42 U.S.C. § 3604

Section 3604 can be violated when rental decisions produce significant discriminatory effects, although the applicable evidentiary standard was left for a developed record.

Halet v. Wend Investment Co. · filed 1982-03-26

Significant discriminatory effects flowing from rental decisions may be sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Fair Housing Act. ... As these cases show, the circuits have applied different standards in determining how important a discriminatory effect is in proving a Fair Housing Act violation. We prefer to address the issue of which standard should apply when it is presented in the context of a fully-developed record. ... Halet has made sufficient allegations to state a cause of action under the Act.

Section 3604(a) prohibits a city from making housing unavailable because of race, including by blocking a housing proposal to exclude Black residents.

United States v. City of Birmingham, Mich. · filed 1982-05-27(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that, by acting to block the Baldwin House proposal, in part because of its desire to exclude black people from the City, Birmingham made housing unavailable to certain individuals on the basis of their race in violation of § 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) prohibits a municipality from making housing unavailable or denying a dwelling because of race, including by intentionally blocking a proposed housing development.

United States v. City of Birmingham, Michigan · filed 1984-02-08(a)

This fair housing case was filed by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice against the City of Birmingham, Michigan, charging that the City had prevented the development of racially integrated low-income senior citizen and family housing by Baldwin House, a private corporation, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) and 3617. ... We further conclude that the district court did not err in holding that the City acted with discriminatory intent in blocking the Baldwin House proposal. ... In the present case we conclude that the district court did not err in deciding that the totality of circumstances establishes that the City of Birmingham blocked development of Baldwin House with racially discriminatory intent.

Section 3604(a) requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant denied or made housing unavailable because of race; a neutral ordinance limiting dogs does not satisfy those requirements merely because it affects minority plaintiffs.

Koorn v. Township · filed 2003-10-17(a)

As such, the enactment and enforcement of the Ordinance does not violate the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of religion or another protected characteristic, including through discriminatory zoning restrictions.

Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona · filed 2017-12-07(a)

The Act itself make it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable ... a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... “The phrase ‘otherwise make unavailable’ has been interpreted to reach a wide variety of discriminatory housing practices, including discriminatory zoning restrictions.” ... Plaintiffs have proven that their intended purpose was to thwart the development of the rabbinical college because it was proposed by Orthodox/Hasidic Jews. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

Section 3604(a) reaches actors who directly affect the availability of housing, including those who own, dispose of, or practically assist in transactions involving property.

Henderson v. Vision Property Management, LLC · filed 2021-08-23(a)

Given the Sixth Circuit’s broad interpretation, the Court finds Atalaya and ACM’s alleged conduct falls within § 3604(a). Specific to Atalaya, Plaintiffs allege ... This is sufficient to allege that Atalaya was “an actor who directly affect[ed] the availability of housing.” ... Specific to ACM, Plaintiffs allege that ACM “held legal title to properties acquired through Vision’s discriminatory bulk sales practice and acquired for Vision’s predatory LOP scheme targeting Black communities.” ... This is also sufficient to allege that ACM “owned or disposed of property” under § 3604.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race, and an agent’s violation may be imputed to the brokerage.

Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc. · filed 1983-11-30(a)

However, eight acts of agents making unavailable a dwelling because of race have been established and imputed to Hilltop. Each is declared to violate section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) supports a housing discrimination claim based on a racially motivated firebombing of a home.

Byrd v. Brandeburg · filed 1996-03-18(a)

This Court finds that, under all of the undisputed facts in this case, the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their claims under § 1982, § 3617 and § 3604(a).

Section 3604 prohibits a municipality from discriminatorily interfering with an organization's effort to construct low-income housing.

Smith v. Town Of Clarkton · filed 1982-06-29

It is axiomatic that a municipality cannot construct housing and then operate it in an illegally discriminatory manner, Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973), and it is just as clear that a municipality cannot discriminatorily interfere with a private organization's effort to construct low income housing. Arlington Heights, supra; Kennedy Park Homes v. City of Lackawanna, supra.

Section 3604 bars a municipality from discriminatorily interfering with a private organization’s effort to construct low-income housing.

Smith v. Town of Clarkton · filed 1982-06-29

Reviewing the evidence in this case, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that racial discrimination of precisely the type condemned by both the Fair Housing Act and the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause controlled Clarkton’s consideration of low-income housing.

Section 3604(f)(1) permits a claim when a municipality discriminatorily interferes with financing needed to make housing available to people with disabilities.

San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1998-11-06(f)(1)

The allegation here is not that the City violated the Act by failing to approve the ACOF loan, but that it improperly interfered with the loan ACOF needed to purchase the Fentises' property. ... Because we read their complaint to allege discriminatory conduct, we hold that the Fentises state a claim under the Act.

Section 3604(b) allows a landlord to reject a rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, such as insufficient information to verify rental history.

Peek v. Pines Apartment LLP · filed 2017-09-30(b)

Accordingly, defendants have submitted admissible evidence supporting a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the rejection of plaintiffs’ housing application—plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient information for The Pines to verify a satisfactory rental history pursuant to the requirements of the screening criteria.

Section 3604(d) prohibits misrepresenting that a dwelling is unavailable when it is available if the representation is made because of race.

Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc. · filed 1982-12-08(d)

Thus, to establish a cause of action under Title VIII, a party must prove that he or she was discriminated against because of race.

Section 3604(d) prohibits representing that a dwelling is unavailable because of race when it is actually available.

Blockman v. Sandalwood Apartments · filed 1980-01-10(d)

Although there is a dispute about the facts of this case, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's finding of racial discrimination against Blockman. ... 42 U.S.C. § 3604 makes it unlawful: (d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.

Section 3604(a) bars discriminatory actions that affect the availability of housing, but it does not protect intangible interests in property that plaintiffs already own.

Southend Neighborhood Improvement Association v. County of St. Clair · filed 1984-09-17(a)

We hold that the County’s actions here could not have affected the availability of housing in a manner implicating Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act. Section 3604(a) is designed to ensure that no one is denied the right to live where they choose for discriminatory reasons, but it does not protect the intangible interests in the already-owned property raised by the plaintiffs allegations.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discriminatory conduct affecting the availability of housing, but does not cover discrimination in financing an already-owned home.

Evans v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana · filed 1987-09-18(a)

Because their allegations concern the availability of additional financing, and not the availability of housing, the court finds that section 3604 is not implicated by plaintiffs’ complaint. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under section 3604.

Section 3604(b) permits a Fair Housing Act claim based on a housing policy's disproportionate adverse impact on the minority individuals subject to the policy, without requiring proof of continuing or community-wide segregation effects.

Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates · filed 1984-06-18(b)

In order to prevail in a discriminatory impact case under Title VIII, plaintiffs, members of a discrete minority, are required to prove only that a given policy had a discriminatory impact on them as individuals. ... Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs are not required to show a discriminatory impact on anyone but the existing minority residents of Building Three.

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of the handicap of a person who will reside there, and the court treated a discriminatory effect on handicapped persons’ housing choices as actionable even without discriminatory intent, subject to its compelling-interest analysis.

Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul · filed 1990-01-18(f)(1)(B)

Their support for this position comes from 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). That section prohibits discrimination due to the handicap of “a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available.” ... A law enacted without discriminatory intent may still be invalid if it has a disparate impact on a protected group. ... Therefore, the law does, on its face, have the effect of limiting the housing choices of the handicapped. ... However, they do have the effect of making housing for the handicapped unavailable. This discriminatory effect is permissible, however, because the laws are narrowly drawn to promote a compelling governmental interest.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a racially discriminatory effect can establish a prima facie violation, subject to the defendant's non-discriminatory justifications.

Keith v. Volpe · filed 1985-09-03(a)

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by demonstrating racially discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that non-discriminatory reasons justify its conduct. ... If the defendant offers no valid non-discriminatory reason for its actions, then the plaintiff has succeeded in proving a Title VIII violation. If the defendant does offer valid non-discriminatory reasons, the court must determine whether they are substantial enough to justify the racially discriminatory effect. ... In conclusion, none of Hawthorne’s purported justifications are legitimate. Because the plaintiffs and intervenors have established a prima facie case and Hawthorne has failed to rebut it, the court finds that Hawthorne has violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604(a) permits a prima facie housing-discrimination claim based on discriminatory effect without proof of discriminatory intent.

Huntington Branch National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of Huntington · filed 1987-09-09(a)

“that discriminatory impact is the appropriate standard by which to determine whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under § 3604(a).”

Section 3604 prohibits housing rules enacted with discriminatory purpose or causing a disparate impact on a statutorily protected class.

Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assoc. · filed 1996-06-19

Because Ng did not present sufficient evidence that the two challenged rules were enacted with a discriminatory purpose, or that they had a disparate impact on a statutorily-protected class, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants on Ng's Fair Housing Act claims. See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 813 (1989).

Section 3604(b) permits disparate-impact liability for housing practices, using a burden-shifting framework under which liability requires proof that the stated business reason is pretextual or that a less discriminatory alternative would serve the same goal.

Graoch Associates 33, L. P. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations Commission · filed 2007-11-21(b)

Moreover, the FHA does not impose liability based solely on the existence of a disparate impact. It imposes liability only when a plaintiff can meet the ultimate burden of persuasion by showing either that the landlord’s business reason for a practice is a pretext for discrimination or that an alternative practice would serve the same business goal with less discriminatory effect.

