8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while exceptions apply for certain asylum or withholding claims based on material changed country circumstances and the BIA retains discretion to deny reopening even when prima facie eligibility is shown.

Velsaco v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-07-26(c)(2)

Generally, “an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). An exception to the timely filing requirement exists if the alien is reapplying for asylum and withholding of removal “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). However, the BIA has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Thus, her motion to reopen based upon her marriage was presented in her second motion to reopen, approximately 14 months after the BIA had affirmed the IJ’s order of removal on February 1, 2005. Accordingly, her motion was number-barred and time-barred, and it did not fit the “changed country circumstances” exception to the time-bar. ... Accordingly, the BIA properly denied that motion based upon time and number limitations, and did not abuse its discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation was ordered; derivative asylee status approved in the United States does not qualify.

He Xiang Qiu v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-21(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed no later than ninety days after the final administrative decision sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). While the regulations enumerate exceptions to this general rule, the BIA properly found that Qiu did not establish any such exceptions. ... The relevant portion of the regulation provides that the time and numerical limitations will not apply if the motion to reopen is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). The changed circumstance that Qiu alleges, namely, the approval of his derivative asylee status in the United States, is a personal circumstance that did not arise in his country of nationality.

Section 1003.2(c) permits the BIA to deny a second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred when the movant does not establish an applicable exception based on changed country conditions.

Amayo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-23(c)

The BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that petitioners’ second motion to reopen was both untimely and numerically-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Moreover, for the reasons stated by the BIA in its order denying the motion, we agree that petitioners failed to establish an exception to these bars, because petitioners failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a numerical limitation that can bar a second motion to reopen seeking the same relief.

Aquino v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in treating this second motion as seeking the same relief as the first motion to reopen and therefore being barred by a numerical limitation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after the challenged decision.

Wang v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-09-04(c)(2)

With limited exceptions, an alien may file only one motion to reopen deportation proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the decision being challenged. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a numerical bar on motions to reopen, and denying a motion as numerically barred did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Perez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-13(c)(2)

Specifically, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to reopen as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that BIA denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision sought to be reopened.

Kadir v. Clement · filed 2007-09-17(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion as untimely and numerically barred, as it was their third motion to reopen and it was not filed within 90 days of the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of their claims for relief. The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen, and that such motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions.

Teodores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this ease, that “a party may file only one motion to reopen....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal; section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and its discretionary decision not to do so is not judicially reviewable.

Sabhari v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-10(c)(2), (a)

In a removal proceeding, an alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (emphasis added). This motion must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, Sabhari’s motion to reopen fails because it is his second motion to reopen, and it was filed well beyond 90 days. In fact, it came years after the final administrative order of removal. ... The governing regulations also provide that the BIA may reopen proceedings on its own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, we recently held, en banc, that the decision whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is committed to the BIA’s discretion by law and that we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary decision. Tamenut v. Mukasey, No. 05-4418, 2008 WL 637617 (8th Cir. Mar.11, 2008) (en banc) (published per curiam). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Sabhari’s proceedings sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the BIA decision is mailed.

Ramirez-Guerrero v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-17(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a single motion to reopen may be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This motion, petitioners’ second motion to reopen, was filed over two years after mailing of the BIA’s decision. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ second motion to reopen as both time- and number-barred.

Subsections (c)(2) and (3) impose time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, subject to specified exceptions supported by additional evidence.

Hernandez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-21(c)(2) and (3)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioners’ motion was untimely, as well as number-barred, and the petitioners have not provided additional evidence to support an exception to the numerical or time limits for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2) and (3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits a party to file only one motion to reopen, so a second motion is barred by the numerical limit.

Jimenez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-22(c)(2)

The regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as barred by numerical limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires filing it within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to exceptions.

Neris-Maria v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-23(c)(2)

With certain exceptions not applicable here, a party may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. ... Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Neris-Maria’s third motion to reopen was both number and time-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, and an asylum application based on changed personal circumstances must proceed through a motion to reopen subject to those time and number limits.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-02(c)(2)

One statute and its regulation provide that an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to one motion to reopen the removal proceedings, which motion must be filed within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal.1 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Applying the same interpretation to Chen, who is subject to a final order of removal, the BIA properly concluded that Chen could apply for asylum only in connection with a motion to reopen, subject to the time and number limitations of § 1229a(c)(7).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days and permits only one such motion, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts motions seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions from those limits.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 *617C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner’s final administrative order of removal was entered on March 12, 2003. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on July 16, 2007, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Further, the regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen as barred by numerical limitations. To the extent petitioner challenges the denial of his motion to reopen because his motion falls within an exception to the general time and number requirements, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion on this ground. The regulations state that the time and numerical limitations do not apply to motions that are seeking to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of removal based upon changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Petitioner’s evidence that country conditions in India are the same as they were previously is not evidence of changed circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Araujo-Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-15(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that “a party may file only one motion to reopen ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as numerically barred and time barred.

