Statute Annotations › Federal › 42 U.S.C. § 3604

42 U.S.C. § 3604

Discrimination in sale or rental of housing and other prohibited practices: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
1,978
Cited in passing
913
Citing cases indexed
4,834
Case dates
1969–2026
Screened through
2026-06-17
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-01
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

2,891 citing cases reviewed of 4,834 in the citation index: 1,978 interpreted the section (annotated below), 913 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-17 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 42 U.S.C. § 3604?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1974-08-22 Pub. L. 93-383 added sex to the protected grounds in § 3604(a)–(e). Source
  • 1988-09-13 Pub. L. 100-430 added familial status to § 3604(a)–(e), handicap to § 3604(c)–(e), and § 3604(f)'s disability protections, including reasonable modifications, accommodations, and accessibility requirements; the amendments took effect 1989-03-12, while the design-and-construction duty applies to covered buildings first occupied after 1991-03-13. Source
  • 1988-09-13 Pub. L. 100-430 replaced former § 3612(a)'s 180-day private-action deadline with the two-year period in § 3613(a)(1)(A), effective 1989-03-12. Source
  • 1995-12-28 Pub. L. 104-76 amended § 3607(b)(2)(C)'s older-persons exception to familial-status protection, removing the former significant-facilities-and-services requirement while retaining the 80-percent occupancy and intent criteria and adding age-verification requirements. Source
  • 2003-01-22 Meyer v. Holley held that ordinary agency rules can make a principal or employer liable for an agent's Fair Housing Act violation without the principal's personal involvement. Source
  • 2015-06-25 Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project confirmed disparate-impact liability under the Fair Housing Act without proof of discriminatory intent, but required a robust causal link to an identified policy and allowed valid interests to justify it. Source
  • 2017-05-01 Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami held that an FHA damages claim requires a direct relation between the claimed injury and discriminatory conduct; foreseeability alone does not establish proximate cause. Source
  • 2018-08-27 Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC held that § 3604(b) reaches post-acquisition discrimination in services and facilities connected with a rental, including common areas and meals. Source

Discrimination in the sale or rental of dwellings

Section 3604(a) permits a tenant to raise a racially discriminatory lease termination or refusal to renew as a defense to a possession action.

Marine Park Associates v. Johnson · filed 1971-08-27(a)

Again, the question: Is the assertion of a claim under 42 U.S.C., sec. 3604(a) and sec. 1982, germane to the distinctive purpose of determining plaintiff’s right to possession? The answer, we think, is that whether possession is sought by reason of lease termination or refusal to renew, if based upon the rights enunciated and protected by these sections, then such is pertinent and germane under Rosewood to the distinctive purpose of the proceeding and can be introduced by “joinder, counterclaim or otherwise”.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions based on race or national origin.

Lozano v. City of Hazleton · filed 2007-07-26(a)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions on the basis of “race ... or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits race-based discrimination in the sale or rental of covered dwellings, but it does not create a right to menace or assault someone who allegedly opposed its purposes.

The People of the State of New York v. Davis · filed 1969-03-28

Section 804 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is indubitably a “law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States,” prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of dwellings covered by its terms “because of race, color, religion, or national origin.” ... In contrast the Fair Housing Act confers no right to menace or assault anyone, including persons who have allegedly demonstrated hostility to its purposes.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) and (d) prohibit racially discriminatory refusals to sell housing and discriminatory misrepresentations that housing is unavailable.

McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc. · filed 1973-11-14(a) and (d)

Each of these acts individually and all of them collectively were motivated by racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (d).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race, and § 3604(b) prohibits racially discriminatory terms or conditions of sale.

United States v. Pelzer Realty Company, Inc., and William G. Thames · filed 1973-11-19(a), (b)

Thames violated § 3604(a) when he offered to build identical houses for them in another part of town, and when he threatened to force them into litigation before selling the houses. ... We find that Thames’ demand that Barnett and Marshall find other buyers before they could avoid payment of closing costs was discriminatory treatment, and we find further that this discriminatory treatment was racially motivated. It therefore violated 42 U. S.C. § 3604(b). ... The placing of “sold” signs in front of the houses in order to foreclose the right of Barnett and Marshall to recontract for the houses violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits using race as a factor in selling or negotiating for residential lots and invalidates a facially neutral sales policy when it operates to discriminate.

D. C. Williams Et Ux. v. The Matthews Company · filed 1974-06-20(a), (b)

Race is an impermissible factor in real estate transactions under both 42 U.S..C- § 1982 and 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and “cannot be brushed aside because it was neither the ... reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimination.” ... The undisputed facts show that under the circumstances the alleged procedure of selling lots only to builders carried racial overtones, and such a policy, even though neutral on its face, cannot stand if it in its operation serves to discriminate on the basis of race.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) and (d) prohibit racially discriminatory refusals to sell or negotiate for the sale of a dwelling and misrepresentations that a dwelling is unavailable, but those prohibitions apply only to property meeting the Act’s definition of a dwelling.

Ryan v. Brown · filed 1976-01-16(a) and (d)

The Act makes it unlawful where on basis of race, color, religion, or national origin a person refuses to sell or negotiate for the sale of a dwelling or to represent that any dwelling is not available for inspection or sale when it is, in fact, so available. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (d). ... Despite this, there was not competent substantial evidence to sustain the Commission’s finding that the tract of acreage was offered for sale in such a manner as to meet the definition of “dwelling” under 42 U.S.C. § 3602.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of race and applies even when the residential operation is noncommercial.

United States v. Hughes Memorial Home · filed 1975-05-25(a)

Whether the Home is within the scope of the prohibition in section 3604(a) thus turns on whether it is “occupied as . . . a residence.” ... The Court therefore holds that the Home is a dwelling within the meaning of section 3602(b). ... While the Home receives some payment on behalf of 80%-90% of the residents, the Court concludes that the Act also reaches noncommercial activities, and that the Home is prohibited from discrimination even with respect to residents for whom no payment is made.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) covers real-estate appraisers and reaches practices that effectively make a dwelling unavailable or deny it because of race or national origin, including discriminatory appraisal standards.

United States v. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers of the National Ass'n of Realtors · filed 1977-11-23(a)

It is clear from the plain language of the provisions that appraisers are not exempted from their coverage; both sections are unrestricted with respect to the class of persons subject to their prohibition. The “otherwise make unavailable or deny” language of section 804(a) has been applied to a variety of conduct to prohibit all practices which have the effect of denying dwellings on prohibited grounds. ... The promulgation of standards which cause appraisers and lenders to treat race and national origin as a negative factor in determining the value of dwellings and in evaluating the soundness of home loans may effectively “make unavailable or deny” a “dwelling” and may “interfere” with persons in the exercise and enjoyment of rights guaranteed by the Act. When such denial or interference occurs as a result of considerations relating to race or national origin, sections 804(a) and 817 are transgressed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 does not make a multiple-listing service vicariously liable for participating brokers’ discriminatory acts where the brokers are not its agents and the service has not violated an express statutory duty.

Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co. · filed 1978-03-15(b)

Nonetheless, the facts offered by plaintiffs to support this aspect of their claim are insufficient to hold MLS liable under Title VIII. ... It is evident that here MLS is not a principal and has not been shown to have violated an express statutory duty.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to negotiate for, make unavailable, or deny a dwelling because of race, color, religion, or national origin.

Dillon v. AFBIC Development Corp. · filed 1979-06-21(a)

To carry out that purpose, Congress made it unlawful “to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin”. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Thus, Greene’s refusal to sell comes within the prohibitions of the Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or negotiate for a dwelling, or otherwise making it unavailable, because of race.

Dewitt and Ella McDonald v. Raymond L. And Bonnie G. Verble · filed 1980-05-05(a)

We read these actions as violative of the letter and spirit of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b) and (d).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, and a housing applicant may recover when race actually played a part in the denial rather than relying on hypothetical housing availability.