Section 3604 requires a disparate-impact plaintiff to show that a facially neutral policy actually or predictably causes under-representation of families with children in housing relative to the general population.

Khalil v. Farash Corp. · filed 2006-09-21(a) and (b)

Finally, I note that to establish a disparate-impact claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, plaintiffs must demonstrate that a facially neutral policy actually or predictably leads to under-representation of families with children in the housing relative to the general population.

A disparate-impact claim under § 3604 requires a significantly greater discriminatory impact on members of a protected class; equal treatment of all tenants does not satisfy that requirement.

Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood Housing, LLC · filed 2007-07-13

However, as the district court noted, the building is closed to all potential tenants. In other words, members of classes protected under the FHA are being treated the same as everyone else. Therefore, all tenants were equally affected by the closure and there is no “significantly greater discriminatory impact on members of a protected class.”

Section 3604 permits disparate-impact housing-discrimination claims and prohibits housing advertisements that communicate a race-based preference; notifying applicants of a local residency preference does not violate subsection (c) absent a communicated racial preference.

Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority · filed 2002-11-27(a)-(c)

Moreover, there is no question that Fair Housing Act claims may rest on a disparate impact theory of discrimination. ... However, even taking these affidavits at face value and accepting that notice of the residency preference in fact dissuaded some applicants of color from applying to the various PHAs because of the residency preference, I cannot agree that the advertisements and announcements at issue here, simply by notifying applicants of the residency preference, communicated a race-based preference. That they communicated a preference is beyond question, but that preference, as is by now crystal clear, is for local residents of the PHAs’ communities.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on discriminatory intent or discriminatory effects, but it does not require municipalities to approve every affordable or minority housing project.

Macone v. Wakefield, Town of · filed 2002-01-10

We begin by noting that the Federal Fair Housing Act certainly imposes no affirmative obligation on municipalities to approve all proposed affordable or minority housing projects.

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged housing action or practice was motivated by discriminatory purpose or had a discriminatory impact to establish a prima facie discrimination case.

Wadley v. Park at Landmark LP · filed 2008-02-12(b)

“To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA, Wadley must demonstrate that either the housing action or practice being challenged was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or had a discriminatory impact.”

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact challenges to housing policies, but the plaintiff must identify a policy or practice causing the discriminatory effect; a one-time decision is insufficient.

Mabry v. City of East Chicago · filed 2021-10-20(a)

However, a multi-decade scheme involving a series of decisions by many different actors is not the sort of zoning law or housing restriction the FHA is intended to address. ... Plaintiffs have only identified individual decisions, not a policy or policies to which they attribute the statistical disparity, and have therefore failed to state a claim for disparate impact under the FHA.

Section 3604 prohibits housing development policies that perpetuate racial segregation or disproportionately harm minority groups, even if the policies are neutral on their face.

Broadway Triangle Community Coalition v. Bloomberg · filed 2011-12-23(a)

However, it is well established that race neutral policies violate the Fair Housing Act if racial segregation is perpetuated or if a minority group or groups are adversely impacted. ... In light of the above, plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Fair Housing Act claim.

Section 3604 permits a discriminatory impact claim against a municipality, but the plaintiff must present evidence of an actual or predictable racial effect.

Thomas J. MacOne and Frank Bramante, Trustees of Bramac Development Trust v. Town of Wakefield · filed 2002-01-10

Appellants argue that the Board’s rescission of its support for the Hillview Estates project has a discriminatory impact. However, we find that appellants provide no evidence and can only speculate about any such impact. Therefore, we hold that they fail to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory impact.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race, including conduct that has a discriminatory effect on a reasonable housing seeker and is intended to steer.

Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc. · filed 1985-10-02(a)

The District Court was correct in holding that to violate Sec. 3604(a), one looks to whether the statement or conduct would have an untoward effect on a reasonable person under the circumstances who is seeking housing, and behind the statement or conduct to the intent of the agent. If a statement or act would have a discriminatory effect and is made with the intent to steer, it violates Sec. 3604(a).

Under § 3604, discriminatory effect is evidence of a violation, but liability for racial steering requires race-based different treatment or an inference of it rather than effect alone.

Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi · filed 1990-03-02(a), (b)

But discriminatory effect is not, as the challenged instruction conveyed, the violation; it is merely evidence of violation.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable, denying it, or refusing to negotiate for its sale or rental because of race; racial steering and disparate treatment of similarly situated home seekers violate that prohibition.

City Of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Incorporated · filed 1993-01-25(a)

Compensatory damages are an appropriate remedy under both Sections 1982 and 3604. Given the facts of this case, the magistrate judge properly held all the defendants liable for compensatory damages. The individual agent defendants--King, Munoz, Scarpiniti, and Walker--all engaged in racial steering. The facts demonstrate that the four agents treated the black testers worse than the white testers. The magistrate judge's conclusion that this different treatment was because of race is amply supported by the record. Matchmaker agents King, Munoz, Scarpiniti, and Walker consistently steered white testers toward white areas and black testers toward black areas. The four agents also denied the black testers information about housing that they readily gave to similarly situated white testers. We agree with the magistrate judge's conclusion that the individual agents violated the testers rights under Sections 1982 and 3604.

Section 3604(a) prohibits racial steering by real estate brokers and multiple listing services.

Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc. · filed 1976-11-22(a)

The tactics of “racial steering” as described in paragraphs 37 to 40 of the amended complaint constitute, in the view of this Court, a clear violation of § 3604(a).

Section 3604 prohibits racial steering in the sale or rental of real estate.

Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty · filed 1979-12-28

Racial steering in the sale or rental of real estate is a violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

Section 3604 reaches racial steering when a broker offers an apartment to a White renter but withholds it from a similarly situated Black renter, even though neither asked about that neighborhood.

Cabrera v. Jakabovitz · filed 1994-05-05

One of these devices is to offer to show apartments in predominantly White neighborhoods to prospective renters who are White, even if these renters do not express any interest in those neighborhoods. By so doing, the landlord can increase the chances of renting those apartments to White tenants. Breitman’s crabbed reading of the statute would effectively immunize this mechanism for racial steering from judicial scrutiny.

Section 3604(a) bars practices that make a dwelling unavailable or deny it because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and reaches practices that have the effect of making housing harder to obtain on those grounds.

United States v. Yonkers Board of Education · filed 1985-11-20(a)

Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits practices which "make unavailable or deny ... a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). In keeping with the broad purposes of the Fair Housing Act, § 804(a) has been construed to reach “every practice which has the effect of making housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds."

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent, otherwise make unavailable, or deny a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the provision is construed broadly enough that allegations of discriminatory interference with housing development state a cause of action.

Bendetson v. Payson · filed 1982-03-15(a)

Giving broad construction to the expressed Congressional intent “to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States”, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, the plaintiffs’ allegations do state a cause of action upon which they may recover.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race, and liability follows when race played a part even if it was not the sole reason.

Shaw v. Cassar · filed 1983-01-07(a)

Racial animus need not have been the sole reason for the eviction; defendants are liable so long as race played a part in their decision.

Section 3604(a) reaches discriminatory practices that directly affect housing availability, while § 3604(b) covers discriminatory services connected with a dwelling sale or rental and § 3604(d) bars misrepresenting housing availability.

Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n · filed 1987-11-23(a), (b), and (d)

Courts have characterized this general, catchall language to be “as broad as Congress could have made it,” ... Thus, although section 3604(a) applies principally to the sale or rental of dwellings, it also encompasses a wide variety of discriminatory practices that affect detrimentally the availability of housing to minorities and thereby make housing more difficult to obtain. ... Despite the broad scope of the section, however, courts still have insisted upon a showing that the discriminatory action directly affected the availability of housing. ... This court concludes, as a matter of law, that BAPA’s activities could not have affected the availability of housing in a manner implicating section 3604(a). ... First, because BAPA personnel fully informed those visiting the Center that BAPA did not provide comprehensive housing information, BAPA’s denying the plaintiffs access to limited housing information could not have amounted to representing that available housing was “unavailable.” Moreover, if the plaintiffs are alleging that BAPA personnel affirmatively misrepresented the availability of certain dwellings, this claim is clearly contradicted by the plaintiffs’ own affidavits, which demonstrate that BAPA personnel never made such misrepresentations. ... As stated earlier, however, BAPA’s role in supplying voluntarily and without charge limited housing information regarding nontraditional moves is too far removed from transactions in the commercial residential market to be considered services “in connection” with the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of a handicap of the buyer, an intended resident, or a person associated with the buyer.

Oak Ridge Care Center v. Racine County, Wis. · filed 1995-08-11(f)(1)

Under the statute, it is illegal To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of— (A) that buyer or renter, (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). Under subsection c, the defendant must make the plaintiff's property unavailable and the plaintiff's association with a handicapped group must cause that unavailability. The phrase "to otherwise make unavailable or deny" includes exclusionary zoning decisions. See Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1984).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable to people with disabilities through enforcement of a neutral restrictive covenant that would bar their occupancy.

Board of Managers v. Rios · filed 1995-06-27(f)(1)

the court concludes that the restrictive covenant, although neutral and not specific, cannot be equitably enforced so as to prohibit the sale of a condominium unit to an entity such as Concern for Mental Health for use and occupancy by mentally or developmentally disabled or handicapped individuals.

Section 3604(a) can reach predatory lending practices that make housing unavailable by putting borrowers at risk of losing the property securing their loans.

Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp. · filed 2000-09-29(a)

The predatory practices alleged can make housing unavailable by putting borrowers at risk of losing the property which secures their loans.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, or otherwise making unavailable, a dwelling because of race, and the court treated sufficiently severe or pervasive race-based housing harassment as actionable.

Smith v. Mission Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 2002-10-04(a)

To establish a claim of hostile housing environment, plaintiffs need to show that the “offensive behavior unreasonably interfere[d] with [the] use and enjoyment of the premises.” ... As with a Title VII hostile work claim, actionable harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the housing arrangement.” ... To establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show that 1) they were members of a racial minority, 2) that they applied for and were qualified to rent an apartment at Heritage Hills, 3) that they were denied the opportunity to rent, inspect or negotiate for an apartment at Heritage Hills and 4) the housing .opportunity remained available.

Section 3604(a)’s “otherwise make unavailable” language reaches discriminatory government interference that makes it more difficult for protected-class purchasers to develop and move into homes.

Lynn v. Village of Pomona · filed 2005-06-10(a)

Consequently, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claim that defendants intentionally made it more difficult for and interfered with the ability of their minority purchasers to develop and move into homes in High Gate Estates falls within the meaning of “otherwise make unavailable” and therefore within the ambit of § 3604(a) of the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of national origin, including by posting closure notices intended to get tenants to leave.

2922 Sherman Avenue Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-04-14(a)

The FHA prohibits making housing “unavailable” on the basis of national origin. Although the District never forcibly removed the tenants of 2922 Sherman Avenue and 1458 Columbia Road from their apartments, it did post closure notices on both buildings for the purpose of, according to one city witness, “get[ting] the tenants to leave.” Trial Tr. 221, Apr. 13, 2005. The notice posted at 1458 Columbia Road stated that “by order of the housing regulation administration this structure is declared unfit for human habitation and its occupancy and/or use is hereby prohibited.” J.A. 417. The Sherman Avenue tenants received a similar notice warning that their building was “unfit for human habitation” and advising them “to seek alternative housing accommodations.” Id. at 409. Telling the tenants either that their “occupancy . . . is . . . prohibited” or that they must “seek alternative housing” certainly qualifies as making the buildings “unavailable” under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) can reach racially motivated arson that makes housing unavailable, even outside traditional housing-discrimination claims.

Antonio v. SECURITY SERVICES OF AMERICA, LLC · filed 2010-03-31(a)

In light of this clear precedent supporting the application of the FHA to a racially motivated arson, the Court believes there is a cognizable basis to conclude the FHA applies to this case. Accordingly, the Court will deny summary judgment to Individual Defendants Speed, Everhart, and McCann as to the applicability of the FHA.

Section 3604(a)'s prohibition on making housing unavailable can cover conduct that causes existing occupants to lose access to or be unable to inhabit their homes, including a racially discriminatory disaster-recovery grant formula.

Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 2010-09-07(a)

The scope of the “otherwise make unavailable or deny” language is not entirely clear. ... And the D.C. Circuit has made clear that “make unavailable” means not just preventing access to new housing by prospective buyers and renters but also the loss of housing to those who already occupy it. ... The claim here rests not on a reduction in property values or a limit on the growth of a residential area but on the inability of homeowners to inhabit their houses because of a Road Home Program formula. Consequently, the Court shall not dismiss plaintiffs’ FHA claim pursuant to section 3604(a) against Keegan.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it, because of race, and reaches zoning decisions that effectively prohibit housing construction.

Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, GA · filed 2006-10-12(a)

The FHA prohibits the “refus[al] to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). In order to prevail on a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate “unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing.” Jackson v. Okaloosa County Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994). Housing may become unavailable within the meaning of the FHA as a result of zoning decisions that effectively prohibit the construction of housing. Id. at 1542 n.17.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of national origin.

Rivera v. Incorporated Village of Farmingdale · filed 2008-07-08(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful to refuse to rent, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person on the basis of national origin with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of a person's disability, including when refusing a reasonable accommodation effectively forces the person to leave.

Castillo Condominium Ass'n v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2016-05-02(f)(1)

The Secretary's decision ultimately rests on his determination that the Association violated the Act. Though the proof is conflicted at several points, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Secretary's finding that the Association's refusal to allow Giménez to keep an emotional support dog in his condominium unit as a reasonable accommodation for his disability was unlawful. That refusal made Giménez's home unavailable to him as a practical matter and, thus, violated the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).

Section 3604(a) reaches post-acquisition discriminatory conduct that makes housing unavailable, including threats or attempts to evict, and § 3604(b) applies the same direct-or-circumstantial-evidence and McDonnell Douglas framework to discrimination claims.

Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2022-03-23(a) and (b)

Rather, in Cox the Fifth Circuit clarified that when proceeding under § 3604(a)’s “otherwise make unavailable” language, there is a distinction between availability and mere habitability, the latter of which § 3604(a) generally does not protect. ... Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims that the Defendants attempted to evict the Treeces using the occupancy limits and subsequent harassment fall within the protections of § 3604(a). ... As with claims under § 3604(a), a plaintiff bringing a claim under § 3604(b) can provide direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, and, if the plaintiff provides the latter, the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis explained above applies.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race or another protected characteristic, and a policy can violate the statute when its effects make housing unavailable even without a foreclosure or paid penalties.

Pickett v. City of Cleveland · filed 2023-09-30(a)

In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) provides that it shall be unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” (emphasis added.) ... Therefore, the court need not meticulously examine each class member’s factual background to determine whether they suffered a municipal foreclosure or some other form of individualized damages because the mere assessment of the water lien on their property makes has the effect of making housing unavailable to them within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and thereby allows them to pursue an action under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) reaches public and private practices that make housing more difficult to obtain because of a protected characteristic.

United States v. Housing Authority of City of Chickasaw · filed 1980-03-07(a)

This provision is as broad as Congress could have made it and it reaches every private and public practice that makes housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits disability-based rental conditions that make housing harder to obtain, even when a landlord does not formally deny an application.

Sanders v. SWS Hilltop, LLC · filed 2018-02-16(f)(1)

The issue of whether Defendants formally denied Plaintiffs' application is therefore immaterial and Defendants' self-described conduct falls comfortably within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).

Section 3604(a) can reach discriminatory statements that cause a resident to leave her home.

Inland Mediation Board v. City of Pomona · filed 2001-08-23(a)

Plaintiff Cross has provided direct evidence of discrimination, as well as evidence that she subsequently resigned from her resident manager position and moved away from Pomona as a result of Keagy’s statements. This raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants made housing “otherwise unavailable” to Cross.

Section 3604 permits imputing a real estate sales or rental agent’s discriminatory acts to the property owner when they are within the agent’s apparent authority, even without the owner’s specific authorization.

Ruth Coates and Bennie Coates v. Bechtel · filed 1987-02-02

As a matter of well-settled agency law, a principal may be held liable for the discriminatory acts of his agent if such acts are within the scope of the agent’s apparent authority, even if the principal neither authorized nor ratified the acts. In cases of racial discrimination in housing under both 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, the courts have imputed the wrongful acts of a real estate sales or rental agent to the property owner he is representing regardless of whether the owner specifically authorized the agent to engage in racial discrimination.

The Fair Housing Act allows a landlord to be held liable under respondeat superior for discriminatory racial steering by a real-estate broker acting as the landlord's agent.

Cabrera v. Jakabovitz · filed 1994-05-05

In order to avoid predicating liability for Title VIII violations on the vagaries of state law, the question whether an agency relationship exists for purposes of the Fair Housing Act is determined under federal law. ... Because we decide that the landlords are liable for AM Realty's discrimination under traditional doctrines of respondeat superior, we do not need to consider whether they might also be liable because landlords may have a nondelegable duty not to discriminate.

Section 3604 permits a housing-discrimination claim based on a landlord’s agent’s discriminatory conduct when the evidence supports an agency relationship.

Marya v. Slakey · filed 2001-11-20(a) and (c)

It is well established that a principal is liable for the wrongful acts of his or her agent in FHA housing discrimination claims. ... In this case, the Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence of the conduct of Slakey and Norris from which a reasonable jury could find the existence of an agency under Arora’s FHA and CRA claims. ... Thus, the Court cannot conclude that the evidence is clearly insufficient to establish the existence of an agency relationship between Slakey and Norris.

Section 3604(b) is violated when race-based quota practices give eligible applicants less favorable treatment in rental privileges, even without an outright or permanent denial of an apartment.

Williamsburg Fair Housing Committee v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1980-07-14(b)

An applicant need not actually be “denied” a rental.

Section 3604 bars discriminatory denial or nonrenewal of insurance when it effectively makes housing unavailable because of race, regardless of the applicant's race.

United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. v. Metropolitan Human Relations Commission · filed 1994-05-23(a)

The federal Fair Housing Act applies to the discriminatory denial of insurance as well as the discriminatory refusal to renew insurance that effectively precludes ownership of housing on the basis of race, regardless of the race of the applicant.

Section 3604(a) applies to insurance redlining that denies homeowners insurance because of race.

McDiarmid v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1984-08-01(a)

Third, this Court, like Judge Rubin in Dunn, will defer to the opinion of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the governmental agency responsible for both drafting the regulation and enforcing the law in question, which was to the effect that § 804(a) was applicable to insurance redlining.

