La. Stat. Ann. § 14:27

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt when a person, with specific intent to commit a crime, performs an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. McNair · filed 2012-12-28(A)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... From the actions of Matthews and the appellant, it can be inferred that they intended to defraud the bartender at the Mango Mango Daiquiri Shop and obtain the drink and the shot without paying for them with legitimate currency. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact (here the trial judge) could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted forgery.

Section 14:27 defines an attempted crime as requiring specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime; searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon and intent to commit a crime is sufficient to constitute an attempt.

State of Louisiana v. Dexter Holder · filed 2012-11-07

An attempted crime occurs when: [a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object . . . [S]earching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. La.R.S. 14:27. Specific criminal intent to kill is a required element of the crime of attempted murder.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; whether the intended crime was actually completed is immaterial.

State v. Chehardy · filed 2013-05-01(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Because the evidence satisfied the elements of attempted first degreé murder, we find that the jury’s decision to “compromise” the verdict was lawful under the circumstances.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act tending directly toward its commission, even though the crime is not completed.

State of Louisiana v. Christopher Marshall, Jr. · filed 2013-05-08

As the underlying conviction was for attempted manslaughter, the State was required to prove that the defendant possessed a specific intent to kill. ... A person who has a specific intent to commit a crime and who does an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime intended. It is immaterial whether, under the circumstances, the defendant would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) treats a person as guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Anderson · filed 2013-07-03(A)

Attempt is defined in pertinent part, as: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27. ... The State proved all the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, including the identity of Defendant. ... He further attempted to rob Fisher of her purse while armed with a firearm. He shot at her on two occasions, thus, exhibiting the requisite intent to kill her.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent and an act or omission tending directly toward commission of the crime; § 14:27(C) treats attempt as a separate lesser grade even if the intended crime was actually completed.

State v. York · filed 2013-08-07(A) (C)

The elements of attempt are (1) specific intent ... to commit the crime and (2) an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly Rtoward accomplishing the crime. ... Importantly, “attempt” is “a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime,” and even though it appears at trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by the person, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime.

Section 14:27(A) requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission for that purpose tending directly toward its accomplishment; attempted simple burglary therefore requires conduct tending toward unauthorized entry plus intent to commit a felony or theft inside.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2013-10-16(A)

Therefore, a conviction for attempted simple burglary requires proof that the defendant committed “an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward” the unauthorized entry of a dwelling or other structure “with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein.” LSA-R.S. 14:27; LSA-R.S. 14:62; State v. Nelson, 2008-0584 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/08); 3 So.3d 57, 60, writ denied, 10-166 (La.1/7/11); 52 So.3d 881. . . . Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the jury had sufficient evidence before it to reasonably conclude that the defendant entered the vehicle without authorization. But the evidence does not indicate that he entered it with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein. The state could not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the defendant, believing the vehicle to be abandoned, simply wanted to rest. After all, that is what the vehicle‟s owner and only witness to this event believed. As this hypothesis is one of innocence, the conviction for Attempted Simple Burglary must be reversed.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; whether the intended crime was actually completed is immaterial.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2013-11-06

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 addresses “attempt,” stating that: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... With regard to the charges for attempted second degree murder, the State had to establish that the defendant had specific intent to kill a human being and committed an act in furtherance of that purpose. State in the Interest of L.H., 94-903 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/15/95), 650 So.2d 433. Firing into a crowd is sufficient to establish specific intent to kill. Id. We find that the State presented evidence that, if credited by the jury, is sufficient to establish those elements.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent plus an act tending directly toward completing the intended crime, and limits an attempt sentence to no more than half the completed offense's maximum fine or imprisonment term.

State v. Sellers · filed 2013-11-20

Attempt is defined as any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27. ... Although incest is a general intent crime, attempted incest requires a showing of specific intent. La. R.S. 14:78 and 14:27. ... The penalty for incest between an ascendant and descendant is imprisonment at hard labor for no more than 15 years. La. R.S. 14:78; the penalty for attempt sets a fíne or a term of imprisonment not exceeding one-half of the largest fíne, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. La. R.S. 14:27. Thus, the maximum penalty for attempted incest is 7 ½ years. Robert received a sentence of seven years.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the crime, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been accomplished.

State v. Coleman · filed 2014-01-08(A)

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense if, having a specific intent to commit a crime, he does an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. German · filed 2014-01-22(A)

The pertinent elements of attempted aggravated rape are the specific intent to commit anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse with a person without that person’s lawful consent, where the offender does an act for the purposes of and tending directly to accomplish one or more of those acts of intercourse, and when the act is committed under certain aggravating circumstances: when the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance is overcome by force; or when the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or when the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:41; La. R.S. 14:42.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment.

State of Louisiana v. Handy · filed 2014-02-12(A)

La.R.S. 14:27(A) further provides that to attempt to commit a crime, an accused must do or omit an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of the crime while “having a specific intent” to commit the crime. ... In order to prove an attempted simple robbery, the State had to prove that the defendant: (1) had a specific intent to commit the crime of simple robbery, and (2) did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the commission of the crime of simple robbery.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent and an act tending directly toward commission of the intended crime, and generally limits an attempted offense’s fine or imprisonment to one-half of the maximum prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Deweese · filed 2013-10-30(A), (3)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act ... for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Therefore, we find that specific intent to kill may reasonably be inferred from the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries and from defendant’s use of a deadly weapon to produce those injuries, which involved serious risk of death. ... We conclude that defendant had the specific intent required to be convicted of the responsive verdict of attempted manslaughter. ... La. R.S. 14:27(3) provides in general that a person who attempts to commit a crime: “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” ... Therefore, we find that no corrective action is required.

Section 14:27 requires an intent to commit the target offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment; for attempted second-degree murder, the required intent is specifically intent to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Cornelius Eugene Wilson AKA N.O. · filed 2014-05-07

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim‟s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to commit the target offense and committed an overt act in furtherance of that intent.

State v. Milton · filed 2014-05-14

In order to prove attempted second degree murder, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt a crime when a person with specific intent commits or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense, even if the offense would not actually have been completed.

State v. Leone · filed 2014-05-15(A)

Further, La. R.S. 14:27(A) provides: ... A. Any person who, having the specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... To support a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the state must prove the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act done with intent to commit a crime and directed toward accomplishing it.

State v. Williams · filed 2014-10-01(A)

An attempt is committed when a defendant, after having formed the intent to commit rape, does an act for the purpose of and intending directly toward the accomplishing of the objective. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission directed toward accomplishing it.

