La. Stat. Ann. § 14:27

Drawing a weapon to obtain property can satisfy Section 14:27’s requirement of an act tending directly toward the crime.

State of Louisiana v. Arthur Bias, Jr. · filed 2011-05-04(A)

Defendant’s assertion that the record does not show an act in furtherance of the attempted robbery is inaccurate. His producing the weapon was such an act.

Section 14:27(B) excludes mere preparation from an attempt.

State v. Fogan · filed 1992-12-01(B)

We find those acts insufficient to conclude that they were in furtherance of a sale of marijuana, and the actions of the defendant constituted “mere preparation.”

Section 14:27(D)(3) sets a maximum sentence for an attempt at one-half the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense and does not expressly impose a minimum sentence.

State v. Callahan · filed 1996-03-29(D)(3)

La.Rev.Stat. 14:27D(3) by its terms provides only a maximum sentence for a conviction of attempting to commit a crime. There is no express statutory minimum sentence for being convicted of an attempt, and principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed.

Section 14:27 limits an attempted offense sentence to no more than one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Varnado · filed 1999-09-22

A defendant convicted of attempted armed robbery shall be sentence to not more than one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. See La. R.S. 14:27, and La. R.S. 14:64. However, the sentence for someone who commits the crime of first-degree robbery is no less than three years and not more than forty years. A district court judge presented with an application to correct an illegally lenient sentence may therefore correct a sentence that he or she imposed by making the necessary changes in the minutes, without bringing the inmate to court, and sending a certified copy of the new minutes to the inmate and to the relevant prison authorities, who otherwise lack the discretion to make the amendments themselves in the documents they receive from the sentencing court pursuant to La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 892. State v. Harris, 93-1098, 94-2243 (La.1/5/96), 665 So.2d 1164. The defendant in the instant case was sentenced to serve 30 years for first-degree robbery, which we find to be an error in the record. Nevertheless, we find that the sentence is also within the sentencing guidelines for attempted armed robbery.

Section 14:27 sentences an attempt in the same manner as the completed offense, but limits imprisonment to no more than one-half of the longest term prescribed for that offense, leaving no minimum sentence when the statute defining the completed offense supplies only a minimum term.

State v. Brown · filed 2001-12-19

Defendant was convicted of an attempt. La. R.S. 14:27 provides that a person convicted of an attempt of the variety in the instant case shall be imprisoned in the same manner as for the offense attempted, with such imprisonment not exceeding one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. Thus, there effectively is no minimum sentence for a person convicted of attempted possession of cocaine in an amount more than twenty-eight grams but less than two hundred grams. Therefore, defendant's sentence must be amended to delete the provision denying him the benefits of probation and parole.

Section 14:27 requires a person convicted of an attempt to be sentenced in the same manner as for the offense attempted.

State v. Bertrand · filed 2004-04-28

La. R.S. 14:27, the attempt statute, requires that a person convicted under that statute be sentenced "in the same manner as for the offense attempted"; La. R.S. 14:43.1, the sexual battery statute, prohibits the benefits of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, the trial court erred in suspending Mr. Bertrand's sentence and placing him on active probation. Accordingly, the sentence must be vacated.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for an attempt to one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Spencer · filed 2004-12-08(D)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27(D)(3) provides that for an offense of attempt, a defendant "shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." Therefore, for his attempted armed robbery conviction, the defendant could have been sentenced to forty-nine and one half years.

Section 14:27 requires a person convicted of an attempt to be sentenced in the same manner as for the offense attempted.

State v. Bertrand · filed 2004-12-15

La. R.S. 14:27, the attempt statute, requires that a person convicted under that statute be sentenced "in the same manner as for the offense attempted”; La. R.S. 14:43.1, the sexual battery statute, prohibits the benefits of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, the trial court erred in suspending Mr. Bertrand’s sentence and placing him on active probation. Accordingly, the sentence must be vacated.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the sentence for an attempt to no more than one-half of the maximum imprisonment term for the completed offense and provides no minimum sentence.

State v. Session · filed 2005-04-26(D)(3)

The attempt statute provides for sentencing not to exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). It does not provide for a minimum sentence.

Subsection (D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to the same kind of fine or imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense, but no more than one-half of that offense's maximum fine or imprisonment.

State v. Moses · filed 2006-05-09(D)(3)

The sentencing exposure for an attempt conviction under La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) was in 1996, as now, "fine[] or imprison[ment] or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." Therefore, the defendant's sentencing exposure was imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two and one half years and for not more than forty-nine and one half years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Subsection D(3) does not alter how the sentence for the underlying offense is to be served, including its parole, probation, and suspension-of-sentence rules.

State v. Brown · filed 2010-02-10(D)(3)

Nothing in the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27 D(3), alters how the sentence is to be served in that respect.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the fine and imprisonment for an attempted offense to no more than one-half of the maximum fine and prison term prescribed for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. Lefeat · filed 2011-10-05(D)(3)

The attempt statute, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), provides that an offender Ashall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.@ Defendant could have received a maximum sentence of two and one-half years and a two thousand two hundred and fifty dollar fine.

Section 14:27 limits the punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense; applied to attempted armed robbery, the court calculated a 10-to-49½-year range at hard labor without benefits.

State v. Smith · filed 2016-01-13(D)(3)

(3) be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half the largest fíne, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.

For an attempted felony carnal-knowledge sentence, § 14:27 requires the judgment to specify whether the sentence is to be served with or without hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Ervin · filed 2017-12-13

Additionally, the sentences imposed for attempted carnal knowledge of a juvenile are indeterminate due to the trial court’s failure to specify whether they are to be served with or without hard labor. ... Thus, when resentencing Defendant, the trial court should specify whether the sentences for attempted felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile are to be served with or without hard labor.

For attempted second-degree murder, § 14:27, together with § 14:30.1, provides a sentencing range of ten to 50 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Hudson · filed 2018-05-23

The trial judge incorrectly informed Defendant of the maximum sentence for attempted second degree murder. She advised Defendant that the maximum sentence for that offense was 40 years; however, the sentencing range for attempted second degree murder under La. R.S. 14:30.1 and La. R.S. 14:27, is ten to 50 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits an attempt sentence to the same manner as the completed offense, but imprisonment may not exceed one-half of the longest term prescribed for the attempted offense.

