42 U.S.C. § 3604

Section 3604(a) bars denying or making housing unavailable because of protected characteristics, § 3604(b) bars discriminatory rental terms or conditions, and § 3604(c) bars housing statements indicating discriminatory preferences or limitations.

Glover v. HPC - Eight · filed 2022-04-04(a), (b), (c)

The SAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for housing discrimination pursuant to section 3604(a). ... Accordingly, the SAC fails to state a plausible claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §3604(a), and any amendment with respect to this claim would be futile. ... The SAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for disparate treatment under section 3604(b). ... Accordingly, the SAC fails to state a plausible claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §3604(b), and any amendment with respect to this claim would be futile. ... The SAC fails to allege any facts that defendants, or their agents, made any statements that indicated a preference or limitation based on race. Accordingly, the SAC fails to state a plausible claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §3604(c), and any amendment with respect to this claim would be futile.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in housing terms, conditions, privileges, or related services based on specified protected classes, but does not protect economic or housing status.

(PS) Bryant v. Steinburg · filed 2022-10-04(b)

However, economic and housing status are not protected classes under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (protected classes under the FHA include color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and handicap); see also Community H., Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting a plaintiff must show a defined protected class to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA).

Section 3604(f)(1) bars making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of handicap, while § 3604(f)(2) bars discrimination in the sale or rental terms, conditions, or privileges because of handicap.

Graves, Esq v. Foulger-Pratt Companies, LLC · filed 2023-03-30(f)(1), (f)(2)

It is unlawful under the FHA to “make unavailable or deny . . . a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), or to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... To state a claim alleging a failure to accommodate under the FHA, a plaintiff must show that “the accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.” Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., Md., 124 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 1997). ... Graves has failed to state a plausible allegation of disability discrimination under the FHA. ... Second, Graves has failed to plead facts to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the alleged disability and the denial of reasonable accommodations. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims of violations under the FHA for failure to state a claim.

Section 3604 recognizes disparate-treatment, disparate-impact, and failure-to-make-reasonable-accommodation housing-discrimination claims.

Ellis v. Alvarez · filed 2023-10-24

The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3604 “contemplates three types of claims for perceived discrimination: ‘disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to make reasonable accommodations.’” Batista v. Cooperativa De Vivienda Jardines De San Ignacio, 776 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2015). ... Plaintiff has not alleged facts which might reasonably support a housing discrimination claim based on this reasonably perceived slight, whether passive-aggressive or not.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on protected characteristics and encompasses FHA theories including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failures to accommodate or permit reasonable modification.

Miller v. Alco Management, Inc · filed 2024-03-25

The Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... Section 3604 is part of the codification of the FHA. The Sixth Circuit has noted that there are several theories an aggrieved individual can rely on to show a violation of the FHA, including “disparate treatment, disparate impact, failure to make a reasonable accommodation, or failure to permit a reasonable modification.”

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Boyce v. St. Vincent DePaul (Lane Co) · filed 2024-04-11

The FHA prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... In summary, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the FHA.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin in various real-estate-related transactions.

LOPEZ v. PEC · filed 2025-01-03

“The FHA prohibits discrimination based on ‘race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin’ in various real estate-related transactions.” Butler v. Sundo Cap., LLC, 559 F. Supp. 3d 452, 456 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604). ... A plaintiff can “state a claim under the FHA by alleging either that a defendant discriminated intentionally or that a defendant’s actions had a discriminatory effect.” El v. People’s Emergency Ctr., 438 F. Supp. 3d 283, 289–90 (E.D. Pa. 2020). ... Here, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently state a claim under the FHA—whether under a theory of disparate treatment/intentional discrimination or a theory of “failure to make a reasonable accommodation.” ... Plaintiffs do not adequately state a claim under the FHA because they do not sufficiently allege that the Palisades Defendants “discriminated intentionally” against them based on race or national origin (and if so, how and when this discrimination occurred), nor do Plaintiffs allege that the Palisades Defendants’ actions had a discriminatory effect (and if so, what effect). ... Therefore, the portion of Count Two of the Amended Complaint alleging a violation of the FHA is likewise DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing because of specified characteristics, and does not recognize membership in a specific geographic community as a protected class.

Fulton v. City of New York · filed 2025-01-13(b)

However, neither federal nor state law recognize members of a specific geographic community as a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(1).

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) bars refusing reasonable modifications, § 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory housing notices or statements, and § 3604(f)(3)(B)–(C) require reasonable accommodations and accessible design and construction for covered dwellings.

Baker v. Avenue5 Residential · filed 2025-04-25(f)(3)(A), (c), (f)(3)(B), (f)(3)(C)

A plaintiff can establish discrimination under the FHA by showing that a defendant “refus[ed] to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A). ... To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), a plaintiff must “show that the defendant made, printed, or published a discriminatory notice, statement or advertisement.” ... The FHA prohibits “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). “To make out a claim of discrimination based on failure to reasonably accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffers from a handicap as defined by the [FHA]; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap ‘may be necessary’ to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.” ... Discrimination under the FHA includes “a failure to design and construct [covered multifamily dwellings] in such a manner that,” for example, “the public use and common use portions of such dwellings are readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C).

Section 3604 protects persons from housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and an FHA claimant must plausibly allege membership in a protected class.

Fuller v. Christine Apartments LLC · filed 2025-09-17

At minimum, Mr. Fuller needs to explain how he belongs to a protected class, i.e. “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604; see Slaughter v. Valley View I LLP, No. C23-1360JLR, 2023 WL 6461058, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2023) (dismissing FHA discrimination claim because plaintiff “neither alleges intentional discrimination based on her membership in a protected class, nor does she describe any neutral policy that adversely and disproportionately affected her based on her membership in a protected class”).

Section 3604 requires a plaintiff to allege housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

MOORE · filed 2025-12-18

Similarly, to assert a violation of 42 U.S.C, § 3604, a plaintiff must allege discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”; and WHEREAS, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” or that he is otherwise a member of a protected class, see id.; see 42 U.S.C, § 2000d; Gonel, 2025 WL 2528650, at *2; and WHEREAS, to state 4 claim for retaliation under Title VI, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he was “engaging in a protected activity”; (2) Defendants subjected him to an “adverse action after or contemporaneously with the protected activity”; and (3) a “causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity,” Whitfield v. Notre Dame Middle Sch., 412 F. App’x 517, 522 (3d Cir. 2011); and WHEREAS, here, Plaintiff does not specifically identify an alleged “protected activity” in which he was engaged. See id. Nor does Plaintiff allege any “adverse action” that Defendants took in connection with Plaintiff’s alleged protected activity. See id.

Section 3604(b) requires a plausible allegation that protected-class status, qualification to rent or purchase a dwelling or good-standing tenancy, and different terms, conditions, or privileges were involved; section 3604(f) requires disability, qualification, discriminatory refusal or terms, and causation.

Baker · filed 2025-12-29(b), (f)

To state a claim for discriminatory terms and service, Mr. Baker must plausibly allege that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified to rent or purchase a dwelling or was an existing tenant in good standing; and (3) Defendants applied different terms, conditions, or privileges to Mr. Baker compared to others. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). To state a claim for disability discrimination, Mr. Baker must show that (1) he is a person with a relevant disability; (2) he was qualified to rent or buy a dwelling; (3) Defendants refused to rent/sell or applied different terms, conditions, or privileges to his tenancy; and (4) causation. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f).

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination based on race and other protected classes in rental housing, subject to the Fair Housing Act's exemptions for certain small owner-occupied dwellings.

Garfield · filed 2026-04-24

The Fair Housing Act prevents discrimination on the basis of race and other protected classes in rental housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Those provisions are inapplicable to single-family homes rented by certain private individual owners and “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.” 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1)-(2).

Section 3604(f) prohibits handicap discrimination in making a dwelling unavailable but limits the protected class to buyers or renters, while § 3604(f)(1) addresses discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Jenkins v. New York City Department of Homeless Services · filed 2009-07-07(f), (f)(1)

Thus, the “otherwise make unavailable” clause may expand the prohibited activities under § 3604(f) beyond simply renting and selling but it does not expand the class of individuals who are protected from discrimination on the basis of a handicap beyond renters or buyers. Even if an argument could be made that Jenkins was denied “housing” by being excluded from the shelter he prefers, he is not a buyer or a renter of any property and so has no claim under the differently-worded “otherwise make unavailable” clause of § 3604(f).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race and permits disparate-impact claims evaluated through a three-step burden-shifting framework.

Johnson v. City of Annapolis · filed 2024-02-22(a)

The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) outlaws, in relevant part, “mak[ing] unavailable or deny[ing], a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” ... In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of disparate impact causes of action under the FHA. ... The Fourth Circuit has explained that the Supreme Court’s ruling in ICP establishes a “three-step, burden-shifting framework” for analyzing such a claim. ... To satisfy the first step of the disparate impact inquiry, the plaintiffs must “begin by identifying the specific practice that is challenged.” ... The proper comparison is between the racial composition of the population subject to the licensing and inspection regime, i.e. all renters in the City, and the racial composition of the population subject to the non-enforcement policy, i.e. renters in HACA properties.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits refusing reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; a claim requires a refusal after an opportunity to accommodate.

SAMUEL v. THE DELAWARE COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2023-12-20(f)(3)(B)

Here, it is not in genuine dispute that Samuel failed to abide by DCHA’s procedures for getting a live-in aide approved as laid out in the Administrative Plan, so Defendants never acted on his request one way or another—he was never “refused” as required to proceed under the Fair Housing Act. ... And without that paperwork in hand, according to the Administrative Plan, the accommodation of a live-in aide was not “requested” consistent with DCHA policy, so there was no “refusal” by Defendants to grant that accommodation whose reasonableness can be judged.9 Revock, 853 F.3d at 110; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to have an opportunity to accommodate before its conduct counts as a refusal.

Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium As · filed 2017-03-31(f)(3)(B)

For a housing provider’s action to be considered a “refusal” under the Fair Housing Act, the provider must have had a prior “opportunity to accommodate.”

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or negotiate for a dwelling, or otherwise making it unavailable, because of sex or familial status; the court treated sex-stereotyping and familial-status discrimination as covered by that prohibition.

Smith v. Avanti · filed 2017-04-05(a)

Under § 3604(a), it is unlawful “[to] refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... sex, familial status, or national origin.” ... Applying the principles stated above, the undisputed material facts show Defendant violated the FHA by discriminating against the Smiths based on their sex. ... As, such, Defendant violated §§ 3604(a) and 3604(c) of the FHA in preferring to rent the Townhouse to someone without children and in refusing, in the emails, to rent the Townhouse to the Smith Family.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discouraging families with small children from renting a dwelling because of their familial status.

