42 U.S.C. § 3604

Section 3604(b) requires a housing-discrimination claimant to allege different terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected status, and sex-offender status is not one of the statute's protected classes.

Barral · filed 2026-01-15(b)

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, Plaintiff must allege that he was “subjected to different terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected status.” ... Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff fails to allege that he is a member of any of the classes protected by the Fair Housing Act or that Defendants’ adverse actions were based on his status as a protected class member. ... Plaintiff therefore does not state a claim for discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) requires facts suggesting discrimination on an impermissible basis to state a housing discrimination claim.

HEIMBACH v. HILL · filed 2021-10-14(a)

While the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits discriminatory practices in housing, Heimbach has not stated a claim under that statute because nothing in his Complaint suggests that he was discriminated against on an impermissible basis.

Section 3604(b) does not treat economic status as a protected status under federal fair housing law.

Morris v. Memorial Development Partners, LP · filed 2024-05-14(b)

Economic status is not a protected status for purposes of federal fair housing laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing statements that indicate a preference based on a protected characteristic; source of income is not a protected characteristic.

Short v. Manhattan Apartments, Inc. · filed 2012-12-03(c)

Plaintiffs’ § 3604(c) claim fails because the challenged statements do not indicate a preference based on any of the protected categories identified in the statute. Ms. Rofeim’s statements, as well as the other statements targeted by Plaintiffs, relate to “working people” and persons on HASA or other government assistance programs. However, source of income is not a protected class under § 3604(c) or any other provision of the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits familial-status discrimination in housing sales, and the housing-for-older-persons exemption permits age restrictions on occupancy, not ownership.

New Jersey Realtors v. Township of Berkeley · filed 2024-07-31(a)

Critically, the FHA's housing for older persons exemption permits restrictions on occupancy, not ownership, to persons fifty-five years and older. Thus, the exemption does not expressly permit the restriction on ownership embodied in the Ordinance. ... Because the exemption does not apply and the Ordinance's restriction on ownership in age-restricted communities discriminates on the basis of familial status, we conclude that the Ordinance violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and is therefore unlawful.

Section 3604(f)(2), as defined by § 3604(f)(3)(B), requires a reasonable and necessary accommodation that directly ameliorates disability-related needs; § 3604(b)'s familial-status protection covers households with children under 18, not families with disabled adult children.

McGrath v. Dunecrest Condominium Association · filed 2024-05-23(f)(2), (f)(3)(B), (b)

The § 3604(f)(3)(B) causation requirement comes from the linking of the “necessary” and “equal opportunity” elements of the failure to accommodate legal standard and acts as a limit on a defendant’s accommodation duty. ... Accordingly, the Association is entitled to summary judgment on the McGraths’ § 3604(f)(2) discrimination claim because the McGraths cannot establish that they were discriminated against as defined by § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... However, the plain language of § 3604(b) does not provide a remedy for discrimination based on a family with disabled adults. ... For these reasons, the Court concludes the McGraths are proceeding solely on a theory of liability based on the presence of disabled adults in their family, which is not a protected class under the plain language of § 3604(b) or the FHA’s definition of familial status. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k)(1). Consequently, the McGraths’ § 3604(b) claim fails. Accordingly, the Association is entitled to summary judgment on the McGraths’ § 3604(b) discrimination claim.

Section 3604(b)’s familial-status protection does not encompass family size alone.

Katz v. New York City Housing Preservation & Development · filed 2024-02-16(b)

Therefore, one of Katz’s holdings was that the familial-status protection in the FHA does not encompass family size. This holding is the law of the case, and the Court adheres to it here.

Section 3604(a) reaches a racially discriminatory eviction as making a dwelling unavailable, section 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory housing notices or advertisements, and sections 3604(f)(1) and (f)(3)(B) cover disability-based unavailability and refusals to make reasonable accommodations necessary for equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling.

Hughes v. Bouchon Properties LLC · filed 2024-05-30(a), (c), (f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

After reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds that Hughes has stated a claim under section 3604(a). ... Therefore, the conduct complained of—the eviction—falls within the scope of section 3604(a) for racially discriminatory acts prohibited by statute. ... There are no allegations that Bouchon advertised or set forth any notice in which there was discrimination against or preference for any race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin. Rather, all allegations center around eviction and refusal to rent, activity which falls outside of this section’s language. ... 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) makes it unlawful to discriminate or make unavailable a dwelling because of the disability of the buyer or renter. The Fifth Circuit interprets this provision as containing two prohibitions—one against the refusal to rent, and one against otherwise making the dwelling unavailable. ... “For the purposes of [section 3604], discrimination includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” ... As described above, eviction qualifies under the unavailability clause, and therefore is an activity which, if sufficiently alleged, is violative of the FHA. ... To state a claim for failure-to-accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) the plaintiff requested an accommodation; (3) the requested accommodation was reasonable; and (4) the accommodation was necessary to provide the plaintiff equal opportunity to use and enjoy the home. ... These conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under section 3604(f)(3).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of religion and reaches a wide range of discriminatory housing practices, including discriminatory zoning restrictions.

Indig v. Village of Pomona · filed 2024-08-30(a)

The FHA makes it illegal to: “otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . religion[;] . . . [or] [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b). “The phrase ‘otherwise make unavailable’ has been interpreted to reach a wide variety of discriminatory housing practices, including discriminatory zoning restrictions.” ... “Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Indigs’ FHA discrimination claim is denied.”

Section 3604(a) prohibits municipalities from blocking or impeding the provision of housing because of religion, and an indirect disparate-treatment claim is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Zikar Holdings LLC v. Ruhland · filed 2024-12-26(a)

The FHA prohibits municipalities from either blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of religion, among other protected traits. ... The Court applies the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to indirect-evidence disparate treatment claims. ... To succeed on such a claim, Plaintiffs bear an initial burden to make a prima facie showing that the City treated IP more favorably than it did Zikar. ... Finally, Plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden to establish that the City’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for enacting the Moratorium was a pretext for intentional discrimination against Muslims.

Section 3604 provides a federal cause of action for housing discrimination, but not for an alleged denial of subsidized housing unaccompanied by discrimination.

Devenney v. Miller · filed 2025-01-02

And there is no federal cause of action for denial of subsidized housing absent alleged discrimination, which Devenney does not allege here. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

Section 3604(a) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of a protected characteristic; § 3604(b) bars discrimination in rental terms or privileges; § 3604(c) bars discriminatory housing statements; and §§ 3604(f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(a), and (f)(3)(B) prohibit disability-based housing discrimination and require reasonable accommodations when necessary for equal use and enjoyment.

Webster v. Fairway Management Inc · filed 2025-10-02(a), (b), (c), (f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(a), (f)(3)(B)

Section 3604 requires that, to be liable, Defendants must “make unavailable … a dwelling” to Plaintiff; a plain reading of this language supports Defendants’ argument that, absent eviction or refusal to rent, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under this section of the statute. ... A plain reading of the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” refers to the contractual terms of sale or, in this case, a lease; Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants have discriminated against her in the terms of her lease. ... This claim fails for the same reason that Plaintiff’s claim under § 3604(b) fails; even if this Court were to construe the property manager’s statement as an instance of discrimination against Plaintiff because Plaintiff is a domestic violence victim, that does not mean that the statement would constitute sex discrimination. Plaintiff must still show that the property manager’s discriminatory statement was directed toward Plaintiff based upon her sex, and no such evidence appears in the record. ... To state a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) [s]he suffers from a handicap as defined by the FHAA ; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff's handicap [or disability]; (3) accommodation of the handicap [or disability] 'may be necessary' to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.” ... Ultimately, the FHA and Rehabilitation Act prohibit discrimination because of an individual’s handicap, so the record must demonstrate that animus toward Plaintiff because of her disability was a cause of the delay; the above factors are only useful insofar as they may demonstrate this unlawful motive.

Section 3604(a) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of listed protected characteristics, and § 3604(f)(2) bars making housing unavailable because of disability; an FHA claim must allege such discrimination to proceed.

Israel · filed 2025-10-16(a), (f)(2)

Magistrate Judge Katz found that even assuming Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the Fair Housing Act, dismissal was required as the Complaint “was devoid of any allegations” of discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” (Dkt. No. 6, at 8 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)). As relevant here, the FHA also prohibits making housing unavailable on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Plaintiffs articulate no specific objection to Magistrate Judge Katz’s recommendation of dismissal. Accordingly, having reviewed for clear error and having found none, the Court adopts the recommendation that the Fair Housing Act claim be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Section 3604(a) prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability, and an intentional-discrimination claim requires protected status, adverse treatment, and discrimination because of that status.

Suarez · filed 2025-10-28(a)

The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing,” Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 US. 91, 93 (1979), based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), ((1). Generally, to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) she is a member of class of individuals protected under the FHA; (2) she suffered “adverse treatment”; and (3) the defendant discriminated against her based on her protected classification. ... Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, and the Court dismisses Plaintiff's FHA claims on this basis.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in housing based on protected characteristics, but does not generally regulate housing quality.

Bell v. Weinreb Management LLC; Abraham Reiss of Weinreb Management LLC; Pitor Piwowarczyk of… · filed 2025-11-06

First, plaintiff has not raised any claims under the Fair Housing Act because he has not alleged any acts of discrimination. The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) does not regulate the quality of housing generally, but rather prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of characteristics such as race, religion, or disability.

Section 3604(a) prohibits property owners and municipalities from blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Rojas · filed 2025-12-30(a)

The FHA prohibits property owners and municipalities from blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Section 3604 does not make references to race or recognition of racism actionable discrimination without differential treatment in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing or related services.

