42 U.S.C. § 3604

Section 3604(a) prohibits denying a dwelling because of familial status, but it does not make student status a protected category, so a student-only housing policy may disqualify a parent seeking housing with a nonstudent child.

Spinette v. University of Vermont, Catamount/Redstone Apartments LLC, and Catamount Commercial Services, Inc. · filed 2023-03-10(a)

We conclude that Whitaker is persuasive and decline plaintiff’s request to reject it as wrongly decided. We do not agree that applying the reasoning of Whitaker to other cases “would effectively gut the FHA’s prohibition of familial status discrimination by creating a loophole that would allow all housing providers to lawfully refuse to deal with families with minor children.” Defendants limit the housing at the Redstone Apartments to students and students are not a protected class under the FHA or VHFA. If a parent and child were both UVM students, they would be eligible to live at the Redstone Apartments. Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against based on her familial status, but plaintiff was not qualified to sublet a unit in the Redstone Apartments because she sought to secure housing for herself and a nonstudent. The nonstudent status of her child was relevant to the qualification criteria established by defendants.

Section 3604 prohibits municipalities from using housing rules that treat families with children less favorably, but a facially neutral growth rule is not facial discrimination merely because it cites school capacity, and a housing statement violates § 3604(c) only if an ordinary reader would understand it as preferring or disfavoring the protected group.

Brookline Opportunities, LLC et al. v. Town of Brookline et al. · filed 2023-07-07(a), (b), and (c)

Section 3604(a) of the FHA states that it is unlawful to “make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . familial status.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination against any person “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . familial status.” Id. at § 3604(b). Lastly, § 3604(c) makes it unlawful to make or publish any statement “that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . familial status.” Id. at § 3604(c). ... Although the challenged ordinances operate in a facially neutral way, the Developers argue that they are invalid on their face because their stated purpose is discriminatory. ... But even if the Developers’ proposition is correct, the stated purpose here is not facially discriminatory. ... As this example illustrates, I am not persuaded that the ordinances, on their face, discriminate against families with children merely because they invoke school capacity concerns as their justification. ... A statement is prohibited under § 3604(c) if it “suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular protected group is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question.” ... Although discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish a violation of § 3604(c), evidence of the speaker’s intent and the context in which the statement was made can help a factfinder determine “the way an ordinary listener would have interpreted it.” ... Because the evidence does not conclusively show that the challenged statements indicate a preference against families with children, the Developers cannot prevail on their § 3604(c) claim at this stage.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on familial status and allows a claim based on either disparate treatment or disparate impact.

Arredondo v. Village on the Lake, Ltd and Votl I GP, Inc. · filed 2023-12-14

To prove housing discrimination, a plaintiff may show either disparate treatment or disparate impact on a protected class. ... Because Arredondo has not provided prima facie proof of a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on families, she has not fulfilled step one of her familial status discrimination claims under the FHA and TFHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of familial status.

Atwood v. Hill · filed 2024-10-17(a)

Under the FHA it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to ... rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the ... rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... familial status.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... The evidence presented at the hearing does not show that the plaintiff refused to rent to the defendants because they have multiple children. The statement of plaintiff alone is insufficient to find any direct evidence of discrimination. ... In this case, the defendants have failed to prove they were rejected from housing because of their children. The statement made by the plaintiff came after the defendants were already tenants. The defendants did not present any evidence they were rejected by the plaintiff. As such, the defendants have failed to meet their burden to establish a prima facie case that would shift the burden to the defendant. ... The defendants are not entitled to relief on this claim.

Section 3604(b) protects against discrimination because a household has minor children under 18, not because it includes disabled adults.

McGrath v. Dunecrest Condominium Association · filed 2025-03-26(b)

As set forth in the Court’s summary judgment ruling, the plain language of § 3604(b) does not provide a remedy for familial status discrimination based on a family with disabled adults. Instead, a familial status discrimination claim is based on the presence of minor children under the age of 18 living in the household. Thus, the Court concludes, as argued by the Association, that the McGraths’ Count II claim for disability-based discrimination based on familial status was groundless from the outset.

Section 3604(a) prohibits facial discrimination based on gender and familial status in a dwelling, and a men-only homeless-shelter policy can establish a prima facie violation.

COMMUNITY HOUSE, INC. v. City of Boise · filed 2009-07-29(a)

Here, Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of facial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act because they have been excluded from Community House based on their gender and familial status. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgement on Plaintiffs’ FHA claim based on gender and familial status.

Section 3604 requires facts suggesting that adverse housing treatment was motivated by familial status to state a claim of intentional familial-status discrimination.

Gadson v. Riverbay Corporation · filed 2025-08-26

Here, Gadson does not allege facts suggesting that any adverse actions that Riverbay took against him were motivated by his familial status, and therefore does not state a claim of intentional familial-status discrimination in violation of the FHA. Rather, the allegations suggest that the adverse actions by Riverbay against Gadson that are described in Gadson’s submissions were motivated solely by Gadson’s failure to pay rent arrears.

Denial of a qualified family's lease renewal can establish a prima facie familial status claim under § 3604(a).

Khalil v. Farash Corp. · filed 2008-05-07(a)

The Khalils and Banahenes did, however, establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 3604(a) based on the “refus[al] to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny” a rental unit on account of familial status.

Section 3604(a) prohibits familial status discrimination in both housing sales and rentals.

Seniors Civil Liberties Association, Inc. v. Kemp · filed 1992-07-13(a)

Also, and more important, plaintiffs' argument that Congress had no intent to regulate the sales market is undermined by the plain language of the statute that regulates both rentals and sales. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 ("to refuse to sell or rent").

Section 3604(b) permits restrictions on children's use of a development's swimming pools unless they create an inequity for families with children under 18 that tends to exclude those families from the development.

Untitled California Attorney General Opinion · filed 1992-10-06(b)

In view of the foregoing legislative history of the Fair Housing Act, we believe that a homeowners' association may place restrictions on the use of its swimming pools by children unless such practice is one which, by creating an inequity for families with children under 18 years of age, tends to exclude such families from the development.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to negotiate for a dwelling rental because prospective tenants have a child.

Morgan v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Frank Riciotti, Iii, Real Party in Interest · filed 1993-02-18(a)

The FHA prohibits refusals to negotiate for the rental of a dwelling space on the basis of familial status, as well as statements indicating such discrimination.

Section 3604(b) permits a familial status discrimination claim based on a policy’s discriminatory effect without proof of intent; the defendant must show the policy is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling business purpose.

Fair Housing Council of Orange County, Inc. v. Ayres · filed 1994-06-16(b)

This case interprets the 1988 amendments to the federal Fair Housing Act, and its provision protecting familial status, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The court holds that a showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary for plaintiffs to state a prima facie case of housing discrimination based on familial status. The court also holds that, to rebut the case, a defendant must show that the policy in question is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling business purpose.

Section 3604(a) prohibits occupancy restrictions that discriminate against families with children based on familial status.

United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc. · filed 1995-04-12(a)

Applied here, Tropic Seas’ occupancy restriction discriminates against the Sallees based on their familial status. ... In sum, the court GRANTS the Sallees’ motion against Tropic Seas, Inc. (as to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 3604).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent a dwelling because the applicants have a child.

Kormoczy v. Secretary, United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1995-04-28(a)

The ALJ considered the testimony of the witnesses and found that Petitioners rejected the Briggs’ rental application because they had a child. Petitioners violated the Fair Housing Act. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 3604(a) does not prohibit zoning changes that reduce housing construction when discrimination against families with children did not motivate them.

Eastampton Center, LLC v. Township of Eastampton · filed 2001-07-09(a)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot establish that the adoption of the challenged land use ordinances and the denials of their residential development applications were motivated by an intention to discriminate on the basis of familial status.

Section 3604(a) permits familial status discrimination claims to be evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework.

AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange · filed 2001-07-10(a)

The defendants’ arguments, to the contrary, can be distilled as follows: (1) the trial court properly applied the “pretext”/McDonnell Douglas framework and properly concluded that AvalonBay had not proven a violation of the fair housing laws; ... We agree with the defendants’ first argument and, therefore, we need not address the reviewability or the merits of their second and third arguments.

Section 3604(b) prohibits mobile home park rules that restrict children’s access to shared facilities because of familial status without a compelling business necessity pursued through the least restrictive means.

United States v. Plaza Mobile Estates · filed 2003-07-01(b)

It is clear from the age restrictive rules discussed above that the rules at issue here (the past rules from 1989 to the present at the Current Parks and the past rules from 1989 until the sale or closure of the Previously Owned Parks) are facially discriminatory. ... As with the absolute prohibitions, these adult supervision requirements are also not the least restrictive means to achieve any health and safety objectives.

Section 3604 prohibits terminating a tenancy because occupants have children, imposing lease terms based on familial status, and using rental applications or leases that exclude children.

United States v. Rupp · filed 2021-05-28(a), (b), (c)

Therefore, Plaintiff has shown that there is not a genuine dispute of material fact and that Defendants violated § 3604(a), and summary judgment will be granted as to that claim. ... As a result, Plaintiff has shown that there is no genuine dispute of fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... Consequently, they have failed to show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists or that Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Defendants’ violation of § 3604(c).

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, but it does not prohibit discrimination based solely on low income.

White Oak Property Development, LLC v. Washington Township · filed 2010-06-04(b)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). As an initial observation, we note White Oak’s lack of evidence and implausible argument that condominium units starting in the low $200,000 range qualify as low-income housing. Even if the development transitioned to low-income or subsidized housing after construction, the plain language of the FHA does not prevent discrimination based on “low income,” and White Oak cites no authority that says otherwise.

Section 3604 requires proof that the challenged housing conduct was because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; redlining is actionable under the section.

