N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment; a termination claimant’s prima facie case requires protected class membership, qualification or performance, termination, and replacement by someone younger.

Tegler v. Global Spectrum · filed 2018-02-14(a)

Age discrimination in employment violates NJLAD. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... To establish a prima facie case of termination based on age, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position from which she was discharged, or, stated differently, was performing in the position from which she was terminated; (3) she was nevertheless terminated from that position; and (4) she was replaced by someone younger.

A student alleging age discrimination under Section 10:5-12 must plead facts linking the challenged treatment to the student's age.

D.B. AND C.B. VS. JERSEY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-3334-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-07

In this case, count two was not dismissed because the judge found that there is no remedy under NJLAD, but because plaintiffs failed to state any facts to support that the treatment D.B. received was due to his young age.

In a reduction-in-force age discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(a), an employee need not show that they were replaced, but must rebut the employer's legitimate reasons for eliminating the position.

SHRADER VS. DATAMOTION, INC. (L-2562-15, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-10(a)

Unlike the trial court, we find that plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of age discrimination. ... Thus, as plaintiff did not meet his burden in refuting defendants' stated non-discriminatory, legitimate business reasons for eliminating his position, we conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to defendants.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits age and gender discrimination claims to proceed when material facts remain disputed about the employer’s decision.

MARINO v. WESTFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2020-03-03(a)

In sum, there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Plaintiff establishes a prima facie age discrimination claim under the ADEA or the LAD, or a reverse gender discrimination claim under Title VII or the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment without requiring an employee to be at least forty years old.

RUDOLPH v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC. · filed 2021-03-02(a)

The primary difference between the two statutes for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case is that individuals need not be forty years old to be protected against age discrimination under NJLAD.

An age discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(a) can fail on summary judgment when the employer gives a legitimate reason for termination and the evidence does not show that age influenced the decision.

PATIKOWSKI VS. ST. PETER'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL (L-3214-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-03-03(a)

Even if plaintiff established a prima facie case of age discrimination, defendant articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination—the May 28, 2015 incident. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we are satisfied that defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff was based on legitimate criteria. Therefore, summary judgment on plaintiff's age discrimination claim was properly granted.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not treat a weekly appointment requirement imposed on younger employees too as age discrimination without evidence that it was applied because of age.

JANE ROCKS v. PNC INVESTMENTS, LLC (L-0114-19, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-04-04(a)

The record plainly does not support plaintiffs' contentions that the weekly appointment requirements constituted age discrimination in violation of the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of age.

BOYD v. RIGGS DISTLER AND COMPANY, INC. · filed 2022-12-29(a)

The NJLAD prohibits employers from, among other things, discharging an individual from employment because of the individual's age. N.J.S.A. § 10:5–12(a). ... For these additional reasons, summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim under the NJLAD is denied.

Section 10:5-12 protects against age discrimination without specifying a minimum age for the protected class.

PACIUS v. MOBIS PARTS AMERICA LLC · filed 2024-09-19(t)(5)

The NJLAD does not specifically state the necessary age to fall into the protected class, rather, it more broadly states that “age” encompasses a “protected class” upon which employers must not discriminate. N.J.S.A. §10:5-12(t)(5).

Section 10:5-12 prohibits firing an employee because of age; when no distinct state-law argument is raised, the claim is analyzed under federal age-discrimination standards.

Palmer v. Britton Industries Inc. · filed 2025-02-26

The New Jersey Act also prohibits employers from discharging employees because of their age. ... The same analysis generally governs claims under both statutes. ... Palmer does not advance any distinctive arguments under New Jersey as opposed to federal law, so we will analyze both claims under the federal standards.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment; an employee challenging a non-renewal must show that the employer's stated reason was pretextual.

Vega v. Elizabeth Board of Education · filed 2025-10-23(a)

In sum, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant's purported legitimate reasons for not renewing her were pretextual. Thus, the record and the law support the dismissal of her LAD age discrimination claim.

Age discrimination claims under § 10:5-12(a) follow the same standard as ADEA claims.

DVINYANINOVNA · filed 2026-03-10(a)

Claims brought under the NJLAD for age discrimination are governed by the same standard as the ADEA.

Section 10:5-12(a) has no minimum age limit for age discrimination claims.

Robinson v. Sizes Unlimited, Inc. · filed 1988-05-04(a)

For example, the NJLAD, unlike the ADEA, does not contain a minimum age limit, thus persons under 40 could be members of the state but not of the federal class action (compare N.J.Stat.Ann. 10:5-12(a) with 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)).

Section 10:5-12(a) permits forced retirement for lawful reasons other than age; that language does not create a separate affirmative defense to an age discrimination claim.

O'Brien v. Telcordia Technologies · filed 2011-06-13(a)

We disagree, accepting instead Telcordia's view that the emphasized language in the NJLAD qualifies the conditions under which forced retirements can occur.

Section 10:5-12(a) treats an existing employee’s contract nonrenewal as a termination, so its over-seventy hiring exception does not permit age-based nonrenewal.

Nini v. MCCC · filed 2009-04-23(a)

We hold that the over-seventy exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12a should not be interpreted to equate contract nonrenewals with a new hire. Stated differently, the over-seventy statutory exception should be interpreted to equate a contract nonrenewal with a termination and to bar an age-based nonrenewal.

An employee who was not meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations at termination fails to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim under the NJLAD.

Holster v. McMaster-Carr Supply Co. · filed 2008-01-23

We need not enter the fray because the District Court found that even if collateral estoppel effect was not accorded to the issues in dispute, Holster failed to satisfy her burden of proof on her NJLAD and ERISA claims, a finding with which we agree. ... With reference to the NJLAD claim, the District Court found that because Holster did not come to work when she did not have jury duty, she was not meeting MCSC’s legitimate expectations at the time of her termination and, therefore, failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under NJLAD.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie race discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(a) with evidence of satisfactory job performance and more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Taylor v. AMCOR FLEXIBLES INC. · filed 2009-11-04(a)

There is evidence in the record that Plaintiffs performance with respect to his sales quota was comparable to the performance of other white Regional Sales Representatives who were not terminated. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to support the fourth element of a prima facie case.

Section 10:5-12 permits an employee to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim by showing a logical basis to find that age significantly affected the termination; replacement by a younger worker is not required.

Arenas v. L'OREAL USA PRODUCTS, INC. · filed 2011-05-13

Under that framework, to establish a prima facie case of unlawful termination under the NJLAD in the context of age discrimination, Ms. Arenas must demonstrate (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the position held, (3) that she was terminated despite adequate qualifications, and (4) a logical basis on which to find that L’Oreal’s decision to terminate her was affected significantly by her age.

An employee claiming age discrimination must present evidence that supports an inference of unlawful discrimination; replacement by someone sufficiently younger can support that inference.

Warner v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2001-11-09(a)

Based upon these facts, Plaintiff cannot establish that he was replaced by someone sufficiently younger to raise an inference of age discrimination.

For an age discrimination claim based on a reduction in force, the plaintiff must show that the employer retained a similarly situated employee sufficiently younger to support an inference of discrimination.