State v. Canales · filed 2014-12-10

An attempt occurs when the perpetrator “having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.” La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation generally is insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Thacker · filed 2015-01-28(A)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 defines attempt, in pertinent part, as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. B. (1) Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. Given the above, the State also failed to prove the Defendant had the specific intent to use force or threats to influence C.D. Accordingly, the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for obstruction of justice are vacated.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, while § 14:27(C) makes attempt a separate lesser grade and permits conviction for an attempt even when the intended crime was completed.

State v. Gayton · filed 2015-01-28A, C

An attempt to commit an offense occurs when “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his ob-ject_” La. R.S. 14:27 A. “An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” La. R.S. 14:27 C. ... As previously mentioned, Mr. Cummings was convicted of attempted possession of cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, all of which are authorized responsive verdicts to the charge of simple possession. ... The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted possession of cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; it is immaterial whether the intended crime is actually completed.

State of Louisiana v. Fontenot · filed 2015-03-18

Attempt is defined as: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27. ... The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Defendant intended to kill Bourgeois. It is accepted jurisprudence that pointing a gun at a person and pulling the trigger indicates specific intent to cause serious bodily harm or death to that person.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Ernest Carter, Jr. · filed 2015-04-01

For Defendant to be convicted of attempted aggravated rape, the State must have proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, all elements of the crime that were in effect between September 12, 1975, and August 18, 1977, the dates for which the jury convicted Defendant. During that time, attempt was defined as: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. B. Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. ... La.R.S. 14:27 (as amended by 1970 La. Acts No. 471, § 1).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the intended offense would actually have been accomplished.

State v. Thomas · filed 2015-03-04

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Thibodeaux · filed 2016-04-13

... “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act; for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” LSA-R.S. 14:27. To prove attempted second degree murder, the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; lying in wait with a dangerous weapon can constitute an attempt.

State v. Clements · filed 2016-05-04(A), (B)(1)

Thus, although the completed crime of second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, a conviction for attempted second degree murder can only be obtained by showing that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an act tending to | accomplish that purpose. ... As to the specific intent to kill, the evidence established that the two gunmen were parked nearby for at least forty-five minutes to an hour before the shooting, which could easily constitute “lying in wait” for the victim. See La. R.S, 14:27 B(l).

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant specifically intended the crime and committed an overt act in furtherance of it; for attempted second degree murder, the intended crime must include a specific intent to kill.

State v. Patterson · filed 2015-11-18

To prove attempted second degree murder, the state must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had the specific intent to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1; State v. Tillman, 47,386 (La.App.2d Cir.8/8/12), 104 So.3d 480.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Eley · filed 2016-09-16(A)

The attempt of forcible rape and simple rape involve the same elements of these crimes except that, despite a defendant having the specific intent to commit one of these crimes, he did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object. See La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, while § 14:27(D)(3) sentences an attempted felony such as manslaughter in the same manner as the offense attempted.

State v. George · filed 2016-11-09(A), (D)(3)

The sentencing provision in the attempt statute that is applicable to an attempt to commit a crime such as manslaughter, La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), simply provides, in pertinent part, that the offender be imprisoned “in the same manner as for the offense attempted,” meaning, in this case, as per the sentencing provision in |nthe manslaughter statute. ... As for attempted manslaughter, attempt is defined, in relevant part, as “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly' toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an overt act tending toward accomplishing it.

State v. Rose · filed 2016-09-28

Therefore, the state must prove that the defendant (1) intended to kill the victim, and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishing of the victim’s death.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing that crime for an attempt conviction.

State v. Francis · filed 2017-01-11

The elements of attempted possession of a CDS require a person to knowingly or intentionally do or omit an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of the possession of the CDS, without a valid prescription or in the absence of an enumerated professional practice. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 40:967(C); La. R.S. 40:968(C).

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt when a person with specific intent to commit a crime performs or omits an act tending directly toward its accomplishment, even if the intended crime is not completed.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2017-04-05(A)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The fact that he was stopped by the deputies before actually accomplishing his purpose is “immaterial.” La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to commit the underlying offense and committed an overt act tending toward its accomplishment; for attempted second degree murder, that means intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the victim’s death.

State v. Mahogany · filed 2017-07-26

In a prosecution for attempted second degree murder, the State must .prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim and (2) committed an overt act , tending towards the accomplishment Qf.the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27(30.1).

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act directed toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime could actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Timothy Eugene Dowden, Sr. · filed 2017-08-02(A)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 provides: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime and an overt act tending directly toward accomplishing it; attempted murder therefore requires specific intent to kill and an overt act toward that goal.

State v. Hust · filed 2017-01-11

The crime of attempted murder, whéther first or second degree, requires proof of the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; the court found the evidence sufficient to establish attempted second degree murder.

State v. Holder · filed 2012-11-07

Specific criminal intent to kill is a required element of the crime of attempted murder. ... The evidence was sufficient to find Defendant committed attempted second degree murder.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime is completed.

State v. Lewis · filed 2017-11-15(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A). ... At trial, N.H. testified that after she shot defendant, he wrestled the gun out of her hand and said, "Now bitch, you'll know what it feels like to be shot," as he put the gun to her head and pulled the trigger. Fortunately, the gun jammed. Although no shots were actually fired by defendant, evidence that defendant pulled the trigger while he held the gun to N.H.'s head is sufficient to establish that he had the requisite intent to kill, and therefore, is sufficient to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific intent to commit a crime coupled with an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, regardless of whether the intended offense was actually completed.

State v. Thomas · filed 2017-12-13(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the intended crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Young · filed 2018-01-18(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly towards the accomplishing of his object is guilty of attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the underlying offense and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward completing that offense.

