La. Stat. Ann. § 14:27

Section 14:27(D)(3) limits the fine or imprisonment for an attempt to half the maximum prescribed for the attempted offense.

State v. Wallace · filed 2013-02-21(D)(3)

Accordingly, defendant was eligible for no more than five years at hard labor and a fíne of no more than five thousand dollars.

Section 14:27 makes attempted simple burglary punishable by up to six years of confinement, with parole, probation, and suspension of sentence available.

State v. Phillips · filed 1982-04-05

By plea bargain with the State, the original charge was amended to attempted simple burglary in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 62, which carries a maximum sentence of confinement with or without hard labor for a term not to exceed six years, and is subject to parole, probation and suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent plus an act or omission tending toward accomplishing the intended crime; mere preparation is insufficient, and actual completion is immaterial.

State v. Simmons · filed 1982-11-05

Under the Louisiana attempt statute, R.S. 14:27, mere preparation is not sufficient; however, an attempt conviction is possible if one, having the necessary specific intent, "does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending toward the accomplishing of his object ... and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose."

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission purposefully tending directly toward its completion.

State v. Allen · filed 1983-04-22

A person is guilty of an "attempt" to commit a crime if, "having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object ..." La.R.S. 14:27. ... After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This assignment lacks merit.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt require specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion of the crime is immaterial.

State v. Anderson · filed 1983-10-12(A)

An attempt has been legislatively designated in La.R.S. 14:27(A) as follows: "Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose."

Section 14:27 requires proof of an act or omission done for the purpose of, or tending directly toward, accomplishing the underlying offense.

State v. Dunn · filed 1984-02-21

An attempt to commit the offense requires proof of an act or omission for the purpose of or tending directly toward the accomplishment of the offense. La.R.S. 14:27. ... On the basis of the evidence presented, even when reviewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could not conclude that the essential element of an attempt to have or share control or dominion over the drug by defendant was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an overt act tending directly toward its accomplishment; the State need not prove every completed-crime element.

State v. Hunter · filed 1984-06-06

An attempt requires specific intent to commit the crime and an overt act tending directly toward the accomplishment of that crime. R.S. 14:27. Although the State need not prove every element of the crime, the State does have the burden of proving specific intent to commit the charged crime. ... Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. R.S. 14:10, 14:27.

For attempts governed by § 14:27(D)(3), sentencing is in the same manner as for the offense attempted, including the completed offense's conditions on probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, subject to the statute's one-half limits.

State v. Napoli · filed 1983-02-22(D)(3)

La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) is applicable in the instant case and provides as follows: [6] "In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." (Emphasis added). The offenses attempted in the instant case require that all or a portion of the sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. If the defendant is to be sentenced "in the same manner as for the offense attempted", such sentence must include the same conditions as the sentences for the offenses originally charged. See, for example, State v. Lensey, 333 So.2d 645 (La.1976).

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires an attempt to be punished in the same manner as the completed offense, including the completed offense's parole, probation, and suspension-of-sentence restrictions.

State v. Palmer · filed 1984-03-07(D)(3)

The present sentence falls under the guidelines of La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) which provides for sentencing in the "same manner as for the offense attempted." ... By sentencing defendants "in the same manner as for the offense attempted" the Court correctly imposed the same conditions on the defendants' sentences for the attempted conviction as would be imposed for the completed offense. This condition in the statute comprises part of the sentence mandated for the offense of armed robbery.

For attempted armed robbery, Subsection (D)(3) limits the sentence to no more than one-half of the maximum sentence for the completed offense and imposes no statutory mandatory minimum.

State v. Burford · filed 2005-05-11(D)(3)

In this case, the crime was attempted armed robbery. Attempted armed robbery carries a sentence not longer than half the maximum sentence permitted for the completed crime. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). In this instance, then, the maximum sentence that the Burfords could have been sentenced is 49½ years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. There is no statutory mandatory minimum sentence in cases involving attempted offenses under La. R.S. 14:27.

Subsection (D)(3) does not require a minimum penalty for an attempted offense even when the completed offense carries a mandatory minimum.

State v. Chandler · filed 2010-05-05(D)(3)

“[T]he language of La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) (the attempt statute) does not require a minimum penalty even though one is required for the completed offense.”

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, while § 14:27(C) permits conviction for an attempt even when the intended crime was actually perpetrated.

State ex rel. W.H. · filed 2011-04-06(A), (C)

“Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” |4 La. R.S. 14:27 A. And “it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” Id. Additionally, “any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime attempted or intended was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.” La. R.S. 14:27 C; see also La. C.Cr.P. ART. 814(43); see also State v. Little, 01-2218, p. 1 (La.3/28/02), 814 So.2d 547, 548.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant committed an act with the specific intent to kill multiple victims but did not ultimately succeed in killing them to establish attempted first-degree murder.

In re State in Interest of J.S. · filed 2018-12-21

Similarly, to prove attempted first degree murder, the State must show that the defendant committed an act with the specific intent to kill multiple victims, but did not ultimately succeed in killing them.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt.

State of Louisiana v. Monteco K. Frost · filed 2020-03-04

La. R.S. 14:27 defines an attempted offense as occurring when any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires a person convicted of attempted armed robbery to be sentenced at hard labor and without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, with imprisonment not exceeding half the maximum term for armed robbery.

State Ex Rel. Sullivan v. Maggio · filed 1983-05-23(D)(3)

Specifically, the question is whether the language of the third penalty clause, section D(3), providing for punishment "in the same manner as for the offense attempted" means that a person who attempts armed robbery shall be sentenced without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... Giving the criminal attempt article a genuine rather than a strict interpretation, a person convicted of attempted armed robbery must be imprisoned "at hard labor" and "without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence." ... A realistic and genuine construction of the two provisions requires that persons who attempt armed robbery shall be punished at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. ... Accordingly, we adhere to the statutory interpretation announced in Patterson and hold that a person adjudged guilty of attempted armed robbery must be imprisoned at hard labor and without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:27(D)(1) authorizes a sentence of up to fifty years at hard labor for attempted second degree murder.

