La. Stat. Ann. § 14:27

For an attempt, the fine is imposed as for the offense attempted but cannot exceed half of that offense's maximum fine.

State v. Robinson · filed 2008-05-27(D)(3)

Likewise, according to La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) a defendant shall be fined in the same manner as for the offense attempted, and such fine shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine prescribed for that offense.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires a defendant convicted of attempted possession of pornography involving juveniles to face a mandatory fine of not more than $5,000.

State v. Aston · filed 2013-09-04(D)(3)

Because Defendant was convicted of attempted possession of pornography involving juveniles, he faced a mandatory fine of not more than five thousand dollars.

Section 14:27 sets the punishment range for attempted cultivation by applying the attempt penalty to the underlying cultivation offense.

State of Louisiana v. Hebert · filed 2008-11-05

Pursuant to La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 40:966, the minimum penalty for attempted cultivation of marijuana is imprisonment at hard labor for two and one-half years, while the maximum penalty is fifteen years and a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempted offense to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment or fine prescribed for the completed offense, so attempted carjacking has no mandatory minimum sentence.

State v. Kelly · filed 2017-12-29D(3)

La. R.S. 14:64.2 B provides that carjacking is punishable "at hard labor for not less than two years and for not more than twenty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence." La. R.S. 14:27 D(3) dictates that whoever attempts to commit a crime "shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted ... [to] not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of the imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." Thus, defendant was subjected to a sentence "with the sentencing range reduced to half the longest sentence available, in this case, from zero to 10 years at hard labor, without benefits."

Section 14:27 sets the penalty for an attempted offense at no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term or largest fine prescribed for the completed offense, or both.

State v. Vanhorn · filed 2019-04-10

The penalty for an attempted offense is imprisonment for no more than one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, a fine for no more than one-half of the largest fine prescribed the offense so attempted, or both.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets the penalty for attempting an offense punishable by life imprisonment at 10 to 50 years at hard labor without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Romero · filed 2021-12-15(D)(1)(a)

We also note that the potential sentence for each of the crimes of attempted second degree murder and attempted first degree murder are the same: 10 to 50 years of imprisonment at hard labor without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a). Accordingly, we amend the verdict and reduce Defendant’s conviction of attempted first degree murder to attempted second degree murder, such that the plea of double jeopardy is inapplicable.

Section 14:27 limits an attempted offense's maximum imprisonment to one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense and, together with the underlying offense statute, requires the sentence to be served without benefits.

State of Louisiana v. Dowles · filed 2022-05-25

The penalty for an attempted offense is imprisonment for no more than one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, a fine for no more than one-half of the largest fine prescribed the offense so attempted, or both. La. R.S. 14:27. Thus, for attempted armed robbery, Dowles faced a penalty of up to 49½ years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. ... La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:64 statutorily mandate that the sentence be served without benefits, and the trial court’s failure to declare that those sentences be served with restricted benefits is harmless and self-correcting.

Section 14:27(D)(l)(a) sets attempted aggravated rape imprisonment at hard labor from 10 to 50 years when the completed offense carries mandatory life imprisonment.

State v. Wise · filed 2010-07-14(D)(l)(a)

The defendant’s assertion is incorrect. Mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor is the sentence provided for aggravated rape under La. R.S. 14:42(D). Accordingly, the sentencing range for an attempted aggravated rape conviction is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 10 nor more than 50 years. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a) and La. R.S. 14:42(D).

Section 14:27 D(3) does not alter whether the sentence is served with or without hard labor.

State v. Randall · filed 2010-10-27D(3)

The attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27 D(3), does not alter how the sentence is to be served in that respect.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(b) authorizes a 20-to-50-year hard-labor sentence without benefits when an attempted offense punishable by death or life imprisonment is committed against a peace officer performing lawful duties, and the court upheld the maximum sentence here.

State of Louisiana v. Clark · filed 2010-12-08(D)(1)(b)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 provides in pertinent part: ... (b) If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment and is attempted against an individual who is a peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duty, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than twenty nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... In view of the facts discussed at the two relevant hearings, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence upon the defendant, Kenneth Jay Clark.

Section 14:27(D) requires a sentence for attempted first-degree murder of a peace officer to be served at hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Dorsey · filed 2011-03-09(D)

A sentence for attempted first degree murder of a peace officer is to be served at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:27(D).

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempted crime to no more than one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense; for attempted manslaughter here, that meant zero to twenty years.

State v. Boudreaux · filed 2012-07-25(D)(3)

The penalty for manslaughter is “imprison[ment] at hard labor for not more than forty years.” La. R.S. 14:31(B). “Whoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished ... in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). The sentencing range for attempted manslaughter is thus zero to twenty years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) permits a maximum sentence of forty-nine and one-half years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for attempted armed robbery.

State of Louisiana v. Nash · filed 2013-04-03(D)(3)

The crime of attempted armed robbery carries a maximum potential sentence of forty-nine and one-half years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3); State v. Brown, 09-884 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/31/10), 36 So.3d 974, writ denied, 10-1120 (La. 4/29/11), 62 So.3d 105.

Section 14:27(A) and (C) require specific intent to commit the target crime and an act tending directly toward its accomplishment for an attempt, which is a separate lesser grade of the intended crime; § 14:27(D)(3) provides that an attempt is punished in the same manner as the offense attempted, subject to a one-half cap on the maximum fine or imprisonment term.

State v. Moore · filed 2017-03-15(A), (C), and (D)(3)

To support a conviction for attempted forcible rape, the State must prove that defendant had the specific intent to commit forcible rape and that he did an act for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, the accomplishment of his objective. ... The attempt statute provides, in pertinent part, that a defendant should be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted, and that the fine or term of imprisonment should not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. ... Therefore, we remand this matter for resentencing in compliance with the benefits provisions under La. R.S. 14:42.1 and La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(A) makes it immaterial that the offender did not actually accomplish the intended crime when the offender acted with specific intent toward accomplishing it.