State v. Wooten · filed 2018-02-13

To convict a defendant of attempted armed robbery, the state must prove that the defendant, having the specific intent to commit armed robbery, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the taking of anything of value belonging to another, from the person of another or in the immediate control of another, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act directly tending toward its accomplishment; when the victim survives, intent to kill supports attempted second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Derrick Walker Stafford -Aka- Derrick Stafford · filed 2018-03-07(A)

In the instant matter, the element of “specific intent” is set out in both La.R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27. Considering the two statutes together, if an accused severely beats the victim only with the intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm and the victim dies, then the accused is guilty of second degree murder. However, if a defendant beats a victim with the intent to inflict serious bodily injury and the victim survives, the defendant is not guilty of attempted second degree murder, but is guilty of a different crime, a battery. See Bishop, 835 So.2d 434. If a defendant beats a victim or shoots the victim as in the current case, with the intent to kill, and the victim survives, then it is attempted second degree murder. The two statutes read together cannot be clearer. It did not take a bill of particulars to know the State’s burden of proof in this case.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as specific intent plus an act tending directly toward the crime, while § 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for other attempted crimes to one-half the longest term for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. Dirk Douglas Thomas AKA Dirk Thomas · filed 2018-09-26(A), (D)(3)

An attempt to commit a crime constitutes a separate but lesser grade of the crime intended, and occurs when: “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does . . . an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object[.]” La.R.S. 14:27(A). Thus, the State must prove Thomas did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward touching D.T.’s genitals. ... The application of the attempt statute adjusts the penalty range to zero to five years, with or without hard labor, and without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence: “In all other cases he shall be . . . imprisoned . . . in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such . . . imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the . . . longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted[.]” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to commit the target offense and committed an overt act tending toward its accomplishment.

State v. Minor · filed 2018-09-26

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27 ; 14:30.1.

Section 14:27(A) requires a defendant attempting a crime to act with specific intent.

State v. Thomas · filed 2018-09-26(A)

While attempted sexual battery requires a defendant to act with specific intent pursuant to La.R.S. 14:27(A), Thomas was charged with one count of sexual battery, which requires only a showing of general intent.

Section 14:27 is satisfied when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant had specific intent to kill and committed an overt act tending toward the victim's death.

State v. Weston · filed 2018-11-14

From the eyewitness accounts establishing that several shots were fired, as well as facts showing Defendant's pursuit of Jamerson after the two left the store following the verbal altercation, the jury could have reasonably inferred that he possessed the specific intent to kill Jamerson and committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the crime and an overt act tending directly toward accomplishing it; the possibility of success is not determinative.

State of Louisiana v. Ladray Bias, Jr. · filed 2019-02-06

Our supreme court has provided, “It is the intent to commit the crime, not the possibility of success, that determines whether the act or omission constitutes the crime of attempt.” ... The essential elements of the crime of attempted second degree murder are a specific intent to kill the victim and the commission of an overt act that tends toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. ... Accordingly, we find that the evidence is sufficient to establish the elements of attempted second degree murder, and Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, and the possibility of success is immaterial.

State v. Bias · filed 2019-02-06

Our supreme court has provided, "It is the intent to commit the crime, not the possibility of success, that determines whether the act or omission constitutes the crime of attempt." ... Reading the pertinent parts of these articles together, the state in this case had the burden of proving that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

Section 14:27 requires proof of an intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death to sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder.

State v. Harris · filed 2019-02-27

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27 ; 14:30.1.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Ross · filed 2019-03-13(A)

“‘Attempt’ is defined in La.R.S. 14:27 which states, “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended[.]”

Section 14:27(A) requires proof of specific intent to commit the target offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment.

State v. Youngblood · filed 2019-05-22(A)

The crime of attempted first degree murder requires proof of the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Frinks · filed 2019-06-12

A conviction for an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. State v. Dean, supra; La.R.S. 14:10 and 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, so an attempted simple burglary conviction requires proof of specific intent to commit the underlying theft or felony.

State of Louisiana v. Leeson · filed 2019-07-17

La. R.S. 14:27 defines attempt as, “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” ... Because we have determined that any rational trier of fact necessarily must have a reasonable doubt as to the third element—intent to commit a theft, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of the charged offense, simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, or the responsive verdict returned by the jury, attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to kill and committed an overt act tending toward the victim’s death for attempted second-degree murder, and it provides a 10-to-50-year hard-labor sentencing range without benefits.

State of Louisiana v. Killingsworth · filed 2019-11-20A; D(1)(a)

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant (1) intended to kill the victim and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:30.1, 14:27 A; State v. Bishop, 01-2548 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So. 2d 434; State v. Harris, 52,541 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 953, writ denied, 19-00611 (La. 9/17/19), __ So. 3d __. The penalty for a conviction of attempted second degree murder is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 10 nor more than 50 years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1; La. R.S. 14:27 D(1)(a).

Section 14:27 treats an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit the intended crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward completing it.

State of Louisiana Versus Elvin D. Villafranca · filed 2019-11-27

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. La. R.S. 14:27. To support a conviction for attempted forcible rape, the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit forcible rape and that he did an act for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, the accomplishing of his objective.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act tending toward accomplishing the victim's death.

State of Louisiana v. Duckett · filed 2019-12-18

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act tending toward the victim’s death to sustain an attempted second-degree-murder conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Sawyer · filed 2020-05-20

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission intended to directly accomplish it for attempt liability.

State of Louisiana Versus Ed Raymond Veillon, Jr. · filed 2020-07-29(A)

According to La. R.S. 14:27(A), to be guilty of an attempt to commit an intended offense, it must be found that a person “having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly towards the accomplishing of his object.” The crime of attempted murder requires proof of the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; shooting at the victim is sufficient evidence of an attempt to murder.

State of Louisiana v. Dorsey · filed 2020-12-09(A)

“Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” La. R.S. 14:27(A). ... As set forth above, Victim testified at trial that, on the evening of January 31, 2017, she, Decedent, and Defendant were together in a house in Orleans Parish. A disagreement arose and Defendant stated, “I should shoot y’all for playing with me.” He then shot both women and, immediately left the house. This testimony was sufficient to permit a rational juror to find that Defendant murdered Decedent and attempted to murder Victim.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; asking the child to perform oral sex, opening or lowering his pants, touching the back of her head, and directing her to put his penis in her mouth satisfied those requirements.

State of Louisiana v. Michael Jerome Cochran A/K/A Michael Jerome Cochran, Jr. A/K/A Michael Cochran · filed 2019-12-18(A)

This uncontroverted testimony shows an intent to commit a crime and tends directly toward the accomplishing of oral intercourse with the victim.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt a crime when a person with specific intent commits an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime, even if the crime would not have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Kirby · filed 2021-01-13(A)

Attempt is defined by La. R.S. 14:27(A): Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. “Specific intent” is therefore a required element for a conviction of attempt to commit the offense intended, in this case, third degree rape. ... After review under the Jackson standard, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant’s intoxication did not preclude the presence of specific intent to commit third degree rape and all the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 requires proof of an intent to commit the offense and an overt act tending toward its completion; the overt act need not be the final step, and success need not be possible.

