8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal, subject to stated exceptions.

Teclezghi v. Holder · filed 2010-04-30(c)(2)

By law, a 'motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal,' subject to a few statutory and regulatory exceptions not at issue in this case. 8 U.S.C. y1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); accord 8 C.F.R. y 1003.2(c)(2), (3). ... Consequently, we conclude that the BIA acted within its broad discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reopen filed nearly three years late.

Section (c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal.

Liu v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-05-20(c)(2)

Petitioner’s motion to reopen was clearly not filed within the requisite ninety-day period and the BIA therefore correctly determined that it was time barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Liu v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2010-05-20(c)(2)

Petitioner’s motion to reopen was clearly not filed within the requisite ninety-day period and the BIA therefore correctly determined that it was time barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after entry of a final administrative order of removal.

Uribe-Espinosa v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-12-13(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Uribe–Espinosa’s motion as untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the BIA’s May 3, 2005, final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of a final administrative order of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the entry of a final administrative order of removal), and Uribe–Espinosa does not contend he is entitled to equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (deadline can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Cai Ping Jiang v. Holder · filed 2010-12-16(c)(2)

The BIA’s denial of Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely was not in error. A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a successive motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal.

Hernandez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-12-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the successive motion was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present evidence of changed conditions in Mexico particular to petitioners and their circumstances so as to qualify for the exception to the regulatory filing limitations, see id. at § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final removal order.

Juan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-01(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that they were entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the BIA's final removal order, subject to equitable tolling when the petitioner acts with due diligence.

Alcaraz-Mendiaz v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-01(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Alcaraz-Mendiaz’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled where a petitioner acts with due diligence).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than 90 days after the BIA's final order, absent an applicable exception.

Xu v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Xu’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than 90 days after the issuance of the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Xu failed to establish either changed circumstances in China, see He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2007) (change in personal circumstances does not establish changed circumstances in the country of origin excusing untimely motion to reopen), or that he acted with the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling of the time limitation, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing due to deception, fraud, or error, and exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline when it seeks asylum or withholding based on material changed country circumstances that could not previously have been presented.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-03-29(c)(3)(ii)

The “motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” id. at 1003.2(c)(2), except that the time limitation does not apply where the alien seeks to “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” id. at 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... Because Chen and Liu‟s motion to reopen was not filed within the required 90 days, it had to be based on changed country conditions in China with respect to the Chinese government‟s enforcement of its population control policies. We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying their untimely motion to reopen because they did not make the required showing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) ordinarily requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal, but the deadline is subject to equitable tolling.

Cao v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-04-01(c)(2)

Ordinarily, “[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In Mahmoud, we held that attorney conduct can provide a basis for equitable tolling of the ninety-day deadline. 427 F.3d at 252. ... We conclude that the Board abused its discretion in determining, on this record, that equitable tolling was not warranted in Cao‟s case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal.

Shahid v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-06-03(c)(2)

Ordinarily, “[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Shahid and Bilal’s second motion to reopen was a year late.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after entry of a final administrative order of removal.

Doe v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-06-03(c)(2)

Ordinarily, “[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation’s exceptions.

Mkhaeil v. Holder · filed 2010-06-09(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mkhaeil’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two and a half years after the BIA’s order dismissing his underlying appeal, and did not fall within any exception to the 90-day filing limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3); see also Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (BIA 2002) (motion to reopen to adjust status based on marriage to a U.S. citizen may be granted if, inter alia, the motion is timely filed).

Subsection (c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days and limits successive motions, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes those limits for a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Udjari v. Holder · filed 2010-06-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file his motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, there is no time or numerical limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably found that Petitioners’ motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-06-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than six years after the BIA’s October 20, 1999 dismissal of his underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (stating that motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order), and Singh failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling due to his lack of diligence.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen, subject to potential equitable tolling.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-07-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the issuance of the BIA’s April 25, 2006, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish the grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

De Araiza v. Holder · filed 2010-09-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez de Araiza’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than five years after the BIA’s February 19, 2002, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Gonzalez de Araiza failed to establish that she acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Emerson Jose Simonato Gonzalez v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2010-08-27(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Because Gonzalez’s motion to reopen was untimely, and he presented no evidence establishing changed conditions in Venezuela, the BIA’s denial of his motion was not arbitrary or capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the BIA's final removal order.