Mary L. Cartwright & the Northwest Indiana Open Housing Center v. American Savings & Loan Association · filed 1989-07-14

Section 3604 requires proof of discrimination “because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” ... The court also found no evidence of reclining, which is actionable under § 3604. ... Because the district court found that American Savings did not discriminate against Mary Cartwright based on her race or sex and did not engage in redlining, and these findings preclude recovery under § 3604 (even assuming, without deciding, that the appellants’ allegations fall within that section), we hold that the district court properly granted the appellee’s Rule 41(b) motion on this claim as well.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit discrimination against any person because of that person's race or sex; the wording does not limit protection to members of a minority group.

Childress v City of Richmond · filed 1997-08-05(a), (b)

we attach no significance to this difference in wording.

Section 3604(b) can apply to discriminatory housing-related actions by third parties such as a homeowners association and is not limited to parties named in the tenant’s rental agreement.

Williams v. Arora Hills Homeowners Association Inc. · filed 2021-06-02(b)

The court also notes that nothing in the text of section 3604(b) prohibits suits against third-parties or restricts suits to the parties named in a tenant’s rental agreement. Rather, the wording of the statute indeed appears broad enough to encompass Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 3604 addresses discriminatory availability of housing, not discrimination in obtaining additional financing secured by an already-owned home.

Thomas v. First Federal Sav. Bank of Indiana · filed 1987-02-06(a)

Because their allegations concern the availability of additional financing, and not the availability of housing, the court finds that section 3604 is not implicated by plaintiffs’ complaint.

Section 3604 does not support a discrimination claim based on a non-purchase money loan.

Gibson v. Household International, Inc. · filed 2005-10-12(f)(1), (2)

Plaintiff points to no authority that a § 3604 claim may proceed in the case of a non-purchase money loan. Neither the plain language of the statute nor the case law supports the plaintiffs argument. The district court therefore did not err in granting Household’s motion to dismiss the FHA claim under § 3604.

Section 3604 permits a tester who alleges personal injury from discriminatory steering to sue without living in the targeted area.

Village of Bellwood v. Gorey & Associates · filed 1987-03-23

In the case before this Court, however, the seven individual testers have alleged “direct and palpable” injuries to their individual persons, the type of allegation which would have satisfied the Seventh Circuit. ... The fact that the plaintiffs have not alleged that they resided within the target area is irrelevant.

Section 3604 gives housing testers standing to sue over alleged misrepresentations about apartment availability even when they do not intend to rent.

Open Housing Center, Inc. v. Samson Management Corp. · filed 1993-12-14

Here, the Individual Plaintiffs unquestionably have standing to litigate claims under the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act for injuries suffered from defendants' alleged misrepresentations regarding apartment availability.

Section 3604(d) gives a tester a right to truthful housing availability information even if the tester expects a false answer and does not intend to rent or buy.

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman · filed 1982-02-24(d)

That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to negotiate for or sell a dwelling, or steering prospective buyers, because of race.

Alice Sanders and James Sanders v. Nancy Dorris Century 21-Robertson County Real Estate and Chandler Sales, Inc. · filed 1989-05-01(a)

Thus, we hold that the district court erred in finding that there was no evidence that the defendants engaged in a pattern of steering black prospective home buyers away from Greenbrier.

Section 3604(b) prohibits sexual harassment in housing, including hostile-environment and quid-pro-quo harassment, when the plaintiff's sex is the but-for cause.

Fox v. Gaines · filed 2021-07-16(b)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... As these Title VII cases make clear, the plain text of “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), includes sexual harassment where the plaintiff proves that, but for her sex, she would not have been subjected to sexual harassment. ... Thus, we hold that sexual harassment—both hostile housing environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment—is actionable under the FHA, provided the plaintiff demonstrates that she would not have been harassed but for her sex.

Section 3604(a) addresses making a dwelling unavailable or denying a dwelling, not denying services at a dwelling, and does not reach an elevator company's refusal to service a property where the company is not acting as a landlord.

Clifton Terrace Associates, Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp. · filed 1990-01-10(a)

First, it is quite evident to the Court that § 3604(a), on its face, does not apply to this case. The plain language of § 3604(a) refers to the act of making unavailable or denying “a dwelling,” and not to the act of making unavailable or denying any service at a dwelling. ... Nothing in the complaint suggests that Otis was in the position of a landlord, with the ability to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling to others. That is what the statutory language clearly contemplates. In short, Otis’s alleged refusal to service the Clifton Terrace elevators did not affect the availability of housing in a manner implicating § 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) and (f)(1) address housing availability, not mere habitability; a lack of elevator service is not an unavailable dwelling under those provisions.

Clifton Terrace Associates, Limited v. United Technologies Corporation · filed 1991-04-05(a), (b), (f)(1), (f)(2)

A lack of elevator service is a matter of habitability, not availability, and does not fall within the terms of these subsections.

Section 3604(f)(9) does not require a dwelling to be made available to an individual whose tenancy would pose a direct threat to others’ health or safety or cause substantial physical damage to others’ property.

Association of Relatives & Friends of Aids Patients v. Regulations & Permits Administration or Administracion De Reglame · filed 1990-06-15(f)(9)

While the Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals, including AIDS patients, it does not prevent a defendant from denying housing in order to preserve the health and safety of the community. Section 3604(f)(9) provides: “Nothing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9). In this case, however, there is absolutely no evidence supporting the conclusion that the tenancy of ten terminal AIDS patients carries a significant threat to the safety of the community. To the contrary, the uncontested scientific and medical evidence establishes that HIV is not readily transmittable through flood, mosquitoes or casual contact, and that the presence of the hospice poses no risk to the community at large. A.R.P.E.’s denial of the permit, therefore, cannot be justified on public health grounds.

Section 3604(f)(9) permits refusing to rent to an individual whose tenancy would pose a direct threat to others' health or safety or cause substantial physical damage to others' property.

Charles Talley, Jr. v. Lane · filed 1994-01-05(f)(9)

The Fair Housing Act does not require that a dwelling be rented to an individual who would constitute a direct threat to the health and safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9); 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(d). Thus, it is within the CHA’s discretion to find that individuals with a history of convictions for property and assaultive crimes would be a direct threat to other tenants and to deny their applications.

Section 3604(f)(9) does not require a dwelling to be made available to a person whose tenancy would threaten the health or safety of other individuals.

Hertwig-Brilliant v. Wright · filed 1995-01-26(f)(9)

Petitioner’s claim that he was discriminated against because of his mental disability in violation of the Fair Housing Act is unfounded in light of petitioner’s continued threat to the safety of other individuals in the cooperative.

Section 3604(f)(9) does not require a dwelling to be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals.

Stout v. Kokomo Manor Apartments · filed 1997-03-17(f)(9)

As the Landlord notes, however, the Fair Housing Act generally deems discrimination based on a handicap to be unlawful but does not require that “a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals.” Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 804, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9). An act of child molestation against another resident at the apartment complex qualifies Stout’s son as “a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals.” The Fair Housing Act therefore does not protect the “disability” of Stout’s son.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars refusing to rent a dwelling because of a person's handicap, but § 3604(f)(9) does not require making a dwelling available when the person's tenancy would pose a direct threat to others' health or safety or cause substantial physical damage to others' property.

Foster v. Tinnea · filed 1997-12-29(f)(1), (f)(9)

We likewise conclude Hallford failed to establish a right to relief under any federal cause of action. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter, or a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available. However, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9), "[n]othing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others." Detailed testimony was elicited during the presentation of plaintiff's evidence documenting Hallford's obscenities, fights, and treatment of young children in the complex and the serious threat he poses to other Jefferson Arms tenants. Further, the testimony shows that "no `reasonable accommodation' will eliminate or acceptably minimize the risk [plaintiff] poses to other residents," further justifying defendants' actions and the trial court's ruling herein.

Section 3604(f)(2) covers discrimination in services or facilities connected with a dwelling, and a secondary or vacation condominium home qualifies as a dwelling for FHA standing.

Telesca v. Village of Kings Creek Condominium Ass'n · filed 2010-08-02(f)(2)

The FHA prohibits discrimination “in the provision of services or facilities in connection with [a] dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... The FHA explicitly states that it creates a cause of action for owners of a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... The fact that the Telecas’ unit was a secondary or vacation home does not divest them of standing under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) covers discriminatory sales of seasonal homes when the homes are dwellings, even if they are not suitable for year-round residence.

United States v. Columbus Country Club · filed 1990-12-18(a)

The government alleges that defendant’s policy and practice of prohibiting the sale of bungalows to non-Catholics violates the Fair Housing Act. That Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988). ... We agree with these cases and hold that the central inquiry is whether the defendant’s annual members intend to remain in the bungalows for any significant period of time and whether they view their bungalows as a place to return to. ... Consequently, defendant’s bungalows fall within the ordinary meaning of “residence” and must be considered dwellings for purposes of the Fair Housing Act. ... Therefore, we agree with the district court that the bungalows fall within the statutory definition of “dwelling” and that defendant is subject to the provisions of the Act.

Section 3604 applies to temporary farm labor camps when the camps serve as employees' dwellings during their employment.

Hernandez v. Ever Fresh Co. · filed 1996-05-03(a), (c)

This court finds that the FHA is applicable to a temporary farm labor camp, such as the camp owned by Ever Fresh and L2K Farms, because the camp serves as the dwelling of the employees ... with Ever Fresh and/or L2K Farms.

Section 3604(a) and (b) prohibit housing discrimination involving a dwelling, and seasonal migrant-camp structures occupied for four to five months qualify as dwellings under the FHA.