Guion v. Bonner Homeless Transitions · filed 2020-04-02

Even if Barlow and Graham made the comments Guion alleges they did, it would not be enough to show discrimination. ... Mentioning someone’s race and recognizing that racism and discrimination are unfortunately a part of our society does not itself constitute discrimination. ... Further, none of Bonner Defendants’ actions throughout Guion’s stay at Holland House show any differential treatment.

Section 3604(b) requires factual allegations showing discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges, or related services in a dwelling transaction and the defendant's role; a bare conclusion of racial discrimination is insufficient.

Doe v. Related Companies LLP · filed 2022-09-19(b)

Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants engaged in racial discrimination is a legal conclusion bereft of factual allegations. The Court cannot determine from Plaintiff’s allegations whether she alleges that she was discriminated against in making a housing-related contract, was retaliated against for exercising her rights under the FHA, or something else. Plaintiff also does not plead facts showing how any particular defendant was involved in violating her rights. Plaintiff’s allegations are therefore insufficient to establish a violation of the FHA.

Section 3604(b) requires a housing-discrimination claim to allege that a protected characteristic was at least a motivating factor in discrimination involving the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing.

Watts v. Brito · filed 2023-10-27(b)

Because Plaintiff’s complaint is difficult to understand, the Court cannot discern facts sufficient to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege facts sufficient to state such a claim; he must allege facts showing that at least one of his characteristics that is protected by the FHA was at least a motiving factor in the alleged discrimination in housing that he has experienced, and that such discrimination was the result of the affirmative acts or enforcement of at least one of the individual defendants named in the amended complaint.

A claim of intentional housing discrimination under § 3604 requires proof of discriminatory intent; a seller is entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff offers no evidence that the seller’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Cheng v. Shore Club Hotel Condominiums, et al. · filed 2013-07-01(a), (b)

To prove an FHA violation, a plaintiff may “show either discriminatory intent or disparate impact.” Macone v . Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1 , 5 (1st Cir. 2002). ... Because Teng has not met her burden of showing that Bellemore acted with discriminatory intent, the court also grants summary judgment to Bellemore on Teng’s statutory claims.

Section 3604(b) requires a discrimination claimant to allege different treatment in a rental relationship because of protected class status.

(PS)Shultz v. Kern County · filed 2022-03-04(b)

Plaintiff’s FHA claim does not state a claim for relief because she does not allege that she is a member of a protected class or that she was treated unfairly because of her protected class status.

Section 3604(a) allows a violation to be proved through discriminatory intent or discriminatory effect.

South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors · filed 1989-04-27(a)

There are two recognized methods of proving a Section 3604(a) violation: by proving discriminatory intent or by proving discriminatory effect.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing a bona fide offer to buy a dwelling because the buyer does not share the seller’s religious beliefs.

Chapp v. Bowman · filed 1990-10-02(a)

The plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood that they will succeed on the merits of their federal claim. The evidence shows that the plaintiffs made both written and oral bona fide full price offers to purchase the home located at 429 Pearl Street. Both of these offers were communicated to Mr. Bowman, but neither was accepted by Mr. Bowman. The evidence further shows that religious beliefs were a substantial factor in Mr. Bowman’s refusal to sell to the Chapps; he raised the subject of religion during a discussion with Mr. Chapp concerning the sale. He was inquisitive about Mr. Chapp’s religion, and admonished him that “good Christians” should not go into debt to purchase property. He indicated in no uncertain terms that money was not the sticking point holding up the sale. Finally, he later admitted that he had (at least “officially”) taken the property off the market in order to avoid the appearance of discrimination. The implication is clear: that the Chapps were denied purchase of the property because Mr. Bowman and his wife were concerned that the Chapps did not share their religious beliefs.

Section 3604(a) requires discrimination affecting access to housing, while § 3604(b) covers racially discriminatory police protection provided in connection with housing.

Campbell v. City of Berwyn · filed 1993-03-05(a), (b)

With respect to their Section 3604(a) claim, plaintiffs must allege that defendants’ discriminatory actions, or the discriminatory effects of such actions, affect the availability of housing to them. ... Plaintiffs had already moved and secured housing in Berwyn before Kravcik’s decision to terminate on-site police protection became an issue. ... Under this reading of the statute, plaintiffs’ allegation regarding the termination of their police protection because of race is sufficient to state a valid claim under Section 3604(b).

Section 3604(a) prohibits treating people who inquire about available housing less favorably because of race, even before they submit an application.

United States v. Lorantffy Care Center · filed 1998-03-24(a)

However, the government does offer sufficient evidence that LCC engaged in a pattern and practice of treating black “walk-ins” less favorably than their white counterparts. If true, this clearly violates the FHA. Therefore, the court finds that the government may proceed in its claims against LCC.

Section 3604(a) requires a refusal to sell housing to be connected to a protected characteristic; denial alone does not establish discrimination.

Tufano v. One Toms Point Lane Corp. · filed 1999-09-13(a)

Nowhere in the Amended Complaint does Plaintiff allege that the reason he was discriminated against was related to any of the six denominated determinants. Because these factors are absent from Plaintiffs allegations, there is no discriminatory nexus, as required.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination beyond a refusal to sell or rent, including discrimination in housing terms, services, and disability accommodations.

Arthur v. Windsor Shadows Homeowner's Association · filed 2021-03-31

A brief look at Plaintiff’s Complaint disabuses the Court of that notion, as the FHA prohibits far more than “discrimination in the sale or rental of dwellings.” ... While Plaintiff’s Complaint could be clearer and more concise, she has sufficiently stated a claim under the FHA to give this Court subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore the Court will not dismiss Count One with prejudice.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on protected characteristics, and a complaint must allege facts showing how the defendant discriminated.

Fulkerson v. The Hartford · filed 2020-08-18

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), as amended, ... prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental and financing of housing based on race, color, religion, ... national origin, sex, handicap and family status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Plaintiff does not include ... factual allegations as to how he was discriminated against in violation of the FHA by the Hartford or Pheasant.

Section 3604(a) requires factual allegations linking a refusal to rent to a protected trait to state a housing discrimination claim.

Burnside v. Monarch Real Estate Corp. · filed 2022-10-26(a)

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to the Fair Housing Act because the Complaint does not contain factual allegations showing that race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin were a factor in Defendants' decision to deny Plaintiff the opportunity to rent the unit.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race and sex discrimination in rental-related services or facilities, while § 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of disability and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations that afford equal use and enjoyment.

Canty-Massey v. Vantage Management, Inc. · filed 2024-06-11(b), (f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in rental housing or “in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b). ... Broadly reading the language of the FHA, Canty-Massey has plausibly alleged that because of her race she was denied access to facilities, including the rental office, that other tenants had access to. ... Canty-Massey has also plausibly alleged that because of her race and sex, she was treated differently than her white and Asian male neighbors regarding the service of resolving complaints. ... The FHA makes it unlawful “to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... The FHA only requires that Vantage make “reasonable” accommodations that would allow Canty-Massey the same use and enjoyment of the property as other non-handicapped persons.

Section 3604(f)(1) is violated when disability is a motivating factor in making a dwelling unavailable or denying it, rather than only when disability is the but-for cause.

Gilead Community Services, Inc. v. Town of Cromwell · filed 2024-08-12(f)(1)

The binding precedent of our Circuit establishes that a plaintiff bringing a disparate treatment claim for discrimination under Section 804(f) of the FHA must show that a protected characteristic was one motivating factor causing the defendant’s actions taken against the plaintiff.

A tenant may assert an alleged Section 3604 violation as an affirmative defense when an eviction case is reopened to enforce a stipulation that did not waive the defense.

Mercy v. Johnson · filed 2024-08-15

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Johnson did not waive his right to assert alleged violations of the CFHA and the F HA as affirmative defenses to Mercy Housing’s motion to reopen the FED case to enforce the stipulation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing-discrimination plaintiff seeking a reasonable accommodation to plead refusal, a reasonable accommodation, and necessity/equal opportunity.

PARKER v. LEE · filed 2024-08-20(f)(3)(B)

Finally, the claim also fails to the extent it can be construed as one for failure to accommodate under the FHA. To state such a claim, Parker must “plead enough facts to make out the three elements set forth in [42 U.S.C.] § 3604(f)(3)(B): refusal, reasonable accommodation, and necessity/equal opportunity.” Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 111 (3d Cir. 2018). Parker does not allege he requested any reasonable accommodation for any specific disability.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) permits a reasonable accommodation claim against facility owners based on employees’ alleged conduct as their agents when the complaint plausibly alleges ownership, agency, and a refusal to accommodate.

Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center, Inc. v. Plantation Management Company, LLC · filed 2022-01-24(f)(3)(B)

In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept these factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Under this standard, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to place Moving Defendants on notice of, and allow Moving Defendants to understand, the nature of the claims against them.

A reasonable accommodation claim under Section 3604 must plausibly allege that a disability denied the claimant meaningful access to the Section 8 program.

Louis ex rel. G.A.H. v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2016-01-14

In their opposition brief, plaintiffs raise new reasonable accommodation claims based on Section 504 and the' Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... In any event, the FHAA and Section 504 claims fail for the same reason as the Title II claims: plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead that they were denied meaningful access to the Section 8 program because of a disability.

A person seeking relief under § 3604(f)(3)(B) must prove that they have a disability covered by the FHAA.