State of Louisiana in the Interest of J.K.. · filed 2022-07-13

Thus, for a delinquency finding of the attempted second degree murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14.30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La. 1982). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. State ex rel. G.B., 2007-1577, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/08), 985 So.2d 828, 830 (quoting State v. Bishop, 2001-2548, p. 4 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437) (citations omitted). “The overt act need not be the ultimate step toward or the last possible act in the consummation of the crime attempted, and it is the intent to commit the crime, not the possibility of success that determines whether the act or omission constitutes the crime of attempt.” Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 12, 281 So.3d at 755 (citation omitted).

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime is not completed.

State of Louisiana v. Zackery Shane Deville A/K/A Zackery Deville · filed 2022-11-23(A)

An attempt occurs when a person, “having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. . .; and it shall be immaterial whether . . . he would have actually accomplished his purposes.” La.R.S. 14:27(A). ... When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the record in this case supports the trier of fact’s conclusion that Defendant had the specific intent to kill Chief Leggett and committed an act to accomplish that goal.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to commit the target offense and committed an overt act in furtherance of that intent.

State of Louisiana v. Cole · filed 2024-01-10

For attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that Cole had the specific intent to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:30.1.

An attempt requires specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, and it is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime even if the intended crime was actually completed.

State of Louisiana v. Horton · filed 2024-02-28(A), (C)

The elements of attempt are (1) specific intent to commit the crime and (2) an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the crime. La. R.S. 14:27(A). Importantly, “attempt” is a “separate but lesser grade of the intended crime,” and even though it appears at trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by the person, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:27(C).

Section 14:27(A) requires a specific intent to commit the offense and an overt act tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Detriavion D. Green · filed 2024-10-30(A)

An attempt to commit second degree murder requires that the offender possess the specific intent to kill and commit an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. LSA-R.S. 14:27(A); 14:30.1(A)(1).

Section 14:27(A) treats a person who specifically intends to commit a crime and performs or omits an act directly tending toward it as guilty of an attempt, even if the crime is not completed.

State of Louisiana v. Lavonta L. Smith · filed 2024-11-20(A)

Further, La. R.S. 14:27(A) provides: ... Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Proof of specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal is necessary to convict of attempted first degree murder. ... It is clear from the record that Smith fired multiple shots in the direction of Sass’s vehicle during Sass’s vehicular pursuit of Smith. This amply supports the trial court’s finding the Smith possessed the specific intent to kill Sass.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act purposefully tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State Of Louisiana v. London · filed 2024-06-03(A)

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the State must prove the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1.

Subsection (A) makes an attempt complete when a person with specific intent commits or omits an act tending directly toward the intended crime, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been accomplished.

State of Louisiana v. April Butler · filed 2024-12-30(A)

An attempt occurs when someone “who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.” La. R.S. 14:27(A). As La. R.S. 14:27(A) further states, “it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he [or she] would have actually accomplished his [or her] purpose.”

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward completing it; for attempted manslaughter, the State must prove specific intent to kill, and mere preparation is generally insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Randall · filed 2025-02-05(A), (B)(1)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... B. (1) Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. ... In order to obtain a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27(A) permits an attempt conviction when a person specifically intends to commit a crime and performs an act to accomplish it, even if the crime is not completed.

State of Louisiana v. Brisco · filed 2026-01-20(A)

Finally, a defendant may be convicted of attempting to commit a crime if he had the specific intent to commit the prescribed crime and commits an action for the purpose of accomplishing that crime, regardless of whether he actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending toward accomplishing it; the court applied those requirements to uphold the attempted second degree murder conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Scott · filed 2026-03-04(A)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27(A) defines attempt, in pertinent part, as: “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended[.]” ... We find the Defendant’s act of kicking in the Bruces’ door at night while armed, then entering their bedroom, shows specific intent sufficient to support the first three convictions. ... Regarding aggravated burglary and attempted murder, Defendant brought a loaded firearm into the Bruces’ home under cover of night. In addition, he had previously told third parties that he would kill James Bruce.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; for attempted second-degree murder, the required intent is specific intent to kill and the act must tend toward the victim’s death.

State of Louisiana v. Virani · filed 2026-04-08(A)

An attempt to commit an offense occurs when any person, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:27(A). Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Bishop, 01-2548 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So. 2d 434. Therefore, to sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. Id.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending toward accomplishing it; for attempted second degree murder, the required intent is specific intent to kill and the required act is an overt act tending toward the victim's death.

State of Louisiana v. Haywood · filed 2026-04-29(A)

An attempt, as defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A), involves “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended[.]” To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14.30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982).

An attempt requires actual specific intent to commit the offense and an overt act directed toward that end.

State v. Stewart · filed 1987-11-17(A)

Thus, an attempt to commit a crime requires that there be a specific intent to commit that crime. The essential elements are actual specific intent to commit the offense, and an overt act directed toward that end.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission undertaken for that purpose that tends directly toward completing it.

State v. Cunningham · filed 1988-02-03

The essential elements of attemped molestation of a juvenile, La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:81.2, are: 1. A person with the specific intent to commit a crime 2. does or omits an act 3. for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, the molestation of a juvenile, the elements of which are set forth above.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act in furtherance of it.

State v. Robinson · filed 1992-12-09(A)

When the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent and committed an act in furtherance thereof.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the offense and an act directed toward accomplishing it, even if the offense is not completed.

State v. Wells · filed 1997-06-18

An attempted forcible rape is committed when the offender has the specific intent to commit forcible rape, defined below, and does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, regardless of whether he would have actually accomplished his purpose under the particular circumstances.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission for that purpose that tends directly toward its accomplishment.

State v. Greenwell · filed 1999-08-18(A)

Hence, a conviction for an attempted offense rests upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

An attempt requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission that tends directly toward accomplishing it; whether the crime could actually have been completed is immaterial.

State v. Stipe · filed 2009-02-04(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an ... act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment.

State v. Brown · filed 2011-06-29(A)

La. R.S. 14:27(A) provides that to attempt to commit a crime, an accused must do or omit an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of the crime while “having a specific intent” to commit the crime.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act tending directly toward its commission.

State v. Watson · filed 2013-05-15(A)

The record supports a finding that Watson had the specific intent to manufacture crack cocaine. ... The evidence supports a finding that Watson was cooking cocaine in the kitchen.

Section 14:27(a) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act tending directly toward its completion.