Jordan v. Dellway Villa Of Tenn., Ltd. · filed 1981-10-19(a)

If race played a part in the claimant's denial, then recovery of damages is mandated. ... Hypothetical factors are irrelevant to this inquiry. Accordingly, courts are not to erect hypothetical constructs of what might have happened in each individual class member's case had the defendant not discriminated against the entire class. ... The critical issue in determining eligibility for recovery of damages in this case is whether an individual applicant was actually discriminated against by the defendants, not whether an individual applicant would have been able to rent an apartment at Dellway Villa if all applications had been processed fairly.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and this prohibition applies to federally assisted public housing authorities.

Title VI and Urban Indian Housing · filed 1982-06-08

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 more specifically bans discrimination in the sale or rental of housing “ because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604. This prohibition applies to public housing authorities like the St. Raul agency involved here that receive federal financial assistance. 42 U .S.C . § 3603(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 bars race discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, including governmentally operated housing and the terms and conditions of rental, and may be enforced by private parties.

Burney v. Housing Authority of County of Beaver · filed 1982-08-20(a), (b)

The operative section of Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, bars discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, including both governmentally and privately operated units, as to both the actual sale or rental and all terms and conditions; Section 3604 is among those sections of Title VIII that are enforceable by private parties.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, including making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race.

Betty Anderson, Arlene Hudson, Cassie Moore and Bertha Daniels v. City of Alpharetta · filed 1984-08-01(a)

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, while section 3617 provides that it shall be unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with" any person's exercise or enjoyment of the rights secured by the other provisions of Title VIII. ... The plaintiffs do not allege that HUD was involved in the sale or rental of housing in north Fulton County, and we do not believe that the language "or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race" can be extended to cover the action or inaction of the federal defendants in this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race; race need only be an effective reason for the refusal, not the sole reason.

Melvin E. Green and John W. Saunders, III v. Century 21, Briarcrest Realty, Inc., Martin Fewlas, Donna Fewlas, Ruth Ann · filed 1984-08-13(a)

Similarly in housing discrimination suits, other circuits have clearly and repeatedly found liability when race was only one factor, rather than the sole reason for refusal to sell. ... Judge Young’s instruction that the jury could find liability if race was “an effective reason for defendants’ refusal to sell” was therefore an accurate statement of housing law. There was no error in the instruction.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Delano Village Companies v. Orridge · filed 1990-01-12(a)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent * * * or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin” (42 USC § 3604 [a]).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits handicap discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or making it unavailable or denying it, and applies to discriminatory leasing conduct occurring after the Act's effective date regardless of when the dwelling was built.

United States v. Forest Dale, Inc. · filed 1993-03-05(f)(1)

The Act makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The prohibition against handicap discrimination is thus applicable to discriminatory conduct in the lease or rental of any dwelling which occurs after the effective date of the Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits racial discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, and permits liability based on significant discriminatory effects when tied to an identified policy, procedure, or practice.

Gordon D. Simms, Gordon D. Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, First Gibraltar Bank, Fsb, Now Known as First Madison Bank, Fs · filed 1996-05-31(b)

Section 3604(b) provides that it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race.” ... We agree that a violation of the FHA may be established not only by proof of discriminatory intent, but also by a showing of significant discriminatory effect. ... The relevant question in a discriminatory effects claim against a private defendant, however, is not whether a single act or decision by that defendant has a significantly greater impact on members of a protected class, but instead the question is whether a policy, procedure, or practice specifically identified by the plaintiff has a significantly greater discriminatory impact on members of a protected class. ... We therefore conclude that Simms did not present sufficient evidence to establish a violation of the FHA under a discriminatory effects theory of liability.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination based on familial status in the sale or rental of housing unless the housing qualifies for the Fair Housing Act's older-persons exemption.

Lippman v. Bridgecrest Estates I Unit Owners Ass'n · filed 1998-09-01(a)

Because Bridgecrest fails to qualify as housing for older persons under 42 U.S.C. Section 3607(b), it is not exempt from 42 U.S.C. Section 3604(a) which prohibits discrimination, based on familial status, in the sale or rental of housing. If Bridgecrest used its right of first refusal solely to discriminate based on familial status, the trial court erred in finding that Bridgecrest properly exercised its right of first refusal to purchase the Klass unit. At trial, two Bridgecrest board members testified that the sole reason for exercising the right of first refusal was to stop Mr. Lippman from leasing the unit to someone who did not meet Bridgecrest’s age restriction. Because Bridgecrest does not qualify for an older persons’ housing exemption under the Fair Housing Act, Brid-gecrest’s exercise of its right of first refusal was improper.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling because of race or other listed protected characteristics.

Cooper v. Commission on Human Rght., No. Cv 99 0496223 (Oct. 23, 2000) · filed 2000-10-23

The federal Fair Housing Act, and regulations issued thereunder, as well as the state statutes, make it unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin or handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 ; 24 C.F.R. § 100.60 (b)(4); General Statutes § 46a-64c (2).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse, negotiate, or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling because of familial status, among other protected characteristics.

Opinion Number · filed 2003-03-14(a)

Under federal law is 42 U.S.C. § 3604 , "Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and other prohibited practices," provides it shall be unlawful (a) to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familia status, or national origin."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin in the sale or rental of a dwelling, including claims based on disparate impact.

Darst-Webbe Tenant Association Board, a Missouri Non-Profit Corporation Housing Comes First, a Missouri… · filed 2003-08-08(a)

... However, the appellants presented evidence of disparate impact discrimination and we believe that the district court should have provided some explanation as to why that evidence is insufficient. See United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir.1992) (setting out the proper test to apply when analyzing alleged discrimination under the Fair Housing Act). As such, these three counts are remanded to the district court for a more thorough explanation on the appellants' disparate impact claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap.

Needham v. Mae · filed 2012-02-21(f)(1)

However, Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits “discrimination] in the sale or rental of, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap,” Needham was not denied the ability to buy or rent a home. Therefore, he states no Fair Housing Act Claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination that makes housing unavailable or denies housing because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

White v. Ockey · filed 2007-06-05(a)

M s. W hite’s Fair Housing Act claim fails to state a cause of action against the State Defendants because it does not allege that the State Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits making housing unavailable or denying housing because of a protected classification, including race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Parker v. Viacom International, Inc. · filed 2009-03-11(a)

Under the Fair Housing Act, discrimination is the sale or rental of housing is prohibited on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C §§ 3601-3631. To assert a violation under the Fair Housing Act, plaintiff must show: (1) he is the “victim of a discriminatory housing practice;” (2) “that make[s] unavailable or den[ies]’ housing” on account of a protected classification. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Here, Plaintiff has made no such claim. Rather Plaintiff describes Defendants’ behavior as harassment, designed to make him lose access to the Internet.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent a dwelling after a bona fide offer because of a protected status, and a plaintiff must plausibly connect the refusal to that status.

Bond v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-05-21(a)

The Act provides that it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent” a dwelling, “after the making of a bona fide offer,” on account of a protected status, including disability, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f), but Bond’s amended complaint says nothing which raises a plausible inference that he is a member of a protected class under the Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race or another protected characteristic.

Maine Human Rights Commission v. Megunticook Management · filed 2017-05-17(a)

housing was denied Ms. Kelderhouse and Ms. Patton by Megunticook within the meaning of 5 MRS §§4581-A(l)(B) and 42 U.S.C §3604(a). They are members of a protected class; and they were qualified for a housing opportunity, which in this case means they had a right to have their application reviewed; and their application was denied while the housing opportunity remained available to others.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, or making housing unavailable, because of a person’s handicap or an associated person’s handicap; a prima facie case requires discriminatory purpose or impact.

Thomas v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC · filed 2018-02-20(f)

“The FHA, enacted pursuant to United States policy to provide for ‘fair housing throughout the United States,’ 42 U.S.C. § 3601, makes it unlawful, inter alia, to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing or otherwise to make housing unavailable to a buyer or renter because of that buyer’s or renter’s handicap or the handicap of certain persons associated with the buyer or renter.” Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cty., Md., 124 F.3d 597, 602-03 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)). “To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA, the [plaintiffs must] demonstrate that the housing action or practice being challenged was either motivated by a discriminatory purpose or had a discriminatory impact.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and covers discrimination based on sexual orientation, while harassment must be severe or pervasive to be actionable.