Southern California Housing Rights Center v. Krug · filed 2007-10-15(a)

The Court concludes that HRC has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants violated Section 3604(a) when they discouraged Ms. Myrant and HRC’s testers with small children from renting a unit at the subject property.

Section 3604(f)(2) bars disability-based discrimination in rental terms and services, § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal of necessary reasonable accommodations as discrimination, and § 3604(b) bars religion-based discrimination in rental terms and services.

Lloyd v. Presby's Inspired Life · filed 2017-05-01(f)(2), (f)(3)(B), (b)

See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (making it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such a dwelling, because of. a handicap”). Discrimination is defined to include “a. refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of ",.. rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of ... religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Plaintiffs alleging a violation of § 3604 may bring either a disparate treatment claim or' a disparate impact claim.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability in the rental or sale of a dwelling.

DEJESUS v. LUCEY · filed 2022-01-05

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability in the rental or sale of a dwelling. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. DeJesus does not allege that the defendants discriminated against him in the rental or sale of a dwelling based on any of these protected characteristics. Rather, he alleges that the defendants rented him an illegal apartment that lacked heat. These allegations do not support a basis for a claim under federal law.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing and related services based on protected characteristics, including race and handicap.

Richardson v. Cardinal Ritter Institute Residential Services Corporation · filed 2023-05-11(b), (f)

The FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f).

Section 3604(f)(1)(C) prohibits denying a dwelling to a renter because of the handicap of a person associated with that renter, even when the renter is not herself disabled.

Gorman v. Breeze Condominium Association, Inc · filed 2024-06-03(f)(1)(C)

Further, Defendants state that when Plaintiff signed the contract for Unit 311, she was not “associated” with Mr. Tomlinson, a person with disability. However, that distinction does not matter. Looking at the plain text of Section 3604(f)(1)(A)-(C), it states that “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter, or any person associated with that buyer or renter.” Here, the Complaint’s allegations fit squarely within section 3604(f)(1)(C). Plaintiff alleges that her contract for Unit 311 was interfered with by Defendants because of the denial and ongoing legal matter regarding the denial of Mr. Tomlinson’s emotional support animal in Unit 304. See [ECF No. 19] {7 40-41. These allegations are enough to show discrimination in denying a dwelling to renter (Plaintiff) because of a handicap of a person (Mr. Tomlinson) associated with that renter (Plaintiff). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III is denied.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of disability.

Matter of Oceanview Home for Adults, Inc. v. Zucker · filed 2025-02-13(f)(1)

The FHAA, enacted in 1988, amended the FHA to add disability as a protected classification ( see 42 USC § 3604 [f] [1]) (making it unlawful to "discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter" because of disability). ... We do not need to resolve these thorny questions, though, because we hold that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the regulations "deny" or "make unavailable" housing on the basis of a person's disability ( see 42 USC § 3504 [f] [1]).

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and an FHA claim must allege facts supporting discriminatory intent.

Moore v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-26

Nor does the Complaint state a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which enacts the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... An FHA claim must allege facts that have “at least minimal support for the proposition that the housing provider was motivated by discriminatory intent.” ... The Complaint does not plead facts that even minimally support an inference of discriminatory intent.

Section 3604 prohibits refusing to sell or rent housing or discriminating in housing services or facilities because of religion and prohibits disability discrimination in housing.

Lepp v. Mallett · filed 2025-06-09(a)-(b), (f)(2)

“The FHA prohibits refusing to sell or rent housing to a person or discriminating against a person in relation to the provision of housing services or facilities on the basis of ‘race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.’ ... Discrimination on the basis of disability is also prohibited under the FHA. ... ‘To state a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege, at a minimum, sufficient facts to support an inference that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of one of those protected classes.’”

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits disability-based differences in the terms, conditions, privileges, or provision of services or facilities connected with a dwelling, and section 3604(b) provides the corresponding protection against race- or ethnicity-based disparate treatment.

Kononen · filed 2025-10-20(f)(2) (b)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was treated differently than other tenants in the terms, conditions, privileges, or the provision of services or facilities in her housing; and (3) that disparate treatment was, at least in part, due to her disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... As above, these disparate treatment claims can be established via the McDonnell Douglas framework. Plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was treated differently than other tenants in the terms, conditions, privileges, or the provision of services or facilities in her housing; and (3) that disparate treatment was, at least in part, due to her race or ethnicity. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604 prohibits refusing or imposing different rental terms because of familial status or disability, including disability of a person associated with the renter, and prohibits false representations about a dwelling’s availability.

Huston · filed 2026-02-03(a), (b), (d), (f)(1)(B), (f)(1)(C)

Fair housing law prohibits a refusal to rent a dwelling to an individual because of familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); ORS 659A.421(2). Failing to accept or consider a bona fide offer because of familial status is prohibited. 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b)(1). Here, as discussed above, Plaintiffs submitted the first application to rent the Property, met all relevant criteria, and were denied without explanation. WVR’s communication with Plaintiffs slowed considerably when they learned how many children would live at the Property and the Property was subsequently rented to someone with a smaller household. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. ... Fair housing law prohibits discrimination against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the rental of a dwelling based on familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); ORS 659A.421(2)(c). It is “unlawful, because of . . . familial status . . . to impose different terms, conditions or privileges relating to the sale or rental of a dwelling.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(a). Here, as set forth above, WVR offered Ms. Collins more favorable terms when she contacted WVR about renting the Property than were offered to Plaintiffs, including a quick turnaround on her application and a refund of her application fee in the event of a denial. Unlike Plaintiffs, Ms. Collins did not disclose her familial status. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. ... Fair housing law prohibits falsely representing that dwelling is unavailable for rent because of the familial status of the applicant. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); ORS 659A.421(2)(i). Here, after Plaintiffs disclosed their familial status, WVR falsely represented to Plaintiff that there was new activity surrounding the rental of the Property and encouraged them to consider other properties. WVR later told Ms. Collins that there was only one other applicant, Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs application was unlikely to work out. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. ... The protections of the FHA extend to persons “associated with” the renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(C). ... Fair housing law prohibits the refusal to rent a dwelling because of an individual’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B); ORS 659A.145(2)(a). Failing to accept or consider a bona fide offer because of disability is prohibited. 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b)(1). Here, as discussed above, Plaintiffs met all the criteria, but their application was denied without explanation and their treatment by WVR changed for the worse after they disclosed their children’s disabilities to WVR and Ms. Sharifi. The Property was subsequently rented to individuals who were not disabled. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. ... Fair housing law prohibits representing that a property is not available because of an individual’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); ORS 659A.145(2)(e). It is unlawful “to provide inaccurate or untrue information about the availability of dwellings for sale or rental” on the basis of disability. 24 C.F.R. § 100.80(a). Here, as discussed, shortly after disclosing their children’s disabilities, WVR falsely represented to Plaintiffs that there was new activity surrounding the Property and encouraged Plaintiffs to rent elsewhere. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race and requires proof that race was a factor in the challenged housing decision, which requires the decision-maker to know the renter's race.

Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, Inc. v. Hotard · filed 2017-08-07(a)

Although the Fifth Circuit has - never explicitly held that there can be no Fair Housing Act violation when the defendant is unaware of the plaintiffs status as a member of a protected class, this conclusion is clear from the text of section 3604(a), as well as Fifth Circuit caselaw requiring proof that race was a factor in the adverse decision.

Section 3604(f)(1)(A) prohibits denying a renter a dwelling because of a handicap; the landlord’s knowledge of the handicap is assessed through the date of actual eviction.

Radecki v. James Joura Carol Joura · filed 1997-06-03(f)(1)(A)

We hold the district court erred in limiting its “knowledge” inquiry to the date defendants sent Radecki the eviction notice (August 16). In assessing whether and when defendants knew of Radeeki’s handicap, the court should have considered the date Radecki was actually evicted (December 16), as the FHA provides that unlawful discrimination occurs when a dwelling is “den[ied]” to a renter because of that renter’s handicap.

Section 3604(a) prohibits housing unavailability caused by discriminatory insurance practices and permits a disparate-impact claim against an insurer whose policy creates a clear, non-speculative barrier to housing.

National Fair Housing Alliance v. Travelers Indemnity Company · filed 2017-08-21(a)

This interpretation makes sense: “insurance provides the financial assistance necessary to maintain a dwelling,” NFHA, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 58, and thus denial of insurance has the effect of making housing “otherwise . . . unavailable,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Hence, insurance policies can create exactly the type of “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” to housing that disparate-impact liability is suited to address. See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2524. The arguments in these cases, then, apply with full force to Travelers. Here, NFHA alleges that Travelers refuses to provide insurance to landlords who rent to voucher recipients. And importantly, these are the type of clear, non-speculative, connections that Inclusive Communities requires to make out a prima facie claim of disparate impact. Accordingly, nothing about the fact that Travelers offers insurance, rather than directly selling or renting property, makes the causal connection too weak for NFHA to state a claim under Inclusive Communities.

Section 3604(b) prohibits sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and in related services or facilities; sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under that prohibition.

West v. DJ Mortgage, LLC · filed 2017-09-14(b)

The FHA prohibits discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” because of a person’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... Moreover, courts (including this one) have consistently held that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under the FHA.

Section 3604 allows domestic-violence victims to pursue housing-discrimination claims under a sex-discrimination disparate-impact theory when a facially neutral policy disproportionately burdens women.

BUTLER v. SUNDO CAPITAL, LLC · filed 2021-09-10

Although the Third Circuit has not weighed in on this issue, most district courts that have addressed it have found that domestic violence victims are members of a protected class and may bring a claim for housing discrimination under the FHA through a theory of sex discrimination. ... Plaintiffs are therefore not barred from bringing their disparate impact claim based on Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory enforcement of their early termination and rent acceleration provisions.

Section 3604 does not support a sex-discrimination claim based only on the relative genders of housing residents and HUD officials, without facts indicating discriminatory housing treatment.

Newbury v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 2024-08-20

Similarly, Plaintiffs cite 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and advert to “sex discrimination in terms and conditions of housing” based solely on their unsworn representation that approximately 80% of the WH I residents are female, while some (but not all) of the HUD officials are male. Because such facts (assuming them to be true) fall woefully short of supporting a claim of sex discrimination in housing, I have not struggled to understand and develop further Plaintiffs’ allusion to sex discrimination. ... Last, I pause to address Plaintiffs’ wholly undeveloped claims against the Federal Defendants based on 28 U.S.C. § 4101, et seq. (federal court recognition of foreign defamation judgments) and 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (gender-based housing discrimination). I recommend that these be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Section 3604(b) prohibits sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling or related services.