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but allows a late asylum-related motion when the applicant sufficiently establishes changed circumstances in the country of origin.

Sanchez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.... ” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Changed circumstances in petitioners’ country of origin, however, may justify the late filing of a motion to reopen to file a claim for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). The BIA properly found that the evidence submitted by petitioners, a declaration by one petitioner that petitioners fear random violence in Mexico, was not sufficient to establish changed circumstances to support further consideration of petitioners’ asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Hamoui, 389 F.3d at 826; Rostomian v. INS, 210 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as numerically and time barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits a petitioner to file one motion to reopen within 90 days after the Board of Immigration Appeals mails its decision.

Arce-Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-16(c)(2)

Specifically, the regulations provide that a petitioner may file one motion to reopen within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In this case, the petitioner filed his second motion to reopen more than 31 months after mailing of the BIA’s November 8, 2004 decision. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred. See Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative removal order, while section 1003.2(a) commits sua sponte reopening to the BIA's discretion.

Sabhari v. Gonzales · filed 2008-04-10(c)(2), (a)

In a removal proceeding, an alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (emphasis added). This motion must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The governing regulations also provide that the BIA may reopen proceedings on its own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, we recently held, en banc, that the decision whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is committed to the BIA's discretion by law and that we lack jurisdiction to review the agency's discretionary decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not remove those limits unless the movant demonstrates materially changed country conditions.

Zhang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhang’s motion to reopen as time and numerically barred. The final agency order was issued in November 1998, but Zhang did not file his motion until April 2007. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). And, while only one motion to reopen is allowed under the regulations, the instant motion was Zhang’s third. See id. We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s finding that Zhang failed to demonstrate that conditions in China have changed such that the time and numerical limitations did not apply to his motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Fang Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-29(c)(2)

Lin’s September 2006 motion to reopen was untimely in light of the fact that it was filed more than eight years after the IJ’s November 1997 decision ordering Lin’s deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (an alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, which generally must be filed within 90 days after entry of the final order.

Orozco-Alcala v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Cuevas v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen when it is untimely or exceeds the numerical limit.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was untimely and numerically-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows a party to file only one motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions.

Velazquez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2)

The regulations provide that, with certain exceptions not relevant to this petition, “a party may file only one motion to reopen.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as numerically barred. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to applicable exceptions.

Placido v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. *2508 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ fourth motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and numerically-barred. See id.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within the applicable time limit, while section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by time and number unless an exception is adequately supported.

Villa v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(b)(2), (c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because petitioner’s motion was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). We further conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioner’s motion was untimely, as well as number-barred, and the petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to support an exception to the numerical or time limits for motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) and 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed eight years late when the motion does not satisfy a regulatory exception.

Estuardo-Lopez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in affirming the order of the immigration judge as petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed eight years late, and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, subject to exceptions that require the movant to qualify for them.

Cheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-22(c)(2)

It is beyond dispute that Cheng’s motion to reopen was untimely and number barred, and we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s finding that he did not qualify for an exception to the time and numerical limitations applicable to such a motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA's decision and a second motion to reopen.

Kurnia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-26(c)(2)

Kurnia is barred from raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it was not filed within 90 days of the BIA’s decision and it is her second such motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order, while (c)(3)(ii) removes the time and number limits for a motion based on qualifying changed country conditions and previously unavailable material evidence.

Ping Chen v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2008-09-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as time and number barred. As the BIA noted, its final order was issued in March 2004, but Chen did not file her second motion until February 2007, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there are no time or number limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final order and limits a movant to one such motion.

Sargsyan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-05(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the second motion to reopen as time- and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final order and movant is limited to one such motion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits a party to file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings.

Reda v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-16(c)(2)

Because an alien is allowed to file only one motion to reopen, Reda’s current, second motion to reopen is barred by both statute and regulation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (“[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (“a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings”).

