La. Stat. Ann. § 14:27

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; for attempted armed robbery, the intent to take something of value must be proved even if no taking occurred.

State v. McNeal · filed 2001-04-04(A)

La. R.S. 14:27(A), defining attempt, provides that any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. To convict of attempted armed robbery, there must be sufficient evidence to establish the intent to take something of value, even though the act of taking need not be established.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an overt act in furtherance of accomplishing it.

State v. Harrell · filed 2002-02-26

The Defendant was charged with attempted second degree murder, which requires a specific intent to kill and an overt act in furtherance of that object. La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. ... To prove attempted second degree murder, the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. ... We find that the severity of the victim's injuries demonstrates the Defendant's specific intent to kill. Thus, the State proved the essential elements of the charged offense, attempted second degree murder, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill and an act tending toward accomplishing the killing for an attempted second-degree murder conviction.

State v. Woods · filed 2002-09-11

While a conviction for second degree murder can be obtained by showing that the defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, a conviction for attempted second degree murder requires a showing that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an act tending to accomplish that purpose.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Maten · filed 2005-03-24(A)

An attempted offense is committed when a defendant, "having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object." La. R.S. 14:27 A.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target offense and an act in furtherance of accomplishing it for an attempt.

State v. Gray · filed 2007-01-10(A)

To commit the offense of attempted simple kidnapping, Defendant must have had the specific intent to commit the offense of simple kidnapping while taking some action in furtherance of accomplishing that offense. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to possess the firearm and an overt act toward completing the possession offense for an attempted-possession conviction.

State v. Ray · filed 2007-06-27

To sustain a conviction for attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the state is required to prove that defendant had the specific intent to possess the weapon(s) and that he committed an overt act towards the completion of that offense. La. R.S. 14:27. (Emphasis added).

Section 14:27 requires an intent to commit the underlying offense and an overt act tending toward its completion; for attempted second degree murder, the intent must be specifically to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Ivory L. Simon · filed 2007-10-03

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La.R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La. 1975); State v. Martin, 92-0811 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/94), 638 So.2d 411.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt.

State v. Colbert · filed 2008-07-23

Likewise, the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for the attempted second degree kidnapping of Ms. Alexander. La. R.S. 14:44.1 A(5) defines second degree kidnapping in pertinent part as: "the doing of any of the acts listed in Subsection B wherein the victim is: ... (5) Imprisoned or kidnapped when the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon ... B. For purposes of this Section, kidnapping is: (1) The forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to another." In addition, La. R.S. 14:27 defines an attempt as occurring when "[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object." Ms. Alexander testified that after the appellant shot Jefferson, he came around to her side of the car, ordered her out at gunpoint, threatened to kill her, and took her over to her car, where he tried to get her to enter the back seat. This unrefuted testimony established the elements of attempted second degree kidnapping. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying the motion for a post verdict judgment of acquittal.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; actual completion of the crime is immaterial.

State v. Shivers · filed 2008-12-03(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended, and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A). ... Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:10, 14:27.

An attempt requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; it does not matter whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Warren · filed 2008-12-17(A)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... In order to convict a defendant of attempted second degree murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. ... Thus, the state provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to kill Lamesha at the time of the crash.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission intended to accomplish that crime and tending directly toward its completion.

State v. Manning · filed 2009-06-24(A)

An attempt, as defined in La. R.S. 14:27(A), occurs when: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his objective. Thus, in order to prove attempted aggravated rape, the state would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to and engaged in an act for the purpose of carrying out sexual intercourse without the lawful consent of the victim and the existence of one of the aggravating factors.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt a crime when a person specifically intends to commit an offense and takes an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the offense would not actually have been completed.

State v. Turner · filed 2010-02-03(A)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The state additionally proved that the defendant had the requisite specific intent under La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30. ... Because five of the state’s witnesses testified that they observed defendant either holding or directly firing a gun into a crowd of people, defendant’s specific intent to kill may be inferred and the requisite elements of the crime of attempted first degree murder are established.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the offense and an act tending directly toward its accomplishment; mere preparation, propositioning, or solicitation alone is insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. J. v. F. · filed 2010-10-06(A) (B)

The two key elements of an attempt are (1) specific intent to commit the offense, and (2) an act toward accomplishing that offense. La.R.S. 14:27. Even when viewing the evidence in the record in a light most favorable to the prosecution as to the charge of attempted rape, the second mandatory element is not proven. There was no evidence establishing an act by Defendant toward accomplishing the offense in question. Defendant asked, actually begged, J.C. to engage in illicit sexual activity. The record clearly indicates that Defendant took no further action toward accomplishing his quest for sexual activity with an eight-year-old child. However sickening Defendant’s actions were, mere propositioning, without anything further, does not constitute an act toward accomplishing that offense and, therefore, does not constitute an attempt. Though it may constitute another crime, it does not constitute attempted aggravated rape. The State failed to prove an essential element of an attempt, i.e., “an act [by Defendant] for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(A). “Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(B). Solicitation alone is insufficient. Consequently, Defendant’s conviction of attempted aggravated rape is vacated.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime could not actually be completed.

State of Louisiana v. Thomas · filed 2010-10-06(A)

“Attempt” is defined as: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27(A). ... However, the State was not required to prove that Defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim. In this case, the State had only to prove that there was specific intent to kill the intended victim, which according to Fontenot’s testimony was Mario Wilson. ... Furthermore, its irrelevant that the two men were aiming at Mario Wilson and not the actual victim, the doctrine of transferred intent applies in this case.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Bias · filed 2011-05-04(A)

Armed robbery is defined by La.R.S. 14:64(A) as: “the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” Attempt, as defined by La.R.S. 14:27(A), is when “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the 11f)circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” Thus, there is a two-prong test in determining whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of attempted armed robbery: first, whether Defendant had the specific intent to commit an armed robbery; and second, whether he committed an act tending toward the accomplishment of such a robbery.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion of the intended crime need not occur.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-11-02(A)

By aiming his gun at Kesiah and firing multiple shots at her, Defendant exhibited the specific intent to kill that is required by La.R.S. 14:27. Therefore, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s attempted second degree murder conviction.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as having specific intent to commit a crime and doing an act that tends directly toward accomplishing it; attempted second degree murder therefore requires specific intent to kill and an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

State v. Bannister · filed 2012-02-14(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does ... an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. La. R.S. 14:27. ... Regarding defendant’s first claim, to prove attempted second degree murder, the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. ... Based on the foregoing, we find the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion need not have been possible.