Strole v. Wirth · filed 2025-04-04(b)

As pled, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FHA sex discrimination claim is plausible on its face under a disparate treatment theory.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making housing unavailable because of sex, including through a men-only policy at a covered shelter.

Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise · filed 2007-06-07(a)

Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiffs’ request under the Fair Housing Act for a preliminary injunction requiring, at this stage of the litigation, reinstatement of Community House residents excluded by the men-only policy.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to negotiate for or rent a dwelling because of sex.

Baumgardner v. The Secretary, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, on Behalf of Blanton · filed 1992-03-31(a)

HOME (and later HUD) concluded that Baumgardner treated males and females differently with regard to renting this property. Upon a careful examination of the record, we are of the view that there is substantial evidence to support this conclusion, and that the AU was in the better position to make what was essentially a credibility determination on the content and effect of the Holley/Baumgardner conversations.

Section 3604(a) covers sex discrimination in access to shelter; a facially discriminatory men-only policy is assessed under the Johnson Controls test.

Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho · filed 2006-11-09(a)

Because the City's men-only policy at Community House is facially discriminatory regarding women and families, the more stringent test of Johnson Controls applies. Under the Johnson Controls framework, the plaintiffs have raised serious questions regarding the merits of the City's proffered justifications for the men-only policy at Community House. There is no dispute that the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiffs' favor. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' request under the Fair Housing Act for a preliminary injunction requiring, at this stage of the litigation, reinstatement of Community House residents excluded by the men-only policy.

Section 3604(f)(5) provides that compliance with state or local laws incorporating the FHA's accessibility requirements is deemed to satisfy the FHA's design-and-construction requirements.

United States v. Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc. · filed 2017-03-27(f)(5)

According to the statute, a state or unit of local government may “review and approve newly constructed covered multifamily dwellings for the purpose of making determinations as to [accessibility under the FHA’s design and construction requirements]” and compliance with state or local laws that incorporate the FHA “shall be deemed to satisfy” the FHA’s design and construction requirements 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(5).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested accommodation to be necessary to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; it does not require an accommodation that provides a better opportunity.

Rood v. Town of Ft. Myers Beach · filed 2022-08-18(f)(3)(B)

To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that its requested accommodation is ‘necessary.’ ... That term carries its plain meaning of “indispensable, requisite, essential . . . or absolutely required.” ... So “a ‘necessary’ accommodation is one that alleviates the effects of a disability.” ... For necessity, the accommodation must “address the needs created by the” disability. ... When “accommodations go beyond addressing these needs and start addressing problems not caused by a person’s handicap, then the handicapped person would receive not an ‘equal,’ but rather a better opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” ... The statutory and regulatory plain language “cannot support” that result.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing accommodation to be necessary to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, meaning it must alleviate disability effects and address disability-created needs.

Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Dothan, Alabama · filed 2022-12-06(f)(3)(B)

But it does require “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphases added). ... If the accommodation provides “no direct amelioration of a disability’s effect,” the accommodation is not necessary. ... This breaks down into two inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff can show that the accommodation “actually alleviates the effects of the plaintiff’s disability”; and (2) whether the accommodation “addresses the needs created by the plaintiff’s disability.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested reasonable accommodation to be essential to provide an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, not merely more beneficial.

Women's Elevated v. City of Plano · filed 2023-11-20(f)(3)(B)

We hold that the district court erred by applying a standard accepting that therapeutically beneficial treatment constitutes necessity under the FHA and ADA. ... A requested accommodation is necessary only if the plaintiff shows that without the requested accommodation, they will receive no ameliorative effect from their disability, thereby depriving them of the equal opportunity to enjoy the dwelling.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to provide equal housing opportunities; the necessity inquiry concerns the requested accommodation itself, not removal of conditions imposed on its approval.

Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corporation · filed 2025-07-15(f)(3)(B)

The problem with this analysis is that the district court was asking the wrong question. What matters under the necessity prong is whether a proposed accommodation is necessary to provide equal housing opportunities. ... By asking instead whether removal of the Corporation’s proposed conditions was “necessary,” the district court erred.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires facts showing that a requested accommodation is necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Stracco · filed 2026-03-31(f)(3)(B)

Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants refused to make necessary accommodations.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires evidence that a requested accommodation is necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Weatherford v. Nevada Rural Housing Authority · filed 2013-05-17(f)(3)(B)

Although Dr. Udani stated that Plaintiff needed a three-bedroom unit for her lower back pain he did not explain why a three-bedroom unit was “necessary” to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling based on her back pain.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested accommodation to be necessary for an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Caesar v. Westchester Corporation · filed 2022-08-18(f)(3)(B)

Without otherwise passing on the merits of Ms. Caesar’s reasonable-accommodation defense, we hold that it at least fails at prong three—the requirement that use of the guest room be “necessary to afford” Ms. Caesar “equal opportunity ... to use and enjoy” her dwelling. D.C. Code § 2-1402.21(d)(3)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested accommodation to address an injury that would otherwise prevent a disabled resident from enjoying a dwelling as a nondisabled person would.

Singletary v. City of Toledo, Ohio · filed 2025-09-02(f)(3)(B)

As I noted above, a requested accommodation is necessary if it “would redress injuries that otherwise would prevent a disabled resident from receiving the same enjoyment from the property as a non-disabled person would receive.” Id. (citation omitted).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable zoning accommodation when it is necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Howard v. City of Beavercreek · filed 2002-01-09(f)(3)(B)

In sum, because Howard failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the variance he requested was a necessary accommodation under § 3604(f)(3)(B), the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Beavercreek on Howard’s FHAA claim.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested accommodation to be necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Howard v. City of Beavercreek · filed 2000-08-08(f)(3)(B)

The Court finds Beavercreek’s argument persuasive. The accommodation that Howard has requested is not necessary to afford him “an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of [his] choice.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires an accommodation to be necessary for equal housing opportunity; necessity for a sober-living home operator’s chosen model alone is insufficient.

Harmony Haus Westlake v. Parkstone · filed 2021-04-13(f)(3)(B)

Showing that an accommodation is necessary for a sober-living home operator’s chosen model is not sufficient.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested accommodation to be necessary to afford a disabled tenant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Brower v. Roose · filed 2024-04-19(f)(3)(B)

They fail to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits because their brief does not allege that Brower’s requested ESA was necessary to afford him equal opportunity to use and enjoy the apartment.

Sections 3604(a) and (b) can reach discriminatory failures to maintain REO properties when the resulting disparities make the properties unavailable or dissuade buyers from purchasing them.

National Fair Housing Alliance v. Deutsche Bank National Trust · filed 2019-11-13(a) (b)

Previously, the Court held that a plaintiff may “indeed state an FHA claim if the disparate effects caused by the defendant’s failures to maintain render the property unavailable.” ... The SAC now includes allegations that Defendants’ conduct dissuades buyers from purchasing the REO properties in minority neighborhoods. (SAC ¶¶ 164, 304, 289.) This suffices to cure the Court’s earlier concerns, and Plaintiffs’ § 3604 claims may proceed.

Section 3604 permits a claim based on discriminatory failure to maintain housing when the neglect makes it unavailable, but the complaint must plausibly allege that effect.

National Fair Housing Alliance v. Deutsche Bank National Trust · filed 2018-11-19(a), (b)

A plaintiff may indeed state an FHA claim if the disparate effects caused by the defendant’s failures to maintain render the property unavailable. ... Even putting aside the question of whether Plaintiffs have alleged a disparate effect (see supra at Part III.B (observing that Plaintiffs’ statistical allegations require amendment)), Plaintiffs have still failed to allege the REO properties were neglected to such an extent as to dissuade purchasers from buying them.

Section 3604 requires evidence that a buyer’s protected status contributed to a refusal to sell; knowledge of that status and suspicion of bias alone are insufficient.

Kaplan v. 442 Wellington Cooperative Building Corp. · filed 1983-02-28(a)

A 3604 case is never to be made out on the mere suspicion that because the plaintiff’s minority status is known to the defendant, the defendant’s action rejecting the plaintiff necessarily resulted at least in part from some pre-existing bias.

Section 3604(b) allows tenants to use direct evidence to prove discriminatory intent in rental treatment, and a dispute over the landlord’s motives can preclude summary judgment.

Aloqaili v. National Housing Corp. · filed 1990-04-20(b)

Therefore, this Court finds that the direct evidence analysis is a proper path which may be taken to resolve the ultimate issue of defendants’ intent. ... Therefore, this Court finds that there is a material issue of genuine fact as to whether defendants’ articulated reasons were either the true reason or the motivating reason for the decisions they made, and defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Fair Housing claim, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1977).

Section 3604 claims fail at summary judgment when the plaintiff offers no evidence of racial discrimination.

Scipio v. Housing Authority of Hartsville · filed 2025-03-10

Thus, the Court overrules this objection since Plaintiff has offered no evidence of racial discrimination. ... It is, therefore, ORDERED that that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment DE 88) is granted on Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1982, equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 & 3617 claims.

Section 3604(b) prohibits a homeowners association from adopting discriminatory rules or enforcing facially neutral rules discriminatorily when it has authority to enforce restrictions on a dwelling purchaser under the terms of sale.

H.O.P.E., Inc. v. Lake Greenfield Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2018-07-31(b)

If a homeowners association has the authority to enforce restrictions on the purchaser of a dwelling pursuant to the terms of the sale, the association violates section 3604(b) by adopting discriminatory rules, or enforcing facially neutral rules in a discriminatory fashion.

Section 3604(b) prohibits racial discrimination by a mandatory homeowners’ association in access to facilities and services tied to the purchase of a home, including discrimination after the purchase.

Watts v. Joggers Run Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2025-04-07(b)

Section 3604(b) prohibits race-based discrimination related to the sale or rental of a home, including its attendant facilities and services.

Section 3604(b) permits a housing-discrimination claim to proceed when a protected-class plaintiff plausibly alleges adverse treatment and a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation; under § 3604(f), an unexplained lengthy delay may constructively deny a reasonable disability accommodation.