Lauer Farms, Inc. v. Waushara County Board of Adjustment · filed 1997-11-25(a) (b)

I am persuaded that four to five months is sufficient time to render the structures which would have been placed on the subject parcel of property “dwellings” within the meaning of the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or otherwise making unavailable a dwelling because of a protected characteristic, so the FHA does not cover a commercial, non-dwelling property or defendants who were not its sellers.

Hatch v. Barrett · filed 2021-06-16(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). ... In addition, the FHA covers the actions of sellers in a real-estate transaction. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). None of the Moving Defendants were in the process of selling the Property. ... Accordingly, the protections of the FHA cover neither the Property nor the Moving Defendants’ alleged roles in the transaction.

Section 3604(f) bars discriminatory zoning and occupancy rules affecting people with disabilities, requires direct-threat evidence rather than generalized safety fears, and requires reasonable accommodation where necessary for equal use and enjoyment of housing.

JEFFREY O. v. City of Boca Raton · filed 2007-02-26(f), (f)(9), (f)(3)(B)

An ordinance facially discriminates against the handicapped where it singles them out and applies different rules to them. ... The legislative history indicates that generalized perceptions of threats to safety should not support discrimination. ... The City did not present sufficient evidence to justify the Ordinance based on legitimate public safety concerns or to demonstrate that the restriction imposed benefitted the recovering individuals. ... Discrimination under the FHA includes denying or making a dwelling unavailable because of a handicap, including refusing to make reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services such that would be necessary to afford such person the opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ... Where Section 28-2 itself provides no exception for handicapped individuals and the City’s Code has no clearly established procedure that would allow a handicapped individual, group of individuals, or provider of group homes, to request a reasonable accommodation of the occupancy limitation, the City has not demonstrated that no less discriminatory alternative to Section 28-2 would serve the same interest. Therefore, Section 28-2 as written violates the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of handicap, but it does not invalidate state or local group-home dispersal requirements that do not bar a person with a handicap from purchasing, renting, or occupying a private dwelling.

Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul · filed 1991-01-08(f)(1)

Congress did not intend to abrogate a state’s power to determine how facilities for the mentally ill must meet licensing standards. Minnesota’s dispersal requirements address the need of providing residential services in mainstream community settings. ... The challenged state laws and city ordinance do not affect or prohibit a retarded or mentally ill person from purchasing, renting, or occupying a private residence or dwelling.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of a person's handicap, but it does not invalidate neutral dispersal rules for group homes that do not prevent disabled people from purchasing, renting, or occupying private residences.

Familystyle Of St. Paul, Inc. v. City Of St. Paul · filed 1991-02-15(f)(1)

Familystyle argues that the Minnesota and St. Paul dispersal requirements are invalid because they limit housing choices of the mentally handicapped and therefore conflict with the language and purpose of the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act. We disagree. We perceive the goals of non-discrimination and deinstitutionalization to be compatible. Congress did not intend to abrogate a state's power to determine how facilities for the mentally ill must meet licensing standards. Minnesota's dispersal requirements address the need of providing residential services in mainstream community settings. The quarter-mile spacing requirement guarantees that residential treatment facilities will, in fact, be "in the community," rather than in neighborhoods completely made up of group homes that re-create an institutional environment--a setting for which Familystyle argues. We cannot agree that Congress intended the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988 to contribute to the segregation of the mentally ill from the mainstream of our society. The challenged state laws and city ordinance do not affect or prohibit a retarded or mentally ill person from purchasing, renting, or occupying a private residence or dwelling. ... The state plays a legitimate and necessary role in licensing services for the mentally impaired. We agree with the district court that the dispersal requirement as part of the licensure process is a legitimate means to achieve the state's goals in the process of deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill. Accordingly, we conclude that the Minnesota Human Services Licensing Act and the St. Paul zoning code do not violate the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.

A § 3604(f)(1) disparate-impact claim is made out when a housing practice has a greater impact on handicapped applicants than on non-handicapped applicants.

Cason v. Rochester Housing Authority · filed 1990-08-06(f)(1)

A plaintiff makes out a pri-ma facie case of disparate impact by showing that a given practice has a greater impact on handicapped applicants than on non-handicapped ones.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits zoning rules that make housing unavailable to people with handicaps, including residents of small group homes.

In re Millcreek Township Zoning Ordinance · filed 1989-07-25(f)(1)

Millcreek Zoning Ordinance 87-24 appears to be in violation of the FHAA as it denies the handicapped non-institutional housing in small group homes within areas zoned for residential use. By upholding the validity of the ordinance, the board has violated federal law.

Section 3604(f)(2) does not bar a housing-referral agency from conditioning referrals on disclosure of active substance-abuse problems when HUD's regulatory exceptions permit the inquiries and conditions.

Williams v. SECR. OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HUMAN SERV. · filed 1993-03-11(f)(2)

The Williams plaintiffs rely on 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) [8] and its implementing regulations for the proposition that the DMH may not be a party to such an agreement with the MHFA. We do not agree. ... There are exceptions, as follows: "[T]his paragraph does not prohibit the following inquiries, provided these inquiries are made of all applicants, whether or not they have handicaps: (1) Inquiry into an applicant's ability to meet the requirements of ownership or tenancy; (2) Inquiry to determine whether an applicant is qualified for a dwelling available only to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap; (3) Inquiry to determine whether an applicant for a dwelling is qualified for a priority available to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap; (4) Inquiring whether an applicant for a dwelling is a current illegal abuser or addict of a controlled substance...." 24 C.F.R. § 100.202 (c). ... To the extent that the DMH client abuses controlled or illegal substances, § 100.202(c)(4) is applicable. ... That the DMH distinguishes clients who are simply mentally disabled from those with a dual diagnosis in the DMH's own housing referral services, by conditioning the availability of those housing referral services on authorization to disclose substance abuse problems, serves a legitimate interest of the DMH and its clients; a blanket requirement that the DMH withhold all relevant information about potential tenants from MHFA landlords would, in all likelihood, precipitate a substantial decrease in participation in the housing set-aside program.

Section 3604(f) bars handicap-based discrimination in housing and does not require an insurer to modify a neutral policy to offer disabled persons housing options unavailable to all policyholders.

Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc. v. GE Financial Assurance Co. · filed 2003-07-07(f)

The policy in question covers (and excludes) certain facilities in a disabled-neutral manner, ... and the FHA does not require GE to modify the content of its policy to give the disabled ... a choice of homes not offered all policyholders.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination in the provision of services or facilities connected with a dwelling when the discrimination is because of a handicap; a facially neutral classification violates it only if handicap status is the basis for different treatment.

Community Services, Inc., T/a Community Services Group v. Wind Gap Municipal Authority · filed 2005-08-31(f)(2)

Regardless of whether plaintiff frames a disparate treatment claim under the FHAA as one alleging discriminatory animus or one alleging a facially discriminatory classification, the most fundamental element of the claim is that plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s alleged discrimination was “because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... In short, given the facts as established by the record, we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the use of the term “personal care home” in the Regulations constitutes a facially discriminatory classification “because of’ a handicap under the FHAA. ... For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court erred in determining that the use of the term “personal care home” was a facially discriminatory classification under the FHAA. The language of the regulation and the record evidence do not establish that the use of the term was facially discriminatory “because of’ a handicap.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars handicap-based discrimination in renting a dwelling, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal to make necessary reasonable accommodations as discrimination.

Ackerman v. Deaf & Hearing Connection of Tampa Bay, Inc. · filed 2006-09-26(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental . . . [of a dwelling] to any buyer or renter because of a handicap” and to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2). The FHA further defines discrimination to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations . . . when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... In short, the evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that DHC did not discriminate against Ackerman because he is deaf and blind, but that the denial of his desired roommate and the nonrenewal of his lease were based on his continuing violations of his agreement.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits discriminating in rental or otherwise making unavailable or denying a dwelling because of the renter's handicap.

Matarese v. Archstone Communities, LLC · filed 2012-02-28(f)(1)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful to discriminate in the rental, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a renter because of a handicap of the renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits disability discrimination against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental, or in related services or facilities.

WARTLUFT v. THE MILTON HERSHEY SCHOOL AND SCHOOL TRUST · filed 2020-03-18(f)(2)

Under Section 3406(f)(2) of the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap,” 42 U.S.C. § 3406(f)(2). ... In this case, Defendants reason that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law to the extent the Estate’s FHA claim is premised upon Subsection (f)(2) because, having already established that Abrielle was not a “buyer or renter,” the Estate has failed to demonstrate that Abrielle was discriminated against “in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling.” ... Were we to include the Estate’s contentions that Abrielle was denied access to her student home and barred from school activities in toto as falling within the ambit of Subsection (f)(2), we would render Subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) distinct without a difference and violate the well-settled aforementioned jurisprudential principle. We decline to do so here and shall grant Defendants summary judgment as to Count I on that basis to the extent it is premised upon Section 3604(f)(2).

Section 3604(f) prohibits discrimination in housing because of a person's handicap or disability.

Mountainside Manor Real Estate Associates LLC v. Dallas Township · filed 2021-06-29(f)

For claims made pursuant to the FHA, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted in a discriminatory manner “because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. §3604(f). For a disparate treatment claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must show that a discriminatory purpose was a “motivating factor.”

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap, and the court applied that prohibition to disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims.

OXFORD HOUSE, INC. v. TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN · filed 2022-06-29(f)(1)

The FHA, passed by Congress as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... Under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged discrimination was because of a handicap. ... Therefore, Plaintiff does not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its FHA and ADA claims under either disparate treatment or disparate impact theory.

Section 3604(f) prohibits housing discrimination because of handicap, including intentional discrimination, disparate impact without a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, and failure to make reasonable accommodations.

