of “interference” too far if it were to hold that a lack of friendliness and civility between neighbors caused by a dispute over the use of their Condominium constitutes a violation of the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits an employer from conditioning an existing employee’s continued employment on signing an arbitration agreement that waives the employee’s right to pursue LAD claims in court or before the Division on Civil Rights.

Ackerman v. the Money Store · filed 1998-10-15(d)

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that The Money Store violated N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) of the LAD in requiring plaintiff as an existing employee to execute an agreement to arbitrate possible employment discrimination claims. In advising her that she was terminated for failing to sign the Agreement, defendant "interfered" with her rights as "granted or protected by the Act" under N.J.S.A. 10:5-13.

Section 10:5-12(d) does not protect complaints about workplace hostility that do not allege gender-related or sexual conduct.

Reyes v. McDonald Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc. · filed 1998-04-08(d)

Plaintiff never complained that the outbursts and name-calling by Manna were gender-related or sexual in nature. Therefore, plaintiff is unable to show that she was engaged in a protected activity, and she can not satisfy the prima facie elements of a retaliatory discharge claim.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee from retaliation for reporting conduct she believed was sex discrimination.

Lombardi v. Cosgrove · filed 1997-10-31(d)

First, plaintiffs incident report is a protected activity under the NJLAD because plaintiff thought that Cosgrove was discriminating against her because she was a woman.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee from retaliation for opposing conduct she reasonably believed was discriminatory, even if her discrimination claim fails.

Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 1990-06-06(d)

UC is not free to retaliate against plaintiff simply because she has failed to build her sex discrimination claim properly. ... Thus, plaintiff's retaliation claim under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) survives defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Section 10:5-12(d) permits compensatory liability against a club for retaliation by its officers or members when the club participates or knows or should know of the conduct and fails to prevent it.

MacZik v. Gilford Park Yacht Club · filed 1994-02-08(d)

Further, if the retaliatory activity was not the result of direct board action, it is inconceivable that the board did not know of it. At the least, it should have known, yet failed to prevent the "deliberate concerted effort to put her out of business and ... subjecting her to demeaning and threatening verbal harassment for seeking membership and otherwise opposing the club's discriminatory membership policies." There was ample basis for imposing liability upon it for the compensatory damages.

Section 10:5-12(d) permits a retaliation plaintiff to establish a causal connection through circumstances supporting an inference of retaliatory motive.

Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco · filed 1995-10-23(d)

Clearly, causal connection may be demonstrated by evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, an adverse action, and a causal link between them.

Lawrence v. Natl Westminister · filed 1996-10-15(d)

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under LAD a plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he was discharged subsequent to or contemporaneous with such activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the discharge.

A retaliation claim under § 10:5-12(d) requires evidence of a causal link between protected activity and the challenged employment action.

Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank New Jersey, Albert Lawrence · filed 1996-10-15(d)

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under LAD a plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he was discharged subsequent to or contemporaneous with such activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the discharge. ... Lawrence offers no evidence for his contention he was denied benefits because of his refusal to sign the termination agreement. Therefore, we will affirm that part of the district court’s summary judgment order dismissing Lawrence’s retaliation claim.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected conduct, a subsequent adverse employment action, and a causal link between them.

DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications Inc. · filed 1997-03-21(d)

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either the ADA, ADEA or NJLAD, DeJoy must show (1) that he engaged in protected conduct, (2) that he was subject to an adverse employment action subsequent to such activity, and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits reprisals for opposing practices forbidden by the NJLAD or participating in proceedings under it. A disputed failure to promote or change in job responsibilities may support a reprisal claim.

Rodriguez v. Torres · filed 1999-06-30(d)

Our analysis of the NJLAD retaliatory harassment claim will be guided by the Third Circuit’s discussion of what qualifies as an “adverse employment action” under Title VII case law. ... While we believe that the comments plaintiff points to are insufficient to demonstrate actionable adverse action standing alone, we conclude that plaintiffs proofs concerning his change in job responsibilities present a factual issue on this point sufficient to require denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 10:5-12(d) covers retaliatory discipline that tangibly affects an employee’s pay or leave.

Marrero v. Camden County Board of Social Services · filed 2001-10-04(d)

Thus, the Defendants’ conduct in disciplining Plaintiff for her alleged dress code violations is, taking Plaintiffs allegations in the light most favorable to her, also sufficiently adverse to satisfy the second element of a cause of action for retaliation under the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires evidence that the person who took the challenged employment action knew of the employee’s protected complaint and that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for retaliation.

Mancuso v. City of Atlantic City · filed 2002-04-12(d)

However, even if Plaintiff were to succeed in that effort, she has not offered any evidence to support a conclusion that Chief Levy was aware of her complaints at the time he decided to transfer her, nor has she provided any evidence that would permit a jury to conclude that the City’s asserted justification for its action is merely pretext for impermissible retaliation. Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendant that summary judgment should be granted.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation claimant to show that the employer knew of protected activity when it took an adverse employment action.

Pilkington v. BALLY'S PARK PLACE · filed 2003-10-15(d)

To establish a prima facie case of prohibited retaliation, the claimant must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity known to her employer, (2) she was subjected thereafter to an adverse employment decision by the employer, and (3) there was a causal link between the two. ... Plaintiff cannot meet the elements of the claim because she cannot establish that at the time DeLury (on Bally's behalf) declined to respond to her request to be rehired, or to have a "grievance" hearing, plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct of which DeLury was aware.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for reporting sexual harassment; factual disputes over causation and the employer’s stated reasons can preclude summary judgment.

Howard v. Sprint/United Management Co. · filed 2003-12-30(d)

Thus, issues of fact including, but not limited to, the causal connection between plaintiffs reporting and incidents of alleged retaliation as well as the sufficiency of defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reasons for their conduct toward plaintiff preclude summary judgment in this case.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee’s discrimination complaint known to management even if those managers lack final authority to fire the employee.

Grazioli v. Genuine Parts Co. · filed 2005-12-30(d)

We also conclude that Grazioli has satisfied the first prong under NJLAD. Although NJLAD explicitly requires that the protected activity be “known” to the employer, Grazioli alleges that Fitzpatrick and Fisher, management employees, did know of her complaints. We cannot interpret NJLAD to exclude this conduct from its protection just because neither Fitzpatrick nor Fisher had the ultimate power to take the alleged retaliatory action that resulted.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NJLAD; a claimant must show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal link.

Moran v. DaVita Inc · filed 2011-08-08(d)

To maintain a prima facie case of employer retaliation under NJLAD, a plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination; a claimant must prove an adverse action to establish a prima facie case.

Holland v. Simon Property Group Inc · filed 2012-08-29(d)

Both the ADA and the NJLAD prohibit retaliation against any individual because he has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by those statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12(d). ... Because Holland failed to prove a prima facie case of retaliation, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on his ADA and NJLAD claims.

Section 10:5-12(d) allows a retaliation claim when protected activity is causally linked to an adverse employment action.