Monaco v. American General Assurance Company · filed 2004-02-23(a)

In reaching our conclusion we point out that the facts of this case demonstrate why a terminated plaintiff should not be able in a McDonnell Douglas burden shifting case to demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination without showing a difference in age between him or her and the replacement employee sufficient to support an inference of age discrimination or, in the circumstance that he or she was discharged in a reduction in force, showing that the employer retained someone similarly situated to him or her sufficiently younger to permit the drawing of such an inference.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not require a plaintiff alleging ordinary age or sex discrimination to show that the replacement was outside the protected class to establish a prima facie case.

DeWees v. RCN CORP. · filed 2005-07-15(a)

Unless a plaintiff is claiming reverse discrimination, it is unnecessary to show a replacement outside of the protected class in order to satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie case.

Section 10:5-12 requires evidence sufficient to support an inference of age discrimination for a prima facie age discrimination claim.

Fischer v. Allied Signal Corp. · filed 1997-09-04

As discussed herein, the core of a prima facie case is evidence adequate to create an inference of age discrimination. Because the facts of this case do not give rise to such an inference, the Court concludes that Fischer has failed to prove his prima facie case of age discrimination.

Section 10:5-12 does not require an employment discrimination plaintiff to show replacement by someone outside the protected class; the circumstances of the employment decision must support an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Williams v. PEMBERTON TP. SCHOOLS · filed 1999-07-27

In light of the various contexts in which employment discrimination claims arise, we consider it unwise to require a plaintiff to establish unfailingly as part of the prima facie case that plaintiff was replaced by an individual outside the plaintiff's protected class. The appropriate fourth element of a plaintiff's prima facie case requires a showing that the challenged employment decision (i.e., failure to hire, failure to promote, wrongful discharge) took place under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed. 2d 207, 215 (1981); Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F. 3d 81, 91 (2d Cir.1996); Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F. 3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.1995).

An age discrimination plaintiff need not show replacement by someone sufficiently younger to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.

Reynolds v. Palnut Co. · filed 2000-04-19(a)

Because here plaintiff Reynolds asserted a traditional age discrimination claim, the heightened standard utilized in reverse discrimination suits is not applicable. He need not show that he was replaced by someone sufficiently younger.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employment decisions based on age; denying tenure under uniformly applied qualifications does not violate that rule.

Sprague v. Glassboro State College · filed 1978-08-02(a)

While appellant may legitimately question the opinions and conclusions of the individuals involved in the decisional process which resulted in the final determination by the President of the college, there is no basis to conclude the decision was made because of appellant's age. The record amply demonstrates an evenhanded evaluation process which obliterates appellant's allegation.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not prohibit a facially neutral labor contract provision that incidentally disadvantages older employees absent discriminatory intent.

Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ. · filed 1985-08-08(a)

It is our view that in the absence of intentional discrimination, i.e. proof of discriminatory intent and purpose, a facially neutral provision in a labor contract which impacts adversely on an older age group in an incidental manner does not violate the ADEA or the LAD.

Section 10:5-12 does not require a cost-free pension transfer when the applicant was denied that transfer for reasons unrelated to age discrimination.

Simon v. Board of Trustees · filed 1989-05-10

Appellant contends that denying him a cost-free transfer made available to other sheriffs constitutes unlawful age discrimination contrary to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 and violates his right to equal protection under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. We conclude that these contentions are without merit. The cost-free transfer is being denied because the board has determined that he was not the victim of prior age discrimination.

An employee may knowingly and voluntarily waive an age discrimination claim under § 10:5-12(a); the waiver’s validity depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Swarts v. Sherwin-Williams Co. · filed 1990-10-16(a)

The statutory protections against age discrimination under the NJLAD do not bar knowing, wilful waiver of those protections. The NJLAD protects an employee from being forced to retire for reasons of age. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12a. ... In light of the public goal of the NJLAD, we find the totality of the circumstances the more persuasive and appropriate standard.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of age; a plaintiff may prove such a claim using the burdens of proof applied in federal discrimination cases.

McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service · filed 1993-03-29(a)

N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a). In interpreting the burdens and allocations of proof under the LAD, New Jersey courts have adopted the standards developed in Title VII cases by federal courts. ... After a thorough review of the record, I conclude that the evidence plainly supported the finding of liability. All of the plaintiffs established a prima facie case at trial.

Age discrimination claims under the LAD follow the same standards and burden of proof as claims under the ADEA.

Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc. · filed 1994-12-28(a)

Age discrimination claims under the LAD are governed by the same standards and burden of proof structures applicable under the ADEA.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits discharge because of age; an employee must show that age played a significant role in the termination to establish a prima facie claim.

Krassowski v. Bloomberg Lp · filed 2024-01-09(a)

We are satisfied plaintiff did not demonstrate that age played a significant role in his termination and, thus, did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(s) prohibits an employer from denying pregnant employees a chance to seek a waiver of an accrued-leave requirement when comparable nonpregnant employees can seek one.

DELANOY VS. TOWNSHIP OF OCEAN (L-4441-14, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-01-03(s)

We hold the Department's maternity assignment policy, as written, unlawfully discriminates against pregnant employees as compared to nonpregnant employees who can seek and potentially obtain a waiver from the Police Chief. Such nonequal treatment violates the PWFA.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not require an employer to extend pregnancy-related medical leave beyond a uniformly applied policy that already provides more leave than federal or state law requires.

Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort · filed 2005-07-25(a)

The LAD does not require an employer to deviate for pregnant employees from the even-handed application of its medical leave policy that already provides more leave than any relevant federal or state statute requires.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits singling out pregnancy as a reason not to renew employment, but a discrimination finding requires evidence that the policy treated pregnancy differently or disadvantaged women.

Gilchrist v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BOROUGH OF HADDONFIELD · filed 1978-01-17(a)

We would have no difficulty in sustaining a determination of discrimination if the record supports a finding that pregnancy has been singled out by the Board as the only kind of temporary disability which would lead to nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract. It seems to us this would constitute a gender-based discrimination which would be a violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) and N.J.S.A. 10:5-4. ... There is simply no evidence to base a determination that the only temporary disability or absence being singled out by the Board was pregnancy, or, as a matter of fact, that any class, including gender-based classifications, was disadvantaged by the policy of the Board.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits mandatory maternity leave that keeps a teacher from returning when physically able and denial of sick leave for childbirth-related disability when other disabilities qualify.

Castellano v. Linden Board of Education · filed 1978-03-27(a)

Addressing first the matter of the mandatory leave of absence policy under scrutiny, we hold that the contract provision did discriminate against complainant on the basis of sex, in violation of the Law Against Discrimination. ... We are convinced that to deprive a pregnant employee of sick leave benefits for an absence occasioned by childbirth does indeed constitute discrimination on account of sex.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits denying a teacher accumulated sick leave for childbirth disability when teachers with other temporary disabilities may use it, even if the teacher also takes maternity leave.

Farley v. Ocean Tp. Bd. of Ed. · filed 1980-06-16(a)

N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 and 10:5-12(a) prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, including discrimination in the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment...." ... The period of disability resulting from the childbirth is separate, and a pregnant teacher should be entitled to both accumulated sick leave for the time in which she is actually disabled and maternity leave for the purpose of raising the child.

Section 10:5-12(s) prohibits treating a pregnant employee less favorably than similarly able employees who are not pregnant; evidence supporting an inference of that treatment can establish a prima facie discrimination claim.