Oxford House Inc v. Township of North Bergen · filed 2023-07-28(f), (f)(2), and (f)(3)(B)

The FHA, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), prohibits housing discrimination “because of a handicap.” 1 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f); ... A plaintiff can establish a violation of the FHA or ADA by showing that the challenged actions are (1) the product of intentional discrimination, (2) disparately impact the plaintiff without a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation, or (3) reflect the defendant’s failure to make reasonable accommodations. Wind Gap, 421 F.3d at 176 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) and (f)(3)(B)).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits discriminating in the sale or rental, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling because of a handicap.

Hendricks v. Urban & Economic Development · filed 2023-05-26(f)(1)

The FHA makes it unlawful “‘[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.’” Perricone-Bernovich, 843 F. App’x at 420 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)). ... Magistrate Judge Baxter correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FHA or the ADA because she has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that Curley’s and Grant’s actions were taken because of Plaintiff’s disability.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination in selling or renting a dwelling or providing access to its facilities because of a person's handicap, and liability requires showing the handicap was the but-for cause of the exclusion.

Joe v. Olive Branch Assisted Living LLC · filed 2025-08-11(f)(2)

The FHA and ADA prohibit discrimination “because of” or “on the basis of” an individual’s disability that prevents her from participating in “full and equal enjoyment” of a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Accordingly, to prevail on a claim under either statute, a plaintiff must establish that she was prevented from participating in or benefiting from a facility or service and that “but for” her disability, such exclusion would not have occurred. See Murray, 934 F.3d at 1105; 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) prohibits discrimination against a person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing because of a handicap.

Hall-Johnson v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2025-08-18(f)(2)(A)

The Amendments prohibit “discriminat[ion] against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.”

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits denying or otherwise making unavailable a dwelling because of a handicap, and a public housing official may be personally liable when positioned to directly effectuate the alleged discrimination.

Wiesman v. Hill · filed 2009-03-24(f)(1)

Under some circumstances, public housing officials can be personally liable for violations of § 3604. ... Such an official must have “the authority and power” to refuse to rent, or otherwise make available or deny, a dwelling unit. ... “In other words, the official must be in a position to directly effectuate the alleged discrimination.” ... In short, the complaint may be reasonably construed to allege a claim of discrimination against Thuot under the Federal Housing Act. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain such a claim is, of course, a question for another day, but the claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. ... In summary, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be denied as to the claim against Thuot under the Federal Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).

Section 3604(f) prohibits disability discrimination in housing and requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

United States v. Com. of Puerto Rico · filed 1991-05-07(f)

The A.R.P.E. justification for the decision, the application of a technical parking space rule to a home with no more need for parking than a private residence, seems a clear violation of the “reasonable accommodation” section of the statute.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in housing rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Crossroads Apartments Associates v. LeBoo · filed 1991-12-16(f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development define discrimination to include a refusal "to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” (42 USC § 3604 [¶] [3] [B]; 24 CFR 100.204).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) can require a landlord to waive generally applicable fees when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, unless the waiver would impose an undue financial burden.

United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co. · filed 1994-07-18(f)(3)(B)

We are not presently deciding that the fees in this case were improperly assessed. We hold only that such charges must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether, in a given case, a waiver of the charge, in whole or at least in part, “may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), and whether such waiver would impose an undue burden on the landlord.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C)'s exemption for pre-1988 construction requirements does not bar a § 3604(f)(3)(B) claim alleging refusal to make reasonable accommodations in existing rules or services.

United States Ex Rel. Woodruff v. Fairways Villas Condominium Ass'n · filed 1995-03-09(f)(2), (f)(3)(B), (f)(3)(C)

Defendants also note that, since the condominium unit in question was constructed prior to 1988, it is exempt from the accessibility requirements added to the Act in that year. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C). The Court does not disagree. But Plaintiff has not alleged a failure by the defendants to comply with those construction requirements. Rather, Plaintiff claims the defendants refused to make necessary and reasonable accommodations in existing rules and services as required by § 3604(f)(3)(B). The regulations cited by the defendants impact claims arising under § 3604(f)(3)(C) but not those brought under § 3604(f)(3)(B). Defendants’ exemption arguments do not justify dismissal of this action.

Section 3604(f)(2) bars handicap discrimination in housing terms, conditions, privileges, and related services, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations necessary to give a disabled person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Jankowski Lee & Associates v. Cisneros · filed 1996-08-26(f)(2) and (f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits discrimination "against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap...." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). This prohibition on discrimination also makes it unlawful to refuse "to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... At that point, Petitioners had a duty to make a reasonable accommodation. They did not make a reasonable accommodation, so they violated the FHA. ... The FHA does not create a right to an assigned handicapped space any more than it creates a right to an increase in the number of handicapped parking spaces at RPA. The FHA does create a statutory right to a "reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give persons with handicaps an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, with the plaintiff bearing the burden to prove reasonableness, necessity, and equal opportunity.

Bryant Woods Inn Inc v. Howard County MD · filed 1997-08-25(f)(3)(B)

The FHA thus requires an accommodation for persons with handicaps if the accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3). Because the FHA's text evidences no intent to alter normal burdens, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving each of these three elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable and necessary accommodation that affords handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing, and the accommodation must directly ameliorate the disability's effects.

Bryant Woods Inn, Incorporated v. Howard County · filed 1997-08-25(f)(3)(B)

The FHA thus requires an accommodation for persons with handicaps if the accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing. ... The "necessary" element--the FHA provision mandating reasonable accommodations which are necessary to afford an equal opportunity--requires the demonstration of a direct linkage between the proposed accommodation and the "equal opportunity" to be provided to the handicapped person. ... We hold that in these circumstances, Bryant Woods Inn's demand that it be allowed to expand its facility from 8 to 15 residents is not "necessary," as used in the FHA, to accommodate handicapped persons.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Harved Realty v. Leekoff, No. Sph 94367 (Nov. 24, 1998) · filed 1998-11-24(f)(3)(B)

I also find, however, that the plaintiff did not "refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when accommodations may be necessary . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B). To the contrary, the plaintiff worked with the defendant's problems but, when faced with roach infestation which created a health hazard, not to mention unpleasantness, for other tenants, the landlord may well have had the obligation to proceed with summary process proceedings. See also 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(9). I find that the plaintiff did make the accommodations which were reasonable in the circumstances.

Section 3604(f)(9) permits individualized public-safety restrictions, while § 3604(f)(3) requires a reasonable and necessary accommodation linked to equal housing opportunity.

Keys Youth Services, Inc. v. City of Olathe, Kan. · filed 1999-10-29(f)(9), (f)(3)

The City is therefore entitled to judgment on plaintiffs reasonable accommodation claim.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Spieth v. Bucks County Housing Authority · filed 2009-01-28(f)(3)(B)

In order to state a claim for failure to make a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must show that “the accommodations that it requested are necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” ... Spieth failed to show that there is a causal link between the denial of the extra funds and an inability to enjoy or use a dwelling.

Section 3604(f)(2), read with (f)(3)(B), bars disability discrimination in housing services and does not require a requested accommodation that is unreasonable because it imposes undue financial or administrative burdens.

Fisher v. SP One, Ltd. · filed 2014-03-18(f)(2)

The Fair Housing Act1 prohibits discrimination “in the provision of services or facilities in connection with [a] dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... An accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes undue financial and administrative burdens on the defendant. ... As a result, we agree that Fisher failed to prove that his requested accommodations were reasonable.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to make a reasonable accommodation, including allowing an emotional-support animal, when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Warren v. Delvista Towers Condominium Ass'n · filed 2014-07-29(f)(3)(B)

Therefore, this Court holds that an emotional support animal as defined by the FHA is a reasonable accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities in housing and bars disability discrimination.

Ely v. Mobile Housing Board · filed 2015-03-27(f)(3)(B)

Multiple federal statutes, including the Fair Housing Act, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012), require reasonable accommodations for and bar discrimination against persons who have disabilities. ... “[A] plaintiff must actually request an accommodation and be refused in order to bring a reasonable accommodation claim under the FHA.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities, and an unreasonable delay in responding to an accommodation request may amount to a denial; the statute does not necessarily require an immediate grant or denial.

Moody v. Gongloff · filed 2017-04-26(f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Act requires housing authorities “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... In any event, Moody was entitled to her proposed instruction only if the evidence showed that the housing authority’s delay in granting her request was unreasonable. ... A jury could not have found that the housing authority’s delay was unreasonable, so the court did not err in rejecting Moody’s proposed instruction.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits disability-based discrimination in the provision of services or facilities connected with a dwelling; a failure-to-accommodate claim requires a known disability, a request for a reasonable and necessary accommodation, and the defendant’s refusal.

Chandler v. Chartwell Holdings, Inc., et al. · filed 2019-09-13(f)(2)

The FHA provides, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person . . . in the provision of services or facilities in connection with [a] dwelling,” because of that person’s “handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate under the FHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) that he or she is handicapped, as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 2) that the defendant(s) knew or should reasonably have known of that handicap; 3) that he or she requested a particular accommodation that is both reasonable and necessary to allow plaintiff equal opportunity to use and enjoy the housing in question; and 4) that the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to consider a facially reasonable disability accommodation, unless it would impose an undue burden or fundamentally alter the provider’s program, when the accommodation is necessary to give the person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County, Inc. · filed 2019-09-18(f)(3)(B)

In sum, we hold (1) that a court must first consider whether a plaintiff has shown that a requested accommodation is facially reasonable and then whether a defendant has demonstrated that the accommodation would result in an undue burden or fundamental alteration to its program or policy; (2) that a plaintiff’s financial state in any particular case could be unrelated, correlated, or causally related to his disability and that, in some cases, an accommodation with a financial aspect—even one that appears to provide a preference—could be “necessary to afford [an] equal opportunity to use or enjoy a dwelling” within the meaning of the Act; and (3) that Schaw failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Habitat’s minimum-income requirement disproportionately excludes SSDI recipients.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to make reasonable and necessary accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

WATTERS v. HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AT THE PRESERVE AT BRIDGEWATER · filed 2019-11-21(f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Act, as amended (“FHAA”), makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person with a handicap by refusing “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). “The basic elements of an FHAA accommodation claim are well-settled.” Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 752 n. 12 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “The FHAA requires accommodation if such accommodation (1) is reasonable, and (2) necessary, (3) to afford a handicapped person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2002).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing-discrimination plaintiff seeking a reasonable accommodation to show that the accommodation may be necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling.