Sanders v. AHEPA 78 VI Apartments, Inc. · filed 2024-08-30(f)(3)(B)

The burden of proving a disability lies with Sanders. See Furbee v. Wilson, 144 N.E.3d 801, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (to prevail on FHAA claim, plaintiff must first establish he is disabled within meaning of FHAA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Our review did not reveal any agreement by AHEPA on this element of Sanders’ claim. While AHEPA acknowledged Sanders had an issue, it did not agree the issue constituted a disability as that term is defined in the FHAA. Sanders failed to show that he is disabled and thereby protected under the FHAA.

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) requires evidence of a resident’s handicap; age alone does not establish one.

Caron v. City of Pawtucket · filed 2004-02-27(f)(1)(B)

As an initial matter, this Court finds that the Bernard Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence to establish that they are “handicapped” within the meaning of the FHA. Undoubtedly, they are all elderly, but “[t]he mere fact that a person is elderly does not constitute a handicap” under the FHA.

Section 3604 requires a claimant alleging disability discrimination to prove that the prospective tenants have a qualifying handicap under the FHA.

1st Step Sober Living LLC and Scott Smith v. Bill Cleveland, Sherri McClain, Terry Garrett, Dori Garrett, Lunsford Warne · filed 2025-02-18(f)(1)

1st Step also asserts they are entitled to damages because the residents and City violated the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, by “discriminating” against potential tenants of the sober living home. The threshold requirement here was the question of whether the potential tenants of 1st Step were handicapped and, thus, a protected group under the FHA. ... In short, we agree with the chancellor that 1st Step did not provide support for or sufficiently prove that the tenants of the proposed rehabilitation business fit the “handicap” criteria as set out in the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Leonard v. Hocking Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 2024-09-18(f)(3)(B)

To state a failure-to-accommodate claim under the FHAA, Plaintiff must allege that (1) he suffers from a disability within the meaning of FHAA; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the disability; (3) the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused to make the accommodation. See Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 415 F. App’x 617, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2011). Here, the allegations plausibly suggest that Plaintiff is a person with a disability, that Defendants knew of the disability, that his requested accommodation of possessing an ESA is necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use his dwelling, and that Plaintiff’s possessing an ESA is reasonable. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged that Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to live at the housing complex with his ESA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a failure-to-accommodate plaintiff to show a covered handicap, the defendant’s knowledge of it, a necessary and reasonable accommodation, and refusal after a request.

Chhang v. West Coast USA Properties LLC · filed 2024-05-03(f)(3)(B)

A plaintiff alleging a claim for failure to accommodate must show: (1) the existence of a covered handicap; (2) the defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of that handicap; (3) that an accommodation may be necessary; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and 5) that the defendant refused to make the necessary and reasonable accommodation upon request.

A Fair Housing Act claim based on insurance-claim adjustment decisions requires allegations explaining how the decisions fit within § 3604(a)-(f); vague, conclusory allegations of discriminatory motives are insufficient.

Ewideh v. Homesite Insurance Company of the Midwest · filed 2024-07-31(a)-(f)

Vague, conclusory allegations that defendants’ adjustment decisions were made for discriminatory reasons are insufficient to state a claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) broadly prohibits discrimination in housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability; an intentional-discrimination claim requires plausible allegations of protected-class membership, adverse treatment, and discrimination because of that classification.

Avila v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2024-10-25(a)

The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing,” Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979), based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f)(1). Generally, to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he is a member of class of individuals protected under the FHA; (2) he suffered “adverse treatment”; and (3) the defendant discriminated against him based on his protected classification.

Section 3604(b) requires facts plausibly showing discrimination in housing because of a protected characteristic.

Bethea v. NYCHA Law Department · filed 2023-03-06(b)

Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts plausibly suggesting that ... Defendant subjected her to discrimination or retaliation in housing on the basis of any impermissible factor, she fails to state a claim under the FHA.

A claim under § 3604 alleging race or disability discrimination must plausibly allege discriminatory purpose.

Hartman v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2016-05-05

Further, while Hartman contends that these defendants violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by refusing to allow her to refinance due to her race or disability, which resulted in her credit being ruined and her being forced into bankruptcy, her complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendants acted with a discriminatory purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination by creditors “on the basis of race”); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination in the sale of housing “because of race” or “because of a handicap”).

A Fair Housing Act disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting an inference that the defendant acted because of a protected characteristic.

Macon v. Parker · filed 2021-07-30(f)(1)

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination under the FHA and Oregon’s Fair Housing Act because she does not allege facts establishing discriminatory intent. She does not allege any facts that create a causal relationship between Defendants’ conduct and Plaintiff’s family status, race, or disability.

Section 3604(b) requires a housing-discrimination claim to connect the alleged adverse housing conditions or action to the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.

Smith v. Supportive Housing Coalition · filed 2024-08-16(b)

The complaint fails to state a claim under the federal Fair Housing Act because it does not include any facts supporting the allegation that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, let alone facts establishing a plausible causal connection between Plaintiff's protected status and any discriminatory conduct on the part of Defendants.

Section 3604 requires facts linking adverse housing conditions or actions to a protected status; unsafe conditions alone do not establish housing discrimination.

Smith v. Supportive Housing Coalition · filed 2024-09-24

In sum, the FHA does not regulate living conditions generally, but only discrimination in the terms or provision of housing. And, to state a claim, Plaintiff must present underlying facts that link the adverse or unsafe living conditions to his familial status or his disability.

Section 3604 can reach a tenant screening company whose practices contribute to a discriminatory rental decision, even when the company is not the housing provider.

Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Corelogic Rental Prop. Solutions, LLC · filed 2019-03-25

For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant can be held liable under the FHA as an agent of WinnResidential.

Section 3604(f)(2) and (f)(3)(C) prohibit discriminatory rental conditions and inaccessible design or construction without limiting liability to a particular type of actor or method of discrimination.

Access Living of Metropolitan Chicago v. City Of Chicago · filed 2024-09-30(f)(2), (f)(3)(C)

Based on the evidence presented, and viewing the evidence in Access Living’s favor for now, a reasonable jury can find that the City must comply with the Housing Act because of Chicago’s role in the design and construction of the affordable housing developments. Remember that the Housing Act’s prohibitions are not directed at a specific actor. Instead, the prohibitions ban an outcome without requiring “who the actor is, or how such actors” discriminate against potential tenants. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted). And the Housing Act should be interpreted broadly. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Under those principles, it is reasonable to hold that the City, in its role providing funding for the housing developments, approving the construction and rehabilitation of the developments, and its contractual obligation to ensure that the developments comply with federal law “discriminate[d] against [a] person in the … conditions … of sale or rental of a dwelling” by its “failure to design and construct those dwellings in such a manner that … [is] readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2), (f)(3)(C). At the very least, a reasonable jury could so find.

Section 3604's sex-discrimination protection can cover a domestic-violence-based claim only when a policy has a disparate impact on women or the defendant intentionally discriminated because the plaintiff is a woman.

McVicker v. Muskogee Housing Authority · filed 2024-10-04(a), (b)

Congress, in drafting the FHA, expressly denominated multiple protected classes – “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, and national origin” – status as a domestic violence victim is not one of these enumerated classes. This unambiguous statutory text and its plain meaning control in the absence of compelling argument demonstrating that the text is ambiguous or otherwise in need of some further judicial gloss. ... In this Court’s view, a sex discrimination claim based upon claimant’s status as a domestic violence victim may lie only if a plaintiff can demonstrate: (1) the defendant has adopted a policy regarding victims of domestic violence that has had a disparate impact upon women or (2) the defendant has intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff/domestic-violence-victim because she is a woman.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits disability discrimination that makes a dwelling unavailable or denies it to a buyer or renter, but the FHA does not apply to housing in a jail.

Bradley v. Doe · filed 2024-11-08(f)(1)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap” of the buyer or renter, a person residing in the dwelling, or any other person associated with the buyer or renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... But the Court agrees with the Sheriff and Wellpath that the FHA does not reach a jail like KCAJC. ... Because Congress did not intend for the FHA “to protect housing discrimination in detention facilities,” the FHA does not apply to Bradley’s claims against the Sheriff or Wellpath related to his housing at KCAJC.

Section 3604 supports a private cause of action for discriminatory housing practices.

Bryant · filed 2025-11-14

Additionally, even if the plaintiff is correct that there is not federal question jurisdiction when the cited federal statute does not provide for a private cause of action, the Court would still, at the very least, have original jurisdiction over Counts IV and VII because (1) these Counts seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) private causes of action can be maintained under these statutes.

Section 3604(a) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of protected characteristics, while § 3604(b) bars discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental; both provisions cover discriminatory evictions, including after acquisition.

Smith v. Kittle Property Group, INC. · filed 2025-01-27(a), (b)

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful for an entity “[t]o refuse to…rent…or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). It applies even after someone has acquired the property and covers discriminatory evictions. Watters v. Homeowners’ Ass’n, 48 F.4th 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2022). Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful for an entity “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling…because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). These sections “prohibit discriminatory evictions.”

Section 3604(a) bars making housing unavailable because of race, and a plaintiff must provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the defendant acted with discriminatory motivation.

Thomas v. Genova · filed 2025-02-24(a)

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants discriminated against them in violation of sections 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617 of the FHA. With respect to such claims, we have explained that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s actions were motivated by discrimination.” Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2003). We have also held that, “without some evidence of knowledge of the [plaintiffs’] racial identity, it is impossible to infer such motivation.” Id. at 49. Because, once again, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of Plaintiffs’ race or that they were motivated by racial discrimination, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the FHA claim.