Thompson v. CRF-Cluster Model Program, LLC · filed 2020-08-14(b), (f)

To establish discrimination under the FHA, “plaintiffs have three available theories: [i] intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); [ii] disparate impact; and [iii] failure to make a reasonable accommodation.” ... Instead, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff can allege facts that support a plausible claim that the plaintiff was “a member of a protected class,” suffered relevant “adverse” treatment, and “can sustain a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.” ... A constructive denial may occur where a “request for accommodation is met with indeterminate delay instead of outright denial.” ... Thus, Plaintiff has stated a claim that he was constructively denied a reasonable accommodation under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-treatment claims, but the plaintiff must allege facts supporting protected-class membership, qualification and application, rejection, and continued availability to similarly situated applicants.

Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co. · filed 2019-04-09(a)

Thus, to state a claim for disparate treatment under §3604(a), the plaintiff must allege facts supporting a prima facie case of (1) membership in protected class, (2) that the plaintiff applied and was qualified to rent or purchase housing; (3) that the plaintiff was rejected, and (4) that the housing thereafter remained open to similarly situated applicants after the plaintiff was rejected.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discriminatory housing terms and related services, and a disparate-treatment plaintiff must show circumstances supporting a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive.

Melton v. Malcolm Shabazz, L.P. · filed 2021-02-12(b)

“Under § 3604(b), a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment by making a modest showing that a member of a statutorily protected class was not offered the same terms, conditions or privileges of rental of a dwelling or not provided the same services or facilities in connection therewith made available to others under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable inference of prohibited discrimination.” ... “Because Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence that Defendants were motivated by discrimination in delaying repairs to her apartment, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discrimination based on delayed repairs.”

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of a protected characteristic, and an FHA disparate-treatment plaintiff must show the statutory prima facie elements and that the protected class was a significant factor in the challenged decision.

Mandawala v. Struga Management · filed 2021-07-15(a)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “make unavailable, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... To make out a prima facie claim of disparate treatment under the FHA, a plaintiff must establish (1) membership in a protected class, (2) that he applied and was qualified to rent or purchase housing, (3) that he was rejected, and (4) that the housing thereafter remained open to similarly situated applicants. ... Under the FHA, plaintiff need not show that racial animus was “sole motivation” for the adverse action but he must show his protected class was “a significant factor in the decision.”

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental, or related services, because of protected status; a disparate-treatment plaintiff must show differential treatment motivated at least in part by that status.

Scoggins v. Court · filed 2023-03-03(b)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA based on disparate treatment, plaintiff must first show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was denied a rental relationship or otherwise treated differently in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her rental relationship, or in the provision of services or facilities to her as a tenant; and (3) the different treatment was, at least in part, because of her protected class status. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); see also Shultz v. Kern Cty., 2022 WL 658140, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2022) (quoting Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1997)). Discriminatory intent or motive is a necessary element of any disparate treatment claim under the FHA.

A § 3604(b) disparate-treatment claim requires proof that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent or motive.

Black v. Friedrichsen · filed 2023-09-06(b)

For a disparate treatment claim, a “plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.”

Section 3604's disparate-treatment protection requires a housing-discrimination plaintiff to show protected-class status, qualification for the requested loan modification, denial, and more favorable treatment of similarly situated applicants.

Green v. Allied First Bank sb · filed 2025-03-11

To begin, Green cannot make out a prima facie claim. Doing so requires her to establish four elements: that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she requested and was qualified for a loan modification, (3) Servbank denied it, and (4) Servbank approved similarly situated applicants’ requests. at 640–41 (considering claim under Section 3604); ... Green cannot establish the second or fourth elements.

Section 3604 disparate-treatment claims require a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is in a protected class, was qualified and applied to rent or purchase housing, was rejected, and that the housing remained available to similarly situated applicants.

Carey v. St. Charles Parish · filed 2023-01-09

As a threshold matter, plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case for her claim of disparate treatment under the Fair Housing Act. ... The Fifth Circuit has stated, “[t]o make out a prima facie claim of disparate treatment under the FHA, [plaintiff] must establish (1) membership in [a] protected class, (2) that [plaintiff] applied and was qualified to rent or purchase housing[,] (3) that [plaintiff] was rejected, and (4) that the housing thereafter remained open to similarly situated applicants.” ... Here, plaintiff alleges that “Ms. Carey started having problems with St. Charles Parish in 2012 found out Ms. Carey, (a black woman) actually owned the property.” ... While plaintiff alleges the first element of being a member of a protected class, she fails to allege any facts pertaining to elements two through four. The complaint is devoid of any facts or allegations supporting a claim under Section 3604. As plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing of her claims under Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act, her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 must be dismissed.

Section 3604 does not list domestic-violence status as a protected class, but discrimination against domestic-violence victims may qualify as sex or gender discrimination under certain circumstances.

Wilson v. Guardian Mgmt., LLC · filed 2019-04-22(a)-(b)

The mere fact that being a victim of domestic violence is not specifically protected under the FHA, however, is not dispositive. As the authorities discussed above have noted, being a victim of domestic violence, under certain circumstances, can give rise to a claim of sex or gender discrimination under the FHA.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in rental housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

ALLEN v. MOORE · filed 2020-01-13

The Complaint offers no facts showing that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff “based on his ‘race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.’” Parker, 2015 WL 5247692, at *3 (quoting Section 3604).

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on a protected characteristic or status.

Bryant v. Steinburg · filed 2024-02-28

The district court properly dismissed Bryant’s Fair Housing Act claims because Bryant failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of a protected status. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (setting forth protected grounds under the Fair Housing Act); Avenue 6E Inv., LLC v. City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 502-03 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Fair Housing Act requires either intentional discrimination because of a person’s protected characteristic or a discriminatory effect on a protected class).

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling sale or related services because of sex or familial status, and covers discrimination against single mothers under a sex-plus theory.

MORAN v. ROCKWELL DEVELOPMENT GROUP LLC · filed 2022-03-23(b)

As Plaintiffs’ discrimination is based upon their marital status plus the fact that they are mothers (women), the Court holds that they are part of a protected class under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell, rent, or negotiate for a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and a complaint must allege facts plausibly linking the challenged conduct to a protected class.

Morales v. U.S. Department of H.U.D. · filed 2022-09-14(a)

Morales has failed to set forth any facts from which the Court could plausibly infer, for instance, that he was discriminated against based on his membership in any protected class or retaliated against based on any protected activity, as would be required to state claims under either of the Civil Rights Acts. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) & (b) (codifying Sections 804(a) and 804(b) of Title VII and making unlawful various forms on housing discrimination “because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (making unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any federal program or activity receiving federal financial assistance).

Section 3604 prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it, and discriminating in its rental terms or services, because of listed protected characteristics.

Ryall v. Normandy Village Apts. Inc. · filed 2024-09-03

A plaintiff “is a member of a protected class” if he or she is being discriminated against based on his or her race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap. Id; 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Plaintiff, who appears to have lived alone at the Normandy Village Apartments, is a white, 69 year-old male. He does not allege that he has been discriminated against because of his race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national original, or handicap. (R. Doc. 1). ... Consequently, this Court finds Plaintiff has not pled the first element of an FHA claim.

Section 3604(b) prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin; domestic-violence-victim status is not itself a listed protected class.

Evans · filed 2025-12-03(b)

Status as a victim of domestic violence is not defined as a protected class under the FHA; the statute covers only discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(b) protects against discrimination based on race, but low-income and homeless status are not protected classes.

Patel v. City of Stanton · filed 2024-08-26(b)

While alleged discrimination based on the race of plaintiffs and their guests is a protected class under the FHA, the guests’ alleged status as “low-income and homeless” is not a protected class.

Section 3604(b) does not treat public housing residency as a protected class.

Southwest Fair Housing Council v. Mdwid · filed 2021-11-12(b)

Persons who are residents of public housing are not a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(a) does not make renters, people of a particular economic status, or housing voucher holders protected classes.

Inclusive Commty Project, Inc. v. Heartland Commty · filed 2020-08-10(a)

Needless to say, renters do not constitute a protected class under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Along that line, neither is one’s economic status or being a voucher holder. See id.

Section 3604 does not prohibit refusing to rent housing based on a person’s income or choice of occupation.

Williams v. Settle Homes · filed 2024-05-28

A person’s income and choice of profession are not protected classes enumerated under the FHA.

Under the precedent applied in this opinion, § 3604(a) and (c) do not cover housing discrimination based solely on sexual orientation, even when pleaded as sex, associational, or sex-stereotype discrimination.

Walsh v. Friendship Vill. of S. Cnty. · filed 2019-01-16(a), (c)

Upon consideration the Court rejects this analysis, finding instead that sexual orientation rather than sex lies at the heart of Plaintiffs' claims. ... As noted above, sexual orientation is one such unprotected class, and so this portion of Defendants' motion must be granted. ... Upon consideration, the Court finds its rulings apply with equal force to Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).

Section 3604(b) does not cover age or geographical discrimination, and a claim under it requires a connection to the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Keeney v. Kemper National Insurance · filed 1997-04-23(b)

This cause of action fails because age and geographical discrimination are not within the scope of the FHA, and therefore, such a claim is not actionable. Aso this Court does not believe this cause of action can be sustained because no sale or rental of a dwelling is involved.

Section 3604 does not protect against housing discrimination based on political views.

Murphy v. Brixworth Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2024-08-08(a)–(b)

The FHA does not protect Plaintiffs from discrimination due to their political views.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of race and other protected characteristics, and can reach a hostile housing environment created by persons controlling those matters.

Favourite v. 55 Halley St., Inc. · filed 2019-05-23(b)

Courts in this Circuit have construed Section 3604(b) of the FHA to prohibit the creation of a "hostile environment" by individuals who have control or authority over the "terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling," similar to the prohibition imposed by Title VII against the creation of a hostile work environment. ... A plaintiff asserting a hostile housing environment claim pursuant to Section 3604(b) must establish that (1) she was subjected to harassment that was sufficiently pervasive and severe so as to create a hostile housing environment, (2) the harassment was because of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, and (3) the defendant(s) is responsible for the allegedly harassing conduct towards the plaintiff.

Section 3604(a) et seq. permits a hostile-housing-environment claim based on unwelcome, race-based conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter tenancy conditions and is imputable to the defendant.

Childress v. Roberts · filed 2019-12-11(a) et seq.

The Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed whether a plaintiff may recover under a hostile housing environment claim under the FHA. ... Therefore, the court recognizes Childress’ claim as a cause of action for hostile housing environment. To survive a motion for summary judgment on a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find that the conduct was (1) unwelcome; (2) based on race; (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’ tenancy and create an abusive environment; and (4) is imputable to the defendant.

Section 3604(b) permits a tenant to state a hostile housing-environment claim by alleging landlord sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the dwelling.