JOHN FALAT, JR. VS. THE COUNTY OF HUNTERDON (L-0188-15, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-25(d)

More importantly, as already noted, the post- August 2010 conduct alleged in both the amended and second amended complaint independently failed to establish incidents of LAD retaliation and are insufficient to qualify as retaliatory conduct under the continuing violation doctrine.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for protected activity; returning an employee to his former shift after a requested accommodation ends, without a further medical recommendation, does not establish reprisal.

TAYLOR VS. THE RICHARD STOCKTON COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY (L-0341-14, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-11(d)

The LAD bans "reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because that person has filed a complaint" to enforce "any right granted or protected by this act." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). ... Applying these principles, we detect no basis in this record to support plaintiff's reprisal claim.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination; an employer’s supported, nonpretextual reason for termination defeats a retaliation claim.

MARSH v. ENPRO INDUSTRIES, INC. · filed 2020-04-23(d)

The ADA and NJLAD make it unlawful to retaliate against or intimidate any individual because he or she has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or NLJAD. ... As this Court previously concluded, Defendant has set forth a non-pretextual basis for terminating Plaintiff: excessive, unexcused absenteeism. ... The Court finds Plaintiff unable to present evidence suggesting that stated basis for termination was pretextual. As such, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects a person who complains in good faith about conduct believed to violate the NJLAD from retaliation for that complaint.

CURRO v. HD SUPPLY, INC. · filed 2020-06-29(d)

The NJLAD is clear that Curro must show he engaged in activity protected by the NJLAD. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12(d). ... In so alleging, Curro has sufficiently pleaded a claim for retaliation under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation claimant to have engaged in protected activity before the adverse employment action.

WHITMORE v. MAFCO WORLDWIDE, LLC · filed 2020-08-13(d)

Plaintiff has not stated a prima facie claim for retaliation under either Title VII or the NJLAD. Plaintiff readily admits he did not report the racial slur Artzberger allegedly called him to anyone before he was fired, and therefore, he cannot be found to have been engaged in a protected activity.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a plaintiff claiming retaliation to show that protected activity caused the adverse action.

WILLIAMS VS. CASINO REINVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (L-1500-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-13(d)

Plaintiff failed to present evidence to the motion court establishing a causal link between his counsel's March 17, 2015 letter complaint concerning Mack and his termination.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing a practice the NJLAD makes unlawful.

LAURORA v. BAYER CORPORATION · filed 2021-08-23(d)

Because the Court ultimately finds there is no dispute of material fact that Bayer (or Dr. O’Mullane) did not engage in unlawful retaliation, the Court will not separately address the NJLAD claim for individual liability against Dr. O’Mullane beyond here. ... In addition, there is no dispute that all three statutes prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing a practice made unlawful under the statutes, such as those described above. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(d).

Section 10:5-12(d) does not treat an investigator’s request for confidentiality during a discrimination investigation as retaliation.

USACHENOK v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (L-1577-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-02-28(d)

The amended regulation's request for confidentiality is not a retaliatory act under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d), a waiver of a substantive right in an employment contract under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7, or a required non-disclosure clause in an employment contract or settlement agreement under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.8.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between them.

UNEZE v. GREYSTONE PARK PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL (L-2760-17, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-03-11(d)

To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under the NJLAD, plaintiff was required to show: (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for opposing acts forbidden by the NJLAD; a retaliation claim requires facts supporting a causal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action.

MEJIA v. CMC STEEL US LLC · filed 2023-05-12(d)

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts that suggest a causal connection between his filing for workers’ compensation or requesting time off due to his disability, and Defendant’s decision to terminate his employment.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee’s actions that further a discrimination claim, including filing a complaint.

JOHNSON v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-0416-14, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-06-24(d)

Activities furthering an employee's discrimination claim are protected.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects employees from retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination, but a complaint must identify the discrimination sufficiently to notify the employer.

THOMPSON v. THE ANTHEM COMPANIES, INC · filed 2022-06-29(d)

Plaintiff’s assertion that another individual “must have told” Washington that she had complained to unspecified persons about national origin discrimination is speculative and is not specific enough to constitute protected activity.

Filing a workers’ compensation claim, without more, is not protected activity for an NJLAD retaliation claim.

WALKER v. ESSENDANT, INC. · filed 2022-07-08

Simply put, Walker fails to plausibly allege that he was engaged in a protected activity. Under the NJLAD, filing of a worker’s compensation claim, without more, does not trigger the protections of the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects people from retaliation for opposing discrimination, participating in a discrimination proceeding, or helping others exercise LAD rights; exercising freedom of speech alone is outside its protection.

OKAKPU v. IRVINGTON BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-0926-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-18(d)

The LAD's safeguard against retaliation does not extend to protected rights outside this mandate, such as freedom of speech.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to discrimination under the LAD; general objections to workplace practices do not qualify.

CARMICHAEL v. THOMSON · filed 2023-02-10(d)

Plaintiff fails to show, however, that these activities “concern[ed] discrimination.”

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to discrimination prohibited by the NJLAD; a complaint about unfair treatment without such an allegation is not protected activity.

DUCHEINE v. EAST ORANGE GENERAL HOSPITAL · filed 2023-03-15(d)

In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he engaged in a protected activity within the meaning of the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a causal connection between protected opposition to discrimination and an adverse employment action.

PRYCE v. TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES · filed 2022-11-18(d)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, his complaint to his supervisor that he felt TCS was discriminating against him establishes protected activity. However, Plaintiff fails to establish a causal connection between the protected activity and his termination.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires facts connecting protected activity to an adverse employment action; merely mentioning an EEOC charge is insufficient.

PAREDES v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. · filed 2023-02-06(d)

As indicated above, to state a plausible claim, Plaintiff must show a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment actions he allegedly suffered, and the conclusory and general mention of an EEOC charge is simply insufficient.

Section 10:5-12 retaliation claims use the same prima facie factors as § 1981 retaliation claims.

VIDAL v. GALAXY 2439 ENTERPRISES, LLC · filed 2023-12-06(d)

The factors to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the NJLAD are the same as those required under § 1981. ... This Court, accordingly, adopts the analysis previously provided for Plaintiff's § 1981 claim and dismisses Plaintiff's NJLAD claim without prejudice.

LAD retaliation requires protected activity known to the employer, retaliation, and a causal connection; legitimate, nonpretextual reasons for the employer’s actions defeat the claim.

Azanedo v. Alaris Health at Castle Hill · filed 2024-04-23(d)

After examining the record on appeal, we are satisfied that defendants proved the reasons motivating adverse actions against plaintiff were legitimate and not pretextual.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits reprisals against a person for opposing discrimination forbidden by the LAD or filing a complaint.

NELSON v. EAST JERSEY STATE PRISON · filed 2024-05-13(d)

The anti-retaliation provision of the LAD provides that: ... N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). ... Plaintiff also alleges that after she filed a grievance and a PREA report regarding these behaviors, officers retaliated against her through cell searches, destruction of her property, and restriction of access to the law library and legal telephone calls. ... Thus, Counts Two and Three survive.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation claimant to show a causal link between protected activity known to the employer and an adverse employment consequence.