State of Louisiana v. Rickmon · filed 2023-08-30(D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that a person convicted of attempt “shall be . . . imprisoned . . . in the same manner as for the offense attempted” and “such . . . imprisonment shall not exceed . . . one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted . . . .” Consequently, upon his conviction for attempted third degree rape, Defendant faced imprisonment for a term not more than twelve and a half years.

For attempted second degree murder, Subsection (1)(a) provides a sentencing range of 10 to 50 years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Willis · filed 2024-11-20(1)(a)

The sentencing range for a conviction of attempted second degree murder is not less than 10 nor more than 50 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(1)(a). ... Willis failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the midrange sentence of 25 years, under these specific facts and circumstances.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires sentencing for a covered attempt in the same manner as for the attempted offense, but caps imprisonment at half that offense’s maximum term.

State v. Brown · filed 2010-03-31(D)(3)

Subsection D(3) of La. R.S. 14:27 governs sentencing for persons found guilty of an attempt to commit a certain offenses, providing for sentence upon conviction in the same manner as for the offense attempted but that the imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted.

Section 14:27, together with the armed-robbery statute, requires a sentence for attempted armed robbery to be served without benefit of parole.

State of Louisiana v. Bryan Means · filed 2010-10-06

A sentence imposed for attempted armed robbery, the offense at issue in this case, is to be served without benefit of parole. See La.R.S. 14:27, 14:64, and State ex rel. Sullivan v. Maggio, 432 So.2d 854 (La.1983).

Under the version of § 14:27(D)(2) applicable before August 14, 2010, attempted felony theft carried a maximum prison term of one year.

State v. Richey · filed 2013-10-30(D)(2)

As defendant’s imposed sentence exceeds the maximum term of one year provided by the statute at the applicable time period, we find that defendant’s sentence imposed on October 4, 2012 is constitutionally excessive.

Attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill; firing multiple shots at a victim at close range can establish that intent.

State v. Thompson · filed 2012-12-11(A)

Based on this evidence, we find the evidence sufficiently shows defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill the victim so as to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder.

Firing numerous shots at people in a vehicle can show the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder under § 14:27.

State v. Bethley · filed 2013-02-06

Likewise, in this case, the simple act of pointing a gun at Green’s vehicle and firing numerous shots at the occupants in the vehicle shows specific intent to kill.

Attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill; intent to inflict great bodily harm is insufficient.

State v. Murray · filed 2015-01-14(A)

Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, attempted second degree murder requires the specific intent to | nkill.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended offense; aiming and repeatedly firing a gun at a person can establish intent to kill for attempted second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Wayne K. Jones, Jr. · filed 2011-11-02(A)

By aiming his gun at Kesiah and firing multiple shots at her, Defendant exhibited the specific intent to kill that is required by La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(C) makes attempt a lesser included offense of the charged crime, permitting an attempted aggravated assault verdict when the charged assault rests on placing someone in reasonable apprehension of a battery.

State of Louisiana v. Bridges · filed 2024-05-17(C)

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that La. R.S. 14:27(C) makes an attempt a lesser included offense of the charged crime. ... In the matter herein, we find that attempted aggravated assault with a firearm upon a police officer is a responsive verdict to aggravated assault with a firearm upon a peace officer.

Section 14:27 does not make an attempted offense a lesser-included responsive offense when proof of the attempted offense necessarily proves the charged substantive offense.

State v. Campbell · filed 1996-03-22

Because the offense of jury tampering encompasses the attempt to influence jurors for corrupt purposes, by means of direct or indirect communications or attempted communications, attempted jury tampering is not a lesser and included responsive offense for purposes of La.R.S. 14:27 or La. C.Cr.P. art. 815.

Section 14:27 does not make attempted insurance fraud a lesser and included responsive offense when the underlying insurance-fraud statute already encompasses attempts.

State v. Joshlin · filed 2001-11-09

Because the offense of insurance fraud encompasses attempted insurance fraud, attempted insurance fraud is not a lesser and included responsive offense for purposes of La.R.S. 14:27 or La.C.Cr.P. art. 815.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt to commit a crime a separate, lesser grade of the intended crime when a person with specific intent takes an act tending directly toward its completion.

State of Louisiana Ersus Dustin M. Mc Dowell · filed 2023-03-08(A), (C)

In general, attempt is a lesser grade of the primary crime. ... Domestic abuse battery with child endangerment is similar to the sexual battery cases in that it contains elements in addition to the battery. Domestic abuse battery with child endangerment (and any attempt thereof) requires additional proof of a specific type of offender, a specific type of victim, and the presence of a child. ... This court finds that attempted domestic abuse battery with child endangerment is a valid crime that is responsive to the charged offense of domestic abuse battery with child endangerment.

Section 14:27(3) limits punishment for an attempted offense to no more than one-half of the largest fine or longest imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Albercht · filed 2002-01-30(3)

Ms. Albercht was convicted of attempted possession of child pornography under La. R.S. 14:27(81.1), [1] and a fine of not more than five thousand dollars was the maximum amount that could have been imposed along with the prison term. ... In the present case the trial court has the discretion to determine the amount of the fine up to $5,000. Although a maximum fine is provided, the minimum fine is not delegated by the statute, La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2). Therefore, the trial court has discretion to impose a fine with no minimum up to $5,000.

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempted crime to no more than one-half of the largest fine or longest imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense and does not provide a minimum sentence for the attempt.

State v. Jackson · filed 2002-02-13(D)(3)

The maximum sentence for attempted possession with the intent to distribute cocaine could not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment and would be one-half of thirty years or 15 years with the first five years without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 40:979 A do not provide for a minimum sentence for the attempted offense.

For an attempted offense not otherwise specifically covered, the punishment follows the offense attempted but cannot exceed one-half of its maximum fine or imprisonment term.

State v. Ambeau · filed 2009-02-11(D)(3)

In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or lnone-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.

Section 14:27(D)(1) sets a maximum sentence of fifty years at hard labor when the attempted offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Ethridge · filed 1997-02-05(D)(1)

For the crime of attempted second degree murder, two statutes are involved. La.R.S. 14:30.1(B) states that: Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, because this crime was only an attempt, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1), as it was in effect at the time the defendant committed the crime, stated: If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifty years.... For the crime of attempted second degree murder, the defendant was sentenced to forty-five (45) years at hard labor; this sentence is also below the statutory maximum of fifty (50) years.

Section 14:27(D)(1) requires an attempt of an offense punishable by life imprisonment to be sentenced to 10–50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension.