State v. Shields · filed 1983-12-22(D)(1)

The authorized sentence for a defendant convicted of attempted second degree murder is imprisonment at hard labor for not more than fifty years. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1); La. R.S. 14:30.1; State v. Cavazos, 422 So.2d 417 (La.1982).

Subsection (D)(1) authorizes a maximum sentence of 50 years at hard labor for attempted first degree murder; two concurrent 20-year sentences are within the statutory limits.

State v. Brogan · filed 1984-07-25(D)(1)

The maximum penalty for attempted first degree murder is 50 years imprisonment at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1). Defendant was exposed to a penalty of 100 years at hard labor. The concurrent sentences of 20 years on each count is well within the statutory limits.

Section 14:27(D)(3) requires an attempt sentence to be imposed in the same manner as for the attempted offense, capped at one-half of that offense's longest prescribed imprisonment term.

State v. McCoy · filed 1984-05-10(D)(3)

Because McCoy was convicted of an attempt to commit the offense of which he was accused, the permissible range of sentencing in his case is controlled by La.R.S. 14:27, subd. D (3). That statute provides in part that those convicted of certain crimes, including attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling; "... shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term or imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both."

Section 14:27 treats an offender’s acts as sufficient to constitute an attempt when the offender is searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon.

State v. Andrews · filed 1984-06-27

It is interesting to note that defendant, when he armed himself with a dangerous weapon and set out in search of the two intended victims with a specific murderous intent toward both, was clearly guilty under La.R.S. 14:27 of attempted first degree murder of each brother, even if he had not found either. La.R.S. 14:27 provides that the offender's acts are "sufficient to constitute an attempt" if the offender is "searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon".

Section 14:27 provides that completion of the attempted offense is no defense to an attempt charge.

State v. Walters · filed 1983-10-17

Moreover, La.R.S. 14:27 (the attempt statute) expressly provides that it is no defense to an attempt charge that the offense was actually completed.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent for an attempt, and the attempt is complete when the defendant performs an act tending directly toward the intended crime even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Fredenburg · filed 1983-11-29

From the foregoing, it is obvious that specific intent is an essential element of attempted armed robbery.

Section 14:27 defines attempt as doing or omitting an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the completed crime, and limits the penalty for attempted armed robbery to no more than one-half of the maximum term for armed robbery.

State v. Johnson · filed 1985-03-12D(3)

Attempted armed robbery is comprised of the following elements: (1) the specific intent to take something of value (2) from another person (3) using force or intimidation (4) armed with a dangerous weapon and (5) the perpetrator further "does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward" robbery. LSA-R.S. 14:27. ... La.R.S. 14:27 D(3) provides that the penalty for attempted armed robbery cannot exceed one-half of the maximum term for armed robbery. Thus, the maximum possible sentence on the attempted armed robbery charge is 49½ years.

Section 14:27 does not prohibit probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for a sentence imposed for attempted simple robbery.

State v. Dean · filed 2001-03-14

However, La.R.S. 14:65 and La.R.S. 14:27 do not prohibit the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of | ^sentence upon a sentence imposed for attempted simple robbery.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act tending directly toward its commission.

State of Louisiana v. Jeter · filed 2010-04-07(A)

Defendant’s actions indicated he desired to have sexual intercourse with the victim and he used force in an attempt to accomplish the act.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent and an act tending directly toward committing the intended crime, beyond mere preparation, for an attempt, and limits an attempt's punishment to no more than one-half of the underlying offense's maximum fine or imprisonment term.

State of Louisiana v. David Billy Parker, Jr. · filed 2018-05-30(A), (B)(1), (D)(3)

An “attempt” to commit a crime is defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A), which provides: ... Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... However, “[m]ere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt[.]” La.R.S. 14:27(B)(1). ... La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) provides that the penalty for an attempt “shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Therefore, the defendant was subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years and a maximum fine of five thousand dollars.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Bessard · filed 1984-12-12(A)

In summary, considering the evidence presented at trial in the instant case, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that by grabbing the revolver and attempting to shoot Officer Curtsinger, the defendant not only committed an overt act tending directly toward the attempted murder of Officer Curtsinger, but also had the specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act toward accomplishing it.

State v. Coleman · filed 1985-05-29

La.R.S. 14:27, the attempt statute, requires the specific intent to commit a crime and an act towards accomplishing that crime.

Section 14:27 requires an overt act tending directly toward commission of the intended crime, along with specific intent; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Dunbar · filed 1985-04-10

According to the comments of La.R.S. 14:27, an attempt requires an overt act, that is an act which tends directly towards the commission of the crime, and which will apparently result in its commission unless frustrated by extraneous circumstances. ... In order to be found guilty of attempted simple burglary, a person must have had the specific intent to enter a structure without authorization, with the specific intent to commit a felony or any theft therein. ... Defendant’s entering the building is more than an act tending directly toward the commission of the crime; it is an essential element of the crime itself.

An attempt requires an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense.

State v. Lowery · filed 1986-06-05

Additionally, an attempt to commit an offense requires proof of an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of the offense. La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the targeted offense and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing that objective; the court applied those requirements to attempted second degree murder.

State v. Blache · filed 1985-02-28

The elements of attempted second degree murder are: ... 1. A specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a human being, and ... 2. An act or omission tending directly toward the accomplishment of that objective. ... See La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an overt act tending toward accomplishing it.