ROOPCHAND VS. COMPLETE CARE(L-3654-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-08-03(s)

Viewing her contentions in the light most favorable to her, plaintiff made out a prima facie case for disparate treatment under the PWFA because: 1) she was part of the protected class of pregnant workers and her employers knew of her pregnancy; 2) she was performing her work responsibilities; 3) she suffered the adverse employment action of being demoted to part-time status, ordered to wash windows, and then fired; and 4) she was required to perform an act outside the scope of her job description, that other non-pregnant employees were not required to perform, thus raising an inference of unlawful discrimination.

An out-of-state plaintiff seeking protection under section 10:5-12 must plausibly allege that New Jersey has the most significant relationship to the claim.

DONOVAN v. W.R. BERKLEY CORPORATION · filed 2021-10-08

When balancing the concerns raised by Calabotta and applying the plausibility standard under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court holds that an out-of-state plaintiff must plausibly allege, prior to discovery, some facts to show that he or she is entitled, as a threshold matter, to the protection of the NJLAD. In other words, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), an out-of-state plaintiff must allege that New Jersey has the most significant relationship to his claim.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

YOUNG v. BLOOMINGDALES · filed 2021-09-14(a)

Indeed, according to that statute’s plain language, it applies only where there is an employment relationship.

Section 10:5-12 covers discrimination in the workplace, union activities, housing, public accommodations, lending, and the purchase or sale of goods or services.

CONSERVE v. CITY OF ORANGE · filed 2021-08-09

It is limited, however, to prohibiting discrimination in the workplace, union activities, housing, public accommodations, lending, or the purchase or sales of goods or services. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. ... None of the facts as pled involve activities covered by the NJLAD, therefore Plaintiff’s claims under the statute must be dismissed.

Section 10:5-12(a) applies to discriminatory conduct expected or intended to cause injury in New Jersey; a claim may proceed when the complaint leaves the location of the alleged harm unclear.

BINKS v. US TECH SOLUTIONS · filed 2021-06-30(a)

The court must overrule US Tech’s objection, however, because it is unclear where the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred. The complaint alleges that US Tech employed Binks in New Jersey. Compl. ¶ 3. Although the complaint clearly alleges that Binks was “told to leave” by Boeing in South Carolina, id. at ¶ 15, it does not allege where she was discharged by US Tech. Because Binks alleges that she worked for Boeing in South Carolina but was employed by US Tech in New Jersey, it is unclear where the harm occurred. Accordingly, construing Binks’s complaint liberally, the court agrees with the R&R that dismissal of the claim is inappropriate.

Section 10:5-12(l) can apply to an alleged age-based refusal to do business when the conduct affects a New Jersey business, even if the terminated store agreements concern Pennsylvania stores.

CREST FURNITURE, INC. v. ASHLEY HOMESTORES, LTD. · filed 2020-10-30(l)

Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ claims concern not only the non-renewal of the TUAs for four HomeStores in Pennsylvania, but Ashley’s alleged efforts to put Crest out of the Ashley HomeStore business altogether in New Jersey as well as Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs allege that these efforts were because of Kaplan’s age, which is evidenced by many prior years of a positive and successful business relationship. In this broader context than simply the TUAs for four of the Pennsylvania stores, the NJLAD is clearly applicable.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits discriminatory hiring and discharge of any individual without limiting protection to New Jersey residents or employees, subject to choice-of-law analysis.

CALABOTTA VS. PHIBRO ANIMAL HEALTH CORPORATION (L-1979-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-27(a)

Equally broadly, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) prohibits the discriminatory refusal "to hire or employ" and the discriminatory discharge of "any individual" on the basis of that individual's protected characteristics, which include race, gender, religion, and disability, among others. (Emphasis added). The statute does not restrict the definition of "any individual" to New Jersey residents or employees.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a religious institution to require employees to follow its religious tenets as a condition of employment; that requirement alone does not establish discriminatory intent.

CRISITELLO VS. ST. THERESA SCHOOL (L-3642-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-24(a)

Discriminatory intent or any other element of an LAD claim cannot be established by a religious institution's requiring an employee to follow the tenets of its religion as a condition of employment.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employment relationship; a party that does not directly employ a worker may be liable if it exercises sufficient control over the worker's employment.

TOMPKINS VS. JOHN SCOTT THOMSON (L-6194-09, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-26(a)

Nevertheless, as we discussed in Thomas, to apply the LAD to the putative employer's discriminatory conduct, the control test requires a party, which does not directly employ the plaintiff, to engage in conduct demonstrating it nevertheless exercised such control over a plaintiff's employment.

Section 10:5-12 covers discrimination in employment, housing, and places of public accommodation; DYFS child placement services are not a place of public accommodation.

K.J. ex rel. Lowry v. Division of Youth & Family Services · filed 2005-04-06

These claims do not fall within the areas where discrimination has been prohibited under the statute. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they were denied employment or refused housing by DYFS. Nor is DYFS considered to be a place of public accommodation.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not prohibit an employer from favoring applicants because of family relationships.

Bumbaca v. Township of Edison · filed 2004-11-19(a)

Thus, it is clear that the term familial status, as defined, does not include the concept of nepotism and, further, plays no role in the statutory definition of an unlawful employment practice.

Section 10:5-12’s employment discrimination protections cover employees, not independent contractors.

Kurdyla v. Pinkerton Security · filed 2000-10-13

The NJLAD protects only employees and does not cover independent contractors.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on political affiliation.

Siss v. County of Passaic · filed 1999-05-19(a)

As defendants note, and plaintiff does not contest, the NJLAD prohibits employers from discriminating in employment on numerous bases, but these do not include political affiliation.

Section 10:5-12(a) treats an employee discharged for associating with a member of a protected group as a member of that group for purposes of a prima facie discriminatory-discharge claim.

O'Lone v. NJ Dept. of Corrections · filed 1998-06-22(a)

Therefore, to achieve substantial justice, we conclude that where the plaintiff is wrongfully discharged for associating with a member of a protected group, that is the functional equivalent of being a member of the protected group.

Section 10:5-12(a) protects employees from employment discrimination but does not protect independent contractors.

Pukowsky v. Caruso · filed 1998-06-10(a)

In sum, we hold that the LAD was intended to prohibit discrimination in the context of an employer/employee relationship, and that independent contractors are not "employees" within the meaning of the statute.

Section 10:5-12(a)’s ban on creed discrimination does not cover political beliefs expressed during a mayoral campaign.

Fioriglio v. City of Atlantic City · filed 1997-05-06(a)

By “creed,” Fioriglio means not his religion but rather the political beliefs he espoused during his campaign against Whelan for mayor. ... and because this Court highly doubts that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would accept Fioriglio’s “creed” argument, the Court will dismiss his N.J.L.A.D. claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits sex discrimination in membership by a volunteer fire company that functions as an employer, even when its members are unpaid.

Hebard v. Basking Ridge Fire Company No. 1 · filed 1978-11-24(a)

We affirm the order essentially for the reasons expressed by him and the hearing examiner's report on which the order is predicated. ... The company is an "employer" within the meaning of the law and subject to the provisions thereof relating to employment discrimination. It is not within the statutory exclusion as a nonprofit social or fraternal club or corporation.

Section 10:5-12(a) protects employees and prospective employees from age discrimination, but does not cover independent contractors.

Carney v. Dexter Shoe Co. · filed 1988-12-13(a)

Because the proscriptions apply to an “employer,” — as they do under the terms of ADEA — it is inescapable that the “individual” on the receiving end of the employer’s conduct must be an employee or prospective employee in order for the statute to apply.