Section 1003.2 subjects motions to reopen or reconsider to time and number limits, and an untimely or number-barred motion may be reopened only through the IJ’s or BIA’s discretionary sua sponte authority, which a reviewing court cannot review for lack of a legal standard.

Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-18(c)(2)

Immigration regulations allow motions to reopen or reconsider subject to specific time and number limitations. See id. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). However, because the petitioner failed to meet the NACARA deadline or the § 1003.2 requirements for a motion to reopen, the only remedy available was under the IJ’s or the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen the case. Enriquez-Alvarado, 371 F.3d at 248-49; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b) (“An [IJ] may upon his or her own motion at any time, or upon motion of . . . the alien, reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). Because this provision gives an IJ or the BIA complete discretion to deny untimely motions to reopen, the reviewing court has no legal standard by which to judge the IJ’s ruling, and therefore the court lacks jurisdiction.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) numerically bars a successive motion to reopen unless an exception applies.

Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ successive motion to reopen because the motion was numerically barred and failed to meet any of the exceptions to the numerical limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a successive motion to reopen when the numerical limitation applies, unless an exception is met.

Tubig v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tubig’s successive motion to reopen because the motion was numerically barred and failed to meet any of the exceptions to the numerical limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time limits on motions to reopen before the BIA, subject to applicable exceptions.

Avetisyan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioner’s motion was untimely, and the petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to support an exception to the time limits on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final order.

Reyes-Solis v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred. See id. Petitioner’s arguments as to why the time and numerical limits should not apply to her motion to reopen are unpersuasive.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order, subject to applicable exceptions.

Xet v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material evidence shows changed country conditions.

Jakaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA properly denied the Jakajs’ motion to reopen as untimely and number barred, where it was filed more than two years after their 2005 final order of removal and was them second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that an applicant may only file one motion to reopen and it must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision). Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Jakajs failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions sufficient to satisfy the exception to the time and numerical bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7) (C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-105, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 *146(1988). The documents that the Jakajs submitted provide, at most, anecdotal evidence that violence against women and human trafficking occur in Albania. Such evidence does not demonstrate changed country conditions sufficient to warrant reopening their proceedings. Accordingly, the BIA properly denied their motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Ortiz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-16(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit *592apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars motions to reopen that are untimely or exceed the numerical limit unless an exception under subsection (c)(3) applies.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-20(c)(2), (c)(3)

Therefore, the BIA properly observed that his motion was subject to both the time and numerical bars found in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), unless he could establish an exception to those bars as enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Kolodziej v. Attorney General · filed 2008-10-30(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a party may file a motion to reopen “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” ... An alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The second motion to reopen was number-barred and no exception is applicable here.

Section 1003.2(c) permits the BIA to numerically bar a second motion to reopen.

Salazar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(c)

The BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that Angel Salazar’s second motion to reopen was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal, absent an applicable exception.

Bonilla v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

Specifically, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the agency’s final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3) has no time limit for motions alleging materially changed country conditions.

Touray v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2), (c)(3)

Here, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Touray’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A party seeking to reopen proceedings must file his motion within 90 days of the agency’s final order of removal. Id. It is beyond dispute that Touray’s April 2007 motion to reopen was untimely where it was filed more than nine years after the agency’s final order of removal. While there is no time limit on a motion to reopen alleging materially changed country conditions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), Touray made no such argument in his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Carbajal v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and the motion to reopen must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. ... Petitioner’s third motion to reopen was filed on February 8, 2008, more than 90 days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Nevarez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2)

Respondent’s motion for summary disposition is granted because petitioner’s second motion to reopen violated both the numerical and time limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed. Id. Therefore, this petition for review is denied.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) was applied to uphold denial of a second motion to reopen as numerically barred because no regulatory exception applied.

Lopez-Acosto v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was numerically barred, and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen, which generally must be filed within 90 days after the final order.

Diego-Jara v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2)

In addition, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, absent an applicable exception.

Morales v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-10(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s third motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an exception to the time and numerical limits apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Neri v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-11(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because it was petitioner’s second motion to reopen and was filed on May 19, 2008, more than 90 days after *350the January 31, 2007 final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Cardenas-Ricse v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-15(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because it was petitioners’ second motion to reopen and was filed on May 5, 2008, more than 90 days after the August 18, 2005 final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, generally requiring it to be filed within 90 days after the final order, subject to applicable exceptions.

Parra v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-15(c)(2)

In addition, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the motion was petitioner’s second motion to reopen and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to the time and number limits apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days, unless an exception applies.