Isler v. the Housing Authority of the City of Camden · filed 2023-11-14(d)

Finally, a plaintiff asserting a claim of retaliation under the NJLAD must establish the following prima facie elements: "(1) plaintiff was in a protected class; (2) plaintiff engaged in protected activity known to the employer; (3) plaintiff was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment consequence; and (4) that there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment consequence." Ibid. ... Accordingly, his legal conclusion that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed relative to plaintiff's retaliation claim is unassailable.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects employees from retaliation for opposing conduct prohibited by the NJLAD; a complaint that does not identify an unlawful employment practice is insufficient.

WORTHY v. UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC. · filed 2024-07-08(d)

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to plead a retaliation claim in violation of the NJLAD because he has not identified what “illegal employment practice [] being opposed” was the basis for the adverse employment action—his termination of employment with Defendant.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to practices forbidden by the LAD; a general complaint of unfair treatment does not qualify.

SPENCER v. PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2024-07-14(d)

Protected activities include “oppos[ing] any practices or acts forbidden under this act . . . .” N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). ... For example, Plaintiff’s allegation of contacting “the school resource officer to report” Bush’s interaction with a “Black special education student . . .” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53) without more appears to be part of Plaintiff’s job and constitutes “a general complaint of unfair treatment.” Cohen, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 86.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects employees from retaliation for opposing discrimination based on an NJLAD-protected characteristic; a general complaint of harassment does not qualify.

LEE v. ELECTRIFAI, LLC · filed 2024-09-13(d)

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to plead a retaliation claim in violation of the NJLAD because her reporting of Scott’s email does not constitute a protected activity.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the LAD; a retaliation claimant need not be a member of a protected class.

Algozzini v. Dgmb Casino, LLC · filed 2024-07-17(d)

Thus, the judge erred in requiring plaintiff to prove he was a member of a protected class to establish his retaliation claim under the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for protected activity; a retaliation claim requires proof that the employer knew of the activity and that it caused an adverse employment decision.

Rene Edghill Smith v. New Brunswick Board of Education · filed 2025-03-28(d)

The record does not support a retaliation claim because it is devoid of any evidence plaintiff was engaged in a protected activity that defendants knew about, which they then responded to by not renewing her.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a connection between alleged retaliation and the complainant’s earlier assertion of rights under the Law Against Discrimination.

S.K. v. Newport Gardens Condominium Association · filed 2025-05-01(d)

She fails to show how the alleged harassment she experienced was in retaliation for her settled LAD complaint.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects requests for an accommodation from retaliation, but a retaliation claim requires a causal connection between the request and an adverse employment action.

Wong v. RWJ Barnabas Health · filed 2024-12-04(d)

Wong’s requests for an accommodation are protected activities under NJLAD, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d), but she cannot show a causal connection between such protected activities and her termination.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim.

PERRY v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. · filed 2024-12-09(d)

However, the second element—that Plaintiff afterward or contemporaneously suffered an adverse employment action because of the protected activity—is not satisfied. ... Plaintiff has failed to allege a causal link.

Section 10:5-12(d) does not treat pregnancy alone as protected activity for a retaliation claim.

KONATE v. ACTALENT, INC. · filed 2025-01-24(d)

Being pregnant, however, is not a protected activity for purposes of showing a retaliation claim under Title VII or NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects seeking legal counsel about LAD rights from retaliation, but taking FMLA leave is not protected activity under the LAD.

Reuter v. Berkeley Township · filed 2025-07-31(d)

We do not, however, agree that taking FMLA leave is a protected activity pursuant to the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects employees who oppose unlawful discrimination; asking about a maternity leave policy without raising discrimination is not protected activity.

HAILEY v. EVPASSPORT LLC · filed 2025-10-07(d)

Here, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for protected activity; an involuntary transfer may be an adverse employment action.

Stouch v. Department of Child Protection and Permanency · filed 2025-05-07(d)

With respect to adverse employment action, there appears to be a genuine factual dispute as to whether plaintiff's transfer to the Camden office was voluntary or involuntary.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation against employees who seek to enforce the LAD; a retaliation claim requires evidence linking protected activity to an adverse employment decision.

Fleischmann v. New Jersey Department of the Treasury · filed 2026-02-04(d)

Employers are prohibited from retaliating against employees who seek to enforce the LAD. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). ... Here, plaintiff failed to provide any "unusually suggestive" facts that would warrant the judge finding temporal proximity to satisfy the causation element for a retaliation claim.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show a causal link between protected activity and the employer’s adverse decision.

Gurdgiel v. County of Cape May Library · filed 2026-06-18(d)

Our review reflects that plaintiff has not satisfied the causality prong of the retaliation analysis. The record does not demonstrate that defendant terminated plaintiff because he requested reasonable accommodations or complained of unfair treatment related to his medical condition.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to conduct forbidden by the NJLAD when the complaint’s content asserts NJLAD rights, regardless of its form.

SAPP · filed 2026-03-06(d)

However, the Court does note that when assessing protected activity under NJLAD, it is not the form of a plaintiff’s opposition that is relevant but rather its content, and whether that opposition alleges that plaintiff’s rights under the NJLAD were violated.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee’s requests for disability accommodations and efforts to obtain legal advice about those rights from retaliation.

Reid v. Summit Board of Education · filed 2026-04-02(d)

The LAD explicitly classifies retaining counsel to advocate for health and safety related to her disability, and her advocating for herself in the same way, as a protected activity.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation against employees who seek to enforce the LAD; a retaliation claim requires an adverse employment decision, and a negative evaluation or reassignment without tangible detriment is insufficient.

Harris v. Newark Board of Education · filed 2026-05-18(d)

Employers cannot retaliate against employees who seek to enforce the LAD. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the LAD, a plaintiff must show, among other requirements, they were subjected to an adverse employment decision by the defendant. Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 548-49 (App. Div. 1995). We have held a negative employment evaluation or a job reassignment, unaccompanied by a tangible detriment, such as a salary ... reduction or job transfer, is insufficient to rise to the level of an adverse employment action. El-Sioufi, 382 N.J. Super. at 176. Because plaintiff does not allege adverse employment action, her retaliation claim fails.

Section 10:5-12(d) retaliation claims use the same evidentiary framework as FMLA and Title VII retaliation claims.

Laurora v. Bayer Corp · filed 2022-09-07(d)

Retaliation claims under the FMLA, Title VII and the NJLAD are assessed through the same evidentiary framework.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits reprisals for filing a discrimination complaint; a continuing violation claim requires an act contributing to the claim within the filing period.

Settineri v. PNC Bank Corp. · filed 2004-07-16(d)

Here, neither Ahern nor Brundage committed any act contributing to plaintiff's claim within the two-year statutory period.

Section 10:5-12 provides a discrimination claim independent of a collective bargaining agreement, so the LMRA does not preempt the claim merely because the agreement also prohibits discrimination.