State v. Williams · filed 2017-04-05(A)

The fact that he was stopped by the deputies before actually accomplishing his purpose is “immaterial.” La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific-intent act or omission that tends directly toward accomplishing the intended crime, while § 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a 10-to-50-year sentence for an attempt to commit an offense punishable by life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Henderson · filed 2025-04-09(A), (D)(1)(a)

An attempt to commit an offense occurs when any person, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:27(A). ... Therefore, to sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. Id. ... If the offense so attempted is punishable by life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than 10 nor more than 50 years without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as a specific-intent act or omission tending directly toward the intended crime and limits attempted-offense penalties, including attempted manslaughter, to the statutory amount prescribed by the subsection.

State of Louisiana v. Jordan Mitchell Zaykis Bolden Dylan Johnson · filed 2026-02-09(A), (D)(1)(a), (D)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:27(A) states the following: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it is immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), whoever attempts to commit manslaughter “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.”

Section 14:27(D)(3) provides that an attempt is punished in the same manner as the attempted offense, but imprisonment may not exceed one-half of the longest term prescribed for that offense; it does not impose an express minimum sentence for an attempt.

State v. Thomas · filed 2018-01-10(D)(3)

When a defendant is convicted of an attempted offense, the punishment is "in the same manner as for the offense attempted," but the term of imprisonment "shall not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted." La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). There is no express statutory minimum sentence for being convicted of an attempt, and principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed.

Subsection (D)(3) requires an attempted offense to be punished in the same manner as the offense attempted, including the completed offense’s parole restriction.

State of Louisiana v. Dickerson · filed 2023-06-28(D)(3)

Further, the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), applies to the punishment for attempted armed robbery and provides that the defendant shall be punished in the same manner as for the offense attempted. For the offense of attempted armed robbery, the benefit of parole is not available.

Subsection (D)(3)'s requirement that an attempt be punished in the same manner as the offense attempted includes lifetime electronic monitoring when the completed offense carries that requirement.

State of Louisiana v. Desmond Young · filed 2023-02-08(D)(3)

The attempt article subjects persons to punishment “in the same manner as for the offense attempted.” La.R.S. 14:27 D(3). A realistic and genuine construction of the two provisions requires that persons who attempt armed robbery shall be punished at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. ... Applying this same type of analysis to the present case, we find that a realistic and genuine construction of the penalty provisions at issue necessitates a finding that electronic monitoring applies to defendants convicted of attempt. ... Considering all of the above, we find the legislature intended the electronic monitoring requirement set forth in La.R.S. 14:81.2(D)(3) to apply to a person convicted of attempted molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen.

For an attempted offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, Subsection (D)(1) authorizes 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Shaw Jr · filed 2019-12-11(D)(1)

La. R.S. 14:27(D) provides the penalties for an attempt provides that whoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished as follows: 1. If the offense so alleged is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; for attempted manslaughter, the State must prove specific intent to kill and an overt act in furtherance of that intent.

State of Louisiana v. Pastorick · filed 2022-10-05(A)

To support a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the State must prove that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. ... Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Attempted aggravated burglary requires specific intent to enter unlawfully and commit a felony or theft while armed, together with an act directed toward that crime; actual entry is unnecessary.

State v. Bryant · filed 2011-12-21(A)

A conviction of the underlying felony is not required. ... Here, considering the evidence of record, it is apparent Bryant had the intent to enter Goetz’s house— Goetz witnessed him forcibly break the door in, even though the evidence did not show he actually entered the house.

Section 14:27(A) does not require proof of penetration or emission for attempted aggravated rape.

State v. Castro · filed 2016-12-14(A)

Neither penetration nor emission is required to sustain a conviction for attempted aggravated rape.

Section 14:27(D)(1) set the mandatory maximum sentence for attempted aggravated rape at 20 years at hard labor before September 12, 1975.

State v. Robertson · filed 2017-08-16(D)(1)

Consequently, the sentence to be imposed at the time of both crimes in this case is the mandatory maximum for attempted aggravated rape, which is 20 years at hard labor without any restriction on parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

When the State has not proved a substance was a narcotic, the defendant’s objective conduct must unequivocally corroborate the specific intent required for an attempted narcotics offense.

State v. Harris · filed 2002-05-08(A)

As noted above, that is the purpose behind the evidentiary rule the federal courts crafted, and the Louisiana courts adopted, requiring that “the defendant’s objective conduct, taken as a whole, must unequivocally corroborate the required subjective intent to purchase or sell actual narcotics.” Hollis, 96-738, p. 8, 688 So.2d at 111 (quoting Pennell, 737 F.2d at 525). For the reasons discussed above, that rule is not satisfied in this case, and the evidence presented is insufficient to sustain the conviction of Mr. Harris of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Section 14:27(A) requires proof that the defendant intentionally attempted to commit the intended offense; an intentional attempt to take another person’s property can support an attempted robbery conviction.

State v. Buhcannon · filed 2013-03-13(A)

Considering the foregoing, the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Buhcannon intentionally attempted to take something of value that did not belong to him.

Section 14:27’s comment against attempting an assault applies only when the assault is based on an attempted battery, not when it is based on placing someone in reasonable apprehension of a battery.

State v. Barnett · filed 2013-05-16

Therefore, we find that the 1940 comment, indicating that there can be no such thing as an attempt to commit an assault, only applies to the attempted-battery definition or theory of culpability and does not apply when the state relies on the | ^alternative definition or theory of culpability, i.e., “the intentional placing in apprehension of receiving a battery.”