Valencia-Lopez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-07(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Valencia-Lopez’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Valencia-Lopez did not show he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Yang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-09-13(c)(2)

In general, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date “the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... But as both parties and even the BIA seem to acknowledge, the motion to reopen was timely filed within ninety days of the July 23, 2008, decision – which was the “final administrative decision” in Yang’s case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Yang v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-09-13(c)(2)

In general, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date “the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Subsection (c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the materially changed country-conditions exception addressed in subsection (c)(3)(ii).

Fang Fang Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-09-16(c)(2)

Ordinarily, a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). ... Even assuming that the BIA was not precluded from considering such evidence, Lin failed to show a material change in country conditions related to China’s family planning policy as measured from the date of her 2002 removal hearing. ... Accordingly, we deny Lin’s petition in this respect.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, absent an applicable exception.

Shah v. Holder · filed 2010-09-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed over 90 days after both petitioners’ final administrative orders, and they did not establish that an exception to the filing deadline applies. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal.

Nilesh Shah v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-10-01(c)(2)

Ordinarily, “[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Shah’s second motion to reopen was time- and number-barred, and thus the Board did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it on that basis.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Vardanyan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vardanyan’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s September 2, 2004, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Vardanyan failed to establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when material changed circumstances are shown.

Martinez v. Holder · filed 2010-11-01(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because they did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they failed to demonstrate material changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the removal order.

Babul v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-05-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Babul’s motion as untimely because he filed the motion more than two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of removal order), and failed to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day limit on motions to reopen measured from the BIA’s final deportation order, subject to the regulation’s exceptions.

Perez-Samayoa v. Holder · filed 2011-05-04(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Zet’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s final deportation order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Zet has not identified any exceptions to the ninety-day time limitation that apply, see id. §1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order.

Morales v. Holder · filed 2011-05-05(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the administratively final order, subject to specified exceptions.

Lagua v. Holder · filed 2011-06-17(c)(2)

Citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), the BIA denied Lagua’s October 11, 2007 motion to reopen as untimely because its final order had been entered on April 7, 2006, and “with certain exceptions not relevant here, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the administratively final order.” Assuming without deciding that this court has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Lagua’s motion was untimely and that it was not required to deny the motion on any other basis.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-29(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because it was filed nearly eight years after the BIA’s April 24, 2002, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Singh failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Akond v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-07-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Akond’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than five years after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Akond failed to establish he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of that deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (a petitioner may obtain equitable tolling based on ineffective assistance of counsel as long as “the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the BIA's final removal order, subject to equitable tolling when warranted.

Briseno-Hernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-21(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Briseno-Hernandez’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled where a petitioner acts with due diligence).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Dong v. Holder · filed 2011-08-11(c)(2)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, unless an applicable exception to the deadline exists.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2011-08-15(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA’s denial of Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005). A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Wang’s 2010 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 2004. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Our review of the record reveals no circumstances that would constitute an exception to the deadline for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely.

The regulation generally requires an asylum applicant to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding.

Noel Lisandro Alvaro Barrios v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-11-18(c)(2)

Asylum applicants7 must make any motion to reopen within “90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2011-11-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... However, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen failed to establish changed circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision.

Wen Lan Zeng v. Holder · filed 2012-01-26(c)(2)

As a general rule, an alien must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Wu v. Holder · filed 2012-02-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s denial of Wu’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Wu’s 2010 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in March 2009. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). However, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wu failed to establish changed circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires most motions to reopen a BIA proceeding to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Lin v. Attorney General · filed 2012-03-13(c)(2)

Most motions to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Souleman v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-03-30(c)(2)

There is no question that Souleman’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day time limitation for filing such a motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring that such a motion be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Zhong v. Holder · filed 2012-04-03(c)(2)

The BIA’s denial of Zhong’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zhong’s 2009 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 2001. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the BIA dismisses the appeal.

Bzeih v. Holder · filed 2012-04-05(c)(2)

Here, the BIA correctly found that the motion was untimely, as it was filed in February 2010, more than 90 days after the BIA dismissed his appeal in January 2008. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ashria v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-05-10(c)(2)

A motion to reopen removal proceedings is to be filed “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA issued a final order of removal in March 2001, and Ashria did not file his motion to reopen until November 2011. Ashria’s motion is clearly untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the specific proceeding or order being challenged, rather than from a later denial of reconsideration.

Sarmiento v. Holder · filed 2012-05-21(c)(2)

The Board’s interpretation of the statute, requiring parties to move to reopen within 90 days of the Board’s initial dismissal, is reasonable. ... Those circuits decided that the Board reasonably interpreted the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (formerly § 3.2(c)(2)), to require a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the order it is challenging, and then reasoned that a motion to reopen can only target the Board’s original dismissal. We agree with this analysis. The regulation states that the motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the specific proceeding being challenged.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to any applicable equitable tolling.