Carrington v. RCA Global Communications, Inc. · filed 1991-04-26

In this case, both the existence and the scope of plaintiffs state law discrimination claims under the NJLAD are derived independently from state law, and not from the obligations assumed by the parties under the labor agreement.

Section 10:5-12(r) prohibits retaliation for discussing compensation, but a claim under it is preempted when the same dispute falls within the NLRB’s jurisdiction and the local interest exception does not apply.

DAVIS v. BENIHANA, INC. · filed 2025-02-20(r)

Applying the same analytical framework as it did to the CEPA claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s NJLAD’s anti-wage discrimination claim under Section 10:5-12(r) is identical to an unfair labor practices charge that he could have filed with the NLRB. Thus, there is also a risk of interference with the Board’s regulatory jurisdiction by proceeding with the NJLAD claim. ... Plaintiff’s claims are preempted under Garmon and must go before the National Labor Relations Board.

An employer’s liability for a supervisor’s harassment depends on more than the supervisor’s status; the employer’s harassment policy and procedures for addressing complaints also matter.

Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters · filed 2014-09-16(a)

If the determination of Harrington's supervisory status was the only test to impose vicarious liability upon defendant, summary judgment would have been prematurely granted. However, Lehmann and its progeny make clear vicarious liability is dependent upon additional facts.

A sexual harassment claim under § 10:5-12(a) has a two-year limitations period; a single incident does not qualify as a continuing violation.

May v. BOROUGH OF PINE HILL · filed 2010-12-17(a)

It is undisputed that there is a two year statute of limitations for claims under the NJLAD. ... The entirety of the alleged sexual harassment by Defendant Kearney occurred at a single meal in November 2007, more than two years prior to April 2010 and outside the statute of limitations period. ... Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Kearney in Count One are therefore time-barred, and Count One of the Complaint must be dismissed as to Defendant Kearney.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits an employer to raise an affirmative defense to supervisor harassment when the supervisor took no tangible employment action, but the employer must show reasonable efforts to prevent and correct the harassment and an unreasonable failure by the employee to use available safeguards.

Harris v. RAILROAD CONSTRUCTORS, INC. · filed 2010-12-07(a)

However, if a supervisor created a hostile environment, but failed to take a tangible employment action against the employee, the employer may raise an affirmative defense by showing (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassment, and (2) that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities or to otherwise avoid harm. ... Defendant has not met its burden of establishing an affirmative defense to employer liability. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion will be denied as to Plaintiffs racial and sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the NJLAD, and § 1981.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits workplace sexual harassment when conduct is severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person in the protected class believe the work environment is hostile or abusive.

Anastasia v. Wakefield · filed 2011-12-15(a)

A hostile work environment claim under the NJLAD requires the plaintiff to show conduct that is so “severe or pervasive” that a reasonable person in the protected class would believe that “the conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive.” ... That is not sexual harassment under New Jersey law.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employer discrimination, and a hostile-environment claim under it rests on vicarious liability.

Calkins v. Dollarland, Inc. · filed 2000-09-26(a)

In any case, claims of hostile-environment harassment under NJLAD are grounded in a theory of vicarious liability, ... as are, of course, respondeat superior claims. As such, count eleven is redundant and will be dismissed.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions for a hostile work environment claim.

Lynch v. New Deal Delivery Service Inc. · filed 1997-08-12(a)

Collectively, they do not rise to the level required to render a work environment hostile and bring it within the purview of the NJLAD. It follows that Lynch has failed to present sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment against her claim of hostile work environment.

Section 10:5-12(b) treats a hostile work environment as the harm in a sexual harassment claim; a plaintiff need not prove a separate injury caused by the violation.

Baliko v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPER. ENGINEERS · filed 1999-06-22(b)

The trial court must emphasize to the jury that it is unnecessary for each plaintiff to prove she was subjectively harmed to establish an LAD violation as the "hostile work environment is the legally recognized harm."

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits a supervisor’s unwelcome remarks or physical contact with an employee when the conduct occurs because of the employee’s sex.

TL v. ToysR'Us, Inc. · filed 1992-04-16(a)

Although no New Jersey case has specifically addressed the issue of sex discrimination as it pertains to non quid pro quo sexual harassment, we are convinced that when a supervisor makes unwelcome offensive remarks or physical contact with a subordinate employee that would not otherwise have been made, but for the sex of the subordinate, such conduct discriminates on the basis of sex.

Section 10:5-12(a) can hold an employer liable for workplace sexual harassment by an independent contractor when the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take appropriate corrective action.

Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods · filed 1996-05-16(a)

We apply both 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(d) and (e) to the LAD. The overwhelming body of federal precedent has applied them to Title VII. We can see no policy reason not to apply them to the LAD. Regarding subsection (e), it must be emphasized that, while the harasser may not be an employee, the victim is an employee. An employer that knows or should know its employee is being harassed in the workplace, regardless of by whom, should take appropriate action.

Section 10:5-12 does not impose employer liability for sexual harassment by non-supervisory employees outside the workplace when the employer has no authority over the forum where it occurs.

Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1999-06-09

Under the LAD, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate in conditions of employment. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. ... In this case, no evidence suggests that any individual defendant was plaintiff's supervisor or invoked any authority delegated by Continental to perpetuate harassment of plaintiff through the Forum. Nor does any evidence suggest that Continental had any direct authority over the Forum such that it could inspect or police the information posted.

Section 10:5-12(f) prohibits hostile-environment sexual harassment of students in public schools.

KP, Ex Rel. SC v. Corsey · filed 2002-10-30(f)

In this case, it is clear from the established precedent of the New Jersey Supreme Court that sexual harassment based on a hostile environment is prohibited in schools under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim when a reasonable woman could find the environment hostile because of her sex, even if a man was exposed to the same conduct.

Thomas v. Town of Hammonton · filed 2003-12-04(a)

If a jury agreed that this perception of Thomas's was a reasonable one for a woman in her position, it could find that she was a victim of sexual harassment even though DeStefano was exposed to the same conduct.

Section 10:5-12(l) prohibits conditioning continued business with a company on its owner's submission to sexual demands.

Jt's Tire Serv. v. United Rentals · filed 2010-01-06(l)

Based on Lehmann, and the plain language of the LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12( l ), we have no hesitation in concluding that quid pro quo sexual harassment violates subsection ( l ).

Section 10:5-12 does not permit an employer to use the affirmative defense to vicarious liability for a supervisor’s sexual harassment when the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as termination or lost pay.

MCBRIDE VS. FOULKE MANAGEMENT, ETC. (L-2633-17, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-18(a)

The affirmative defense does not apply where an employee is subject to a tangible employment action. ... That fact issue precludes a proper determination defendant is entitled to summary judgment based on the affirmative defense adopted in Aguas on defendant's narrowly targeted summary judgment motion.

Section 10:5-12(g) permits a housing applicant to bring a sexual harassment claim against a leasing manager's employer when the manager conditions an apartment offer on sex.