Ross v. Tucker · filed 2019-07-25

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against anyone in the sale or rental of housing based on their race, color, religion, sex, family status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Plaintiff’s complaint states that he was evicted as a result of his failure to pay rent despite apparent verbal agreements that he had with Defendant Tucker. He also complains that he paid a utility bill that was not his. These landlord-tenant issues are not actionable under the Fair Housing Act, and there is no other basis for federal jurisdiction because the parties are all from Wisconsin. (Docket #1 at 1–2); 28 U.S.C. § 1332. While discrimination based on sexual orientation is actionable under the Fair Housing Act, Plaintiff does not allege that he was evicted for his heterosexuality, or that the harassment that he experienced was “severe or pervasive.” Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Comm., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2018). Therefore, his complaint must be dismissed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) bars religion-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling sale or related services, while § 3604(c) bars housing-sale statements indicating a religious preference or intent to discriminate and permits context and ordinary-reader analysis.

Morris v. W. Hayden Estates First Addition Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2019-04-04(b), (c)

Section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale ... of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of" that person's religion. ... Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful "[t]o make ... any statement ... with respect to the sale ... of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... religion ... or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination." ... Finders of fact evaluating a claim under section 3604(c) may use the context in which the statement was made to evaluate whether the statement expresses a preference that a non-religious individual purchase the home. ... The Court, having reviewed all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to offer sufficient proof upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Homeowners Association violated sections 3604(b), 3604(c) and 3617 of the Fair Housing Act. As it must in the Rule 50 context, the Court has not evaluated the credibility of the witnesses in deciding the issue. Put simply, the January 2015 Letter, which is by far Plaintiffs strongest piece of evidence, does not support the conclusion that the Homeowners Association intended to discriminate against Plaintiffs due to Plaintiffs' Christian faith. As such, judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Homeowners Association is appropriate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell, rent, or negotiate for a dwelling, or otherwise making it unavailable or denying it, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Alcaraz v. KMF Oakland LLC · filed 2019-12-05(a)

Mr. Alcaraz alleges that Altezza engaged in a variety of discriminatory practices, including refusing to sell, rent, or negotiate the sale or rental of his residence, that effectively made his home unavailable to him within the meaning of § 3604(a). ... Although the SAC’s allegations could be more robust, the Court finds them sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claims is DENIED.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or negotiate for a dwelling, or otherwise making it unavailable or denying it, because of race, color, or national origin.

Noel v. Aqua Vista Townhomes Condominium Association, Inc. · filed 2019-09-12(a)

Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful, on the basis of someone’s race, color, or national origin, (1) to refuse to sell a dwelling after the making of a bona fide offer, (2) to refuse to negotiate for the sale of a dwelling, or (3) to otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the rental or sale of a dwelling based on handicap, race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Briley v. Barreca · filed 2020-10-26(f)(1), (b)

The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, prohibits discrimination in the rental or sale of a dwelling because of a handicap of that buyer or renter, or a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling. The Fair Housing Act also prohibits discrimination in the rental or sale of a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. Plaintiff does not allege that he was discriminated against in the rental or sale of a dwelling because of a handicap of a buyer or renter, or a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling. Plaintiff also does not allege that he was discriminated against in the rental or sale of a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) covers discriminatory conditions or services after a dwelling is acquired and requires discriminatory motive, while § 3604(e) bars profit-driven inducements based on a protected class, not homelessness alone.

Brown v. Fire Department of the City of New York · filed 2020-11-25(b), (e)

The Second Circuit has recently ruled that § 3604(b) covers not just the initial sale or rental of a dwelling but “conduct that . . . would constitute discrimination in the enjoyment of residence in a dwelling or in the provision of services associated with that dwelling after acquisition.” ... Discriminatory motive is an element of any § 3604 discrimination claim. ... Section § 3604(e) defines protected classes as “race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e). ... Accordingly, having failed to allege that the Building Defendants made representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons in any protected class, Plaintiffs’ blockbusting claim fails.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits discrimination in the rental or sale of a dwelling because of a handicap, and § 3604(b) prohibits such discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Briley v. Barreca · filed 2021-01-27(f)(1) (b)

The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, prohibits discrimination in the rental or sale of a dwelling because of a handicap of that buyer or renter, or a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling. The Fair Housing Act also prohibits discrimination in the rental or sale of a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the rental of a dwelling based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, but does not prohibit housing discrimination based on age.

Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2021-05-11(b)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the . . . rental of a dwelling, . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” and on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f). The Fair Housing Act does not prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of age.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap, and a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to make a disability-discrimination claim plausible.

Swanson v. King · filed 2021-08-27(f)(1)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). Plaintiff alleged discrimination because of his disability in his complaint, but he does not provide any factual support of his complaint in either his complaint or his objection. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts demonstrating a plausible claim that defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his disability.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

Miller v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama · filed 2022-01-05

Although Miller does not specify the specific provisions at issue, the court assumes she is referring to the provisions that make it unlawful to discriminate against any person in “the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,” or for “any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions” to discriminate in these transactions, based on an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605. Unfortunately, however, Miller does not plead that Blue Cross, her health insurance provider, discriminated against her in the terms of her residence, engaged in discriminatory real-estate transactions, or interfered in the “making or purchasing of loans or . . . other financial assistance” for her home due to her race, religion, gender, disability, familial status, or nationality.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin in real-estate transactions, and a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case at the motion-to-dismiss stage when factual allegations plausibly support discrimination.

Thornton v. Caramagno · filed 2022-03-18(a)

The FHA prohibits discrimination against “any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” in real estate transactions. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... At the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, Thornton is not required to plead a prima facie case or show that Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selling the property to her was pretextual. ... Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Thornton’s FHA and ELCRA claims should be dismissed for failure to plead a prima facie case of housing discrimination. ... Together, these allegations permit the Court to draw the reasonable inference of racial discrimination and are sufficient to state a claim for relief. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of Thornton’s FHA or ELCRA claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin; it does not generally create a right to a habitable home.

Northern v. Pedcor Management Corp. · filed 2022-05-09

The Fair Housing Act contains provisions making it unlawful for a person to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin in the sale or rental of housing. 42 U.S.C. §3604; Valencia v. City of Springfield, Illinois, 883 F.3d 959, 966 (7th Cir. 2018). ... The Fair Housing Act is a discrimination law; it does not generally establish a right to a “habitable home.” ... Because Northern does not claim to belong to any of the protected categories of the Act, nor claim that any such category was the basis for discrimination against him by defendant, his complaint does not state a viable claim under the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent, refuse to negotiate, or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Williams Jr v. Heartland Realty Investors, Inc. · filed 2022-08-01(a)

In Count II, plaintiffs rely on 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which states it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” ... Construing these pro se allegations in plaintiffs’ favor, along with allegations that defendants’ conduct was harassing and defendants’ reason for the grill infraction was factually baseless, plaintiffs have alleged “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ FHA claims as alleged in Counts I and II.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or making a dwelling otherwise unavailable or denied, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Want v. Jones · filed 2022-08-09(a)

Further, Mr. Want does not allege that there was discriminatory conduct by Ms. Jones in connection with leasing the property to him as a disabled person. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The FHA prohibits discrimination in rental housing or “in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b). ... Here, there is no allegation that Mr. Want’s landlord refused to make reasonable accommodations in any rules or practices, and Mr. Want was not denied the opportunity to lease the apartment. The FHA claim also fails.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 bans discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on protected characteristics including race and disability.

Hall-Johnson v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2022-11-01

The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 bans discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of, among other protected groups, race or disability.2 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... These allegations suffice to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination under the FHA at the pleading stage.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits specified forms of discrimination in the sale or rental of dwellings, and the conduct alleged here did not fall within those prohibited categories.

Douse v. Traeger · filed 2022-10-20

Moreover, the conduct complained of – the delayed return of a pool deposit check and the alleged misclassification of real property that has led to higher assessments, also does not fit into any of the types of prohibited discrimination enumerated in § 3604.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, including discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling sale or rental based on protected status or other prohibited acts listed in the statute.