Menendez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-05-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Menendez’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Even if Menendez were entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline during the representation by her former counsels, her motion is untimely because it was filed more than ninety days after she met with present counsel and “definitively learned” of her former counsels’ incompetence. See Ghahremani, 498 F.3d at 999-1000; see also Dela Cruz v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[T]he pendency of a petition for review of an order of removal does not toll the statutory time limit for the filing of a motion to reopen with the BIA.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision.

Soumalia v. Holder · filed 2012-05-29(c)(2)

An alien must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Soumalia’s motion to reopen was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than six years after his order of removal became final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Sano v. Holder · filed 2012-07-31(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Sano’s 2010 motion was untimely, as the agency’s final administrative decision was issued in 2008. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day filing limit for motions to reopen, subject to the exceptions addressed in subsection (c)(3).

Francisco v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Francisco’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than thirteen years after the final order of removal and did not qualify for an exception to the 90-day filing limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Santos v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mazariegos Santos’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed the motion more than seven years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed to show the due diligence required to obtain equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling is available where petitioner demonstrates due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error that prevented timely filing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2012-08-23(c)(2)

The BIA’s denial of Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. ... An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Jiang’s 2010 motion was untimely, as her final administrative order was issued in 2007. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Margarita Corcino-Osornio v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-17(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where they filed the motion more than thirteen months after their final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678-80 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who establishes that he suffered from deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order, subject to equitable tolling when the petitioner was prevented from filing by deception, fraud, or error and exercised due diligence.

Ortiz v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ortiz’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed the motion more than four years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679-80 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Chand v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chand’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed the motion more than six years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed allege ineffective assistance against his third attorney who represented him between July 2009 and November 2010, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679-80 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the BIA's final order, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-03-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because Singh filed the motion more than 90 days after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present the material evidence of changed circumstances in India that was required to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Yang v. Holder · filed 2013-04-16(c)(2)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Yang’s 2011 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 2002.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception requiring material evidence of changed country circumstances.

Abramian v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-08-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Abramian’s motion to reopen as untimely because Abramian filed the motion more than 90 days after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and she failed to present the material evidence of changed circumstances in Georgia that was required to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that petitioner did not qualify for exception to time limit because she failed to submit new evidence that was qualitatively different from evidence presented at original hearing and that had individualized relevancy).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Espinal-Cruz v. Holder · filed 2013-09-18(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Petitioners’ 2011 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 2009.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3) provides an exception for materially changed conditions, including changed country conditions under (c)(3)(ii).

Kong v. Holder · filed 2013-11-05(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... While Kong contends that the newspaper articles he submitted demonstrated worsening conditions for Christians in China, the general statements in these articles that Chinese authorities had engaged in a “crackdown” do not reflect the conditions that existed in 2008, or provide material evidence of a change in country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2013-11-13(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal, subject to specified exceptions.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-11-19(c)(2)

Motions to reopen must be “filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ostrovskaya v. Holder · filed 2013-12-19(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... There is no dispute that Petitioners’ 2011 motion was untimely, as the final administrative order was issued in 2003.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceedings sought to be reopened.

Selmani v. Holder · filed 2014-02-25(c)(2)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Selmani’s November 2011 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued more than a year earlier.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen deportation proceedings before the BIA to be filed within 90 days and applies to final administrative decisions issued on or after July 1, 1996.

Oluwatoyin v. U.S. Attorney general · filed 2014-03-28(c)(2)

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires that a motion to reopen deportation proceedings before the BIA be filed within 90 days of the final agency order or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later. ... Further, Matter of Monges Garcia suggests that § 1003.2(c)(2) also applies to all final administrative decisions issued on or after July 1, 1996, as we can discern no meaningful difference between § 1003.2(c)(2) and § 1003.23(b)(1) that would impact the BIA’s interpretation of the deadline. Therefore, because the final administrative order in this case was issued on September 30, 2002, the 90-day timeline applied, meaning that any motion to reopen had to be filed by December 30, 2002.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Emin v. Holder · filed 2014-05-09(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Emin’s 2012 motion was untimely as the agency’s final administrative decision was issued in 2004.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision.

Gao v. Holder · filed 2014-05-30(c)(2)

An alien must move to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Gao’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than three years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for moving to reopen “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of the final order of removal, absent applicable exceptions.