State v. Underdonk · filed 2012-03-23(A)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27(A), in turn, provides: ... |inA. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the state established that defendant did have the specific intent to commit an aggravated rape of O.N. ... These facts and circumstances, taken together, establish that defendant had the requisite intent to support his conviction for attempted aggravated rape.

Section 14:27(A) supports an attempted-crime conviction when the defendant acts with specific intent and commits conduct directly tending toward the intended crime; here, shooting Steele at close range supported the required intent to inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Jefferson · filed 2012-03-07(A)

Thus, the state offered sufficient evidence that the defendant shot Steele at close range, indicating an intent to inflict great bodily harm.

Section 14:27 treats an act or omission that directly tends toward committing a crime, undertaken with specific intent to commit it, as an attempt even if the crime is not completed; attempted second-degree murder specifically requires intent to kill and an overt act in furtherance.

State v. Holmes · filed 2013-05-16

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Although the surviving victim appears to not have been the target of the shooting, testimony that defendant shot into the crowd is sufficient to establish a specific intent to kill for the attempted second degree murder conviction.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent and an act tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime, while § 14:27(B)(1) provides that mere preparation is insufficient but specified armed conduct can constitute an attempt.

State v. Cortez · filed 2013-08-07(A), (B)(1)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A). Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. La. R.S. 14:27(B)(1). ... After considering the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the state proved that the defendant had the specific intent to kill Mr. Ballard and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal, thereby supporting his conviction for attempted manslaughter.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt require specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, even if the crime would not actually be completed.

State v. Vargas · filed 2014-03-26(A)

La. R.S. 14:27(A) defines attempt as follows: ... Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Given the evidence that Bernardo was vomiting while passed out and lying on the ground, that the victim was completely physically incapacitated, combined with the fact that her bikini bottom was found several feet away, and that defendant was also nude from the waist down with an erection, positioned between the victim’s legs in close proximity to her, we conclude that a rational juror could have found proof that defendant was the individual who undressed the victim, thereby committing an act in furtherance of the attempted simple rape and demonstrating specific intent.

Section 14:27(A) requires an act or omission directly tending toward committing an offense, together with specific intent to commit it, for an attempt conviction.

State v. Pennywell · filed 2014-05-07(A)

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense when he “does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object” and he has the specific intent to commit the crime. ... Accordingly, we find that the evidence in the present case supports the imposition of a verdict of guilty of attempted aggravated incest, as Defendant’s acts of having T.W. take her clothes off and lie on the bed and Defendant then placing his private part on her private part while “humping” her constituted an act in furtherance of penetration.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime could actually have been completed.

State v. Jones · filed 2014-11-19(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27(A) requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to commit the underlying crime and performed an act in furtherance of that crime.

State v. J.M. · filed 2015-02-11(A)

Accordingly, to support a conviction for attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile, the State has to show beyond a reasonable- doubt that defendant specifically intended to commit a lewd or lascivious act upon the victim or in the victim’s presence and did an act in furtherance thereof.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt, and completion of the crime is unnecessary.

State v. Apodaca · filed 2015-09-30(A)

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender Actively desired to cause the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27(a) requires proof that, with specific intent to commit a crime, the defendant did or omitted an act tending directly toward accomplishing it; that standard applies to attempted armed robbery.

State v. Amos · filed 2016-04-06(a)

That is, to convict a defendant of attempted- armed robbery with a firearm, the State must prove that the defendant, with the specific intent to commit armed robbery, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and'tending directly toward the taking of anything of value belonging to another, from the person of another or in the immediate control of another, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a firearm. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:64(A); La. R.S. 14:64.3(A).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Hickman · filed 2016-05-16(A)

Thus, to prove attempted second degree murder, the State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the specific intent to kill a human being and committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. ... The evidence was sufficient to infer from the circumstances that Defendant specifically intended to kill Victim and that she committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; mere preparation is insufficient, and an attempt’s penalty cannot exceed one-half of the target offense’s maximum fine or imprisonment term.

State v. Parker · filed 2018-05-30(A), (B)(1), (D)(3)

An "attempt" to commit a crime is defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A), which provides: ... However, "[m]ere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt[.]" La.R.S. 14:27(B)(1). ... Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 states that an "attempt" occurs when "[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object[.]" ... The overt act need not be the ultimate step toward or the last possible act in the consummation of the crime attempted, and it is the intent to commit the crime, not the possibility of success, that determines whether the act or omission constitutes the crime of attempt. ... However, the defendant was convicted of attempted manufacture and possession of a bomb, and La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that the penalty for an attempt "shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." Therefore, the defendant was subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years and a maximum fine of five thousand dollars.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; mere preparation is insufficient to constitute an attempt.

State v. Contreras · filed 2018-05-30(A)

Attempted murder, whether first degree or second degree, requires specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act toward that goal. ... La. R.S. 14:27 provides in part: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The evidence in this case, when viewed in light most favorable to the State, established the defendant's guilt of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. ... The defendant's act of shooting the victims at close range clearly was sufficient to support the conviction for attempted second degree murder and necessarily the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter.

Section 14:27 defines an attempted offense as requiring specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission intended for and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Hardyway · filed 2019-02-27

La. R.S. 14:27 defines an attempted offense as occurring when any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward the crime, regardless of whether the crime would have been completed.

State v. Vanhorn · filed 2019-04-10

An attempt is defined by La. R.S. 14:27 as any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires an intent to commit the target crime and an overt act tending directly toward its commission; for attempted second degree murder, the required intent is specific intent to kill.

State of Louisiana Versus Cory Bartholomew · filed 2019-10-23

In order to prove attempted second degree murder, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. ... Defendant’s conduct of pointing a gun and firing it toward the victim in the truck are circumstances from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant had the specific intent to kill.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the intended victim’s death to sustain an attempted second-degree-murder conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Lynn · filed 2020-01-15

Thus, to sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:30.1; State v. Bishop, supra; State v. Harris, supra.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Marshall J. Alexander, Jr. · filed 2022-06-01(A)

However, to support a conviction of attempted armed robbery, the state must prove the defendant, having the specific intent to commit the armed robbery, did or omitted “an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.” See La. R.S. 14:27. ... The state’s conviction rests on the testimony of Wanda Brown, and a detailed examination of her testimony, in conjunction with the physical evidence, reveals that no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing took place during an attempted armed robbery.