Gerdon v. French · filed 2023-01-09

Gerdon fails to allege facts establishing that French discriminated against Gerdon with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling on account of Gerdon’s protected status, or for any other prohibited act set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a)-(b) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Leonard v. Montgomery · filed 2023-01-27(a)-(b)

Similarly, Plaintiff has pled no facts supporting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604. That title outlaws discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. Id., (a)-(b). Plaintiff has made no such allegations. So dismissal is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, including discriminatory denial of a rental relationship or its terms, conditions, or privileges, based on protected traits such as race, color, national origin, and familial status.

Intermountain Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Tomlinson & Associates, Inc. · filed 2023-03-29

The legal framework governing this claim is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibits discrimination in the rental or sale of a dwelling based on certain protected characteristics, such as race, color, national origin, and familial status.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.

Tidwell v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. · filed 2023-05-10

Lastly, Tidwell cites to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. His claims have nothing to do with housing.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Burnside v. Monarch Real Estate Crop · filed 2023-07-06(a)

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants pursuant to the Fair Housing Act for failure to state a claim because there are no factual allegations that suggest Plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, were factors that motivated Defendants’ actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and a plaintiff may proceed past screening by identifying the type of discrimination, the alleged discriminator, and when it occurred.

Kendrick v. Brennan · filed 2023-11-17

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against anyone in the sale or rental of housing based on their race, color, religion, sex, family status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §3604. To state a discrimination claim under the FHA, a plaintiff need only identify the type of discrimination, by whom, and when.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Kendrick v. Oakbrook Corporation · filed 2024-02-14

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against anyone in the sale or rental of housing based on their race, color, religion, sex, family status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §3604. To state a discrimination claim under the FHA, a plaintiff need only identify the type of discrimination, by whom, and when.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability in the rental or sale of a dwelling.

ROBINSON v. PATHWAY TO HOUSING · filed 2024-04-18

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin or disability in the rental or sale of a dwelling, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604, but nothing in Robinson’s Complaint suggests she was discriminated against, so this statute is inapplicable here.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on protected characteristics and protects the exercise or enjoyment of equal housing services and conditions.

Jett v. The Country Acres Association of Columbus County LTD · filed 2024-04-22

Plaintiffs state they are bringing this action pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, Am. Compl. [DE-8] at 6, which prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Plaintiffs do not state which provisions of the act were violated or how, and a conclusory statement that the act was violated is insufficient to state a claim. ... they have not sufficiently alleged that the failure to sell the lots was due to a discriminatory purpose, i.e., race, color, religion, sex, familial status, handicap, or national origin discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605. ... To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to state a claim for retaliation under the Fair Housing Act, an individual must have been engaged in “protected activity,” which includes “any action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination or the exercise or enjoyment of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 to equal services and conditions of housing.” ... Plaintiffs have not alleged they engaged in any protected activity. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a Fair Housing Act claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to make a dwelling unavailable or deny it because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

COPENY v. ENGLAND · filed 2024-06-24(a)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to "make unavailable or deny a dwelling" or "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services of facilities in connection therewith," on the basis of that person's race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)–(b). The Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations from which the Court could infer racial discrimination in the sale, terms, conditions, or provision of services for Copeny's home.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, including discrimination in rental terms, conditions, or privileges, because of protected characteristics such as race or sex.

Clark v. GSL Properties, Inc. · filed 2024-08-26(a), (b)

The Ninth Circuit applies “Title VII discrimination analysis in examining Fair Housing Act discrimination claims.” ... “A plaintiff can establish a FHA discrimination claim under a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact.” ... A plaintiff must plead that the “(1) plaintiff’s rights are protected under the FHA; and (2) as a result of the defendant’s discriminatory conduct, plaintiff has suffered a distinct and palpable injury.” ... In other words, she has not alleged that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably. ... Further, Clark has not alleged any other facts suggesting that the rent increase, calls to police, other negative treatment, and eventual eviction were because of a protected status. ... For these reasons, the Court finds that Clark fails to state an FHA claim and recommends that the district judge dismiss her claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin; a disparate-treatment plaintiff must plausibly allege prohibited conduct and discriminatory intent.

Semper v. Hawaii Life Real Estate Services, LLC · filed 2024-09-25(b)

To prevail on a claim of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that she qualified for protection under the FHA, that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the FHA, and that the defendant’s prohibited conduct was motived by discriminatory intent. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that these Defendants engaged in conduct prohibited by the FHA or that their conduct was motivated by discriminatory intent. The Court finds that the conclusory allegations of Defendants’ intent to discriminate in the FAC based on their knowledge that Plaintiff’s Section Q contingencies were religious in nature are insufficient to state a plausible claim for discrimination under the FHA against these Defendants.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale of a dwelling based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and a violation may be shown through discriminatory intent or significant discriminatory effect.

Holloway v. SiFuentes · filed 2024-10-17

Section 3604 of the Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person in the sale of a dwelling based on the person's “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” ... “[A] claim brought under the Act ‘may be established not only by proof of discriminatory intent, but also by proof of a significant discriminatory effect.’” ... Even if the Court liberally construes Holloway’s Complaint to raise a claim under the Fair Housing Act, Holloway pleads no facts to show that SiFuentes discriminated against her in violation of the Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits housing-market actors from refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race.

Williams v. 647 E. 229th St. Bronx LLC · filed 2024-10-21(a)

The FHA, which was enacted as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, makes it unlawful for private actors in the housing market to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... To state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that he is “a member of a protected class,” that he “suffered relevant ‘adverse’ treatment,” and he must sustain “a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.” ... Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts about what occurred that could give rise to an inference of racial discrimination, he fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under the FHA.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a)-(b) prohibits refusing or making unavailable a dwelling, and discriminating in its rental terms or services, because of race or other protected characteristics; allegations that a landlord terminated a lease partly because of race adequately state an FHA claim.

Johnson v. FirstKey Homes LLC · filed 2025-01-30(a)-(b)

In pleading that Defendant terminated her lease shortly after she took possession, at least in part, due to her race, Johnson has adequately stated a claim under the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental, or related services, because of race or sex, while § 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of disability.

Lopez v. The YWCA of North East New York · filed 2025-02-27(b), (f)(1)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race” or “sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The FHA also makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of” the buyer or renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... For the reasons discussed above, see supra Part III.C.3., the Court finds Plaintiff’s disability-based FHA claims against all Defendants require a response. ... In an abundance of caution, and while the allegedly overt harassing conduct appears to have been committed by third-parties, the Court finds that a response is required to Plaintiff’s FHA, sex discrimination claim and hostile housing environment claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 governs discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, rather than ordinary homeowners’ association fee charges.

Turner v. Autumn Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2025-04-24

That has nothing to do with the Fair Housing Act, which governs (1) discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, 42 U.S.C. § 3604; (2) discrimination in the making or purchasing of loans for housing and the sale, brokering, or appraising of property, id. § 3605; and (3) discrimination in the listing and brokering of property for sale or rent, id. § 3606.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate for the sale or rental, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a protected characteristic.

Askins v. Prestige Management Inc. · filed 2025-05-27(a)

The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979). Among other things, it prohibits the “refus[al] to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, . . . [and the] refus[al] to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, . . . national origin,” or disability.5 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f)(1). ... Here, Plaintiff does not state a claim under the FHA because he does not allege facts suggesting that he has a disability as defined by the FHA or that any adverse actions Defendants took against him were motivated by his disability. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s FHA claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) bars statements about the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicate a religious preference, limitation, or discrimination, while § 3604(f)(1) bars disability-based rental discrimination and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations necessary for equal use and enjoyment.