Andrade-Valle v. Holder · filed 2014-08-06(c)(2)

Absent certain exceptions which Andrade-Valle has not alleged here, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)-(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Andrade-Valle filed his motion to reopen almost six months after the BIA’s final order of removal on March 28, 2013. Thus, his motion was untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the asylum and material-change exception in § 1003.2(c)(3).

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2014-08-29(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision, unless that motion seeks to apply for asylum and is based on a material change in conditions in the country of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3). There is no dispute that Jiang’s motion, filed in 2012, was untimely because the BIA issued a final order of removal in 2004.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

You Zhong Liu v. Holder · filed 2014-09-05(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2014-08-06(c)(2)

In general, motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days from the date “on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-09-24(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (“[A] party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened . . .”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen immigration proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Jin v. Holder · filed 2014-10-23(c)(2)

“Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may move to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Jin’s motion to reopen was untimely: he filed it more than a year after the agency entered an order of removal against him. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Xu v. Holder · filed 2014-10-29(c)(2)

The BIA’s denial of Xu’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Xu’s September 2013 motion was untimely from the agency’s March 2012 final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after a final order of removal, subject to applicable equitable tolling.

Solano-Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-01-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Solano-Garcia’s motion to reopen as untimely, where Solano-Garcia filed the motion more than seven years after his order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal), and he failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as the alien exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order, subject to applicable equitable tolling.

Escobar-Alarcon v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-01-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Escobar-Alarcon’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than four years after his deportation order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order), and failed to establish the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling of the motions deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal, absent an applicable exception.

Vazquez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-04-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cendejas Vazquez’ motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than eight months after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal), and does not dispute that his motion was untimely or invoke any exception to the motions deadline, see Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (a petitioner waives a contention by failing to raise it in the opening brief).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to specified exceptions.

Wang v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-31(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, absent enumerated exceptions.

Xu v. Lynch · filed 2015-08-28(c)(2)

Absent certain enumerated circumstances which are not present here, an alien may generally move to reopen no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Xu’s 2013 motion was untimely because his final administrative order was issued in 2003.

(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable exceptions.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-18(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must move to reopen no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the agency’s final order of removal.

Rivas-Campos v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rivas-Campos’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over 90 days after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Rivas-Campos failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and the alleged ineffective assistance was not plain on the face of the administrative record, see Reyes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 592, 596-99 (9th Cir. 2004) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to reopen where alien failed to comply with Lozada and ineffectiveness was not plain on the face of the record).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen immigration proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Mejia-Ramaja v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-20(c)(2)

Normally, a motion to reopen immigration proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final order of removal. See Meng Hua Wan v. Holder, 776 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 2015); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The petitioner's motion was filed well past this 90-day limit.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, and a motion filed well beyond that deadline is untimely.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2016-09-15(c)(2)

Singh’s motion to reopen was untimely filed because the agency’s final order of removal was entered in October 2014 and Singh did not file his motion to reopen until June 2015, well beyond the 90-day deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days after entry of a final order of removal.

Dankam v. Lynch · filed 2016-09-30(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal. ... Here, the Board correctly found that Dankam’s motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen, subject to an exception when materially changed country conditions are established.

Chitcharuek v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-25(c)(2)

Because Chitcharuek failed to establish a material change in country conditions that would qualify him for the exception to the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), the BIA did not err in denying Chitcharuek’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for qualifying changed country conditions.

Sahi v. Lynch · filed 2016-11-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2016). This time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to seek asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We further conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Sahi failed to establish changed country conditions excusing a late motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to the regulatory exception for materially changed conditions in the country of removal.

Sanchez-Romero v. Sessions · filed 2017-07-26(c)(2)

A petitioner normally must file a motion to reopen proceedings no later than ninety days after the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). One exception to this ninety-day rule is materially changed conditions in the petitioner's home country. See Xiao He Chen v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2016). To this end, a petitioner must (1) demonstrate changed conditions through evidence that was not available at the original merits hearing and (2) establish a prima facie case of eligibility for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the Board of Immigration Appeals issues its final order.

Mohamed v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-01-11(c)(2)

In Appeal No. 12-73277, the BIA acted within its discretion in denying Mohamed’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mohamed did not establish materially changed circumstances in Egypt to overcome the time limitation for a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after a final administrative order.

Huerta-Pimentel v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-05-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Huerta-Pimentel’s motion to reopen to seek a waiver under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), where it was filed more than 18 years after his final administrative order and more than 10 years after the deadline for special motions to reopen to seek such relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed 90 days after a final administrative order); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(h) (special motions to reopen to seek a waiver under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) must be filed by April 26, 2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal, while subsection (c)(3) provides exceptions to that deadline.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-09-19(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 90 days after his final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he did not demonstrate he met any exception to the filing deadline, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of a final removal order; § 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider sua sponte, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise that discretion.