State v. Jones · filed 2003-04-23(D)(1)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1) provides that “[i]f the offense so attempted is punishable by ... life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard 14labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”

Section 14:27(D)(l)(a) sets a ten-to-fifty-year hard-labor sentence without parole, probation, or suspension for an attempt to commit an offense otherwise punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Harrison · filed 2009-06-25(D)(l)(a)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a) states that anyone convicted of the attempted commission of an offense that would otherwise be punishable by death or life imprisonment shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty year without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(l)(a) provides a ten-to-fifty-year hard-labor sentence without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the attempted offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Richard · filed 2013-04-24(D)(l)(a)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a) provided: “If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a 10-to-50-year hard-labor sentence without benefits for an attempt to commit an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Johnston · filed 2016-06-22(D)(1)(a)

Based on La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4), the range of this sentence is 10 to 50 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant got it all, but this sentence is lawful.

Subsection (D)(1) sets a maximum 50-year hard-labor sentence for attempting a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Kurz · filed 2018-02-28(D)(1)

During that time period, La. R.S. 14:27(D) provided a 50-year maximum sentence for the attempt of a crime punishable by death or by life imprisonment.

Section 14:27 provides that an attempt to commit an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment carries 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Martin · filed 2019-05-22

The statute defining and punishing the crime of attempt, La. R.S. 14:27, in relevant part states: "If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence."

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a ten-to-fifty-year hard-labor penalty, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for an attempt to commit an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Dewayne Sylvester -Aka- Dwayne Anthony Sylvester, Sr. · filed 2020-02-05(D)(1)(a)

(D)(1)(a) If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 does not authorize a district court to impose restitution in a felony case as part of an executory sentence of imprisonment.

State v. Prince · filed 1997-09-26

The relevant statutes, La.R.S. 14:27; La.R.S. 14:31; La.R.S.La. 14:44.1, do not authorize a district court to impose restitution in a felony case as part of an executory sentence of imprisonment.

Section 14:27(D)(3) sets a maximum sentence for an attempt but no statutory minimum sentence.

State v. Cox · filed 2012-02-22(D)(3)

However, this information was incorrect. The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that “La.Rev. Stat. 14:27 D(3) by its terms provides only a maximum sentence for a conviction of attempting to commit a crime. There is no express statutory minimum sentence for being convicted of an attempt, and principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed.”

Section 14:27(D)(3) caps imprisonment for an attempt at one-half the longest term prescribed for the completed offense and does not impose a minimum sentence.

State v. Patrick · filed 1998-10-28(D)(3)

The punishment for an attempted offense is a fine or sentence of imprisonment not to exceed onehalf of the largest fine or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Consequently, the maximum sentence for attempted first degree robbery is 20 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. See, e.g., State v. Sweet, 575 So.2d 937 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991). There is no minimum sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(3) caps punishment for an attempt at half the maximum for the completed offense and provides no express minimum sentence.

State v. Sampognaro · filed 2010-03-23(D)(3)

By the terms of the attempt statute, only a maximum sentence is provided for the conviction of attempting to commit a crime. “There is no express statutory minimum sentence for being convicted of an attempt and principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed.” Therefore, the sentencing range for attempted possession of child pornography is zero to five years and a fine up to $5,000.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward commission of the intended crime; the dangerous-weapon language in § 14:27(B)(1) does not apply when weapon use is not alleged as an element of the charged offense.

State v. Workman · filed 2015-04-15(A) (B)(1)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Clearly the law pertaining to dangerous weapons under La. R.S. 14:27(B)(1), did not apply, and therefore, the trial court instructed the jury as to the correct charge and elements necessary to convict defendant of the attempted aggravated rape offense.

Section 14:27(B) provides that lying in wait with a dangerous weapon and the intent to commit a crime is sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the intended offense.

State v. Kunzman · filed 1999-05-05(B)

Furthermore, "... lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime ... shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended." La. R.S. 14:27(B).

Lying in wait with a knife and trying to lure the victim there can constitute an overt act toward an attempted armed robbery.

State v. Sanders · filed 2012-09-11(B)(1)

Additionally, by waiting for the detective in a back alleyway with a knife and trying to lure the detective there, defendant committed an overt act tending directly toward accomplishing the armed robbery.

Section 14:27 treats lying in wait or searching for an intended victim with a dangerous weapon as conduct that can constitute an attempt.

State v. Devillier · filed 2018-10-17(B)

The jury instruction closely tracks the language of the statute, which includes the language of lying in wait with a dangerous weapon or searching for an intended victim with a dangerous weapon as examples of what constitutes an attempt.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires the sentence for an attempted crime to be imposed in the same manner as the sentence for the offense attempted, so restrictions applicable to the completed offense may apply to the attempt.

State v. Allen · filed 2015-10-14(D)(3)

Because La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) dictates that the sentence for someone convicted of an attempted crime be “in the same manner as for the offense attempted,” we find no error in the trial court's restriction of benefits.

Section 14:27 sets the punishment for attempts, limiting attempted armed robbery to no more than one-half of the underlying offense's maximum term and prescribing ten to fifty years for attempted second degree murder.

State v. Roberts · filed 1999-05-14D(1), D(3)

La. R.S. 14:27 D(3) provides that the penalty for attempted armed robbery cannot exceed one-half of the maximum term for armed robbery. Thus, the maximum possible sentence on the attempted armed robbery charge is 49 years. Therefore, appellant received less than the maximum sentence. The penalty provision for second degree murder is "life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence." La.R.S.14:30.1 B. For attempted second degree murder, the penalty is "imprison[ment] at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence[.]" La. R.S.14:27 D(1). Defendant's sentence was less than the maximum.

For an attempt covered by Subsection (D)(3), the sentence is imposed in the same manner as for the attempted offense but may not exceed one-half of that offense’s maximum term, so the attempt carries no minimum sentence here.

State v. Rodriguez · filed 2001-02-14(D)(3)

Defendant was convicted of an attempt. La. R.S. 14:27 provides that a person convicted of an attempt of the variety in the instant case shall be imprisoned in the same manner as for the offense attempted, with such imprisonment not exceeding one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. Thus, there effectively is no minimum sentence for a person convicted of attempted possession of cocaine in an amount more than twenty-eight grams but less than two hundred grams. Therefore, defendant's sentence must be amended to delete the provision denying him the benefits of probation and parole.

Section 14:27 applies to an attempted offense and provides for one-half of the largest fine or one-half of the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the offense attempted, or both.