State v. Payton · filed 1986-10-09

The essential elements of attempted murder are: (1.) the specific intent to kill and, (2.) an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Smith · filed 1987-03-04(A)

Attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27, in pertinent part, as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... We believe that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have concluded that the state proved the essential elements of the crimes of aggravated rape and attempted first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 14:27 defines attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward completing the intended offense, and the court applied that requirement to the attempted indecent-behavior convictions.

State v. Reed · filed 1987-07-22(A)

La.R.S. 14:27, attempt, reads in pertinent part: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... To prove an attempted violation of La.R.S. 14:81, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was over the age of 17 at the time of the offense; he committed or attempted to commit a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of or in the presence of a person under the age of 17 with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person; and, appellant was more than two years older than the victim.

Section 14:27(A) requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion need not have been possible.

State v. Eason · filed 1984-12-05(A)

La.R.S. 14:27, in pertinent part, defines attempt as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill the victim or inflict great bodily harm upon her.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime combined with an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Davis · filed 1986-10-14

An attempt occurs when a person ".... having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly towards the accomplishing of his object...." La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target offense, which may be established through the defendant's conduct and surrounding circumstances.

State v. Prudhomme · filed 1986-10-29

The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, amply demonstrates that defendant specifically intended to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon those found at the school yard. ... The actions of defendant and the surrounding circumstances indicated he specifically intended to kill or inflict great bodily harm. The assignment is without merit.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended offense for an attempt conviction.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 1987-05-18

Specific intent to commit the offense is an essential element of the proof necessary to convict an accused of an attempt to commit the offense intended. La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the underlying crime for an attempt conviction.

State v. Fisher · filed 1987-06-19

The defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated rape. The trial judge defined attempt as requiring specific intent and then defined specific intent. The trial judge's instructions were clear. We find no irregularity dictating reversal in the instruction phase of the trial.

Section 14:27 requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant committed an act in furtherance of the intended crime to establish an attempt.

State v. Nelson · filed 1987-11-04

In order to prove attempt under La.R.S. 14:27, the prosecution must show that the defendant committed an act in furtherance of the crime.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime could actually be completed.

State v. Perkins · filed 1987-11-10(A)

An attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A), (B), in pertinent part, as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. B. Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; .... Thus, to be found guilty of attempted simple burglary, a defendant must have a specific intent to make an unauthorized entry of "any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other structure ..." and to commit a felony or any theft therein.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Dean · filed 1988-05-04

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. More specifically, specific intent to kill is an element of the crime of attempted manslaughter. ... Hence, a conviction for an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La.R.S. 14:10 and 14:27. ... The foregoing testimonial evidence leads to the conclusion that a reasonable trier-of-fact could have concluded that the defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill when he approached the victim from behind and plunged a knife into his back.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an overt act tending toward accomplishing it for an attempted second-degree murder conviction.

State v. Holley · filed 1988-06-21

The gravamen of the crime of attempted second degree murder is specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. La.R.S. 14:27 and 30.1; State v. Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184 (La.1984).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an overt act in furtherance of that intent for an attempt.

State v. Carmon · filed 1989-02-08

La.R.S. 14:27 provides that an attempt requires the specific intent to commit the crime coupled with an overt act in furtherance of this goal.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its commission.

State v. Heacox · filed 1989-04-19

"In response, the court essentially reread the statute and informed the jury as follows: "In order to convict the defendant of attempted distribution of marijuana, whether it be second offense, or first offense or attempt to commit one or any other lesser offense ... responsive offense, you must find that the defendant had a specific intent to commit the crime, and that he did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the commission of that crime." ... In the instant case, the trial judge chose to recharge the jury by repeating the statutory definition of attempt and summarizing the meaning of the statute. These instructions represent an accurate statement of the law and did not mislead the jury."

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Lewis · filed 1990-02-15(A)

We find that, viewing the evidence as a whole in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the relator had the specific intent to take something of value from the person of the two victims by the use of force, while armed with a dangerous weapon, and did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that object.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward its commission.

State v. Clay · filed 1991-03-13

To prove an attempted armed robbery, the state must prove that the defendant 1) had a specific intent to commit the crime of armed robbery, and 2) did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the commission of the crime of armed robbery.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit an offense plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Walters · filed 1991-05-30

Attempted armed robbery requires specific intent to commit the offense of armed robbery, combined with an act or omission tending directly towards the accomplishing of the offense. La.R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime plus an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing that crime; completion of the crime is immaterial, and specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. Voorhies · filed 1991-11-13

Attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27 and states in pertinent part: "Any person, who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La.R.S. 14:10(1). In order to commit attempted forcible rape, the offender must actively desire to commit rape by preventing the victim from resisting the act by force or threats where the victim may reasonably believe that such resistance would not prevent the rape. A conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon the sufficient proof that the offender actually desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. Specific intent is a state of mind and, as such, need not be proven as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances and actions of the accused. Furthermore, specific intent is a legal conclusion ultimately to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Volkmann, 539 So.2d 1279 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1989).

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt complete when a person with specific intent performs or omits an act tending directly toward the crime, regardless of whether the crime is actually accomplished; Section 14:27(D)(1) limits punishment for an attempt to commit a life-imprisonment offense to no more than fifty years.