Monus v. Riecke · filed 2021-04-30(b)

A plaintiff can state a claim under § 3604(b) by alleging that a landlord’s sexual harassment altered the terms, conditions, or privileges on the use of a dwelling. ... Such a claim is viable when a landlord’s harassment (including sexually aggressive behavior) is so severe or pervasive as to interfere with a tenant’s use and enjoyment of the premises. ... Given this jurisprudence, Monus’s allegation that Riecke touched her vaginal area is sufficient, at the pleading stage, to state a hostile housing environment claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(b) prohibits racial discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and in the provision of related services or facilities; the court recognized a hostile-housing-environment theory based on sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment and landlord knowledge without appropriate action.

Lazarus v. Ouansafi · filed 2023-10-03(b)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits racial discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... Federal District Courts within the Ninth Circuit have interpreted the Fair Housing Act to permit a hostile housing environment claim. ... Such a claim arises when a plaintiff can establish that they were subject to harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with or deprive them of their right to use or enjoy their home. ... It is necessary that the landlord knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to take appropriate action.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling and reaches post-acquisition discrimination in a resident’s enjoyment of the dwelling or associated services.

Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC · filed 2024-03-28(b)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of rental of a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 3617 (Westlaw through P.L. 118-41) (“It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by [§ 3604.]”). The Second Circuit has held that the FHA protects residents against post-acquisition conduct that “would constitute discrimination in the enjoyment of residence in a dwelling or in the provision of services associated with that dwelling.” Francis v. Kings Parks Manor, Inc., 944 F.3d 370, 377 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated in part on other grounds, 992 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2021). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must plead adequate facts to establish “(1) that she was subjected to harassment sufficiently pervasive and severe so as to create a hostile housing environment, (2) that the harassment was because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class; and (3) that a basis exists for imputing the allegedly harassing conduct to the landlord.”

Section 3604(b) prohibits hostile housing environments comparable to Title VII and requires pervasive or severe harassment because of protected-class membership that is imputable to the landlord.

Leon v. Kearney · filed 2024-08-07(b)

Courts in this Circuit have construed [§] 3604(b) of the FHA to prohibit . . . a hostile environment” that is “comparable to” Title VII.” To set out a prima facie case that a landlord has created a hostile housing environment, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that she was subjected to harassment sufficiently pervasive and severe so as to create a hostile housing environment, (2) that the harassment was because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class; and (3) that a basis exists for imputing the allegedly harassing conduct to the landlord.”

Section 3604 prohibits sex-based housing discrimination, including sexual harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile housing environment, and requires a basis for imputing the harassment to the defendant.

Charlier v. 21 Astor Place Condominium · filed 2024-09-03

To state a housing discrimination claim under the FHA based on sexual harassment, a plaintiff must plead facts to establish “(1) that she was subjected to harassment sufficiently pervasive and severe so as to create a hostile housing environment, (2) that the harassment was because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class; and (3) that a basis exists for imputing the allegedly harassing conduct to the [defendant].” ... Plaintiff has plausibly pleaded that Mr. Proverbs’ conduct during the June 29 incident was “extraordinarily severe,” and that it was sufficiently physically threatening and humiliating to create a hostile housing environment. ... The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for housing discrimination under the FHA and NYSHRL, and under the more liberal pleading standard of the NYCHRL.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or related services, because of religion or another protected characteristic; a hostile-housing-environment claim requires sufficiently pervasive and severe harassment, discriminatory motive, and responsibility of the defendant.

Stern v. Highland Lake Homeowners Association · filed 2025-03-31(b)

To establish prima facie showing of a hostile housing environment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) a Plaintiff must establish that (1) he was subjected to harassment that was sufficiently pervasive and severe to create a hostile housing environment, (2) the harassment was because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, and (3) the defendant is responsible for the allegedly harassing conduct towards the plaintiff.

Section 3604(b) prohibits housing discrimination based on national origin in the terms, conditions, privileges, rental, or related services of a dwelling and supports a hostile-housing-environment claim when protected-class harassment is severe or pervasive enough to interfere with housing services or facilities and liability can be imputed to the defendant.

KAPINGA v. TERRACE POND LLC · filed 2025-09-30(b)

The Defendants first argue that because neither First Circuit nor the Law Court have explicitly recognized hostile housing environment claims under the FHA and MHRA, respectively, that Kapinga’s claim must fail. ... I disagree. ... As for the elements of a hostile housing environment claim, the Seventh Circuit, borrowing the framework from hostile work environment claims, has held, A hostile-housing environment claim requires a plaintiff to show: (1) that she endured unwelcome harassment based on a protected characteristic; (2) the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to interfere with the terms, conditions, or privileges of services or facilities; and (3) that there is a basis for imputing liability to the defendant. ... Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Kapinga, a factfinder could reasonably find that she endured unwelcome harassment due to her Congolese national origin when Duffy blamed the food from her country for the cockroach infestation, and that there is a basis for imputing that harassment to the Defendants. ... I agree with the Plaintiff, see Opposition at 14-16, however, that a reasonable factfinder could find that the harassment extended beyond just the comment to blaming her for the cockroaches, attempting to evict her, failing to renew her lease, and failing to return her security deposit—and that these actions interfered with Kapinga’s use of her apartment. ... Kapinga has presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment.

Section 3604(b) requires harassment supporting a hostile housing environment claim to be severe and pervasive; an allegation of repeated harassment alone is insufficient.

Allen v. Virgin Islands Housing Authority · filed 2023-08-28(b)

At the same time, the Court finds, here, that Plaintiff’s allegation of “repeated” harassment, Compl. at 5, without more, does not constitute “severe and pervasive” harassment, a required element to establish the claim.

Section 3604 permits a hostile housing environment claim when unwelcome sexual harassment is severe or pervasive enough to interfere with a person’s use or enjoyment of a home.

Salisbury v. Hickman · filed 2013-09-24

As alluded to above, to prevail on a hostile housing environment claim a plaintiff must establish that she was subjected to (1) unwelcomed (2) sexual harassment that was (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with or deprive the plaintiff of her right to use or enjoy her home.

Section 3604(b) covers a landlord’s sexual harassment of a tenant when it creates a hostile housing environment tied to the tenant’s housing.

Tripp · filed 2026-01-26(b)

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a hostile housing environment claim under the FHA against Defendant Tripp based on her alleged sexual harassment of him while serving as his landlord.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in housing terms or rental privileges because of protected characteristics, but a facially neutral occupancy limit based only on group size does not establish a violation without evidence of discrimination.

Council of Association of Unit Owners of Pelican Cove Condominium v. Yeilding · filed 2019-06-03(b)

The language of the occupancy limit does not differentiate based on—and it in fact says nothing about—any renting family’s characteristics, ... In other words, the Declaration’s occupancy limit is facially neutral, and the Yeildings have pointed to no evidence of ... discrimination against families at Pelican Cove (in fact, the record suggests that the various units of Pelican Cove have been the home of or rented to many families without issue).

Section 3604(f)(2) treats different occupancy limits for handicapped group homes as prima facie intentional discrimination, but allows limits tied to legitimate governmental concerns; § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable accommodation only when necessary to provide equal opportunity and does not require an opportunity unavailable to others.

Courage to Change Holding Company v. El Paso County, Colorado · filed 2020-07-31(f)(2) (f)(3)(B)

There may well be rational explanations for the different occupancy levels. However, there is no doubt that the ordinance for Group Homes imposes different occupancy levels for handicapped persons than for other types of group homes. This is sufficient to make out Plaintiffs’ prima facie claim for intentional discrimination under the FHA. ... However, as Plaintiffs admit in their Motion, “[o]ccupancy limits are not a per se violation of the FHA, as long as they are tied to legitimate governmental concerns and not based on the person[’]s status as handicapped.” ... Thus, because a reasonable factfinder could find that the different occupancy levels are based on bona fide governmental concerns, the Court will also deny Plaintiffs’ cross Motion for Summary Judgment as to this theory of intentional discrimination. ... As explained in Part III.A of this Order, a Rehabilitation Facility is not permitted as either an Allowed Use or Special Use in the relevant zoning district. As a result, the County’s denial of Soaring Hope’s Special Use application cannot be considered a failure to accommodate since Plaintiffs were seeking an opportunity which was wholly unavailable to Soaring Hope. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the “accommodation is reasonable.”

Section 3604(a)-(b) requires discrimination based on a protected characteristic; injuries and threats at an apartment complex alone do not state a claim.

Lyons v. Kyner · filed 2010-02-10(a)-(b)

The Act prohibits “discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services in connection with a rental.” Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b). As the district court and the magistrate judge recognized, though Lyons has alleged that he has endured physical injuries and threatening conduct while living at his apartment complex, he has not alleged that he was the victim of discrimination on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Section 3604(a)-(d) prohibits occupancy restrictions that discriminate against families with children; a facially neutral policy may still violate the section.

United States v. J. Rogers Badgett, Sr., D/B/A Georgetown Apartments Jean Brittain · filed 1992-11-23(a)-(d)

We therefore find that the occupancy restrictions imposed by Georgetown violate sections 3604(a)-(d) of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) permits a reasonable occupancy limit based on a dwelling’s size and a legitimate interest in preserving the property, under HUD’s guidance in effect at the time.

Karl Pfaff Elizabeth Pfaff v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 1996-07-02(a)

Following HUD’s original “reasonableness” standard in this case, we think the Pfaffs’ policy sufficient. It is certainly reasonable to seek to preserve the value of one’s property, as the Pfaffs sought to do, and a numerical limitation on occupancy here advances this legitimate business purpose.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable housing accommodations when necessary to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, while § 3604(c) bars discriminatory housing statements by persons engaged in selling or renting dwellings.

LaRosa v. River Quarry Apartments, LLC · filed 2019-08-03(f)(3)(B), (f), and (c)

The FHA forbids discrimination in the rental of housing, including “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Rather, once a housing provider knows of an individual’s request for accommodation, the provider has “‘an opportunity to make a final decision . . . which necessarily includes the ability to conduct a meaningful review’” to determine whether the FHA requires the requested accommodation. ... River Quarry also did not have sufficient information to come to a meaningful decision until Dr. Wilper completed the “Verification for Assistance Animal” form, at which point the LaRosas’ request was granted. ... Thus, despite the amendments, plaintiffs still fail to allege that River Quarry actually or constructively denied their accommodation request. The Court will therefore dismiss the § 3604(f) claim. ... Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “make, print or publish . . . any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . handicap . . . or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). ... But Mr. Cullimore is an attorney; he is not a “person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling,” 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(b).