State v. Marcotte · filed 2002-05-15

Finally, because Defendant was convicted of attempted distribution to a minor, La. R.S. 14:27 applies, which provides for a sentence of "one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." Therefore, Defendant was subject to a sentence from five to thirty years in prison. Thus, his sentence of fifteen years is a mid-range sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(b) sets the penalty for attempted first-degree murder of a peace officer at twenty to fifty years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Timothy Vollm, Jr. · filed 2004-11-10(D)(1)(b)

Furthermore, the penalty for attempted first degree murder of a peace officer is a minimum of twenty and a maximum of fifty years to be served at hard labor and without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:27 (D)(1)(b).

Section 14:27(D)(3) caps imprisonment for an attempted offense at one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense and requires no minimum penalty.

State of Louisiana v. Insley · filed 2005-02-02(D)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27(D)(3) sets forth the appropriate penalty for attempted cultivation of marijuana, providing that the sentence imposed for an attempt shall not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense attempted. The Louisiana Supreme Court has found that this language requires no minimum penalty provision. ... Turning to the defendant’s claim that his four year sentence was excessive, we first note that the defendant could have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from zero to fifteen years. La.R.S. 40:966; La.R.S. 14:27.

Subsection (D)(3) limits an attempted-offense sentence to one-half of the maximum term for the completed offense and requires the sentence to be imposed in the same manner as the attempted offense.

State v. Wilson · filed 2007-05-09(D)(3)

Louisiana R.S. 14:27(D)(3) limits the maximum term for an attempted offense to one-half of the maximum term for the base offense. Sentences imposed in accordance with this statute should be imposed "in the same manner" as the offense attempted.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires an attempted offense to be punished in the same manner as the completed offense, including mandatory hard-labor and parole, probation, or suspension restrictions.

State v. Smith · filed 2009-01-13(D)(3)

The attempt statute, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), pertinently provides that whoever attempts to commit a crime shall be punished "in the same manner as for the offense attempted[.]" In State ex rel. Sullivan v. Maggio, 432 So.2d 854, 857 (La. 1983), the Supreme Court analyzed the "in the same manner" phrase as it applied to an attempted armed robbery offense. The armed robbery crime, like the instant crime, required the statutory restrictions. The Court held: "A realistic and genuine construction of the two provisions requires that persons who attempt armed robbery shall be punished at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence." Id. We agree with the Third Circuit that the same reasoning applies to the crime of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See: State v. Everett, 05-214, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916 So.2d 1210, 1212. Therefore, the defendant's sentence for attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in this case required imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the imprisonment for an attempted offense to one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. Insley · filed 2009-11-04(D)(3)

The statute governing penalties for attempted offenses, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), provides as follows: ... In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the maximum fine or prison term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Woods · filed 2010-03-09

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:27, an attempt is punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both, “in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Therefore, the maximum sentence that the Defendant could have received for the attempted simple burglary conviction was six years at hard labor, with not less than six months being served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. That is a period one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed 12ftfbr the completed offense.

For an attempted offense not otherwise covered, Section 14:27(D)(3) authorizes the same kind of fine or imprisonment as the completed offense, caps each at one-half of the completed offense’s maximum, and does not require a minimum penalty even when the completed offense has one.

State of Louisiana v. Chandler · filed 2010-05-05(D)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27(D)(3) sets forth the appropriate penalty for the attempt to possess a firearm by a convicted felon as follows: ... In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. ... “[T]he language of La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) (the attempt statute) does not require a minimum penalty even though one is required for the completed offense.” State v. Everett, 05-214, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916 So.2d 1210, 1212. Further, the sentence must be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.1 Id.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to one-half of the largest fine or longest imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Maze · filed 2010-05-05(D)(3)

The Louisiana attempt statute, in pertinent part, provides that the offender “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Accordingly, the maximum sentence of incarceration the Defendant could have received in this case was twenty years for the crime of attempted manslaughter, which was the sentence imposed upon him.

Section 14:27 generally limits punishment for an attempted offense to no more than one-half of the penalty prescribed for the completed offense.

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS JAMES WILLIE WHITE AKA JAMES WILLIE WHITE, JR. AKA JAMES JUNE WHITE, ETC. · filed 2012-04-04

The Defendant pled guilty to attempted distribution of marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1). As such, the Defendant could have received one half of the prescribed penalty of five to thirty years, plus a fine of up to $25,000.

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempted offense to no more than half the completed offense's longest imprisonment term and largest fine, with no stated minimum in this application.

State of Louisiana v. Marqule Craft · filed 2012-10-03

The possible exposure for an attempted offense is half the largest fine and/or half the longest term of imprisonment for the completed offense. La.R.S. 14:27. Thus, the sentencing range here is zero to fifteen years and/or a fine of fifty thousand dollars.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense; here, that made attempted manslaughter punishable by up to twenty years.

State of Louisiana v. Wilcy Ernest Monceaux, Sr. · filed 2012-11-07(D)(3)

According to the attempt statute, “[w]hoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished . . . in the same manner as for the offense attempted . . . [except that] such . . . imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of . . . the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Therefore, the trial court gave Defendant the maximum sentence provided by law for attempted manslaughter.

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the maximum imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. Jones · filed 2013-12-11

The applicable penalty under La.R.S. 14:27 is imprisonment not to exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted.

Section 14:27 requires an attempt to be punished in the same manner as the completed offense, with the applicable imprisonment and fine reduced by half.

State of Louisiana v. Gurvis Harvey, Jr. · filed 2014-04-02

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 requires imprisonment in the same manner as for the offense attempted. At the time of the commission of the offense, the penalty for a violation of La.R.S. 14:78.1 was a fine of not more than $50,000.00 or imprisonment with or without hard labor for a term not less than five years not more than twenty years, or both. Thus, the penalty for attempted aggravated incest was not more than ten years with or without hard labor, a fine of not more than $25,000.00, or both.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Benoit · filed 2016-06-01(D)(3)

The attempt statute, in pertinent part, provides that a defendant shall be punished in the same manner as for the offense attempted, which shall not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the ■ offense so attempted. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). The maximum sentence for the offense of manslaughter is forty years at hard labor; thus, Defendant received the maximum penalty allowable under the law. La.R.S. 14:31 and 14:27.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. Dixon · filed 2016-09-28(D)(3)

With regard to an attempt to commit the offense of aggravated crime against nature, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that an offender convicted of an attempt to commit the offense of aggravated crime against nature is subjected to imprisonment that “shall not exceed . . . one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted[.]”