Section 3604(f)(1) reaches post-acquisition disability discrimination that makes a dwelling unavailable, but requires an actual, realistic, concrete threat of eviction or comparable risk of losing housing.

Park Crossing Homeowners Association Inc. and Martha Fernandez v. Suarez · filed 2025-04-30(f)(1)

We agree with the Association that the Suarezes presented no competent evidence to support a verdict on their discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) because they presented no evidence that the Association had issued an actual threat of eviction or that they had faced a genuine risk of losing their housing. The pre-suit mediation request did not constitute the kind of actual eviction threat required to support a discrimination claim under section 3604(f)(1). ... At the time the Suarezes filed their counterclaim, no actual, realistic, concrete threat of eviction existed that rendered the property “unavailable” under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The pre-suit mediation letter was not an action “that would lead to eviction but for an intervening cause.”

Section 3604(a) prohibits making housing unavailable because of race or color, applies to post-acquisition conduct as well as initial sale or rental, and requires discriminatory intent.

Green · filed 2025-10-22(a)

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in discriminatory

Section 3604(b) does not impose direct FHA liability on a maintenance employee who is not a housing provider and lacks ownership or control over rental decisions.

Trujillo v. Amity Plaza LLC · filed 2025-05-02(b)

First, Mr. Martinez is not a “housing provider” as that term is used in the FHA, i.e., he is not a landlord, real estate company, homeowner, homeowners association, municipality, or insurance company. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

Section 3604(c)'s prohibition on discriminatory housing statements applies even when the housing transaction might otherwise fall within an exemption under § 3603(b).

Calloway v. Morgan · filed 2025-07-01(c)

In any event, Ms. Calloway brings a claim for discriminatory statements violative of the FHA pursuant to section 3604(c), and such a claim is not subject to the exemptions set forth in section 3603(b).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a landlord to address a tenant’s reasonable-accommodation request when the tenant’s notice is sufficient to indicate that the tenant may have a disability requiring accommodation, even if the notice is ambiguous or does not expressly identify the disability.

Brockway v. Petschke Trust No. 102 · filed 2025-07-11(f)(3)(B)

Even where notice of the disability or request for accommodations is “ambiguous,” if the employee (or tenant) provides notice “sufficient to notify the employer that the employee may have a disability that requires accommodation,” the duty shifts to “the employer [to] ask for clarification.” ... This applies equally in the FHA context. ... A reasonable jury could find that the only way to read this portion of the letter is as a statement that Plaintiff had a disability requiring accommodations and was “formally” seeking accommodations for that disability.

Section 3604 requires a landlord to know of both a tenant’s disability and the tenant’s desire for an accommodation before the duty to accommodate arises.

Al-Awadi v. Housing Authority for the County of San Diego CA4/1 · filed 2014-02-25(f)(3)(B)

To trigger the FHA requirements, a landlord must know of both the disability and the tenant's desire for an accommodation for that disability.

Section 3604(b) covers intentional housing discrimination and actions with a discriminatory effect on a protected class, and requires a plausible connection to covered housing or related services.

FEINGOLD v. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE · filed 2025-07-31(b)

To establish a prima facie case under section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act, Mr. Feingold must show either “the challenged actions were motivated by intentional discrimination or that the actions had a discriminatory effect on a protected class, regardless of motivation.”26 Mr. Feingold does not allege facts allowing us to plausibly infer a claim for discrimination, to find Erie is his landlord, or to find Erie is otherwise providing him housing covered by this federal statute. Mr. Feingold does not plead a Fair Housing Act claim.

A prima facie disparate-treatment claim under § 3604(a)–(b) requires a buyer to show protected-class membership, qualification for the dwelling, denial of the opportunity to buy it, and its continued availability.

Mitchell v. Century 21 Rustic Realty · filed 2002-04-29(a)-(b)

Plaintiffs may demonstrate prima facie disparate treatment by proving: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) that they sought and qualified for the dwelling at issue; (3) that they were denied the right to procure the dwelling; and (4) that the dwelling remained available after being denied to them. ... The Mitchells failed to present a prima facie housing discrimination case.

Section 3604(b) requires proof of intentional discrimination or discriminatory impact; enforcement of housing standards against the compared landlords did not establish gender discrimination.

Scruggs v. Auth · filed 2000-08-23(b)

To establish a violation under the FHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate either intentional discrimination or discriminatory impact. ... Moreover, that MHA found all three Section 8 landlords, Scruggs, SKA and Ford to have violated ... MHA’s housing standards, precludes a finding of gender discrimination.

For these housing-discrimination claims, plaintiffs had to show that they belonged to a protected class and that similarly situated people outside the class received different treatment.

Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass'n v. ST. LOUIS HOUSING · filed 2004-01-06(a), (b)

In the case at bench, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs must show that (1) they are within a protected class, and (2) that similarly situated non-members of the class were subject to disparate treatment.

Section 3604(a) reaches discriminatory housing consequences caused by any actor, not only landlords, and supports race-discrimination claims based on disparate treatment or disparate impact.

BROWN v. TOWN OF SCARBOROUGH · filed 2025-08-22(a)

As to discrimination under federal law, the FHA does not limit liability to landlords. Instead, it prohibits any conduct, regardless of the actor, that “make[s]” housing “unavailable” or that discriminates in housing “terms, conditions, or privileges” based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b). That statutory language “ ‘refers to the consequences of an action rather than the actor’s intent’ ” and is “ ‘results-oriented.’ ”

Section 3604(f) does not impose liability on a housing assistance provider or its employee merely for helping someone obtain a hotel room when they do not provide the rental dwelling.

BITTENBENDER · filed 2026-02-26(f)

Because she does not allege that FSABC or Stewart was a provider of a rental dwelling, but at best helped her obtain her hotel room at the Extended Stay America, the FHA claims against them will be dismissed for this additional reason.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race or color, and a state-court eviction does not by itself bar a later FHA claim, although damages may be limited to injuries before the eviction judgment.

Frazier · filed 2025-10-14(a)

(a) To refuse to. . . rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the . . . rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race [or] color. ... As a result, collateral estoppel does not bar Plaintiffs FHA claims. ... The Court must note, though, this does not dismiss Plaintiff's FHA claims, nor does this Court find a state court eviction bars a later FHA claim. This Court merely limits Plaintiff's damage claims up to the September 13, 2022, judgment date.

Section 3604(b) does not limit liability to housing providers; service providers may be liable for discriminatory acts involving services connected to housing.

Mendy v. Larson · filed 2025-09-02(b)

Section 3604, in turn, similarly declares certain housing practices to be unlawful without limiting who may be liable. ... Thus, the FHA applies to NWSS and Larson.

Section 3604(c) bars statements indicating a protected-class preference, limitation, or discrimination only when made with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling; the court held that post-purchase neighbor statements were not sufficiently connected to the housing market.

Burley v. Chapman · filed 2025-09-25(c)

The Motion does not explain how Defendant’s alleged statements were made “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); see generally Dkt. No. 8-3 at 16-18. Plaintiffs also do not allege that Defendant made any statements in connection with the purchase of their home. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that they completed the purchase in “early-January 2023,” id. at ¶ 8; that Defendant “moved into the neighboring property as a tenant in February 2023,” id. at ¶ 9; and that Defendant’s alleged discriminatory statements began “in April 2023,” id. at ¶ 10. As a result, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendant’s statements were “made in connection with the housing market.”2 Space Hunters, 429 F.3d at 424. Accordingly, the Court denies this portion of the Motion and dismisses this prong of Plaintiffs’ FHA claim.

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing statements that indicate a preference or discrimination based on a protected characteristic; language encouraging desegregation does not facially indicate such a preference.

Reese v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2002-12-05(c)

This language is not discriminatory on its face because it does not “indicate any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.”

Section 3604(c) applies to discriminatory housing statements by anyone, including people who are neither dwelling owners nor their agents.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Space Hunters, Inc., John McDermott Defendants-Appellees · filed 2005-11-09(c)

Nothing in this language limits the statute’s reach to owners or agents or to statements that directly effect a housing transaction.

Section 3604(c) prohibits asking tenants to state their national origin on applications for apartment services.

Housing Rights Center v. Donald Sterling Corp. · filed 2003-08-01(c)

Plaintiffs have established likely success on the merits of their claim that asking a tenant to state his or her national origin as part of an application for apartment-related services violates the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).

Section 3604(c) prohibits written housing statements that indicate a preference against tenants with disabilities.

Johnson v. Macy · filed 2015-11-16(c)

Plaintiff is likely to prevail on her claim under § 3604(c) because defendant’s written notes facially indicate a preference for tenants without disabilities.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell, rent, or otherwise make a dwelling unavailable because of a protected characteristic; §§ 3604(c)-(e) address discriminatory housing advertising, misrepresentations about availability, and blockbusting.

Baker · filed 2025-12-23(a), (c)-(e)

This provision of the FHA makes it unlawful to refuse to sell, rent, or otherwise make unavailable a dwelling to any person based on a protected characteristic. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... To state a claim for discriminatory advertising, Mr. Baker must “‘show that the defendant made, printed, or published a discriminatory notice, statement or advertisement.’” Baker, 2025 WL 1207666, at *4 (citing Green v. California Ct. Apartments, LLC, No. C07-0334MJP, 2008 WL 681835, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2008)). ... To state a claim for misrepresentation of availability, Mr. Baker must show that (1) Defendants falsely represented that a dwelling was not available for inspection, sale, or rental, (2) the dwelling was actually available, and (3) Defendants made the false representation because of Mr. Baker’s protected characteristic. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d). ... To state a claim for blockbusting, Mr. Baker must show that (1) Defendants acted for profit, (2) Defendants induced or attempted to induce a person to sell or rent a dwelling, and (3) such inducement was based on representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of persons of a particular protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e). ... Thus, the court dismisses his claim for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (c)-(e) with prejudice.