State v. Benedict · filed 1992-10-16(A) (D)(1)

An attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27 as follows: (A) Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La.R.S. 14:27. Thus, in this case the state was required to establish that defendant actively desired to rape the victim either by overcoming her utmost resistance by force or by preventing her from resisting the act by being armed with a dangerous weapon. ... Because defendant was charged with attempted aggravated rape, it was not necessary for the state to prove the crime was completed. See La.R.S. 14:27(A). Under the circumstances of this case, it is evident that defendant intended to use the knife for the specific purpose of preventing the victim from resisting the rape. See La.R.S. 14:42(A)(3). That he was unable to accomplish his purpose is immaterial. ... Although La.R.S. 14:42 provides that a person convicted of aggravated rape shall serve the mandatory life sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1) only provides that a person convicted of an attempt to commit a crime punishable by life imprisonment shall be imprisoned for not more than fifty years. Thus, the denial of parole eligibility on defendant's sentence for attempted aggravated rape is unlawful.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Hongo · filed 1993-10-06(A)

Reading the pertinent parts of these articles together, the state in this case had the burden of proving that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Turner · filed 1993-11-03

La.R.S. 14:27 provides in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. To convict the defendant of attempted first degree murder the State had to prove that he had the specific intent to kill the victim, that the victim was a police officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, and that the defendant, having such specific intent, did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of the offense intended.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; it does not matter whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Guidry · filed 1994-11-02

laA. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, and permits an attempt conviction as a separate, lesser grade even when the completed crime was actually perpetrated.

State v. Culverson · filed 1995-04-05(A), (C)

The crime for which he was convicted, attempted carrying a firearm by a student or nonstudent on school property, requires proof that he had specific intent to commit the crime and did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his objective. R.S. 14:27 A. Although the specific intent required to prove an attempt is narrower than the general intent required to prove the completed felony of R.S. 14:95.2, an attempt is always viewed as a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime. La.R.S. 14:10, 27 C; State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn, 424 So.2d 246 (La.1982).

Section 14:27 makes an attempt a crime when a person specifically intends to commit an offense and performs an act or omission directly tending toward it, even if the offense would not have been completed; an attempt is a separate, lesser grade of the intended crime.

State v. Taylor · filed 1995-10-04(A), (C)

Attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27 as: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. * * * * * * C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment for an attempt conviction.

State v. Johnson · filed 1995-10-06

The gravamen of the crime of attempted second degree murder is specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. La.R.S. 14:27 & 30.1.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended offense and an overt act toward completing it for attempt liability.

State v. Riser · filed 1997-12-12(A)

To sustain a conviction for attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, however, the state is required to prove that defendant had the specific intent to possess the weapon(s) and that he committed an overt act towards the completion of that offense.

Section 14:27 requires an overt act in furtherance of a specific intent for an attempt conviction; attempted murder requires specific intent to kill.

State v. Armant · filed 1998-05-27

To prove an attempted second degree murder, the state must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that he committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Forbes · filed 1998-06-29

The essential elements of attempted molestation of a juvenile, La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:81.2, are: 1. A person with the specific intent to commit a crime 2. does or omits an act 3. for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, the molestation of a juvenile, the elements of which are set forth above.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the offense plus an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Taylor · filed 1998-10-28

A person attempts to commit simple burglary when he has the specific intent to commit the offense and does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his object.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill and an act tending toward accomplishing that intent for an attempted second-degree murder conviction.

State v. Sullivan · filed 1999-02-24

To support a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. La. R.S. 14:27(30.1); State v. Banks, 496 So.2d 1099 (La.App. 4 Cir.1986).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; blocking a victim to enable an accomplice to open her purse can constitute an attempt.

State v. Davis · filed 1999-03-24(A)

Any person who, having the specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended. La. R.S. 14:27(A). ... A review of the record shows that the State proved Davis' guilt of attempted purse snatching beyond a reasonable doubt. He acted as a principal in that he stepped in front of Ms. Hebert and her boyfriend as they were walking on the ramp outside the Superdome in order to impede their forward progress. This gave Trammell the opportunity to open Ms. Hebert's purse. This assignment of error is without merit.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Pitts · filed 1999-03-31(A)

To be guilty of an attempt, a person must have a specific intent to commit a crime, and must do or omit some act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his object. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit a particular crime and an overt act demonstrating a firm purpose to complete that criminal intent; mere preparation is insufficient, and the attempt statute cannot be used to create an attempt to commit an already-inchoate offense.

State v. Sloan · filed 1999-08-18

On the other hand, an attempt requires a "specific intent" to commit a particular crime and an "overt act" directed toward that end. La. R.S. 14:27. The overt act must be such that it demonstrates a firm purpose by the actor to complete his criminal intent. Article 27 further states that mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission in furtherance of accomplishing it; the actual completion of the crime is immaterial.

State v. Allen · filed 1999-07-27A

LA.-R.S. 14:27 defines attempts as follows: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 defines attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Thomas · filed 1999-08-18

Although Thomas has not challenged any particular element of the offense of conviction, attempted manslaughter, we note that the evidence supports the verdict. ... From her window vantage point she saw him exchange angry words with Cynthia James, pull the gun, point it at her and shoot. This will support the finding of a specific intent to kill the victim. ... Thus a rational trier of fact could find every essential element of attempted manslaughter. ... R.S. 14:27 defines attempt, in part, as "having a specific intent to commit a crime,” the defendant "does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of its object.”

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Recasner · filed 1999-12-22

La. R.S. 14:27 provides: "Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended." In this case, the jury heard testimony that the defendant approached a person who was under suspicion for drug activity, spoke to the person, exchanged objects with the person, and immediately walked away. ... Thus, the jury could have determined that when the defendant, who was carrying paraphernalia used for smoking crack cocaine, approached a subject being watched for narcotics trafficking, and conducted an apparent drug transaction, he intended to possess cocaine, and did an act directly toward the accomplishment of his object.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime and an act or omission toward accomplishing it, and permits an attempt conviction even when the crime appears to have been completed.