Mercuri v. Occidental Tower Apartments · filed 2020-05-13(f)(3)(B)

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mercuri’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) because Mercuri failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Occidental violated the FHA by providing only one parking pass for Mercuri and his co-occupant. See Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must show that the accommodation “may be necessary to afford [him] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling”).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Eulitt v. City of San Diego · filed 2020-05-20(f)(3)(B)

First, Plaintiff fails to allege that she requested a reasonable accommodation from Defendant, accordingly she cannot state a claim against Defendant for denial of reasonable accommodation. Second, Plaintiff does not allege the length of stay she requested from her landlord. Third, Plaintiff does not allege what her specific handicap is, other than that she has a disability. (Doc. No. 29 at 4.)

Section 3604(f) prohibits housing discrimination based on handicap and requires reasonable and necessary accommodations that afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Fedynich v. Boulder Housing Partners · filed 2020-09-08(f)

To state a claim alleging a failure to accommodate under the FHA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she suffers from a disability under the definition set out in the FHA, (2) the defendant knows of the disability or reasonably should know, (3) the accommodation is reasonable and necessary to afford the plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, and (4) the defendant refused to make such an accommodation. ... Further, a plaintiff must plead facts that demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the alleged disability and discriminatory act — in this case, the accommodation denial. ... Ultimately, because Plaintiffs merely label themselves as disabled and fail to identify any plausible nexus between their alleged disabilities, their requested accommodations and Defendants’ alleged discrimination, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ FHA claims against all Defendants.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in housing rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; a request need not be formal or written but must give sufficient notice of the accommodation sought.

Backus v. I.Q. Data International, Inc. · filed 2021-03-04(f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . that buyer or renter.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The FHA also prohibits discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” because of a person’s handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination is defined as “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Plaintiff is correct that the FHA does not impose a requirement to make a formal or written request for an accommodation, and it is only necessary for the person making the request to provide sufficient notice that a reasonable person could understand the nature of the accommodation sought due to the requester’s disability.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations that may be necessary to give disabled persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Southwest Fair Housing Council v. WG Scottsdale LLC · filed 2021-03-08(f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA, unlawful discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... The trier of fact will have to determine whether or not Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s requests for an ASL interpreter constituted a refusal or failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) bars disability-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling's sale or rental and related services, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling.

Higgins v. 120 Riverside Boulevard at Trump Place Condominium · filed 2021-11-19(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (the “FHAA”) extended the FHA’s principle of equal opportunity in housing to individuals with handicaps, making it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of that person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). ... The FHA, as amended by the FHAA, prohibits a housing provider’s “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts showing that she gave such an explanation or otherwise indicated that she was requesting an accommodation, she has not adequately pleaded an essential element of her failure-to-accommodate claim.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) makes it unlawful for a housing provider to refuse a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services when the accommodation is necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

McDonald v. Madison Flats · filed 2021-12-27(f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful for a housing provider to refuse to make a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices or services, when the accommodation is necessary to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). A plaintiff must show that she: (1) suffers from a disability, (2) requested an accommodation necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, (3) the requested accommodation was reasonable, (4) the defendant housing provider refused to make the accommodation, and (5) the defendant knew or should have known of the disability at the time of the refusal.

Section 3604(f) requires a disability-discrimination plaintiff to show that a housing provider refused a requested reasonable accommodation.

Johnson v. Guardian Management · filed 2022-02-10(f)(3)(B)

Because Defendants have not raised Mr. Johnson’s rent or required him to leave, they have not refused Mr. Johnson’s requested accommodation, as required to sustain a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f).

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling.

Parada v. Sandhill Shores Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2022-05-25(f)(1)(B) (f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). Such prohibited discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 729 (1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). ... To prevail on an FHA reasonable-accommodation claim, Parada must demonstrate (1) that she is handicapped; (2) she requested an accommodation and Sandhill Shores denied it; (3) the requested accommodation is reasonable; and (4) the requested accommodation [in rules, policies, practices, or services] of the handicap is necessary to afford Parada an equal opportunity [i.e., equal to a non-handicapped person] to use and enjoy the dwelling. ... Parada has adequately alleged her handicap for the purpose of her FHA reasonable-accommodation claim.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations to rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Backus v. I.Q. Data International, Inc. · filed 2022-06-03(f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

Discrimination is defined as “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Construing the allegations of the amended complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff has stated a failure to accommodate claim under the FHA based on his request to be moved to an apartment closer to the mailbox. ... At this stage of the case, the Court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of the amended complaint as true, and this is sufficient to state a failure to accommodate claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Skochko v. Mercy Housing, Inc. · filed 2022-08-15(f)(3)(B)

The FHA, FEHA, and DPA prohibit discrimination in housing on the basis of disability, which includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(b)(3)(B); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12927(c)(1), 12955(a). To prevail on these claims, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she has a disability as defined by the statute; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of her disability; (3) accommodation may be necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits a housing provider from refusing a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Sallaj v. The Summit Apartments · filed 2022-12-08(f)(3)(B)

As relevant here, it is unlawful under the FHA for a housing provider to refuse to make a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices or services, when the accommodation is necessary to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... For an FHA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege that she: (1) suffers from a disability, (2) requested an accommodation necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, (3) the requested accommodation was reasonable, (4) the defendant housing provider refused to make the accommodation, and (5) the defendant knew or should have known of the disability at the time of the refusal. ... These allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim for FHA disability discrimination.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a landlord to make a disability-related reasonable accommodation when necessary to give a person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, but a plaintiff must allege that the landlord refused a requested accommodation.

Levy v. Lawrence Gardens Apartments Del, LLC · filed 2023-03-28(f)(3)(B)

The FHA’s requirement for reasonable accommodations is not limited to buildings built after a certain date. A plaintiff alleging discrimination based on a landlord’s refusal to accommodate must plead that: “(1) he suffers from a handicap as defined by the FHAA; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.” ... To plead a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff must allege that defendants “refused to make such accommodation.” ... Levy pleads no facts, however, that he requested a handicapped spot from Lawrence Gardens and was refused one. ... Likewise, he does not allege that he asked Lawrence Gardens to maintain the elevators and automatic doors or requested 24-hour access to the accessible lobby doors, let alone that Lawrence Gardens refused these requests. His FHA discrimination claim must therefore be dismissed.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits refusing reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Lu v. Vivente 1, Inc. · filed 2023-06-12(f)(3)(B)

Federal law prohibits disability discrimination in the form of “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Because Defendant did not deny a reasonable accommodation request, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of these claims.

Section 3604(f) prohibits disability discrimination in housing and requires reasonable modifications when necessary for a person with a disability to have equal enjoyment and opportunity to use a dwelling; the requested modification must be necessary, not merely preferred.

Debity v. Vintage Village Homeowners Association · filed 2023-09-21(f)(1), (f)(3)(A)

The “operative elements” of a reasonable-modification or reasonable-accommodation claim under the FHA are “the reasonableness and necessity of the requested modification” or accommodation. ... Based on the foregoing, a fence may be necessary to allow Plaintiffs’ son to receive the same enjoyment from the property as a non-disabled child. However, Plaintiffs have failed to show how the approved wrought iron fence would not adequately alleviate their concerns. ... Although Plaintiffs may prefer a wooden fence, they have failed to show that it is a “necessity” especially in light of the HOA’s approval of a six-foot wrought iron fence. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to prove an operative element of their FHA claim and, as a result, summary judgment is proper.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable-accommodation plaintiff to plausibly allege disability, the defendant's knowledge, necessity of the accommodation, reasonableness, and refusal.

Filho v. Mercy Housing California XVII, LP · filed 2024-06-27(f)(3)(B)

A plaintiff must prove five elements to prevail on an FHA reasonable accommodation claim under § 3604(f)(3)(B): (1) that the plaintiff or his associate is disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the [disability]; (3) that accommodation of the [disability] may be necessary to afford the [disabled] person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested accommodation.” Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1216 (2007). “The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.” Id.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits disability discrimination in housing terms and services, while § 3604(f)(3)(A) requires reasonable, necessary modifications that give disabled occupants equal enjoyment.

Debity v. Vintage Village Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2024-08-26(f)(2), (f)(3)(A)

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale . . . of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... To prevail, the Debitys must establish that (1) G.D. had a disability, (2) they requested a modification on G.D.’s behalf, (3) the HOA refused to permit the requested modification, (4) the HOA knew or should have known of G.D.’s disability at the time of refusal, and (5) the requested modification was reasonable and necessary to afford G.D. an equal opportunity for enjoyment. See id. at 540–41. And here, “‘[e]qual opportunity’ means that disabled individuals are entitled to live in the same residences and communities as non-disabled individuals, insofar as that can be accomplished through a reasonable accommodation or modification.” Id. at 541.

Section 3604(f) requires landlords to make reasonable accommodations to rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, including administrative rental policies.