Traore v. Fairview Homes Preservation, L.P. · filed 2023-11-22(g)

Traore has sufficiently pled an LAD claim against Related because Mendoza's touching of Traore and quid pro quo offer of an apartment and ... financial assistance in exchange for sex was intended to benefit Related by leasing a Fairview apartment if she acceded to his demands.

Section 10:5-12(l) prohibits refusing to contract with an independent contractor because of age; the claimant must prove a refusal to contract caused by age.

FENNIMORE v. PARTYLITE GIFTS, INC. · filed 2021-08-17(l)

Thus, because no reasonable jury could conclude that PartyLite refused to contract with Plaintiff or that Ricca’s decision to select Yanuskiewicz as her Designee was in any way based on Plaintiff’s age, Count I is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 10:5-12(l) prohibits discriminatory refusals to do business; the expiration of a planned three-month project without renewal did not establish a refusal to contract.

CPM CONSULTING LLC v. CAPSUGEL US LLC · filed 2020-09-21(l)

As a result, Plaintiff fails to establish that Capsugel refused to do business or contract with Plaintiff.

Subsection (l) does not prohibit refusing to contract with a parent because of the parent's child's disability.

CRAIG SASHIHARA, ETC. VS. NOBEL LEARNING COMMUNITIES, INC., ETC. (L-2227-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-16(l)

The statute, despite listing multiple classes of persons, does not name "child" as one of the protected persons.

Subsection (l) prohibits refusing to contract with an independent contractor, or terminating that contract, because of age.

Rubin v. Chilton · filed 2003-04-01(l)

We are persuaded plaintiffs can, indeed, legitimately advance a claim that the Hospital refused to contract with them because of their age in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 l .

Section 10:5-12(l) prohibits refusing to contract with a person because of drug addiction protected as a handicap.

Horn v. Mazda Motor of America · filed 1993-05-28(l)

Mazda was not legally entitled to refuse to contract with Mr. Seneca because of his addiction. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12( l ) (prohibiting discrimination in contracting); N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1 (extending the protections of the Law Against Discrimination to handicapped persons); Matter of Cahill, 245 N.J. Super. 397, 585 A. 2d 977 (App.Div. 1991) (defining a drug addict as a handicapped person); see also Estate of Behringer v. Princeton Med. Ctr., 249 N.J. Super. 597, 642-644, 592 A. 2d 1251 (Law Div. 1991) (surgeon handicapped by AIDS is protected by LAD).

Section 10:5-12(l) covers discriminatory refusal to contract or termination of a contract, but does not cover discrimination during an existing contract.

UBER DRIVER PARTNER EMERY v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC. · filed 2021-03-12(l)

Emery’s claim that Uber violated N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(l) by expecting him to submit to sexual demands from riders—in the course of his relationship with the company, under the then-operative TSA—does not “provide a basis for liability,” because N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(l) does not cover discrimination “during the ongoing execution of a contract.”

Section 10:5-12(l) prohibits refusing to contract with someone because of race, including a stated refusal to enter future contracts.

THOMAS v. U-HAUL COMPANY · filed 2024-10-15(l)

Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts that could establish a claim of discrimination under N.J.S.A. § 10-5:12(l), showing both a stated future refusal to contract with the plaintiff on the basis of race and discriminatory intent.

Section 10:5-12(l) prohibits discrimination in refusing to contract with an individual and can protect independent contractors.

HERRERA v. GOYA FOODS INC. · filed 2022-11-14(l)

Additionally, the NJLAD prohibits discrimination in refusing to “contract with” an individual, see N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(l), but the CFEPA does not protect independent contractors.

A labor union can be liable under subsection (b) for sex-based picket-line harassment attributable to it, and members who assist or encourage that conduct can be liable under subsection (e) as aiders and abettors.

Baliko v. Stecker · filed 1994-07-20(b), (e)

We conclude therefore that the conduct which plaintiffs have alleged, if attributable to Local 825, would violate N.J.S.A. 10:5-12b. ... If one member assists, supports, encourages, and supplements the efforts of another in conduct which violates the LAD, the local may be liable as a principal for violating N.J.S.A. 10:5-12b and individual members may be liable as aiders and abettors for violating N.J.S.A. 10:5-12e.

Section 10:5-12(b) applies to labor unions, so a union can face a discrimination claim even if it was not the plaintiff’s employer.

Treusch v. Center Square Supermarket, LLC · filed 2013-01-31(b)

The prohibitions against unlawful discrimination and employment discrimination contained in the NJLAD are expressly applicable to labor unions. ... Therefore, Local 152’s arguments that it cannot be held liable under the NJLAD because it was not Plaintiffs employer is without merit.

For employment discrimination, § 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for supervisors who affirmatively discriminate within the scope of employment, but not for nonsupervisory coworkers or supervisors whose only conduct is inaction.

Tyson v. Cigna Corp. · filed 1996-02-26(e)

We hold that the NJLAD: (1) does not impose liability on non-supervisory employees, and (2) imposes liability on supervisory employees only to the extent that the supervisory employee affirmatively engages in discriminatory conduct while acting in the scope of employment. A supervisory employee’s omissions, acquiescence, passivity or other failure to act will not support a claim under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for a supervisor’s intentional involvement in discriminatory conduct; inaction alone is insufficient.

Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department · filed 1996-07-12(e)

The original charge and the amended version make it perfectly clear that Madamba may not be held liable unless he intentionally involved himself in unlawful, sexually harassing conduct. We see no error.

Section 10:5-12(e) does not impose liability on an employee who lacks direct supervisory authority over the employee alleging discrimination.

Poveromo-Spring v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1997-06-26(e)

The LAD does not permit this type of action unless the accused individual employee has direct supervisory authority over his or her fellow employee, ie., the victim.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for a supervisor who aids or abets an employer’s discrimination through affirmative acts or deliberate indifference.

Horvath v. Rimtec Corp. · filed 2000-06-27(e)

In addition, there is sufficient evidence in the record that a jury could find that Koeda had knowledge of plaintiffs claims of discrimination and failed to stop them or at least investigate them. Thus, he may have violated his duty through his “deliberate indifference or affirmative acts.” ... In sum, the Court holds that plaintiffs claim under the NJLAD against defendant Koeda does not fail as a matter of law.

Section 10:5-12(e) provides the route for individual supervisor liability for discrimination or a hostile work environment through aiding and abetting.

Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff's Office · filed 2008-05-28(e)

Instead, individual liability of a supervisor for acts of discrimination or for creating or maintaining a hostile environment can only arise through the “aiding and abetting” mechanism that applies to “any person.”

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability through its aiding and abetting provision, including when a supervisor committed the alleged discrimination himself.

Mann v. Estate of Meyers · filed 2014-11-21(e)

The Act makes it unlawful for “any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). ... I will follow those precedents. Meyers (and by extension his Estate) is a proper defendant for Mann’s discrimination claims under the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for supervisors who commit acts forbidden by the LAD.