Section 3604(c) requires a statement related to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates a handicap-based preference, limitation, or discrimination; under § 3604(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must plausibly allege refusal, a reasonable accommodation, and necessity/equal opportunity.

United States v. AION Management, LLC · filed 2025-03-18(c), (f)(3)(B)

Thus, to establish a violation of Section 3604(c), a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant made a statement; (2) the statement was made with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling; and (3) the statement indicated a preference, limitation or discrimination based on a handicap. White v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Dev., 475 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2007). ... To successfully plead a cause of action under Section 3604(f)(3)(B), Plaintiff and Intervenors must “plausibly plead enough facts to make out the [following three elements]: refusal, reasonable accommodation, and necessity/equal opportunity.” Vorchheimer, 903 F.3d at 111.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) permits reasonable-accommodation claims by fictional testers when the allegations plausibly show necessity, while § 3604(c) requires allegations that housing statements would suggest a protected class is preferred or disfavored and does not require an explicit denial of housing or accommodation.

United States v. AION Management, LLC · filed 2025-06-26(f)(3)(B), (c)

The Vorchheimer Court did not discuss tester standing nor whether testers are categorically barred from asserting Section 3604(f)(3)(B) claims. Contrary to Defendants’ argument, “fair housing organizations can use fictional testers to advance the purposes of the FHA,” including Section 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Plaintiffs’ Section 3604(f)(3)(B) claims may proceed, and the factfinder will determine whether those claims have ultimately been proven. ... Plaintiffs are not required to allege that Defendants explicitly denied them housing or an accommodation. Instead, Plaintiffs must allege that Defendants’ statements “would suggest to an ordinary listener that a particular protected class is preferred or not preferred for the housing in question.” ... Therefore, at this stage in the proceedings, the alleged statements made by Defendants’ agents are sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants may have had a “preference, limitation, or discrimination based on [ ] handicap” in violation of Section 3604(c). 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added).

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff to allege membership in a protected class and treatment different from other homebuyers because of that membership.

Ward v. Williams, Jr. · filed 2019-08-05(b)

To state a claim of discrimination under Section 3604(b), Plaintiff must allege that he is a member of a protected class and that he was treated differently than other homebuyers because of his membership in that class.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discriminatory housing practices in the sale or rental of housing, and a claimant must identify conduct violating the subsection and show injury from it.

Nandlal v. Oregon Cascade Properties LLC · filed 2021-11-15(b)

To state a claim of discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Plaintiff must show that he has been harmed by a discriminatory housing practice. ... A “discriminatory housing practice” is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was a victim of discriminatory housing practices as defined by § 3604(b) (Doc. 1 at 6), but does not identify any conduct by any named defendant that violated § 3604(b).1 Nor does it set out whether or how Plaintiff was injured by such conduct.2 The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under the FHA, but grant leave for Plaintiff to amend the claim.

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff to show that they were subjected to different terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected status.

(PS) Butler v. Dozier · filed 2022-04-19(b)

“To state a claim under § 3604, a plaintiff must show that he or she was subjected to different ‘terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected status.’”

Section 3604(c) prohibits making, printing, or publishing a notice, statement, or advertisement about renting a dwelling that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on a protected class.

Chapman v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 2024-04-19(c)

Under the Fair Housing Act, “it shall be unlawful . . . to make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the . . . rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). A § 3604(c) claim has three elements. Miami Valley Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Connor Grp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 396, 406–07 (S.D. Ohio 2011). A plaintiff must prove that: (1) defendant made a statement; (2) the statement was made with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling; and (3) the statement indicated a preference, or limitation or discrimination on the basis of a protected class. Id. (citing White v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 475 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff to show that, because of a protected status, the defendant subjected the plaintiff to different terms, conditions, or privileges of housing or related services.

Mendy v. Larson · filed 2024-06-10(b)

“To state a claim under § 3604(b), a plaintiff must show she was subjected to different ‘terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected status.’” ... These allegations adequately set forth a theory of Fair Housing Act liability against ASP.

Section 3604(f)(1)(C) prohibits housing discrimination against a person because of the disability of someone associated with that person.

Finch v. Housing Authority of Cook County · filed 2019-08-09(f)(1)(C)

Individuals can, however, bring disparate treatment claims based upon associational discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and FHA. See Hale v. Pace, No. 09 C 5131, 2011 WL 1303369, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding plaintiff stated an associational discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(C), (2)(C) (it is unlawful to discriminate, under the FHA, against individuals because “of a handicap of . . . any person associated” with that individual). ... And here, Adana alleges that Defendant discriminated against the whole family due to Ramon and Shorter’s disabilities, [54] ¶ 40, 48−49; [66] at 2. Thus, although Adana does not allege any disability, she can nonetheless state an associational discrimination claim for disparate treatment against Defendant under both acts.

Section 3604(f)(2)(C) bars discrimination in a dwelling’s sale or rental terms, conditions, privileges, or related services because of the disability of someone associated with the buyer or renter.

Seelig v. Old Vegas Manor and Estates Homeowners Association · filed 2021-12-06(f)(2)(C)

As discussed, Mrs. Seelig plausibly alleges that she may maintain actions under the ADA given her association with Mr. Seelig. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(C). The same is true under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E).

Section 3604 prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it, or discriminating in rental terms, because of a protected characteristic, including disability; a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the housing action to such a characteristic.

Muhammad v. Wilhite · filed 2019-08-15(a), (b), and (f)

Muhammad’s allegations do not reveal his race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial, or disability status, and he does not claim that Wilhite terminated his lease because of his disability or any classification protected by the FHA. ... The allegations in the complaint suggest that Muhammad’s lease was terminated after a dispute with Wilhite regarding parking and after he complained about the bathroom plumbing. But nothing in the complaint suggests that Wilhite’s position or response to those issues had anything to do with Muhammad’s race, color, national origin, sex, familial, or disability status. ... Even under the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, Muhammad fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief under the FHA, ADA, or § 1982.

Section 3604(b) prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and a claimant must show a direct relation between the asserted injury and the alleged discriminatory conduct.

Pirro v. Board of Trustees of the Vil. of Groton · filed 2022-03-03(b)

The fourth cause of action alleging violations of the FHA was also properly dismissed. Broadly stated, the FHA prohibits discriminatory housing practices based upon race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin ( see 42 USC § 3604 [b]). ... Plaintiffs' claims under the FHA fail because they cannot show a "direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged" ( Bank of America Corp. v Miami , 137 S Ct at 1306 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). ... Defendants' enforcement of the Nuisance Law and any resulting injury to plaintiffs stemming from eviction of domestic violence victims is simply too attenuated to establish a cognizable FHA claim ( see generally Tax Equity Now NY LLC v City of New York , 182 AD3d 148, 167 [2020], appeal dismissed 35 NY3d 1077 [2020]).

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, and does not treat source of income or Section 8 funding as a protected characteristic.

Prendergast v. Wode Cooper Companies Atcheson Place Lofts · filed 2025-09-15

First, Plaintiff’s claim for source-of-income discrimination against Triumph under the FHA fails because source of income is not a protected characteristic under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting housing discrimination because of “race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin”); Kaiser v. Fairfield Props., No. 20CV05399GRBJMW, 2022 WL 17412405, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022), report and recommendation adopted (Mar. 11, 2022) (“Because source of income, and specifically Section 8 funding recipients, are not protected classes under the FHA, Plaintiff fails to state that he is in a protected class, and thus, cannot meet the pleading standard required to maintain an FHA claim.”).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Shen v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services · filed 2025-11-04(a)

But the district court did not abuse its discretion because the registration and affidavit requirements are not discriminatory housing practices under section 3604(a).

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

Wolf v. Bank of America, N.A., et a · filed 2016-01-20

Under the FHA, it is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing against any person based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

Section 3604(c) bars anyone from making housing-related statements conveying a disability-based preference or discrimination, while § 3604(f)(1)’s “otherwise make unavailable” language reaches discriminatory conduct that makes housing more difficult to obtain and does not require an express denial.

Gilead Community Services, Inc. v. Cromwell · filed 2019-09-30(c), (f)(1)

The Second Circuit has rejected as “too narrow” efforts to limit the statute’s reach to “expressions that result in the denial of housing.” Id. As a result, 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act also “protect[s] against [the] psychic injury caused by discriminatory statements made in connection with the housing market.” ... Courts have found that a defendant “otherwise makes [housing] unavailable” under the Fair Housing Act when the defendant engages in a series of actions that imposes burdens on or constitutes harassment of a protected class of residents or intended residents, making it more difficult for the members of the protected class to obtain housing or conveying a sense that the members of the protected class are unwanted. ... Defendants’ efforts to narrow the reach of § 3604(f) to an express denial of a housing opportunity or the unavailability of a specific housing opportunity are just not sustainable.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to any person because of religion or another listed protected characteristic, and a disparate-treatment claim requires discriminatory intent or motive.

OT, LLC v. Harford County Maryland · filed 2019-09-23(a)

Importantly, to prevail on an FHA disparate-treatment discrimination claim, a “plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.”

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling because of sex, and a claim may proceed under disparate-impact or disparate-treatment theories.

McNeil v. Yale University · filed 2020-01-30(a)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent , . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §3604(a). “A plaintiff can make out a claim of discrimination either on a theory of disparate impact or on one of disparate treatment.” Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, N.Y., 316 F.3d 357, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1995)). After a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, “the burden shifts to the defendant to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for the challenged decision.” Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39, 47 (2d. Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03(1973)). To bring a claim under a theory of disparate impact, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that an outwardly neutral practice actually or predictably has a discriminatory effect . . . .The plaintiff need not make any showing of discriminatory intent.” Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm., Inc., 316 F.3d at 366. A prima facie case is established by demonstrating “(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices.” Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). As alleged, the facts supporting a claim of discrimination “need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015).

Section 3604(a)-(b) prohibits refusing or making housing unavailable, or changing rental terms, conditions, privileges, services, or facilities, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

McDaniel v. Dominium Management Services, LLC · filed 2022-05-03(a)-(b)

To state an FHA discrimination claim based on disparate treatment, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was denied a rental relationship or otherwise treated differently in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her rental relationship or in the provision of services or facilities to her as a tenant; and (3) the different treatment was, at least in part, because of her [protected status].”

Section 3604(a) and (b) do not support disparate-treatment claims when the complaint's allegations fail to plausibly show discrimination or discriminatory intent.

CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Arbor Realty Trust, Inc. · filed 2022-09-06(a) (b)

At bottom, Plaintiffs have not alleged discrimination, and their comparator allegations and statistical analysis allegations are insufficient to create an inference of discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA. Counts I, II, III, and IV will be dismissed against the seven Arbor Related Defendants.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race and requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to plausibly allege unequal treatment affecting housing availability.