Section 3604(f)(1) covers discriminatory lease nonrenewal based on a renter’s handicap, even when the renter remains in the dwelling on a month-to-month tenancy.

Matarese v. Archstone Pentagon City · filed 2011-01-05(f)(1)

The statute prohibits discrimination in the rental of an apartment, or otherwise making unavailable or denying a dwelling, on the basis of a handicap. The nonrenewal of a lease falls within the plain meaning of these terms.

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap of a person residing in or intending to reside there, and an FHA damages claim requires a direct relation between the injury and the alleged violation.

Judy Shaw Foundation v. City of Howard · filed 2026-01-05(f)(1)(B)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). ... In addition, a “claim for damages under the FHA—which is akin to a tort action” requires a plaintiff to establish that its injuries were proximately caused by a statutory violation. ... Because the evidence demonstrates “some direct relation” between iRecover’s withdrawal from its contract with JSF—which resulted in JSF’s monetary damages—and the City’s adoption of Ordinances 745 and 746, summary judgment on JSF’s FHA claim is denied.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a person's handicap.

Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City Of Middletown · filed 2002-02-19(f)(1)

The FHA makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... Based on this evidence, then, a reasonable juror could refuse to credit the defendants' stated reasons for denying RECAP a special-use permit and find that the real reason was discrimination based on the identity of RECAP's clients. ... We therefore hold that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants on each of the three statutory claims.

Section 3604(f)(1)(A) prohibits discriminating in the sale or rental, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling to a buyer or renter because of that buyer’s or renter’s handicap.

Bellus Real Estate and Management Corporation v. Brodeur · filed 2021-09-30(f)(1)(A)

Under the Federal Housing Act, it is “unlawful . . . to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of (A) that buyer or renter, (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A)–(C). ... Mr. Brodeur’s sudden change of heart in these circumstances is sufficient to permit an inference that the protected characteristic of the potential occupants played a role in his decision.

Section 3604(a) reaches a government entity’s denial of a housing opportunity, even when no dwelling is directly withheld.

Thompson v. United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2005-01-06(a)

There can be a constructive illegal “denial” of housing — i.e., a government entity may violate § 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act by denying a plaintiff a housing opportunity, for example by withdrawing from a multi-municipal housing authority.

Section 3604 prohibits refusing to rent a dwelling because of the applicants' race.

Derry Harper and Nikki Harper v. Hutton · filed 1979-03-14

On the basis of the entire record, we are convinced that the defendant refused to rent to the plaintiffs because they were both poor and black. Had they been white, he would not have refused.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent housing because of race, including when race is one reason for the refusal; discrimination based on a tenant’s interracial association is also covered.

Oliver v. Shelly · filed 1982-03-29(a)

Defendant Shelly’s refusal to rent plaintiffs the apartment because they were an interracial couple constitutes discrimination on the basis of race in violation of section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act and The Fair Housing Act. For purposes of these provisions, there is discrimination on the basis of race where race is part of the reason why a prospective tenant is refused housing.

Section 3604 prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable to a person because of national origin or another protected characteristic.

Mascaro v. Hudson · filed 1986-10-09

Despite argument to the contrary, we conclude that the defenses raised by Hudson in this case can be used in a summary eviction proceeding. ... The Fair Housing Act provides in pertinent part: "... it shall be unlawful ... to refuse to rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its conclusion. His recognition of the law that prohibits discrimination in renting dwelling is correct, and was properly applied in this case.

Sections 3604(a)-(c) prohibit race-based denial or unavailability of housing, discrimination in rental terms or privileges, and discriminatory housing statements, while § 3604(d) addresses misrepresentations that an actually available dwelling is unavailable.

United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment & Housing Authority · filed 1989-07-24(a)-(d)

Rather, for the purposes of assessing whether there has been a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(c), being made to wait longer because of race than is justified for public housing is functionally equivalent to being denied public housing. ... This court finds that the policy of CRHA does not run afoul of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) because the effect of the policy, on its own terms, means that the units in question which are rented to a white applicant in preference to a black applicant are not actually available to the black applicant in question although, by this opinion, the court finds that those units should be open to the eligible black applicant. Section 3604(d) addresses an issue of misrepresentation, of a refusal of a landlord to indicate that unoccupied properties are open for rental.

Section 3604(a) provides the sole remedy for an allegedly discriminatory denial of rental housing; the same denial does not also create a separate § 3617 interference claim.

Eddie Frazier, Diane Treloar and Long Island Housing Services, Inc. v. Tony Rominger and Anna Maria Rominger · filed 1994-06-23(a)

Moreover, the only “interference” that plaintiffs can claim is the actual denial of rental housing. However, under this theory, every allegedly discriminatory denial of housing under § 3604(a) would also constitute a violation of § 3617 in that the denial “interfered” with the prospective tenant’s Fair Housing Act rights. Declining to believe that Congress ever intended such a statutory overlap, we believe that the plaintiffs’ sole remedy in this ease existed in their § 3604(a) cause of action. Because the plaintiffs did not state a cause of action under § 3617 separate and distinct from their cause of action under § 3604(a), the district court did not err in refusing to grant the plaintiffs a new trial on their purported § 3617 claim.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race- or color-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling's sale or rental and related services or facilities, while § 3604(d) prohibits falsely representing that a dwelling is unavailable for inspection, sale, or rental on that basis.

United States v. Shen · filed 1997-03-14(b), (d)

Here, there is ample evidence that supports the district court's findings, including testimony from testers who were sent to Shen's apartment complex, testimony from former tenants who assisted Shen, testimony from victims of Shen's discrimination, and statistical evidence. Given the abundance of evidence presented by the government in this case, the district court properly found that Shen violated sections 3604(b) and (d) of the FHA.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit refusing to rent a dwelling or discriminating in rental terms because of race, and cover pattern-or-practice discrimination based on race or familial status.

United States v. Matusoff Rental Co. · filed 2007-03-30(a) and (b)

The FHA provides that it is unlawful to refuse to rent any dwelling because of a person’s race and to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions or privileges of rental of a dwelling on the basis of his race. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b). ... Matusoff has engaged in patterns or practices of discrimination against tenants and applicants for apartments on the basis of familial status and race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b).

Section 3604(b) requires a Fair Housing Act plaintiff to plead housing discrimination because of race, using direct evidence or at least minimal support for discriminatory intent under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Calixte v. Susan Ray Equities Inc. · filed 2022-01-12(b)

To plead a claim under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff must adequately plead housing discrimination because of race. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). To do so, a plaintiff may offer direct evidence of discriminatory treatment. “Direct evidence of discriminatory treatment is evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse action.” Fair Hous. Just. Ctr., Inc. v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV-3196 (VSB), 2018 WL 4565152, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018) (quoting United States v. Hylton, 944 F. Supp. 2d 176, 187 (D. Conn. 2013), aff’d, 590 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2014)). Alternatively, a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc). To do so, he must offer “at least minimal support for the proposition that” an adverse action by a housing provider “was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Ibid.

Section 3604 prohibits race-based housing discrimination, and a plaintiff must allege facts showing such discrimination to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act.

Bethea v. NYCHA Law Department · filed 2023-06-12

Specifically, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the FHA because the amended complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that (1) Defendants did anything to discriminate against her based on her race, (2) she exercised her rights under the FHA, or that (3) Defendants coerced, intimidated, or threatened her, or interfered with her exercise of those rights because of her race. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617.

Section 3604(a) prohibits race- or color-based discrimination in housing and permits claims under either disparate-treatment or disparate-impact theories.

Flores v. First Cambridge Realty Corporation · filed 2024-02-02(a)

Both statutes prohibit discrimination in housing based on race or color. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e); M.G.L. c. 151B, §§ 4(6) and (7B). And under both statutes, a plaintiff may pursue either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact theory of liability. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 545-46 (2015); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2000); Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 474 Mass. 107, 121-24 (2016).

Section 3604(b) bars discrimination based on race in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling's sale or rental and in related services or facilities.

LENNON v. NVR MORTGAGE · filed 2024-11-26(b)

The FHA prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... These provisions “can be violated by either intentional discrimination or if a practice has a disparate impact on a protected class.” ... In order to prevail on intentional discrimination claims, the plaintiff must show that “some discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind the challenged action.”

Sections 3604(a) and (b) can reach actual or constructive eviction, and a race-based statement about renting can support a plausible § 3604(c) claim at the pleading stage.

Frazier v. Luther · filed 2025-04-07(a)-(c)

Section 3604(a) applies to the case sub judice because “the Fifth Circuit held open the possibility that actual or constructive eviction could qualify as refusal to rent under section 3604(a).” Hughes v. Bouchon Prop. LLC, Civ. Action No.: 24-103, 2024 WL 2784626, *3 (E.D. La. May 30, 2024) (citing Cox v. City of Dallas, 420 F.3d 734, 742 (Sth Cir. 2005) (citing supporting authority from other circuits))). ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s sections 3604(a) and (b) claims are reasonably plausible and survive 12(b)(6). ... To succeed on a claim under § 3604(c), a plaintiff must prove a defendant (1) made a statement (2) with respect to the .. . rental of a dwelling (3) that indicated a preference based on protected class membership. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s section 3604(c) claim is plausible on its face and survives 12(b)(6).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, and a plaintiff must plead facts showing conduct of that kind.