State v. McGee · filed 2000-02-23

To support a conviction for an attempt, the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime and did or omitted some act toward accomplishing his goal. A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even where it appears that the defendant actually perpetrated the offense. La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as a specific-intent act tending directly toward the intended crime and makes it a separate, lesser grade for which a defendant may be convicted even when the intended crime was completed.

State v. Monette · filed 2000-03-22

The "Attempt" statute, La. R.S. 14:27, provides in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. * * * * C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. "If the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support a conviction of the charged offense, the jury's [responsive] verdict is authorized." State v. Harris, 97-2903, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/1/99), 742 So.2d 997, 1001-1002.

An attempt requires specific intent to bring about the prohibited criminal result and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing that result.

State v. Sanders · filed 2000-10-04

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:10, 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended offense plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Guillory · filed 2000-11-02

A person attempts to commit simple burglary when he has the specific intent to commit the offense and does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his object. La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Musgrove · filed 2000-12-15

In order to convict a defendant of attempted armed robbery, the state must prove that the defendant, having the specific intent to commit armed robbery, did or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the taking of anything of value belonging to another, from the person of another or in the immediate control of another, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Schleve · filed 2000-12-20(A)

One is guilty of an attempt to commit simple burglary when he has the specific intent to commit the offense and does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his object.

Section 14:27 requires an attempt prosecution to prove specific intent to commit the target crime and an act done for, and tending directly toward, its accomplishment.

State v. Allen · filed 2000-12-22

To support this conviction for attempted possession of cocaine, the state has the burden of proving that the defendant had the specific intent to knowingly possess an illegal drug, and that he performed an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of his object. La. R.S. 14:27; State v. Matthews, 552 So.2d 590 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 137 (La.1990).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as having the specific intent to commit a crime and doing an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Hodge · filed 2001-01-17

Defendant was convicted of attempted possession of marijuana; the jury found that she had the specific intent to commit the crime of possession, and did an act for the purposes of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of that object. La. R.S. 14:27, La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it, whether or not the intended crime could actually have been completed.

State v. Charles · filed 2001-05-09(A)

Attempt, according to La.R.S. 14:27, is: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended the crime and committed an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward its accomplishment.

State v. Carter · filed 2001-05-09

To convict this defendant of attempted first degree murder the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter had the specific intent to kill the victim, that Carter was engaged in the perpetration of an armed robbery, and that Carter, having such specific intent to kill, did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of the murder. La. R.S. 14:27, 14:30; State v. Strother, 362 So.2d 508 (La.1978); State v. Odom, 511 So.2d 1214 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 515 So.2d 446 (1987).

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Knight · filed 2001-05-23(A)

La. R.S. 14:27(A) provides: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... These facts are sufficient to prove attempted possession of cocaine.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing that crime.

State v. Bishop · filed 2001-07-24

"Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended." La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt criminal when a person with specific intent to commit an offense performs or omits an act tending directly toward its accomplishment, even if the offense is not completed.

State v. Isenogle · filed 2000-04-25

“Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; actual completion is immaterial.

State v. Singleton · filed 2001-11-07(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... To support a conviction for an attempt the state must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime and did or omitted some act toward accomplishing his goal.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Loyd · filed 2002-02-27

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La.R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act or omission, undertaken with specific intent, that tends directly toward completing the intended crime, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Johnson · filed 2002-04-10(A)

Attempt is defined in La. R.S. 14:27 as follows: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Viewing |fithe evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted forgery.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment.

State v. Gay · filed 2002-10-23

An attempt to commit murder, whether first or second degree, requires that defendant possess the specific intent to kill and commit an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.

Section 14:27 requires proof of specific intent to commit the target offense and an act done for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, accomplishing that offense.

State v. Robinson · filed 2002-12-11

To support a conviction for attempted forcible rape, the state must prove that defendant had the specific intent to commit forcible rape and that he did an act for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, the accomplishing of his objective.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the target crime and an overt act in furtherance of that intent for an attempt conviction.

State v. Stacker · filed 2002-12-30

To support a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being and that the defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1; State v. Harrell, 01-841 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 1015, 1019.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as having specific intent to commit a crime and doing or omitting an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime would actually have been completed.

State v. Wix · filed 2003-01-15

La. R.S. 14:27 provides that any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Attempted armed robbery is comprised of the following elements: (1) the specific intent to take something of value; (2) from another person; (3) using force or intimidation; (4) armed with a dangerous weapon; and, (5) the perpetrator further does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward robbery.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Gilbert · filed 2003-01-28(A)

An attempted offense under La.R.S. 14:27(A) is when Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. Thus, in order to convict the Defendant of the offense, the State had to prove that the Defendant had the specific intent to possess marijuana, that he had the intent to distribute the drug, and that he acted directly toward the accomplishing of that goal.

An attempt requires specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission that tends directly toward completing it.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2003-02-12(A)

"Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended." ... "While the police officers could clearly have better assisted the trier of fact with a more thorough investigation, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have concluded that the state established the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent plus an act tending directly toward committing the intended crime, while subsection (D)(3) limits an attempt sentence to one-half of the fine or imprisonment term prescribed for the completed offense.

State v. Holloway · filed 2003-05-16(A) and (D)(3)

The state proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had the specific intent to possess cocaine, and that the defendant did an act tending directly toward possessing cocaine. La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 40:967(C). ... The attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3), provides that the sentence "shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both." Accordingly, the minimum sentence the defendant could receive, as a fourth felony offender, was the 20-year sentence imposed by the trial court.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion of the crime is immaterial.

State v. Pierre · filed 2003-06-11(A)

To establish attempted second degree murder the State must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant specifically intended to kill her husband and that she committed an "act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of" that intent. Specific intent to commit great bodily harm is not enough. State v. Williams, 95-879 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 670 So.2d 414.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill and an overt act tending toward accomplishment of the killing to establish attempted second-degree murder.