Section 3604 does not prohibit a city from changing a parcel's land-use designation from a commercial classification that bars residential development to an intermediate-density residential classification that permits it.

Litton International Development Corp. v. City of Simi Valley · filed 1985-07-05

there is no conceivable way the City could have violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, by changing a parcel’s land use designation as the City did here from General Commercial which did not allow residential development to Intermediate Density residential which does.

Section 3604(f)(1) and (2) can reach discriminatory zoning or land-use practices affecting a disabled person’s housing, including an existing resident, but a neutral setback ordinance generally applied and nondiscriminatorily enforced does not violate the statute.

Robinson v. City of Friendswood · filed 1995-02-16(f)(1) and (2)

Although this Court concurs with the City that the FHAA addresses discrimination against the handicapped in obtaining housing, even if it applies to individuals already in residence in the community, Plaintiff has failed to show that the City violated its provisions. ... The disputed zoning ordinance, requiring a twenty-five-foot setback from the front property line of all structures for residential use in the City, is neutral on its face and applies generally to all residences of the City. Nor was it applied to Plaintiff in a discriminatory manner. ... Accordingly the Court concludes that summary judgment under the FHAA should be granted to the City.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race, color, or national origin, reaches discriminatory zoning, and supports both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact liability.

Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau · filed 2016-03-23(a)

Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act, also known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act .of 1968, makes it unlawful “,[t]o refuse to' sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, ... or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... For this reason Sections 804(a) and 805(a) of the FELA provide for both discriminatory intent and disparate-impact liability. ... (3) We further hold that the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Garden City’s decision to abandon R-M zoning in favor of R-T zoning was made with discriminatory intent, and that Defendants failed to demonstrate they would have made the same decision absent discriminatory considerations. Thus, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court insofar as it found Plaintiffs had established liability under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the FHA based on a theory of disparate treatment.

Section 3604 can cover claims that exclusionary zoning practices make housing unavailable to a protected group.

Highview Properties D.H.F. Inc. v. Town of Monroe · filed 2022-06-09

Accordingly, the Court construes Highview to assert claims 8 and 9 under the FHA, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 3604 based on the facts alleged.

Section 804(a) prohibits refusing to rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of religion; the court held that exclusion based on not belonging to the project’s targeted group was not religious discrimination.

Knutzen v. Nelson · filed 1985-09-20(a)

Therefore, any discrimination based on religion was not the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs’ exclusion from the Tabor Apartments.

Section 3604(a)'s protection against religious discrimination does not extend to religious practices that are criminal and not entitled to First Amendment protection.

Barlow v. Evans · filed 1997-06-16(a)

Therefore, under the present state of the law, the court finds that the term “religion” in the FHA does not include religious practices that are both against the criminal law and not entitled to First Amendment protection.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent a dwelling because of a person's religion.

Snyder v. Bazargani · filed 2007-06-22(a)

Moreover, the judgment does not rest solely on this finding. The jury also concluded that Dr. Bazargani personally “decline[d] to rent the condominium to plaintiffs because of their religious affiliation,” id., which is an independent violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), and the PHRA, 43 P.S. 955(h)(1).

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale of a dwelling, and the Fair Housing Act does not cover a commercial motel that is not occupied, designed, or intended as a residence.

Patel v. Holley House Motels · filed 1979-12-03

The Palms Motel is a commercial “public accommodation” owned and operated by Holley House Motels.

Section 3604(b) does not reach a detention facility because a jail is not a dwelling within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act.

Garcia v. Condarco · filed 2000-09-26(b)

For all of the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the Hobbs City Jail is not a “dwelling” within in the meaning of the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits handicap discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental, so its protection does not extend to a transient bed-and-breakfast that is not a statutory “dwelling.”

Schneider v. County of Will, State of Illinois · filed 2002-03-14(f)(2)(A)

The proposed bed and breakfast does not fit within the FHA definition of “dwelling.”

Section 3604(f)(1) reaches handicap discrimination involving a dwelling, and a drug- and alcohol-treatment facility may qualify as a dwelling when intended for significant stays and treated as a home.

Lakeside Resort Enterprises, LP v. Board of Supervisors of Palmyra Township · filed 2006-08-31(f)(1)

Because the Lakeside facility was intended to house persons for a significant period of time and because those persons would have viewed it as their home during that time, we hold that it is a dwelling under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, and vacant undeveloped land intended for residences can qualify as a dwelling even if it is not suitably zoned.

Garvey Farm LP v. City of Elsmere, Kentucky · filed 2023-05-26(b)

Available case law, although merely persuasive, supports a finding that vacant land may be considered a “dwelling” under the Fair Housing Act. ... Here, the plaintiffs purchased the vacant property with the intent to establish residences for mobile park customers. ... Regardless, there is no indication that undeveloped land may be considered a “dwelling” under the Fair Housing Act only if the real property is suitably zoned. 42 U.S.C. § 3602; Cf. Lauer Farms, Inc. v. Waushara Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (focusing on the temporary period that potential migrant-worker residents would remain on the property but concluding that the plaintiffs’ § 3604(b) claim survived after the board denied the plaintiffs’ conditional use permit request, despite the property’s vacant, undeveloped characteristics). The property in this matter satisfies the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, so conduct unrelated to a plaintiff’s housing is not actionable under it.

Doe v. University Of Idaho · filed 2024-09-26(a)

The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ implicit assertion that Congress broadly intended the FHA to extend to alleged discriminatory conduct which occurred on-campus and was unrelated to Plaintiffs’ housing. Plaintiffs’ assertion that a “dwelling” means a community is both overbroad and contradicts the FHA. The statute specifically defines “dwelling” to mean “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b). The statute does not include a “community” in this definition.

Section 3604(b) protects against discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling, but does not apply to a homeless shelter that is merely a place of transient accommodation rather than a residence.

Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries · filed 2009-09-10(b)

The court finds that the shelter is neither intended nor designed for occupants who intend to remain there for any significant period of time. ... Accordingly, the court holds that the homeless shelter is not a “dwelling” subject to the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(1) covers a proposed drug and alcohol treatment facility as a dwelling when it is intended for significant stays and residents would treat it as their home.

Lakeside Resort Enterprises, LP v. Board of Sup'rs of Palmyra Tp. · filed 2006-07-20(f)(1)

The Fair Housing Act proscribes discrimination in the sale of a dwelling due to a handicap 5 of those who are to reside in the dwelling after the sale. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... Because the Lakeside facility was intended to house persons for a significant period of time and because those persons would have viewed it as their home during that time, we hold that it is a dwelling under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) permits a citizenship-policy claim to proceed when the policy may be a pretext for national-origin discrimination.

Espinoza v. Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n · filed 1981-09-16(a)

Thus, a material factual issue remains in the present case as to whether Hillwood’s citizenship policy was a pretext for national-origin discrimination.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit housing discrimination based on national origin, and direct evidence of national-origin animus can create a triable issue; claims under subsections (c)-(e) fail without supporting evidence.

Texas v. Crest Asset Management, Inc. · filed 2000-02-29(a) and (b); (c)-(e)

Hence, Texas’s affidavit is sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether Defendants discriminated against him based on his national origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b) and Tex.Prop.Code Ann. § 301.021. Texas, however, has presented no evidence to support a claim under the remaining provisions of § 3604. Thus, because there exist genuine issues of material fact with respect to four of Texas’s housing discrimination claims, summary judgment is not warranted on those claims. Summary judgment is proper, however, on Texas’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)-(e), as Texas has proffered no evidence in support of those claims.

Section 3604(a) prohibits lenders from refusing to make a dwelling available or denying it to a person because of national origin.

Shahin v. Rogan · filed 2015-08-24(a)

Under the ECOA, a creditor may not discriminate against any applicant on the basis of national origin, see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a), and the FHA prohibits lenders from refusing “to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . national origin,” see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... The complaint here does not plausibly indicate that PNC declined1 to provide a loan for any discriminatory reason. ... We thus conclude that the District Court properly determined that the claims of discrimination in violation of the FHA and ECOA did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing rental because of national origin, and a disparate-treatment claim requires evidence that the challenged housing action was motivated by national origin.

Schonton v. MPA Granada Highlands LLC · filed 2020-03-05(b)

Even assuming the affidavits relied upon by Plaintiffs were sufficient, neither provides the critical link indicating that Plaintiffs were denied leases “because of” their national origin as required under the FHA.

Section 3604(b) allows a tenant to state a national origin discrimination claim by alleging that a housing provider denied translation assistance and repairs because of the tenant’s national origin.

Cabrera v. Alvarez · filed 2013-03-27(b)

Interpreting all inferences from these facts in favor of plaintiffs, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have alleged facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility” that defendants violated the terms of plaintiffs’ lease by failing to provide language translation accommodations and failing to remedy the unhabitable conditions of plaintiffs’ rental unit because of plaintiffs’ national origin. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have stated a claim for intentional discrimination on the basis of national origin under the FHA, FEHA, and the Unruh Act.

Section 3604(c) does not apply to a Recorder of Deeds who merely accepts and records deeds containing racially restrictive language, because that ministerial act is not making, printing, or publishing a discriminatory notice with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Woodward v. Bowers · filed 1986-03-25(c)

The Recorder does not know, and does not care what each individual deed says. He has no intent to make specific statements contained in the deed generally known, whether discriminatory or not, nor could he have such intent, for he does not even know of the existence of such statements. The Recorder of Deeds is no more a publisher than is an archivist, a preserver of historic documents. ... After examining the language of § 3604(c), and the limited legislative history of that section, we are forced to draw the conclusion that § 3604(c) does not apply to the acts of the Recorder of Deeds and particularly to the acts of the Recorder in this case.