Valdez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-15(c)(2)

In addition, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the motion was petitioner’s second motion to reopen and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to the time and number limits apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as both untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary and unreviewable, while § 1003.2(c)(2) generally imposes ninety-day and one-motion limits on motions to reopen, subject to exceptions.

Rodriguez-Santos v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2008-12-15(a), (c)(2)

We lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.” ... A motion to reopen must generally be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA therefore abused its discretion when it denied the motion as untimely, citing to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... With certain exceptions not applicable here, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings (whether before the BIA or the Immigration Judge). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii). ... Thus, his second motion was numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Sanchez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s third motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen as time and number-barred. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen removal proceedings filed within 90 days after the final removal order, unless an exception applies.

Felix v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have failed to demonstrate that an exception to this time limit applies, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final removal order, absent an applicable exception.

Bautista v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline and was her second motion to reopen, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to the time or numerical limits apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by imposing a filing deadline and a one-motion limit, which the court applied to uphold the denial of a second motion.

Sanchez-Martinez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(2)

Second, to the extent that petitioner’s motion could be construed as a motion to reopen removal proceedings, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner’s second motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that BIA denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, this petition for review is denied.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen proceedings.

Martinez-Reyes v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-26(c)(2)

In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) that petitioner’s second motion to reopen was numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Neza v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-12-31(c)(2)

“Except as provided [in the regulatory exceptions], an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) can exempt a motion when the applicant adequately alleges changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Mann v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in determining that petitioner failed to allege changed circumstances in India that would exempt him from the time and numerical limits for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004).

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but those limits do not apply when the alien presents material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Zhou v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-01-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

In general, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and the alien must file that motion no later than ninety days after the date of the final administrative decision denying relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Nevertheless, the numerical and time limitations set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) do not apply if the petitioner can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires filing it within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-13(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is entitled to one motion to reopen and must file his motion no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Chen’s July 2007 motion was both untimely and numerically barred. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) numerically bars a successive motion to reopen.

Arredondo-Sicairos v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ successive motion to reopen because the motion was numerically barred and failed to meet any regulatory exception. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2)-(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and permits a party to file only one motion to reopen.

Gavrilova v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-29(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner’s final administrative order of deportation was entered on June 15, 1998. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on January 29, 2008, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of deportation was entered and petitioner has not established that any exceptions to this time limit apply. See id. Further, the regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen as also barred by numerical limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when its regulatory restrictions apply.

Batepola v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-22(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not err in its determination that the October 12, 2004 motion to reopen was barred by regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ines v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-29(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, absent an applicable exception.

Mora v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-29(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed on April 28, 2008, beyond the 90-day ... deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying their untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days of the final order.

Palacios v. Holder · filed 2009-02-19(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners have previously filed a motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen within 90 days, but excuses those time and numerical limits for changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is material and was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2009-02-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an applicant may file only one motion to reopen his proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. However, an applicant may be excused from compliance with the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen if he submits evidence establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality..;.” ' 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); . 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Such a motion shall not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered in support of the motion “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, absent an established exception.

Rocha v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners have not contended that any established exceptions to these numerical and time limits apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ third motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien with a final order of removal to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final order.

Fernandez v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must ... be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on June 30, 2008, more than a year after the BIA’s March 19, 2007 final order. Because the motion was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final order, absent an applicable exception.

Sanchez v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen.

Bonilla v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

The regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Villalobos-Medina v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. ... Further, the regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reopen. ... Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ fourth motion to reopen as also barred by numerical limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien with a final removal order to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days, absent an applicable exception.

Flores-Otero v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 12298(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners’ final orders of removal were entered on April 21, 2005. Because petitioners’ third motion to reopen was filed on July 7, 2008, beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners do not contend that any exceptions to the time and number limits apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and barred by numerical limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Barragan v. Mukasey · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) allows only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Garcia v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

The regulations also provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable, while § 1003.2(c)(2) counts motions filed before either the Board or the Immigration Judge toward the one-motion limit.

Lindor v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-03-18(c)(3)(ii), (c)(2)

By not addressing whether Lindor, by his alleged evidence and arguments concerning his older brother’s murder, his younger brother fleeing after an arrest warrant was issued, and political persecution in Haiti, established a change in country conditions sufficient under applicable laws and regulations to excuse the time bar on motions to reopen—that is, by not addressing whether that evidence “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing” (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii))—the BIA abused its discretion. ... “an alien may file only one motion to reopen . . . (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge)”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen when it is filed outside the applicable time limit and is numerically barred, absent a qualifying regulatory exception.