Section 14:27, together with § 14:64.1, requires a sentence for attempted first degree robbery to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Shelton · filed 2016-09-28

The only error patent found is the trial court’s failure to specify that the defendant’s sentence be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as required by La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:64.1.

Section 14:27(D)(1) limits punishment for an attempt of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment to hard labor for no more than fifty years.

State of Louisiana v. Hall · filed 2017-07-19(D)(1)

The attempt statute provided that “If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifty years.” La.R.S. 14:27 (D)(1).

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) provides a sentence of 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the attempted offense is punishable by life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Holley · filed 2020-04-22(D)(1)(a)

[I]f the offense so attempted is punishable by…life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than 10 nor more than 50 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires an attempted offense to be punished in the same manner as the completed offense, but limits the fine or imprisonment to one-half of the completed offense's maximum.

State of Louisiana v. Martin · filed 2020-05-20(D)(3)

Pursuant to La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), the punishment for attempted armed robbery is a fine or imprisonment or both “in the same manner as for the offense attempted; [but] such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” ... Contrary to La.R.S. 14:64 and La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence for the defendant’s conviction of attempted armed robbery. This requirement is non-discretionary; therefore, this court is authorized to correct the error without remanding the matter to the trial court to correct this error.

Subsection D(3) requires an attempted offense to carry imprisonment in the same manner as the completed crime attempted.

State of Louisiana Versus Jyrease Havies · filed 2022-12-22D(3)

While the sentence intended by the trial court was within the range prescribed by La. R.S. 14:110 B(4) and La. R.S. 14:27 D(3), the court must sentence defendant on the crime for which he was convicted, i.e., attempted simple escape. La. R.S. 14:27 D(3) further provides that the term of imprisonment shall be in the same manner as the crime attempted.

For an attempted offense, subsection (D)(3) permits the same kinds of fines or imprisonment as the completed offense but limits them to one-half of the completed offense's maximum fine or imprisonment term.

State of Louisiana v. Marcus · filed 2024-02-28(D)(3)

In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. (emphasis added).

Subsection (D)(3) limits punishment for an attempted offense to one-half of the maximum fine and/or imprisonment term for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. Thibodeaux · filed 2026-05-06(D)(3)

Since Defendant was convicted of attempted cruelty to a juvenile, she could be sentenced to only one-half of the largest fine and/or only one-half of the longest term of imprisonment. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Thus, the maximum fine that could have been imposed was $500.00.

Section 14:27(D) is an available penalty provision for an attempted drug offense, and the state may choose it instead of La.R.S. 40:979(A).

State v. Thomas · filed 1996-12-20(D)

The attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in a drug free zone is punishable under either La.R.S. 40:979(A) or 14:27(D), and the state may choose either provision as the basis for the prosecution.

Section 14:27 treats conduct as an attempt when a person does or omits an act intended to accomplish an offense and directly tending toward that objective.

State v. McKnight · filed 1999-06-25

Defendant also argues that because the results of the investigation into the victim's death were only delayed, not distorted, the state proved, at most, an attempt to obstruct justice. We disagree. An attempt requires doing or omitting "an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of [the] object...." La. R.S. 14:27. Here, the state proved that defendant actually committed the act of "tampering with the evidence." First, she removed the victim from the home and threw him into the river. Defendant then returned home and prepared a pallet on the living room floor, deliberately creating the false appearance that the victim had been on the pallet when he "disappeared." Further, defendant lied to the police concerning her knowledge of the victim's whereabouts and later implicated Jordan in the child's disappearance. Finally, she urged her son to lie about his knowledge of her involvement in the matter. Clearly, there was sufficient evidence to prove that defendant committed the completed offense of obstruction of justice, as opposed to merely attempting the offense.

Section 14:27 permits conviction for an attempt even when the defendant appears to have actually perpetrated the underlying offense.

State v. Thomas · filed 2003-02-19

A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even where it appears that the defendant actually perpetrated the offense.

Section 14:27 permits a person to be convicted of an attempt even when the evidence indicates that the person actually completed the offense.

State v. Armstead · filed 2002-11-06

A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even where it appears that the defendant actually perpetrated the offense.

Section 14:27(C) makes an attempt a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime, but it cannot be used to create an attempt offense when the underlying crime is itself an attempt.

State v. Presley · filed 2000-03-01(C)

La.R.S. 14:27(C) provides in part, that "[a]n attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime...." For the reasons set forth infra, we conclude that attempted assault by drive-by shooting is not a lesser included charge of assault by drive-by shooting and, thus, La.R.S. 14:27 is inapplicable to an offense relative to an assault.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) requires a sentence of ten to fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, when the attempted offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Gregoire · filed 2014-03-21(D)(1)(a)

The correct provision states that if the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits an attempt sentence to no more than one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment for the completed offense, supplies no express minimum sentence, and carries over the completed offense's restrictions on parole, probation, and suspension of sentence.

State v. Collins · filed 1999-03-10(D)(3)

The penalty for an attempted crime such as first degree robbery is fine or imprisonment or both, “in the same manner as for the offense attempted,” but “such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). ... Our supreme court has noted, “La.Rev. Slat. 14:27D(3) by its terms provides only a maximum sentence for a conviction of attempting to commit a crime. There hps no express statutory minimum sentence for being convicted of an attempt, and principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed.” ... With respect to whether the defendant was eligible for parole, probation or suspension of sentence, we note our supreme court has also ruled that “in the same manner as for the offense attempted,” as stated in La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), “means exactly what it says, i.e., that the other aspects of the imprisonment shall be ‘in the same manner’ as provided for in the crime statute itself.” ... Therefore, the sentencing range applicable to attempted first degree robbery is from no imprisonment to not more than twenty years imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 requires the entire sentence for attempted second degree murder to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Runyon · filed 2005-11-02

The penalty provision for attempted second degree murder requires the entire sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; however, the trial court ordered only ten years of Defendants' sentences to be served without benefits, La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. Thus, Defendants received illegally lenient sentences for their attempted second degree murder convictions.

Section 14:27 treats attempted manslaughter as an attempted homicide subject to manslaughter’s mitigating factors.

State v. Laird · filed 2010-02-10

“Sudden passion” and “heat of blood” are not elements of manslaughter, but rather, “they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibit a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed in the absence of these factors.” ... It stands to reason that attempted manslaughter is an attempted homicide with those mitigating factors. La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; for attempted second degree murder, this means specific intent to kill and an overt act toward the victim's death.