For attempted second-degree murder, Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the victim’s death.

State of Louisiana in the Interest of R.B. Vs. · filed 2022-08-26

(1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Small · filed 2023-08-09(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Michael R. Suydam, Jr. · filed 2024-02-28(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27(A). Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. ... In order to convict Defendant of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm, the State was required to prove Defendant had the specific intent to place Doll in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery and committed an act in furtherance thereof.

Section 14:27(C) treats an attempt as a lesser grade of the intended crime and permits conviction for attempt even when the intended crime was actually completed during the attempt.

State of Louisiana v. White · filed 2024-11-20(C)

An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. La. R.S. 14:27(C). ... A conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:27; State v. Kennedy, supra. ... We find that a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence was sufficient under the Jackson standard to support a conviction of either the charged offense, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, or the responsive verdict, attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Section 14:27 defines attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Jalen Levine A/K/A Jalen Juwan Levine · filed 2025-03-19

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27 defines attempt as when a person who, having specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. ... Therefore, and in summary, we find the evidence in this case is more than sufficient to support the jury’s unanimous verdict finding Defendant guilty of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime together with an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense.

State of Louisiana v. Edwards · filed 2025-03-26

An attempt is statutorily defined as “having a specific intent to commit a crime,” and doing or omitting “an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing” of the intended offense. La.R.S. 14:27. “Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant’s act of pointing a gun and firing at a person.”

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act tending directly toward its accomplishment; lying in wait with a dangerous weapon and intent to commit a crime is sufficient for an attempt.

State of Louisiana v. Boswell · filed 2025-04-09(A), (B)

La. R.S. 14:27(A) provides that any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. La. R.S. 14:27(B). Attempt requires both the specific intent to commit a crime and an act for the purpose of, or an “overt act,” tending directly toward accomplishment of that crime.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not have been completed.

State v. McGuire · filed 1990-04-10

Further, any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of intent to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27. ... Our review of the record indicates that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of the charged offense of simple burglary. Therefore, a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could clearly have concluded that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of attempted simple burglary. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt a lesser grade of the intended crime when a person specifically intends the crime and takes or omits an act directly tending toward its completion, even if the crime could not actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Doyle · filed 2024-05-22(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires an act tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense for criminal attempt.

State v. Bell · filed 1990-09-19

From Bell's mere presence in the car close to the sealed package on the console between the two men, a rational factfinder could not have concluded that, even assuming he was aware of the contents, Bell exercised control and dominion over the package, or that he willfully and knowingly shared with Davis the right to control it. The state's evidence was therefore insufficient to prove that Bell was in constructive possession of the cocaine, or that he had performed any act tending directly toward accomplishing that goal. R.S. 14:27; 40:967.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Randel · filed 1991-01-23

An attempt requires the specific intent to commit a crime and the doing or committing of an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Simmons · filed 1993-08-12

An attempted crime occurs when a person who has a specific intent to commit a crime does an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La.R.S. 14:27. There is no evidence that Simmons' possessed a specific intent to commit the crime of forcible rape. That is, there was no evidence of force or threats or of a reasonable belief that resistance was futile.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not ultimately be completed.

State v. Davis · filed 1994-02-25

La.R.S. 14:27 defines an attempt: "Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." ... Although Ms. Woods did not hear defendant demand anything of value from her, it is undisputed that defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon within a few feet of Ms. Woods and his action in pointing the gun to Ms. Woods' head is clearly an act tending directly toward defendant's objective of robbing Ms. Woods.

Section A requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its commission; the completed offense need not actually have been accomplished.

State v. Stone · filed 1993-03-03(A)

La.R.S. 14:27 defines attempt. Section A provides: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... To prove an attempted armed robbery, the State had to prove that the defendant 1) had a specific intent to commit the crime of armed robbery, and 2) did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the commission of the crime of armed robbery.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent plus an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime; for attempted second-degree murder, the statute does not require use of a dangerous weapon.

State v. Caine · filed 1995-03-03(A)

La.R.S. 14:27(A) provides, in pertinent part: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Stabbing Fitzgerald with the needle after making the statement that he would give her AIDS was an act committed for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of killing Fitzgerald. ... Furthermore, although the defendant claims that the state failed to prove that the needle was a dangerous weapon, La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1 do not require that a defendant use a dangerous weapon in order to be found guilty of attempted second degree murder.

Section 14:27(A) treats an attempt as requiring specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward the intended crime, so an attempted offense may be committed without completing the underlying entry.

State v. Lynch · filed 1999-02-03(A)

La.R.S. 14:27 provides in pertinent part: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... It is conceivable that the offense of attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling could be committed without perpetration of the offense of criminal trespass. ... A criminal trespass requires an entry. Therefore, because a reasonable state of facts can be imagined wherein the greater offense of attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling can be committed without perpetration of the lesser offense of criminal trespass, a verdict for criminal trespass cannot be responsive to the greater offense with which defendant in the present case was charged.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target offense and an act or omission intended to accomplish it and tending directly toward that result.

State v. Clark · filed 2000-12-06

A person "attempts" to commit the crime of simple robbery when he has the specific intent to commit the offense and does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his object. La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt when a person with specific intent commits or omits an act directly tending toward the intended crime, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Camese · filed 2001-07-11(A)

La.R.S. 14:27, the attempt statute, provides: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Second degree murder is defined as the "killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1. Thus, a conviction for attempted second degree murder requires a showing that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an act tending to accomplish that purpose.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt when a person, with specific intent to commit a crime, commits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient, but specified armed preparatory acts can suffice.

State v. Allen · filed 2001-08-01

Next the defendant argues that the State did not prove the elements of the crime of attempted armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. ... La. R.S. 14:27 defines attempt as follows: § 27. Attempt A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. B. Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. ... The State submitted sufficient information from which the jury could have reasonably concluded the defendant intended to rob Mrs. Schmidt.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt when a person with specific intent to commit a crime performs or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime.