Moffett · filed 2025-12-23(a)

But Plaintiff does not plead specific facts to illustrate this assertion, nor does he plead facts to support an inference that he was discriminated against by the Defendants in one of the ways specifically prohibited by the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604 prohibits racial discrimination against tenants and rental applicants.

Fair Housing of Marin, a California Non-Profit Corporation v. Jack Combs, D.B.A. Waters Edge Apartments · filed 2002-04-09

There is ample evidence in the record that Combs violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the California Unfair Business Practices Act.

Section 3604's ban on sex discrimination requires disparate treatment based on the individual's sex; a facially gender-neutral housing-allocation rule based on family composition and affecting men and women alike is not sex discrimination.

Braunstein v. Dwelling Managers, Inc. · filed 1979-10-24

The Court does not find present in this case the requisite difference in treatment which would justify a finding of discrimination. A mother and daughter who reside together receive the same treatment as a father and son; neither family is eligible for rental of a two bedroom apartment. Since the essence of sex discrimination is the difference in treatment of the individual based on gender, and males and females receive similar treatment from the defendants, there is no sex discrimination.

Section 3604(b) claims may proceed under disparate-treatment standards, requiring a protected class, notice, qualification, and refusal to rent despite qualification.

Cavalieri-Conway v L Butterman and Associates · filed 1998-01-28(b)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA, Cavalieri-Conway must show that: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) Defendants knew it; 3) she was qualified to rent the apartment; and 4) Defendants refused to rent her an apartment despite her qualifications.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit race discrimination in making a dwelling unavailable or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of its rental, and a disparate-treatment plaintiff must ultimately prove intentional discrimination.

Gadsons v. Royal/Concord Gardens · filed 1998-05-13(a)-(b)

... Under that framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by demonstrating that: (a) he or she belongs to a class of citizens protected by the FHA; (b) the defendant was aware of his or her membership in that protected class; (c) the plaintiff was ready and able to purchase or rent the premises in question; and (d) the defendant refused to deal with the plaintiff (or terminated the plaintiff’s lease) and the premises remained available for sale or lease. If the plaintiff carries that burden, the defendant must then rebut the presumption of unlawful discrimination by articulating a non-discriminatory basis for its actions. The burden then reverts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered justification for its conduct is pretextual and, at its core, defendant’s conduct constitutes intentional discrimination.

Section 3604(a) prohibits gender-based discrimination in the sale of a dwelling.

Hadeed v. Abraham · filed 2003-05-23(a)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits gender-based discrimination in the sale of a dwelling.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing and related services because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and a disparate-treatment claim requires membership in a protected class, differential treatment, and discriminatory intent or motive.

Grier v. HUD · filed 2022-11-14(b)

Under a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they are a member of a protected class, were treated differently from others, and “that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive[.]” ... Ms. Grier has failed to state a claim under either the disparate impact theory or the disparate treatment theory. She vaguely references a “protected class” of “native New Orleanians” who “were less likely to be disproportionately affected than” her, Am. Compl. 6,5 but native New Orleanian is not a recognized protected class under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental, or in related services or facilities, because of protected characteristics; a disparate-treatment plaintiff must first show different treatment.

Arthur v. Windsor Shadows Homeowner's Association · filed 2022-07-06(b)

To bring a disparate treatment discrimination claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must first show that she has been treated differently than others.

The FHA lets a person who is not a tenant of record sue for their own injury from discriminatory housing practices, but a disparate-treatment claim requires facts supporting discriminatory intent.

PARKER v. LEE · filed 2024-06-11(a), (b)

Residents may challenge discriminatory practices under the FHA even if they “are not ‘tenants of record’ for a dwelling.” ... And under the FHA, “any person harmed by discrimination, whether or not the target of the discrimination, can sue to recover for his or her own injury.” ... To state a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA, “[a] plaintiff must show that ‘some discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind the challenged action.”

Sections 3604(a) and (b) prohibit denying or making a dwelling unavailable, or discriminating in its sale, rental, terms, conditions, privileges, services, or facilities, because of religion or another listed characteristic; a disparate-treatment claim requires plausible allegations of protected status, adverse action, and minimal support for discriminatory intent.

Gurevitch v. Emerald Green Property Owners Association Inc. · filed 2025-02-27(a), (b)

When, as here, a plaintiff brings a claim under the FHA that does not rest on direct evidence of . . . discrimination, . . . he must plausibly allege that he [1] is a member of a protected class, [2] suffered an adverse action, and [3] has at least minimal support for the proposition that the housing provider was motivated by discriminatory intent. ... But there are no allegations in the AC from which I can conclude that Defendants were motivated to so act by discriminatory intent. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim must be dismissed.

A race-based disparate treatment claim under Section 3604 requires factual allegations that plausibly support intentional discrimination.

Boykin v. Fenty · filed 2012-10-04

The Court finds that the plaintiffs’ claim for disparate treatment under the FHA based on race lacks the plausibility required to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 3604(b) prohibits denying a person, because of race, conditions, services, or facilities connected with renting a dwelling.

Khawaja v. Wyatt · filed 1980-07-29(b)

it is not true that a person may be denied, on the basis of race certain “conditions,” “services,” or “facilities” in connection with renting a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(b) covers discrimination in services or facilities connected with the sale or rental of a dwelling, including generally provided governmental services, but does not reach a decision to select a stadium site.

Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Authority · filed 1989-09-08(b)

The Court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs’ allegations do not state a claim within the purview of § 3604(b). The scope of § 3604(b) depends on whether the language “in connection with” refers to “the sale or rental of a dwelling” or more broadly to a “dwelling.” The Court finds that the most natural reading of the statute is the narrower reading. ... Even under a broad reading, however, “services or facilities” refers to “services generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection.” ... Section 3604(b) cannot be extended to a decision such as the selection of a stadium site and plaintiffs therefore do not state a cause of action under Title VIII.

Section 3604(b) prohibits gender-based discrimination in renting a dwelling or providing rental-related services, including disparate treatment and sexual harassment; hostile-housing-environment harassment is actionable when offensive behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive and would not have occurred but for the claimant's gender.

Honce v. Jose A. Vigil, D/B/A Dorado Investments, Inc., A/K/A Villa Chaparral Mobile Home Sub-Division Dora · filed 1993-08-25(b)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits gender-based discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services in connection with a rental. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Discrimination may occur either by treating one gender less favorably (disparate treatment) or by sexual harassment. ... Applied to housing, a claim is actionable when the offensive behavior unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the premises. The harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of the housing arrangement. ... The offensive acts need not be purely sexual; it is sufficient that they would not have happened but for claimant’s gender.

Section 3604(b) protects people from race discrimination in housing services and facilities regardless of whether they belong to a racial minority.

Jordan v Khan · filed 1997-07-23(b)

White individuals are not excluded from the definition of “person.”

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of religion or national origin; the court treated housing exchanged for services as covered.

Mogilevsky v. Keating · filed 2000-02-11(b)

Mogilevsky alleges in addition, that the Defendants’ actions violate the Fair Housing Act (“Act") because they discriminated against him in the terms, conditions or privileges and/or the provision of services or facilities in connection with the rental of a dwelling. ... As the Act defines a dwelling as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families,” it would apply to Mogilevsky’s apartment. 42 U.S.C. §3602(b). The Act defines the term “to rent” as including “to lease, to sublease, to let and otherwise to grant for a consideration the right to occupy premises not owned by the occupant.” 42 U.S.C. §3602(e). The agreement between the parties here, services in exchange for housing, is covered by this language. ... The motion to dismiss Count VII, housing discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §3604, is denied.

Section 3604(b) and (f)(2) prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, or disability in the provision of services or facilities connected with the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Young v. Hagar-Mace · filed 2017-12-14(b), (f)(2)

The FHA prohibits discrimination against any person “in the provision of services or facilities” connected with the sale or rental of a dwelling, based on the person’s disability, race, or sex.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental, or in services or facilities connected with it.

Wilson v. Hillsborough Township Construc · filed 2019-08-01(b)

Wilson has not explained how defendants’ alleged actions fall within the scope of that provision, or any other provision of the FHA. However, even if Wilson could bring a claim under the FHA for defendants’ licensing, inspection, and tax assessment decisions, her vague, conclusory speculations that those decisions were made for a discriminatory reason are insufficient to state a claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and in related housing services or facilities, including discriminatory municipal housing-policy enforcement.

Indig v. Village of Pomona · filed 2019-11-19(b)

The FHA disallows “discriminat[ion] ‘against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith’ for any of those same reasons.” ... Under the FHA, a plaintiff can sue a municipality or government agency for “implementing or enforcing housing policies in a discriminatory manner.” ... Here, plaintiffs argue defendants did not make the same housing services or facilities available to Orthodox Jewish residents on the same terms as they did for non-Orthodox Jewish residents. Thus, for the same reasons the Court finds plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges an equal protection claim, the Court finds plaintiffs have stated a claim for discrimination under the FHA.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, or in connected services or facilities, based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Carpenter v. Southern Nevada Regional Housing Authority · filed 2021-10-25(b)

Plaintiff has not stated state a prima facie discrimination claim because she has not alleged any discriminatory housing practice under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617. The only possibly relevant provision is § 3604 (b). IT provides that it is unlawful to discriminate against a person in the terms conditions or privileges of a rental of a dwelling or in the provision of services or facilities connected therewith based on the person's race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. Plaintiff's complaint does not set forth any facts to suggest that the defendant discriminated against her.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination based on race and other protected characteristics in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and in the provision of related services or facilities.