Section 10:5-12 covers a surgeon approved to practice at a hospital that provides a staffed and regulated operating room, even without an employment relationship.

Behringer Est. v. Princeton Med. Ctr. · filed 1991-04-25(l)

While there is not the relationship of employer-employee, the providing of a fully-equipped, fully-staffed, regulated and controlled operating room to a surgeon whose practice in the medical facility has been passed on and approved by the medical facility is sufficient to bring that surgeon within the scope of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age and sex discrimination in employment and applies to a religious school's termination of a lay teacher despite the school's First Amendment challenge.

Gallo v. Salesian Soc., Inc. · filed 1996-05-17(a)

We first consider defendants' claim on the cross-appeal that because Don Bosco is a religious school, application of the LAD violates the Free Exercise and Establishment of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. ... On the cross-appeal, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff is affirmed.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not provide an employment discrimination claim against a person or entity that is not the claimant’s employer.

PEARSON v. BOROUGH OF KEANSBURG (L-4135-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-10-24(a)

The LAD did not create a cause of action for employment discrimination against entities or persons that are not the claimant's employer. See Pukowsky, 312 N.J. Super. at 180; N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) (stating it is "unlawful discrimination [f]or an employer" to discriminate against an individual because of race). Plaintiff had no viable cause of action against the Board or Niesz because they were not his employer.

An out-of-state employee invoking § 10:5-12 must plead facts showing that New Jersey has the most significant relationship to the claim.

BEAM v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON · filed 2022-12-28

In sum, even considering and accepting as true Beam’s allegations that certain conduct underlying her retaliation, discrimination, and aiding and abetting claims occurred in New Jersey, application of the relevant Restatement factors demonstrates that Ohio has the most significant relationship to this matter. As this juncture, the Court concludes that Beam has failed to allege sufficient facts to connect her alleged discriminatory termination to New Jersey and thus avail herself of the NJLAD’s protections.

Section 10:5-12(a) can apply to a worksite company that controls a temporary worker’s work, even when a staffing agency dispatched the worker.

SYDER v. EXPRESS SERVICES, INC. · filed 2023-03-29(a)

Syder has therefore alleged that he had a common law employment relationship with Cooperative Laundry, which therefore is potentially liable for employment discrimination.

An employment discrimination claim under § 10:5-12 fails against a defendant who was not the plaintiff’s employer.

SEXTON v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2023-12-22

However, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12 proscribes unlawful discrimination by employers. HTPD or Kenna were not Plaintiff's employer. Thus, any claim against HTPO or Kenna for alleged violations of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12 is dismissed.

Claims under Section 10:5-12 by an out-of-state remote employee may survive dismissal when discovery could establish a sufficient connection to New Jersey.

WEST v. NNIT, INC. · filed 2024-07-23(a), (d)

Here, discovery may reveal the extent of Defendant’s relationship to New Jersey and whether decisions related to Plaintiff's employment were made in New Jersey. ... The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs NJLAD claims on the grounds that Defendant’s arguments are premature.

Section 10:5-12 does not protect against employment discrimination based solely on tattoos.

DODSON v. ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY COMPANY · filed 2024-08-06

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no allegation that he is a member of any protected class under the Civil Rights Act or NJLAD, neither of which protect against discrimination based on tattoos. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for employment discrimination under either the Civil Rights Act or NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(g) does not protect against disparate treatment based on economic disadvantage.

RAFTER v. AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC. · filed 2025-03-03(g)

As Defendants’ correctly point out, “economic disadvantage” is not a protected class under the NJLAD. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5- 12(g).

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employer-employee relationship for an employment discrimination claim; judicial oversight of a municipal court administrator does not make the AOC her employer.

Palmisano v. State of New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts · filed 2025-07-14(a)

The LAD prohibits unlawful employment practices and discrimination based on an employee's gender regarding the terms and conditions of employment. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... We conclude the court did not err in finding there was no employer-employee relationship between plaintiff and the AOC because the statutes governing municipalities demonstrate plaintiff is employed by the Township.

Section 10:5-12 does not cover the plaintiff’s disability accommodation claims arising from police questioning and the handling of his PTI application.

Duffy v. the Absecon Police Department · filed 2025-07-30

The specific LAD provision plaintiff cites, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, has been applied almost exclusively in labor and employment contexts. ... The pled section of the LAD does not apply to plaintiff in this context.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not extend its employment discrimination protections to independent contractors.

Sanger v. Next Level Business Services, Inc. · filed 2026-03-26(a)

Applying these legal principles and based on our de novo review, we agree that the Pukowsky factors overwhelmingly support plaintiff's status as an independent contractor and reject plaintiff's claim that she was an employee of either defendant entitled to the protections of the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits citizenship restrictions required by federal law; an undocumented worker barred from lawful employment cannot recover LAD damages arising solely from termination.

Crespo v. Evergo Corp. · filed 2004-02-09(a)

LAD is not contradictory. Indeed, although it provides that all persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment without being discriminated against, N.J.S.A. 10:5-4, it also provides that it shall not be unlawful under the LAD for an employer to "restrict employment to citizens of the United States where such restriction is required by federal law...." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... Just as in Cedeno, then, it is the illegality of plaintiff's employment which precludes both economic and non-economic damages she claims resulted from the termination of that employment.

An NJLAD failure-to-accommodate claim requires evidence that the employer knew of the disability and that the employee requested an accommodation for it.

CASCINA v. HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER HEALTH · filed 2021-10-01

On the specific issue of failure to accommodate, as discussed in the previous paragraph, there is no evidence that HUMC possessed the knowledge of Cascina’s disability that would have triggered the duty to accommodate. What is more, Cascina did not specifically refer to a disability when she requested what she now characterizes as an accommodation of her disability; rather, she testified, she requested to be excused from walking long distances because of snow and ice.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a disability based hostile work environment claim without medical testimony when the employer stipulates that the employee has a disability and the evidence supports that the harassment occurred because of it.

IKO VS. COUTY OF MIDDLESEX (L-1407-15, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-20(a)

The LAD provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination . . . [f]or an employer, because of . . . disability . . . to discriminate against such individual in . . . conditions or privileges of employment." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... That made out a prima facie case of harassment and therefore the trial court properly denied the motion for involuntary dismissal. ... Thus, unlike in Viscik and Clowes, there was no need for medical testimony that would demonstrate that plaintiff's condition amounted to diabetes or that it constituted a disability under the LAD.

An employer may choose among reasonable accommodations so long as the accommodation lets the employee perform the essential functions of the job.

S.S. VS. CHERRY HILL PUBLIC SCHOOLS (NEW JERSEY DIVISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS) · filed 2019-03-11(a)

However, the employer has the discretion to choose which accommodations to give, so long as the accommodations are effective in permitting the employee to perform her essential job functions.

Section 10:5-12 does not require a job-sharing arrangement as a disability accommodation when the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job.

Baker v. Hunter Douglas Inc. · filed 2008-03-19

The District Court also found that Baker’s request that Hunter Douglas allow her to share her duties with another employee is not a reasonable accommodation under NJLAD. ... Again, we agree with the District Court’s reasoning and conclusion that there were no material issues of fact that would preclude summary judgment on Baker’s claim that Hunter Douglas violated the NJLAD by failing to provide her with reasonable accommodations.