Section 3604(a) covers discriminatory appraisals that effectively make housing unavailable or deny access to a dwelling, even when the claim is not about refusing a sale or rental.

Hanson v. The Veterans Administration · filed 1986-09-29(a)

The authorities do not support the district court’s conclusion. Courts have consistently given an expansive interpretation to the Fair Housing Act; to state a claim under the Act, it is enough to show that race was a consideration and played some role in a real estate transaction. ... We conclude that section 804(a) does address the claim asserted by appellants. Discriminatory appraisal may effectively prevent blacks from purchasing or selling a home for its fair market value. This interferes with the exercise of rights granted by the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) treats a housing policy that explicitly excludes women and families as facial discrimination, analyzed under a facial-discrimination framework rather than the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test.

Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho · filed 2006-11-08(a)

We hold, contrary to the district court, that the plaintiffs’ gender and familial discrimination claims are properly characterized as claims of facial discrimination and should be analyzed in that framework.

Section 3604(b) requires intentional discrimination to state a claim, including a hostile-housing-environment claim against a landlord.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. · filed 2015-03-16(b)

Fairly read, the text of both Section 3604(b) and Section 3617 of the FHA, and the above-mentioned cases interpreting those statutes, require intentional discrimination on the part of a Defendant in order to state a claim under those provisions.

Section 3604 can be violated by intentional housing discrimination where race, color, or national origin is one motivating factor without separate proof of racial animus, and disparate-impact liability requires a challenged lending practice that causes the disparity.

Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co. · filed 2018-08-20

Accordingly, this Court finds the word "animus" need not appear in a charge on intentional discrimination and that the charge read was correct. ... The Court does not see a reading of this instruction that would permit a jury "without more," to rule against Emigrant for disparities Emigrant did not create. ... Therein lies the alleged cause (beyond mere ethnicity-or even credit scores, as Emigrant argues-but including the entire loan product and its marketing to Black and Hispanic communities, the absence of income or asset verification, its longevity notwithstanding its rate of failure) of the impact on the communities targeted.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit intentional housing discrimination based on protected characteristics, and an intentional-discrimination claim must plausibly allege that people outside the protected classes were treated differently.

Mabry v. City of East Chicago · filed 2020-02-11(a) and (b)

In an FHA claim, “[i]t does not take much to allege discrimination, but one essential allegation [is] . . . that someone else has been treated differently.” ... There is no allegation that people outside of the alleged classes—African-American and Hispanic people and households with children—were treated differently than people who are members of one or more of these classes. Therefore, the Court dismisses this claim.

Section 3604 treats facially different occupancy limits for handicapped persons as sufficient to make a prima facie intentional-discrimination claim, but such limits are not a per se violation when tied to bona fide governmental concerns rather than disability status.

Courage to Change Holding Company v. El Paso County, Colorado · filed 2021-02-22

There may well be rational explanations for the different occupancy levels. However, there is no doubt that the ordinance for Group Homes imposes different occupancy levels for handicapped persons than for other types of group homes. This is sufficient to make out Plaintiffs’ prima facie claim for intentional discrimination under the FHA. ... However, as Plaintiffs admit in their Motion, “[o]ccupancy limits are not a per se violation of the FHA, as long as they are tied to legitimate governmental concerns and not based on the person[’]s status as handicapped.” ... Thus, because a reasonable factfinder could find that the different occupancy levels are based on bona fide governmental concerns, the Court will also deny Plaintiffs’ cross Motion for Summary Judgment as to this theory of intentional discrimination.

Section 3604(b) prohibits intentional discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing because of race or disability, and a disability claim requires allegations identifying the disability and requested accommodation.

Pittman v. Viamonte Investments Group LLC · filed 2021-03-29(b)

And for much the same reason, to the extent that Pittman alleges that Viamonte violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), by neglecting to maintain his apartment because of his race, this claim also fails. The allegations in his complaint do not plausibly suggest that the neglect of his unit was “intentionally done to discriminate.” See Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). ... We have also considered whether Pittman might have stated a disability discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), or the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). See Valencia v. City of Springfield, 883 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2018) (the inquiry is the same for both statutes). Crucially, Pittman’s filings do not answer the threshold question of what disability he has, other than to say it was “visible,” or what accommodations he requested that Viamonte failed to provide. See Wilson, 830 F.3d at 467 (plaintiff must allege discrimination occurred because of the disability).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a protected characteristic, and an intentional-discrimination claim requires a triable adverse action caused by discriminatory treatment.

Bastanipour v. 55 W Erie Condominium Association · filed 2021-12-30(a)

Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act provides, in relevant part, that “it shall be unlawful *** (t)o *** make unavailable or deny *** a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... In other words, Bastanipour must demonstrate a triable issue as to whether she suffered an adverse action due to defendants’ discrimination against her. ... Because Bastanipour failed to show a triable issue identifying any adverse action, her violation of the Fair Housing Act claims cannot survive summary judgment.

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff alleging intentional housing discrimination to plead protected-class status, adverse treatment, and facts supporting a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.

Sykes v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2022-03-24(b)

Generally, to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that he “was ‘a member of a protected class,’ suffered relevant ‘adverse’ treatment, and ‘can sustain a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.’” Palmer v. Fannie Mae, 755 F. App’x 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (emphasis in original) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making unavailable or denying a dwelling because of a protected characteristic, and an intentional-discrimination claim at the pleading stage requires plausible facts supporting a minimal inference that the characteristic was a motivating factor.

Avila v. ACACIA Network, Inc. · filed 2024-04-15(a)

The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979). Among other things, it prohibits the “refus[al] to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, . . . [and the] refus[al] to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, . . . national origin,” or disability.7 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f)(1). ... Generally, to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that he is “‘a member of a protected class,’ suffered relevant ‘adverse’ treatment, and ‘. . . [he must sustain] a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.’” Palmer v. Fannie Mae, 755 F. App’x 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original, footnote omitted)). “‘[A] plaintiff need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation’ at the pleading stage.” Id. at 45-46 (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015)). Thus, “a plaintiff may not need to prove that [his] protected status was a but-for cause of the adverse action [he] suffered, but only a motivating factor.” Id. at 46 (citing, inter alia, Vega, 801 F.3d at 86); see, ... The Court assumes, for the purposes of this order, that Plaintiff has a disability, as defined by the FHA. He alleges no facts, however, showing that his disability was at least a motivating factor with regard to his allegations of discrimination by Acacia, 1412 College Avenue LLC, Douglas, or Griffiths, including any regarding his entrance into a renewal agreement and/or sublease that appears to have specifically stated, and to which he seems to have agreed, that neither Acacia nor its employees would provide him with any social services. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA against Acacia, 1412 College Avenue LLC, Douglas, and Griffiths, and the Court dismisses those claims for that reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Under § 3604(b), an intentional-discrimination claim requires plausible allegations that a housing policy was created or enforced because of the plaintiff’s protected status, rather than merely in spite of it.

Farhan v. 2715 NMA LLC · filed 2025-12-04(b)

Applying Bloch to this case, Farhan must plausibly allege that defendants created the “neutrality” policy, or applied it against her, “‘because of’ and not merely ‘in spite of’” her national origin.

Section 3604(f) permits an intentional discrimination claim when disability was a motivating factor in the challenged housing decision.

CMDS Residential, LLC v. Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore · filed 2024-02-01(f)

But while the ADA and FHA prohibit actions where discrimination was a “motivating factor,” Baird, 192 F.3d at 470; Thomas v. The Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 641 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461-62 and Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 1989)), the RA requires the plaintiff to show that the adverse action was “‘solely by reason of’ his disability,” Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461-62.

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff claiming racial discrimination to plead facts supporting intentional discrimination.

Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC · filed 2026-03-16(b)

Assuming without deciding that an FHA claim could be premised on the sort of post-acquisition conduct alleged here, see Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 80 n.50 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (reserving decision on the extent to which the FHA covers such conduct), Dickerson’s FHA discrimination claim would still fail because the SAC does not properly plead that she was subject to intentional discrimination, id.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit refusing or making housing unavailable, or discriminating in housing terms, conditions, privileges, services, or facilities, because of religion; the prohibition is not violated when housing is not denied because of religious beliefs.

Hanrahan v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority of Duluth · filed 1995-11-13(a) and (b)

Nevertheless, the Plaintiff’s claim under this Statute fails for the same reasons that his free exercise claim has faltered. As detailed in the text of this Opinion, the Defendants have not discriminated against the Hanrahans nor have they denied the Hanrahans access to public housing because of their religious beliefs. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim under this Section is without merit.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit discriminatory denial or unavailability of housing and discriminatory housing terms, but they do not require a landlord or seller to provide an individual applicant a reasonable accommodation for religion.

Hack v. The President And Fellows Of Yale College · filed 2000-12-28(a) and (b)

However, the FHA does not require a landlord or seller to provide a reasonable accommodation with respect to an individual applicant's religion.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination because of religion in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Niya Bunch v. Victor Valley Domestic Violence, Inc. · filed 2019-12-11(b)

The Fair Housing Act (the “Act”) therefore makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” because of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The Court assumes for purposes of this order that Better Way is a “dwelling” under the Act,” and that Better Way “rents” to occupants.