State v. Gibson · filed 2015-07-06(a)

Thus, to sustain a conviction for attempted armed robbery with a firearm, the State must prove that the defendant, with the specific intent to commit armed robbery, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the taking of anything of value belonging to another, from the person of another or in the immediate control of another, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a firearm.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission directed toward accomplishing it.

Ricalde v. Evonik Stockhausen, LLC · filed 2016-09-22(A)

The present case is distinguishable from Thurston because Mr. Ricalde presented no evidence that anyone at Evonik had the specific intent to commit the alleged crimes and presented no evidence of any acts or omissions by anyone at Evonik for the purpose' of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of that objective.

Section 14:27 requires an overt act toward the intended offense; attempted second degree murder also requires specific intent to kill.

State v. Anderson · filed 2018-10-17

Based on the testimony and evidence specified above, we find that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission toward accomplishing it.

State v. Bordenave · filed 1995-08-23

Attempt requires the specific intent to commit a crime and the commission or omission of an act toward accomplishing that object. La.R.S. 14:27. Bordenave shot Lewis in the hand, chased him, and shot several more shots, two of which hit Lewis. The evidence clearly supports a conviction for attempted second degree murder under La.R.S. 14:27(30.1).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward it; whether the person could have completed the crime is immaterial.

State of Louisiana v. Washington · filed 2021-08-04(A)

Under La. R.S. 14:27(A): “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.”

Section 14:27 defines attempted first degree murder, as applied here, as specific intent to kill plus an act tending directly toward the killing while committing aggravated arson; because aggravated arson is included in that attempted felony-murder offense, the State may not convict and punish for both offenses.

State v. Rogers · filed 1984-12-19

The elements of first degree murder applied in this case are: 1) the killing of a human being, 2) when the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, and 3) is engaged in the perpetration of aggravated arson. La.R.S. 14:30(1). Attempted first degree murder occurs when any person, while having a specific intent to kill and while committing aggravated arson, does any act which tends directly toward the killing. La.R.S. 14:27. The definition of attempted first degree murder includes aggravated arson, and when Rogers was convicted of attempted first degree murder, the jury of necessity found that every element of aggravated arson had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 requires a sentence for attempted first-degree murder to be served without benefit of parole.

State of Louisiana v. Hadnot · filed 2015-06-03

Both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder are to be served without benefit of parole, which is required by La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30. Accordingly, the sentences imposed in this case are illegally lenient. However, because the issue was not raised, this court will not address it.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) requires an attempted first-degree-murder sentence to be served entirely without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Breaux · filed 2019-03-13(D)(1)(a)

Initially, we find that although the penalty provision for attempted first degree murder requires the entire sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a) and 14:30(C)(2), the trial court ordered only ten years of Defendant’s two sentences for attempted first degree murder served without parole or suspension of sentence. Thus, both Defendant’s sentences for attempted first degree murder are illegally lenient because they fail to include a probation restriction and further fail to extend for the entirety of sentence.

Section 14:27 defines attempt as requiring specific intent and an act tending directly toward the crime, and subsection (C) treats attempt as a separate lesser grade even when the intended crime was completed.

State v. Musacchia · filed 2013-12-12(C)

An attempt occurs “when the offender, having the specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.” La. R.S. 14:27. Attempt requires both the specific intent to commit a crime and an act tending directly toward accomplishment of that crime. ... “Attempt” is “a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime [;] ” further, even though the evidence at trial may show that the crime attempted was actually completed by the defendant, he may nevertheless be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:27(C).

Section 14:27 treats an attempt as a separate, lesser grade of the intended crime even when the intended crime was completed, and generally limits the punishment for an attempted felony to one-half of the maximum punishment for the completed offense; the misdemeanor-theft provision in subsection (D)(2) does not apply to an attempt to issue a felony worthless check.

State v. Landry · filed 1986-05-14(C), (D)(2), (D)(3)

“C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” ... “The attempt article, La.R.S. 14:27, as applied to this offense, provides that whoever attempts to commit this particular crime shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted, but such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.”

Section 14:27 treats a person who specifically intends a crime and performs an act tending directly toward it as guilty of an attempt, which is a separate and lesser grade of the intended crime.

State v. Odom · filed 1988-07-12A; C

La.R.S. 14:27 defines attempted crimes; it provides: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. * * * * * * C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. We find that the evidence in this case indicates that the defendants are guilty of attempted armed robbery, a lesser included offense, and we hereby modify the verdict and render a judgment of conviction on that charge.

Section 14:27(D)(3) sets a maximum attempt penalty of one-half the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense and does not impose a mandatory minimum sentence.

State v. Howard · filed 2003-10-23D(3)

Because the language in La. R.S. 14:27 and 40:979 is now virtually identical, it would appear that the reasoning of State v. Callahan, supra , would apply and there is no longer a mandatory minimum sentence for an attempt. The current sentencing range for attempted manufacturing of methamphetamine is 0-15 years at hard labor, to be served with or without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempt, in cases other than those specifically listed, to no more than one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Esteen · filed 2002-05-15(D)(3)

For an attempted possession of cocaine over 400 grams, the sentencing range is imprisonment "in the same manner as the offense attempted and such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense attempted, or both."

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempt to one-half of the maximum fine or imprisonment for the completed offense, while an attempt of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment carries 10 to 50 years at hard labor.

State v. Robicheaux · filed 2003-12-30(D)(3), (D)(1)

The attempt provision provides in pertinent part that the Defendant shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Thus, in this case, the maximum sentence to which the Defendant could be sentenced for attempted armed robbery was 49½ years. ... The attempt provision provides in pertinent part that if the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1). Thus, the maximum sentence for the offense of attempted second degree murder was 50 years.

Section 14:27's attempt sentencing rule does not apply when attempted conduct is already an element of the charged offense under Section 14:129.1.

State v. Becnel · filed 2018-06-27

The trial court's statement that defendant was required to be sentenced under the attempt statute (La. R.S. 14:27, which provides for a term of imprisonment of one-half the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense) because both the State and the jury found him guilty of attempt to intimidate or impede a witness, is misplaced. ... Thus, whether defendant actually intimidated Ms. Pena or only attempted to intimidate Ms. Pena, sentencing under La. R.S. 14:129.1 is the same.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt by specific intent and an act tending directly toward the crime, treats attempt as a separate lesser grade, and limits imprisonment to one-half the maximum term for the offense attempted.