Section 10:5-12(a) bars employment discrimination based on an employee’s association with a person with a disability.

Downs v. US PIPE & FOUNDRY COMPANY · filed 2006-08-01(a)

In the absence of any contrary authority, this Court concludes that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that NJLAD bars employment discrimination based upon a person’s association with a person with a disability.

For handicap discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment, § 10:5-12(a) requires an adverse employment action causally connected to the employee's handicap; the employee need not show termination or that the employer sought a replacement.

Mosley v. Femina Fashions, Inc. · filed 2002-12-04(a)

In a handicap discrimination case, where the employee is alleging discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, fairness requires modification of the prima facie case. The third factor of discharge should be modified to include adverse employment action. Additionally, the fourth factor that the employer sought other employees is not required here. Rather, plaintiff must show a causal connection between her handicap and the adverse employment action.

Section 10:5-12(a) protects employees and applicants with physical disabilities without requiring that the disability be severe.

Andersen v. Exxon Co. · filed 1982-05-24(a)

We reject such an interpretation of the New Jersey statute. We need not limit this remedial legislation to the halt, the maimed or the blind. The law prohibits unlawful discrimination against those suffering from physical disability.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits firing an employee because of obesity that qualifies as an actual or perceived handicap when the condition does not disqualify the employee from the job.

Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. · filed 1991-08-02(a)

We conclude that the record adequately supports the factual findings and the legal conclusion that Gimello was a victim of discrimination because of his obesity. We do not think it matters particularly whether his condition is dubbed an actual or perceived handicap. It was a recognized medical condition for which he sought legitimate treatment with but modest success. The record supports the conclusion that he was fired because of this physical condition which his supervisors perceived as a defect and which did not in fact disqualify him in any proven sense from his present job or his career path.

An employee claiming perceived disability discrimination under § 10:5-12 must present evidence that the employer perceived a disability and terminated the employee because of it.

Thurston v. Cherry Hill Triplex · filed 2008-08-05

Because Plaintiff does not claim that she is or was disabled, the primary issue to be decided as to Count Three is whether for the purposes of summary judgment Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to show that Defendants perceived her as disabled and terminated her because of that perceived disability. ... The Court will grant Defendant’s motion with respect to Count One and Three because Count One fails as a matter of law, and because Plaintiff has faded to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because of a disability; evidence of the employer’s knowledge and the timing of termination can support a claim for a jury to decide.

Fitzgerald v. Shore Memorial Hospital · filed 2015-03-13(a)

Section 10:5-12(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of that person’s disability or race. ... The Court will accordingly deny summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim that she was terminated because of her disability.

Section 10:5-12(g) prohibits landlords from discriminating based on disability or a lawful source of rent income.

ANTHONY REEVES VS. LAWRENCE NON-PROFIT HOUSING, INC. (L-2675-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-11-01(g)

Nor is there any evidence that the landlord refrained from evicting non-disabled delinquent tenants, or otherwise discriminated against plaintiff on account of his disability or because his rent was subsidized by the Board.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not prohibit a suspension following a positive drug test when the evidence does not show discrimination based on an actual or perceived disability.

RICHARD BAKER VS. CAMDEN COUNTY HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT (L-4146-14, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-08(a)

Moreover, as we noted, pursuant to Vargo, defendant's suspension of plaintiff as a result of the positive drug screen was not discriminatory.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits age and disability discrimination in termination decisions; an employee must establish a prima facie case and show that an employer's stated legitimate reason was pretextual.

HAHN VS. ONE CALL CARE MANAGEMENT (L-1786-15, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-17(a)

Pertinent to this appeal, the LAD prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of age and disability, when making termination decisions. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... Based on our independent review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age or disability discrimination under the LAD. Even if he did, defendant proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff, which plaintiff failed to show was merely a pretext for discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(a) protects employees whom an employer perceives as disabled, even if they are not actually disabled.

WILLIAMS VS. THE MLB NETWORK, INC. (L-3675-14, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-14(a)

The LAD declares it unlawful for employers to discriminate against any individual because of disability. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... As to the first element in the prima facie LAD case, it is well settled that "those [persons who are] perceived as suffering from a particular handicap are as much within the protected class as those who are actually handicapped."

Section 10:5-12(a) may protect an employee from disability discrimination involving prescribed medical marijuana use outside work; the Compassionate Use Act does not override those protections.

JUSTIN WILD VS. CARRIAGE FUNERAL HOLDINGS, INC. (L-0687-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-27(a)

Because we conclude that the Compassionate Use Act does not immunize what the LAD prohibits and because the second amended complaint – whether viewed as written, or when viewed expansively and with liberality, as required ... by Printing Mart – contains those allegations required by the LAD, we reverse the order dismissing the LAD claims and remand for further proceedings.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a disability discrimination claim based on an employee’s medical marijuana use; the Compassionate Use Act does not eliminate that claim.

Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc. · filed 2019-03-27(a)

And the LAD makes it unlawful "[f]or an employer, because of the ... disability ... of any individual, ... to discharge ... or to discriminate against such individual ... in terms, conditions or privileges of employment," N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a), "unless the nature and extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment," N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1 ; see also N.J.S.A. 10:5-2.1. ... Just as the Compassionate Use Act imposes no burden on defendants, it negates no rights or claims available to plaintiff that emanate from the LAD.

Disability discrimination claims under § 10:5-12(f)(1) follow the same standards as ADA discrimination claims.

PRATT v. ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER · filed 2019-09-18(f)(1)

Because discrimination claims under the NJLAD track the same analysis as those under the ADA, the Court also revives Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim contained within Count V.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a disability discrimination claim involving authorized medical marijuana use outside work when the allegations satisfy LAD pleading standards.

Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Feeny Funeral Home, LLC (082836)(Bergen County & Statewide) · filed 2020-03-10(a)

At this early stage of this case, in which the facts have yet to be developed and plaintiff’s allegations are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact, we do not view those provisions to bar his cause of action. We agree with the Appellate Division that plaintiff has properly stated a claim under the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits disability discrimination in employment, but a claim fails when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext.

IAPICHINO v. HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2020-09-15(a)

As a result, Plaintiff offers no evidence by which a reasonable jury could determine that HUMC’s stated reason for the termination was a pretext. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, therefore, is granted as to the LAD claims.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires a disability discrimination claimant to show that she could perform the essential functions of her job at the time of termination.

SHELDON VS. THE COOPER HEALTH SYSTEM (L-0350-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-03-24(a)

Thus, based on her sworn testimony and certifications, plaintiff was unable to demonstrate under the second prong that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job ... to establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the LAD.

Section 10:5-12 requires a disability discrimination claimant to show that the adverse employment action was caused by the disability; an employer's response to the employee's forfeiture of employment does not satisfy that requirement.

GORMAN VS. BOROUGH OF AUDUBON (L-1230-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-16

Plaintiff's forfeiture established that the Borough's action was not based on a disability or perceived disability; rather, it was in response to plaintiff's forfeiture of his position.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when the timing of a termination plausibly supports an inference of disability discrimination.

SYDER v. EXPRESS SERVICES, INC. · filed 2022-02-24(a)

That temporal proximity lends plausibility to his claim that both Cooperative Laundry and Express terminated him because of his disability or the perception that he had become disabled.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not require an employer to retain an employee who cannot perform essential job duties even with reasonable accommodation.