Exline-Johnson v. Rosser Properties, LLC · filed 2025-07-10(c), (f)(1), and (f)(3)(B)

First, § 3604(c) prohibits only statements or advertisements made “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicate[] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... religion... .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added). ... The statement at issue here was not made, printed, or published “‘with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling” as required by the statute. ... When evaluating whether this requirement is satisfied, the Court uses an “ordinary listener” standard. ... The Court concludes that no ordinary listener would believe that a religion-based preference, limitation, or discrimination was expressed by Ms. Rosser. ... The evidence is insufficient to create a disputed question of fact as to whether the Rosser Defendants violated § 3604(c) by making a statement of religious preference with respect to the rental of a dwelling, and the Rosser Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to that claim. ... Section 3604(f)(1) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits landlords from discriminating in or denying the rental of a dwelling to a renter because of the handicap of that renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... Because Ms. Johnson cannot establish that she was handicapped under either § 3602(h)(1) or (3), she cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. ... Accordingly, the Rosser Defendants’ motion is granted with respect to Ms. Johnson’s claims that the Rosser Defendants discriminated against her with respect to the rental of a dwelling in violation 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Ms. Johnson’s § 3604(f)(3)(B) claims fail for the same reasons as her other § 3604 claims. ... Absent such evidence, Ms. Johnson’s failure-to-accommodate claim cannot proceed to trial. The Rosser Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to that claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making unavailable or denying a dwelling because of a protected characteristic.

Rosa v. Administration for Children's Services (ACS) · filed 2025-08-05(a)

The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979). Among other things, it prohibits the “refus[al] to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, . . . [and the] refus[al] to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, . . . national origin,” or disability.7 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin in the terms, conditions, or privileges of dwelling sales or rentals and related services or facilities.

Solano v. PHH Mortgage Company · filed 2025-09-04

The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, and national origin with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling or in the provisions of services or facilities in connection therewith. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... The Court finds that such allegations do not comply with the pleading standards under Rule 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” ... He also fails to allege that these actions were “because of” his race, instead alleging that they “may have been” based on his race; this is fatal to his claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling based on race, color, religion, sex, familiar status, or national origin.

Armour v. Gold · filed 2025-09-30

Among other things, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling based on race, color, religion, sex, familiar status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. And section 3617 makes it unlawful to threaten another for exercising their rights under section 3604. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they have attempted to rent or purchase any property from Defendants, or alleged any discrimination based on the statuses listed in section 3604. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a Fair Housing Act claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f)(1)(A) prohibits discriminating in the sale or rental, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling to a buyer or renter because of that person's handicap.

HERRERA v. MADDOX MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2025-11-26(f)(1)(A)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him by responding to rental verifications by prospective landlords with false or misleading information. But Plaintiff also does not allege that Defendant discriminated in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or otherwise made unavailable or denied him a dwelling, because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A) (it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter.”). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant denied him a rental or a dwelling. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Fair Housing Act when it provided an allegedly false or misleading response to rental verification inquiries from prospective landlords, while the state court eviction proceeding was pending. This type of claim does not appear to fall under the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of dwellings based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Harden · filed 2025-12-08(a)

Ms. Harden specifically references 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which prohibits discrimination against a person based on their “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” in the sale or rental of dwellings. But Ms. Harden does not allege Defendants discriminated against her based on any of these categories.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f)(1)(A) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or making a dwelling unavailable or denying it, because of a buyer’s or renter’s handicap.

Herrera · filed 2026-01-06(f)(1)(A)

But Plaintiff also does not allege that Defendant discriminated in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or otherwise made unavailable or denied him a dwelling, because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A) (it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter.”). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant denied him a rental or a dwelling. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Fair Housing Act when it provided an allegedly misleading response to rental verification inquiries from prospective landlords, while the state court eviction proceeding was pending. This type of claim does not appear to fall under the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a)-(b) prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, but a plaintiff who was not prevented from renting and was not required to accept different or additional lease terms cannot establish a discrimination claim under those provisions.

Rockette · filed 2026-03-13(a)-(b)

These undisputed facts make it impossible for Mr. Rockette to raise a claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(b) because he was never prevented from renting an apartment from Defendants and he was not forced to take different or additional terms in his lease when compared to other tenants. Mr. Rockette’s racial discrimination claims pursuant to §§ 3604(a)-(b) are dismissed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.

King · filed 2026-03-19

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... “The FHAA makes it unlawful to discriminate in housing or make unavailable a dwelling because of a handicap of a buyer or renter.” ... Here, the analysis is the same with respect to the Rehabilitation Act. Again, King alleges “exacerbated anxiety symptoms,” Doc. 5 at 10, but she does not allege anything indicating that her anxiety “substantially limits one or more of” her “major life activities.” See also 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). King fails to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the purchase or rental of property because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Wente · filed 2026-03-24

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the purchase or rental of property because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, including disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination.

Xu v. Suffolk County · filed 2021-03-26(b)

The FHA forbids “discriminat[ion] against any
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) applies to a discriminatory statement only if it concerns the sale or rental of a dwelling.

FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF CENTRAL INDIANA, INC. v. NEW · filed 2021-12-17(c)

In order for Section 3604(c) to apply to a statement, that statement must be made with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege discrimination connected with the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Dean v. Lafayette · filed 2023-03-13(b)

Here, even drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, plaintiff fails to allege a violation of the FHA because he has not plausibly alleged defendants discriminated against him and he has not alleged defendants’ purported conduct occurred in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 applies to discrimination in the sale or rental of housing; allegations unrelated to housing do not state a claim under it.

Grimes v. Mossy Nissan Kearny Mesa · filed 2024-03-14

None of Plaintiff’s allegations relate to the sale or rental of housing, and the Court can conceive of no argument as to how the FHA is relevant to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mossy Nissan. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the FHA, and the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE this claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling; allegations unrelated to such a transaction do not establish a violation.

Douse v. Traeger · filed 2023-08-29

Likewise, the factual allegations Douse raised in other portions of his complaint did not encompass conduct prohibited by the FHA because they did not relate to the sale or rental of a dwelling.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) requires discrimination connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling; disputes arising after the plaintiffs already owned their home did not state a claim under it.

Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n · filed 2002-07-02(b)

Because plaintiffs already owned their home and none of plaintiffs’ allegations involve the sale or rental of housing, there are no hypothetical facts consistent with plaintiffs’ second amended complaint that would entitle plaintiffs to relief under § 3604(b).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits refusing to sell or rent housing, or discriminating in the terms of a sale or rental, based on listed protected traits.

Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul · filed 2008-12-18(a)-(b)

Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent to any person or discriminate in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a building on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) requires a buyer alleging discriminatory terms of sale to plead that buyers outside the protected class received more favorable terms.

Wiltshire v. Dhanraj · filed 2005-09-14(b)

In sum, plaintiffs’ FHA claim would have survived had plaintiffs alleged that other home buyers, who are not members of the protected class, purchased homes from the defendants on more preferable terms.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Constitutionality and commercial-speech scope of the anti-blockbusting prohibition

Section 3604(e) prohibits profit-driven efforts to induce or attempt to induce a person to sell or rent a dwelling through representations about the entry or prospective entry of people of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin, and regulates conduct rather than mere speech.

United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc. · filed 1970-05-19(e)

The challenged section, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e), provides that it shall be unlawful “for profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood, of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin.” ... It is evident that the statute does not make mere speech unlawful. What it does make unlawful is economic exploitation of racial bias and panic selling. We conclude that the statute is one regulating conduct, and that any inhibiting effect it may have upon speech is justified by the Government’s interest in protecting its citizens from discriminatory housing practices and is not violative of the First Amendment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(e) prohibits even an attempted inducement of a home sale or rental through representations encouraging racially motivated “white flight.”

Linmark Associates, Inc., and William Mellman v. The Township of Willingboro and Gerald Daly · filed 1976-04-28(e)

The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits the mere attempt to encourage "white flight." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(e)’s prohibition on profit-driven blockbusting is within Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority and does not violate the First Amendment.

United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc. · filed 1973-03-16(e)

We find that § 3604(e) falls within the constitutional authority of Congress to enact legislation to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and that § 3604(e) does not violate the First Amendment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Discriminatory housing advertisements

Section 3604(c) prohibits anyone, including newspapers, from making, printing, publishing, or causing publication of housing advertisements indicating a racial preference, limitation, or discrimination, including an advertisement describing an apartment as being in a “white home.”