State v. Baker · filed 2001-09-26

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. La. R.S. 14:27. To support a conviction for attempted forcible rape, the state must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit forcible rape and that he did an act for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, the accomplishing of his objective. La. R.S. 14:27, 14:42.1; State v. Dorsey, 30-683 (La.App. 2d Cir.06/24/98), 718 So.2d 466, writ denied, 98-2227 (La.12/18/98), 732 So.2d 54.

Section 14:27(A) requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Young · filed 2001-11-28(A)

La. R.S. 14:27(A) further provides that to attempt to commit a crime, an accused must do or omit an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of the crime while "having a specific intent" to commit the crime.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it; for attempted armed robbery, the act must tend directly toward taking something of value by force or intimidation while armed with a dangerous weapon.

State v. Johnson · filed 2002-06-12

In order to convict a defendant of attempted armed robbery, the state must prove that the defendant, having the specific intent to commit armed robbery, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the taking of anything of value belonging to another, from the person of another or in the immediate control of another, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:27 and 64; State v. Musgrove, 33,977 (La.App.2d Cir.12/15/00), 774 So.2d 1155, writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.09/28/01), 798 So.2d 112. Specific intent is a state of mind and need not be proved as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. ... Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:10, 14:27; State v. Loyd, 35,637 (La. App.2d Cir.02/27/02), 810 So.2d 1214.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt conviction.

State v. Hines · filed 2002-09-30(A)

Thus, the State had to prove not only that the defendant had the specific intent to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute it, but also that defendant did an act or omitted to do an act "for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of [her] object." La.R.S. 14:27; 40:966(A).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Gaspard · filed 2003-03-05

The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant specifically intended to commit a lewd and lascivious act upon the person of, or in the presence of V.G., and did an act in furtherance thereof. ... For the reasons expressed, we find the evidence adduced by the State, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, does not satisfy the elements of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:81.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt conviction.

State v. Dauzat · filed 2003-04-02(A)

“A conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon the sufficient proof that the offender actually desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.”

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Higgins · filed 2005-04-01

However, to support a conviction of attempted armed robbery, the state must prove the defendant, having the specific intent to commit the armed robbery, did or omitted "an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object." See La. R.S. 14:27. The state's conviction rests on the testimony of Wanda Brown, and a detailed examination of her testimony, in conjunction with the physical evidence, reveals that no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing took place during an attempted armed robbery.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Taylor · filed 2005-04-06

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27. Thus, in this case, the State was required to prove that Taylor had the specific intent to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute it and that he did an act or omitted to do an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime, and treats an attempt as a separate lesser grade for which a defendant may be convicted even when the intended crime was completed.

State v. Jones · filed 2005-04-26(A), (C)

An attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27, which provides in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. .... C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. To prove an attempt, the State must show that the defendant committed an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of his intent to possess cocaine. State v. Lee, 03-901, p. 7 (La.App. 5th Cir.12/9/03), 864 So.2d 654, 659. Possession of cocaine is a general intent crime. Sylvia, 01-1406 at 9, 845 So.2d at 364. However, an attempt requires specific intent to commit the crime. See: Id. at ftnt. 1.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its commission; mere preparation is insufficient, and it does not matter whether the intended crime could actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Ordodi · filed 2005-11-02(A), (B)(1), (C)

With regard to the elements of the offense of an attempt to commit the intended crime, La.R.S. 14:27(A) provides: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Additionally, “[m]ere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(B)(1). ... Considering the decisions in Stone, 615 So.2d 38, and Young, 800 So.2d 847, we do not find that these acts were sufficient to be construed as constituting a specific intent. However, assuming they were, we would still reach the same decision, as none of these acts were in furtherance of the offense but were acts in mere preparation. Acts in furtherance of the offense of armed robbery require more than that which is before us in this case.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Jones · filed 2006-11-21

La. R.S. 14:27 defines an attempt, in pertinent part, as occurring when a person, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, it being immaterial whether he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The fact that his attempt to tamper with the evidence backfired does not mean he did not have the specific intent to commit obstruction of justice, and the act of moving the marijuana was from his pocket to the ground, and thus out of his physical possession, fits the element of movement of evidence, and thus was an act in furtherance of the crime.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Browhow · filed 2006-12-13(A)

A conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. ... However, whether or not such pain or suffering was actually proven is not relevant to whether the evidence supports a conviction for attempted cruelty to the infirm. The evidence need only be sufficient to prove that the defendant actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow her act or failure to act and that she committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of that object.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment for an attempt conviction.

State v. Jones · filed 2008-02-20(A)

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as having specific intent to commit a crime and doing or omitting an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Tyrone Smith · filed 2008-05-28

An attempt to commit a crime occurs when “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27. Thus, attempted second degree murder occurs when the defendant intends to commit a second degree murder and acts to kill a human being. La.R.S. 14:30.1.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt require specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the intended crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Jones · filed 2008-06-03(A)

"Attempt" is defined in La. R.S. 14:27 as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) requires an act that tends directly toward accomplishing the intended offense; jumping into a vehicle without taking control did not meet that requirement.

State of Louisiana v. Harold Dewayne Baylor, Sr. · filed 2008-11-26(A)

The evidence fails to disclose a “taking.” The Defendant simply jumped head first into the open passenger window of a vehicle being driven by the alleged victim, Mr. Butler. The Defendant never took control of the car. How could he commandeer the car when his feet were still hanging out of the window? No rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that this act tended “directly toward the accomplishing” of carjacking. See La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; the target crime need not actually be completed.

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS H. O.,aka J. O., AKA H. B.,aka H. B. · filed 2012-03-07

The attempt statute provides that “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.”

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime is completed.

State of Louisiana v. Kato · filed 2013-05-15(A)

Unlike Goodley, the present case involves an attempted armed robbery. Attempt is governed by La.R.S. 14:27(A), which states, Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.[1] The facts demonstrated through the testimony of Rogers show that Defendant had the requisite intent and committed acts in furtherance of the offense.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not have been completed.

State v. Kato · filed 2013-05-15(A)

Attempt is governed by La.R.S. 14:27(A), which states, ... Is Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... The facts demonstrated through the testimony of Rogers show that Defendant had the requisite intent and committed acts in furtherance of the offense.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime is not completed.