State v. Butler · filed 2003-06-25

To convict a defendant of attempted second degree murder, the state must prove: (1) specific intent to kill and (2) the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt require specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Hannon · filed 2003-08-20

La. R.S. 14:27 provides, in pertinent part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. To support a conviction for attempted forcible rape, the state must prove that defendant had the specific intent to commit forcible rape and that he did an act for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, the accomplishing of his objective.

Section 14:27(A) requires a specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission purposefully tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Herron · filed 2004-05-14(A)

Under La. R.S. 14:27(A), a person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense when he has a specific intent to commit a crime and "does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object."

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Cheatham · filed 2004-06-23(A)

Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, a conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. La. R.S. 14:10, 14:27.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act in furtherance of that intent tending directly toward its accomplishment, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Reeves · filed 2004-11-10(A)

Thus, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the specific intent to escape when he committed an act in furtherance of an intentional departure from the jail.

Section 14:27 requires a specific intent to commit the completed offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment.

State v. Austin · filed 2005-03-01

The crime of attempted murder, whether first or second degree, requires proof of the specific intent to kill and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt require specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether completion was possible.

State v. Martin · filed 2005-08-17

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27. Specific intent to kill is an essential element of crime of attempted second-degree murder, and also of the responsive crime of attempted manslaughter. ... The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support the verdict of attempted manslaughter.

Section 14:27(A) defines attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion of the crime is immaterial.

State v. Jefferson · filed 2005-12-21(A)

Attempt is defined as occurring when a person, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object; it is immaterial whether he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A). To prove attempted murder, the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal; proof of intent to inflict great bodily harm is not enough.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission directly tending toward accomplishing it, even if the crime would not actually have been completed.

State v. Francois · filed 2006-04-05(A)

Attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A), which provides: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. To convict Defendant of attempted second degree murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he specifically intended to kill Ms. Vital and that he committed an "act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of" that intent. La.R.S. 14:27(A); 14:30.1(A)(1).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target offense and an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Templet · filed 2006-08-16(A)

Under La. R.S. 14:27(A), a person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense when he has a specific intent to commit a crime and "does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object."

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment.

State of Louisiana v. Bell · filed 2006-09-27

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as acting or omitting an act with specific intent that tends directly toward committing the intended crime, even if the crime would not have been completed under the circumstances.

State v. Bordelon · filed 2006-04-19

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward completing it, regardless of whether completion was actually possible.

State of Louisiana v. J. M. · filed 2006-11-02(A)

The attempt statute, La.R.S. 14:27, provides, in part: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... In order to support a conviction for attempted aggravated incest, the State is required to prove that the defendant specifically intended to engage in an act listed in Subsection B of LSA-R.S. 14:78.1 with his daughter. Such proof is indispensable, as specific intent to accomplish the offense is the sine qua non of the criminal offense of attempt. ... There was sufficient evidence of Defendant’s intent to sexually gratify himself. ... There was sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find Defendant guilty of the crimes of aggravated incest and attempted aggravated incest. There is no merit to this assignment of error.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; mere preparation is generally insufficient.

State of Louisiana v. Paul Roberts, Jr. · filed 2007-01-17

Attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27 as follows: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... B. (1) Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. ... To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La.1975); State v. Martin, 92-0811 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/94), 638 So.2d 411. ... Reyna’s testimony clearly showed that Defendant pointed a pistol at Reyna and Cook, then fired it, killing Cook and hitting Reyna three times. Further, Defendant’s actions support a finding of specific intent. “Deliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range are circumstances which will support a finding of specific intent to kill.” State v. Brown, 03-897, p. 22 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1, 18. Therefore, the evidence supported a finding that Defendant specifically intended to kill Reyna and Cook beyond a reasonable doubt. For this reason, the first portion of Defendant’s argument fails.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime plus an act or omission for that purpose that tends directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Latigue · filed 2007-04-04(A)

Attempt occurs when any person specifically intends to commit a crime, and he does or omits an act for the purpose of committing the crime when the act tends directly toward the accomplishment of his objective. La.R.S. 14:27(A). In the instant case, Defendant admitted that he had attacked C.B., but he had been too high to say much of anything. Instead, Defendant demonstrated his intent to have sex by wrestling C.B. into a vulnerable position and pulling down her shorts. C.B. resisted to her utmost by fighting, but Defendant overcame her resistance by throttling her unconscious. Additionally, Defendant used a dangerous weapon to commit the crime; he used a chain to strangle C.B.

Section 14:27 makes an attempt when a person specifically intends a crime and commits or omits an act tending directly toward its accomplishment, even if the crime would not have been completed.

State of Louisiana v. Tittle · filed 2007-04-04(A)

Attempt is defined by La.R.S. 14:27, which states in pertinent part, A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... While S.C.’s testimony does not support the crime charged, it could reasonably be seen as supporting the conviction for attempt because Defendant’s touching of the victim’s genitals with his genitals could be viewed as an effort to achieve penetration.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant actively intended the criminal result and committed or omitted an act that directly tended toward accomplishing it.

State v. Youngblood · filed 2007-05-09

A conviction of an attempted offense must rest upon sufficient proof that the offender actively desired to cause the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27 A makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing the crime, even if the crime would not have been completed.

State v. Butler · filed 2007-06-20A

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27 A.

Section 14:27(A) makes an attempt require specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Charles · filed 2007-10-03(A)

To commit the offense of attempted simple kidnapping, Defendant must have had the specific intent to commit the offense of simple kidnapping while taking some action in furtherance of accomplishing that offense. La. R.S. 14:27(A). Specific intent is a state of mind existing when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act. ... After reviewing the entirety of the record, we find insufficient evidence to support the conviction on the charge of attempted simple kidnapping. Accordingly, the Defendant’s conviction for attempted simple kidnapping is reversed.