Sections 3604(a)-(d) prohibit denying or making housing unavailable, discriminating in housing terms or services, publishing discriminatory housing statements, or falsely representing that an available dwelling is unavailable; the claimant must allege a personal violation of those rights.

Nur v. Blake Development Corp. · filed 1987-02-06(a)-(d)

While the plaintiffs’ complaint contains serious allegations against the defendants, it alleges no facts that would constitute a violation of § 3604(a), (b), (c) or (d). ... Mr. Keen and Ms. Burns have failed to meet the burden placed upon them. They have failed to demonstrate or allege factually that the defendants violated rights accorded to Mr. Keen and Ms. Burns under § 3604.

Section 3604(c) prohibits publishing a notice, statement, or advertisement about a dwelling’s sale or rental that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on protected traits, or an intent to do so; discriminatory intent is not required.

United States v. University Oaks Civic Club · filed 1987-02-20(c)

The prevalent interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) requires no discriminatory intent for a violation to occur.

Section 3604(c) does not require proof of subjective intent to discriminate to establish a violation.

United States v. Security Management Company · filed 1996-10-24(c)

We have also held that no showing of subjective intent to discriminate is needed to prove a violation of this section of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) prohibits a municipality from proceeding discriminatorily in subsidized-housing construction and siting once it has undertaken to construct housing.

United States of America, Yonkers Branch--National Association for the Advancement of Colored People… · filed 1987-12-28(a)

This does not mean that we would have reached the same conclusion in the face of findings that there had been discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent, for the absence of a general obligation to construct does not give the municipality license to proceed discriminatorily once it has started down the road to construction.

Section 3604(b) prohibits a landlord from conditioning a tenant’s continued tenancy or housing-related services on the tenant providing sexual favors.

Grieger v. Sheets · filed 1988-06-21(b)

Finally, we need not, at this juncture, address Sheets’ claim that Grieger cannot raise her claim of direct discrimination, the quid pro quo sex for tenancy and services, under § 3617 because we conclude she can raise it under her § 3612 claim as a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(b) covers sexual harassment in housing, and unpermitted intentional sexual touching by a resident manager can establish the requisite offensive housing environment at the pleading stage.

Beliveau v. Caras · filed 1995-01-06(b)

such touching would support a sexual harassment claim under the federal Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604's prohibition on sex discrimination reaches sexual harassment that creates a hostile housing environment, evaluated under a Title VII-like prima facie test.

Williams v. Poretsky Management, Inc. · filed 1996-10-15(a) (b)

After reviewing these cases, few as they may be, it is not difficult to conclude that this court should recognize sexual harassment as actionable under Title VIII. ... A similar test should be applied in the hostile housing environment context.

Section 3604(b) prohibits sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, including harassment that creates a hostile housing environment.

Dicenso v. Henry G. Cisneros, Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Chr · filed 1996-09-23(b)

Like the Tenth Circuit, we recognize a hostile housing environment cause of action, and begin our analysis with the more familiar Title VII standard. ... Applied to the housing context, a claim is actionable “when the offensive behavior unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the premises.” ... Considering the totality of the circumstances in this ease, we agree with the ALJ that DiCenso’s conduct was not sufficiently egregious to create an objectively hostile housing environment.

Section 3604(b) reaches sexual harassment in the housing context as discrimination in housing terms and conditions.

Krueger v. Cuomo · filed 1997-06-03(b)

Krueger’s challenge to HUD’s conclusion that he violated sections 3604(b) and 3617 warrants little discussion.

Section 3604(b) prohibits sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, including sexual harassment.

Glover v. Jones · filed 2007-09-24(b)

Sexual harassment claims are cognizable under the FHA and the NYHRL. ... Sexual harassment constitutes discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling on the basis of sex.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); ... It is clear that under the FHA, owners of real estate may be held vicariously liable for discriminatory acts by their agents and employees.

Section 3604 prohibits sex discrimination in housing, including hostile-environment sexual harassment, and a hostile-housing-environment claim does not require a tangible housing action.

Kingston Mound Manor I. v. Keeton · filed 2019-08-07(a) (b)

Although Appellee argues Appellant was not sexually harassed and/or did not suffer sex-based discrimination because no tangible housing action was taken against her, this provision indicates a hostile housing environment claim does not require a tangible housing action to have occurred.

Section 3604 covers sex-based housing discrimination, including quid pro quo sexual harassment when housing benefits are conditioned on sexual favors and a tangible housing action follows refusal.

Iula v. Voos · filed 2023-12-21

The FHA prohibits sex-based discrimination in the sale or renting of housing. ... In the context of the FHA, “‘[q]uid pro quo’ harassment occurs when housing benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned on sexual favors.” ... Plaintiff can thus state her claim by sufficiently pleading that a “tangible” housing action resulted from her refusal to submit to Defendant’s sexual demands.

A sexual harassment claim involving a broker’s housing services can survive dismissal under § 3604 even without an alleged loss of housing.

PEOPLE OF STATE OF NY, BY ABRAMS v. Merlino · filed 1988-09-16

Specifically, the issue presented is whether sexual harassment constitutes sexual discrimination as prohibited by the Fair Housing Act where the defendant real estate broker is alleged to subject female customers to sexual harassment during the provision of services, but no loss of housing is claimed as a result of those acts. ... In light of this and the rule of Meritor, we are reluctant at this stage of the proceedings to dismiss a claim of sexual harassment for failure to state a cause of action. ... The defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in all other respects.

Section 3604 permits a housing-discrimination claim based on discriminatory effect or intent, and summary judgment must be denied when the zoning record presents triable issues on those elements.

Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Radin, Inc. v. Village of New Hempstead · filed 2000-04-12(a)

Thus, the plaintiffs burden on summary judgment would be satisfied by raising an issue of fact either as to the existence of a discriminatory effect resulting from passage or application of the zoning provisions, or as to the existence of animus as a motivating factor in defendants’ actions.

Section 3604(a) bars refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of familial status; its application here depended on whether the plaintiffs qualified as having familial status under § 3602(k).

Gorski v. Troy · filed 1989-06-05(a)

Newly amended 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) provides as follows: ... it shall be unlawful — (a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. ... For purposes of the plaintiffs’ standing, the important question is whether the plaintiffs attained “familial status” and thus are qualified to employ the relevant sections of the Fair Housing Act. ... The court, however, does not find it necessary to pass on the question of whether foster children under all circumstances or even circumstances distinct from the instant case are precluded from inclusion in the definition of familial status. Rather, the court expressly finds that on the basis of the allegations of the instant complaint and testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing that the plaintiffs lack the requisite familial status to sue under the relevant sections of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful for a landlord to refuse, make unavailable, or deny housing because of familial status, including by treating otherwise comparable households differently based on whether occupants are adults or children.

Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corporations · filed 1990-08-07(a)

Moreover, as previously noted, the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful for an owner “[t]o refuse to_rent_or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of_familial status.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... It is the finding of this Court that defendant’s practice of refusing to rent an apartment to a Section 8 voucher holder solely on the basis of that household’s size when they would rent that same apartment to the same sized household where there is the presence of an adult instead of a child constitutes discrimination on the basis of familial status. Landlords may not refuse applicants apartments which they can afford and desire solely because these households do not conform with the landlord’s traditional notions of what constitutes a family unit. If the landlord would make that size apartment available to a household consisting of the same number of individuals, but with more adults and less children, the landlord must accept the otherwise qualified Section 8 household as a tenant for that size apartment. Otherwise, the landlord is guilty of discriminating against that household on the basis of that family’s familial status. Since Crestwood has admitted to such a practice, it has been unlawfully discriminating against applicants who are single parents.

Section 3604(c) reaches a landlord's expressed preference for tenants based on familial status, and an alleged policy plus retaliatory eviction can injure applicants before a child actually moves in.

Jerold M. Gorski and Peggy J. Gorski v. Stanley Troy and Shirley Troy, Doing Business as S & S Rentals · filed 1991-04-11(c)

Even if we assume, ... that the Gorskis had not yet achieved “familial status” as that term is defined in the Act, the Troys’ alleged actions, at the very least, still were discriminatory because the Troys expressed a preference for tenants on the basis of familial status in violation of section 3604(c) and, in violation of section 3617, retaliated against the Gorskis when the couple attempted to ... have the discriminatory policy changed.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing, denying, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of a protected characteristic, including familial status such as having children under 18.

Opinion No. · filed 1992-03-24(a)

The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3631 , makes it unlawful for an owner "[t]o refuse to . . . rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a). The 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act added "familial status," defined essentially as the status of having a child or children under 18 years, to the list of prohibited bases for refusing to rent a dwelling to a person. The protections extend to individuals who are pregnant or who are in the process of securing legal custody of a child. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602 (k), 3604 (a) (b).

Section 3604(a) prohibits housing decisions because of familial status, and in a disparate-treatment case the protected characteristic must play a substantial or determinative role in the adverse decision; a discriminatory-effect case instead requires proof of discriminatory effect.