Price v. Howard · filed 2023-03-31(a)

The FHA prohibits the “refus[al] to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). To prevail on a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate “unequal treatment on the basis of race . . . that affects the availability of housing.” Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty. Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race and requires an FHA disparate-impact claim to show a disproportionate impact on a particular protected racial group; a discriminatory-effect claim may also proceed on legally significant perpetuation of segregation.

Noel v. City Of New York · filed 2023-04-28(a)

The FHA prohibits racial discrimination in the provision of housing, making it unlawful “to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §3604(a). ... The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Policy causes a disparate impact by race as a matter of law. ... Although Plaintiffs have shown that multiple racial demographic groups are affected within multiple CD typologies, they have failed to make the requisite showing that members of the protected class at issue—African American New Yorkers—are disproportionately or disparately impacted by the CP Policy. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs may be able to prove that the CP Policy causes a discriminatory effect through the perpetuation of segregation, should they proffer sufficient evidence demonstrating that the CP Policy has a significant effect on inhibiting integration.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and supports disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims subject to the FHA's pleading requirements.

Bell v. Pappas · filed 2024-04-19(a)

Section 3604 of the FHA provides that it is unlawful to "make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Both the FHA and ICRA allow recovery under both disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination. ... To state a disparate treatment claim under the FHA requires allegations of intentional discrimination, provable via either direct or circumstantial evidence. ... A plaintiff may establish a prima facie disparate impact claim under the FHA by alleging (1) a statistical disparity; (2) a specific policy; and (3) a causal connection between the disparity and the policy.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a protected characteristic, and the FHA applies that prohibition to municipal zoning and land-use decisions under both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories.

MBSC Property South LLC v. Myrtle Beach South Carolina, The City of · filed 2025-08-28(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” ... The Supreme Court has confirmed that the FHA applies to municipal zoning and land-use decisions. ... Both intentional discrimination (“disparate treatment”) and facially neutral policies with discriminatory effects (“disparate impact”) are cognizable under the Act. ... In sum, MBSC has plausibly alleged both intentional discrimination and disparate impact under the FHA. ... Accordingly, the City’s motion to dismiss MBSC’s Fair Housing Act claims is denied.

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to make a dwelling unavailable or deny it because of race; an FHA disparate-impact violation normally does not require proof of discriminatory intent.

City of Fort Lauderdale v. Scott · filed 2012-08-23(a)

Specifically, Counter-Plaintiffs allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.... ” ... Establishing an FHA violation normally does not require proof of discriminatory intent. ... In evaluating an FHA claim alleg ing disparate impact, courts consider various factors, including “the strength of a plaintiffs showing of discriminatory effect,” any evidence of discriminatory intent, and the defendant’s interest in taking the challenged action. ... Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to the City on Counter-Plaintiffs’ FHA claim.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits handicap discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental and in services or facilities connected to a dwelling; providing forms governing requests for an emotional support animal can qualify as a service directly connected to the rental.

Conlin v. RU Cliff · filed 2019-11-06(f)(2)

The court, construing the FHA broadly, as it must,4 concludes that the Cullimore Defendants provided a service directly connected to Ms. Conlin’s rental of the apartment. They drafted, advocated, and provided formulaic, copyrighted, non-proprietary documents to both clients and non-clients. Those forms filled the landlord’s need for rules governing renter requests, such as Ms. Conlin’s, for permission to keep an emotional support animal in the apartment. As such, Ms. Conlin is an aggrieved person who need not independently establish a tort duty on the part of the Defendants.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) treats refusal to permit a reasonable and necessary modification of a disabled person's dwelling as prohibited discrimination.

Kooman v. Boulder Bluff Condominiums, Units 73-123, 125-146, Inc. · filed 2020-02-10(f)(3)(A)

Prohibited discrimination under the FHAA includes “a refusal to permit . . . reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied” by a disabled individual “if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A). ... The period between the June 17th request and the August 23rd approval was not unreasonable. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a failure to permit a reasonable modification claim.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) requires housing providers to permit reasonable structural modifications necessary for a disabled tenant’s full enjoyment of the premises when the tenant bears the expense.

Timmons v. Kingsley-Johnston, Inc · filed 2020-11-13(f)(3)(A)

The FHA also makes it unlawful for a housing provider to refuse “to permit, at the expense of the [disabled] person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied . . . by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A). But unlike accommodations, modifications involve structural changes made to the premises, and the tenants, rather than the housing providers, are responsible for the costs of the modifications. See id.; Joint Statement on Reasonable Modifications at 3.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) prohibits refusing to permit, at a disabled person's expense, reasonable modifications to existing premises when necessary for the person's full enjoyment of the premises.

Adam v. Andmark White Lakes Apartments, LLC · filed 2024-02-28(f)(3)(A)

Under the FHA, a property owner discriminates when it “refus [es] to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied . . . by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A). Viewing the allegations, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he asked AFI if he could make a reasonable modification to the unit. Rather, the allegations are focused on the failure to AFI to provide proper maintenance and complete repairs. Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss repeats this position. (Doc. 50 at 4.) (“Plaintiff identified numerous instances wherein Defendant AFI intentionally failed to cure major defects within Plaintiff’s unit despite Plaintiff’s repeated asks.”) Because Plaintiff has failed to allege that he requested a modification that he was going to complete and pay for and that such requested reasonable modification was refused, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a claim of discrimination on the basis of refusal to permit reasonable modification.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) requires a defendant to permit reasonable modifications, at the handicapped person's expense, when they may be necessary to afford full enjoyment of the premises.

Siguel v. King Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc. · filed 2024-07-03(f)(3)(A)

Regarding Count VI (storage sheds), to establish a claim of failure to allow a modification/accommodation under the FHA, Plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant refuses to: (a) “permit. . . at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications. . .if those modifications may be necessary to afford the person full enjoyment of the premises;” or (b) “make reasonable accommodations. . . when such ... person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)(A), (B); see also Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty, Md., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997); Acosta v. A&G Mgmt. Co., Inc., Civ. No. WMN-14-515, 2014 WL 1236918, at *2 (D. Md. 2014)(citation omitted); see Gavin v. Spring Ridge Conservancy, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 685, 687-88 (D. Md. 1995).

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) requires permitting, at the handicapped person's expense, reasonable modifications of existing premises when necessary for full enjoyment, but does not cover a modification outside the dwelling's premises.

Rodriguez v. City Of Chicago · filed 2025-02-06(f)(3)(A)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A), it is unlawful to refuse “to permit at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises.” ... While exterior accessible routes may require “curb ramps,” id., Rodriguez does not seek modification of the premises she occupies but wants to alter the public way outside of a neighboring property, [9] ¶ 13; [9] at 18 (showing driveway was part of the lot adjacent Rodriguez’s residence); [19] at 4 (acknowledging driveway was in front of adjacent property). ... While Rodriguez’s landlord owns both her building and the adjacent lot, the driveway was not within the property line of Rodriguez’s residence such that it falls within the “premises” of her dwelling under the FHA.

A person requesting a reasonable modification must offer to pay for it before a housing provider can be liable for ignoring or rejecting the request.

Robins · filed 2026-02-04(f)(3)(A)

Until the plaintiff offers to pay, the defendant is not liable under the FHA for ignoring or rejecting the plaintiff’s modification request.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) requires a landlord to permit reasonable structural modifications at the tenant’s expense, but does not require the landlord to pay for them.

Hugee v. Kimso Apartments, LLC · filed 2012-04-03(f)(3)(A)

I further note that Hugee's structural modification requests fell squarely under the "reasonable modifications” subsection of the FHA rather than the "reasonable accommodations” subsection, meaning Kimso was only obligated to permit Hugee to make the repairs at her own expense — Kimso was under no obligation under the FHA to finance the modifications itself.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) prohibits refusing a resident-funded modification that is reasonable and necessary for a disabled occupant’s full enjoyment of the premises.

Rodriguez v. Montalvo · filed 2004-01-12(f)(3)(A)

To hold Defendants liable for discriminating on the basis of Jose’s disability, Rodriguez must therefore show that Defendants refused a modification of the premises that was both reasonable and necessary to afford Jose full enjoyment thereof. ... Rodriguez, therefore, has a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits of both her federal and state law discrimination claims.

Section 3604(b) permits disparate-impact claims, but a plaintiff must show a robust causal connection between the challenged policy and a disproportionate effect on protected persons.

Southwest Fair Housing Council Incorporated v. Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement District · filed 2020-02-21(b)

Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs have not shown—or even attempted to show—that the protected-group members residing at West Edwards Circle would be “disproportionately” affected by the security-deposit increase “compared” to the other residents of West Edwards Circle. Nor could they—everybody has to pay the same fee. Rather, Plaintiffs have merely shown that the District chose to adopt a race-neutral policy at housing facilities whose population is composed of a higher percentage of protected-group members than the general population. Under Reyes, that is not robust causality. Id. (suggesting the disparate-impact claim would have failed had the plaintiffs “merely allege[d] that Latinos would face eviction in higher numbers than non-Latinos”).

Section 3604(a) requires a disparate-impact plaintiff to show that the challenged housing policy robustly caused the discriminatory effect, including by causing the protected group to be the dominant group of those affected.

Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2021-02-12(a)

After ICP II, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that a challenged practice robustly causes a discriminatory effect. ... After consideration of the Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court finds they have not met the Fifth Circuit standard for establishing the causation element of their prima facie case—that a challenged policy caused the relevant minority group to be the dominant group of those affected by the occupancy limits.

Section 3604(b) does not impose liability on a housing-program administrator that is neither the landlord nor in a position to control alleged tenant-on-tenant harassment.

Steele v. HAPHousing · filed 2022-09-07(b)

The problem for Plaintiff is that even if this court were to come down on the side of the Seventh Circuit and hold that a landlord is liable under the FHA when it has actual notice of tenant-on-tenant harassment based on a protected status, Way Finders is not the landlord of any of the alleged harassers. ... Simply put, there is no evidence that Way Finders had any relationship to the alleged harassers, legal or otherwise, that would have allowed it to exercise any control over their behavior. For this reason, as a matter of law, Way Finders cannot be liable to Plaintiff.

For an FHA landlord-harassment claim based on deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the landlord exercised substantial control over the context of the harassment and over the harasser; the ordinary powers of a landlord over a tenant are insufficient.