Section 14:27(A) requires proof of specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act in furtherance of that intent to establish an attempt.

State v. Martin · filed 2007-10-17(A)

In order to convict a defendant of attempted simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, the State must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant had the specific intent or active desire to commit the crime of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and (2) that he did one act in furtherance of his intent or desire to commit the crime of burglary of an inhabited dwelling.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, regardless of whether the crime could actually have been completed.

State v. Fields · filed 2008-01-09(A)

In La. R.S. 14:27(A), "attempt" is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense, intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it, but completion of the crime is immaterial.

State v. Kennedy · filed 2008-01-09(A)

The attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27, provides, in part: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... It is clear from the recitation of facts presented by the state that defendant was admitting to conduct which was adequate to support convictions of attempted aggravated incest and attempted aggravated rape, the charges to which he pleaded guilty. ... By admitting that between January 1, 1999, and November 28, 2004, he had attempted to rub "his penis on [his under 18-year-old stepdaughter's] vagina with the intent to satisfy sexual desires," defendant admitted to the essential elements of the crime of attempted aggravated incest. ... By admitting to attempting to penetrate B.S. (d/o/b 9/10/98) vaginally between December 1, 2002 and November 31, 2004, defendant admitted to the essential elements of the crime of attempted aggravated rape.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; the crime need not actually be completed, and the evidence here supported the required intent for attempted aggravated incest.

State v. J.M. · filed 2006-11-02

The attempt statute, La.R.S. 14:27, provides, in part: ... A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the eireum-...stances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... In the current case, the facts presented at trial indicated a continuous and planned activity. ... There was sufficient evidence of Defendant’s intent to sexually gratify himself.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific-intent crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense.

State of Louisiana v. Massey · filed 2008-01-30(A)

With regard to the attempt offense, La.R.S. 14:27(A) provides that “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” ... Even though they are lesser and included verdicts, the defendant argues in this assignment of error that the evidence does not support the verdicts rendered. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that not only did the state present proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the responsive verdicts, but of the original charges as well.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the victim’s death for attempted second-degree murder.

State Ex Rel. Gb · filed 2008-05-14

[t]o sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30.1.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act or omission done with specific intent to commit a crime that tends directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Calvert · filed 2008-06-06(A)

Attempted sexual battery is the commission or omission of an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of a sexual battery with the specific intent to commit a crime. See La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission toward accomplishing it.

State v. Collier · filed 2008-06-18

Attempt requires the specific intent to commit a crime and the commission or omission of an act toward accomplishing that object. La. R.S. 14:27.

Section 14:27(A) requires both specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Caston · filed 2008-09-24(A)

An attempt requires both "specific intent to commit a crime" and an act or omission "for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object." La. R.S. 14:27(A); State v. Houston, 40,642 (La.App. 2d Cir.3/10/06), 925 So.2d 690, writ denied, 06-796 (La.10/13/06), 939 So.2d 373.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant intended to commit the crime and committed an act tending directly toward accomplishing that intended crime.

State v. DHILLY · filed 2008-11-19

To prove attempt, the State must show that the defendant committed an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of his intent, possession of the drug. See La. R.S. 14:27. ... Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of attempted possession of crystal methamphetamine.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Baylor · filed 2008-11-26(A)

To support a conviction for attempted carjacking the State must prove that the Defendant had the specific intent to take Butler's car and did or omitted some act toward accomplishing his goal.

Section 14:27(A) defines attempt as requiring specific intent to commit the intended crime plus an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment; attempted manslaughter therefore requires specific intent to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Russell J. Auguillard, Jr. · filed 2008-12-10(A)

“[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” ... To convict of attempted manslaughter, the state had to prove that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. La.R.S. 14:27; State v. Porter, 626 So.2d 476 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993).

Section 14:27 requires a knowing or intentional act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense.

State v. McGraw · filed 2008-12-10

The elements of attempted possession of hydrocodone require a person to knowingly or intentionally do or omit an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of the possession of hydrocodone, a Schedule III drug, without a valid prescription or in the absence of an enumerated professional practice. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 40:968. To prove attempt, the State must show that the defendant committed an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of his intent, possession of the drug. State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990).

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended offense and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment, and it is immaterial whether the offense would actually have been completed.

State v. Landry · filed 2009-02-13(A)

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim and that he committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death, and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. See La. R.S 14:27(A); 14:30.1.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Langston · filed 2009-02-25

Specific intent to commit a crime is ban element of an attempted offense. La. R.S. 14:27. Hence, an attempt to commit second degree murder must rest upon proof that the offender actively desired to kill a human being and that the offender committed or omitted an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing his objective.

Section 14:27(A) requires a specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment.

State v. TRAN · filed 2009-08-13(A)

La. R.S. 14:27(A) further provides that to attempt to commit a crime, an accused must do or omit an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of the crime while “having a specific intent” to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:10(1) defines specific criminal intent as that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. In order to prove an attempted simple robbery, the State had to prove that the defendant: (1) had a specific intent to commit the crime of simple robbery, and (2) did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the commission of the crime of simple robbery.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the accused specifically intended to commit the target offense and committed an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State, in Interest of Kmt · filed 2009-08-19

To support defendant’s conviction, the state must have proved that defendant had the specific intent to commit forcible rape and that he did an act for the purpose of, and tending directly toward, the accomplishing of his objective.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target crime and an overt act tending toward its accomplishment; for attempted second-degree murder, intent to inflict great bodily harm is not enough.