State of Louisiana v. Coward · filed 2007-10-03(A), (C), (D)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27(A) provides that [a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Additionally, “[a]n attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” La.R.S. 14:27(C). ... When one is convicted of an attempt to commit an offence, the maximum possible penalty is “one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted.” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt require specific intent plus an act or omission directed toward accomplishing the intended offense, while § 14:27(C) treats attempt as a lesser grade and permits conviction even when the intended crime was completed.

State of Louisiana v. Perkins · filed 2007-10-31(A) and (C)

It is also unlawful for any person who has a specific intent to commit distribution of a controlled dangerous substance to do or omit an act with the purpose of accomplishing the commission of that offense, i.e., to attempt to commit that offense. La.R.S. 14:27(A). Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1). Furthermore, “[a]n attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” La.R.S. 14:27(C).

Subsection (D) limits imprisonment for attempted manslaughter to one-half the maximum term for manslaughter, or 20 years.

State v. Jackson · filed 2008-02-13(D)

La. R.S. 14:27(D) provides that a person convicted of attempting to commit an offense (other than theft or receiving stolen goods, or offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment) shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both. Therefore, a person convicted of attempted manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than 20 years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Womack · filed 2013-01-16(D)(3)

Regarding attempted armed robbery, La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), states, in pertinent part, that “such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” ... The sentence imposed for armed robbery is mid-range, while the sentence for the attempted armed robbery is far below the potential sentence of 49½ years. When the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, 50 years in prison is not grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed, and the sentence does not shock the sense of justice. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing these sentences.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific-intent crime accompanied by an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, and § 14:27(D)(3) limits an attempted offense's imprisonment to one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana Versus Sylvester Hayman · filed 2021-04-28(A), (D)(3)

Attempt is defined in La. R.S. 14:27(A) as: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that for an attempted offense, the offender shall be imprisoned for a period of time not to exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense attempted. ... Therefore, the sentencing range for attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile is zero to twelve and a half years of imprisonment at hard labor, with at least two years of the sentence served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... The sentence imposed as to count two is illegally lenient with respect to the restriction of benefits as the trial court was required to restrict benefits for at least two years as to count two.

For attempted manslaughter, § 14:27 requires proof of a specific intent to kill.

State v. Vanvorst · filed 1987-03-16

A specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of attempted manslaughter. La.R.S. 14:27, 14:31.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act tending directly toward its accomplishment; specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm satisfies the intended-crime intent requirement.

State v. Thorne · filed 1987-03-04(A)

The state’s evidence that the defendant stabbed the victim in the chest and told her that he would cut her throat if she screamed would have convinced a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm or kill.

Section 14:27 supports an attempted-murder conviction when the defendant intends to kill and takes direct steps toward the killing, even though the victim survives.

State v. Scoby · filed 1988-11-22

According to the bill of information, defendant was charged with an attempted second degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1(1). La.R.S. 14:30.1(1) specifically refers to a murder committed "[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; ...." Therefore, defendant was charged with the attempt to kill Joseph Wheaton when he had the specific intent to kill. Defendant admitted that he stabbed the victim with a large butcher knife. Testimony of the eyewitnesses and the victim established that defendant attacked the victim as the victim was lying on the ground and that he pursued the victim as the victim attempted to flee. The victim testified that he was stabbed in the back and that he sustained a broken rib, as well as liver and lung damage in the incident, all of which caused him to seek emergency medical treatment and to stay in the hospital for twenty-four days. We find, therefore, that any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, could have found that the state proved the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821. This assignment of error has no merit.

For attempted second-degree murder, § 14:27 requires specific intent to kill; intent only to inflict great bodily harm is insufficient.

State v. Hall · filed 1992-10-06A

While specific intent to either kill or to inflict great bodily harm will support a conviction of second degree murder under La.R.S. 14:30.1, only specific intent to kill will support a conviction of attempted second degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1 and La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill for attempted murder; intent merely to inflict great bodily harm is insufficient.

State v. Cavazos · filed 1992-12-10

The bill misdefined the offense, as the gravamen of attempted murder is the specific intent to kill, not simply to inflict great bodily harm.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the offender specifically intended to kill to support a conviction for attempted second degree murder.

State v. Arnold · filed 1998-01-21

A conviction for attempted second degree murder, under La. R.S. 14:27 and 14.30.1, requires proof of the offender's specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the attempted offense; attempted second degree murder therefore requires specific intent to kill and cannot rest solely on an underlying felony.

State v. Wills · filed 1999-06-16

The appropriate inquiry following Defendant's Alford plea was whether or not a factual basis existed to support a finding that Defendant had the specific intent that the victim be killed, as required by La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1, defining second degree murder.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime for an attempt conviction; for attempted manslaughter, that means specific intent to kill.

State v. Hutcherson · filed 2001-04-04(A)

The law is clear that although specific intent to kill is not necessary for a conviction of manslaughter, a specific intent to kill is required for a conviction of attempted manslaughter. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this court finds that the state adequately proved that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill for attempted manslaughter, and that intent may be inferred from the defendant’s actions and the circumstances, including aiming and firing a gun at the victim.

State v. Willis · filed 2002-08-14

Attempted manslaughter requires proof of specific intent to kill. La. R.S. 14:27; ... Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the defendant's actions and the circumstances of the transaction. ... The specific intent to kill may be inferred when the defendant aims a gun directly at his victim and fires.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended criminal object for an attempted offense.

State v. Whalen · filed 2007-08-15

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. ... Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27, as applied to attempted manslaughter, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to kill.

State v. Blanche · filed 2012-04-25

In order to obtain a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill. ... After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Blanche’s specific intent to kill may be inferred from his act of pointing a gun and firing at Turner. ... From all of the evidence before it, the jury could have reasonably found proof of specific intent to kill. Thus, this assignment of error has no merit.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime for an attempt conviction.

State v. Smith · filed 2013-01-30(A)

An attempt to commit any crime is a specific intent crime.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the target crime and an act tending directly toward its completion; for attempted armed robbery, that intent may be inferred from conduct showing an intent to rob while armed, even if no property is ultimately taken.

State of Louisiana v. Jones · filed 2013-10-09

The offense of “attempt,” in pertinent part, is defined as: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... In the current case, the jury determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant‟s actions indicated that he had the specific intent to rob the victim while armed with a dangerous weapon.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the crime attempted, and this requirement does not make attempted manslaughter a legally impossible offense.