WRAITH v. WAYFAIR, INC. · filed 2023-07-12(a)

Even though Plaintiff requested to be placed on light duty, it is abundantly clear that Plaintiff was not qualified to complete the required tasks included in his job description, even with the accommodation of indefinite light duty.

Section 10:5-12 protects employees with disabilities from discrimination, and a disability discrimination claimant must establish a qualifying disability.

Cardillo v. State Operated School District for the City of Paterson · filed 2024-02-29

Under the LAD, an employee who has a disability is a member of a protected class. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits disability discrimination in employment, but a claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

WEAVER v. BARRETTE OUTDOOR LIVING, INC. · filed 2024-06-28(a)

There are simply no facts in the record from which a reasonable juror could infer a discriminatory animus or find that Plaintiff’s disability was “more likely than not [] a motivating or determinative cause” of his termination, see Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765, or that Defendant’s stated reason for termination was “so plainly wrong that it cannot have been [its] real reason.” See Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109; see also Lane v. Sears Logistics Servs., Inc., No. 11-6157, 2014 WL 1301549, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014) (noting that “speculations, generalities, and gut feelings, however genuine, do not permit an inference of discrimination to be drawn”). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as to Plaintiffs disability discrimination claim.

An employee must request assistance for a disability to establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD; saying that one's health is suffering does not itself make that request.

Flores v. Page-Hawkins · filed 2024-04-30

The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff did not submit any request for accommodation of a disability to her employer. Even if plaintiff mentioned in an email her health was "suffering," there is no evidence in the record she made any request for a disability accommodation. Any request for ... leaves of absences that plaintiff submitted were granted. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate a disability under LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability and engage in a good-faith interactive process.

Bohnyak v. Town of Westfield · filed 2024-05-06(a)

We begin by acknowledging that Bohnyak's cardiac condition unquestionably constituted a disability under the LAD. Therefore, defendants were required to provide a reasonable accommodation and engage in an interactive process in good faith.

Section 10:5-12(a) does not require an employer to continue employing a person who cannot perform the essential functions of the job, even with reasonable accommodation.

Laposta v. John F. Kennedy Medical Center · filed 2025-06-02(a)

Nevertheless, we concur with the trial court's determination that the hospital was not required to continue to employ plaintiff as he was unable to perform, even with an accommodation, the fundamental requirements of the job.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires an employer to explore reasonable accommodations with a disabled employee but does not require placement in a job the employee cannot perform under her restrictions.

B.C. v. Robert Wood Johnson Barnabas Health · filed 2025-10-10(a)

The evidence in the record supports the Division's conclusion RWJBH had fulfilled any obligation it had to engage in an interactive accommodation process with B.C.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to show that they were otherwise qualified to participate in the activity or program.

Parker v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission · filed 2025-10-24(f)(1)

Much like the requirements for a § 504 claim, to succeed on a disability discrimination claim under the LAD, see N.J. Stat. § 10:5-12(f)(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she “was otherwise qualified to participate in the activity or program at issue.”

For a disability discharge claim proved through circumstantial evidence, § 10:5-12(a) requires the employee to show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual and that discriminatory animus motivated the termination.

Dechert v. Totowa Board of Education · filed 2026-03-11(a)

First, as to sciatica, there is no evidence plaintiff was terminated because of this condition. ... Under these circumstances, plaintiff failed to establish that defendant's reason for termination was pretextual and instead actually based on a discriminatory animus related to her sciatica.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual because of disability.

Manos v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union · filed 2014-03-28(a)

This provision of the CBA omits handicap and disability discrimination, which are protected under the NJLAD and asserted by Plaintiff in Counts III and IV.

Section 10:5-12 prohibits race discrimination, and a disparate treatment claim requires evidence that race influenced the employer’s decision.

J.R. VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY (L-4920-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-06-21

The LAD prohibits discrimination because of race, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, or nationality. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. ... Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to support his assertion that his race was a factor which resulted in his termination.

A majority-group employee alleging reverse race discrimination under § 10:5-12(a) must show background circumstances suggesting that the employer discriminates against the majority.

Kirschling v. Atlantic City Board of Education · filed 2014-03-31(a)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact demonstrating background circumstances sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination supporting his contention that the Board is the unusual employer that discriminates against the majority. Having failed to establish the first element of his prima facie case, summary judgment in favor of the Board is warranted here.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits national-origin discrimination in employment; a majority-class plaintiff must show circumstances suggesting that the employer discriminates against the majority.

MaClean v. Shoes · filed 2012-03-29(a)

The NJLAD specifically prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). ... Here, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first prong in establishing a prima facie case for her claim of discriminatory demotion because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant is the unusual employer that discriminates against the majority.

Section 10:5-12 does not prohibit an English-only or English-mainly workplace rule by itself; an employee must show that the rule serves as a proxy for discrimination on a protected ground.

Rosario v. Cacace · filed 2001-03-09

A discharge for speaking another language in the face of an employer's English-only or English-mainly rule is not by itself a violation of the Law Against Discrimination.

Section 10:5-12 prohibits racial discrimination in public employment and leaves employers no discretion to negotiate terms that depart from that prohibition.

Teaneck Bd. of Ed. v. Teaneck Teachers Ass'n · filed 1982-06-28

The Legislature has decreed that there shall be no racial discrimination in the employment of public employees. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 and N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4 a(3). These statutes speak in the imperative and leave nothing to the discretion of the employer. When a specific statute sets a term or condition of employment, any negotiation in contravention of that statute is illegal.

Section 10:5-12(a) permits a national-origin discrimination claim based on disparate treatment, analyzed under federal discrimination standards.

Maietta v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1990-10-01(a)

Federal analysis utilized in claims under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) has been adopted by the New Jersey courts in analyzing claims brought under the LAD. ... Maietta does not point to any facially neutral employment practice, but rather asserts Italians were singled out for harsher treatment than non-Italians.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits discharge based on race; a plaintiff states a discriminatory discharge claim when she establishes a prima facie case and the employer fails to rebut the presumption of discrimination.

Butler v. Sherman, Silverstein & Kohl, P.C. · filed 1990-11-14(a)

The evidence discussed above is sufficient to sustain her claim that defendant discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of her race. In short, we find that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Further, defendant has not successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination. Therefore, we find that plaintiff states a legally sufficient claim.

Section 10:5-12(a) protects employees from national origin discrimination, and a claim may proceed when evidence creates a genuine dispute about the employer’s motive.

Wesley v. Palace Rehabilitation & Care Center, L.L.C. · filed 2014-03-12(a)

However, Plaintiff pleads a cognizable claim of national origin discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. National origin is a protected status under the NJLAD. See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a). Summary judgment is denied as a matter of law as to Plaintiffs claim of national origin discrimination under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) requires facts plausibly connecting an adverse employment action to race; a smaller retirement payment alone does not establish discrimination.

Daniel Galman, Jr. v. Sysco Food Services of Metro N · filed 2016-12-08(a)

But the mere fact that Galman received a smaller retirement payment than other employees is not enough to infer that he suffered discrimination. The Complaint says nothing about the employees’ retirement contribution levels, annuity elections, or age at retirement—all of which could account for the alleged disparity.