State of Louisiana v. Craig · filed 2013-10-09(A)

Attempt is defined by La.R.S. 14:27(A): Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... As the State points out, the evidence demonstrates acts in furtherance of attempted armed robbery and, thus, the corpus delicti of that crime. Defendant had removed the victim‟s firearms from a gun cabinet, loaded them, and strategically placed them in various locations in the house before the victim came home. ... Defendant fled after his shot missed the victim. However, his actions up to that point constituted acts in furtherance of an armed robbery.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it; an attempted forcible rape is complete for attempt purposes even if the victim's resistance prevents the completed rape.

State v. Alexander · filed 2015-09-18(A)

To support a conviction for attempted forcible rape, the State must prove the defendant had the specific intent to commit forcible rape and that he did an act for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, the accomplishing of his objective. See La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:42.1; State v. Dorsey, 30,683 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/98), 718 So.2d 466, 471, writ denied, 98-2227 (La.12/18/98), 732 So.2d 54.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; actual completion is immaterial.

State v. Hartford · filed 2015-03-18A

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission undertaken for and tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

State of Louisiana v. Isiah Demon Lively · filed 2014-02-12(A)

A person attempts a crime when he, ―having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object[.]‖ La.R.S. 14:27(A).

An attempt requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion is immaterial.

State of Louisiana v. Kendall Barnes Derrick Groves · filed 2021-06-10(A)

Under La. R.S. 14:27(A), “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.”

Section 14:27(A) treats an act directed toward carrying out a crime as an attempt even if the offender would not actually accomplish the crime.

State of Louisiana v. El Jerico Jermiah Bartie · filed 2022-11-16(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... La.R.S. 14:27(A) (emphasis added). In a light viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence supports a finding by the jury that he had the specific intent to kill all officers within range, including Deputy Chief Fondel and Lieutenant McCollough.

Section 14:27(A) requires an act tending directly toward the crime; asking for oral sex and lying in an empty bed, without further action, do not satisfy that requirement.

State v. Smith · filed 1994-11-09(A)

Therefore, based upon the Baxley analysis of the relation between solicitation and attempt, defendant Smith’s actions were not sufficient to constitute an “act” within the meaning of La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27(D)(3)'s requirement that an attempt be punished "in the same manner" as the completed offense carries forward the completed offense's restrictions on probation, parole, and suspension of sentence when those restrictions apply to the entire sentencing range, even though the attempt statute limits the term and eliminates the minimum.

State of Louisiana v. Everett · filed 2005-11-02(D)(3)

Likewise, we find that a “realistic and genuine construction” of the two articles in the present case, La.R.S. 14:95.1(B) and La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), requires a person convicted of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon to be imprisoned without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(l)(a) requires the sentence for attempted first degree murder to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Ford · filed 2007-05-09(D)(l)(a)

The jurisdiction check in this appeal reveals that the trial court failed to impose the sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a) and La. R.S. 14:30(C). ... The applicable sentencing statutes mandate that the entire sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; thus, there is no issue of an indeterminate sentence.

Section 14:27 requires a sentence for attempted second degree murder to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Jackson · filed 2019-10-16

La. R.S. 14: 30.1. and La. R.S. 14:27 require that a person convicted of attempted second degree murder serve the sentence imposed without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The trial court failed to impose these restrictions at the sentencing hearing held on December 18, 2018. These restrictions are automatically contained in the sentence whether or not imposed by the sentencing court. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A); State v. Dominick, 2013-0121, p. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/20/13), 129 So.3d 782, 787. Accordingly, those errors patent are self-correcting. See State v. Klein, 2018-0022, p.12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/22/18), 252 So.3d 973, 981.

Section 14:27 limited the maximum sentence for the attempted offense here to two and one-half years’ imprisonment, with or without hard labor.

State v. F.A.R. · filed 1991-01-11

Under the law applicable at the time of the offenses, the crime of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile carried a maximum penalty of two and one-half years’ imprisonment, with or without hard labor.

Section 14:27 sets the sentencing range for an attempt at one-half of the maximum penalty for the completed offense.

State v. Crooks · filed 1991-05-22

The statutory sentencing range for attempt is one-half the maximum penalty for the principal offense. La.R.S. 14:27. Therefore, defendant faced a possible sentence of not less than two and one-half nor more than fifteen years at hard labor, and a discretionary fine of not more than $7,500 on the attempted distribution of marijuana conviction.

Section 14:27(D)(1) sets a maximum penalty of fifty years at hard labor for an attempt to commit first degree murder.

State v. Arbuthnot · filed 1993-10-15(D)(1)

The penalty for attempted first degree murder is imprisonment at hard labor for not more than fifty years.

Section 14:27 limits the penalty for an attempt to no more than one-half of the maximum term for the completed offense.

State v. Landry · filed 1994-08-17

False imprisonment with a dangerous weapon provides for maximum sentence of ten years with or without hard labor. La.R.S. 14:46.1. An attempt is punishable by up to one-half of that term, or a maximum of five years with or without hard labor. La.R.S. 14:27. Thus, the appellant received the maximum statutory sentence.

Section 14:27 limits the maximum sentence for an attempted crime to one-half of the maximum sentence for the completed crime; thus, attempted armed robbery has a 49½-year maximum when armed robbery carries a 99-year maximum.

State v. Labostrie · filed 1997-11-19

However, because the maximum sentence for armed robbery is ninety-nine years, the maximum sentence for attempt armed robbery is forty-nine and one-half years. See La. R.S. 14:27; 14:64. Thus, the trial court exceeded the maximum sentence for count three, and that sentence is hereby amended from fifty years to forty-nine and one-half years.

Section 14:27 limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the largest fine or longest imprisonment term prescribed for the attempted offense.

State v. Cooley · filed 1999-11-17

La. R.S. 14:27 provides that a person convicted of an attempt "shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted or both." Under La. R.S. 14:64.1, the longest term of imprisonment for a person convicted of first degree robbery is forty years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Thus, the trial court's sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence on the defendant's conviction for attempted first degree robbery is illegally excessive.

Section 14:27 limits the maximum penalty for an attempt to one-half of the penalty prescribed for the completed crime.

State v. Holmes · filed 2000-02-18

Under La. R.S. 14:27, the maximum penalty for attempt of a crime in this category is one-half the penalty for the crime, which in this instance would be twenty years imprisonment at hard labor.

Section 14:27 sets the maximum sentence for attempted carjacking at ten years, before any applicable habitual-offender enhancement.