State v. Harris · filed 2009-09-23

An attempted second degree murder requires that the defendant possess the specific intent to kill and that he commit an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal. ... An intent to inflict great bodily harm is not an element of the crime.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant actively desired to commit the underlying offense and committed an act in furtherance of that goal.

State v. Ashley · filed 2009-09-23

To prove the crime of attempted forcible rape, the state was required to establish that the defendant actively desired to commit rape by preventing the victim from resisting the act by force or threats of physical violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably believed that such resistance would not have prevented the rape and that he did an act in furtherance of his goal.

Section 14:27 requires proof of specific intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the victim’s death for attempted second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. George · filed 2009-10-07

The essential elements of the crime of attempted second degree murder are a specific intent to kill the victim and the commission of an overt act that tends toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La.R.S. 14:30.1; State v. Hollingsworth, 42,317 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/07), 962 So.2d 1183. ... The specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of attempted second degree murder. La.R.S. 14:27, 14:30.1; State v. Hongo, 96-2060 (La. 12/2/97), 706 So.2d 419. ... The evidence here was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant’s actions showed he had the specific intent to kill Watkins, even if the only injuries he inflicted were the two blows to Watkins’ head immediately before she was found.

Section 14:27 makes a person guilty of an attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person does or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it, even if the crime is not completed.

State v. Johnson. · filed 2009-11-04

Louisiana defines attempt at La.R.S. 14:27 as: A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act tending toward accomplishing the victim’s death.

State v. Johnson · filed 2010-02-10

To sustain an attempted second degree murder conviction, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as a specific-intent crime accompanied by an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment.

State v. Martinez · filed 2010-03-23(A)

La. R.S. 14:27(A) states, in pertinent part, “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.”

Section 14:27(A) requires a specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward its accomplishment, even if the crime could not actually be completed.

State v. Freeman · filed 2010-04-14A

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27 A.

Section 14:27(A) defines an attempt as an act or omission tending directly toward committing a crime undertaken with specific intent, regardless of whether the crime is completed.

State v. Sumlin · filed 2009-10-28(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; whether the crime would actually have been completed is immaterial.

State v. Williams · filed 2010-01-27(A)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime and an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Jones · filed 2010-03-10(A)

Accordingly, in order to have convicted Defendant of the lesser and included offense of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile, the jury would have had to find that the Defendant specifically intended to commit a lewd and lascivious act upon the victim, or in the victim’s presence, and did an act in furtherance thereof.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it for an attempt.

State of Louisiana v. Jackson · filed 2010-06-02(A)

However, Louisiana law defines one who attempts a crime as “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.” La.R.S. 14:27(A) (emphasis added). Therefore, an attempted offense requires a showing of specific intent. Id.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit the target offense and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. H. A., Sr. · filed 2010-10-06(A)

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense when he “does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object” and he has the specific intent to commit the crime. La.R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27(A) requires an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing an offense, together with specific intent to commit it, for an attempt conviction.

State v. HA, SR. · filed 2010-10-06(A)

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense when he “does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object” and he has the specific intent to commit the crime. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of attempted aggravated incest.

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as requiring specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing the intended offense, even if the offender would not actually have accomplished it.

State of Louisiana v. Miller · filed 2010-11-03

Attempt is defined in La.R.S. 14:27, which states, in pertinent part: ... Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27(A) makes a person guilty of attempt when, with specific intent to commit a crime, the person performs or omits an act tending directly toward accomplishing it; attempted second degree murder therefore requires specific intent to kill a human being.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2011-03-09(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." La.R.S. 14:27(A). When a defendant is charged with attempted second degree murder, the State is required to prove the specific intent to kill a human being.

Subsection (A) requires specific intent to commit a crime plus an act done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State of Louisiana v. Simon · filed 2011-04-13(A)

An attempt to commit a crime occurs when: “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does . . . an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. . . .” La.R.S. 14:27(A). Thus, the State must prove Defendant did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward touching M.G.’s anus.

For attempted second-degree murder, Section 14:27 requires specific intent to kill and an overt act tending toward the victim’s death.

State of Louisiana v. Thomas · filed 2011-04-27

“The essential elements of the crime of attempted second degree murder are a specific intent to kill the victim and the commission of an overt act that tends toward the accomplishment of the victim’s death. La.R.S. 14:30.1; State v. Hollingsworth, 42,317 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/07), 962 So.2d 1183.”

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the intended crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; mere preparation is insufficient.

State v. Davillier · filed 2011-11-02(A)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. ... Attempt requires both the specific intent to commit a crime and an act for the purpose of, or an “overt act,” tending directly toward accomplishment of that crime. ... Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted offense. The state has the burden of proving the defendant’s specific intent to commit the charged crime.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Alsay · filed 2011-12-13(A)

Attempt is defined as “Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Section 14:27 defines an attempt as specific intent to commit a crime combined with an act or omission done for the purpose of and tending directly toward accomplishing the criminal object.

State v. Chappell · filed 2011-12-28

An attempt occurs when the offender, having the specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; the intended crime need not actually be completed.

State v. Cortes · filed 2012-02-01(A)

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires proof of specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it.

State v. Barnes · filed 2012-09-19

Thus, to convict the defendant of attempted second-degree murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he specifically intended to kill Burds and that he committed an “act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of’ that intent.

Section 14:27(A) requires specific intent to commit a crime and an act or omission tending directly toward accomplishing it; actual completion of the intended crime is immaterial.

State v. Maldonado · filed 2012-12-11(A)

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Section 14:27 requires specific intent to commit the target offense and an act or omission tending directly toward its commission.

State v. Merrill · filed 2012-12-27

To convict an offender for attempted possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State had to prove that the defendant had the specific intent to possess cocaine, and that defendant did, or omitted to do, an act tending directly toward possessing cocaine.