Blaz v. Barberton Garden Apartment · filed 1992-07-29(a)

A discriminatory effect or "disparate impact" case involves a facially neutral policy or practice which has the effect of discriminating against a particular protected group. A discriminatory intent or "disparate treatment" case involves an individual claim of differential treatment based upon a forbidden characteristic such as race, sex or familial status. ... Either standard is sufficient to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act. ... The language of the Fair Housing Act prohibits housing decisions "because of ... familial status." 42 U.S.C § 3604(a). ... Defining the plaintiff's burden of proof using the terms "substantial factor" and "but for cause" is consistent with Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-65 (but for cause and substantial factor both required) (O'Conner, J. concurring). Therefore, the district court did not err in using these terms in its jury instruction.

Section 3604 bars housing discrimination based on familial status, subject to the older-persons exception; a facility invoking that exception must prove that it satisfies the exception’s requirements.

Elaine Rogers, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees v. Windmill Pointe Village Club Association, Inc., Defendants-Cro · filed 1992-08-03

The Act prohibits discrimination in housing transactions because of race, color religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. ... To qualify for the “older persons” exception a facility must: (1) have 80% of units occupied by at least one person age 55 or older; and, (2) publish and adhere to policies and procedures which demonstrate an intent to restrict the residents to those age 55 and older; and, (3) provide services specifically designated to meet the physical or social needs of older persons; or, if no such facilities are practical, the facility must demonstrate through credible objective evidence that the housing facility is necessary to provide important housing opportunities for older persons. 24 C.F.R. § 100.304. ... As stated above Defendants have the burden of proving that they fall within the exception provided in the Act. Defendants have not proven that they meet any of the three requirements for qualification under the “older persons” exception to the act.

Section 3604(a)'s familial-status housing-discrimination prohibition does not override the H-2A family-housing rule; participating H-2A farmers must provide family housing only when it is the prevailing practice in the area and occupation of intended employment.

Almeda Farmer v. Employment Security Commission Of North Carolina · filed 1993-09-02(a)

Under these circumstances, we conclude that 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1188(c)(4) controls over 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604. We therefore hold that participating H-2A farmers must provide family housing to temporary agricultural laborers, whether foreign or domestic, only when such is the prevailing practice in the area and occupation of intended employment.

A familial-status housing claim did not warrant preliminary relief where the defendants showed likely nondiscriminatory reasons for withdrawing approval, including occupancy-code violations and application misrepresentations.

Laurenti v. Water's Edge Habitat, Inc. · filed 1993-06-28(a)

Thus, plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction must be, and is hereby, denied. The Court makes no finding regarding the merits of defendants’ eviction proceedings in State Court.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent a dwelling because of familial status, and a housing-discrimination claim may be proven through direct evidence of discriminatory intent.

Kormoczy v. Secretary, United States Department Of Housing And Urban Development · filed 1995-04-28(a)

The provision at issue is 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(a) which proscribes the refusal to "rent after the making of a bona fide offer ... a dwelling to any person because of ... familial status...." ... Using the direct method to establish intentional discrimination, commonly referred to as disparate treatment, a plaintiff may introduce direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. ... Where direct evidence is used to show that a housing decision was made in violation of the statute, the burden shifting analysis is inapposite. ... Instead, once the plaintiff demonstrates disparate treatment through the direct method, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible factor. ... The Court finds that the ALJ's decision is legally and procedurally sound, and is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the final order stands.

Section 3604(a) prohibits housing discrimination based on familial status, including neutral practices with a disparate impact, unless the defendant shows that the practice has a manifest relationship to the housing in question.

Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary Of Housing And Urban Development · filed 1995-05-30(a)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of familial status. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604. Discrimination may occur either by disparate treatment or disparate impact. ... For purposes of this opinion, we shall assume, just as the ALJ did, that a Title VIII plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory impact by proof of national statistics relative to U.S. households as presented here. Thus, a Title VIII prima facie case, once established, as here, could alone suffice to prove a Title VIII violation unless the defendants justify the discriminatory effect which has resulted from their challenged actions. ... In accordance with Griggs and the Act, we hold that for the purposes of Title VIII FHA housing discrimination cases, the defendant must demonstrate that the discriminatory practice has a manifest relationship to the housing in question. A mere insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because such a low standard would permit discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral practices. At the same time, there is no requirement that the defendant establish a "compelling need or necessity" for the challenged practice to pass muster since this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible to satisfy.

Section 3604(c) asks whether an ordinary listener, considering the circumstances, would understand a housing statement as indicating a familial-status preference or limitation.

Burnett v. Venturi · filed 1995-10-18(c)

In determining whether a statement “indicates” impermissible discrimination, the Court must ask whether it suggests to an ordinary listener that people with a particular familial status are preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of familial status, and § 3604(e) prohibits statements indicating a familial-status preference; the court held those provisions apply to seasonal employee cabins.

Villegas v. Sandy Farms, Inc. · filed 1996-03-01(a), (e)

The Act makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... familial status[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The FHA also prohibits statements “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... familial status ... or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e). ... Accordingly, interpreting the FHA broadly as required to effectuate its intent, I find that defendant’s cabins are dwellings within the meaning of the FHA. ... Thus, defendant’s actions in “making unavailable” the smaller cabins on the basis of familial status is a violation of the FHA. ... Based on the foregoing, defendant’s cabins are dwellings subject to the FHA, and defendant’s policy of excluding families with children from the smaller cabins constitutes discrimination on the basis of familial status in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and ORS 659.033.

Section 3604(a) does not establish a familial-status disparate-impact violation when the landlord did not actually enforce the alleged occupancy policy, while § 3604(c) is not violated by an uncommunicated preference statement unsupported by evidence that it affected rental decisions.

Carlson v. HUD · filed 1996-04-05(a), (c)

Carlson concedes he preferred to rent the upstairs apartment to three or fewer people because the apartment is small, but the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows Carlson never actually limited the number of occupants in the apartment. Carlson and Summy rented the apartment to anyone who wanted to live there, including families of four. ... We also reject the ALJ's conclusion that Carlson violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988) by making a statement indicating a preference not to rent to families with children. ... Carlson and Summy never mentioned this comment to prospective tenants or anyone else, and there is no substantial evidence that Summy believed Carlson was asking him not to rent to families. ... We see no violation of § 3604(c).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to negotiate for, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling because of familial status, including discrimination in the application process.

Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp. · filed 1997-03-05(a)

The Gilligans’ complaint states that they are a family, that only families receive AFDC benefits, that Jamco has a policy prohibiting all AFDC recipients from applying for apartments, and that Jamco has relied on its “no AFDC” policy to “refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable” units at Verdugo Gardens. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Thus, the Gilligans allege that they are members of a class protected under the FHA, identify a policy that affects only members of that class, and set forth facts that demonstrate the enforcement of that policy in the form of actions prohibited by the FHA. We hold that these allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person because of familial status, but does not itself specify a permissible family size.

Fair Housing Advocates Assn. v. City of Richmond Heights · filed 1998-03-24(a)

The Fair Housing Act does not specifically apply to “a family of (4)” as opposed to a family of 3 or a family of 5. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604(c) does not require proof of subjective intent to discriminate in a housing statement.

Llanos v. Estate of Coehlo · filed 1998-08-20(a), (b), (c)

Section 3604(c) may be violated without a showing of a subjective intent to discriminate.

Section 3604(a) does not impose liability for a municipal condemnation when the evidence fails to show discriminatory treatment or disparate impact against families with children.

Avalonbay Communities, Inc. v. Orange, No. Cv99-065826 (Feb. 9, 2000) · filed 2000-02-09(a)

Accordingly, Avalonbay is not entitled to damages for any allegedly improper conduct by Orange under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) and (c) claims survive summary judgment when factual disputes remain about a familial-status statement and the reasonableness or pretext of an occupancy restriction.

Reeves v. Rose · filed 2000-04-24(a), (c)

Thus, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 3604(a) does not invalidate facially neutral occupancy ordinances when the evidence fails to establish discriminatory intent or discriminatory effect against families.

Fair Housing Advocates Ass'n v. City of Richmond Heights · filed 2000-04-13(a)

Housing Advocates has also failed to establish that the ... occupancy ordinances had a discriminatory effect on families.

Section 3604 prohibits making dwellings unavailable, discriminating in the terms and conditions of sale or rental, or publishing statements indicating a preference based on familial status.

Gibson v. County of Riverside · filed 2002-01-04(a) (b) (c)

In enacting and enforcing each version of Section 18.7, the County made dwelling units unavailable to Plaintiffs based on familial status in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... In enacting and enforcing each version of Section 18.7, the County discriminated against Plaintiffs in the terms and conditions of sale and rental of dwellings based on familial status in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... In enacting each version of Section 18.7, the County published a statement with respect to the sale and rental of dwellings that indicated a preference based on familial status in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in rental housing based on familial status, including households with persons under 18 domiciled with a parent, legal custodian, or designee.

McFadden v. Moll · filed 2003-05-28(b)

In 42 U.S.C. §3604(b), the federal Act prohibits discrimination in rental housing on the basis of familial status, which is defined in Section 3602(k) to mean one or more persons under age 18 being domiciled with a parent, other person having legal custody, or their designee.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on familial status, including discrimination shown through disparate treatment or disparate impact.

Krisha Bowman v. City of Des Moines Municipal Housing Agency Scott Littell in His Official Capacity as Review Officer an · filed 2011-11-04

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on familial status, either by disparate treatment or impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604; see also Iowa Code § 216.8 (prohibiting discrimination in housing based on familial status under the Iowa Civil Rights Act). ... But these effects are not disproportionate. Large families may present more circumstances that could be treated as a violation, but not disproportionately more. ... At least on the record before us, we agree that Bowman has failed to prove a disparate impact.