State v. Kirkling · filed 2005-05-18

The maximum sentence for attempted carjacking is ten years. La. R.S. 14:64.2 and La. R.S. 14:27. The applicable penalty for a second offender is imprisonment “for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.” La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(a). Thus, the statutory sentencing range as to count one is five to twenty years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the fine or imprisonment for an attempted offense to one-half of the largest fine or longest imprisonment prescribed for the offense attempted.

State v. Alverez · filed 2014-12-23(D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that a person convicted of attempt “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted” and “such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest 121fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Consequently, upon his conviction for attempted aggravated incest, the defendant faced the penalty of a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for a term not more than ten years.

Section 14:27(D)(3) capped the penalty for attempted cruelty to the infirm at five years at hard labor because the completed offense carried a ten-year maximum.

State of Louisiana v. LaFleur · filed 2025-11-19(D)(3)

Cruelty to the infirm, La. R.S. 14:93.3(E)(1), provides a sentence of up to ten years, with or without hard labor, with at least one year of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when the act of cruelty to persons with infirmities was intentional and malicious. As LaFleur was found guilty of attempted cruelty to the infirm, the maximum penalty allowed at the time of the offense would have been five years at hard labor. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

Under the 1976 version of § 14:27, attempted forcible rape carried a maximum sentence of ten years, half the maximum for forcible rape.

Underwood v. Blackburn · filed 1983-05-17

Thus, the maximum penalty for an attempt to commit forcible rape in 1976 was one-half of twenty, or ten years imprisonment.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for an attempted offense to one-half of the longest term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Bell · filed 2012-06-06(D)(3)

Accordingly, the maximum sentence of incarceration Defendant could have received in this case was twenty years for the crime of attempted manslaughter, which was the sentence imposed on him.

Section 14:27(D)(1) authorizes a sentence of up to 50 years at hard labor when the attempted offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Pyke · filed 1996-03-06(D)(1)

La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1) provides "[i]f the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifty years". Defendant was sentenced to fifty (50) years at hard labor, the maximum sentence provided by law.

For an attempted crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, Section 14:27 provides a sentence of ten to fifty years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. King · filed 1997-04-02

The attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27, provides that crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment shall be punishable by not less than ten nor more than fifty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

For an attempt to commit an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, Section 14:27(D)(1) requires a 10-to-50-year hard-labor sentence without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, including when the sentence is enhanced under the habitual-offender law.

State v. Rowell · filed 1999-02-10(D)(1)

Additionally, the statutory sentencing provision for an attempt to commit a crime provides that the attempt shall be punished as follows: "If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence[.]" La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1). ... After all is said and done, although this defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, the penalty provisions of the underlying offense (by La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30) are the reference provisions on which the penalty increase is calculated. ... Ergo, recognizing our jurisprudential guidelines and our Louisiana Supreme Court's analysis, we conclude the defendant's sentence as a second felony offender for attempted first degree murder should have denied him parole eligibility, which it did not.

Section 14:27(D)(1) requires an attempt to commit an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment to be punished by 10 to 50 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Jones · filed 2000-03-08(D)(1)

La.R.S. 14:27(D) provides that "[w]hoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished as follows": (1) If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; The trial judge sentenced Defendant to serve forty years at hard labor on each count without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence to run concurrently with each other and with the ten year sentence Defendant is currently serving.

For an attempted offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, § 14:27(D)(1) requires a sentence of 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Evans · filed 2003-12-09(D)(1)

Finally, the defendant's sentence for attempted aggravated rape is illegally lenient, because the trial court failed to specify that the sentence would be without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, as required by La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1). [6] This Court need make no correction to this error, however, because the self-activating provisions of La.R.S. 15:301.1(A) will cause the defendant's sentence to be served without benefits.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) provides a sentence of 10 to 50 years at hard labor, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for an attempted offense otherwise punishable by death or life imprisonment.

State v. Johnson · filed 2010-07-29(D)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 14:27 D(1)(a) states that anyone convicted of the attempted commission of an offense that would otherwise be punishable by death or life imprisonment shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty year without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

When the attempted offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment, § 14:27(D)(1)(a) authorizes imprisonment at hard labor for ten to fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Morris · filed 2011-05-04(D)(1)(a)

Under La.R.S. 14:27, which addresses punishment for attempted crimes, “[i]f the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, [the defendant] shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a) (emphasis added).

Section 14:27(D)(l)(a) requires an attempted offense punishable by life imprisonment to receive 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Marlowe · filed 2011-12-22(D)(l)(a)

La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that if the offense attempted is punishable by life imprisonment, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 sets a ten-to-fifty-year hard-labor sentence without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence when the attempted offense is punishable by life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana v. Hamilton · filed 2013-11-20

Additionally, La.R.S. 14:27 provided that if the offense attempted was punishable by life imprisonment, as in this case, the penalty was ten to fifty years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Subsection (D)(1)(a) requires an attempted offense punishable by death or life imprisonment to be sentenced at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Mosley · filed 2017-06-21(D)(1)(a)

If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) requires the entire sentence for an attempted offense punishable by life imprisonment to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Carter · filed 2018-04-11(D)(1)(a)

By operation of law, the trial court was required to impose Carter's entire 20-year sentence without benefits. Consequently, we amend the sentence to 20 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27, together with § 14:60, does not authorize imposing a sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Walker · filed 1991-03-13

The judge did not have the authority under La.R.S. 14:60 and 14:27 to impose a sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) requires an attempted offense punishable by death or life imprisonment to be sentenced without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana Versus Dartanya O. Spottsville AKA "Lo" · filed 2024-10-30(D)(1)(a)

The sentence on Count 3, attempted second degree murder (La. R.S. 14:30.1, 14:27), was imposed without restrictions on probation, parole or suspension of sentence, as required under R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a).

Section 14:27 requires an attempted armed-robbery sentence to be served without benefits when read with the armed-robbery statute, so omission of that restriction from the sentence is harmless and self-correcting.

State of Louisiana v. Powell · filed 2023-03-01

La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:64 statutorily mandate that the attempted armed robbery sentence be served without benefits, and the trial court’s failure to declare the sentence be served with restricted benefits is harmless and self-correcting.

Section 14:27 provides that an attempt is punished in the same manner as the offense attempted, but the fine or imprisonment may not exceed one-half of the maximum prescribed for that offense; it does not authorize restricting benefits for attempted manslaughter.