Section 10:5-12 prohibits discharge based on race, but a discriminatory discharge claim requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

COARD VS. OAKS INTEGRATED CARE, INC. (L-1329-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-03

However, we agree that plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that circumstantially raises an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(f)(1) requires a public accommodation discrimination claim to allege discrimination based on a protected characteristic; undocumented immigration status alone does not establish national origin discrimination.

FLORENTINO v. CITY OF NEWARK · filed 2020-08-31(f)(1)

Although Plaintiff contends she was unlawfully arrested, her arrest, whether lawful or unlawful, was premised on her status as an undocumented immigrant; it was not based on her national origin. Plaintiff’s allegations that the Officer Defendants taunted her with pro-Trump comments on the drive to the precinct are, without more, too conclusory to sustain a claim for discrimination. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that indicate others outside of her protected class received different treatment.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits race-based discrimination in compensation, and a plaintiff must offer competent evidence that lower pay was based on race to establish a prima facie claim.

Harrington v. Garden State Nissan, Inc. · filed 2026-04-24(a)

Pursuant to the LAD, it is "an unlawful employment practice" or "unlawful discrimination" for "an employer, because of the race" or "color . . . of any individual . . . to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... Plaintiff, therefore, failed to satisfy her burden to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination in violation of the LAD.

A race discrimination claim under Section 10:5-12(a) can survive summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to infer discrimination and find the employer’s stated reason for termination pretextual.

PHILLIPS v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION · filed 2022-08-31(a)

The above-described evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 70) on Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the NJLAD in Counts One, Two, and Three of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 36) will be denied.

Section 10:5-12 does not prohibit implementation of a valid affirmative action plan.

Jersey City Educ. Ass'n Inc. v. BD. OF ED. · filed 1987-05-27

Moreover, implementation of a valid affirmative action plan is not the impermissible discrimination contemplated in N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 or Article 16-8.

Section 10:5-12 permits an employer to consider race in an employment decision only under an established affirmative action plan.

Klawitter v. City of Trenton · filed 2007-07-31

We hold that race can be considered in an employment decision only pursuant to and in accordance with an established affirmative action plan. Without such a plan in place, an employer would be in violation of Title VII and the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of sex; claims under it are not subject to the Tort Claims Act’s notice requirement.

Fuchilla v. Layman · filed 1988-02-08(a)

By declaring as a "civil right" that all persons shall have "the opportunity to obtain employment," N.J.S.A. 10:5-4, the Law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of their sex, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). ... The difference between the substantive standard for negligence, which was clearly a legislative concern in the Act, and the Law's implicit emphasis on motive or intent suggests that the Legislature did not intend that the Act apply to discrimination claims under the Law.

NJLAD discrimination and retaliation claims survive dismissal when the pleaded facts plausibly support unequal treatment because of race or national origin or termination because of discrimination complaints.

NAGGAYI v. EMR USA HOLDING, INC. · filed 2024-06-26

Courts analyze Title VII and NJLAD claims the same way. ... Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to plausibly support the conclusion that Defendant treated her less favorably than others because of her race or national origin and/or retaliated against her by terminating her employment because of her complaints.

Section 10:5-12(a) protects majority group plaintiffs without requiring them to satisfy the Background Circumstances Rule.

Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield · filed 2026-03-06(a)

The facial coverage of the NJLAD leaves no room for the Background Circumstances Rule.

A release of discrimination claims under § 10:5-12 must be knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

Riddell v. Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange · filed 1998-10-14

Consequently, our analysis set forth above reveals that Riddell did not execute a knowing and voluntary release of her state law claims.

In a LAD retaliation claim, the jury may decide whether protected activity caused the alleged retaliation, even if causation was considered at the prima facie stage.

BENNETT VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-1774-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-20(d)

Asking the jury here whether a causal connection existed between the alleged retaliation and conduct protected under the LAD or CEPA was not a legal error.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation claimant to show protected activity known to the employer, an adverse employment decision, and a causal connection between them.

WALTERS v. SAFELITE FULFILLMENT, INC. · filed 2021-04-30(d)

Under the NJLAD, retaliation requires a Plaintiff to show (1) that he engaged in a protected activity known to his employer, (2) that he was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and (3) a causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse employment action. ... Thus, Plaintiff has provided no evidence of a pattern of antagonism that could allow a rational trier of fact to find that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for his objection to Klein’s termination.

A retaliation claim can proceed when there is evidence of a good faith basis for the discrimination complaint, even if the underlying discrimination claim fails.

CHARLES KAZABA, JR. VS. RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-1652-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-15(d)

The jury was not persuaded that defendant discriminated against plaintiff because of his age, but there was a least a scintilla of evidence supporting a determination plaintiff had a good basis to file a claim he was the victim of age discrimination.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects a worker who reasonably and in good faith opposes an employer’s attempt to retaliate against a coworker; the worker need not establish a basis for the coworker’s underlying complaint.

RIOS VS. MEADOWLAND HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER (L-0142-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-04-14(d)

We interpret the Court's holding in Carmona to require that a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) must establish as a prerequisite that the alleged action triggering the retaliation was taken on a good faith and reasonable basis.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment consequence for a retaliation claim.

STEVENS VS. COUNTY OF HUDSON (L-3792-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-01-15(d)

Again, plaintiff does not make a connection to the purported retaliation. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).

Section 10:5-12(d) requires an employee claiming retaliation to show that protected activity caused the adverse employment action.

Shinn v. Fedex Freight Inc · filed 2019-08-22(d)

Shinn cannot make a prima facie case because he cannot show that his assistance of the investigation into the breakroom incident caused his termination.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects a discrimination complaint from retaliation when it concerns any characteristic protected by the LAD; the employee need not identify gender specifically.

SANTA MALLON VS. HUDSON SAVINGS BANK (L-0466-13, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-23(d)

However, with the retaliation claim, the jurors could consider her discrimination complaint a protected activity if based upon, or perceived by defendants as based upon, any protected characteristic under the LAD, not limited to gender.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee’s reports to an investigator about discriminatory treatment of a coworker as opposition to discrimination.

WILSON v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-10-25(d)

Here, Plaintiff’s statements to Allen, which allegedly occurred in spring 2014, constitute protected opposition under Title VII and the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for opposing discrimination, but a retaliation claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee fails to rebut the employer's legitimate reasons for termination.

ELGHANDOUR VS. MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ETC. (L-5963-14, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-08(d)

Assuming arguendo plaintiff's bare assertions were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the LAD, summary judgment was nevertheless appropriate because she failed to rebut the abundant proof supporting defendant's non-pretextual reasons for termination.

A retaliation claim under § 10:5-12(d) can be barred by collateral estoppel when the employee raised and lost the same retaliation defense in a prior disciplinary proceeding.

Wolff v. Salem County Correctional Facility and County of Salem · filed 2015-01-29(d)

We see no reason why Winters would not apply to a retaliation claim under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) when it applies to a retaliation claim under CEPA.

Section 10:5-12 does not prohibit retaliation against an employee for claiming workers' compensation benefits.

LARSON VS. CITY OF PATERSON, ETC. (L-4092-13, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-10-26

Plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim, however, is not based on an alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, and the statute does not prohibit discrimination or retaliation against an employee for asserting rights to workers' compensation benefits.