Bobnyonga v. Sessions · filed 2018-09-13(c)(2), (a)

An alien must usually file a motion to reopen within 90 days of a final administrative order of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA correctly construed this part of the motion as a “request that [it] exercise [its] discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). 18-9519 AR at 3. ... “[W]e do not have jurisdiction to consider [a] petitioner’s claim that the BIA should have sua sponte reopened the proceedings . . . because there are no standards by which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the removal order, subject to specified exceptions.

Rufino-Silva v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-07-19(c)(2)

Nor did the BIA err in determining that the motion to reopen was untimely. In general, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Rufino-Silva filed his motion roughly four years after the issuance of the removal order. While there are certain exceptions to the general 90-day deadline, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), Rufino-Silva does not rely on any of these exceptions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen an immigration appeal to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Morales v. McAleenan · filed 2019-08-21(c)(2)

A party seeking to reopen an immigration appeal must generally file that motion “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA issued its final administrative decision on April 10, 2019 when it denied Morales’s motion for reconsideration. This means any motion to reopen was due on or about July 9, 2019. But Morales didn’t file his motion until August 9, 2019 – a month after the statutory deadline and well outside the 90-day window.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to exceptions.

Melendres v. Barr · filed 2019-08-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, where they filed the motion more than twelve years after their final administrative order of removal, and they did not show due diligence for equitable tolling of the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3) (subject to exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses that deadline for an asylum motion supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Lin v. Barr · filed 2019-10-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the agency issues its final administrative decision. ... However, noncompliance with the 90-day time limitation is excused if the motion is filed in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” ... Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Lin did not establish a material change in conditions in his home province of Fujian.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the entry of a final administrative order unless an applicable exception applies.

Acuna v. Barr · filed 2019-12-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Gonzalez Acuna’s motion to reopen, where it was filed more than 90 days after the entry of a final administrative order and he did not contend he met any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)-(iv).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception when there is sufficient evidence of changed country conditions.

Li v. Barr · filed 2020-02-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Li’s motion to reopen was untimely because Li filed the petition more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision denying her asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly concluded that Li’s motion did not warrant an exception to the usual 90-day limit because she did not produce sufficient evidence of changed country conditions in China, but instead relied only on changed personal circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that evidence of changes in personal circumstances alone, without evidence of changed country conditions, is insufficient to warrant reopening of proceedings).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of a final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for asylum or withholding claims based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; the court held that Aliti did not establish changed country conditions sufficient to invoke the exception.

Aliti v. Barr · filed 2020-02-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2019). ... This time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to seek asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions, if the alien’s evidence of the same “is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2019). ... There is no dispute that Aliti’s motion to reopen was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We have reviewed Aliti’s arguments on appeal, in conjunction with the administrative record, and conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Aliti failed to establish a material change in country conditions so to excuse the late-filed motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to specified exceptions.

Menchaca v. Barr · filed 2020-03-10(c)(2)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Menchaca’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion 17 years after his final order of deportation, and he did not show due diligence for equitable tolling of the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3) (subject to exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day limit on motions to reopen, subject to equitable tolling for deception, fraud, or error when the petitioner acts diligently, and the court applied that rule to deny tolling here.

Montiel-Cabrera v. Barr · filed 2020-05-13(c)(2)

Although the 90-day time bar prescribed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) may be subject to equitable tolling “because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error,” Iturribarria v. I.N.S., 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003), the BIA held that tolling was unwarranted. The ineffective assistance of counsel claimed in the motion to reopen repeated the arguments that petitioners’ prior attorney had previously made and that the BIA had dismissed, almost seven months before. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding that no deception, fraud, or error prevented the petitioners from filing their motion to reopen within the time required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final decision unless a regulatory exception applies, and vacatur of the prior conviction did not qualify for an exception here.

Camacho v. Barr · filed 2020-06-11(c)(2) and (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Parra’s motion to reopen was untimely because Parra filed the petition more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the BIA properly concluded that the vacatur of Parra’s prior conviction did not bring his motion within any statutory or regulatory exception to the time limit on motions to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Purba v. Barr · filed 2020-09-10(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Purba filed his 2017 motion to reopen more than a decade after the BIA’s final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.

Moussa Sow Bolo v. Barr · filed 2020-09-29(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must “be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled when an alien “received ineffective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced thereby.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the agency’s final administrative decision, subject to statutory exceptions.