State of Louisiana v. Jackson · filed 2021-11-17(D)(3)

La. R.S. 14:27 states, in pertinent part: “D. Whoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished as follows: (3) In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” ... Although this sentence is within the range prescribed by La. R.S. 14:31 and 14:27, those statutes do not reflect that a defendant may be sentenced to attempted manslaughter with a restriction of benefits.

Section 14:27 does not require a sentence for attempted manslaughter to be imposed without parole, probation, or other benefits.

State v. Lambert · filed 2018-05-23(A)

The sentencing transcript shows that the trial court did not restrict any benefits as to that sentence, and La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:31 do not require any restriction of benefits.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires a sentence for the attempted offense to include ineligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Lindsey · filed 1991-06-27(D)(3)

[3] We note patent sentencing error. Although the trial court properly imposed sentence on Count 2 without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, the sentence for Count 3 merely provided for imprisonment at hard labor for a period of five years. This sentence also should have included ineligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) and 95.1(B).

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempt to no more than one-half of the longest imprisonment prescribed for the offense attempted.

State v. Planco · filed 1997-03-26(D)(3)

La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) states, "[i]n all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both."

Section 14:27 limits the sentence for an attempted offense to one-half of the maximum sentence authorized for the completed offense.

State v. Jefferson · filed 2003-01-29

These sentences were within the statutory limits of La. R.S. 14:65, and one-half the statutory limit of La. R.S. 14:95.1, as required by the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 punishes an attempt in the same manner as the completed offense, but limits imprisonment to one-half of the longest term prescribed for that offense and does not impose an express minimum sentence for an attempt.

State v. Latin · filed 2007-06-20

When a defendant is convicted of an attempted offense, the punishment is "in the same manner as for the offense attempted," but the term of imprisonment shall not exceed "one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted." La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 40:979. There is no express statutory minimum sentence for being convicted of an attempt, and principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed. State v. Callahan, 95-1331 (La.3/29/96), 671 So.2d 903. The language in the attempt statutes of La. R.S. 14:27 and 40:979 is now virtually identical. Therefore, under either statute, the reasoning of State v. Callahan, supra , applies and there is no longer a mandatory minimum sentence for an attempt.

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits an attempted offense to one-half of the maximum imprisonment for the completed offense and provides no statutory mandatory minimum for an attempted offense.

State v. Robinson · filed 2008-04-15(D)(3)

"The maximum sentence the defendant could receive for attempted armed robbery was imprisonment at hard labor for not more than 49½ years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. LSA-R.S. 14:64(B) and LSA-R.S. 14:27(D)(3). ... There is no statutory mandatory minimum sentence in cases involving attempted offenses under La. R.S. 14:27."

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its commission; § 14:27(D)(3) limits imprisonment for an attempt to no more than half the maximum term prescribed for the completed offense.

State of Louisiana v. T. V. · filed 2008-10-01(A), (D)(3)

“Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended . . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(A). “In order to commit attempted forcible rape, the offender must actively desire to commit rape by preventing the victim from resisting the act by force or threats where the victim may reasonably believe that such resistance would not prevent the rape. A conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon the sufficient proof that the offender actually desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. Specific intent is a state of mind and, as such, need not be proven as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances and actions of the accused. Furthermore, specific intent is a legal conclusion ultimately to be resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Voorhies, 590 So.2d 776, 778 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991).

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits punishment for an attempted offense to no more than one-half of the largest fine or longest imprisonment prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. TV · filed 2008-10-01(D)(3)

"A defendant convicted of attempting an offense "shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Thus, Defendant's ten-year sentence is a mid-range penalty for attempted forcible rape. Based on the facts of the instant case and the findings by the trial court, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to ten years at hard labor.

Section 14:27 limits the fine or imprisonment for an attempted offense to no more than one-half of the greatest punishment prescribed for the completed offense and has no express minimum sentence.

State v. Shaw · filed 2009-06-24

A defendant who is convicted of an attempted offense shall be fined or imprisoned in the same manner as for the offense attempted, but such fine or term of imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the greatest punishment prescribed for the completed offense. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 40:979. There is no express statutory minimum sentence for being convicted of an attempt, and principles of lenity require that the statute be strictly construed.

Under § 14:27(D)(3), an attempted offense carries the same sentencing restrictions as the completed offense, subject to the statute’s one-half maximum limits.

State v. Beaulieu · filed 2013-08-07(D)(3)

Similarly, a “realistic and genuine construction” of the two articles in the present case, La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) and La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), requires a person convicted of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon to be imprisoned without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a ten-to-fifty-year hard-labor sentencing range without parole, probation, or suspension for an attempt to commit a crime punishable by life imprisonment, including attempted second degree murder.

State v. Hughes · filed 2014-11-25(D)(1)(a)

Defendant’s conviction for attempted second degree murder is punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years nor more than fifty years without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(i )(a). Therefore, defendant’s sentence for attempted second degree murder, although the maximum sentence allowed under the law, was within the applicable. sentencing range.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) sets a 10-to-50-year hard-labor sentencing range, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for the attempted offense at issue.

State v. Harper · filed 2018-08-15(D)(1)(a)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), Defendant faced a sentencing range of 10 to 50 years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(b) requires 20 to 50 years at hard labor without benefits for attempted murder of a peace officer, while § 14:27(D)(3) limits attempted-manslaughter punishment to one-half of the punishment prescribed for manslaughter.

State of Louisiana v. Wright · filed 2019-12-18(D)(1)(b), (D)(3)

Under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(b), a defendant convicted of attempted murder against a peace officer “shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than twenty nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” ... Additionally, under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), a defendant convicted of attempted manslaughter “shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Under La.R.S. 14:31(B), “Whoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years.” Accordingly, the twenty-year sentences Defendant received for his two attempted manslaughter sentences were maximum sentences.

Section 14:27(D)(1)(a) supplies the sentencing range for an attempt, including a first-offense attempt to commit second degree murder when read with § 14:30.1(B).

State of Louisiana v. Smith · filed 2023-11-08(D)(1)(a)

The sentence for a first offense attempted second degree murder was not less than ten nor more than 50 years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a); La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).

Section 14:27, as applied with § 14:62.3, requires proof that the defendant attempted an intentional unauthorized entry into an inhabited dwelling.