VELEZ VS. ROCKTENN COMPANY (L-1228-12, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-30(e)

A supervisor may be held individually liable for acts forbidden by the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) permits a retaliation claim directly against an individual who takes reprisals for protected activity.

MCDERMOTT v. QUALCARE, INC. · filed 2020-11-30(d)

Unlike discrimination, NJLAD retaliation may be directly asserted against an individual defendant. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) (making it unlawful “for any person to take reprisals against any person” due to the latter’s protected activities) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12742, at *37-38 (D.N.J. May 28, 1998) (rejecting argument that individual employees cannot be liable for retaliation under the NJLAD).

Individual employees may be liable under the NJLAD for aiding and abetting discrimination only if the employer is found liable.

KUMAR v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2021-08-25

Because Kumar no longer asserts an NJLAD claim against the NJSDA in her Amended Complaint, which is a necessary predicate for subsequent employee liability, and in fact modified the original Complaint by removing the NJSDA as a Defendant, I DISMISS this claim.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for a supervisor through aiding and abetting.

MILLER v. GOLDCREST PROPERTIES, LLC · filed 2023-06-23(e)

Thus, in order to establish individual liability against the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff’s NJLAD claims must be based on a theory of aiding and abetting.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for supervisors who aid and abet discrimination, including through their own conduct.

BLOUNT v. TD BANK NA · filed 2023-11-09(e)

The Court has reviewed this portion of its decision and maintains that it is a correct recitation of applicable law. Indeed, the NJLAD prohibits unlawful discrimination by an employer, does not include individual supervisors in its definition of “employer,” and individual liability for such supervisors may only arise from aiding-and-abetting conduct.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for supervisors who aid or abet an employer’s discrimination, but not for their direct discriminatory acts.

BONDS v. NJ JUDICIARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURT · filed 2024-05-09(e)

In other words, individual liability for supervisors under NJLAD may only arise from aiding-and-abetting conduct. ... Being that the Amended Employee Defendants are all alleged individual employees of the NJ Judiciary and former supervisors of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Count Six of her Second Amended Complaint is therefore impermissible, duplicative and futile, insofar as it relates to the Amended Employee Defendants.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not impose individual liability on supervisors; a claim against a supervisor may proceed under subsection (e) for aiding and abetting.

Kennedy v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies · filed 1999-08-26(a)

Similarly, unless liability under NJLAD is imposed under § 10:5-12(e), the section which prohibits individuals from aiding and abetting another’s violation of NJLAD, the Third Circuit has held that there is no individual liability for supervisors under § 10:5-12(a) of the NJLAD. ... Here, there is no indication in the summary judgment record or in plaintiffs brief in opposition to the motion that plaintiffs NJLAD claim against Nadbielny is predicated upon a theory of aiding and abetting prohibited by N.J.S.A. § 10:5—12(e).

Subsection (e) can apply to threats against a business that refuses to fire gay employees without offending the First Amendment.

Presbytery of New Jersey of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman · filed 1996-10-25(e)

Likewise, a person who threatened a business if it refused to fire its gay employees could certainly be held liable as a "coercer" under the Law Against Discrimination without offending the Speech Clause.

Section 10:5-12’s aiding and abetting and boycott provisions have constitutional applications and are not facially invalid under the First Amendment.

Presbytery Of New Jersey Of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman · filed 1996-10-25

Because appellants have not presented a valid facial challenge to the Law Against Discrimination and because the district court abstained properly from their "as applied" challenge, we will affirm.

Labor organizations may be liable for aiding and abetting discrimination under Section 10:5-12(e).

Jackson v. T & N VAN SERVICE · filed 2000-09-27(e)

Based on the above, this Court finds that labor organizations may be potentially liable under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) for aiding and abetting an alleged NJLAD violation against a plaintiff.

Section 10:5-12(e) makes an employee liable for aiding and abetting an employer’s unlawful discrimination when the employee knows of the breach and gives substantial assistance or encouragement.

Failla v. City of Passaic · filed 1998-05-29(e)

Accordingly, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would find that an employee aids and abets a violation of the LAD when he knowingly gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the unlawful conduct of his employer.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits aiding and abetting liability when a supervisor substantially contributes to a hostile work environment.

Hurley v. Atl Cty Pol Dept · filed 1999-03-18(e)

At all events, as discussed below in Section IV.A.2, we conclude that a reasonable jury could impose aiding and abetting liability on Madamba for his substantial contribution to the hostile work environment; his putative advances could be evidence of aiding and abetting.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits aiding and abetting liability when a person knowingly gives substantial assistance or encouragement to an employer’s unlawful discrimination.

Mobley v. City of Atlantic City Police Department · filed 1999-06-24(e)

Under this standard, the court finds that Rifice, Fair, Loen and Snyder are entitled to summary judgment on Mobley’s LAD claims. Just as no reasonable jury could find intentional discrimination on the basis of gender from the record evidence in this case, no reasonable jury could find that these defendants provided substantial assistance to any alleged unlawful conduct by the ACPD from this evidence.

Section 10:5-12(e) can reach a workers' compensation carrier that aids an employer's discrimination, but an unsupported allegation of an improper investigation does not establish substantial assistance.

Gardenhire v. New Jersey Mfrs. · filed 2000-04-05(e)

Thus, as an undisputed initial matter, this court finds that Melchiore and NJM may be potentially liable under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) for aiding and abetting an alleged LAD violation against plaintiff. ... An unsubstantiated allegation of an improper workers compensation investigation does not implicate § 12(e) liability as such conduct by itself does not rise to the amount of assistance required to be deemed "aiding and abetting."

Section 10:5-12(e) permits liability for aiding and abetting another person’s harassment, but a principal harasser cannot aid and abet his own conduct.

Newsome v. Administrative Office of the Courts of New Jersey · filed 2000-07-05(e)

Moreover, Coleman, as the alleged principal wrongdoer, cannot aid and abet his own wrongful conduct.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for supervisors who aid or abet an employer’s unlawful discrimination.

Santiago v. City of Vineland · filed 2000-08-02(e)

However, the NJLAD does impose liability on individual supervisors who aid or abet a principal who violates the law.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires knowing and substantial assistance for aiding and abetting liability; notice or limited involvement is insufficient.

Bowers v. . National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Act, Inc. · filed 2001-08-06(e)

As in Gardenhire, this evidence falls short of proof that ACT/Clearinghouse “had any role as part of an overall scheme to discriminate” or that ACT/Clearinghouse “knowingly and substantially assisted” in discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for supervisors who aid or abet an employer’s unlawful employment actions.

Hargrave v. County of Atlantic · filed 2003-05-12(e)

The NJLAD does, however, contain a separate provision which expressly contemplates individual liability for supervisors who “aid or abet” an employer’s unlawful employment actions.

A supervisor aids and abets an employer's discrimination under subsection (e) only by giving substantial assistance or encouragement to the unlawful conduct.