State of Louisiana v. Javan Marshall and Alfred Williams · filed 2022-06-15

Mr. Marshall asserts that to be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, the State must prove that the offender had the specific intent to commit the crime attempted pursuant to La. R.S. 14:27, and that manslaughter, by definition, is an involuntary act for which specific intent could not have been present. ... The above discussion establishes that the offense of attempted manslaughter is both a valid offense in Louisiana, and a valid responsive verdict to the crime of attempted first degree murder. Consequently, the trial court should have denied his claim either on the merits, or based on his inexcusable failure to raise it in the proceedings leading to conviction. Mr. Marshall’s assertion lacks merit.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended offense; attempted simple burglary therefore requires intent to enter unlawfully and commit a felony or theft inside.

State v. Davis · filed 1989-06-20(A)

Specific intent to commit a felony or theft is required for attempted simple burglary, La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:62; State v. Jones, 426 So.2d 1323, 1325 (La.1983); State v. Marcello, 385 So.2d 244, 245 (La. 1980).

Section 14:27(A) requires proof of specific intent to commit the intended offense.

State v. Fuqua · filed 1990-03-14(A)

However, using the Jackson and Mussall standards, it was not established that defendant had the specific intent to take or misappropriate without the consent of Miller, or that defendant had the intent to permanently deprive Miller of that which she is supposed to have attempted to take or misappropriate.

Firing three shots at close range, including two at a victim on the ground, can establish intent for attempted manslaughter under § 14:27(A).

State v. Boyd · filed 1996-08-28(A)

When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient proof existed for any rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved the essential elements of the crime of attempted manslaughter. ... The fact that three shots were fired at the victim at close range and that the victim was on the ground when the second and third were fired clearly indicates an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

Section 14:27(A) requires proof of specific intent to commit the underlying crime for an attempt conviction.

State v. MEGASON · filed 2010-10-06(A)

Thus, an attempted offense requires a showing of specific intent. ... This court concludes that the evidence does not establish Megason’s specific intent to commit the crime of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling.

An attempt requires specific intent to commit the crime; criminal negligence alone is insufficient.

State v. Brown · filed 2012-06-20(A)

Proving an attempt requires proof of specific intent to commit a certain crime. Proof of only criminal negligence would not be sufficient to sustain this conviction.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended offense; attempted obstruction of justice was not established without specific intent to use force or threats to influence a witness.

State v. Thacker · filed 2015-01-28(A)

Given the above, the State also failed to prove the Defendant had the specific intent to use force or threats to influence C.D.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent for an attempt; evidence that a defendant fired toward a person can support a finding of intent to kill that person.

State v. Fontenot · filed 2015-03-18(A)

The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Defendant intended to kill Bourgeois.

Attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill; intent to inflict great bodily harm alone is insufficient.

State v. Richardson · filed 2016-12-28(A)

Thus, although La.R.S. 14:30.1 provides that second degree murder requires “specific intent to kill” or “to inflict great bodily harm,” in order to be convicted of attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the crime and an overt act tending directly toward its accomplishment, and factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt.

State v. Prine · filed 2009-05-20(A), (B)(1)

Attempt requires both the specific intent to commit a crime and an act for the purpose of, or an “overt act,” tending directly toward accomplishment of that crime. ... Louisiana’s attempt statute rejects factual impossibility as a defense, stating “it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” La. R.S. 14:27. ... Defendant’s own statements indicated a specific intent to have sexual intercourse with the child. The defense’s argument that only mere preparation was possible because the contemplated victim was fictitious is an argument of factual impossibility and is vitiated by statute. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of attempted aggravated rape therefore turns on whether defendant committed an overt act “tending directly toward” accomplishment of sexual intercourse with the fictitious child.

Section 14:27 makes specific intent to commit the intended crime an element of attempt, and that intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions or inaction.

State v. Doby · filed 1989-02-22

La.R.S. 14:27, defining attempt, provides, in part: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Thus, specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. As it is a state of mind, however, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions and/or inaction of the defendant.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Wilson · filed 1989-05-25(A)

To demonstrate that the defendant "attempted" to commit this crime, the State must also show that the defendant possessed specific intent to commit the crime, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of the object. ... There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant knew or should have known the vehicle was stolen, and that, as a willing passenger did perform a sufficient overt act to justify an attempt at possession.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime as an element of an attempted offense.

State v. Tauzier · filed 1990-10-11(A)

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27 A. A specific intent to kill is required to support an attempted manslaughter conviction.

Section 14:27(A) requires a formed intent and an act directed toward accomplishing the crime, while § 14:27(B) excludes mere preparation from constituting an attempt.

State v. Trackling · filed 1992-04-14(A)(B)

An attempt is committed when a defendant, after having formed the attempt to commit rape, does an act for the purpose of and intending directly toward the accomplishing of the objective. La.R.S. 14:27(A). Mere preparation to commit rape shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt. La.R.S. 14:27(B). ... The State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit a crime and committed an act tending directly toward accomplishment of that crime. ... The circumstances clearly provide sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the defendant of attempted aggravated rape.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to accomplish the target offense for an attempt conviction.

State v. Trackling · filed 1992-12-07

To convict the defendant of attempted aggravated rape, the state had to prove that he specifically intended to engage in an act of anal or vaginal sexual intercourse without his victim's lawful consent. La.R.S. 14:27; La.R.S. 14:42. Such proof is indispensable because specific intent to accomplish the offense is the sine qua non of the criminal offense of attempt, State v. Parish, 405 So.2d 1080 (La. 1981), and anal or vaginal sexual intercourse without lawful consent constitutes the act of rape.

Section 14:27 requires the specific intent necessary to commit the underlying crime; for attempted second-degree murder, intent to kill is required, and intent merely to inflict great bodily harm is insufficient.

State v. Holmes · filed 1993-06-09

The trial judge instructed the jury that an essential element of this crime was a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. This was error, as a specific intent to inflict great bodily harm is not an element of the crime of attempted seconddegree murder.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime for an attempt conviction.

State v. Rice · filed 1993-11-03

Furthermore, as noted in Butler, under LSA-R.S. 14:27 an attempt to commit a crime involves a specific intent to commit a crime. The crime of murder is "the killing of a human being" under certain prescribed circumstances (using the analysis and emphasis as found in Butler ). Thus, a person having the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm may lack the intent to commit murder, as he does not necessarily have the intent to kill another human being.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime as an element of an attempted offense, so attempted manslaughter requires specific intent to kill.

State v. Jynes · filed 1995-03-01

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La R.S. 14:27. Thus, specific intent to kill is an element of the crime of attempted manslaughter.