State v. Kelly · filed 1992-02-25

In order to convict the defendant in the instant case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant attempted the intentional entry without authorization into an inhabited dwelling or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by a person. La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:62.3. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant attempted to intentionally enter the Elder home without authorization. We find no merit to these assignments of error.

Section 14:27(B) provides that mere preparation is not enough for an attempt; the defendant must commit an overt act tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime.

State in Interest of AG · filed 1993-12-30(B)

Mere preparation to commit a crime is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. La.R.S. 14:27(B). Specific intent is not the only element of an attempt crime. There must be an overt act by the defendant tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. R.S. 14:27, Reporter's Comment.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing a specifically intended crime, and provides that mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Smith · filed 1995-10-16(A), (B)

Defendant's acts of entering the room, lying on the bed and requesting his son to sit on his chest tended directly toward the commission of an aggravated crime against nature and were more than mere preparation.

Section 14:27 is satisfied when the defendant's acts go beyond mere preparation and tend directly toward committing the intended offense, even if the crime is interrupted before completion.

State v. Frazier · filed 2003-04-09

These acts are more than mere preparation; they tend directly toward the taking of anything of value belonging to another, from the person of another or her immediate control, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon. The evidence is sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Frazier of attempted armed robbery.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent plus an act tending directly toward committing the crime; mere preparation, including a solicitation or question unaccompanied by further action, is insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Peloquin · filed 2004-11-17(A), (B)(1)

There was no testimony that Defendant did an act in furtherance of revealing his penis to K.P. The question was preparatory and not an overt act similar to that in Baxley. Therefore, the evidence did not prove Defendant’s acts constituted an attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile.

Section 14:27(A) treats conduct as an attempt when a person with specific criminal intent performs an act that directly tends toward completing the crime, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Montecino · filed 2005-02-11(A)

Thus, the defendant committed several overt acts tending directly toward the accomplishment of the murder of Wekawitz. The acts outlined above constitute more than mere preparation. The State presented sufficient evidence that the defendant had the specific intent to kill Wekawitz, offered something of value to someone else to handle the commission of the murder, and performed acts that tended directly towards the accomplishing of his object. It is immaterial whether, under the circumstances, the defendant's purpose would have actually been accomplished.

An attempt requires specific intent plus an act or omission tending directly toward the crime; mere preparation is insufficient, certain predatory acts can suffice, and attempt is a separate lesser grade of the intended crime.

State v. Houston · filed 2006-03-10(A), (B), and (C)

An attempt requires both "specific intent to commit a crime" and an act or omission "for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object." La. R.S. 14:27 A. Mere preparation to commit the crime is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. La. R.S. 14:27 B. On the other hand, a predatory act such as lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime shall be sufficient to show attempt to commit the offense. Id. ... These predatory actions constitute more than mere preparation to commit the crime. They exhibit his intent to commit the crime and, given the totality of the circumstances, we find they constitute the crime of attempt. ... "An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt." La. R.S. 14:27(C). (Emphasis added.).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as a specific-intent crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its completion, while treating searching for an intended victim with a dangerous weapon as sufficient and mere preparation as insufficient.

State v. Ordodi · filed 2006-11-29(A), (B)(1)

The attempt statute itself makes a distinction between actions which are "mere preparation," which are not sufficient to support a finding of an attempt, and an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, which is an essential element of the attempt statute. "Preparation" has been "generally defined as the devising or arranging of the means necessary for the commission of the crime." State v. Pollard, 215 La. 655, 666, 41 So.2d 465, 468 (La.1949). The difference between mere preparation and an overt act is not precisely defined.

Section 14:27 requires both specific intent and an act tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime; mere preparation or solicitation alone is insufficient.

State v. JVF · filed 2010-10-06(A), (B)(1)

The two key elements of an attempt are (1) specific intent to commit the offense, and (2) an act toward accomplishing that offense. La.R.S. 14:27. ... However sickening Defendant's actions were, mere propositioning, without anything further, does not constitute an act toward accomplishing that offense and, therefore, does not constitute an attempt. ... Solicitation alone is insufficient. Consequently, Defendant's conviction of attempted aggravated rape is vacated.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent and an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward completing the crime; in the context of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile, a verbal sexual request may satisfy the overt-act requirement.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-09-07

While a physical overt act is generally required to constitute an attempt for most crimes, that is not necessarily so in the context of La. R.S. 14:81(A).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as acting with specific intent toward committing a crime, while mere preparation ordinarily is insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Deontay Deshun Hardy · filed 2022-07-13A; B(1)

Regarding Defendant’s conviction for attempted armed robbery, the supreme court has previously stated in State v. Ordodi, 06-207, pp. 10-11 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660: ... In order to prove that Ordodi was guilty of attempted armed robbery, the state had to prove the elements set forth in La. R.S. 14:64 and La. R.S. 14:27, which provide in pertinent part: ... § 27. Attempt ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... B. (1) Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. ... Considering the above and after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was one of the individuals who robbed Mr. Smith and attempted to rob Southern Classic and Mrs. Smith. Therefore, we find no merit to the assignments of error that there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant.

Section 14:27 treats conduct as an attempt when the defendant acts for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the intended crime, and whether conduct is an overt act is determined from the totality of the circumstances.

State of Louisana Versus Dan Robertson · filed 2023-03-29(A)

Additionally, attempted simple burglary requires proof that the defendant did or omitted an act “for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object,” sometimes referred to as an “overt act.” La. R.S. 14:27 A and comments thereto; State v. Ordodi, 06-207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 661. In determining whether the action of defendant constitutes an overt act which is an attempt, the totality of the facts and circumstances presented by each case must be evaluated. Id. at 662. ... In finding defendant guilty of attempted simple burglary of Mr. Brown’s vehicle, the jury could have reasonably inferred from its review of the surveillance footage that defendant’s act of pulling on the locked door handle of the vehicle with his bandana was an overt act establishing a specific intent tending toward the commission of a felony or a theft therein. See State in Interest of D.B., 22-28 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/29/22), 2022 WL 3010210 (unpublished opinion; not designated for publication),12 and State in Interest of E.M., supra, (both cases holding that the juvenile’s pulling on car door handles was an overt act tending toward committing a theft or felony in the vehicles at issue).