Bonitsis v. NJ INSTITUTE OF TECH. · filed 2003-10-29(e)

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) states that it is an unlawful employment practice for any person, "whether an employer or an employee... to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce" discriminatory conduct against an employee. When determining whether a supervisor has aided and abetted the discriminatory conduct of the employer, a factfinder must find that the supervisor gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the unlawful conduct of the employer.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires knowing and intentional assistance for aiding and abetting liability; a construction official’s lack of diligence alone is insufficient.

Alliance v. RENAISSANCE ENTER. · filed 2004-07-27(e)

It is impossible to infer from the record here that the Construction Official willfully and knowingly approved these plans, intending to further the construction of housing that did not comply with the subcode. The Construction Official may have been less than diligent in the manner in which he fulfilled his job responsibilities. Lack of diligence, however, is not enough to transform him into an aider and abettor and subject to liability under LAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability only when a person knowingly gives substantial assistance or encouragement to an employer’s unlawful conduct.

Figueroa v. City of Camden · filed 2008-10-02(e)

One is only liable for “aiding and abetting” under the NJLAD when “he knowingly gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the unlawful conduct of [the] employer.”

Aiding and abetting liability under § 10:5-12(e) requires an underlying NJLAD violation by the employer.

Peacock v. ALBERTSONS ACME MARKETS · filed 2009-04-16(e)

In order to impose individual liability on a supervisor for aiding or abetting, Peacock must establish a violation of the NJ LAD by her employer under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). Because the underlying hostile work environment and failure to accommodate claims against Acme fail, the aiding and abetting claim against Carlueci must also fail.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows aiding and abetting liability when a supervisor willfully ignores complaints of discriminatory harassment.

Ivan v. County of Middlesex · filed 2009-05-06(e)

If the aiding and abetting prohibition is to have any effect at all it must prohibit such willful indifference to violations of the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows individual supervisor liability for discrimination or a hostile work environment through aiding and abetting, which the complaint must allege.

Clayton v. City of Atlantic City · filed 2010-06-30(e)

The Court agrees. In her opposition brief, Clayton clarified that her NJLAD claim against Mooney is based on a theory of his aiding and abetting under N.J.S.A 10:5—12(e) (Opp’n Br. at 16); however, the Complaint does not assert an aiding or abetting claim. As such, Plaintiffs NJLAD claim against Mooney is dismissed without prejudice. As “individual liability for a supervisor for acts of discrimination or for creating or maintaining a hostile environment can only arise through the ‘aiding and abetting’ mechanism,” the individual claims against Nolan and Vandenberg are also dismissed without prejudice.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability when an employee knowingly and substantially aids or abets an employer’s discriminatory act.

DeSantis v. New Jersey Transit · filed 2015-04-29(e)

To hold an employee liable as an aider and abettor, Plaintiff must show: (1) the employer whom the defendant aided performed a wrongful act causing an injury; (2) the defendant was generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provided the assistance; and (3) the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the principal violation.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits claims against employees who aid or abet unlawful discrimination, but those claims require an underlying wrongful act.

Oguejiofo v. Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ L · filed 2017-07-31(e)

NJLAD provides for claims against individual employees who “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce” any acts forbidden under the statute. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 928 (N.J. 2004). The District Court properly found that the claims for aiding and abetting fail because “there is no underlying wrongful act” which the accused aided and abetted.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires an underlying wrongful act and knowing, substantial assistance to establish aiding-and-abetting liability.

WILLIAMS VS. CITY OF NEWARK (L-5682-10, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-11-28(e)

Here, there is no evidence of wrongful acts or knowledge of an overall illegal or tortious activity within the meaning of the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires a viable underlying discrimination or hostile work environment claim for aiding and abetting liability.

Canete v. Barnabas Health System · filed 2018-04-11(e)

Because his underlying discrimination and hostile work environment claims fail, Canete’s aiding and abetting claims must also. See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J. 2004).

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting only if the employer is liable for an underlying NJLAD violation.

BOWIE v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION · filed 2019-07-22(e)

Because Bowie’s underlying NJLAD claim for unlawful termination fails, there can be no claim for aiding and abetting against Dezendorf in violation of the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) prohibits any person, including a non-employer, from knowingly giving substantial assistance to discrimination forbidden by the NJLAD.

MICHALAK v. SERVPRO INDUSTRIES, INC. · filed 2019-08-06(e)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct. ... The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VII.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits liability for a person who aids and abets an underlying violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

K.J. v. GREATER EGG HARBOR REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2019-12-16(e)

As is clear from a cursory glance at this Court’s recent cases interpreting the NJLAD, persons may be held liable for aiding and abetting underlying violations of the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows individual supervisor liability through aiding and abetting; alleged supervisory authority and involvement can make such a claim colorable for purposes of fraudulent joinder.

MCBURNIE v. CRC INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. · filed 2020-03-23(e)

“[I]ndividual liability of supervisors [under the NJLAD] . . . can only arise through the ‘aiding and abetting’ mechanism” of the NJLAD. Cicchetti v. Morris Cty. Sherriff’s Office, 947 A.2d 626, 645 (N.J. 2008) (quoting N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(e)). ... For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s NJLAD claims against Defendants Obenauer and Howard are not “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability when a supervisor repeatedly fails to take prompt action to end known harassment.

WILLIAMS v. LENAPE BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2020-05-04(e)

However, a supervisor’s repeated failure to take prompt action to end known harassment does constitute aiding and abetting under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires active and purposeful conduct for individual aiding and abetting liability; a conclusory allegation of substantial assistance is insufficient.

SIMON v. SAINT DOMINIC ACADEMY · filed 2020-07-29(e)

To conclude that an individual person is liable under an aiding and abetting theory there must be “active and purposeful conduct.” ... But Plaintiff fails to plead any facts to support this conclusory allegation. As a result, Count Four is dismissed as to Farrales.

Section 10:5-12(e) makes an employee liable for knowingly and substantially assisting another’s discriminatory act.

DILLARD v. MORRIS COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE · filed 2020-08-24(e)

The NJLAD makes it unlawful for an employee “to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the statute], or to attempt to do so.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). ... Here, Dillard has sufficiently alleged aiding and abetting claims against Speirs, Murzenski, and McNamara.

Section 10:5-12 supports a colorable aiding and abetting claim against a supervisor alleged to have heard an employee’s pay discrimination complaints and then retaliated against her.

CASANOVA v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC. · filed 2020-08-31(e)

Defendants fail to show these allegations do not amount to colorable grounds to support an aiding and abetting claim against Mr. Boyce.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows a supervisor to be held individually liable for knowingly and substantially assisting discrimination prohibited by the LAD.

WICKER v. BLOOMFIELD DISCOUNT, LLC · filed 2020-09-02(e)

A supervisor may be found individually liable under the LAD if he aids and abets the action prohibited by the act. ... It can be inferred from the statement that the owner only hires women for the cashier position that Khan knowingly and substantially assisted in creating this policy. Khan’s motion to dismiss as to Count Six is therefore DENIED.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits personal liability for aiding or abetting conduct forbidden by the NJLAD.