Section 14:27 makes the intent to commit the target offense, rather than the possibility of completing it, decisive for attempt; in attempted purse snatching, intent to take the purse permits inferring intent to take its contents even if the purse contains nothing of value.

State v. Johnson · filed 1993-10-28

The intent to take the contents of the purse can be inferred by the intent to take the purse. Thus, even if the purse contained nothing of value, the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for attempted purse snatching because “it is the intent, not the possibility of success, that determines whether the act perpetrated constitutes the crime of attempt.”

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its completion; for attempted murder, specific intent to kill is required, not merely intent to inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Williams · filed 1996-01-31(A)

La.R.S. 14:27(A) provides: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. In State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189, 192 (La. 1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that since "[t]he crime of murder is `the killing of a human being,' under certain circumstances.... `[t]he elements of the crime of attempted murder are specific intent to kill a human being and an overt act in furtherance of the object....' [A] specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of attempted murder." (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, as a matter of law, attempted murder may not be committed by an act with only the specific intent to commit great bodily harm; there must be specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act tending directly toward its commission; thus attempted manslaughter requires specific intent to kill.

State v. Brunet · filed 1996-04-30

The gravamen of the crime of attempted second degree murder is specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. La.R.S. 14:27 and 30.1. Attempted manslaughter also requires the presence of specific intent to kill. See La.R.S. 14:27 and 31; State v. Holley, 528 So.2d 752 (La. App. 1st Cir.1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1213 (La.1989).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act in furtherance of that intent; completion of the intended crime is immaterial.

State v. Steward · filed 1996-09-27(A)

To prove the crime of attempted forcible rape, the state is required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actively desired to commit rape by preventing the victim from resisting the act by force or threats of physical violence where the victim may reasonably believe that such resistance would not prevent the rape. Where the offender has the requisite intent to commit a forcible rape and does an act in furtherance of his goal, he has committed the offense of attempted forcible rape even if his victim successfully repels the threat or force.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the intended crime and performed an act tending directly toward its accomplishment; for attempted manslaughter, that specific intent is an intent to kill.

State v. Taylor · filed 1996-11-06(A)

In order to obtain a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill, a finding which is not necessary to support a manslaughter conviction.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime for an attempt; criminal negligence cannot be attempted because it is unintentional.

State v. Cortez · filed 1996-12-18(A)

La.R.S. 14:27 provides, in pertinent part, that an attempt includes: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. (Emphasis added). ... A serious problem arises when a defendant is convicted of attempted cruelty to a juvenile, or more specifically, attempted criminally negligent mistreatment of a juvenile, "inasmuch as an attempt is a specific intent crime and a person cannot specifically intend to do something unintentionally." ... Second, it is a legal impossibility for someone to be guilty of attempted criminal negligence. As stated above, one cannot harbor the intent to do an unintentional act. For this court to hold otherwise would defy law and logic. Accordingly, Ms. Cortez could not be convicted of attempted criminal negligence.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt consist of specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the intended crime could actually be completed.

State v. Hollis · filed 1997-01-28(A)

The definition of attempt is found in La. R.S. 14:27(A) as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... To prove an attempt to possess, the state must prove that the defendant committed an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of his intent, i.e., possession of the drugs. La. R.S. 14:27(A), supra; State v. Hookfin, 601 So.2d 320 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991); State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990).

Section 14:27 makes attempted second degree murder require specific intent to kill plus an overt act tending toward accomplishment of the killing.

State v. Barnett · filed 1997-09-23

The gravamen of the crime of attempted second degree murder is the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. La.R.S. 14:27 and 30.1.

Section 14:27 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to commit the target crime, along with conduct tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Fredieu · filed 1997-10-08A

Absent proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of specific intent to commit a crime, the jury’s decision is obviously not grounded in law and will not be allowed to stand.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt require specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Maxie · filed 1998-08-19

La. R.S. art. 14:27 defines attempt, in part, as: any person who, having specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the underlying offense.

State v. Sciortino · filed 1998-11-25

Furthermore, the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27, requires a specific intent to commit the underlying offense.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as acting with specific intent to commit a crime and taking an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Salter · filed 1999-02-24(A)

La. R.S. 14:27 provides, in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The defendant admitted to repeatedly shooting into the car, and this act shows a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. ... The state proved the defendant committed acts which would make him guilty of attempted manslaughter.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as conduct done with specific intent to commit a crime that tends directly toward accomplishing it; for attempted murder, the State must prove specific intent to kill and an overt act toward that goal.

State v. Fauchetta · filed 1999-06-01

"Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." La. R.S. 14:27. To prove an attempted murder, whether first or second degree, the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. La. R.S. 14:27, 14:30; State v. Guccione, 96-1049 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/29/97), 694 So.2d 1060, 1067.

Section 14:27 applies to attempts to commit any felony or misdemeanor and requires proof of specific intent to commit the crime plus an overt act directed toward committing it.

State v. Craig · filed 1999-08-18

The general attempt provision of the criminal code, La. R.S. 14:27, embraces the attempt to commit any crime, whether felony or misdemeanor. One purpose is to punish actors who, as in this case, are apprehended before they complete the crime. For a defendant to be guilty of an attempt, the prosecution has to prove a “specific intent” to commit a crime and an “overt act” directed toward that end.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt punishable when a person specifically intends a crime and performs an act or omission tending directly toward its completion, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Trepagnier · filed 1999-09-15(A)

"Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." La. R.S. § 14:27 A. Mr. Trepagnier argues that he took nothing from the victim, Mr. Thompson, and also that Mr. Thompson failed to establish through his testimony that it was he, Mr. Trepagnier, who shot him. However, the offense of attempted armed robbery does not require that the robber succeed in his act. What is required is an act or omission tending toward the accomplishment of his object.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Touchet · filed 2000-04-05(A)

Attempt is defined by La.R.S. 14:27, as follows: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The State also failed to prove that Mr. Touchet committed or omitted to an act that tended to set-up or organize a drug racket/enterprise.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as acting or omitting an act with specific intent to commit a crime, for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Bass · filed 2000-07-12

An attempt occurs when "Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object." La. R.S. 14:27. The State clearly proved an attempted simple burglary. The evidence was sufficient.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; the court applied that requirement to uphold the attempted-theft conviction.

State v. Bryant · filed 2000-12-06(A)

La. R.S. 14:27 provides in part: (A) Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the specific intent to commit a theft.