Kapoor v. Holder · filed 2009-04-08(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kapoor’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where Kapoor filed the motion nearly three years after the BIA’s decision, and he failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limits for filing motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s time and number bars continue to apply when the alleged circumstances do not establish a qualifying exception for reopening.

Jal v. Holder · filed 2009-04-17(c)(2)

Moreover, to the extent Jal argues that he suffered past persecution on account of his own “resistance” to China’s family planning policy, such evidence was available and could have been presented at the previous hearing. The BIA thus properly found that Jal had not alleged any changed circumstances with respect to China’s family planning policy. Therefore, his motion to reopen to apply for asylum on that basis would still be subject to the applicable time and number bars. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows an alien to file only one motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-04-22(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than nine years after the BIA’s decision dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and generally requires filing within 90 days, but those time and numerical limits may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Bravo-Sifuentes v. Holder · filed 2009-05-12(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that such motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... It is well-established that the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen may be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Lun Ye Chao v. Holder · filed 2009-05-15(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s time and numerical limits apply when an alien seeks to file an asylum application after removal proceedings have been completed, requiring the application to accompany a motion to reopen.

Chen v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-06-05(c)(2)

As an initial matter, we note that Chen’s argument that he may file a successive asylum application without regard to the limits applicable to a motion to reopen is foreclosed by our decision in Liu, in which we held that, after completion of removal proceedings, an alien must file an asylum application in conjunction with a motion to reopen and must meet the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen. 555 F.3d at 152.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, subject to § 1003.2(c)(3)'s exception for materially changed country conditions.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-06-05(c)(2), (c)(3)

Chen further argues that the BIA mis-characterized the grounds for his motion to reopen by stating that he had alleged a change in personal circumstances based on the birth of his child and his wife’s pregnancy, not a change in country conditions in China which would create an exception to the time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen. We disagree. The BIA recognized the change in Chen’s personal circumstances, but also considered the evidence and found that Chen had not established changed circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2 permits only one motion to reopen, generally filed within 90 days, but removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Kong v. Holder · filed 2009-06-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days, but leaves unresolved whether an untimely motion not considered on the merits counts as the first motion.

Nevarez v. Holder · filed 2009-07-08(c)(2)

The regulation interpreting the INA similarly states that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.... ” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The question of whether a petition to reopen that is denied for untimeliness and thus is not considered on the merits by the BIA counts as a first petition for purposes of the number-bar rule is an open question that neither we, nor the BIA, have previously considered. Because the BIA did not adequately consider or explain its conclusion regarding this legal question, we return that issue to it for further review.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-13(c)(2)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an alien “may file only one motion to reopen,” and the motion must be filed “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while subsection (c)(3)(h) provides an exception when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-07-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Zhu v. Mukasey · filed 2009-07-16(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhu’s motion to reopen, which was indisputably untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen filed within ninety days, while subsection (c)(3) provides limited exceptions to those limits.

Chedid v. Holder · filed 2009-07-17(c)(2), (c)(3)

Generally, a petitioner is entitled to file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within ninety days of the date of entry of the Board’s final decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there are certain limited exceptions to the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen if, inter alia, the motion (1) seeks rescission of an in absentia order of removal; (2) seeks to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions; (3) is joined and agreed upon by all parties; or (4) is filed by DHS. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Chedid's case does not fall within any of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)'s explicit regulatory exceptions to the time and numerical limitations on such motions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Min Aung v. Holder · filed 2009-07-20(c)(2)

Here, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aung’s third motion to reopen as untimely. An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is beyond dispute that Aung’s motion was both untimely and number barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Zou v. Holder · filed 2009-07-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen apply when the new evidence shows only changed personal circumstances, rather than materially changed country conditions.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2009-08-04(c)(2)

We disagree. Jiang’s newly proffered evidence, which demonstrated that he joined the China Peace and Democracy Federation (CPDF) while in the United States, showed a change in personal circumstances, and not ... any change in country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling in certain circumstances.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2009-08-12(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, in certain circumstances, the deadline may be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The exception removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when it is based on material changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2009-08-19(c)(3)(h)

There are no time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an applicant to file only one motion to reopen and requires that it be filed within 90 days after the final decision in the underlying proceeding.