Salazar v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-03-17(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than ninety days after the agency rendered the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2021). The Board issued its decision on August 30, 2017, but Candelario Salazar did not file her motion to reopen until December 13, 2017. Her motion to reopen was thus untimely and properly rejected by the Board.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day filing deadline for motions to reopen, subject to specified proceedings in which the deadline does not apply.

Guzman v. Garland · filed 2022-02-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Juarez Guzman’s motion to reopen proceedings as to cancellation of removal where it was filed more than four years after the order of removal became final and he did not establish a statutory or regulatory exception to the time limitation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)-(ii) (an exception to the ninety-day filing deadline for motions to reopen may be established for certain asylum and withholding of removal claims); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3) (ninety-day filing deadline for motions to reopen does not apply in certain specified proceedings).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, subject to equitable tolling when applicable.

Barrios-Mazariegos v. Garland · filed 2022-08-12(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final removal order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner filed his motion to reopen on April 15, 2020, over one year after the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) issued his final order of removal on June 4, 2019. The 90-day deadline, however, is subject to equitable tolling on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel if the petitioner acted with due diligence in discovering his claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative order, subject to an applicable exception for changed country conditions.

Heslop v. Attorney General United States · filed 2022-11-30(c)(2)

Heslop’s petition to reopen was not filed within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative order as required by regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To avoid that time bar, Heslop claims circumstances in Jamaica have changed since his deportation order was entered in 1996.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen, subject to applicable exceptions or equitable tolling.

Tellez-Muro v. Garland · filed 2024-04-02(c)(2)

The agency accurately concluded that the motion, which was filed more than three years after proceedings concluded, failed to comply with the applicable 90-day deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The deadline plainly applies, for Tellez-Muro did not invoke any statutory exception to the 90-day deadline or invoke equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order unless an exception applies.

Bogdan Romance v. Attorney General United States · filed 2024-04-15(c)(2)

A motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the removal order, unless an exception applies under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4). ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Romance’s motion to reopen was filed 154 days after the order of removal; this period far exceeds the 90-day deadline and was not based on an enumerated exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) gives a noncitizen 90 days to file a motion to reopen challenging a final administrative decision, including to raise an ineffective-assistance claim against counsel who represented the noncitizen before both the immigration judge and the BIA.

Bustos-Millan v. Garland · filed 2024-08-06(c)(2)

It turns out, although not an exception, the immigration regulations did offer Petitioners a backstop of sorts: the motion to reopen. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(c). The motion to reopen gives noncitizens 90 days to challenge final administrative decisions like those from the BIA. See id. § 1003.2(c)(2). If a noncitizen wishes to raise an ineffective assistance claim against the attorney who represented the noncitizen before both the IJ and BIA, they have 90 days to retain new counsel and make their motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal is entered.

Castillo v. Bondi · filed 2025-02-18(c)(2)

The relevant statute and implementing regulation require a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the date when the final administrative order of removal is entered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the pertinent date is December 16, 2019, so Petitioner filed her motion nearly three years too late.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal.

Hernandez v. Bondi · filed 2025-03-28(c)(2)

But even if Niz-Chavez could excuse their forfeiture, their motions to reopen were still untimely. They had to file their motions to reopen within 90 days of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). That final order was in June 2017 and the petitioners moved to reopen in April 2022.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen, subject to applicable exceptions.

Lin v. Bondi · filed 2025-07-09(c)(2)

Mr. Lin sought to reopen his case from 1993 by filing a motion in February 2024, over 30 years later and well past the applicable 90-day deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order, subject to applicable exceptions.

Gartor Brown v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2025-08-14(c)(2)

A motion to reopen ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of the date of the final removal order that the noncitizen seeks to revisit. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal.

Leal v. Bondi · filed 2025-09-16(c)(2)

A motion to reopen ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Lopez Leal’s May 2021 motion was untimely because he sought reopening of the BIA’s October 2020 decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after the BIA's decision, subject to specified exceptions.

Chen v. Bondi · filed 2026-03-09(c)(2)

Chen’s September 2023 motion was indisputably filed after the 90-day deadline for reopening following the BIA’s April 2023 decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day time limit does not apply if the petitioner files a motion seeking asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,” provided that the evidence “is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2025-01-07(c)(2)

Because Singh’s motion was filed after the applicable 90-day deadline passed, it was time-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) permits reopening after the 90-day deadline only in specified narrow circumstances, and a change in law is not one of those exceptions.