United States v. Bill R. Hunter, D/B/A the Courier · filed 1972-04-27(c)

Hunter first takes the position that § 3604(c) was not intended to prevent newspapers from publishing classified advertisements indicating a racial or other statutorily proscribed preference in the sale or rental of a dwelling. We reject this assertion, for we find Congress clearly intended that very prohibition. ... The section provides it shall be unlawful “to make, print, publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published” any advertisement prohibited by the Act. In the context of classified real estate advertising, landlords and brokers “cause” advertisements to be printed or published and generally newspapers “print” and “publish” them. Since each phrase in a statute must, if possible, be given effect, United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539, 75 S.Ct. 513, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955), both landlords and newspapers are within the section’s reach.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits denying or making unavailable a dwelling because of race, including through race-based conduct by a housing intermediary.

Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co. · filed 1977-03-04(a)

In his telephone call to the defendant Company, the plaintiff talked with a person who identified himself as the defendant Haugh (hereafter Haugh). The plaintiff says that after he told what he wanted in the way of financing, Haugh asked where the house was, and when the plaintiff told him, Haugh said that was a bad area, as it was transitional from white to black. Because of the racial problems there, the only conventional financing available was with a fifty percent down payment. Haugh said that if the plaintiff would look for property elsewhere, he would probably be able to get the financing he wanted. ... It is clear that the actions of Haugh that are found by the Court to have taken place violate the provisions of Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3604(c), 3605, and 3617.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) makes landlords liable when they use their control over rental property to express a discriminatory intent that is coupled with a race-based refusal to rent.

Stewart v. Furton · filed 1985-10-08(c)

Given these conclusions, the District Court's conclusion as a matter of law that the Furtons exercised no control over Crosson's rental decision is error. As landlords, the Furtons had actual control over the rental of Crosson's trailer. In the specific context of that rental, the Furtons expressed an intention to exercise their control in a discriminatory way. Their control of the premises together with their statement of intention, coupled with the subsequent race-conscious refusal to rent, is part of one chain of events that renders the Furtons liable for damages under Sec. 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits denying sewer services because of race when that denial interferes with efforts to provide racially integrated housing.

McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, N.C. · filed 1987-09-08(b)

His complaint sufficiently alleges he has offered to provide racially integrated housing, the city has denied him sewer services because of race in violation of Sec. 3604(b) and interfered in violation of Sec. 3617 with his aiding and encouraging prospective minority tenants to rent the housing that he proposes.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits conduct that directly affects the availability of housing to minorities, but discriminatory effect alone is not automatically unlawful; the court applies a four-factor analysis to determine when a discriminatory-impact action violates the statute.

Burrell v. City of Kankakee · filed 1987-04-06(a)

Under this four part analysis the evidence does not support a violation of Section 3604(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing advertising that, to an ordinary reader, naturally indicates a racial preference; proof that the advertiser intended to express the preference is unnecessary.

Saunders v. General Services Corp. · filed 1987-05-12(c)

In order to prove a violation of this subsection, plaintiffs need not establish that defendants intended to express a racial preference.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise denying housing because of race, while § 3604(c) prohibits advertisements indicating a racial preference or intent to make one; an advertisement does not violate § 3604(c) merely because it omits models of a particular race absent intent or other extrinsic circumstances revealing such a preference.

Spann v. Colonial Village Inc. · filed 1987-05-22(a) and (c)

The Court holds, therefore, that absent a showing of intent to indicate a racial preference or of other extrinsic circumstances revelatory of a racial preference, real estate advertisements do not violate the Fair Housing Act merely because models of a particular race are not used in one ad or a series of ads.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) bars publishing housing advertisements indicating a racial preference, limitation, or discrimination; an allegation that defendants used only white models adequately states a § 3604(c) claim.

Ragin v. Steiner, Clateman and Associates, Inc. · filed 1989-06-20(a) and (c)

We believe that the complaint adequately states a claim under § 3604(c).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing advertisements that indicate a racial preference, but a mere racial imbalance or absence of models is insufficient without an obvious discriminatory message or extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent.

Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc. · filed 1990-02-19(c)

It is clear from the case law interpreting Section 3604(c) that a violation is not triggered merely because models of a particular race were not used in one advertisement or in a series of advertisements. ... The kinds of advertising Congress intended to prohibit through the enactment of Section 3604(c) fall into two categories: (1) advertisements which communicate in an obvious and undeniable way a discriminatory preference; or (2) advertisements rendered discriminatory through the proof of extrinsic circumstances which demonstrate a discriminatory intent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing advertisements that suggest to an ordinary reader that a particular race is preferred or dispreferred; discriminatory intent need not be shown.

Fenwick-Schafer v. Sterling Homes Corp. · filed 1991-04-01(c)

Section 3604(c) makes it unlawful to publish or cause to be published any housing advertisement which indicates a preference or discrimination based on race. ... Thus, § 3604(c) is violated “if an ad for housing suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular race is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question.” ... Plaintiffs need not show that defendants had a discriminatory intent although this evidence may lend additional support to plaintiffs’ case; it is the suggestion contained in the ad itself which is the key.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits publishing housing advertisements that indicate a racial preference or limitation.

Spann v. Carley Capital Group · filed 1989-09-08(c)

Clearly, then, the subject matter of the lawsuit is covered by the statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits making, printing, publishing, or causing an advertisement about selling or renting a dwelling that indicates a racial preference, limitation, discrimination, or intent to do so.

Ragin v. Harry MacKlowe Real Estate Co., Inc. · filed 1992-08-25(c)

Given this pattern, an ordinary reader who had viewed the pre-Limitations Period Ads as frequently as did the Plaintiffs would naturally infer from these ads, the single-model Limitations Period Ads and the post-Limitations Period ads that white individuals were preferred as tenants at Riverterrace and Riverbank West. ... I therefore conclude that the Plaintiffs have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendants violated § 3604(c).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) does not require proof of discriminatory intent when an advertisement would discourage an ordinary reader from answering it.

Tyus v. Urban Search Management · filed 1997-01-06(c)

The plaintiffs need not show that the defendants hád a discriminatory intent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

An ambiguous housing advertisement requires evidence of the author's intent before it establishes discrimination under the § 3604(c) standard.

Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Harlett · filed 1999-02-26(c)

Therefore, since the advertisement was not clearly discriminatory on its face, it was proper to consider evidence presented as to the author’s intent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits discriminatory housing notices and representations about availability or preferences, but does not prohibit truthfully disclosing that someone else is attempting unlawful discrimination.

Staff of the Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Nordling · filed 2001-03-29(c), (d), and (e)

Contrary to Nordling’s position, these provisions do not establish a blanket prohibition against disclosure of the Invalid Rule.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) bars making, printing, or publishing a housing notice that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on a protected class, and its causation language reaches causing particular discriminatory content rather than merely providing a forum.

Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc. · filed 2008-03-14(c)

Causation in a statute such as § 3604(c) must refer to causing a particular statement to be made, or perhaps the discriminatory content of a statement.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) bars facially discriminatory housing restrictions unless they further a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest in theory and practice and no less-discriminatory alternative would serve that interest.

Sierra v. City of New York · filed 2008-10-01(a)

The Court held that it must apply a “heightened level of scrutiny,” upholding such a provision only where it “ ‘further[s], in theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect.’ ” ... In sum, the Court concludes that the City has carried its burden of demonstrating that HMC section 27-7076(b) furthers, in theory and in practice, legitimate government interests in the health, safety and welfare of children that cannot be achieved through other alternatives, and that HMC section 27-2076(b) does not violate the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) applies to discriminatory notices, statements, or advertisements concerning the sale or rental of a dwelling, and does not apply to advertising by defendants not engaged in selling or renting homes.

Davis v. Fenton · filed 2014-02-07(c)

Because Defendants were not engaged in the business of selling or renting homes, Plaintiffs claim under section 3604(c) is also misguided.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits sex discrimination in housing, and a violation may be shown by discriminatory intent or by disparate impact or effect.

Linkletter v. Western & Southern Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2017-03-23(a)

But a violation of the Fair Housing Act can be shown either by proof of discriminatory animus or by proof of disparate impact or effect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory housing advertisements, and a plaintiff challenging advertisements based solely on reading them must allege personal injury, including psychic injury or substantial insult or distress.

