8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the evidence shows that conditions deteriorated since the prior proceedings.

Hila v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-02(c)(3)(ii)

The only exception that could possibly be applicable is the changed circumstances exception. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To succeed under the changed circumstances exception, Hila would have to prove that the country conditions in Albania had deteriorated since his original proceedings in September 2000 and his March 2000 motion to reopen. Hila submitted numerous documents, including country reports and newspaper articles, in support of his motion to reopen, however, these documents do not indicate that the situation in Albania has drastically changed since Hila’s previous hearing. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Hila’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the BIA's final order, subject to exceptions not discussed here.

Calderon-Morales v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Calderon-Morales’s motion to reopen as untimely because she did not file the motion within ninety days of the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and because the motion failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), see Azanor, 364 F.3d at 1022 (noting that failure to comply with Lozada is significant where the facts underlying petitioner’s claim were not plain on the face of the record).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to an asylum exception for changed country conditions supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Khatra v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2005-12-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen removal proceedings must file a motion no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... This deadline may be excused in a motion to reopen an asylum case based on “changed circumstances” in the applicant’s home country, if he or she provides material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority, while section 1003.2(a) leaves the decision to grant or deny reconsideration to the Board's discretion, subject to abuse-of-discretion review.

Sangarbuwa v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-05(b)(1), (a)

The regulations provide, among other things, that a motion to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2005); see also Zhao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing requirements for motion to reconsider). The burden is on the movant to establish that reconsideration is warranted. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110. The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, and thus this court reviews the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2005). Sangarbuwa failed to meet these standards.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to be timely and to specify errors of fact or law, permits the Board to reconsider or reopen on its own motion, and requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2005-12-19(b)(1), (a), (c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, a motion to reconsider a BIA decision must be filed within thirty days of the decision, and must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision . . . supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (2). Additionally, “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, the BIA “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Under the regulations, however, the BIA has broad discretion to reconsider claims on its own motion and the BIA’s exercise of this discretion is not subject to judicial review. See Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... The regulations provide that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and provide pertinent supporting authority.

Hu v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2005-12-19(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2005).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Abdel-Whab v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2005-12-06(a)

Under the regulations, the Board “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). As Abdel-Whab’s motion was numerically barred by the regulations, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to show that supporting evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Li You Cao v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-07

Further, Cao failed to demonstrate the materiality of the evidence or how it “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) allows only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying a prior motion to reconsider.

Min Zhi Weng v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2005-12-08(b)(2)

Hence, petitioner’s June 2003 motion was a motion to reconsider, and his September 2003 motion was a second motion to reconsider. As such, Weng’s motion was plainly number barred under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.”).

The numerical limit on motions to reopen is not jurisdictional, so the BIA may consider a motion that exceeds the limit.

Miron, Catalin v. Gonzales, Alberto R. · filed 2005-12-14(c)(2)

Further, although Miron's motion to reopen violates the numeric limits on motions to reopen, since an alien generally may file only one such motion, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), numerical limits on motions to reopen are also not jurisdictional, Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the BIA could have reached the merits of Miron’s motion despite its lateness and its exceeding the number limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days of the final administrative decision; the time and numerical limits may be bypassed under subsection (c)(3)(ii) only when the alien establishes changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Nanda v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2005-12-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien is limited to one motion to reopen exclusion or deportation proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). ... This motion must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). ... A motion that does not comply with these time and numerical limitations can only be brought where the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, allowing a second motion to be denied as both time- and number-barred.

Al Ayed v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-12(c)(2)

The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as both time and numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days, while section 1003.2(c)(3)'s changed-circumstances exception requires changed country conditions rather than merely changed personal circumstances.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-12(c)(2), (c)(3)

The regulations state that an individual can file only one motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The only exception that could be relevant in this case is the “changed circumstances” exception. In his motion to reopen, Lin only asserts that his case should be reopened because his wife gave birth to their third child; he does not claim that the Chinese government has changed how it enforces the coercive family planning policy. This Court has already held that a change in an individual’s personal circumstances does not qualify under this exception; rather, an individual must demonstrate that the country conditions have changed. Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005). *326Moreover, motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal is entered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lin still would have been able to file a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) if he fell into one of the exceptions provided for untimely filings. However, as previously discussed, the only exception that could have been applicable is the changed circumstances exception. Given this Court’s decision in Li Yong Zheng, 416 F.3d at 130-31, Lin’s change in personal circumstances does not qualify for the exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline when material evidence of changed country conditions could not have been presented earlier.

Zhao, Bin v. Gonzales, Alberto R. · filed 2005-12-13(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen based on changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal is exempt from the 90-day deadline, so long as the evidence is material and could not have been adduced at the proceeding to be reopened.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Adeniyi v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement · filed 2005-12-09(c)(1)

A “motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234. ... Although the evidence of Famola’s sister’s attack was not available at the time of his hearing, it cannot be considered material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 generally imposes a 90-day limit on motions to reopen, permits the specified changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii), and gives the BIA broad, non-reviewable discretion over sua sponte reopening.

Dalien v. United States Attorney General · filed 2005-12-13(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(3)(ii)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the “final administrative decision” by the BIA or before 30 September 1996, whichever is later. ... Additionally, the regulations provide for no exception based on grounds of an ineffective assistance of counsel, even if those grounds were discovered after the limitations period. ... (3) . . . The time and numerical limitations set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings: .... (ii) To apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.] ... Dalien’s untimely application is not relieved by the one applicable exception, the presence of material evidence of changed country circumstance that could not have been previously discovered, since Dalien has not provided such evidence and has failed to argue that he is entitled to that exception in his initial brief to our court. ... Even though Dalien’s motion is untimely, the BIA has “very broad discretion” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 to grant or deny his motion to reopen. ... Therefore, we will not review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to grant Dalien’s untimely motion to reopen.

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Gao v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2005-12-13(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and to include pertinent supporting authority.

Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-15(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and be supported by pertinent authority. ... The BIA denied Wang’s motion for reconsideration because he did not identify any errors of law or fact in the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief. Because Wang’s motion for reconsideration relied solely on an argument previously presented to the BIA and was based on an article that was not part of the administrative record before the IJ, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the December motion did not meet the standard for reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(a) places the decision whether to grant a motion for reconsideration within the BIA’s discretion.

Muriel v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2005-12-16(a)

The decision to grant a motion for reconsideration lies within the discretion of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We thus review the BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration only for abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given BIA decision and bars a motion seeking reconsideration of a denial of an earlier reconsideration motion.

Shun Qing Ke v. U.S. Dept. of Justice · filed 2005-12-19(b)(2)

Under the regulations governing reconsideration of decisions of the BIA, “[a] party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (2005). The BIA’s decision affirming the order of the IJ was issued on August 25, 2003, and Ke moved for reconsideration on October 8, 2003. When that motion was denied on December 2, 2003, Ke moved for reconsideration on December 11, 2003. Whether his December 11, 2003 motion is viewed as a second motion to reconsider the BIA’s August 25, 2003 decision, or as a motion to reconsider its December 2, 2003 denial of his first motion to reconsider, the December 11, 2003 motion is expressly prohibited by § 1003.2(b)(2), and the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying it.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts that would be proven.

Tchavouchian v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-23(c)

Because the only argument raised was the conclusory statement that changed country conditions, in the form of Bulgaria’s new communist government, merited a new hearing, the Tchavouians did not state the new facts that would be proven as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

The exception to the time limits for a motion to reopen requires the movant to establish materially changed circumstances in the relevant country.

Pio v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-21(c)(3)(ii)

Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pio’s motion to reopen, because Pio failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

The regulation allows an untimely motion to reopen when the movant establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Jean v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-25(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jean’s untimely motion to reopen because he did not establish materially changed circumstances in the Ivory Coast to overcome the time limitation for motions to reopen.

The ninety-day deadline for a motion to reopen may be waived when the motion relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Yan Fang Chen v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2015-12-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Thus, to obtain relief on his untimely motion to reopen, Chen had to provide the Board with new, previously unavailable material evidence of changed conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when there is material evidence of changed country conditions.

Li v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than five years after her order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Li failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in China to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin, 588 F.3d at 989 (agency’s determination that petitioner did not establish material changed country conditions was not “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it is untimely and number-barred; the court applied those limits to a third motion filed more than seventeen years late.

Wu v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Wu’s third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the motion was filed over seventeen years late, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limits for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2009) (the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying an untimely motion to reopen where the record did not establish change in family planning laws or enforcement of such laws); He, 501 F.3d at 1132 (change in personal circumstances does not establish changed circumstances in country of origin).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to provide evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered at the prior hearing.

Reyna v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-30(c)(1)

De La Cruz, however, was required by statute and regulation to provide evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered at the time of his 2012 hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and the court applied it to a motion filed more than four years after the Board’s final decision.

Zambarrano-Rut v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zambarrano-Rutledge’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the BIA reasonably determined she failed to establish changed circumstances in the Philippines to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits reopening to one motion filed within 90 days unless an exception applies, while section 1003.2(a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-27(c)(2), (a)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings to present new evidence of his eligibility for relief may file only one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision, unless an exception applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The statute and regulations governing motions to reopen do not provide an exception to the applicable time and numerical limitations based on purported eligibility for adjustment of status, leaving the BIA’s sua sponte reopening authority as Singh’s only avenue for reopening. ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte reopening authority to permit Singh to apply for adjustment of status based on the visa petition filed by his wife because sua sponte reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen cases sua sponte, and its decision whether to do so is generally not reviewable.

Xu Tong Ouyang v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-25(a)

We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because that decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and to include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Njie v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-11(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted” and “be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Zhang v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-17(c)(1)

A motion to remand that relies on newly available evidence is held to the substantive requirements of a motion to reopen. ... A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Zhang could have presented his new submissions at his merits hearing. ... He did not, however, explain why he could not have handled these tasks prior to his merits hearing. Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen proceedings that seeks relief to include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Li v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-26(c)(1)

The BIA properly determined that Li’s failure to file a new asylum application was fatal to his motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material, previously unavailable evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Gyamfi v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-25(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Gyamfi’s motion where, construed as a motion to reopen, it was unsupported by material, previously unavailable evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing, and where, construed as a motion to reconsider, it was filed beyond the thirty-day deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Huang v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-29(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... A motion to reopen must “be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include an application for relief.

Mejia v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-09(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening because Morales failed to submit an application for relief with his motion, as required under the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing if the motion is granted.

Maldonado v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-22(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.”. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reconsider must specify the factual or legal error allegedly made by the Board in its earlier decision.

Nketsiah v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-09(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, and the movant must specify that error of fact or law.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Hu v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-24(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because it did not identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s decision dated February 14, 2013. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (motions to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying- the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Barron-Miranda v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-26(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Barron-Miranda’s motion to reconsider because he failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority; merely repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Gomez-Gutierrez v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-29(b)(1)

“‘A motion to reconsider contests the correctness of the original decision based upon the previous factual record.’ ... ‘A motion to reconsider must identify ‘errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.’” ... The motion “must give the [Board] ‘a reason for changing its mind, something the tribunal has no reason to do if the motion merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place.’”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

Rivera-Rodas v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-22(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rivera-Rodas’ motion to reconsider where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Xian v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-26(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Xian’s motion to reconsider, where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision dismissing her appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte at any time, and federal courts lack jurisdiction to review its decision whether to do so.

Lawrence v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-17(a)

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (providing that the Board “may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision”). But we lack jurisdiction to review how the Board exercises its sua sponte discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) provides an exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen when the government joins the motion.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2016-05-10(c)(3)(iii)

The BIA correctly held that none of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limit applies here. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The order of removal was not entered in absentia, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iii); the motion asserted the existence of neither changed country conditions nor a battered spouse, child, or parent, id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) & (iv); and the government did not join the motion, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) & (iv).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed three years after the BIA’s final decision as untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed country conditions to qualify for an exception to the time limitation.

Greenwood v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Greenwood’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed it three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in Jamaica to qualify for an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-990 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen that is untimely or number-barred, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the applicant establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Miralda v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-03(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Fortin Miralda’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed over 17 years after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Honduras to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) does not categorically excuse a movant from providing new evidence merely because the motion alleges ineffective assistance of counsel.

Lujan-Jimenez v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-23(c)(1)

We reject Mr. Lujan’s blanket statement that under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) an alien need not provide new evidence in support of a motion to reopen if he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen cases sua sponte but provides no meaningful standard for judicial review of that discretion.

Oliveira v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2016-05-17(a)

Additionally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on the BIA’s sua sponte authority because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the regulation allowing BIA discretion over motions to reopen, provides no meaningful standard against which we could judge the BIA’s exercise of that discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits consideration of a transcript on remand only when it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing, and consideration without an evidentiary finding supporting that prerequisite is error.

Chang-Cruz v. Attorney General United States · filed 2016-08-24(c)(1)

However, to the extent that the Government might rely on the transcript in making any argument concerning discretionary relief, we note that there was no evidence introduced to satisfy the pre-requisite for the BIA’s consideration of the transcript under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) and (4)—the requirement that the transcript “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). It would appear that the consideration of this transcript, at least without an evidentiary finding as to the justification for the Government’s delay, was in error.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief, even when an exception to the filing deadline applies.

Sherpa v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-16(c)(1)

Irrespective of whether this exception applies, the motion “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen or remand to be material and previously unavailable, meaning evidence available at the merits hearing does not satisfy that requirement.

Singh v. Sessions · filed 2017-03-06(c)(1)

The movant must “present material, previously unavailable evidence.” Id. at 158; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand for consideration of Singh’s additional evidence because that evidence was available at the time of his 2014 merits hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Yan Ping Lin v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-02-07(c)(3)(ii)

However, she claimed that she qualified for an exception under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which allows for reopening after the 90-day window has elapsed if there is evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... We conclude that the BIA adequately considered the evidence Lin presented and therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. ... On this record, we have no basis to disturb the BIA’s conclusion there has not been a “significant” or “material” change in those conditions since the time of Lin’s hearing in 2002.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides an exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen based on material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Laoye v. Attorney General United State · filed 2017-02-15(c)(3)

There is an exception to the time and number requirements for motions to reopen that rely on material evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Laoye had not shown changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it is untimely or exceeds the numerical limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are established.

Ramos v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-22(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez Ramos’s motion to reopen because it was time and number-barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Lopez Ramos failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits and other evidentiary material.

Zubar v. Lynch · filed 2017-01-04(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be supported “by affidavits and other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts supported by evidence and bars reopening based on evidence that is not material or was previously available.

Ever Cruz-Guillen v. Boente · filed 2017-02-07(b)(1), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision. The movant must specify the error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2016). ... The motion “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2016). It “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. ... We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration and reopening. Cruz-Guillen failed to specify an error of law or fact concerning the Board’s finding that he failed to show a nexus between past persecution or fear of future persecution and a protected ground. Additionally, substantial evidence supports the finding that the previously unavailable evidence did not show that Cruz-Guillen was targeted or that there is a reasonable possibility that he will be harmed on account of his membership in a particular social group.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings, subject to the exceptions in paragraph (c)(3).

Chen v. Ashcroft · filed 2005-07-15(c)(2)

That is because the BIA's third conclusion -- that Chen violated the numerical limit on motions to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) -- was clearly correct and alone constituted sufficient grounds to reject his petition.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law, and § 1003.2(c)(1) permits denial of a motion to reopen for failure to present new, previously unavailable, material evidence.

Lama v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2005-07-25(b)(1) and (c)(1)

While Lama raises a number of legal issues in her brief to this Court, Lama did not allege any of these legal errors in her motion to reconsider with the specificity required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The BIA may deny a motion to reopen when the.petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought or when the petitioner has failed to introduce new or previously unavailable, material evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to deny reopening even when the movant has made a prima facie case, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time and numerical limits for an asylum motion based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Kaur v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2005-08-15(a), (c)(3)(ii)

The applicable regulation provides that the BIA “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... These “time and numerical limitations” do not apply to a motion to reopen to apply for asylum based on changed circumstances arising in the country of removal, “if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions from the ninety-day deadline only when the supporting evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Kaur v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2005-08-30(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances in the country to which removal has been ordered, provided the evidence of changed circumstances is material, was not available, and could not have been presented at the previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify the new facts the applicant could prove and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Singh v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2005-09-06(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must state what new facts the applicant could prove, and be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to a changed-country-conditions exception for asylum or withholding claims, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires facts and supporting evidence establishing prima facie eligibility.

Ghasemimehr v. Gonzalez · filed 2005-09-22(c)(2) (c)(1)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than ninety days after the final administrative decision sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The ninety-day limit does not apply, however, when the applicant seeks to reopen proceedings to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. Id. An alien can satisfy his burden to show changed circumstances by providing sufficient facts and supporting documentary evidence, through affidavits or other evidentiary material, establishing prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. See id. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A timely motion to reopen tolls the voluntary-departure period while the BIA considers it, so the BIA must decide the motion on the merits rather than treating the motion as forfeited.

Kanivets v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2005-09-07(d)

That is a different situation from that presented here where we hold that tolling applies during the period of time that the BIA deliberates on a timely motion to reopen. ... Accordingly, we hold that because Kanivets timely filed his petition for reopening, the BIA should decide his motion for reopening on the merits.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to offer material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Najera-Rodriguez v. Ashcroft · filed 2005-11-22(c)(1)

The motion will not be granted “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. In his motion, petitioner simply asserts that he is a CSS class member and attaches a copy of his CSS worksheet. As the BIA noted in its decision, this evidence is not new. Admin R. at 2. Rather, the evidence is cumulative of what was in the record at the time of the BIA’s June 2, 2004 order affirming the IJ’s decision. Id. at 2 (explaining that the denial in 1994 of petitioner’s application for CSS membership was an exhibit in the administrative record during petitioner’s first appeal to the BIA). Accordingly, petitioner has not demonstrated that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it exceeds the time or numerical limits, unless an exception such as changed country conditions under subsection (c)(3)(ii) applies.

Wan Zhen Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2005-11-22(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

Lin has filed three motions to reopen with the BIA. As designated in the regulations, the BIA will not decide the merits of a motion to reopen where it is time and numerically barred. Lin’s motion to reopen, for which the petition for review was filed, was submitted in December 2003, more than five years after the BIA’s final order of removal in June 1998. Lin is not eligible for an exception to the time and numerical limitation requirement; he has failed to submit any documents to evidence *542a change in country conditions in China in the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day filing deadline and numerical limit on motions to reopen, but those limits may be equitably tolled when counsel’s error prevents timely filing and the petitioner acts diligently.

Lata v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-01(c)(2)

The second BIA decision denied Lata’s second motion to reopen because it was untimely and because Lata had failed to demonstrate due diligence sufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the 90-day filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We recognize equitable tolling of deadlines and numerical limits on motions to reopen during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of counsel’s error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the error. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897-98 (9th Cir.2003). The BIA had substantial evidence to support its finding that Lata was not diligent because Lata did not seek out and retain new counsel until sometime in 2003, which was at least several months after the BIA denied her first motion to reopen, and she did not file the motion until April, 2004. Therefore, we deny Lata’s petition for review of the decision on her second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative removal order.

Gao v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-02(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must normally be filed within 90 days of a final administrative order of removal, exclusion, or deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2004). Here, Gao’s order of removal became final on January 15, 2003, when the BIA denied *183Gao’s appeal. Gao filed his motion to reopen on December 29, 2003, over 90 days after his order was final, and the BIA accordingly did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for untimeliness.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Vasquez v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-02-13(c)(2)

First, Vasquez’s motion was untimely. A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days “after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(A)(i). Vasquez did not file the motion to reopen until April 26, 2005, nearly a year after the final order had been rendered on April 28, 2004.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days.

Chand v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed almost one year after the 90 day time limit had expired. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days).

Section 1003.2 permits an untimely and numerically barred second motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the prior hearing.

Chen v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-02-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

Chen’s second motion was numerically barred and untimely, and therefore could only have been considered by the BIA if Chen had demonstrated that the country conditions had changed, and if “such evidence [wa]s material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes numerical and 90-day limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) and (c)(3)(h) provide an exception for qualifying changed circumstances arising in China, which the birth of U.S. citizen children alone does not establish.

Qiu v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-02-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(3)(h)

The BIA properly found that Qiu’s motion, which was his second motion to reopen, was filed six months beyond the ninety-day time limit imposed under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and that he did not present changed circumstances arising in China that would provide for an exception to the numerical and time limitations provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Qiu’s claim that he feared persecution due to the birth of his “two U.S. citizen children (in addition to his China-born son),” does not, without more, constitute changed circumstances arising in China under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides an exception when changed circumstances in the designated country of deportation are shown.

Dun Zhuo Zheng v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-02-07(c)(2), (c)(3)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a party may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. ... An exception to the time and numerical limitations for a motion to reopen is available to a party under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) if he or she can show changed circumstances in the designated country of deportation. Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by holding that the codification of the Chinese family planning policy did not constitute a changed circumstance exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Tarin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-01(c)(1)

The regulations, in turn, provide that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234. Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new facts or evidence warranting reopening.

Zhong He Chen v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-02-13(c)(1)

The BIA disagreed, addressing first that if Chen’s motion was indeed a motion to reopen, it failed to present any new evidence as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and second, if it was a motion for reconsideration, it was time-barred by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... Even so, as a motion to reopen, the BIA correctly identified that Chen failed to present any new facts or evidence to warrant reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings, subject to four exceptions, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in a motion to reopen to have been unavailable at the previous hearing.

Sene v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-17(c)(2), (c)(1)

First, with regard to the numerical limitation, “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There are four exceptions to this requirement, but Sene does not argue for, nor does she qualify for, any of them. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Moreover, this court has never held that equitable tolling applies to numerical limitations on motions to reopen.3 Second, evidence offered on a motion to reopen must have been unavailable at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Since this is undoubtedly Sene’s second motion to reopen and the proffered evidence was previously available, the BIA’s decision cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and provide pertinent supporting authority.

Zhao v. United State Department of Justice · filed 2006-02-03(b)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law and cite pertinent authority.

Gjoka v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-06(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact in the prior order and support them with pertinent authority.

Cardenas-Aguilar v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2006-02-14(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” INA § 240(c)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (same). ... In this case, we conclude from the record that the BIA correctly found that Cardenas-Aguilar’s motion to reconsider failed to specify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision, and merely reiterated arguments of his direct appeal.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and provide pertinent supporting authority.

Yu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-15(b)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Liu v. Alberto R. Gonzales, 1 · filed 2006-02-21(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration “is a request that the Board reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.” ... As such, it “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of law or fact in the prior BIA decision; merely restating earlier arguments is insufficient.

Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-21(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Gonzalez-Gonzalez’s motion to reconsider because his motion merely restated arguments already presented to the BIA on direct appeal and failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s previous decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2 gives the Board discretion to deny reopening or reconsideration, and requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Elder Alfredo Ortega Barbas v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-02-16(a), (c)(1)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Furthermore, the BIA shall not grant a motion to reopen unless “it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to the exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Bermudes-Cardenas v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-10(c)(2), (c)(3)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), subject to the exceptions in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), a party “may only file one motion to reopen,” which “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” The exceptions do not apply here because Bermudes-Cardenas’s removal was not ordered in absentia.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and provide pertinent supporting authority.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-31(b)(1)

This was a proper basis for denying the motion to reconsider, since Lin’s motion merely restated the factual elements of his claim without specifying errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision, and he did not provide any authority, pertinent or otherwise.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Cui Ping Chen v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2006-02-01(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider a decision of the BIA must be filed within thirty days after the BIA has mailed the decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

The 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen under § 1003.2(c)(2) is nonjurisdictional and may be equitably tolled.

Torabi v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-01(c)(2)

Because the 90-day limitations period under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) is not jurisdictional, the doctrine of equitable tolling may be applied.

The exception to the ninety-day deadline applies only when a motion to reopen for asylum is based on changed conditions or circumstances in the country of nationality or removal, not on a personal change such as divorce.

Haddad v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-09(c)(3)(ii)

Haddad’s divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in Jordan. ... Without a showing of changed country conditions, Haddad was subject to the ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the new evidence is material and was unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Chen v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-02-15(c)(1)

A motion to reopen cannot be granted unless the BIA determines that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2 generally limits petitioners to one motion to reopen, but allows an additional motion to seek asylum or withholding based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of origin.

Kurtishi v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2006-02-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners are normally limited to filing one motion to reopen before the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2004). Petitioners are exempt from this numerical limitation, however, to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances in the country of origin, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the new evidence is immaterial.

Rojas-Iriarte v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-01-30(c)(1)

The BIA is required by regulation to deny a motion to reopen if the new evidence is immaterial. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA determined that Rojas-Iriarte’s new evidence—that the FARC had called Rojas-Iriarte’s wife to threaten him—was cumulative because the IJ and BIA already had considered the fact of many threats to Rojas-Iriarte when he was denied asylum and withholding of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable at the former hearing, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

Huang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-01-30(c)(1), (b)(1)

For the BIA to reopen proceedings, a petitioner must present evidence that is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... A motion to reconsider, on the other hand, must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the supporting evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Patel v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-02-02(c)(1)

The events Patel cited in his motion papers all occurred well before Patel’s August 2003 hearing before the IJ, and as such did not constitute evidence which “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new evidence or materials that were unavailable at the previous hearing.

Liyanto v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-07(c)(1)

The new evidence submitted with the motion was either published before Liyanto’s asylum hearing and could have been made available or the information contained in the articles pertains to events that occurred before Liyanto’s asylum hearing. Liyanto’s motion did not present any new evidence or materials not available at the previous hearing; therefore, the BIA’s decision must be affirmed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(h).

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the last administrative decision was entered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day deadline does not apply when a motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h), and this Circuit has recognized that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may trigger equitable tolling of the 90-day period, see Iavorski v. United States INS, 232 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2000).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen immigration proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding.

Qi Hang Guo v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-02-17(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Here, the BIA correctly denied Guo’s motion as time-barred, as his motion was filed almost two years after the BIA’s January 2003 order, which Guo sought to reopen.

Section 1003.2 limits a person to one motion to reopen, subject to enumerated exceptions, and the court applied those limits to uphold denial of Liu’s second motion.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-07(c)(2), (c)(3)

Even though the BIA erred in denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely filed, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for exceeding the numerical limitations set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Liu has filed two motions to reopen. Moreover, Liu does not argue that his motion falls within one of the enumerated exceptions listed at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not excuse the deadline for a motion to reopen based only on a personal change such as divorce; the exception requires changed conditions or circumstances in the relevant country.

Haddad v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2006-02-09(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s first step was erroneous; correction of the first step makes the second step unnecessary. Haddad’s divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in Jordan.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a petitioner to overcome the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen by showing changed country conditions, but a self-induced change in personal circumstances does not qualify.

Wang v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-02-17(c)(3)(ii)

The law is clear that a petitioner must show changed country conditions in order to exceed the 90-day filing requirement for seeking to reopen removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A self-induced change in personal circumstances cannot suffice.

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

An alien is limited to one motion to reopen removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005), which must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) *881(2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). ... One such exception, the only one invoked here, is if the alien can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2005). ... Such a motion to reopen shall not be granted, however, unless it appears that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding, however, that Lin’s allegations of additional fines for violation of the birth control policy flow directly from her initial claim of fear of persecution for violating China’s family planning policy, and that the Chinese authorities’ discovery of Lin’s illegal departure was not a material new circumstance because it was always reasonably certain that the Chinese border authorities would discover her illegal departure as soon as she returned to China. This reasoning it is not irrational, and therefore not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Nunez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-16(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because Nunez failed to present any evidence to support her assertion that her child would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if she were removed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, unless the changed-circumstances exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) applies.

Kaur v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely as it was filed well after the 90-day filing deadline had lapsed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered”). The motion did not fall within the exception to the deadline found at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) because Kaur did not demonstrate that her claim for relief from removal was legitimized by changed circumstances in India. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Saldivar v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-14(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ first motion to reopen because the motion was not supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and the court treated a motion filed more than three years late, without due diligence, as untimely.

Narayan v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-10(b)(2)

A review of the record and petitioner’s response to the court’s order to show cause indicates that the questions raised in these consolidated petitions for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed more than three years too late and the record indicates that petitioner did not exercise due diligence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact and does not permit using the motion to present previously available new evidence.

Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-14(b)(1)

The BIA and IJ did not abuse their discretion by denying Martinez’s motion to reconsider because Martinez failed to identify any error of law or fact in the IJ’s previous decision and attempted to offer evidence that was previously available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (noting that the purpose of a motion to reconsider is not to present new evidence but to demonstrate that the IJ or BIA erred as a matter of law or fact).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior decision; it is not a vehicle for presenting new evidence.

De Leon v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-14(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying De Leon’s motion to reconsider because De Leon failed to identify any error of law or fact in the IJ’s previous decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (formerly 8 C.F.R. § 3.2); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting that the purpose of a motion to reconsider is not to present new evidence but to demonstrate that the IJ or BIA erred as a matter of law or fact).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Mora v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-14(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia Mora’s motion to reconsider as untimely, because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the [BIA’s] decision”).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen or reconsider any decision on its own initiative, without a party’s request.

Ren, Xue Y. v. Gonzales, Alberto · filed 2006-03-09(a)

The Board itself, moreover, can reopen or reconsider any decision even if no party requests it to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71, 73 (BIA 1998).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a party from filing more than one motion to reopen proceedings.

Fu Chun Pan v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-03(c)(2)

Here, to the extent that Pan’s motion could be read as a motion to reopen the proceedings, the BIA correctly determined that any motion to reopen proceedings would be barred because Pan had already filed one motion to reopen proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law and provide pertinent supporting authority.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-07(b)(1)

As Chen acknowledges, a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). However, Chen did not allege any such errors, but merely restated the same arguments that he initially raised on appeal to the BIA, which BIA had already addressed and properly rejected.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Ni v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-01(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Ni did not allege any errors of fact or law that were not previously raised, nor did she allege any errors of fact or law that could not have been raised before the BIA previously.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA broad discretion to deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to show eligibility for the requested relief.

Orozco v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-14(a)

The BIA acted within its broad discretion in denying Romo Orozco’s motion to reopen because she failed to present evidence that she was eligible for relief, given that she has no qualifying relative. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Ordonez, 345 F.3d at 785 (holding that prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and include supporting pertinent authority.

Li v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-01(b)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen before the BIA to be supported by previously unavailable evidence, and a motion lacking such evidence may be denied.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-15(c)(1)

To the extent Liu’s motion can be construed as a request to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because it was not supported by previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and unavailable, and unavailable means unavailable at the time of the original hearing, not merely unavailable before the Board decides the appeal.

Maricela M. Fernandez, Danelia Fernandez Covarrubias v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2006-03-02(c)(1)

This provision pertains to the facts available at the time of the original hearing, not thereafter.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chen v. Board of Immigration Reviews · filed 2006-03-15(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a party may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen when it is subject to the applicable time and numerical limits and the petitioner has not shown a basis for avoiding those limits.

Miranda v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rojas Miranda’s second motion to reopen as time- and number-barred under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), because Rojas Miranda failed to explain why he did not discover the alleged ineffective assistance of his former counsel or how he was prevented from raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the five years that elapsed between the time when he retained new counsel and the time he filed his second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings unless a statutory exception applies.

Solis-Arenas v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-13(c)(2)

The regulation governing a motion to reopen in immigration court provides that a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings unless one of the statutory exceptions applies.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, but the deadline is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled.

Asere v. Alberto R. Gonzales, United States Attorney General · filed 2006-03-02(c)(2)

Ordinarily, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2006). ... However, we have held that the deadlines for motions to reopen are not jurisdictional, and are therefore subject to equitable tolling.

Subsection (a) permits the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen or reconsider a decision on its own initiative, without a party's request.

Y. Ren v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-09(a)

The Board itself, moreover, can reopen or reconsider any decision even if no party requests it to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71, 73 (BIA 1998).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s limitations apply to a motion to reopen even when the movant later becomes eligible for adjustment of status.

Maksoudian v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-15(c)(2)

We are unpersuaded by Maksoudian’s contention that the BIA violated due process by applying the limitations of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) to his motion to reopen despite his subsequent eligibility for adjustment of status.

Section 1003.2(c) permits reopening a case only when the movant presents new or material evidence supporting the requested relief.

Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-14(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because Cerercer Hernandez failed to present any new or material evidence to support her assertions that her pregnancy was high risk and that her removal to Mexico would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her two United States citizen children. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on new evidence to show that the evidence could not have been presented at the prior removal hearing.

Nouri v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-14(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nouri’s motion to reconsider because he failed to provide any argument in support of his motion, and thereby failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s previous decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir.2003). The record does not support Nouri’s contention that he reasserted in his motion to reconsider the legal arguments he raised in his appeal to the BIA. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nouri’s motion to reopen because he failed to show that the two statements from his relatives could not have been presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) imposes no time bar on a motion to reopen an asylum or withholding case when it is based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Reehal v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-15(e)(3)(ii)

The BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely because the petitioners’ basis for reopening was that country conditions had changed in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) (indicating that no time-bar exists for a motion to reopen asylum or withholding cases “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline when it relies on material evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal that could not have been presented earlier.

Bin Zhao v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-03-08(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen based on changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal is exempt from the 90-day deadline, so long as the evidence is material and could not have been adduced at the proceeding to be reopened.

Section 1003.2(c) permits an alien to seek reopening to reapply for asylum when changed circumstances materially affect the alien’s eligibility for asylum.

Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-03(c)

The regulations allow an alien to seek reopening to reapply for asylum based on changed circumstances that materially affect his eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c); 1208.4(a)(4).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority.

John Wilfredo Laverde Gonzalez v. U.S. Atty. Gener · filed 2006-05-05(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify “the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Thus, Laverde did not specify any “errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision [that were] supported by pertinent authority.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Laverde’s motion for reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation’s exceptions.

Ahmed v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-06-01(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision; a motion failing to comply with these time and numerical limitations, however, may be brought where the alien can establish “changed country conditions” in his country of origin, and offers materials that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at his removal hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(c)(3)(ii) (2005).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law and cite pertinent authority, while section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Velasquez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2006-05-31(b)(1), (c)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). A motion to reopen shall state “new facts” that would be proven at a new hearing, but “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider because they failed to specify any errors of law or fact in the BIA’s decision. Additionally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petitioners’ motion to reopen. First, the proffered new evidence, an affidavit from a law school professor, was not previously unavailable. Additionally, the affidavit was not material and would not have changed the results in the case because it did not address the IJ’s findings that Velasquez’s testimony and asylum application were inconsistent and vague.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given BIA decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying an earlier motion to reconsider.

Velasco v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-05-26(b)(2)

“A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision [of the BIA] and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits only one motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(a) gives the agency limited sua sponte authority to reopen a case in which it rendered a decision.

Zou v. Board of Immigration Reviews · filed 2006-05-22(c)(1), (a)

A party may only file one motion to reopen and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the final order of deportation. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.2(b)(1). However, the agency has limited authority to reopen, sua sponte, any case in which it has rendered a decision. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1); see also In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997). Assuming, hypothetically, that this Court has jurisdiction to review the agency’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and 1003.23(b)(1), neither the IJ nor the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the order.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-05-25(c)(1)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion because he failed to offer material evidence that was not previously available, or to establish a prima facie case for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2 bars repetitive motions to reopen or reconsider, subject to an exception when changed country conditions are shown.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-06-08(b)(2), (c)(3)(h)

Here the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion based on the numerical bars contained in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). This was Singh’s fourth motion to reopen/reconsider, and he made no showing of the “changed country conditions” necessary to get around the numerical bar on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, permits a changed-country-circumstances exception, and requires motions to reconsider to be filed within 30 days without exceptions to the time or numerical limits.

Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-18(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(3)(ii), (b)(2)

An alien is generally limited to one motion to reopen removal proceedings, which must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). A motion that does not comply with these limitations can only be brought where the alien can establish one of four limited exceptions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2005). One such exception, the only one applicable here, is where the alien can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2005). ... Motions to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision the movant is seeking to challenge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). There are no exceptions to the time and numerical limitations imposed upon motions to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the moving party has made a prima facie case for relief.

Singh v. Attorney General · filed 2006-06-06(a)

The decision to deny a motion to reopen is within the Board’s discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001). Under the regulations, the Board “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law, and the BIA may deny the motion when it does not.

Cruz v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-18(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to set forth any error of fact or law in its decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal on the ground that Petitioners have *716no qualifying relatives. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-22(c)(1)

“The regulations, in turn, provide that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234. Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the prior hearing.

Huang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2006-05-19(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reopen, as he failed to establish that the evidence he presented to the BIA was not available or could not have been discovered or presented at his hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-19(c)(1)

Moreover, Chen did not establish that her daughter’s affidavit was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); Kaur v. BIA 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, subject to limited exceptions.

Myteberi v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Service · filed 2006-05-26(c)(2)

With limited exceptions not relevant here, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, whether before the BIA or IJ, and the numerical bar alone constituted a sufficient reason to deny the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, absent an applicable exception.

Xheng v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-05-19(c)(2)

The IJ’s final order of deportation was entered in September 1995. Xheng’s motion to reopen was filed in May 2004, almost nine years after the IJ’s final order. At no point in his brief to this Court does Xheng argue that he fits into an exception to the 90-day rule. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). ... The IJ and BIA did not abuse their discretion in denying Xheng’s motion to reopen as time barred.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion, and because it provides no meaningful standard for that discretion, courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s sua sponte reopening decision.

Rana v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-18(a)

In Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 2003), we held that we had no jurisdiction to review the B IA’s decision on whether to sua sponte reopen a case under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because the regulation provided “no meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.” 5 Although Belay-Gebru concerned a discretionary decision of the BIA, the same logic applies here in regards to the IJ’s decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-01(c)(1)

The regulations, in turn, provide that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005). Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.

Section 1003.2(d) bars a motion to reopen by or on behalf of a person subject to exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings after departing the United States.

Jalloh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-24(d)

The regulations state, “a motion to reopen ... shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is subject to exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). The BIA does not abuse its discretion in denying an applicant’s motion to reopen if she was in removal proceedings and departed the United States prior to filing the motion. See Singh v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.2005). In this case, there is no dispute that Jalloh was placed in removal proceedings in 1999, departed the United States in January 2005, and filed the motion to reopen in February 2005. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Jalloh’s motion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to equitable tolling, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits filing at any time when based on changed country conditions.

Colabewala v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

“The BIA regulations governing motions to reopen final administrative orders provide that such motions must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety day deadline is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled. ... An alien may at any time file a motion to reopen because of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered; the ninety-day deadline does not *738apply to such cases. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to seek relief to include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Rahman v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-08(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Rahman did not provide any supporting documentation with her second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include relevant supporting documentation.

Sanchez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-18(c)(1)

To the extent Adorno Sanchez challenges the Board’s determination that Adorno Sanchez failed to submit any relevant documentation in support of his motion, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), we have jurisdiction, Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir.2006) (explaining that BIA decisions applying the evidentiary requirements for motions to reopen contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) are reviewable), and we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2 leaves motions to reopen or reconsider to the Board’s discretion; under subsection (c)(1), reopening evidence must be material and previously unavailable and the movant bears the burden of persuasion, while subsection (g)(3) permits but does not require a government response.

Liu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2006-05-18(a), (c)(1), (g)(3)

Orders denying motions to reopen are reviewed for abuse of discretion under a “very deferential” standard. ... See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board). ... The regulations provide that the BIA shall not grant a motion to reopen unless “the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Petitioner attempts to shift the burden of persuasion; the Petitioner, as the party seeking to reopen proceedings, had the burden of persuasion to show that his motion was due to be granted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); ... The government was under no obligation to respond. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3) (allowing -- not requiring -- government to respond to motion).

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen, but exempts qualifying asylum or withholding claims based on changed country conditions only when the movant states and supports the new facts and submits the required asylum application materials.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-05-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(1)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, whether before the BIA or the IJ. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This numerical limitation does not apply when a party applies for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the country to which removal has been ordered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii). However, as with any motion to reopen, the movant must state the new facts that would be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion were granted and this statement must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Thus, Singh’s second motion to reopen pertaining to the in absentia order was numerically barred, and Singh failed to offer evidence of changed circumstances to establish that his situation was exempted from the numerical bar. Id. Moreover, Singh failed to submit an application for asylum with his motion to reopen, or any documentation in support of such an application, as required by the BIA’s regulations. Id.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits an alien to file only one motion to reconsider a prior decision.

Sharma v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-06-07(b)(2)

This argument lacks merit. Under Sharma’s reading of the statute, he would not be permitted to file a motion to reconsider the denial of asylum at all. After all, under his reading, the statute only authorizes the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision that an alien is removable. We instead understand the statutory and regulatory framework to allow an alien to file one motion to reconsider a prior decision. As the BIA correctly held, Sharma has already moved once to have the original asylum decision reconsidered. He was entitled to no more attempts to have the same decision reconsidered.