Lleshi v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-11-20(c)(3)

As to the motion to reopen, the Lleshis argue only that the BIA’s decision in Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012), amounts to a change in the law that warrants reopening of the BIA’s decision to deny their applications. But a change in the law is not one of the exceptions to the 90-day deadline to file a motion to reopen. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2013-11-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... In this case, the BIA correctly found that Lin’s newly commenced practice of Catholicism constituted a changed personal circumstance, not changed conditions arising in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception based on materially changed country conditions.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings, and that petition must be filed no later than ninety days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005) (previously codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (2003)). Chen filed her third motion to reopen within ninety days of the BIA’s denial of her second motion to reopen. However, the BIA denied Chen’s third motion on the ground that it exceeded the permitted number of motions to reopen under the regulations. Furthermore, the BIA found that Chen had not established that circumstances had changed in China in such a way as to qualify her for an exception to the numerical limit on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA’s opinion was a rational and proper exercise of discretion. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 233-34.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the timeliness and numerical limits on motions to reopen, and Zheng's motion did not qualify for any exception.

Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-26(c)(3)

Manifest injustice would not result if we refuse to consider this claim because Zheng has filed three motions to reopen and the BIA properly determined that Zheng’s motion does not fall within one of the exceptions to the timeliness and numerical limitation requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but makes an exception when the movant shows changed circumstances in the country of deportation.

Dong v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-03-30(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding the party is seeking to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005); see also Li Yong Zheng v. United States DOJ, 416 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 2005). ... Dong filed his second motion to reopen with the BIA in September 2004, more than 90 days after the BIA’s final administrative decision, causing him to have exceeded both the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen. An exception to the time and numerical limitations is available, however, if the party can show changed circumstances in the designated country of deportation. 8 C.F.R. *100§ 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). We find no abuse in the BIA’s determination that Dong had failed to show changed country circumstances to support his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen that exceeds the numerical and time limits, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality warrant reopening.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA reasonably found that Lin’s motion was both numerically barred and time barred under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lin’s 2005 motion was his second motion to reopen—in excess of the numerical limitations set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Further, the motion, which challenged the BIA’s April 18, 1996 decision, was filed on May 9, 2005, well beyond the July 10, 2002 deadline that the BIA established in Matter of G-C-L- 23 I. & N. Dec. 359 (BIA 2002), for motions that challenged a denial of relief based on Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (1989). Moreover, Lin neither asserted in his brief to the BIA nor in his petition to this Court that there were changed circumstances in China that would warrant an exception to the numerical and time limitations for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and numerically bars a second motion, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Soria v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-17(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Soria’s second motion to reopen based on the birth of her United States citizen daughter because it was numerically barred and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits the number of motions to reopen and permits an exception only when one of the statutory exceptions applies.

Ochoa v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-19(c)(2)

Petitioner’s third motion to reopen exceeds the statutorily established numerical limit and does not raise one of the statutory exceptions thereto.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions that did not apply here.

Kagdina v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2006-04-20(c)(2)

Exceptions to this numerical limitation under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 do not apply in Kagdina’s factual situation.

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to four limited exceptions for an untimely motion.

Zhao v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-05-01(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien is limited to one motion to reopen exclusion or deportation proceedings, and this motion must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). Because the BIA issued Zhao’s final order of exclusion on February 15, 2000, Zhao’s second motion, filed on May 12, 2004, was out of time. An untimely motion may be maintained if the alien can establish one of four limited exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2005). None apply here.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days of the BIA's decision, unless the regulatory exception applies; the exception requires changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Kaur v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-16(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Kaur’s third motion to reopen, filed more than one year after the BIA’s final removal order, as both untimely and numerically barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (permitting only one motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of BIA’s decision), where Kaur failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) waives the time limit for a qualifying in-absentia notice-based motion to reopen, but section 1003.2(c)(2) still limits an alien in removal proceedings to one motion to reopen.

Li Ding Dong v. United States Attorney General · filed 2006-06-20(c)(2), (c)(3)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), the time limitation set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2) does not apply to a motion to reopen removal proceedings by an alien ordered removed in absentia who claims that he did not receive proper notice of the removal hearing. ... An alien in removal1 proceedings may file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3). The motion to reopen that is the subject of this petition was Dong’s third. Accordingly, Dong’s motion was numerically barred under regulation 1003.2(c)(2), and, therefore, remanding the case to the BIA would be futile.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an asylum applicant to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of a final administrative decision.

Osele v. United States Attorney General · filed 2006-08-01(c)(2)

An asylum applicant is limited to only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of a final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Osele’s motions as untimely filed where his appeal was dismissed in January 2004, and he did not file the motions until more than nine months later.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred when it is filed more than 23 months after the final order and no regulatory exception applies.