Jay v. Grand Management Services, Inc. · filed 2025-05-20(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of . . . that person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). “Discrimination” includes, among other conduct, “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). “Thus, the [FHA] imposes an affirmative duty upon landlords reasonably to accommodate the needs of handicapped persons, not only with regard to the physical accommodations, but also with regard to the administrative policies governing rentals.”

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) bars disability discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental or related services, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal of necessary reasonable accommodations as discrimination.

Earle v. Manchester Village Owners Association Inc · filed 2025-07-09(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

The FHA proscribes discrimination against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of the person’s handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). “Discrimination” includes a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Earle alleges sufficient facts to support her claim that Defendants’ failed to reasonably accommodate her disability under the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(2) bars disability discrimination in the terms or conditions of dwelling-related services, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires consideration of necessary reasonable accommodations, including not enforcing a zoning occupancy limit when appropriate.

Yocca v. Turtle Creek ZHB · filed 2025-08-01(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

It is undisputed by the parties that addiction is a disability covered by the FHA. Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination is defined to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Accordingly, non-uniform occupancy restrictions do not fall under the FHA exception and may be subject to reasonable accommodation under the FHA. ... Accommodations under the FHA need not fit neatly into predefined zoning definitions—rather the inquiry is whether the zoning ordinance should not be enforced as written in order to accommodate disabled individuals.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discriminatory actions that affect housing availability, while § 3604(c) prohibits housing notices or advertisements indicating a racial preference.

South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors · filed 1991-06-19(a) and (c)

Because the Apache Street affirmative marketing plan merely provided additional information to white home buyers concerning properties they might not ordinarily know about nor consider, and involved no lessening of efforts to attract black home buyers to these same properties, we conclude that the plan was not in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Thus, we are of the opinion that the Apache Street plan was not an improper statement of racial preference under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).

Section 3604(a) permits race-conscious affirmative marketing that adds potential buyers without excluding minorities, and section 3604(c) does not prohibit advertising directed to a racial group absent a racial quota or preference in access to or purchase of the dwelling.

South-Suburban Housing Center, Cross-Appellant v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors · filed 1991-09-05(a) and (c)

Because the Apache Street affirmative marketing plan merely provided additional information to white home buyers concerning properties they might not ordinarily know about nor consider, and involved no lessening of efforts to attract black home buyers to these same properties, we conclude that the plan was not in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(a). ... As discussed previously, the Apache Street AMP merely directs additional promotional and advertising toward a racial group that would normally have little interest in the respective homes. It contains no racial quota or other provision purporting to make race a factor in a decision concerning who would be permitted to see or purchase the Apache Street homes. Thus, we are of the opinion that the Apache Street plan was not an improper statement of racial preference under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(c).

A real-estate agent's discussion of protected classes in a neighborhood can constitute unlawful steering under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, even without proof of discriminatory intent when the effect is significant.

Opinion Number · filed 1994-06-29

this alone may be sufficient to show a violation of the FHAA even without proof of discriminatory intent.

Assuming the Fair Housing Act applies to homeless shelters, § 3604(f) does not support relief without evidence of discriminatory intent or discriminatory effect, and a requested affirmative accommodation from a governmental body is subject to heightened reluctance.

Johnson v. Dixon · filed 1991-09-05(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

Assuming, without deciding, however, that the antidiscrimination provisions of the Act do apply in the context of shelters for the homeless, the Court must determine whether plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding to prove the allegation of their first amended complaint, that the District of Columbia acted with discriminatory purpose in closing the Pierce and Trust Clinic shelters. ... In the instant case the answers to all four inquiries are unfavorable to the plaintiffs. They present, as previously noted, no evidence of discriminatory intent upon the part of the District of Columbia in closing the Pierce and Trust Clinic shelters, and none to show that the handicapped homeless persons are disproportionally affected in the selection of the shelters to be closed or inadequately accommodated in the manner of doing so. The District of Columbia is, moreover, a governmental body acting within the ambit of legitimately derived authority, both fiscal and legislative, and the relief sought is not merely a waiver of a regulatory requirement, but, rather, a “massive judicial intrusion” upon that governmental autonomy.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race or national origin, including through a housing moratorium that has discriminatory intent or effect.

Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center v. St. Bernard Parish · filed 2009-03-25(a)

Based on all of the evidence discussed above, the Court concludes that the Parish and Council’s intent in enacting and continuing the moratorium is and was racially discriminatory, and as such defendants have violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 and the terms of the February 2008 Consent Order.

Section 3604(f)(2) permits a handicap discrimination claim based on discriminatory intent or an unnecessarily discriminatory effect, even without proof of intent.

Wood v. Rathfelder · filed 2000-10-12(f)(2)

Plaintiffs can establish a violation of the FHAA provision making it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of property based on a handicap by showing a discriminatory intent by defendant, or a disparate impact, meaning the effect of defendant’s action is unnecessarily discriminatory even though no intent to discriminate is proved.

Section 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory housing advertisements but does not expressly give every person a statutory right to be free from them, so mere receipt alone does not establish standing.

Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc. · filed 1996-10-21(c)

Cases holding that mere receipt of a discriminatory advertisement is a sufficient injury to establish standing take Havens too far. We note that the Fair Housing Act provision at issue in Havens was 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), which the Court concluded gives all persons a statutory right to truthful information about availability of housing because it expressly prohibits misrepresentations to "any person." 455 U.S. at 373. The provision at issue here is 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), which prohibits discriminatory advertisements, but does not expressly state that advertisements and statements to "any person" are unlawful; the subsection does not designate to whom the statements must be made to be unlawful. Subsection (c) therefore does not give all persons an express statutory right to be free from discriminatory advertising.

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing advertisements that indicate a protected-class preference, limitation, or discrimination, including subtle messages that would discourage an ordinary reader of that class.

Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc. v. Connor Group · filed 2011-07-27(c)

A § 3604(c) claim has three elements. A plaintiff must prove that: (1) defendant made a statement; (2) the statement was made with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling; and (3) the statement indicated a preference, or limitation or discrimination on the basis of a protected class. ... A plaintiff may establish a violation of § 3604(c) either by proving an actual intent to discriminate, or by proving that an advertisement indicates to an “ordinary reader” that a particular class of persons is preferred or disfavored. ... A plaintiff relying on the “ordinary reader” standard is not required to prove discriminatory intent, although the defendant’s intent may be relevant. ... Section 3604(c) prohibits not only blatant limitations such as “whites only” or “no children.” It also prohibits more subtle messages that suggest an impermissible preference. The relevant question is whether the advertisement would discourage an ordinary reader of a protected class from answering the ad.

Section 3604(c) requires proof that a reasonable reader would naturally interpret a housing advertisement as indicating a racial preference or an intention to make one.

Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc. Girardeau A. Spann v. Marvin J. Gerstin · filed 1990-03-13(c)

This effort will require, of course, proof that defendants violated the Act, i.e., that to a “reasonable reader the natural interpretation of defendants’ advertisements ... is that they indicate a racial preference” or an intention to make such a preference.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) requires a housing provider to permit a necessary disability-related modification, such as a wheelchair ramp, when the modification is reasonable and paid for by the tenant.

United States v. Freer · filed 1994-07-07(f)(2), (f)(3)(A)

Unquestionably, the defendants’ refusal to permit installation of the ramp has effectively denied Ms. Soper an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her home.

Section 3604(f)(1)(C) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a person's handicap or the handicap of an associated person, but does not require a county to fund or assume leases for housing that remains available.

Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa. · filed 1992-02-24(f)(1)(C)

The Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of ... any person associated with that person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(C). ... All the plaintiff has shown is that the defendant has refused to assume certain leases, or to direct the subsequent provider to assume them. ... This in no way “makes unavailable or denies” housing to mentally retarded individuals. ... At the hearing it became clear that, if funding could be found, there is nothing to prevent mentally retarded people from moving into these leased premises tomorrow. ... For this reason, Delaware County could not have violated the Fair Housing Act, since it did not perform any act which would prevent handicapped individuals from obtaining housing.

Section 3604(a) and (f)(1) prohibit housing discrimination in selling or renting a dwelling and in otherwise making it unavailable or denying it, and the latter theory requires an official to have authority and power to directly effectuate the discrimination.

Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn · filed 1996-04-10(a), (f)(1)

The relevant language of § 3604(f)(1) states that it is unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of ... a handicap ..." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (emphasis added). Giving an ordinary and natural readingy to the language and context of both the original § 3604 and of § 3604(f)(1), we ho ld that they proscribe housing discrimination in two contexts: 1) the selling or renting of a dwelling, and 2) the otherwise making unavailable or denying of a dwelling. ... It is axiomatic that for an official to make a dwelling unavailable, that official must first have the authority and power to do so. In other words, the official must be in a position to directly effectuate the alleged discrimination.

Section 3604(a) does not reach vague allegations that a highway will prevent future housing development or perpetuate segregation, and section 3604(b) does not cover alleged discriminatory adverse impacts from a highway as a housing-related service.

Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening · filed 1998-04-28(a) and (b)

This Court finds that plaintiffs’ vague allegations that the Bypass will prevent additional low income housing in Jersey Heights, and will perpetuate segregation by “lockfing] in existing African Americans into a racially compacted area,” Compl. at 63, fail to state a claim under § 3604(a) of the FHA. ... Plaintiffs argue that the Bypass is a “provision of service in connection” with housing under the FHA and that it is being provided in a discriminatory manner because of the disproportionate adverse impact on African Americans (noise, diminished property values, air pollution, etc.). This Court declines to follow the non-binding eases cited by plaintiffs in their opposition that give the FHA such a broad reading as that propounded by plaintiffs. This Court holds that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 3604(b) of the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a protected trait, including race or familial status; discriminatory intent is not always required, because disparate impact can suffice in highly unusual circumstances.

Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, Plaintiffs-Appellants/cross-Appellees v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, Defendants-Appellees · filed 2001-08-31(a)

The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § § 3601, et seq. states that it is unlawful to “make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The standard for finding discriminatory intent is the same under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Even if plaintiffs fail to prove that defendants intended to discriminate on the basis of race, they also have a valid claim under the FHA on the theory that defendants’ actions had a disparate impact based on race. ... Despite, this strong showing of disparate racial impact, plaintiffs cannot prevail unless there are “highly unusual circumstances” present in this case. ... In sum, we find that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants’ actions had a disparate racial impact in violation of the FHA. ... These statements, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, evidence an anti-family bias that runs contrary to the clear dictates of the Fair Housing Act. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants gave effect to the anti-family bias of its citizens by staying the site plan ordinance.

Section 3604(a) reaches public and private practices that directly affect housing availability on prohibited grounds, but denying permission to use municipal property for a non-housing purpose did not make housing unavailable or deny housing.

Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly · filed 2001-08-10(a)

the Court is not convinced that Te-nafly’s denial of permission for the use of its municipal property was a public practice which directly made unavailable or denied housing.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap of the buyer, a resident, or an associated person.

['YOUNG v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY'] · filed 2014-03-12(f)(1)

Finally, the FHA makes it unlawful “to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of (A) that buyer or renter, (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff Deaf-REACH has sufficiently pled a statement of circumstances in support of its Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and FHA claims, which would entitle it to relief.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making housing unavailable or denying it on the basis of race; an action that merely makes living in an area less desirable, without making housing more difficult to obtain, does not qualify.

Mississippi Rising Coalition v. City of Oce · filed 2018-12-03(a)

The only act they allege is the City’s resolution requiring the Mississippi state flag to be flown over public buildings. That is not a “discriminatory housing practice” as required by the FHA, and plaintiffs are therefore not “aggrieved persons” under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i). Plaintiffs do not allege that the City is refusing to sell or rent homes to African-Americans, or to any other racial group. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Nor do they allege that the City has made housing “unavailable” or “den[ied]” it to anyone. Id. Plaintiffs may believe that flying the flag in question makes living in the City less desirable, but the complained-of action does not plausibly equate to making housing unavailable under the statute.

Section 3604(a) bars making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of familial status, and subtle discriminatory conduct can be enough to preclude summary judgment.

Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2020-04-02(a)

Regarding the plaintiff’s § 3604(a) claim in that case, the court stated ... This Court correctly compared the “subtle or discrete discrimination” alleged in the instant matter—such as Haile’s email that may reveal discriminatory intent and the alleged misstatement regarding Wilk’s continued occupancy—to the actions alleged in Darby and found summary judgment in favor of Haile was precluded. Haile has not established the Court made a manifest error of law in this regard.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of religion or familial status, and allegations showing discriminatory animus toward those protected traits can sufficiently state a disparate-treatment claim.

Greens at Chester, LLC v. Town of Chester · filed 2020-05-08(a)

Here, the Proposed Complaint pleads sufficient facts to make a disparate treatment claim under § 3604. ... Such allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that the County’s actions were motivated by a discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s religion and familial status.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Metropolitan Omaha Property v. City of Omaha, Nebraska · filed 2021-03-15(a)

Under the FHA, it is illegal to “make unavailable or deny[] a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (comma omitted). ... Metro Omaha fails to plausibly plead a disparate treatment claim under the FHA. ... Metro Omaha fails to plausibly plead a disparate impact claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

United States v. SSM Properties LLC · filed 2022-08-03(a)

In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 makes it unlawful to, (a) . . . make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. ... And there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Roe violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b), (c), and (d), or that his conduct constituted a “pattern or practice” of discrimination and a “denial of rights” to a group of persons that raises an issue of general public importance, see 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a).

Section 3604(a)–(b) prohibits housing discrimination that denies or otherwise makes a dwelling unavailable, or discriminates in rental terms, conditions, privileges, or related services, and “make unavailable” turns on the consequences of an action rather than the actor’s intent.

Connecticut Fair Housing Ctr v. CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC · filed 2023-07-20(a), (b)

As an initial matter, the Court cannot address the discriminatory impact and discriminatory treatment claims without deciding whether CoreLogic is subject to the FHA. The relevant statutory language requires the Plaintiffs to prove that CoreLogic, “make[s] unavailable or den[ies]” housing and/or sets “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.” §§ 3604(a)–(b); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b) (“It shall be unlawful, because of race, color, . . . or national origin, to engage in any conduct relating to the provision of housing or of services and facilities in connection therewith that otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings to persons.”) The Plaintiffs have not met their burden in showing that CoreLogic in any way sets the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental. Accordingly, the central question is whether CoreLogic “makes unavailable or denies” housing. “Congress’ use of the phrase ‘otherwise make unavailable’ refers to the consequences of an action rather than the actor’s intent.” Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 534. “[T]he word ‘make’ has many meanings, among them [t]o cause to exist, appear, or occur.’” Id. (citing United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937)).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person because of a protected characteristic, including disability.

Askins · filed 2025-09-18(a)

The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing.” ... Among other things, it prohibits the “refus[al] to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, . . . [and the] refus[al] to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, . . . national origin,” or disability.3 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f)(1). ... Generally, to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that he is “‘a member of a protected class,’ suffered relevant ‘adverse’ treatment, and ‘. . . [he must sustain] a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.’” ... Here, as discussed above with respect to Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has as a disability under the FHA, his allegations do not suggest that his disability was a motivating factor in any of the adverse actions taken by Defendants. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s FHA claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 3604(f)(1)(C) bars making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of the handicap of a person associated with the buyer or renter, but it does not make a public agency liable for refusing to pay for a particular dwelling it could choose not to lease.

Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania · filed 1993-01-21(f)(1)(C)

In summary, we hold that a public agency’s refusal to pay for a given housing unit, even if influenced by bias against the handicapped, does not violate § 3604(f)(1).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of handicap discrimination, and liability requires that the discrimination substantially motivate the action and sufficiently cause the threatened housing injury.

Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico for the District of Arecibo · filed 1993-03-09(f)(1)

Title VIII does not require a showing that discriminatory intent was the sole factor, but rather a substantial factor motivating defendants' conduct. ... On the other hand, no liability arises under Title VIII absent a sufficient causal link between the defendants' discriminatory actions and the threatened injury to the plaintiffs.

Section 3604 prohibits housing practices that deny housing because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, including policies with discriminatory effects even absent discriminatory intent.

United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park · filed 1995-05-17

The Fair Housing Act applies not only to intentional housing discrimination, but to all policies or practices which have a discriminatory effect, even absent discriminatory intent.

Section 3604 addresses discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, so construction-bidding opportunities fall outside its scope.

Looper Maintenance Service Inc. v. City of Indianapolis · filed 1999-12-13

It is readily apparent from a reading of these statutes that Looper’s complaint does not fall within the parameters of these sections because the construction bids he complains about are neither the “sale or rental” of property.

Section 3604(a) requires a prima facie housing-discrimination claim to allege protected-class membership, that the plaintiff sought and was qualified for the dwelling, denial of the dwelling, and that it remained available.

Pandozy v. Segan · filed 2007-10-23(a)

To state a prima facie case of discrimination under § 3604, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he sought and was qualified for the dwelling at issue; (3) he was denied the right to procure the dwelling; and (4) the dwelling remained available after being denied to him.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Abdelhalim v. Lewis · filed 2020-06-17(a)

Upon careful review of the record, the Court cannot locate evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Lewis or McDevitt Defendants discriminated based on Plaintiff's “race, color, religion . . . or national origin.”® 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or related services, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

State of Washington v. City of Sunnyside · filed 2020-07-22(b)

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... Plaintiff’s housing discrimination claims assert that Defendants enforce the CFRHP in a manner that results in the extrajudicial judicial eviction of Sunnyside residents who are disproportionately Latino/as, women, or families with children. ... The Court agrees that, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff has alleged a prime facie claim that Defendants have made housing unavailable on the basis of a protected class. Therefore, the claims should not be dismissed at this early stage in the case.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin; zoning decisions that effectively prohibit housing construction can make housing unavailable.

FSI Green Park South Property LLC v. Pelham, City of, The · filed 2020-08-24(a)

The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits the refusal “to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). “[T]o prevail on a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing.” Hallmark Dev., Inc. v. Fulton Cty, Ga., 466 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Housing may become unavailable within the meaning of the FHA as a result of zoning decisions that effectively prohibit the construction of housing.” Id.

Section 3604 requires a Fair Housing Act discrimination claimant to allege facts showing that the defendant's conduct was discriminatory or motivated at least in part by discrimination.

Kahyaoglu v. Sayied · filed 2020-10-02

However, these Counts fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted even when construing the complaint liberally. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support the conclusion that Defendants’ conduct was discriminatory, or motivated, at least in part, by discrimination as required to maintain her FHA discrimination claim in Count 1 under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 or retaliation claim in Count 2 under 42 U.S.C. § 3617. S. Middlesex Opportunity Council Inc. v. Town of Framingham, 752 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95 (D. Mass. 2010).

Section 3604 prohibits a housing decision, including eviction, when race is a significant factor in the decision, and it reaches decisions based wholly or partly on racial considerations.

Miller v. Towne Oaks East Apts. · filed 1992-07-24

In order to succeed on his claims, the Plaintiff “need only prove that race was one significant factor in defendant’s dealings with [him] in order to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act.” ... The statute extends to any situation where a housing decision is based in whole or in part on racial considerations.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise denying housing because of race, and a plaintiff need only show that race was one motivating factor, not the sole factor.