Williams v. Huron Pines Condominium Association · filed 2022-03-17(b)

The first, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, ...

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of a person’s listed protected characteristics.

Santiago v. Chill · filed 2023-03-03(b)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination against “any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith[]” on the basis of that person’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and in related housing services or facilities; a disparate-impact claim requires more than a singular impact on one person.

Christian v. Rancho Grande Manufactured Home Community · filed 2024-07-11(b)

Any claim for intentional race-based discrimination under § 804(b) fails for the same reasons we have discussed earlier. Christian notes that § 804(b) has also been construed to reach disparate-impact claims, see Committee Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711 (9th Cir. 2009), but her opening brief fails to explain how she can satisfy the elements of such a claim. Christian’s opening brief claims that a “disparate impact” is present here based on the Defendants’ alleged application of “one-of-a-kind policies” to her, but the brief fails to explain how this alleged singular impact on one person satisfies the legal requirements for a disparate impact claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing-related services or facilities.

DeYoung · filed 2026-03-06(b)

The FHA addresses discrimination in housing. Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges ... in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race.”

Section 3604(d) prohibits representing that a dwelling is unavailable for inspection, sale, or rental because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and gives people a right to receive truthful housing information.

Coles v. Havens Realty Corporation · filed 1980-09-18(d)

The breadth of Congressional protection against housing discrimination is apparent from the language of section 3604(d), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), which makes it unlawful "(t)o represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available." This prohibition against providing false information creates a concomitant right to receive correct housing information without regard to race or color. Individuals illegally denied housing by subterfuge are, by the nature of the wrongful act, less able than others in our society to require enforcement of the Civil Rights Act through private litigation as "private attorneys general". There is no rational reason why their bona fide surrogates cannot pursue their cause. If the defendants had supplied the testers truthful information-that apartments were available both in Colonial Court and Camelot Townhouses-there would have been no injury and the social reform legislated by Congress would have been advanced without resort to the courts.

Section 3604(d) prohibits falsely representing that housing is unavailable because of race and treats giving minority applicants less availability information than white testers as a cognizable FHA injury.

Asbury v. Leo Brougham, an Individual and D/B/A Brougham Estates and Brougham Management Company, and Wanda Chau · filed 1989-01-30(d)

In addition, § 3604(d) of the FHA specifically prohibits dissemination of false information about the availability of housing because of a person’s race. Accordingly, failure to provide a minority applicant with the same information about availability of a rental unit or the terms and eondi-tions for rental as is provided to white “testers,” results in false information being provided and is cognizable as an injury under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) bars refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race, and § 3604(d) bars falsely stating that an available dwelling is unavailable; a white person denied housing because of association with a Black person has standing to sue.

Cato v. Jilek · filed 1991-11-15(a), (d)

In terms of this case, Sheila was unquestionably given untruthful information about the availability of the apartment—and if George did that because of Joseph’s race, Sheila’s right under Section 3604(d) has been violated and she has independent standing to sue irrespective of whether Joseph was a prospective tenant. ... Sheila and Joseph Cato have standing to sue under Sections 3604 and 1982 as a matter of both fact and law. In addition, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Jileks’ liability under both Sections, and Catos are entitled to a judgment as to liability as a matter of law under Rule 56(c).

Section 3604(b) and (d) claims for false housing-availability representations use a four-part prima facie test requiring a protected applicant, an availability inquiry, an untruthful response, and truthful information to white applicants.

Darby v. Ridge · filed 1992-11-06(b), (d)

Finding defendants’ suggestion reasonable in light of ... and the underlying purpose of section 3604(b) and (d), this court adopts the four-part test.

Section 3604(a) and (d) protect a person's right to truthful information about a dwelling's availability and prohibit discriminatory conduct that makes housing unavailable or frustrates attempts to secure it, even before an application is submitted.

Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2020-02-14(a) and (d)

First, although it is undisputed the Treeces did not submit an application to rent Haile’s unit, the submittal of an application is not necessary to establish a § 3604(a) claim. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, the Supreme Court held a “tester” plaintiff, who had no intention of renting or purchasing an apartment and did not submit an application to do so, still had a legal right to truthful information concerning housing availability under § 3604. ... Second, even if true, the Treeces’ alleged disqualifying characteristics likewise do not deprive them of their broad right to truthful information regarding the availability of housing. Any discriminatory, pre-application “behavior intended to frustrate plaintiffs’ attempts to secure housing” violates § 3604.

Section 3604(d) protects the right to truthful information about housing availability, and substantially different answers to otherwise similar Black and white testers can support an inference that race was a factor.

Metro Fair Housing Services, Inc. v. Morrowood Garden Apartments Ltd. · filed 1983-12-08(d)

Where a white tester is given substantially different information from that given an otherwise similar black tester, an inference that race was a factor can be drawn. ... Whether race was a factor in the failure of defendant to inform plaintiff of the availability of a one-bedroom apartment on the date she had specified she would need to move in would seem to be a question of fact for the factfinder.

Section 3604(d) gives any person, including a tester who is not seeking to rent, a right to truthful information about housing availability.

United States of America, Cross-Appellant v. Joseph P. Balistrieri and Angelina J. Hurdelbrink, Cross-Appellees · filed 1993-01-20(d)

Unlike § 3604(a), § 3604(d) does not require a bona fide offer; instead, § 3604(d) creates an enforceable right to truthful information for any person, not just bona fide apartment seekers.

Section 3604(d) requires evidence that a defendant falsely represented available housing as unavailable because of a prospective tenant’s familial status.

United States v. Branella · filed 1997-08-07(d)

The evidence fails to establish the falsity of that representation or that the unit was, indeed, available to Jackson as a prospective tenant. As a result, the housing discrimination claim pursuant to Section 3604(d) fails as a matter of law and cannot withstand Defendants’ present motion.

Sections 3604(b) and (d) can be violated by discriminatory housing effects without proof of discriminatory intent.

Schmidt v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 1981-01-20(b) and (d)

Accordingly, I conclude that to withstand a motion to dismiss plaintiffs must allege discriminatory effect only.

Section 3604 can be violated by discriminatory effect, without proof of discriminatory motive, when the circumstances warrant relief.

Atkins v. Robinson · filed 1982-08-02

a breach of § 3604 can be established, under certain circumstances, by a showing of discriminatory effect without proof of a discriminatory motive.

Section 3604(a) can be violated based on discriminatory effect alone, including disproportionate adverse impact or perpetuation of segregated housing patterns and prevention of interracial association.

In Re Malone · filed 1984-08-28(a)

A violation of the Fair Housing Act can be made out by proof of discriminatory effect alone, because the purpose of the Act is to promote integrated housing rather than simply outlaw invidious discrimination. See R. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law at 42-43, 127 (1983). For this reason, there are two types of discriminatory effects which can establish a prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act: 1) disproportionate adverse impact on one race; or 2) perpetuation of segregated housing patterns and prevention of interracial association. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.1977); Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F.Supp. 852, 867 (E.D.Va.1982). See generally R. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law at 140-41 (1983).

Section 3604(a) covers conduct by individuals or governmental units that directly affects the availability of housing to minorities; discriminatory intent is not required, but discriminatory effect alone is not automatically unlawful.

Burrell v. City of Kankakee · filed 1987-04-06(a)

In Southend, we held that Section 3604(a) prohibits conduct by individuals or governmental units which directly affect the availability of housing to minorities. ... In Arlington Heights II, we declined to extend the reach of the Fair Housing Act this far. To reiterate, "although a showing of discriminatory intent is not required under Section 3604(a), we refuse to conclude that every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal. Such a per se rule would go beyond the intent of Congress and would lead courts into untenable results in specific cases."

Section 3604(a) imposes Fair Housing Act liability for discriminatory municipal zoning when the challenged practices adversely affect a minority group and tend to perpetuate segregation, absent bona fide legitimate justifications and less discriminatory alternatives.

Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, Tex. · filed 2000-08-01(a)

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have established liability under § 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act by proving that the town’s acts had both an adverse impact on African Americans and tended to perpetuate segregation, that Sunnyvale’s offered justifications are neither bona fide nor legitimate, and that less discriminatory alternatives to the current zoning ordinance exist.

Section 3604(a) prohibits governmental actions that make housing unavailable or otherwise interfere with housing because of race, including actions having a discriminatory intent or effect.

Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center v. St. Bernard Parish · filed 2009-08-17(a)

Based on all of the evidence discussed above, the Court concludes that the Parish and Council’s intent in subverting the re-subdivision application process is and was racially discriminatory, and as such defendants have violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 and the terms of the February 2008 Consent Order. ... Based on the factual record and judged under a clear preponderance of the evidence, the Court finds that defendants’ conduct since March 25, 2009, by subverting the re-subdivision process, has a discriminatory effect on African-Americans and therefore violates the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), and the terms of the February 2008 Consent Order.

Section 3604 permits a prima facie housing discrimination claim based on discriminatory racial effect.

Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo · filed 1976-12-10

We agree with the plaintiffs, however, that the prima facie case concept applicable to cases brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is for the reasons hereinafter discussed, applicable to violations of Title VIII of the 1968 Act.

Section 3604 allows a housing discrimination claim to be proved through discriminatory intent or significant discriminatory effect.

Ryan v. Ramsey · filed 1996-08-01(f)(1)

A violation of § 3604 of the FHA can be established by showing either discriminatory intent (or treatment) or significant discriminatory effect.

Section 3604(a) applies to municipalities and reaches official housing actions, including zoning decisions, that make housing unavailable or deny housing because of race.