GRAHAM v. UNIVERSITY RADIOLOGY GROUP · filed 2020-09-22(e)

The NJLAD provides it is unlawful “[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden [the act], or to attempt to do so.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). Such conduct may result in personal liability.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires active and purposeful assistance to hold an individual within a public entity liable for aiding and abetting discrimination.

H. v. M. · filed 2020-10-27(e)

While the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged the wrongful conduct at issue was the North Warren Defendants’ deliberate indifference to sexual abuse and harassment, Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts to support the requirements of aiding and abetting.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits a supervisor to be liable for aiding and abetting his own conduct that creates a hostile work environment.

WILLIAMS v. TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD · filed 2020-12-09(e)

Under the third prong, DeSimone can be held liable for aiding and abetting his own conduct as Plaintiff’s supervisor.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits a supervisor to be individually liable for aiding and abetting a hostile work environment through his own conduct.

WILLIAMS v. TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD · filed 2020-12-15(e)

Under the third prong, DeSimone can be held liable for aiding and abetting his own conduct as Plaintiff’s supervisor.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits an individual supervisor to be liable for aiding and abetting his own harassing conduct; the plaintiff need not name another individual defendant.

KASTEN v. SHAAN ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2021-02-26(e)

Therefore, there is no need for Plaintiff to name another individual as a Defendant; her aiding and abetting claim is targeted at Lebron, an individual serving in a supervisory role who is already named as a Defendant.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits aiding and abetting liability only when an underlying discriminatory act occurred.

LAVERNE SANDERS VS. DIVISION OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES (L-1533-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-20(e)

Moreover, because we concur with the judge's determination defendants did not engage in discriminatory conduct under the NJLAD, plaintiff's aiding and abetting claims necessarily fails.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits a supervisor who personally carries out an employer's discriminatory act to be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation.

MCCARTHY VS. CARE ONE MANAGEMENT, LLC (L-8657-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-12(e)

That Fitzpatrick-Durski herself fired plaintiff does not relieve her from personal liability under the aiding or abetting theory. To the contrary, that she personally carried out the adverse employment action is precisely the reason she can be held liable under the LAD's aiding and abetting mechanism.

Section 10:5-12(e) does not permit corporate defendants to aid and abet their own violations of § 10:5-12(a) or (d).

BERDZIK v. PHYSICIANS ENDOSCOPY, LLC · filed 2021-07-30(e)

Plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain claims against the Corporate Defendants both for violations of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) and (d), and for aiding and abetting such violations under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e), as the Corporate Defendants cannot aid and abet their own acts in these circumstances.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits aiding-and-abetting liability against a supervisor when deliberate indifference to harassment provides substantial assistance to the violation.

WILMOTH v. ARPIN AMERICA MOVING SYSTEMS, LLC · filed 2021-08-19(e)

With respect to inaction, the Court agrees with Defendants that failure to act, standing alone, is insufficient. ... Construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is plausible that Silvestri’s inaction amounted to deliberate indifference and/or an affirmative act based on a combination of his complete failure to respond to Plaintiff’s complaints and his alleged participation in retaliatory acts.

Section 10:5-12(e) prohibits aiding or abetting unlawful discrimination; liability requires knowing and substantial assistance with the underlying violation.

ANDRE v. TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION · filed 2021-08-31(e)

Under NJLAD, it is unlawful “for any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so.” N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(e). ... Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, supervisors were aware of Plaintiff’s discrimination complaints against Defendant Fuscellaro, and supervisors participated in Plaintiff’s termination decision. There are material facts in dispute as to the rationale and decision-making process for Plaintiff’s termination.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits aiding-and-abetting liability for a supervisor who knowingly and substantially assists a discriminatory termination, even if the supervisor participated in the termination decision.

HAHN v. THE REALREAL, INC. · filed 2021-09-17(e)

Therefore, a finding that Wainwright participated in the termination decision will not preclude a finding that she aided and abetted the termination.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits aiding and abetting claims against supervisory employees when an NJLAD claim against their employer survives summary judgment.

PRIOLI v. COUNTY OF OCEAN · filed 2021-09-30(e)

The NJLAD makes it unlawful “[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NJLAD], or to attempt to do so.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). ... This allows Plaintiffs to pursue a NJLAD aiding and abetting claim against Ocean’s employees. ... Therefore, Individual Defendants are proper defendants for Plaintiffs’ NJLAD aiding and abetting claims.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for supervisors who aid and abet discriminatory conduct, including their own conduct.

VENSON v. PRO CUSTOM SOLAR LLC · filed 2021-10-25(e)

Anclien and Alper may nevertheless be held individually liable under the NJLAD’s “aiding, abetting, and inciting” mechanism, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e). ... The Court therefore finds the aiding and abetting claims against Anclien and Alper are not futile.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits personal liability for a supervisor who knowingly and substantially assists a hostile work environment or retaliation, including through the supervisor’s own acts.

MARTINEZ v. CITY OF UNION CITY · filed 2021-11-08(e)

Aiding and abetting amounts to a mechanism for imposing personal liability for a violation of the NJLAD. ... Thus, having already found above that Martinez has stated NJLAD claims against the City for hostile work environment and retaliation, I find also that she has stated parallel NJLAD claims against Matulewicz for aiding and abetting those acts.

Section 10:5-12(e) makes a person liable for knowingly and substantially aiding an employer’s NJLAD violation, including through that person’s own conduct.

DICKERSON v. NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY · filed 2022-01-10(e)

NJLAD makes it unlawful for “any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). ... I now find that she has adequately alleged that Crawford aided and abetted those harassment and retaliation violations.

Section 10:5-12(e) allows individual liability for a supervisor who aids or abets workplace harassment, including through deliberate indifference.

Thange v. OXFORD GLOBAL RESOURCES, LLC · filed 2022-06-07(e)

The NJLAD makes it unlawful “[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NJLAD], or to attempt to do so.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). ... The question whether King heard, authorized, participated, or acted deliberately indifferent to Adkins’s alleged harassment towards Plaintiff is left to the jury. Accordingly, King’s motion for summary judgment on Counts III and VI is denied.

Section 10:5-12(e) requires an underlying wrongful act by the employer for an aiding and abetting claim against an individual to survive.

MUTAZZ v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC · filed 2022-07-13(e)

Because this Court has dismissed discrimination claims with respect to Amazon, Plaintiff’s aiding and abetting claim cannot survive.

Section 10:5-12(e) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discrimination only when the employer can first be found liable.

DAVENPORT v. NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES · filed 2022-08-23(e)

Here, where the NJBPU is immune from suit, “it would be impossible to establish that the alleged aiders and abetters, .. . are liable because a predicate finding that the [NJBPU] is liable cannot be made.”

Section 10:5-12(e) allows aiding and abetting liability when a person knowingly and substantially assists a discriminatory act.

LAUTO v. DOVER PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2022-08-24(e)

Here, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a claim for aider and abettor liability. ... Plaintiff has sufficiently asserted that Defendants knowingly engaged in the alleged conduct. Count Nine therefore remains.