Section 10:5-12(d) retaliation claims fail when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Reganato v. Appliance Replacement Inc · filed 2018-06-14(d)

She claims her termination was impermissible retaliation under both the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5- 12(d). ... Even assuming without deciding that Reganato established a prima facie case of retaliation, as she argues on appeal, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Appliance Replacement’s reasoning was pretextual.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a causal link between protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action.

D.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Pennsauken School District · filed 2017-03-29(d)

Plaintiffs allege they were retaliated against because of their advocacy for D.V. in violation of N.J.S.A. 10:5—12(d). Similar to retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act, ADA and § 1983, in order to make out a retaliation claim under the NJLAD it is necessary that there be a causal link between the protected action and the alleged adverse action. ... Simply put, there are no facts in the record from which a jury can reasonably infer or conclude there was a causal link between plaintiffs’ educational advocacy and the calls to DYFS.

Section 10:5-12(d) allows a retaliatory discharge claim when an employee alleges protected activity, an adverse employment action, and facts supporting a causal connection between them.

Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc. · filed 2016-11-17(d)

To state a prima facie case for retaliation under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that she (1) engaged in protected activity, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. ... Thus, accepting Plaintiffs allegations as true, and giving her all reasonable inferences, she properly states a claim for retaliatory discharge.

Section 10:5-12(d) requires a retaliation claimant to have opposed conduct prohibited by the NJLAD; a general complaint about negativity does not suffice.

Sharp v. Kean University · filed 2015-12-28(d)

Nothing in that statement indicates that Sharp opposed conduct that the NJLAD prohibits. Moreover, Sharp has failed to remotely suggest that she opposed the type of discrimination contemplated by the NJLAD. Therefore, her NJLAD claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 10:5-12(d) prohibits retaliation for complaints about employment discrimination; a reduction in work hours after a complaint can support a prima facie retaliation claim.

Moody v. Atlantic City Board of Educati · filed 2017-09-06(d)

Accordingly, Moody has established a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the NJLAD.

A request to extend medical leave is protected activity under the section’s retaliation prohibition.

Bertolotti v. AutoZone, Inc. · filed 2015-09-22(d)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs retaliation claim survives summary judgment to the extent that it is based on the removal of Plaintiff from her position as Regional HR Manager in retaliation for Plaintiffs request for an extension of medical leave.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to discrimination prohibited by the NJLAD; a general complaint of unfair treatment is not protected activity.

Ogunbayo v. Hertz Corp · filed 2013-09-09(d)

Rather, only challenges to discrimination prohibited by the NJLAD — such as discrimination on the basis of race, age, or gender, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–12(d) — constitute “protected activity.”

Section 10:5-12(d) protects employees from retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination; supporting a coworker fired for sleeping on the job is not protected activity.

Lapaz v. Barnabas Health System · filed 2015-12-16(d)

The NJLAD protects employees from retaliation for having opposed unlawful discrimination. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5–12(d). LaPaz’s actions in support of her co-worker, who was fired for sleeping on the job, did not constitute protected activity.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee who reports a customer's offensive touching at work to the police.

Prager v. Joyce Honda, Inc. · filed 2016-08-22(d)

Because N.J.S.A. 10:5-12d makes unlawful "reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because that person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this act," and given the "broad and pervasive" scope of the LAD, ... we conclude plaintiff's report to the police of an offensive touching in her workplace by a customer of her employer clearly constitutes protected activity under the Act.

A resignation is a discrete act that requires an employee to pursue a claim that retaliation caused the resignation.

Henry v. New Jersey Department of Human Services · filed 2010-12-10(d)

Similarly, a discrete act of resignation also terminates the employment relationship and obligates the former employee to take action relevant to any retaliatory cause of the resignation.

Section 10:5-12(d) broadly protects people who assist in pursuing discrimination claims from retaliation.

Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. · filed 2010-12-02(d)

Taken as a whole, therefore, the LAD operates not only to fight discrimination wherever it is found, but to protect those who assist in rooting it out.

Section 10:5-12(d) does not protect a general request for more workplace diversity that does not accuse the employer of unlawful discrimination.

Hood v. Pfizer Inc · filed 2009-04-06(d)

A reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Hood accused Pfizer of discrimination in violation of the NJLAD. ... This statement expresses a generalized concern about the extent of Pfizer’s marketing department’s ... affirmative diversity efforts, and Hood concedes that NJLAD says nothing about such efforts, see Appellant’s Br. at 33-34.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to practices forbidden by the NJLAD; a general question about promoting workplace diversity is not protected opposition.

Hood v. Pfizer Inc · filed 2009-04-16(d)

A reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Hood accused Pfizer of discrimination in violation of the NJLAD. Hood asked, at the meeting, “why more wasn’t being done to promote diversity within [his department].” App. 293. This statement ... expresses a generalized concern about the extent of Pfizer’s marketing department’s affirmative diversity efforts, and Hood concedes that NJLAD says nothing about such efforts, see Appellant’s Br. at 33-34.

Section 10:5-12(d) does not necessarily protect an employee who takes confidential employer documents to advance a discrimination claim, even if the documents are later used in litigation.

Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. · filed 2009-08-11(d)

We agree with Curtiss that taking confidential documents from an employer and using them to advance a discrimination claim is not necessarily a protected activity.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects a verbal complaint about age discrimination as opposition to unlawful discrimination.

Sgro v. Bloomberg L.P. · filed 2009-08-20(d)

The foregoing verbal complaint — in which Sgro used the term “hostile work environment” and specifically likened himself to another employee who was disadvantaged in favor of a younger employee — constituted protected activity under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects opposition to practices forbidden by the LAD and the filing of a complaint when the underlying complaint is made reasonably and in good faith.

Bradley v. Atlantic City Board of Education · filed 2010-09-07(d)

As the statute states, protected activity includes “opposing practices or acts forbidden under [the statute]” as well as filing a complaint. Id. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that in order to receive protection, Plaintiff must take those actions in good faith. ... In this case, the Court holds that the record evidence does not sufficiently support a conclusion that Plaintiffs Tort Claim Notice was drafted and filed in good faith.

Section 10:5-12(d) does not treat an employee’s inquiry about why he was passed over for a position as protected opposition to age discrimination when he does not raise discrimination.

Geltzer v. Virtua West Jersey Health Sytems · filed 2011-05-20(d)

Both the ADEA and the LAD prohibit retaliation against an employee who “oppose[s]” age discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. ... Nothing in the record could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Geltzer engaged in activity protected by either the ADEA or the LAD by simply asking why he was not selected for the position.

A retaliation claim under Section 10:5-12(d) requires evidence that the alleged retaliator knew of the employee’s protected activity.

Barroso v. Lidestri Foods, Inc. · filed 2013-03-28(d)

Thus there is no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that DiMaio had knowledge of Plaintiffs protected activity and therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the NJLAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) can cover retaliation after employment ends, even when the retaliatory act is unrelated to the workplace.

Roa v. Roa · filed 2008-07-07(d)

We conclude that the Supreme Court's essential holding in Burlington Northern, i.e., that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision creates a distinct cause of action that need not be related to the workplace, applies with equal reasoning to construction of the LAD.

Section 10:5-12(d) protects an employee who files a discrimination complaint from retaliatory discharge, but the employee must show a causal link between the complaint and the discharge.

Rogers v. Alternative Resources Corp. · filed 2006-07-27(d)

Rogers has not demonstrated a causal link between the filing of the EEOC complaint and his termination, and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination.