8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and limits a party to one such motion, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Zhu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhu’s third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because it was filed over twelve years after the agency’s final administrative decision and Zhu did not show changed circumstances in China in order to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes strict time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, so a second motion is barred when it does not qualify for an applicable exception.

Alkahabbaz v. Holder · filed 2013-06-26(c)(2)

Nonetheless, on consideration of the merits, we hold the BIA need not have addressed his prima facie eligibility for relief under the CAT because it reasonably concluded that his second motion to reopen was both time and number-barred, and Alkahabbaz’s motion failed to establish changed conditions in Syria sufficient to excuse the strict time and numerical limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (where a motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions, the inquiry is a comparison between evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion and those that existed at the time of the merits hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ping Peng Lan v. Holder · filed 2013-07-22(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Lan’s 2011 motion was untimely and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen, and the final administrative decision was issued in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision and bars a second motion to reopen.

Oladokun v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-30(c)(2)

An alien must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which the final administrative decision is entered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly determined that Oladokun’s motion to reopen was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision. See § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, an alien may file only one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date of the final order of removal. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); § 1003.2(c)(2). Given that Oladokun filed a motion to reopen on April 13, 2012, the current motion to reopen is also number barred. See § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3) permits the time and numerical limits to be excused when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Zhu v. Holder · filed 2013-08-08(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered and is permitted to file only one such motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Petitioners contend, however, that the Chinese government’s awareness of Zhu’s pro-democracy activities in the United States constitutes a material change in country conditions excusing their motion from the applicable time and numerical limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Notwithstanding Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that they failed to demonstrate a material change of conditions in China. ... As the BIA reasonably determined, Zhu’s membership in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) and pro-democracy activities in the United States constitute changed personal circumstances, which are insufficient to excuse the untimely and number-barred filing of Petitioners’ motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-country-conditions exception; a motion to remand filed before that final decision does not trigger the numerical bar or require reliance on that exception.

Zhao v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA erred in holding that Zhao’s motion to reopen was numerically barred. Generally, “an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). There are exceptions to the numerical and timeliness requirements if the respondent can establish “changed country conditions arising in . . . the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). As the government properly concedes, Zhao’s first motion to remand was filed before a final administrative decision in her case, so it does not implicate 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, Zhao is not required to meet the “changed country conditions” standard in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days of the final order, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Muyingo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-09(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Muyingo’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because it was his fourth motion to reopen and filed more than 90 days after the BIA issued its final order, and Muyingo failed to present the material evidence of changed circumstances in Uganda that was required to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limits for filing motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Lopez v. Holder · filed 2013-09-10(c)(2)

In general, an alien may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, Mr. Lopez’s second motion was filed more than a decade after the Board’s 1997 decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits denial of a motion to reopen filed outside the time limit and after the numerical limit when no exception applies.

Rossaty v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Rossaty’s motion to reopen as untimely and number barred, where Rossaty filed his motion approximately four years after his order of removal became administratively final, had filed at least seven prior motions to reopen, and did not demonstrate the applicability of any exception to the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than five years after the final decision was untimely and number-barred.

Aujla v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aujla’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Aujla failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a successive motion to reopen when it is untimely and exceeds the permitted number of motions, absent an applicable exception.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion as untimely and number-barred, where the successive motion was filed more than eleven years after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678-80 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who establishes that he suffered from deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to specified exceptions.

Villalvazo v. Holder Jr. · filed 2013-10-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villalvazo’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the successive motion was filed more than three years after her removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Villalvazo failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) and (c)(2) impose filing deadlines and one-motion numerical limits on motions to reconsider and reopen.

Melendez-Amaya v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-15(b)(2) (c)(2)

Because the motion to reconsider was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s last order of 13 October 2011, and because the motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s dismissal of the appeal on 30 March 2011, the BIA properly determined Melendez’ motions were untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A)-(B), (c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). Moreover, an alien may file only one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Given that Melendez filed a motion to reopen on 16 May 2011, the current motion to reopen also was number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ameti v. Holder · filed 2013-10-21(c)(2)

A petitioner may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date the final administrative decision was rendered, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen.

Lal v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-06(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lal’s third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Lal failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limits for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen as time- and number-barred unless the movant qualifies for an exception under § 1003.2(c)(3).

Dong v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-09(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dong’s motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), where Dong failed to demonstrate he qualified for an exception to the limitations on motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (we “defer to the BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”) (citation omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen; a motion filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order is untimely absent a regulatory exception.

Avetisyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Avetisyan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to establish prima facie eligibility for relief and discussing consequences of lack of credibility).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, absent regulatory exceptions.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 995-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to establish prima facie eligibility for relief and discussing consequences of lack of credibility).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2014-05-09(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Singh’s 2013 motion was untimely and number barred because he filed four motions to reopen since he was ordered removed in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2014-05-09(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2014-05-19(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Lin’s 2010 motion–her third such motion–was untimely, as her final administrative order was issued in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, and the procedural requirements in § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims.

Murga-Aquino v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-07-30(c)(2), (c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Murga-Aquino’s motion to reopen as untimely and number barred. First, his motion, being his second motion to reopen and having been filed approximately ten years after his deportation order became administratively final, exceeded the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Our case law forecloses Murga-Aquino’s contention that his motion to reopen, to the extent that it seeks a hearing on his request for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), is exempt from the general filing limitations. See Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely and number-barred motions to reopen, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed circumstances arise in the country of removal; Zhang did not qualify for that exception.

Zhang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhang’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and number-barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Zhang failed to demonstrate that he qualified for the exception to the time and numerical limitations for filing motions to reopen based on materially changed circumstances arising in China, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision and generally permits only one such motion.

Kolami v. Holder · filed 2015-03-13(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered and is permitted to file only one such motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Petitioners’ second and third motions to reopen, filed in April 2012 and September 2013, were untimely and number-barred because their orders of removal became final in 2004. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Al Qasem Asaad v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Asaad’s second motion to reopen as time- and number-barred, where Asaad filed the motion more than five years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and did not establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen and requires filing it within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling when deception, fraud, or error prevented timely filing and the petitioner acted diligently.

Gualajara v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-09(c)(2)

A petitioner is limited to one motion to reopen her removal proceedings, and the motion must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, we permit equitable tolling of “deadlines and numerical limits on motions to reopen or reconsider during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal.

Azevedo-Avila v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-09-22(c)(2)

An alien generally may file one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and must file such a motion within 90 days of the date of a final administrative order of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen when it is filed outside the applicable time limit and exceeds the one-motion limit.

McBarango v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying McBarango’s second motion to reopen, filed five years after his order of removal became final, as time- and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits one motion to reopen within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from those limits.

Wei v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time and numerical limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it is untimely and number-barred.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-02(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s third motion to reopen because it was untimely and number-barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in India to qualify for a regulatory exception for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Patel v. INS, 741 F.2d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[I]n the context of a motion to reopen, the BIA is not required to consider allegations unsupported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely and number-barred when it is filed more than six years after the BIA's final order.

Urie v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-02(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Urie’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Urie failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in Nigeria to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, so a motion filed more than three years after the BIA’s final order may be denied as untimely and number-barred.

Perez v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where he filed his motion more than three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Perez failed to establish changed circumstances in El Salvador or any other qualification for a regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-89 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen when it is outside the applicable numerical and time limits.

Espinosa v. Lynch · filed 2016-09-06(c)(2)

So construed, the motion was clearly numerically and temporally barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen, filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Kurtaj v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-04-25(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen deportation proceedings, which must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was entered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c) limits motions to reopen by time and number, subject to an exception for asylum motions based on materially changed country conditions.

Xia v. Sessions · filed 2017-05-09(c)

It is undisputed that Xia’s motions to reopen were untimely filed more than 13 years after the IJ’s removal order became final, and that her second motion was number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c)(7) (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). These time and number limitations do not apply, however, if the motion is to reopen in order to apply for asylum and “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4)(i). ... The BIA did not err in finding that Xia failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Chand v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-11-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chand’s motion to reopen as time and number barred, where it was his third such motion, he filed it more than eleven years after the filing deadline, and he failed to demonstrate that any exception to the time or number bars was warranted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(i)-(iv) & (3); Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a second motion to reopen untimely and number-barred when filed over 12 years after the final removal order, absent an applicable exception.

Velasquez v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-02-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ordonez Velasquez’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where he filed it over 12 years after his order of removal became final, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception applies.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by time and number, subject to equitable tolling when the petitioner shows due diligence.

Hovsepyan v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-08-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hovsepyan’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where she filed the motion more than ten years after the filing deadline, and did not present sufficient evidence of due diligence for equitable tolling of the deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not treat an approved I-140 immigrant petition as an exception to the temporal and numerical limits on motions to reopen.

N'Guessan v. Barr · filed 2019-03-06(c)(3)

But such an approved petition does not qualify as an exception to the temporal and numerical restrictions on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2018).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions; an approved visa petition and possible adjustment of status do not excuse those limitations.

Daikoku v. Barr · filed 2019-05-15(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Daikoku’s 2016 motion as untimely and number barred because it was his third motion to reopen filed more than three years after his removal order became final in 2012. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (limiting noncitizens to one motion to reopen and setting a 90-day deadline for such motions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). His wife’s approved visa petition and his purported eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status did not excuse the applicable time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv) (listing exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same); see also Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that changed personal circumstances do not excuse the time and number limitations for motions to reopen); Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (“[U]ntimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board . . . .”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen; a second motion filed nine years after the BIA’s final order is untimely and numerically barred.

Le Wang v. Barr · filed 2019-06-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where he filed it nine years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where he failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions in China to qualify for an exception to the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, so a motion filed fifteen years after the BIA’s final order was untimely and numerically barred.

Zacharia v. Barr · filed 2019-06-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zacharia’s third motion to reopen1 as untimely and numerically barred where he filed the motion fifteen years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Indonesia to qualify for an exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding “that the procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after entry of a final order of removal.

Soto v. Barr · filed 2019-08-30(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days after the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2019).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely and successive motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an exception for materially changed country conditions; the exception did not apply because Guan showed no material change.

Guan v. Barr · filed 2019-10-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Guan’s motion to reopen was untimely and number barred because it was his second motion to reopen filed more than 21 years after he was ordered deported. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time and numerical limitations do not apply if the motion is to reopen proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, because Guan did not establish a material change in conditions in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely and number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to exceptions.

Kolodziejczyk v. Barr · filed 2020-03-11(c)(2)

With certain exceptions inapplicable here, an alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one motion to reopen and must do so no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Kolodziejczyk’s December 2017 and July 2018 motions to reopen were untimely and number-barred because they were his second and third motions to reopen and he filed them more than four years after 2013, when the BIA affirmed the IJ’s removal order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, subject to the regulation's exceptions.

Avoyan v. Barr · filed 2020-07-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Avoyan’s second, untimely motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), where he failed to qualify for an exception to the time and number limitations, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Joshue v. Barr · filed 2020-09-18(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Joshue’s 2017 motion was her second motion to reopen and was untimely filed 15 years after her removal order. None of the statutory and regulatory exceptions to the time and number bars apply here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i)–(iv).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after a final administrative order of removal.

Boldmyagmar v. Barr · filed 2020-12-14(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of a final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Go, 744 F.3d at 607. Boldmyagmar’s third motion to reopen, filed on March 1, 2018—ten years after the BIA issued its final order of removal in his case—is admittedly time- and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, including barring a second motion filed more than 14 years after the removal order.

Doucoure v. Barr · filed 2020-12-22(c)(2)

It is undisputed that Doucoure’s motion to reopen was untimely and number barred because it was his second motion to reopen filed more than 14 years after he was ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) applies time and numerical limitations to motions to reopen removal proceedings.

Kojongian v. Garland · filed 2021-04-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kojongian’s motion to reopen as untimely and number barred, where it was filed more than eleven years after the order of removal became final and was beyond the numerical limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Kojongian did not establish changed country conditions in Indonesia that are material to his claim for relief, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (requiring material evidence of changed circumstances to qualify for exception to the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one filing within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Tepozteco-Rios v. Garland · filed 2021-08-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tepozteco-Rios’s untimely and number barred motion to reopen and remand based on changed country conditions where he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final administrative order.

Wilson v. Garland · filed 2022-03-03(c)(2)

It is clear that Wilson’s 2019 motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred because it was her second motion and was filed 23 years after she was ordered to be deported, in 1996. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely and successive motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3) exempts qualifying asylum motions based on material changed country conditions.

Najera-Torres v. Garland · filed 2022-03-09(c)(2), (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Najera-Torres’s 2017 motion was untimely and number-barred because it was her second motion to reopen and she filed it more than 14 years after she was ordered removed in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... These time and number limits, however, do not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country . . . to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... Because the BIA reasonably concluded that Najera-Torres failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions in Honduras, it did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion as untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Zaber v. Garland · filed 2022-07-26(c)(2)

Zaber could properly file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative removal order and bars a second motion to reopen, subject to applicable exceptions.

Valencia-Torres v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2023-02-08(c)(2)

Her motion is time barred because it was filed more than ninety days after the final administrative removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Her motion is also number barred because it is her second motion to reopen her removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final removal order, subject to an exception for changed country conditions.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2023-06-15(c)(2)

Unless an exception applies, a noncitizen who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not list purported eligibility for cancellation of removal as an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen.

Graham v. Garland · filed 2023-11-27(c)(3)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one statutory motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Graham’s April 29, 2020 motion to reopen was untimely and numerically-barred because it was his second motion to reopen and it was filed almost two years after his removal order became final in 2018. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not err in finding that Graham’s purported eligibility for cancellation of removal was not an enumerated basis for excusing the time or number limits. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a movant to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to equitable tolling when qualifying deception, fraud, or error prevented timely filing and the movant acted diligently.

Overton v. Garland · filed 2024-02-16(c)(2)

Generally, a movant is limited to one motion to reopen, which must be filed “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, equitable tolling of the deadlines and numerical limits for a motion to reopen is “available when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, which includes receiving ineffective assistance of counsel, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.” ... We agree with the BIA’s determination that “[e]ven if the filing deadline were tolled until discovery of the alleged ineffectiveness, [the motion to reopen] would still be untimely,” as it was filed more than 90 days after Overton learned of prior counsels’ alleged ineffective assistance.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to the exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Nunes v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2024-03-01(c)(2), (c)(3)

A noncitizen may file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion to reopen at issue is Nunes’s fourth. His final removal order was issued in 2010, and he did not file this motion to reopen until 2022. 5 While there are exceptions to these requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), they are not applicable here.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Castro v. Garland · filed 2024-06-05(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Castro’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred and untimely where it was filed over twenty-four years after the final deportation order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (party may file only one motion to reopen and it must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision), and Castro failed to establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To qualify for equitable tolling on account of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate . . . due diligence in discovering counsel’s fraud or error . . . .”); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (factors relevant to the due diligence inquiry).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen; a numerically barred motion cannot be used to pursue adjustment of status.

Singh v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-04-17(c)(2)

Because Singh’s motion was numerically barred, he did not meet the requirements for a motion to reopen to allow pursuit of adjustment of status.

A motion to reopen must present previously unavailable evidence and is subject to a numerical limit.

Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-01(c)(1), (c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen because it was numerically barred and presented evidence that was previously available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) & (2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-10-05(c)(2)

The BIA properly denied Singh’s third motion to reopen as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (an alien may *50file only one motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a third motion to reopen unless the movant establishes an exception, such as changed country conditions.

Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-02(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that petitioner’s third motion to reopen was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Also, petitioner failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to establish an exception to the bar.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen.

Copto-Lavalle v. Holder · filed 2010-08-25(c)(2)

We find the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Copto-Lavalle’s second motion to reopen because it was numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits when a motion to reopen may be filed and how many such motions may be filed.

Basil-Samms v. Whitaker · filed 2019-01-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Basil-Samms’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed 13 years after the agency’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where the BIA had previously denied Basil-Samms’s first motion to reopen and rescind his in absentia removal order based on lack of notice, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (“[a]n alien may only file one motion” to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal order); Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process challenge).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Peralta-Tejeda v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-29(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(b)(1). ... “This is hardly a successful attempt to specify errors. We cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion that was based on such a generic complaint.”

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA's decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-30(b)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao v. DOJ, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2 supports treating a motion based only on documents previously submitted to the Board as a motion for reconsideration rather than a motion to reopen.

Tounsadi v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-04

Tounsadi is incorrect that the Board erred in construing the motion to reopen as a motion for reconsideration. In the motion, he merely sought to introduce documents which he admits he submitted to the Board during the appeal of the visa petition.

Section 1003.2(b) supports denial of reconsideration when the movant fails to allege an error of law or fact.

Zapeta-Osorio v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-11(b)

He also failed to allege an error of law or fact, the discovery of new evidence, or a change in circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), (c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by previously unavailable evidence, while subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Garcia v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-12(c)(1) and (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s motion to reopen because Garcia failed to support the motion with previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 784-85 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that the movant must support a motion to reopen with new evidence). Additionally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because Garcia failed to specify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s previous decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”); see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a reconsideration motion to identify specific factual or legal errors and cite supporting authority, while subsection (c)(1) permits reopening only when material evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Mario Enrique Restrepo Namen v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-01-17(b)(1), (c)(1)

A proper motion for reconsideration “shall specify the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). In the instant case, Restrepo failed to identify in his motion for reconsideration any specific legal or factual errors on the part of the BIA in dismissing Restrepo’s appeal of the IJ’s decision. ... Thus, Restrepo did not specify, or even generally identify, any “errors of fact or law” in the BIA’s prior decision dismissing Restrepo’s appeal from the IJ’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Finally, to the extent Restrepo was moving to reopen the proceedings, the regulations provide that such a motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Restrepo failed to cite to evidence in his motion that he could not have presented during his counseled evidentiary hearing. ... Thus, Restrepo failed to show that this evidence was “not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the time of his asylum hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of law or fact in the prior order and support them with pertinent authority.

Magda Catalina Merino Barreto v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-01-26(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Petitioner’s motion to reconsider failed to specify any errors of law or fact in the IJ’s or the BIA’s orders. ... Given the foregoing circumstances, we could not say that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law and support them with pertinent authority.

Zhao v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2006-03-30(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Zhao did not allege any errors of fact or law that were not previously raised.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Jin Long Yang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-06(b)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-12(b)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the Board of Immigration Appeals' prior decision.

Gao v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-24(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision, and failure to do so supports denial of the motion.

Guillermo v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-31(b)(1)

The Board acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because petitioners failed to demonstrate any errors of fact or law in the Board’s earlier decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to materially affect the case's outcome.

Kaur v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-07(b), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. ... In order to warrant reopening, the new evidence must materially affect the outcome of the case.

A motion to reconsider must identify the factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Clara M. de los Angeles Segura Silva v. U.S. Atty. · filed 2006-08-28(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”

Section 1003.2 gives the BIA discretion to grant or deny reconsideration and requires a reconsideration motion to identify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority.

Hippolyte v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-19(a), (b)(1)

The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is entirely within the discretion of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Consequently, we review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. ... “A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Hippolyte, however, did not address whether the BIA erred as a matter of fact or law in not addressing such claim in its order. ... For these reasons, the BIA did not act in an arbitrary or irrational manner when it denied Hippolyte’s motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Vasquez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-20(b)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, a motion to reconsider a BIA decision must be filed within thirty days of the decision and must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)-(2). Here, Vasquez’s motion failed to identify errors of fact or law, failed to cite supporting authority, and failed to establish that the IJ erred in finding the asylum application untimely or that his testimony was incredible.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact in the prior decision.

Shang v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-04-05(b)

In denying the motion, the BIA properly relied on Shang’s failure to identify any legal or factual error in its prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a legal or factual error, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires material, previously unavailable evidence for a motion to reopen.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-19(b), (c)(1)

In declining to reconsider its prior decision, the BIA properly relied on Chen’s failure to identify any legal or factual error in its prior decision denying his appeal from the IJ’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90. ... However, because Chen failed to offer material and previously unavailable evidence in support of his new claim, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), the BIA’s denial of Chen’s motion would not have even been an abuse of discretion if the motion had been construed as a motion to reopen.

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Singh’s first motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Garzon v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Lopez Garzon’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

de Chavez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal on the basis that petitioners had presented insufficient evidence of hardship to a qualifying relative. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Lucio-Zamora v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(b)(1)

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the BIA did consider their arguments and petitioners’ motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Argueta-Lazo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(b)(1)

The BIA also acted within its discretion in denying Argueta-Lazo’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and requires it to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Medina v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(b)

A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and such a motion shall be filed not later than thirty days after the mailing of the decision.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and cite pertinent supporting authority.

Khan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-26(b)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given BIA decision and requires that it be filed within thirty days after the decision is mailed.

Jalloh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-31(b)(2)

Such an argument is properly made in a motion to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (explaining that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority). A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and this motion must be filed with the BIA within thirty days after the mailing of the BIA decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Here, even if the BIA had construed Jalloh’s filing as a motion to reconsider, Jalloh’s motion would have been untimely, as it was filed well beyond the thirty-day deadline. 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(b)(2); see also Jie Chen v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 76, 78 n. 5 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (describing a filing as a “motion to reopen” does not allow a petitioner to avoid the thirty-day time limit governing motions to reconsider).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires reconsideration motions to be filed within 30 days.

Jiang v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-27(c)(1), (b)(1)

On a motion to reopen, the alien must present evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision it seeks to challenge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reconsider as untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Olvera-Segoviano v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-27(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s order deeming their applications for cancellation of removal abandoned. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) generally requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within thirty days of the agency decision, while subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte reconsideration authority whose exercise is committed to its discretion.

Ochoa-Ortuno v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-27(b)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ochoa-Ortuno’s September 20, 2005 motion to reconsider as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (motions to reconsider must generally be filed within thirty days of the agency decision). Consequently, we do not reach Ochoa-Ortuno’s contentions that the motion should have been granted on the merits. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to invoke its authority to reconsider sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that “the decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion.”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Alfonso v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-05(b)(1)

Motions to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Petitioners’ motion to reconsider did not identify any errors of law or fact in the previous BIA decision. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to specify factual or legal errors and permits reopening when new, material evidence was unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Zaytseva v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-06-26(b)(1), (c)(1)

Motions to reconsider are filed before the immigration officer or court or the BIA, for review of claimed errors in the law or facts. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5(a)(3), 1003.2(b), and 1003.23(b)(2). “A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(b)(1). ... Because Zaytseva’s motion to reconsider failed to specify errors of law or fact in the BIA’s August 29, 2007, decision, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion on these grounds. ... Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1) and 1003.23(b)(3); see also Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir. 2005).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior Board order.

Contreras v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-02(b)(1)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order affirming the IJ’s decision to deny cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Colunga v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-07(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law, and requires a motion to reopen to state new facts, provide supporting evidence, and generally be filed within 90 days.

Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-07-08(b)(1), (c)(1), (c)(2)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C), INA § 240(c)(6)(C). ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)). ... “A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B), INA § 240(c)(7)(B). ... A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i). ... After reviewing the record, we conclude in this case that the BIA did not make any factual or legal errors in its denial of the motion to reopen. Furthermore, Ramos’s arguments in his motion to reconsider reiterated previously made arguments or alleged new facts that should have been alleged in the motion to reopen. Thus, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to reconsider. Accordingly, we deny Ramos’s petition for review.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and support them with affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Sultana v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-08(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Sultana’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Sultana’s motion to reopen because Sultana failed to set forth new facts or present new evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to deny reconsideration when the movant merely repeats contentions that were already considered and rejected on direct appeal.

Owusu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration where petitioner reiterated the contentions he made on direct appeal that had already been considered and rejected. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to specify errors of law or fact in the prior decision.

Sugihjanto v. Attorney General · filed 2008-08-14(b)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration since Sugihjanto merely reiterated the same arguments he made in his BIA brief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision).

Section 1003.2(b) governs motions to reconsider, which seek correction of alleged errors of fact or law.

Doissaint v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(b)

A motion to reconsider seeks to correct alleged errors of fact or law. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). A motion to reopen, on the other hand, is purely fact-based, seeking to present newly discovered facts or changed circumstances since a petitioner’s hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a legal or factual error in the prior decision, rather than raise new arguments.

Gunawan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-18(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gunawan’s motion to reconsider because she failed to assert any legal or factual error in the BIA’s dismissal of her appeal or any argument that the BIA failed to consider and, instead, raised additional arguments challenging the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and the IJ’s conduct during the merits hearing.

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ prior decision.

Martinez-Salgado v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-23(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Martinez-Salgado’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Kaur v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-25(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s decision denying her motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

Morales v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-27(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior order.

Espinoza v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-27(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Espinoza’s motion to reconsider because the motion did not identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s December 2004 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ prior decision.

Abdallah v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-02(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Abdallah’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify legal or factual error, while a motion to reopen must present new evidence.

Jimenez-Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-11(b)

A motion to reopen must provide new evidence, and a request for reconsideration must be predicated upon legal or factual error. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) & (7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) & (c)(1). Because petitioners’ motion failed to meet those requirements, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen and reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law, and section 1003.2(c)(1) sets requirements for evidence supporting a motion to reopen or remand.

Sanchez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-26(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Sanchez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). The BIA properly determined that remand was not warranted because the evidence Sanchez submitted did not meet the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) and did not establish a prima facie case of hardship.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Damo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-30(b)(1)

The agency also acted within its discretion in denying Damo’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Cabrales v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Mártir Cabrales’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Torres-Gonzalez v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Torres-Gonzalez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify specific errors of fact or law and provide pertinent authority; merely repeating arguments previously rejected does not satisfy that requirement.

Duque v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-02-13(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). However, a motion to reconsider that merely restates the arguments that the BIA previously rejected provides no reason for the BIA to change its prior decision. See Calle, 504 F.3d at 1329. “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Hernandez v. Holder · filed 2009-03-02(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Hernandez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s July 9, 2003 decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

De La Cruz v. Holder · filed 2009-03-02(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Diaz De La Cruz’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Garcilazo-Pamnani v. Holder · filed 2009-03-25(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order dismissing the underlying appeal.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA order.

Villapando-Becerra v. Holder · filed 2009-03-27(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s order.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Yalcin v. Holder · filed 2009-04-06(b)(1)

Here, the BIA properly denied Yalcin’s motion to reconsider where he failed to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law.

Mitrokhin v. Holder · filed 2009-04-15(b)(1)

In denying Mitrokhin’s motion to reconsider its denial of his first motion, the BIA found that he had not specified any error of fact or law as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). We agree.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Di Lu v. Holder · filed 2009-05-12(b)(1)

To the extent that Lu challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider, we find that the BIA reasonably denied his motion where he failed to specify errors of fact or law in its prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify specific factual or legal errors in the prior decision and cannot merely repeat arguments previously presented.

Borneo v. Us Attorney General · filed 2011-11-10(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” ... Accordingly, “merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to show that the prior Board decision contained a material error of fact or law.

Arrobo v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-01-27(b)(1)

Motions to reconsider must demonstrate that the earlier Board decision suffered from a material error of fact or law. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Cajamarca v. Holder · filed 2012-05-31(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “specify errors of fact or law in the [challenged BIA decision] and [] be supported by pertinent authority.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. Mukasey, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001). The BIA does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider when the movant repeats arguments the BIA has already rejected. See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111. Because Cajamarca merely reiterated his previously rejected arguments rather than identifying errors of fact or law in the BIA’s denial of reopening, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to identify a material error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Picciotto v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-09-18(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Picciotto’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any material error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order pretermitting Picciotto’s application for cancellation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) limits a motion to reconsider to identifying factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision and supporting them with pertinent authority, rather than raising previously available new grounds for relief.

Lopez v. Holder · filed 2013-01-04(b)(1)

Under the terms of the regulation, "[a] motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority." Id. ... Under this approach, "[a] motion to reconsider is not a mechanism by which a party may file a new brief before the [BIA] raising additional legal arguments that are unrelated to those issues raised before the [IJ] and on appeal" or arguments that "could have been raised earlier in the proceedings." Id. This gloss is wholly consistent with the text of the implementing regulation as it now stands. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Yeremin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “The purpose of a motion to reconsider is the correction of legal or factual errors that occurred in the BIA’s original decision.” Mu Ju Li v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

Dai Shin Sun v. Holder · filed 2013-07-18(b)(1)

The BIA reasonably denied Sun’s motion to reconsider because his additional attempts to explain his demeanor at his merits hearing and an inconsistency in the record of his underlying proceedings failed to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the challenged decision.

Vann v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-10(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must identify some error of fact or law in the challenged decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see Zavala-Rios v. Holder, 482 F. App’x 935, 936 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the Board’s prior decision.

Cespedes v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-11(b)

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of law or fact in the Board’s prior decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Liang v. Holder · filed 2013-10-17(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior order.

Fang Cheng v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-21(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cheng’s motion to reconsider where the motion did not identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior order denying her motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to state the reasons for the motion by specifying the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision.

Cungachi v. Holder · filed 2013-10-25(b)(1)

"A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision . . . ." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ven v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 357, 360 (1st Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of law or fact in the prior order and support them with pertinent authority; merely reiterating previously rejected arguments is insufficient.

Latipov v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-04-02(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). A motion to reconsider that merely reiterates arguments that the BIA previously rejected provides no reason for the BIA to change its decision, and “does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Lenis Irene Arboleda Bohorguez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-08-22(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and must be supported by pertinent authority. ... Regardless of whether Arboleda Bohorguez’s August 2013 motion to reconsider was number-barred, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion, which identified no errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

A motion to reconsider before the BIA must identify errors of fact or law in its previous decision.

Polyakov v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-10-21(b)(1)

In addition, because the Polyakovs could not identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s previous decision, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Polyakovs’ motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify specific factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; repeating earlier arguments is insufficient.

Leon-Jesus v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-05-14(b)(1)

A properly presented motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also INA § 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6). However, “merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute specifying . . . errors of fact or law as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) allows only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying an earlier motion to reconsider.

Avellaneda v. U.S. Attorney Gen. · filed 2009-06-05(b)(2)

In this case, the BIA correctly found that Avellaneda’s second reconsideration motion was barred by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). That regulation provides in pertinent part: “A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of the regulation expressly prohibited Avellaneda from filing a motion to reconsider the denial of her first reconsideration motion.

Section 1003.2 permits only one motion to reconsider a given BIA decision, bars reconsideration of a decision denying a prior reconsideration motion, distinguishes reopening motions based on new facts, treats alleged factual errors as grounds for reconsideration, and preserves the BIA's discretionary authority to reconsider a case sua sponte.

Liang v. Bondi · filed 2025-02-21(b)(2), (c)(1), (b)(1), (a)

“[a] party may file only one motion to reconsider any given [BIA] decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); ... Unlike a motion to reconsider, a motion to reopen is used to introduce new, material facts that were previously “not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the [petitioner’s] former hearing,” which takes place before an IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (stating that alleged “errors of fact” in BIA decisions should be raised through a motion to reconsider); ... Therefore, because Liang’s second motion clearly seeks “reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider,” it is explicitly prohibited by regulation and number-barred. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); ... At any time, the BIA may “reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) permits an alien to seek reconsideration by identifying specific errors of fact or law, but merely restating arguments the BIA previously rejected is not a proper ground for reconsideration.

Reyes v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-06-11(b)(1)

An alien may file a motion to reconsider to point out specific errors of fact or law in the decision of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider on this basis because a motion to reconsider that merely restates the arguments that the BIA previously rejected does not provide proper grounds for reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior order.

Gonzalez v. Holder · filed 2009-07-02(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s March 17, 2005 order.

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Sherpa v. Holder · filed 2009-07-22(b)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA decision and support those claims with pertinent authority.

Williams v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Alejandre v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying reopening.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion for reconsideration that raises no new legal arguments or changes in the law.

Perlas v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-24(b)(1)

Moreover, we have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that, even if Perlas had challenged the BIA’s decision denying her motion for reconsideration, the BIA acted well within its discretion in denying the motion, as it failed to raise any new legal arguments or allege any changes in the law.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the challenged order.

Sanchez v. Holder · filed 2009-08-13(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s April 11, 2006, order denying their previous motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Diaz v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-08-21(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “[M]erely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Calle, 504 F.3d at 1329.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Maria Claudia Florez Ordonez v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2009-09-28(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”