Steven v. Holder · filed 2009-08-20(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an applicant may file only one motion to reopen his proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding.

Section 1003.2 limits an applicant to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for qualifying changed-country-conditions evidence and a requirement that the supporting evidence be material and previously unavailable.

Alam v. Holder · filed 2009-09-01(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an applicant may file only one motion to reopen his proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. ... Because Alam filed his motion to reopen in August 2007 — nearly two years after the BIA dismissed his appeal from the IJ’s denial of his application for relief — it was clearly untimely. Nonetheless, an applicant may be excused from compliance with the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen if he submits evidence establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). Such a motion shall not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered in support of the motion “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) provides an exception when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Cao v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2009-09-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

The exception removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when it is based on material changed country conditions that were unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-09-04(c)(3)(h)

There are no time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the petitioner did not demonstrate material changed country conditions excusing the time and numerical limitations applicable to Chen’s motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a person from filing more than one motion to reopen.

Li v. Holder · filed 2009-09-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Li’s second motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was numerically barred and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions.

Section 1003.2 permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, unless the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, which removes the time and numerical limits.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-10-19(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3) creates an exception for motions relying on evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality; the BIA must adequately explain why the submitted evidence does not support reopening.

Zhao v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-11-06(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to the time and number requirements for motions that rely on evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... The BIA did not explain how this evidence was insufficient to support reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and generally permits only one such motion.

Padgett-Zelaya v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-11-24(c)(2)

Barring exceptions not applicable to the facts of this case, motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days from the date “the final administrative decision was rendered,” and only one such motion is allowed. ... Though it erred in determining that Padgett’s motion to reopen was untimely, the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Padgett’s second motion to reopen exceeded the statutory numerical limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision and permits only one such motion.

Singh v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-12-17(c)(2)

In general, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date “the final administrative decision was rendered,” and only one such motion is allowed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an individual to one motion to reopen filed within ninety days of a final agency order.

Zhen v. Holder · filed 2009-12-21(c)(2)

With certain exceptions not applicable here, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), federal regulations permit an individual to file only one motion to reopen, and require that the motion be filed within ninety days of a final agency order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Zhen’s second motion to reopen, filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order of exclusion, is both number-barred and untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to deny an untimely motion.

Hoyos v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(c)(2), (a)

There is no dispute that Hoyos’s motion to reopen, filed in August 2008, was untimely because the IJ’s order of removal became final in May 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that an alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered). ... Moreover, insofar as the BIA is the administrative body to which the motion Hoyos’s former counsel allegedly failed to file would have been directed, the BIA’s statement that “there is no indication that such a motion would have been granted[,]” is tantamount to a finding that it would have denied the untimely motion pursuant to its discretionary authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a numerical bar on motions to reopen, subject to the regulatory exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Morales v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bermudez Morales’s fourth motion to reopen as numerically barred, and the motion did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) - (3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a numerical bar on motions to reopen.

Ramos-Jimenez v. Holder · filed 2010-04-07(c)(2)

Therefore, the BIA did not err in finding that the motion, to the extent that it was a motion to reopen, was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to one motion filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) imposes no time limit for motions alleging asylum eligibility based on changed country conditions.

Yu v. Holder · filed 2010-04-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Yu’s March and July 2008 motions to reopen were untimely and number-barred because he was ordered excluded in absentia in June 1993. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that an alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered). However, there is no time limit for motions to reopen either alleging asylum eligibility based on changed country conditions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), or seeking rescission of an in absentia exclusion order based on “reasonable cause” for the failure to appear, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but exempts qualifying asylum motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Jiang v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-05-10(c)(2)

Under the governing regulations, “an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the “time and numerical limitations ... shall not apply” to motions to reopen that “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id.

The one-motion and 90-day limits do not apply to a motion to reopen seeking asylum based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Jiang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-05-10(c)(2)

Therefore, if the asylum applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ, his motion can be considered, even if there has been a prior motion to reopen or the motion is beyond the 90-day time limit for filing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Hu v. Holder · filed 2011-02-02(c)(2)

An alien who has been ordered removed may file one motion to reopen, but must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Hu’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because his motion was filed in November 2009, almost thirteen years after the entry of his December 1996 final order of removal and it was his second motion to reopen. See id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes timeliness and numerical limits on motions to reopen.