Newkirk v. Douglas Elliman, Inc. · filed 2024-12-12(c)

When a plaintiff brings a § 3604(c) claim based purely on reading discriminatory advertisements, the plaintiff must “allege some form of personal injury, including psychic injury or substantial insult or distress.” ... Here, Newkirk does not claim that she suffered any injury from reading the allegedly discriminatory advertisements, only arguing that the advertisements demonstrate that Defendants’ policy of discrimination against voucher holders was ongoing. (See FAC ¶ 303.) Therefore, the purportedly discriminatory advertisements, standing alone, cannot sustain an FHA claim, although they were published within the statute of limitations period.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) permits a person who reads a discriminatory housing advertisement to sue only if the person alleges a personal injury, such as psychic injury or substantial insult or distress.

McDermott v. NEW YORK METRO LLC · filed 2009-09-16(c)

Given the Second Circuit’s limited treatment of standing under section 804(c), this Court concludes that a person who reads a discriminatory advertisement has standing to sue only if they allege some form of personal injury, including psychic injury or substantial insult or distress.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits race- or national-origin-based discrimination in housing terms and conditions and supports a hostile-housing-environment claim only when harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive and tied to a protected characteristic; § 3604(c) prohibits housing notices or advertisements indicating a prohibited preference, limitation, or discrimination.

Ngiendo v. Pep-KU, LLC · filed 2019-07-30(b), (c)

These sections have been interpreted to prohibit discriminatory harassment that unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of a home, i.e., a hostile housing environment. ... The court finds that plaintiff has not alleged facts in the amended complaint which plausibly demonstrate that plaintiff’s living conditions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive environment; that the alleged harassment was based upon plaintiff’s race; or that PEP-KU knew or should have known about the harassment. ... Here, plaintiff’s allegations are too vague to describe a plausible claim for a violation of § 3604(c).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A Section 3604(c) claim based on a website’s publication of discriminatory housing notices supplied by users is barred when Section 230(c)(1) prevents treating the website as their publisher.

Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc. · filed 2006-11-14(c)

Because to hold Craigslist liable under Section 3604(c) would be to treat Craig-slist as if it were the publisher of third-party content, the plain language of Section 230(c)(1) forecloses CLC’s cause of action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits a municipality that undertakes housing construction from proceeding discriminatorily, even though it has no general duty to construct subsidized housing.

United States v. Yonkers Board of Education · filed 1987-12-28(a)

This does not mean that we would have reached the same conclusion in the face of findings that there had been discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent, for the absence of a general obligation to construct does not give the municipality license to proceed discriminatorily once it has started down the road to construction.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) requires a plaintiff challenging a discriminatory housing permit denial to establish a prima facie case, including qualification for the permit and approval of a comparable applicant.

Pina v. TOWN OF PLYMPTON · filed 2007-10-31(a)

As Pina is unable to meet all of the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or disparate treatment, this Court finds that summary judgement in favor of Plympton on the basis of her FHA claim of discriminatory intent is appropriate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing advertisements that indicate a national-origin preference or an intent to make one, including ads seeking buyers or tenants who speak a particular language.

Holmgren v. Little Village Community Reporter · filed 1971-01-14(c)

It is significant that § 3604(c) makes it unlawful not only to print an ad which indicates a preference based on national origin, but also an ad which indicates “an intention to make any such preference.” ... Thus, the ads which indicate a preference for a purchaser or a tenant who speaks a particular language are unlawful under § 3604(e).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) reaches rental advertisements that suggest to an ordinary reader a preference against families with children.

Guider v. Bauer · filed 1994-10-04(c)

Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the language of the advertisement is not facially nondiscriminatory as a matter of law. The inference that the Bauers would not rent to families with children can be drawn from the clearly expressed preference for a single individual or couple.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) can reach housing advertisements with so few Black models that they indicate a racial preference; it requires neither total exclusion nor exact racial proportions.

Ragin v. the New York Times Co. · filed 1989-12-18(c)

Between the polar extremes of total exclusion, and strict proportionalism according to population percentages, the proof at trial may show sufficient numbers of black models to achieve fair representation; or such a paucity of black models as to constitute “tokenism.” The factfinder could, in my judgment, lawfully conclude that proof of the former does not violate the FHA; but that proof of the latter does offend a statute prohibiting advertisements which indicate a racial preference.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) reaches racial preferences conveyed through human models in housing advertisements.

Luther M. Ragin, Jr., Deborah Fish Ragin, Renaye B. Cuyler, Jerome F. Cuyler and Open Housing Center, Inc. v. The New Yo · filed 1991-01-23(c)

A threshold question is whether Section 3604(c) reaches the use of models as a medium for the expression of a racial preference. We hold that it does.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) does not make a single housing advertisement using a small number of all-white models actionable without more; the complaint must allege that the advertiser had an opportunity to include models of a protected group.

Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. The Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., a Division of Gannett Co., Inc. · filed 1991-09-05(c)

We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of section 3604(c) based on the single publication of an advertisement which uses a small number of all-white models does not, without more, state a cognizable claim under section 3604(c) as a matter of law. The complaint must allege that an advertiser had the opportunity, based upon either the large number of models used in an advertisement or the numerous advertisements placed by an advertiser with a particular publisher, to include models of a protected group.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) prohibits distributing rental notices that indicate a preference against families with children, regardless of the landlord’s intent.

Blomgren v. Ogle · filed 1993-07-13(c)

Under either of these standards, as a matter of law, distribution of both the original “no children” provision and the September 1992 “no children” revision were violations of § 3604(c).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Refusal to rent or make a dwelling unavailable because of race

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race; a plausible claim must allege facts showing the plaintiffs were qualified to rent and identifying what the defendants did to deny the housing or subsidy.

Sanders v. Grenadier Realty, Inc. · filed 2010-02-22(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), or “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of race,” id. § 3604(b). ... The complaint fails adequately to plead that plaintiffs “were qualified to rent or purchase the housing.” Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2003). ... Because plaintiffs have not alleged satisfaction of this requirement for the year at issue, we cannot conclude that the complaint plausibly alleges plaintiffs’ entitlement to the subsidies that qualify them to pay their rent. In light of this omission and plaintiffs’ failure to allege what defendants did or did not do to deny them subsidies, we identify no error in the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ FHA claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent a dwelling after a bona fide offer, or otherwise making it unavailable or denying it because of race; race need only be a factor in the refusal.

Williamson v. Hampton Management Company · filed 1972-03-27(a)

The Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)) makes it unlawful “To refuse to . rent after the making of a bona fide offer, . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin.” Race need not be the sole reason for the decision to refuse if it is an element in that decision. Smith v. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-350 (7th Cir. 1971). Finally, a white plaintiff upon whom a discrimination against black persons has an impact may bring an action under the statute. Walker v. Pointer, 304 F.Supp. 56 (N.D.Tex.1969).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to negotiate for a dwelling's sale or otherwise making it unavailable or denying it because of race, and does not require a home seeker to list an existing home for sale first.

Fred Donald Johnson, and Sandra Johnson, His Wife v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, and Erv Jurinek · filed 1973-09-13(a)

They no longer champion this ground, and we certainly know of no such requirement before an action may be brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 3604. It is significant that even defendants exacted no such requirement from the plaintiffs or Shapiros. Since it is undisputed that plaintiffs were actual home seekers, it was erroneous as a matter of law for the district court to rest its decision on the fact that they had not placed their current home on the market before seeking a new residence. ... 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) makes it unlawful to “refuse to negotiate for the sale * * * or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion or national origin.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 prohibits refusing to show or rent an apartment because of racial discrimination.

Fort v. White · filed 1974-10-25(a)

In the instant case the plaintiffs have claimed refusals to show or rent apartments based upon racial discrimination; these claims allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970); violations of § 3604 are explicitly made actionable under § 3612.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell a dwelling after a bona fide offer because of race.