Cousins v. Bray · filed 2003-12-30(a)

In order to succeed on their Fair Housing Act claim, Plaintiffs need not show that race was the sole factor in Defendants’ decision to terminate the tenancy; they need only establish that race was one motivating factor in the decision.

Sections 3604(a) and (b) prohibit racial discrimination that makes a dwelling unavailable or denies it, and discrimination in the terms, conditions, privileges, or connected services of sale or rental, including the denial and pricing of homeowner’s insurance; the prohibition reaches disparate-impact discrimination.

Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc. · filed 2010-04-09(a), (b)

It is unlawful under the FHA “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). This provision has been interpreted to prohibit not just intentional discrimination but also actions that have a discriminatory effect based on race (disparate-impact discrimination). ... We now hold that the FHA prohibits racial discrimination in both the denial and pricing of homeowner’s insurance. ... Section 3604(a) of the FHA makes it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny” a dwelling because of race. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Similarly, Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful to discriminate because of race “in the provision of services or facilities” in connection with “the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(a) prohibits discriminatory denials or pricing of insurance when they effectively prevent a person from obtaining housing because of race.

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1992-10-20(a)

Section 3604 applies to discriminatory denials of insurance, and discriminatory pricing, that effectively preclude ownership of housing because of the race of the applicant.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discriminatory denials or pricing of property insurance when they effectively prevent a person from owning housing because of race.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company · filed 1992-12-07(a)

Section 3604 applies to discriminatory denials of insurance, and discriminatory pricing, that effectively preclude ownership of housing because of the race of the applicant.

Section 3604(a) requires plaintiffs to allege race-based unequal treatment that affects the availability of housing, including public housing.

Jackson v. Okaloosa County · filed 1994-06-08(a)

Therefore, in order to state a claim under § 3604(a), the plaintiffs must allege unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing.

Sections 3604(a) and (b) prohibit discriminatory property-insurance underwriting because insurance availability directly affects a person's ability to obtain housing.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Cisneros · filed 1995-08-04(a) and (b)

Thus, we conclude that Chevron analysis was appropriate in this case and that the district court did not err in finding that insurance underwriting practices are governed by the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(a) and (b) may be applied to discriminatory property-insurance underwriting because the availability of property insurance directly affects a person’s ability to obtain housing.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Cisneros · filed 1995-05-01(a) and (b)

the availability of property insurance has a direct and immediate affect on a person’s ability to obtain housing. ... Accordingly, we conclude that HUD’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act is consistent with goals of the Fair Housing Act and a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, and a claimant must show race-based unequal treatment affecting housing availability.

WODA COOPER DEVELOPMENT INC v. CITY OF WARNER ROBINS GEORGIA · filed 2023-06-13(a)

“The FHA prohibits the ‘refus[al] to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.’” Hallmark Devs., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 466 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)). “In order to prevail on a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994)).

Section 3604(a) permits a property owner and management company to be held vicariously liable for a leasing agent’s discriminatory conduct within the scope of employment.

United States v. Habersham Properties, Inc. · filed 2003-10-06(a)

In the instant case, all of Monner’s actions were in the scope of her employment and for the benefit of Crescent Court. It was in the scope of her employment that she was interacting with applicants and making judgments regarding applicants. Therefore, it will be appropriate to hold both Habersham and PB Investors vicariously liable for Monner’s actions.

A property owner that gives its agent exclusive control over leasing is not vicariously liable under Section 3604 for the agent’s alleged discrimination when the owner lacks the requisite control over the rental process.

Cleveland v. Caplaw Enterprises · filed 2005-07-25(d)

Plaintiffs do not allege, nor does the agreement between Caplaw and LC suggest, that defendant retained the requisite control over the rental process to subject it to liability under the holdings in Cabrera and Meyer.

Section 3604(b) follows traditional agency rules: a corporation may be vicariously liable for an employee’s housing discrimination, but its officers and owners are not personally liable solely because of their positions.

Meyer v. Holley · filed 2003-01-22(b)

The Fair Housing Act forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. 82 Stat. 81, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3604(b), 3605(a). The question before us is whether the Act imposes personal liability without fault upon an officer or owner of a residential real estate corporation for the unlawful activity of the corporation’s employee or agent. We conclude that the Act imposes liability without fault upon the employer in accordance with traditional agency principles, i. e., it normally imposes vicarious liability upon the corporation but not upon its officers or owners.

Section 3604(c) makes statements indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in connection with the sale of property unlawful.

Matt and Robin Kerr, and Debbie Tomaszewski v. Helen C. Vick and Richard Vick, and Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc. And Gerry C · filed 1993-02-19(c)

The Fair Housing Act makes statements which indicate "any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, ... or national origin...." in connection with the sale of property unlawful. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Furthermore, the district court may grant injunctive relief if it finds that a discriminatory act which would violate the Fair Housing Act has occurred or is about to occur. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1). The record supports the plaintiffs' allegation that the Vicks made discriminatory statements; therefore, we cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiffs' claims were baseless.

Section 3604(a) is not violated by a neutral occupancy policy without substantial evidence that the policy was actually enforced in a discriminatory manner, and § 3604(c) is not violated by an undisclosed preference statement absent substantial evidence that it communicated a refusal to rent to families with children.

Carlson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on Behalf of Bad Horse · filed 1996-04-05(a), (c)

The record simply does not support the ALJ's decision that Carlson and Summy were enforcing a three-person maximum when they asked the Bad Horses to move out. ... We also reject the ALJ's conclusion that Carlson violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988) by making a statement indicating a preference not to rent to families with children. ... We see no violation of § 3604(c).

Section 3604(a) treats steering families away from housing as making a dwelling unavailable, while §§ 3604(b) and (c) prohibit discriminatory housing privileges and statements.

Fair Housing Congress v Weber · filed 1997-12-04(a), (b), (c)

An example of “mak[ing] unavailable” in violation of § 804(a) is “steering.”

Section 3604(c) prohibits statements about the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicate a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on handicap; a tacit, non-facial preference may violate the statute when the context would signal it to an ordinary reader.

Maziarz v. Housing Authority · filed 2012-02-27(c)

Clear precedent establishes, however, that “expression of a tacit preference not to provide housing to members of protected groups may violate section 3604(c),” even if that expression is not facially discriminatory, and in such cases, an examination of intent is helpful to determine the context in which the statement was made.

Section 3604(c) prohibits a zoning ordinance that on its face indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on handicap.

Montana Fair Housing, Inc. v. City of Bozeman · filed 2012-02-28(c)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to print any document “that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... handicap ... or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). ... Because the Court has determined that the Authorized Uses Section is facially discriminatory, it necessarily follows that the section violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Thus, Bozeman’s argument fails and Fair Housing is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 3604(c) bars oral or written statements about renting a dwelling that indicate a racial preference, and a prima facie claim requires a statement, a connection to the rental, and an indication of racial preference.

Wentworth v. Hedson · filed 2007-06-26(c)

Thus, to establish a prima facie claim under section 3604(c), plaintiffs must prove that: (1) defendants made a statement; (2) the statement was made with respect to the rental of a dwelling; and (3) the statement indicated a preference, limitation, or discrimination on the basis of race.

Section 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory statements about dwelling rentals, and a violation may be shown through actual discriminatory intent or an objective ordinary-listener interpretation; the prohibition applies to individuals as well as companies.

Fair Housing Resources Center, Inc. v. DJM's 4 Reasons Ltd. · filed 2012-09-06(c)

To prevail under § 3604(c), FHRC was required to prove that the defendant made a statement, the statement was made with respect to the rental of a dwelling, and the statement indicated a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on handicap. See Campbell v. Robb, 162 F. App’x 460, 466–67 (6th Cir. 2006). FHRC contends that § 3604(c) is a strict liability statute rendering the defendant’s intent irrelevant. That position, however, is at odds with our established law. We have previously explained that a plaintiff may prove a § 3604(c) violation in one of two ways: by proof that the defendant made the statement with the actual intent to discriminate, if proof of actual intent exists, or by proof that an “ordinary listener” would naturally interpret the statement as indicating a preference for or against a protected group or as indicating some other limitation or discrimination against a protected group. ... Finally, we agree with FHRC that the prohibitions of § 3604(c) applied to Murphy individually as well as to his company, DJM’s 4 Reasons.

Section 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory statements about a dwelling only when they concern its availability in connection with a prospective or ongoing sale or rental, not after the dwelling has been rented.

Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2019-12-02(c)

The Court finds § 3604(c)’s proscription of discriminatory statements made “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling” applies only to statements concerning the “availability” of housing.

Section 3604(c) prohibits oral or written housing-related statements indicating a sex-based preference, limitation, or discrimination, and sexually harassing statements connected to a lease can satisfy that prohibition.

GLAGOLA v. MACFANN · filed 2023-11-03(c)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “make, print, or publish … any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination” based on sex. ... Mr. MacFann made those statements in connection with Ms. Glagola’s lease and an ordinary listener could find that they amounted to discrimination based on her sex.

Section 3604(a) reaches insurance-related conduct that makes a dwelling otherwise unavailable because of handicap, and § 3604(c) prohibits rental statements that an ordinary listener would understand as expressing a protected-status preference, limitation, or discrimination.

Chhang v. West Coast USA Properties LLC · filed 2025-02-11(a), (c)

One prohibited activity is to refuse to provide property or hazard insurance for dwellings or to provide insurance differently because of handicap. ... Rather, a statement violates § 3604(c) if ‘an ordinary listener would believe that [it] suggests a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on a protected status.’ ” ... The Court is unpersuaded that D&D did not create a duty it owed to Plaintiff under the broad scope of the FHA by its own alleged actions and/or statements. ... Accordingly, D&D’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FHA claim is denied.