Jaswal v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-07(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen filed more than 23 months after the BIA’s final order because the motion to reopen was untimely and numerically barred, and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) numerically bars a motion to reopen unless a regulatory exception applies.

Toor v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-11(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fifth motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was numerically barred and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3) provides an exception when changed circumstances exist in the designated country of deportation.

Zhang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-25(c)(2), (c)(3)

According to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a party may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. Id. Here, the BIA entered its final order in Zhang’s asylum case in March 2003, and she timely filed a motion to reopen in April 2003. The BIA denied that motion and Zhang filed a second motion to reopen in August 2003. The BIA denied that motion in November 2003. Zhang filed her third motion to reopen in April 2004. That motion was denied by the BIA in August 2004 and is the subject of the instant petition for review. ... An exception to the time and numerical limitations is available to a party under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) if she can show changed circumstances in the designated country of deportation. Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by holding that Zhang’s U.S. born children do not constitute a changed circumstance in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen deportation proceedings, filed within 90 days of the administrative decision.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (permitting only one motion to reopen deportation proceedings to be filed within ninety days of the administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a party from filing more than one motion to reopen, subject to the regulation’s exceptions.

Aguirre v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-01(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in construing Aguirre’s motion as a motion to reopen, see id. at 792 (upholding BIA’s decision to construe motion to reconsider as a motion to reopen where motion alleged new facts), and denying the motion as numerically barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) numerically bars a fifth motion to reopen removal proceedings before the BIA.

Lopez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fifth motion to reopen as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(c)(2)

We conclude that this petition for review should be summarily denied because petitioner’s second motion to reopen, filed more than two years after the final order of removal, violated both the numerical and time limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the exceptions in paragraph (c)(3).

Tapia-Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-05(c)(2)

Furthermore, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this section, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2007). ... The second is clearly subject to the numerical bar of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Rodriguez-Gomez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(c)(2)

We find that this petition for review should be summarily denied because petitioners’ motion to reopen violated both the numerical and time limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it is untimely or exceeds the applicable one-motion limit.

Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(c)(2)

Respondent’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument because the motion to reopen filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) was properly denied as both time and numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports denial of a motion to reopen filed more than three years after the BIA's order when the petitioner does not establish due diligence warranting equitable tolling.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen, which was based in part on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, because it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s April 2, 2002 order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh did not demonstrate that he acted with due diligence, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that the court recognizes equitable tolling of deadlines on motions to reopen when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error) (citations omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals, so a second motion is numerically barred.

Barraza-Garcia v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it properly construed his first motion as a motion to reopen and in denying Barraza-Garcia’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (permitting one motion to reopen before BIA).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ordonez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2)

Respondent’s motion for summary disposition is granted because petitioner’s fourth motion to reopen violated both the numerical and time limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when the applicable time and numerical limits have been exceeded.

Rosales-Santos v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-06(c)(2)

As the BIA noted, Rosales-Santos had previously filed motions to reopen with both the IJ and the BIA and that the instant motion to reopen was filed more than six years after the BIA’s September 1999 decision. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in determining that the instant motion to reopen was both time- and numerically-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Singh v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes numerical and time restrictions on motions to reopen, subject to regulatory exceptions, and those restrictions apply when no exception is met.

Sosa v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen and reconsider as numerically barred, and finding that the motion did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions to the time restrictions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days after the final removal order, while subsection (c)(3) supplies exceptions; arguments outside those exceptions remain time- or numerically barred.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2), (c)(3)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. ... Petitioner’s other arguments do not fall under one of the statutory exceptions for an untimely or numerically barred motion to reopen. ... Accordingly, the Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s *190second motion to reopen as time and numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and supporting documentation, while § 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a numerical bar subject to exceptions.

Tahsoh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-21(c)(1), (c)(2)

The BIA denied Tahsoh’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The regulations require that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... She has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion by denying her second motion to reopen as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely or numerically barred motion to reopen when the alien establishes changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Lui v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-06-27(c)(3)(ii)

While an alien is generally limited to one motion to reopen exclusion or deportation proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and that motion *649must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion that does not comply with these time and numerical limitations may be brought where the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)'s time and numerical limits support denying a submission that amounts to a second motion to reopen.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-27(c)

Furthermore, to the extent that Chen’s submission of additional evidence along with her July 2006 motion amounted to a second motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion based on the time and numerical limitations established by the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and permits only one such motion.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-07-11(c)(2)

A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered,” and generally only one such motion may be filed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) affords an exception to these limits for persons seeking to reopen proceedings based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.”