United States v. City of Parma, Ohio · filed 1981-10-14(a)

In agreement with the courts which have applied Title VIII to municipalities we conclude that the comprehensive purpose of the Act would be diluted if it were held to apply only to the actions of private individuals and entities. ... We believe it was the intent of Congress to provide for actions against states and political subdivisions for violation of § 804, § 817 and § 813 as well. ... However, zoning decisions which have a racially discriminatory effect have been held to violate the Fair Housing Act. ... It was not impermissible to hold that Parma’s zoning decisions were part of “a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment” of rights granted by the Fair Housing Act.

A neutral land-use review procedure is not itself a Fair Housing Act violation when it does not dictate a discriminatory result; a § 3604 issue arises only if the procedure is used to discriminate.

Connor v. Cuomo · filed 1994-06-22

ULURP is only a process for review and does not dictate a particular result.

Section 3604(a) requires a plaintiff challenging a city inspection ordinance to plead facts showing that the ordinance was discriminatory under the Act.

Tobin v. City of Peoria Ill. · filed 1996-08-29(a)

Even so, Plaintiffs’ claim, as pleaded, fails to state a cause of action under § 3604(a).

Section 3604(a) permits a fair-housing claim to proceed when evidence raises a fact issue about discriminatory intent in denying site-plan approval and building permits.

Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City of Cuyahoga Falls · filed 1997-06-20(a)

This alone is sufficient reason to deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ fair housing claim.

Section 3604 may be violated by significant discriminatory effects flowing from rental decisions, and allegations showing some possibility of such an effect can state a claim.

Halet ex rel. Halet v. Wend Investment Co. · filed 1982-01-25

Significant discriminatory effects flowing from rental decisions may be sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Fair Housing Act. ... The documents attached to the complaint seem to show some possibility of discriminatory effect. ... Halet has made sufficient allegations to state a cause of action under the Act.

Section 3604(a) may be violated by a discriminatory effect without discriminatory intent, but discriminatory impact alone does not always establish a violation.

Gomez v. Chody · filed 1989-02-27(a)

Under this statutory scheme, a discriminatory effect, without any discriminatory intent, may constitute a violation of the FHA. However, we explicitly have refrained from holding that a discriminatory impact alone always violates the Act.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit making a dwelling unavailable or denying it, or discriminating in its sale, rental, terms, or related services, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a disparate-impact claim requires more than a statistical imbalance and must show a disproportionate burden or a segregative effect.

Edwards v. Johnston County Health Department · filed 1989-09-20(a) and (b)

Both claims must be rejected; neither is supported by the facts alleged in appellants' Amended Complaint, nor do they sufficiently state a claim under Title VIII. ... To allege a violation of Sec. 3604(a), appellants must assert, first, that appellees denied or made housing unavailable to appellants and, second, that appellees' actions were based on appellants' race, color, or national origin. ... Simply put, the state has no duty under the existing statutory scheme to make migrant housing available; it cannot compel farmers to provide such housing. ... Such an impact may take one of two forms: (1) a facially neutral decision may have "a greater adverse impact on one race than another," or (2) it may "perpetuate[ ] segregation and thereby prevent[ ] interracial association [in the entire community involved]." ... Equal adverse impact on white and non-white citizens is not automatically fatal to a Title VIII disparate impact claim; the disputed policy may still produce a racially discriminatory impact in the second sense, that is, it may contribute to continued housing segregation or impede integration efforts. ... Absent such showings of racially discriminatory impact, appellants' allegations with respect to "services" under subsection (b) also fail to state a Title VIII disparate impact claim.

Section 3604 prohibits housing practices that have a discriminatory effect on minorities even without proof of discriminatory intent.

Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp. · filed 1989-10-23

Housing practices unlawful under Title VIII include not only those motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, but also those that disproportionately affect minorities. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs under Title VIII need not show that the policies complained of were fashioned with discriminatory intent.

Section 3604(a) allows a housing-discrimination claim based on discriminatory effect without proof of discriminatory intent; the court found no demonstrated sex-based effect from the neutral occupancy limit but remanded for consideration of its effect on familial status.

Doe v. The City Of Butler · filed 1989-12-29(a)

To make out a prima facie case under Title VIII, a plaintiff can show either discriminatory treatment, see Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.1979), or discriminatory effect alone, without proof of discriminatory intent, see Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3rd Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1457, 55 L.Ed.2d 499 (1978). ... We agree that the fact that the ordinance will have an impact on group homes established for abused women does not alone establish discriminatory effect, because the resident limitation would have a comparable effect on males if the transitional dwelling was established for a different group, such as, for example, recovering male alcoholics. ... We will therefore remand to the district court so that it can decide, in the first instance, whether the across-the-board limit on the number of residents in a transitional dwelling violates Title VIII as amended.

Section 3604(a) allows a Title VIII disparate-impact claim based on discriminatory effect without proof of discriminatory intent, and permits an implied private action against HUD when discriminatory activity is alleged.

Tinsley v. Kemp · filed 1990-01-03(a)

The allegation of disparate impact is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. ... The only fair reading of the discussion is that a private right of action against HUD is implied in Title VIII. ... The allegations of discriminatory activity by HUD bring the claims within the requirements of the cases cited by HUD. Therefore, the claims against HUD under Title VIII, Section 804(a); or Title VIII, Section 808(e)(5) (42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) and 3608(d)) need not be dismissed for failure to allege discriminatory activity by HUD.

Under § 3604, a disparate-impact claim requires more than a statistical imbalance; it must show a disproportionate adverse impact or a segregative effect.

Edwards v. Johnston County Health Department · filed 1989-09-20(a) and (b)

But merely demonstrating a statistical imbalance, without more, does not establish a greater discriminatory adverse effect on one race compared to another.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race or color, and a prima facie housing-discrimination case may be based on discriminatory effects without proof of discriminatory intent.

Orange Lake Associates, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick · filed 1994-04-14(a)

Under the FHA, "it shall be unlawful [t]o ... make unavailable ... a dwelling to any person because of race [or] color." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(a). ... Thus, in contrast to housing practices that may be held unconstitutional, "[h]ousing practices unlawful under Title VIII include not only those motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, but also those that disproportionately affect minorities." ... Therefore, in making out a prima facie housing discrimination case, OLA need not show discriminatory intent.

Section 3604(a) reaches facially neutral housing practices with a disparate impact, subject to a defense that the practice has a manifest relationship to the housing in question.

Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1995-05-30(a)

the defendant must demonstrate that the discriminatory practice has a manifest relationship to the housing in question.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a protected characteristic; discriminatory impact can establish a violation without intent only in limited or highly unusual circumstances, including in a referendum case.

Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City of Cuyahoga Falls · filed 1996-07-05(a)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), it is unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” ... Under limited circumstances, a violation of the Fair Housing Act can be established by showing discriminatory impact without a showing of discriminatory intent. ... Given the strong policy considerations underlying'referenda, the Sixth Circuit has held that the discriminatory effect of a referendum cannot establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act “absent highly unusual circumstances.” ... The Court finds that the Developers have failed to establish the presence of highly unusual circumstances.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, and a plaintiff need not allege discriminatory intent but must identify a practice causing a disproportionate burden on a protected class.

Raso v. Lago · filed 1997-01-06(b)

Plaintiffs also fail to allege a sufficient Title VIII claim. Title VIII prohibits discrimination in the “terms, conditions and privileges in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith ...” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). In order to state a cause of action under this statute, plaintiffs need not allege discriminatory intent, but must at least allege some “practice” which “results in a disproportionate burden on members of a class protected by Title VIII.” ... Generally, such disparate impact is illustrated through statistical evidence.

Section 3604(a) reaches housing practices with an unjustified disparate racial impact, but a disparate impact alone does not establish a violation when the practice has a legitimate and substantial justification.

Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority · filed 2000-03-27(a)

We thus conclude that (absent intentional discrimination), the residency preference does not violate the “because of race” provision of the Fair Housing Act standing alone.

Section 3604(a) permits a Fair Housing Act violation to be proved under a disparate-impact theory without discriminatory intent; after a prima facie showing, the defendant must establish a legitimate governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternative.

Batiste v. City of New Haven · filed 2002-12-23(a)

Under the FHA, “it shall be unlawful [t]o ... make unavailable ... a dwelling to any person because of race [or] color.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). A FHA violation may be established under a disparate impact theory. ... Disparate impact claims are premised on facially neutral policies or practices that are adopted without a discriminatory motive but that, when applied, have a discriminatory effect on a group of individuals who enjoy protected status under the anti-discrimination laws. ... In order to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must show that the challenged practice “actually or predictably” results in a greater adverse impact on a protected group than on others. ... Discriminatory intent need not be shown. ... Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to “prove that its actions furthered, in theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect.”

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on protected status and reaches policies with a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on a particular group.

Rekhter v. Central Park East Ltd. Partnership · filed 2002-03-13

Ms. Rekhter has not raised a genuine issue of fact whether the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of any protected status, ... nor has she raised a genuine issue whether the defendants’ policy had a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular group.

Section 3604(a) prohibits denying or making housing unavailable because of race, and the court applied disparate-impact analysis to a facially neutral policy with a significant adverse impact on a protected minority group.

Owens v. Charleston Housing Authority · filed 2004-06-23(a)

The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) makes it unlawful to deny housing on behalf of race or color, among other things. ... To prevail on this issue, plaintiffs "need prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably results in discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect." ... To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, plaintiffs "must show a facially neutral policy has a significant adverse impact on members of a protected minority group." ... For this reason, I find that CHA's decision to vacate and demolish the Charleston Apartments violated § 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act.