State v. Washington · filed 2016-03-16(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit .the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... To convict Washington of attempted second degree murder the state must prove that Wash: ington: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act tending toward accomplishing the victim’s death for attempted second degree murder.

State v. Dove · filed 2016-05-04

In a prosecution for attempted second degree murder the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim and (2) committed an overt act tending towards the accomplishment of the victim’s death.

Section 14:27, in conjunction with the completed-offense statute, sets the sentencing range for attempted second-degree murder at ten to fifty years.

State of Louisiana Versus Darval B. Ledet · filed 2021-01-27

The trial court advised defendant that the sentencing range on count two, attempted second degree murder, was zero to fifty years; however, La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1 provide that the sentencing range was ten to fifty years.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent and an act tending directly toward the intended crime, but motive is not a required element of attempted second degree murder.

State v. Wommack · filed 2000-06-07(A)

As can be seen from La.R.S. 14:30.1 and La.R.S. 14:27, motive is not a required element of attempted second degree murder.

Subsection D(1) requires a sentence for attempted second degree murder to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Moye · filed 2000-06-14(D)(1)

This sentence is illegally lenient in that it did not include the condition that it be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27 D(1).

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act tending toward the victim's death to sustain an attempted second degree murder conviction.

State v. Bishop · filed 2003-01-14

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1.

Section 14:27 requires an intent to commit the attempted offense and an overt act tending toward its completion; for attempted second degree murder, the required intent is specific intent to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Runyon · filed 2005-11-02

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill for an attempted second-degree-murder conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Jones · filed 2010-08-11

The specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of attempted second degree murder. La.R.S. 14:27, 14:30.1; State v. Hongo, 96-2060 (La.12/2/97), 706 So.2d 419.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) requires a sentence for attempted second degree murder of ten to fifty years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Griffin · filed 2015-09-16(D)(1)(a)

The sentencing restrictions for Mr. Griffin’s present felony, his conviction for attempted second degree murder, are that the sentence,of not less than ten nor more than fifty years at hard labor be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27 D(1)(a).

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a 10-to-50-year hard-labor imprisonment range without parole, probation, or suspension for attempted second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Charles Edward Jackson -Aka- Charles E. Jackson · filed 2015-12-09(D)(1)(a)

Defendant’s attempted second degree murder conviction carries a sentence of no less than ten and no more than fifty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a). His forty-year sentence, however, is ten years below the maximum sentence allowed by law.

Section 14:27(D)(l)(a) makes attempted second degree murder punishable by 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Pierce · filed 2017-02-15(D)(l)(a)

An attempt to commit second degree murder is punishable at hard labor for not less than 10, nor more than 50 years without benefit of parole, probation, or 112suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a). ... For the conviction of attempted second degree murder, the trial court restricted benefits for parole, probation, and suspension of sentence for 113only 10 years, whereas La. R.S. 14:27 does not allow any restriction of benefits. The sentence is thus illegally lenient. ... We order that the entirety of the 25-year hard labor sentence be served without benefits.

Section 14:27 requires proof of specific intent to commit the intended offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment.

State v. Jones · filed 2017-03-22

The prosecution had to therefore prove that Mr. Jones had the specific intent to kill the victims, demonstrated by commission of an overt act that tends toward the accomplishment of the victims’ death.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act tending toward the victim's death to sustain an attempted second degree murder conviction.

State v. Weston · filed 2018-11-14

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on "specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm," attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires, for attempted second-degree murder, specific intent to kill and an overt act tending toward accomplishing the victim’s death.

State of Louisiana v. Evans · filed 2019-05-22

In a prosecution for attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim and (2) committed an overt act tending towards the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27(30.1).

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) makes attempted second-degree murder punishable by 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, so a defendant convicted of that offense is ineligible for a suspended sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Eschenbach · filed 2020-01-15(D)(1)(a)

An attempt to commit second degree murder is punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 10, nor more than 50 years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a); La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... A person convicted of attempted second degree murder is not eligible for a suspended sentence, which is restricted by La. R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27. ... As noted above, Defendant was not eligible for a suspended sentence for his conviction of attempted second degree murder.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) mandates a sentence of 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension for attempted second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Moore · filed 2020-11-12(D)(1)(a)

Defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder, which under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), mandates imprisonment “at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”

Section 14:27 treats an attempted second-degree murder as requiring both an intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the victim's death; intent merely to inflict great bodily harm is insufficient.

State v. Smith · filed 2021-03-03(A)

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” attempted second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill. ... Evidence establishing an intent to kill would be required to support a conviction for attempted second degree murder. In this matter, the record is replete with sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Smith intended to kill Winters and Mr. Urban.

For attempted second-degree murder, § 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a sentencing range of ten to fifty years.

State of Louisiana v. Ladray Bias, Jr. · filed 2023-03-29(D)(1)(a)

Under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a) and 14:30.1, the sentencing range for attempted second degree murder is ten to fifty years.

Section 14:27 requires an overt act toward accomplishing the intended crime; for attempted second degree murder, the State must also prove specific intent to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Scott · filed 2023-08-30

“To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death.” Bishop, 2001-2548, p. 4 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So. 2d at 437 (citing La. R.S. 14:30.1; La. R.S. 14:27).

Attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill; intent to inflict great bodily harm alone is insufficient.

State v. Kidd · filed 2010-11-03(A)

La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) provides that second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. However, to be guilty of an attempt, the offender must necessarily have intended to kill.

Attempted second degree murder requires intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the victim’s death.

State v. Cooks · filed 2011-12-14(A)

To obtain a conviction for attempted second degree murder the State must prove the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death.

Section 14:27 does not require an attempted armed robbery to succeed; an act or omission tending toward accomplishing the robbery is sufficient.

State v. Carter · filed 2001-01-24

The defendant was also charged with three counts of attempted armed robbery. As to the attempted robbery of Ms. Hinson, Ms. Taylor, and Ms. Moore, it is noted that the offense of attempt armed robbery does not require the robber succeed in his act. Rather, what is required is an act or omission tending toward the accomplishment of the objective. State v. Trepagnier, 97-2427 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/15/99), 744 So.2d 181. ... Ms. Moore and Ms. Taylor testified that the defendant approached them, masked and armed with a pistol. He told them to "give it up". They understood that it was a robbery and fled. Ms. Taylor dropped her purse as she ran, and she glanced back and saw the robber retrieving it.

Section 14:27 requires an intent to commit the target offense and an overt act toward its accomplishment, and specifically makes searching for an intended victim with a dangerous weapon and criminal intent sufficient to constitute an attempt.