Edstrom v. St. Nicks Alliance Corp. · filed 2021-05-13

As for the remaining causes, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for violations of the federal Fair Housing Act (42 USC §§ 3604 and 3617 [FHA]) and the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296, et seq. [NYSHRL]), albeit for different reasons than those relied on by Supreme Court. Plaintiff alleges that his landlord failed to respond to reports of sexual-orientation and race-based harassment by a fellow tenant. In Francis v Kings Park Manor, Inc. (992 F3d 67, 75 [2d Cir 2021]), the Second Circuit acknowledged that deliberate indifference may be used to ground an FHA claim against a landlord when "a plaintiff plausibly alleges that a [landlord] exercised [the requisite] substantial control over the context in which the harassment occurs and over the harasser" However, the Second Circuit held, in relevant part, that "[t]he typical powers of a landlord over a tenant—such as the power to evict—do not establish the substantial control necessary to state a deliberate indifference claim under the FHA" ( id. ). Here, the complaint fails to state a claim under the FHA, because it provides no factual basis to infer that defendant had substantial control over the alleged harasser[*2], where it simply alleges the typically arms-length relationship between landlord and tenant.

Section 3604(a) permits a housing discrimination claim based on allegations that Black former employees were evicted while non-Black former employees could remain tenants.

Weekly · filed 2026-05-13(a)

Plaintiff also has alleged that NFI evicted black employees at the conclusion of their employment but that it allowed non-black employees to remain as tenants. The court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim of housing discrimination against NFI under § 3604(a).

Section 3604(a) can prohibit terminating a tenancy because the tenant experienced domestic violence or refused a landlord’s religious discussion, if discrimination is proved.

Bouley v. Young-Sabourin · filed 2005-03-10(a)

The plaintiff alleges the defendant unlawfully terminated her lease on the basis of sex and religion. First, she claims the termination was initiated because she was a victim of domestic violence, and second, because she refused to listen to the defendant’s attempt to discuss religion with her after the incident. These claims, if proven, could constitute unlawful discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(f)(9) does not require a reasonable accommodation that would pose a direct threat to others' health or safety or cause substantial physical damage to others' property.

Hernandez v. Golf Course Estates Home Owners Association · filed 2020-04-10(f)(9)

The FHAA does not require that an accommodation be made if it “would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or . . . would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9). ... Further, defendants provide little evidence that A.R.’s bus constitutes a direct threat to the health or safety of residents. ... However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants, this Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs’ request was reasonable.

Section 3604(f)(9) permits denying a reasonable accommodation when the tenant would pose a direct threat to other individuals' health or safety or cause substantial physical damage to others' property.

Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc. v. Steven C. · filed 2024-10-01(f)(9)

A property owner need not provide a reasonable accommodation if the tenant seeking such an accommodation "would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others." (42 USC § 3604 ([f] [9].) ... On this record, the court cannot determine that a full cure has occurred. However, without more than what is stated in petitioner's affidavit, it cannot be said that respondent is a direct threat to the health or safety of others, or that he is damaging the property of others.

Section 3604(f)(1)(Q) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of a handicap of a person associated with the buyer or renter, including discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral covenants.

Gibson Island Corporation v. Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC · filed 2020-06-05(f)(1)(Q)

The FHA forbids discrimination “in the sale or rental [of] a dwelling ... because of a handicap of ... any person associated with that buyer or renter.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(Q). Accordingly, facially neutral covenants cannot be discriminatorily enforced to prevent the establishment of assisted-living group homes for disabled individuals.

Section 3604(f) prohibits using a facially neutral restrictive covenant to make a dwelling unavailable or deny equal housing opportunity because of disability, and may require declining to enforce the covenant as a reasonable accommodation.

Martin v. Constance · filed 1994-02-10(f)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(3)(B)

The Court concludes that this is an appropriate case for application of the discriminatory effect (sometimes called the disparate impact) analysis, and that under this analysis plaintiffs have established a violation of section 3604(f). ... The private defendants' argument that the statute only reaches special restrictive covenants that specifically prohibit the sale or rental of a dwelling to handicapped individuals is thus without merit. ... The Court concludes that the private defendants discriminated against plaintiffs under the definition of "discrimination" set forth in section 3604(f)(3)(B). ... A reasonable accommodation would have been not to seek enforcement of the covenant. Such an accommodation would not impose an undue financial or administrative burden on the private defendants, nor would it undermine the basic purpose behind the practice of enforcement, namely, to maintain the residential nature of the neighborhood.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of disability, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in generally applicable housing rules when necessary to provide an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis · filed 1996-02-23(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

The Act prohibits the City from making a dwelling unavailable to handicapped people on the basis of their handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). In fact, the Act requires the City to make reasonable accommodations in its generally applicable zoning ordinances when necessary to give a handicapped person "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 1993). ... Also, the City did not fail to accommodate the Oxford Houses as the Act requires. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). The Oxford Houses want the City to let them operate with more than eight residents. The City has consistently said it cannot make an exception to the zoning code unless the Oxford Houses apply to the City's Board of Adjustments for a variance, see St. Louis, Mo., Rev. Code tit. 26, § 26.84.050(D) (1994), and the Oxford Houses refuse to apply. Their refusal is fatal to their reasonable accommodation claim. ... Thus, the Oxford Houses must apply if they want the City to accommodate them. We express no opinion about whether the Fair Housing Act would require the City to grant variances for the Oxford Houses if they apply.

Section 3604(f)(3) requires reasonable accommodations for a person with a disability when necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, but does not require alleviating economic disadvantages by waiving financial requirements.

Daniels v. Brooklyn Estates & Properties Realty · filed 2011-03-15(f)(3)

To the extent he faults Gregan for not affording him a reasonable accommodation from the financial requirements applicable to prospective tenants, the claim fails under Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d. Cir. 1998), which observed that the Fair Housing Act “addresses the accommodation of handicaps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages that may be correlated with having handicaps,” id. at 301. ... Consequently, as in Salute, the accommodation Daniels seeks “is not ‘necessary’ to afford handicapped persons ‘equal opportunity’ to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d at 301 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a renter’s handicap, and a requested disability accommodation must be reasonable.

Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co. · filed 2011-09-30(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), it is unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter, [or of] a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available.” ... While Plaintiffs made a request for special accommodations, the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs’ requested accommodation was reasonable.

Under the Fair Housing Act, an accommodation claim requires the plaintiff to identify a disability and explain how the defendant’s actions affected him more than other residents because of that disability.

Hopkins v. Springfield Housing Authority · filed 2012-07-02(f)(3)(B)

But as the district court noted, under the FHA both an accommodation claim and a disparate-impact claim required Hopkins to identify a disability and explain how SHA’s actions affected him more than other residents because of that disability.

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) bars making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of disability, while §§ 3604(f)(2)(B) and (f)(3)(B) prohibit disability discrimination in rental terms or services and require reasonable accommodations when necessary for equal use and enjoyment.

Harden v. CPLC Estancia LLC · filed 2020-01-21(f)(1)(B), (f)(2)(B), (f)(3)(B)

To the extent the FAC alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B), that claim is easily rejected. This provision of the FHAA “forbids discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, which includes making unavailable or denying a dwelling to a buyer or renter ‘because of a handicap of . . . a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made available.’” Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Here, Harden doesn’t allege that Defendants refused to allow her to rent an apartment due to her disability—instead, she alleges they gave her the wrong apartment. Section 3604(f)(1)(B) doesn’t apply in this circumstance. ... Whether the FAC has plausibly alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(B), which prohibits discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap,” is a closer question. As used in this provision, discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... However, as for the fourth element, the FAC fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest the requested accommodation was reasonable.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats a landlord's denial of a necessary reasonable accommodation as disability discrimination.

WESTFIELD SENIOR CITIZENS HOUSING CORP. VS. PATRICIA LYTELL (LT-002242-19, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-09-28(f)(3)(B)

Discrimination under the FHA includes a landlord's denial of a tenant's request for a reasonable accommodation when such an accommodation is necessary to afford the tenant the ability to use and enjoy the rental unit equal to that of any other tenant. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); U.S. v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). ... Here, the judge correctly concluded defendant failed to demonstrate how the requested reasonable accommodation—mental health services and treatment—was necessary to provide defendant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her unit. As the judge noted, it was beyond plaintiff's role as a landlord to provide or compel mental health services to address defendant's disability and the condition of her apartment. ... Pursuant to the fifth Douglas factor, we find no evidence plaintiff refused to accommodate defendant. The only evidence of a refusal was plaintiff's denial of indefinite additional time to clean defendant's apartment. However, defendant had several years from the 2011 settlement to remedy the problem. Under the circumstances of this case, granting defendant more time would negatively affect other tenants' rights and safety.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination in housing to show that the housing provider failed to accommodate the disability or denied services because of it.

Ortega v. Samaritan Village Myrtle Ave. Men's Shelter · filed 2020-11-23(f)(3)(B)

These allegations are insufficient to state claims under the ADA or the FHA, because plaintiff has not shown that he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, see 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (describing the provisions of the ADA), or that that the New York City Department of Homeless Services discriminated against him or failed to accommodate an alleged disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (describing disability discrimination under the FHA). Plaintiff asserts that only the “Skyway” shelter is an appropriate placement to manage his alleged disabilities, but he has not shown that his current housing has failed to accommodate his disabilities or denied him any services because of his disability. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the ADA or the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations to rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Payne v. City of San Antonio, Texas · filed 2021-02-04(f)(3)(B)

Under the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), “a public entity engages in a discriminatory practice if it refuses to make a ‘reasonable accommodation’ to ‘rules, policies, practices or services when such accommodation may be necessary to afford [a disabled person] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’” Providence Behavioral Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). “Reasonable accommodation claims under the FHA . . . require that a reasonable accommodation be provided to the plaintiffs if necessary to allow the plaintiffs to have usage and enjoyment in a facility equivalent to individuals who are not disabled.” Id. ... The undersigned agrees that Plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to identify the disability at issue. ... Plaintiffs therefore fail to state a claim for disability discrimination or a failure to accommodate a disability.

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) prohibits disability discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, and § 3604(f)(3) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.

CARTER v. MURRAY · filed 2021-09-14(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)

To state a reasonable accommodation discrimination claim under the FHAA, the plaintiff must plead facts showing: (1) accommodations are necessary to afford him equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; and (2) the defendant refused to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services. ... On the face of the complaint, it is apparent the defendants addressed his requests, and he has not plead facts plausibly alleging that the defendants failed to accommodate him. ... Accordingly, Carter’s disability discrimination claim under § 3604(f)(2)(A) is not plausible and will be dismissed without prejudice.