Section 3604(b) does not prohibit a neutral per-occupant rent policy merely because families with children may pay more in total.

Auday Maki and Salwa Atwan v. William Laakko, Beverly Laakko and Liisa Laakko · filed 1996-08-12(b)

The Act merely outlaws discrimination on the basis of familial status. Under a rental pricing system that charges additional rent for additional occupants, a mother, father, and one child would be charged the same amount of rent as three unrelated individuals. Therefore, such a rental policy is neutral with respect to family status.

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing-related statements indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on familial status, evaluated under an ordinary-listener standard.

White v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 2007-02-02(c)

To determine whether a statement indicates impermissible discrimination on the basis of familial status, an “ordinary listener” standard is used.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making housing unavailable because of familial status; that protection includes a minor living with a designee who has written permission from a parent or legal custodian.

Ortega v. Housing Authority of City of Brownsville · filed 2008-01-03(a)

The Fair Housing Act as well as the Housing and Urban Development, (“HUD”), Regulations prohibit discriminatory housing practices based on familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e); 24 C.F.R. § 100.60. ... Thus, Defendant may not discriminate based on familial status against a minor who lives with his or her parent or legal custodian. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k); 24 C.F.R. § 100.20. And, Defendant may not discriminate based on familial status against a minor who lives with his or her parents’ or legal custodian’s designee with written permission. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k); 24 C.F.R. § 100.20. Defendant may not require that all families receiving housing assistance comply with the first prong of the definition of familial status. To do so would discriminate against the families protected by the second prong. Defendant has not interpreted the second prong of the definition to have its own unique definition apart from the first prong and as such its interpretation of the second prong or its complete disregard for the second prong is unreasonable. Therefore, this Court holds that Defendant’s policy is unreasonable and violates federal law. The policy of requiring all recipients living with minors to obtain legal guardianship constitutes unlawful discrimination on the basis of familial status against designees with written permission to have custody of a minor and violates the FHA and HUD regulations.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of familial status, and § 3604(d) prohibits falsely representing that an available dwelling is unavailable for rental because of familial status.

United States v. Fountainbleau Apartments L.P. · filed 2008-06-19(a), (d)

The FHA provides that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... familial status ....” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The FHA further precludes representing “to any person because of ... familial status, ... that any dwelling is not available for ... rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d). ... Despite the different ways of explaining the policy, Defendants agree that it was the policy to deny families with children the right to apply for housing at Fountainbleau Apartments. They contend, however, that Fountainbleau Apartments met the requirements for the housing for older persons exemption, an exception to the FHA’s prohibition against discrimination of persons on the basis of familial status. ... Defendants fail to sustain their burden of proof that they meet the requirements of the affirmative defense of housing for older persons.

Section 3604(a) bars housing restrictions that make a dwelling unavailable to families with children because of familial status.

Sierra v. City of New York · filed 2008-05-13(a)

Section 27-2076(b) of the New York City Housing Maintenance Code, which explicitly provides that no SRO housing unit “shall be occupied by a family with a child under the age of sixteen years,” subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, plainly distinguishes between families with young children and those without, and so is facially discriminatory under the FHA.

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing notices, statements, or advertisements that an ordinary reader would understand as indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on familial status, without requiring discriminatory intent or enforcement.

Iniestra v. Cliff Warren Investments, Inc. · filed 2012-07-31(c)

A statement violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) if the statement, when heard by an ordinary reader, would conclude that the rule suggests a preference. ... Intent is not a necessary element of a § 3604(c) violation. ... Enforcement is also not a necessary element. ... The Court finds that all of these rules enforce some limitation on children’s use of apartment facilities. They thus “indicate” discrimination based on familial status, and violate 3604(c). An ordinary reader of these rules could not interpret them otherwise. ... The Court finds that the Adult Supervision Rule, the Pool Usage Rule, the Unsupervised Children Memo, the June 2011 Memo, and the Curfew Rule violate 3604(c).

Section 3604 bars housing discrimination based on familial status, including a landlord's prohibition on a tenant's dependent child occupying the home.

560 West 165th Street Associates L.P. v. Figueroa · filed 2013-03-06

Familial status discrimination in housing is prohibited under Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107 (5), Executive Law § 296, and 42 USC § 3604 (Federal Fair Housing Act). ... The court finds that any bar on occupancy of her dependent child would in fact violate the Federal Fair Housing Act as well as the Administrative Code of the City of New York.

Section 3604(a) prohibits housing discrimination based on familial status, and that protected interest can support standing even for a plaintiff outside the discriminated-against class.

El Dorado Estates v. City of Fillmore · filed 2014-09-02(a)

It is true, as the City argues, that this injury exists as a legally protected interest only because the FHA prohibits discrimination against families, thereby creating a new legal right “the invasion of which creates standing.” ... What El Dorado has alleged, which we must take as true at the motion to dismiss stage, is that the City has discriminated against families by interfering with El Dorado’s subdivision application and conditioning application approval on El Dorado’s promising not to open the Park to families. The right not to have to endure housing discrimination, even if one is not among the class of persons discriminated against, is a constitutionally cognizable legal interest supporting standing.

Section 3604(a) addresses refusals to sell, rent, or negotiate; § 3604(b) bars discriminatory rental terms or privileges; and § 3604(c) bars discriminatory housing notices or statements, judged by an ordinary reader without requiring discriminatory intent.

Fair Housing Center of the Greater Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Sonoma Bay Community Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2015-10-01(a), (b), (c)

The mere fact that report cards are required does not meaii that housing will be refused — which is the gravamen of § 3604(a). ... Because this rule and the Loitering Rule restrictions on “all' children” are limited to children and because the rules treat children differently than adults — children are essentially confined to their home after dark — Plaintiffs have, at a minimum, established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under § 3604(b). ... Unlike § 3604(b), .§ 3604(c) does not require discriminatory intent and is not analyzed under a burden-shifting paradigm; instead, courts consider what an “ordinary reader’s].. .natural interpretation” would be when reading the relevant advertisement or statement.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of familial status, and § 3604(c) prohibits oral or written statements indicating a familial-status preference or limitation.

Thurmond v. Bowman · filed 2016-09-30(a) and (c)

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... familial status .... ”42 Ú.S.C. § 3604(a). The statute therefore prohibits specific conduct: refusing to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, and refusing to negotiate for a sale or rental of a dwelling. ... It also includes a broad prohibition against otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person. That provision “has been construed to reach every practice which has the effect of making housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds.” ... Indeed, in holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the “otherwise make unavailable” provision of § 3604(a), the Supreme Court explained that the provision “serve[s] as a catchall phrase[ ] looking to consequences, not intent.” ... Under § 3604(c), it is unlawful to “make ... any statement ... with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... familial status ... or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). ... In determining whether a statement violates § 3604(c), the Court asks whether the statement suggests to an ordinary listener that an unlawful discriminatory preference exists for the housing in question. ... Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her § 3604(c) claim. Toombs’ statement—that he would “not be able to rent to [her] because of [her] two small children,” ... plainly would suggest to the ordinary listener that Toombs had a preference against Plaintiffs tenancy because of her familial status.

Section 3604(b) treats rules that limit children’s use of housing facilities differently from adults-only households as facially discriminatory based on familial status, subject to justification under the court’s stated standard.

Belcher v. Grand Reserve MGM, LLC · filed 2017-09-12(b)

On its face, this rule limits the ability of minors seventeen years of age or younger from enjoying the facilities in connection with the rental of a dwelling, as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), Therefore, it is facially discriminatory, and Defendants must justify their disparate treatment on the basis of familial status.

Section 3604's familial-status protection covers only minor children living with a parent or similar legal custodian, and a disparate-impact plaintiff must show a discriminatory effect on that protected class.

Borum v. Brentwood Village, LLC · filed 2020-03-30

As the Court emphasized, a plain reading of the FHA indicates that the statute protects only minor children living with parents (or similar guardians). ... The fundamental issue is fairly straightforward: despite pages and pages of briefings, Plaintiffs never offer any statistical analysis or other evidence that indicates how the proposed development will disparately impact families when family is construed in terms of the protected class defined by the FHA (e.g., in terms of familial status). ... At this summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs’ case falls on their failure to provide statistical evidence of a disparate impact from the proposed redevelopment on only the members of the protected class, as the Court just discussed. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden at step one of the disparate impact analysis, and the Court grants summary judgment on this claim as a matter of law.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, or related services, because of familial status or another listed protected characteristic; a familial-status claim requires alleging familial status as the FHA defines it.

Burshteyn v. Community Housing Association, Inc. · filed 2020-02-03(b)

Because Plaintiffs have not alleged familial status as the FHA defines that term, and because they have not opposed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss their familial status claim, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FHA claim of discrimination based on familial status.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling based on listed protected characteristics, including familial status, which protects families with minor children.

Webb v. State of Delaware · filed 2022-10-31(b)

Second, § 3604 of the Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin.” Section 3602(k) of the Fair Housing Act defines “familial status” as “one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with (1) a parent or other person having legal custody of such individuals[s]; or (2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody, with the written permission of such parent or other person.” It is evident in reading the statute that the Fair Housing Act prohibits housing discrimination against families with minor children.