State v. Wilson · filed 2007-09-19(B)(1)

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. ... Notably, as regarding the attempted second degree charge, "searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended." La. R.S. 14:27 B(1).

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as acting or failing to act with specific intent to commit a crime, in a way that directly tends toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Clark · filed 2025-05-07(A)

An attempt occurs when “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object….” La. R.S. 14:27(A). “Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on ‘specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,’ … attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill.”

For an attempted offense, § 14:27 makes the period to be served without benefits one-half of the period applicable to the completed offense.

State v. Walker · filed 2001-05-16

Because Walker was convicted of an attempt, the period to be served without benefits is one-half, or two and one-half years. La. R.S. 14:27. Also, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the sentence is to be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and says nothing about parole. Therefore, because the substantive statute limits parole ineligibility to the first two and one-half years of the sentence, Walker’s sentence will be amended to set aside that portion of the sentence that provides for a period in excess of two and one-half years to be served without benefit of parole.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires the first six months of a sentence for an applicable attempted offense to be served without benefit of parole.

State v. Piker · filed 2001-05-30(D)(3)

As defendant was convicted of attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, the first six months of the sentence should have been imposed without benefit of parole. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

Section 14:27 does not provide a minimum sentence for an attempt.

State v. Hill · filed 2004-06-23

The supreme court in State v. Callahan, 95-1331 (La.03/29/96), 671 So.2d 903, found that La. R.S. 14:27 did not provide a minimum sentence for attempt. Because La. R.S. 40:979 (providing for attempted possession) now reads the same as 14:27, we reluctantly must follow Callahan and conclude that the trial court was in error in finding that there was a minimum sentence of two and one-half years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits an attempt sentence to one-half of the maximum sentence for the completed offense; here, the maximum was seven and one-half years.

State v. Houston · filed 2007-03-28(D)(3)

Thus, an attempt sentence could be no longer than seven and one-half years. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

Subsection (D)(3) limits an attempted offense punishable by imprisonment to no more than one-half of the longest prison term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Curtis · filed 2008-06-05(D)(3)

Thus, under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), the maximum possible sentence for attempted molestation of a juvenile was not more than seven and one-half years, one-half of the longest prison term prescribed for molestation of a juvenile.

Section 14:27 does not impose a mandatory minimum sentence for an attempt to commit illegal carrying of weapons under La. Stat. Ann. § 14:95.

State of Louisiana v. Roy J. Chapman, Jr. · filed 2009-10-07

Defendant argues the trial court labored under the erroneous belief that La.R.S. 14:27 (Attempt) and La.R.S. 14:95 (Illegal Carrying of Weapons) carried a minimum sentence of two and one-half years. ... Citing State v. Callahan, 95-1331 (La. 3/29/96), 671 So.2d 903, the Everett panel held that there was no minimum term. Thus, the assignment has merit. Defendant’s sentence for illegal carrying of weapons is vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing on that conviction.

Section 14:27 permits a sentence of up to forty-nine and a half years for this attempted armed robbery when applied with La.R.S. 14:64.

State of Louisiana v. Eddie Ray Jackson, Jr. · filed 2022-09-28

Defendant’s sentence of forty-five years for attempted armed robbery is close to the maximum possible sentence of forty-nine and a half years under La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:64.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for an attempt to half the longest term prescribed for the offense attempted.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2010-06-30(D)(3)

the maximum sentence exposure for Attempted Aggravated Assault upon a Police Officer with a Firearm is “half of the longest term of imprisonment for the offense so attempted,” or five years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) permits punishment for an attempted felony by up to one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense, or both.

State v. Stephan · filed 2004-08-18(D)(3)

When a person is charged with attempted aggravated burglary as Stephan was, he may be punished by fine or imprisonment not to exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. See La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

Section 14:27 limits the maximum sentence for attempted forcible rape to one-half the maximum sentence for forcible rape.

State v. Stewart · filed 2013-01-16

Since Stewart was convicted of attempted forcible rape, he was subject to receive one-half of the maximum sentence for forcible rape, or 20 years.

Section 14:27 sets no express minimum sentence for an attempted offense and must be strictly construed under principles of lenity.

State v. Fleming · filed 2017-05-02

There is no express statutory - minimum sentencé for being convicted of an attempt, arid principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires imprisonment in the same manner as for the offense attempted; attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling therefore carries a mandatory hard labor sentence of no more than six years.

State v. Johnston · filed 2018-04-11(D)(3)

On an attempt charge, La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that a defendant shall be imprisoned "in the same manner as for the offense attempted[.]" Thus, the penalty for a conviction of attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling is imprisonment at hard labor for not more than six years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) provides that an attempted felony is punishable in the same manner as the offense attempted, but the fine and imprisonment may not exceed one-half of the maximum prescribed for that offense.

State v. Tumblin · filed 2004-02-23(D)(3)

According to La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), which is the default punishment provision for attempted felonies, "In all other cases [a person convicted of attempt] shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." Consequently, attempted aggravated battery is punishable by a fine of $2,500.00, or imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years, or both.

Section 14:27 requires an attempt conviction to be punished in the same manner as the offense attempted, including the offense’s parole restriction.

State v. Harris · filed 2012-03-28

We further note that, under La. R.S. 14:27, the attempt statute, a person convicted for attempt “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted.” Thus, under either charge (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or the attempt of same), the defendant would not have been eligible for parole.

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempted offense, in cases covered by Subsection D(3), to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Smith · filed 2013-06-26(D)(3)

The 20-year sentence imposed in this case is within the sentencing range of 0-20 years allowed under La. R.S. 14:44.1 and 14:27 for attempted |insecond degree kidnapping. The maximum sentence was imposed, and it is neither statutorily nor constitutionally excessive.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense, while allowing punishment in the same manner.

State v. Henry · filed 2015-03-04(D)(3)

Pursuant to La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), the punishment for attempted armed robbery is a fine or imprisonment or both “in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.”

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for an attempt to one-half the longest term prescribed for the attempted offense.

State v. Page · filed 1996-08-21(D)(3)

Specifically, defendant asserts that he was convicted of attempted possession of cocaine pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 14:27(D)(3) [8] which mandates a sentence no greater than one-half of the largest fine and to a term of imprisonment not greater than one-half of the longest term of imprisonment. Thus, he argues that he could not have been sentenced to a term greater than 15 years. La.R.S. 40:967(F)(2)(b) and 40:979 [9] . While defendant is correct that his original sentence exceeded the maximum allowed, the argument is moot.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent and conduct tending directly toward the intended crime, with mere preparation generally insufficient, and Subsection D(3) limits attempt punishment to one-half of the maximum punishment for the completed offense.