Jewel v. Holder · filed 2011-02-11(c)(2)

Jewel’s motion was both late and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). He did not argue for equitable tolling. See, e.g., Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1188-93 (9th Cir. 2001). Consequently, he was not entitled to relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) provides an exception to the time and number limits for a qualifying joint motion.

Alzaarir v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-02-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(iii)

Also, most motions to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Lin may have tried to persuade DHS to agree to a joint motion to reopen to avoid the time and number limitations on motions to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an alien from filing more than one motion to reopen or filing it later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation’s exceptions.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2011-03-04(c)(2)

An alien who has been ordered removed may file one motion to reopen, but must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen and was filed more than six years after his December 2002 final order of removal. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Malhi v. Holder · filed 2011-03-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Malhi’s motion to reopen as time- and number-barred because the successive motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s June 10, 2003, order dismissing his underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (only one motion to reopen permitted and the motion generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and generally requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final order, subject to the stated transitional deadline.

Aguilar-Lopez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguilar-Lopez’s motion to reopen as time- and number-barred because the successive motion was filed more than 17 years after the BIA’s March 19, 1991, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (only one motion to reopen permitted and the motion generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later ), and Aguilar-Lopez failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a one-motion and 90-day limit on motions to reopen, but those limits do not apply when the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) is satisfied.

Zheng vs U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-03-23(c)(2)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen proceedings, and he or she must do so within ninety days of a final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But these limitations do not apply if the motion to reopen is based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars motions to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision and imposes a numerical bar, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are established.

Jacobo v. Holder · filed 2010-06-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Lima Jacobo’s first motion to reopen as untimely, and by denying her second motion as untimely and numerically barred, where both motions were filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Lima Jacobo failed to establish changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Ajdin v. Holder · filed 2010-06-16(c)(2)

Here, the BIA properly denied Petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because they filed it almost seven years after their October 2001 final order of removal and it was the third such motion they had filed. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline and a numerical bar on motions to reopen; on these facts, the deadline was not equitably tolled because the petitioners should have known the basis for their motion.

Rosas-Moya v. Holder · filed 2010-06-18(c)(2)

Moreover, even if the petitioners had not forfeited their challenge, the Board’s order was not an abuse of discretion. ... First, the Board correctly concluded that the petitioners’ second motion to reopen—filed more than two years after the Board affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of their application for cancellation—was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Equitable tolling of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)’s 90-day time limit was unavailable because the petitioners should have known of the basis of their second motion (i.e., their son’s medical condition and their lawyer’s allegedly ineffective assistance before the immigration judge) no later than August 3, 2004, when the Board affirmed the immigration judge’s removal order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a second motion to reopen filed outside the time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are supported by sufficient evidence.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-29(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in its March 28, 2008, order denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because it was the second motion to reopen, filed nearly three after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(,3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative removal order and limits an alien to one motion, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Nikoghosyan v. United States Attorney General · filed 2010-08-31(c)(2)

Generally, the motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative removal order. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day deadline and one-motion limit do not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen that is untimely and number-barred, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of origin.

Li v. Holder · filed 2010-09-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, because she filed it nearly two years after the BIA issued its final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Li failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit and numerical bar for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2007) (change in personal circumstances is does not establish changed circumstances in the country of origin excusing untimely motion to reopen).

The court applied § 1003.2(c)(2)'s time and numerical bars and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)'s changed-country-conditions exception, holding that petitioners did not qualify for the exception.

Vaz v. Holder · filed 2010-09-24(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where they filed it over four years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation and numerical bar, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one filing within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts material, previously unavailable changed-country-conditions motions from those limits, and subsection (a)'s sua sponte reopening decisions are entirely discretionary and unreviewable.

Ghani v. Holder · filed 2010-09-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

An alien is limited to a single motion to reopen filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). There is no time or numerical limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) Ghani’s motion to reopen alleges a fear of persecution very similar to that made in his original asylum application. ... Thus, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Ghani failed to establish material changed country conditions in Bangladesh excusing the untimely and number-barred filing of his motion to reopen. ... However, eligibility to adjust status is not an exception to the time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen. ... we lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a successive motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred when it is filed eleven years after the prior order.

Cardenas v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-01(c)(2)

To the extent the motion sought reopening, the BIA acted within its discretion in denying it as untimely and number-barred because the successive motion was filed eleven years after the BIA’s March 17, 1997, order dismissing his appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the evidence submitted with the motion failed to establish Zegarra Cardenas acted with the due diligence required to warrant tolling of the time and number bars, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling is available to petitioner who is prevented from filing due to deception, fraud or error, and who exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) limit an alien to one motion to reopen filed within ninety days and do not make eligibility to adjust status an exception to that deadline.