State v. Wells · filed 2016-09-14(A), (B), and (D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:2(4) defines a felony as “any crime for which an offender may be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor.” [Emphasis supplied.] Pandering, in violation of La. R.S. 14:84, is punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor, and thus it is a felony. La. R.S. 14:27 defines “attempt,” and provides in sub-paragraph D(3) that whoever attempts to commit a crime such as pandering — by virtue of the punishment prescribed therefor upon conviction — “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; siich fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half, of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Thus, attempted pandering under La. R.S. 14:84 is a felony because it is punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor (for not more than two and one-half years). Soliciting for prostitutes under La. R.S. 14:83 is a misdemeanor, as is attempted soliciting for prostitutes.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime; § 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a 10-to-50-year hard-labor sentence without benefits for an attempt of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Austin · filed 2014-07-16(A), (D)(l)(a)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A). ... If an attempted offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than 10 nor more than 50 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent for an attempt, while § 14:27(D)(3) governs attempt sentencing by using the manner of punishment for the attempted offense and capping the punishment at one-half of the completed offense's maximum, without imposing a mandatory minimum.

State v. Odle · filed 2002-11-13(A) (D)(3)

It is clear from the definition of attempt found in La.R.S. 14:27, that a finding of specific intent to commit an offense is required to prove an attempt to commit that offense. Thus, the verdict rendered by the jury in the present case, attempted possession of 400 or more grams of cocaine, requires a finding of specific intent to commit the charged offense. ... La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) (emphasis added) states: D. Whoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished as follows: (3) In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. ... Therefore, if the State had elected to file under La.R.S. 14:27, the trial court was correct in not requiring the sentences be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. But if the State had filed under La.R.S. 40:979, the trial court gave an illegally lenient sentence. Accordingly, since we cannot determine from the record if the State filed under La.R.S. 14:27 or La.R.S. 40:979, and under the state of the law as we perceive it at this time, we remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing and ruling on that issue.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; it does not matter whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Strange · filed 2006-09-27

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 sets forth the definition of “attempt,” stating the following: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its completion, regardless of whether completion was possible.

State of Louisiana v. Alton Lane Strother · filed 2009-10-07(A)

La.R.S. 14:27 provides, in pertinent part, that an attempt includes: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Based on the same analysis as in Cortez, there was insufficient evidence in this case to support the conviction for attempted second degree cruelty to juveniles under the theory of intentional mistreatment or neglect; and, a conviction of criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect was a legal impossibility. ... Because the state failed to prove Defendant had the requisite specific or general criminal intent to sustain a conviction for the greater offense, a conviction for an attempt, absent specific intent, cannot stand.

Section 14:27(A) requires an attempted crime to involve specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Megason · filed 2010-10-06(A)

Louisiana law defines one who attempts a crime as: “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(A). Thus, an attempted offense requires a showing of specific intent. Id.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended offense for an attempted offense.

State of Louisiana v. Lantibious A. Broussard AKA Lantipious A. Broussard · filed 2014-05-07

In order to obtain a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill, a finding which is not necessary to support a manslaughter conviction.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt require specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Prince · filed 2014-12-10

See also La.R.S. 14:27 providing that “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended[.]” ... Given the jury‟s finding, and the dictates of La.R.S. 14:27, we find that the State was required to prove intent and, in fact, the trial court in this case instructed the jury as to specific intent. In this case, however, we find that the State failed in its showing.

Section 14:27 requires attempted second degree murder to be committed with specific intent to kill, rather than merely specific intent to inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Sparkman · filed 2014-02-12

This Court has recognized that although specific intent to inflict great bodily harm is sufficient to support a second degree murder conviction, attempted second degree murder requires a specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27(A) treats an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit the intended crime.

State v. Baugh · filed 2018-12-19(A)

However, an attempted battery, one of the definitions of assault, requires specific intent.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually be completed.

State of Louisiana v. Barras · filed 2021-02-03(A)

Further, attempt is defined by La.R.S 14:27(A): “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” Thus, as Defendant asserts, attempted first degree rape is a specific intent crime. We find the facts establish Defendant had the specific intent to rape each of the elderly victims.

An attempt requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime, plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; it does not matter whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Cotlong · filed 2026-03-18(A)

However, an attempt requires specific intent: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27(A). The State did not prove the defendant had the specific intent to harass N.C. when he went to her school and asked to see her. Thus, the evidence is not sufficient to support a responsive verdict.

Section 14:27 authorizes a maximum imprisonment term of three and one-half years for attempted simple robbery when applied with La. Stat. Ann. § 14:65.

State v. Dixon · filed 2003-03-05

This crime carries a maximum term of imprisonment of three and one-half years. La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:65. Defendant was sentenced to three years at hard labor. ... Thus, the total period of imprisonment to which Defendant is exposed is three years, which is six months below the three and one-half year maximum term of imprisonment authorized for attempted simple robbery.

Subsection (D) requires a sentence for attempted first degree murder of a peace officer to be served at hard labor.

State v. Dorsey · filed 2011-03-09(D)

First, both sentences imposed by the trial court were illegally lenient. A sentence for attempted first degree murder of a peace officer is to be served at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:27(D).

Attempting an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment against a peace officer performing lawful duties requires a sentence at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Trammell · filed 2011-11-09(D)(1)(b)

Consequently, we order that the sentence of 58 years be served at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 does not authorize restricting a defendant's right to earn good-time credit.

State v. Gonzalez · filed 2007-11-28

Neither La. R.S. 14:30.1 nor La. R.S. 14:27 provide for a restriction of the right to earn good time. Thus, Gonzalez's sentence must be amended to delete any restriction as to good time.

Placing a combustible or explosive substance in or near a structure, with the specific intent eventually to set it on fire or damage it by explosive substance, is sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit arson.

State v. Simmons · filed 2008-04-16(B)(2)

(2) Further, the placing of any combustible or explosive substance in or near any structure, watercraft, movable, or forestland, with the specific intent eventually to set fire to or to damage by explosive substance such structure, watercraft, movable, or forestland, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the crime of arson as defined in R.S. 14:51 through 53. ... Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant either attempted to set the trailer on fire, or was a principal to an attempt to set the trailer on fire.