Lin v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2010-10-04(c)(2), (c)(3)

To the contrary, an alien may only file a single motion to reopen and must do so within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lin’s August 2009 motion to reopen was filed seven years after the IJ’s June 2002 in absentia removal order became final. ... However, eligibility to adjust status does not constitute an exception to the applicable time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, subject to qualifying exceptions.

Navarro-Vargas v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-11-02(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarro-Vargas’ motion to reopen as time- and number-barred where the successive motion was filed nearly four years after the BIA’s July 27, 2004, order dismissing her underlying appeal, and Navarro-Vargas failed to demonstrate that she qualified for an exception to the time and number limits, or for equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Lako v. Holder · filed 2010-11-22(c)(2)

With respect to 06-71850, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the successive motion was filed almost three years after the agency’s denial of petitioners’ first motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners did not demonstrate the evidence submitted was previously unavailable, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738-39 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a third motion to reopen and requires a motion to be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision.

Rusu v. Holder · filed 2011-04-11(c)(2)

Because this is Rusu’s third motion to reopen, the motion is clearly barred by the numerical limitations. It is also untimely, having not been filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the prior decision and imposes a numerical limit on motions to reopen.

Torres-Alarcon v. Holder · filed 2011-05-12(c)(2)

Torres filed her second motion to reopen almost five years after the BIA’s October 16, 2002 decision, well beyond the ninety-day period for reopening proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Torres’ motion to reopen also exceeds the numerical limitation on filing such motions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (“An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Torres’ second motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2 generally bars a second motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision and limits parties to one motion, unless an exception such as materially changed country conditions applies.

Kaur v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-06-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s second motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred where the successive motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time and number limits, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c) permits denial of a successive motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred when it is filed more than five years after the BIA’s final decision.

Muyingo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-10-31(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Muyingo’s third motion to reopen as untimely and number barred where the successive motion was filed more than five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and he did not establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2012-01-05(c)(2)

A petitioner may file one motion to reopen, which, generally, must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zheng’s 2010 motion was untimely and number-barred, as the immigration court’s final order was issued in 1999, and the 2010 motion was Zheng’s second motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one filing made within 90 days, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Liu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-01-09(c)(2)

Except in specific circumstances, there is a 90-day time limit for filing a motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) & (3). Additionally, a party generally may file only one motion to reopen. § 1229a(c)(7); § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes numerical and time limits on motions to reopen, barring a second motion filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order.

Ahmed v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-04-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ahmed’s second motion to reopen as numerically-barred and untimely where it was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ahmed failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars successive motions to reopen as untimely and numerically limited, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception when sufficient evidence shows materially changed country conditions.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-05-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred where the successive motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time and number limits, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Hu v. Holder · filed 2012-07-05(c)(2)

The agency’s regulations permit an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Hu’s August 2010 motion to reopen was time- and number-barred because the IJ issued a final order of removal in 1998, and it was Hu’s second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, including barring a third motion filed twelve years after the final order of removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s third motion to reopen, filed twelve years after the final order of removal, as time- and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Singh’s contention that the time and number limits on motions to reopen set forth in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) do not apply to his motion is misplaced because the regulations setting the time and number limits were promulgated prior to the effective date of IIRIRA. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (1996), as revised by 61 Fed.Reg. 18900 (April 29, 1996); Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1183, 1191-92 (applying 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) to an untimely motion to reopen where removal proceedings were instituted in 1995).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2012-08-22(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Singh’s 2011 motion was untimely and number-barred, as the final administrative order was issued in 2003 and he had previously filed two motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, subject to applicable exceptions.

Ting Zhou v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Zhou’s motion to reopen on the grounds that it was number barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that, generally, “a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings . . . .”), and that she had failed to present evidence of changed conditions in China material to her claim to asylum in order to warrant an exception to the numerical limitation applicable to motions to reopen, see Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (“The BIA can deny a motion to reopen” based on changed country conditions for “failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order.

Jiang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-10-17(c)(2)

Parties may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen in removal proceedings and requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Patel v. Attorney General of the United States of America · filed 2013-03-25(c)(2)

An alien has the right to file a motion to reopen removal proceedings and must do so within 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). An alien in removal proceedings is limited to only one motion to reopen, whether before the Board or the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).