Crumble v. Blumthal · filed 1977-02-09(a)

In our view, the findings were not clearly erroneous. Under the circumstances it is reasonable to find that the sellers' decision not to pay the real estate commission to the brokers, as provided in both the real estate sales contract and the escrow agreement, caused the transaction to be terminated. There was testimony that at the time when the house was first listed for sale the sellers indicated that they preferred not to sell to black buyers. Still later, the sellers again voiced displeasure at the conduct of the brokers in securing black buyers. Finally, it was after the problem of the earnest money check had been resolved and negotiations between the attorneys were reopened, that the sellers must have instructed their attorney to remove the escrow agreement and terminate the transaction. As analyzed by the district court, the sellers, who were in Florida, had begun to suspect that the buyers were black before they first raised objections to paying the commission as required by the contract, and they had admittedly learned the race of the buyers before the escrow was withdrawn.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to negotiate for or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race, including discouraging prospective buyers from inspecting it.

Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc. · filed 1978-06-23(a)

The efforts by Mr. Pate, an agent of the defendant, to discourage plaintiffs from inspecting the dwelling in question were made because of plaintiffs’ race and were in direct violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), since such actions amounted to a refusal to negotiate because of race.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604 makes it unlawful for an owner to refuse to rent an apartment because of race.

Warner v. Perrino · filed 1978-10-10

Section 3604 makes it unlawful for an owner to refuse to rent an apartment on grounds of race.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) makes a race-based refusal to change zoning unlawful when it makes a dwelling unavailable to the affected person.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., Northwest Opportunity Center and Eluteria D. Maldonado, Intervening v. Village o · filed 1977-08-25(a)

The ultimate question is whether the refusal of the zoning change made a dwelling unavailable to plaintiff Ransom (and others) because of race. If it did, the refusal was unlawful under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) can be violated when a housing provider's actions have a discriminatory effect in making housing unavailable or denying housing, even without direct proof of discriminatory intent, unless the discriminatory results are justified.

Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo · filed 1977-08-31(a)

What we do decide is that plaintiffs have established a prima facie Title VIII case under § 3604(a) against PHA and RDA by proving that the agencies' acts had a discriminatory effect and that the agencies have failed to justify the discriminatory results of their actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits race-based conduct that makes a dwelling unavailable, even if the prospective renter never submits a formal application or makes an overt attempt to rent.

Reeves R. Taylor and Wife, Gloria Beaubien Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc. · filed 1979-03-29(a)

Counsel correctly argued that the defendants could make an apartment unavailable in ways that would preclude plaintiffs from making any overt attempt to rent. ... Of course, counsel’s assertion was correct: a negative answer to the first interrogatory was not dispositive of the case, though it is scarcely a fatal objection to a special interrogatory that it does not incorporate all grounds of recovery.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, color, religion, or national origin, and a pattern or practice can include discriminatory omissions or failure to eliminate a policy preventing fair housing.

United States v. City of Parma, Ohio · filed 1980-06-05(a)

The rights granted by the Act which the government claims Parma has resisted or denied are specified in two separate sections: Sections 804(a) and 817, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) and 3617. ... To demonstrate a pattern or practice of resistance to the enjoyment of the rights secured by Sections 804(a) and 817, the government must prove more than an isolated incident of unlawful discrimination. ... The unlawful discrimination, in other words, must have been a regular procedure followed by the defendant. ... The existence of a discriminatory policy, statute, or ordinance is itself a discriminatory pattern or practice. ... Additionally, the failure to eliminate a policy which prevents fair housing violates the Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or negotiate for a dwelling, or otherwise making it unavailable or denying it, because of race.

Davis v. Mansards · filed 1984-11-14(a)

Defendant Patrice Burke, an agent of defendants Lauerman and The Mansards corporation, misrepresented to plaintiffs Glindolyn and Cecil Johnson the availability of apartments, and refused to let them fill out an application or place a deposit for an apartment, because of the Johnsons’ race. This conduct directly violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b) and (d), because it amounted to a refusal to negotiate a rental, and an effort to make unavailable a dwelling because of race; because it discriminated in the terms and conditions of rental of a dwelling because of race; and because it amounted to a representation because of race that an available apartment was not available.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or negotiate for a dwelling after a bona fide offer, or otherwise making it unavailable, because of race or another protected characteristic; the court applied that rule to a racially motivated refusal to sell vacant residential land.

McHaney v. Spears · filed 1981-11-20(a)

The Court finds from all of the credible evidence in the record and concludes that plaintiffs have proved, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants did reject and refused to accept their offer to purchase Lot 20 because they are black persons in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and 42 U.S.C., § 1982.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or negotiate for a dwelling, or otherwise making it unavailable, because of race.

Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc. · filed 1982-12-06(a)

Finally, plaintiffs’ offer was rejected, and the opportunity to purchase the vacant condominium remained open.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) covers a landlord's refusal to let a prospective tenant sign a lease and return the required checks when the refusal is racially discriminatory.

Portee v. Hastava · filed 1994-06-14(a)

The gravamen of the Portees’ complaint is that Mr. Vajda’s refusal to allow Mr. Portee to sign the lease for the Premises, coupled with his refusal to return the checks, constituted a statutory refusal in violation of this section. Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury was entitled to draw this conclusion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Kloth v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. · filed 1998-09-22(a)

It is unlawful under the Act “to refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The Court has reviewed the other statutory provisions defining “prohibited practices” and finds them all inapplicable to defendant. Thus, the motion to dismiss plaintiffs Fair Housing Act claim is GRANTED as a matter of law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to negotiate for or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race or color, including a trailer pad.

Walker v. Todd Village, LLC · filed 2006-03-13(a)

that the evidence in the summary judgment record, even viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a claim under the FHA and, independently, that the facts are insufficient to sustain a claim for punitive damages under the FHA.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent to individuals because of their religion.

OT, LLC v. Harford County Maryland · filed 2019-10-24(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent to individuals because of their religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), and to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with a person’s enjoyment of housing rights, see 42 U.S.C. § 3617. ... Here, by contrast, the Delegates are not alleged to have made housing available in any capacity. Instead, Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the Delegates conspired with Harford County officials to derail the Old Trails housing project entirely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person because of race; allegations that a landlord returned white testers’ calls but not black testers’ calls adequately plead such a violation.

Project Sentinel v. Komar · filed 2021-04-12(a)

Thus, in this case, Plaintiff may adequately allege an FHA violation by alleging that: (1) it is an aggrieved person, Gillian, 108 F.3d at 250, and (2) it was subject to a discriminatory housing practice, id., by (a) “mak[ing] unavailable” (b) “a dwelling,” (c) “because of race,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Here, Plaintiff is an aggrieved person for the same reasons it has standing. It alleges Defendants made the Property unavailable by refusing to return black testers’ calls. The Property, which Plaintiff alleges is a “three-unit residential rental property,” (ECF No. 1 at 2), is a “dwelling” under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (“ ‘Dwelling’ means any building … which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families … .”). Plaintiff alleges that Sarah Komar returned white testers’ callers, but not black testers’ callers and, hence, the dwelling was made unavailable because of race. Therefore, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a claim for discrimination under the FHA.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of a protected characteristic; the characteristic need only be a significant factor, not the sole reason.

Burnside v. Monarch Real Estate Crop · filed 2023-05-16(a)

(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. ... It is no defense under Section 1982 or under the Fair Housing Act that racial animus was not a defendant's sole reason for denial of housing. Plaintiff need only prove that race was one significant factor in defendant's dealings with them in order to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race or another protected characteristic.

Hinton v. Cochise, County of · filed 2025-06-13(a)

As relevant here, the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs make “no plausible allegation any Cochise County Defendant refused to sell or rent a dwelling after making a bona fide offer, or refused to negotiate for the sale or rental of a property, or make it unavailable or deny access, due to race.” (Doc. 108 at 11–12.) The Court agrees. Plaintiffs allege vaguely that “racial epithets were directed” at them on December 1. While that is reprehensible, it does not support the inference that the County Defendants, who are not alleged to have had any authority to sell or rent the property, engaged in housing discrimination based on Plaintiffs’ race. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race.

Moffett · filed 2025-10-22(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Plaintiff states his belief that Defendants have engaged in race-based discrimination against him generally but does not plead any facts to support this assertion, nor does he allege facts to support an inference that he was discriminated against in one of the ways specifically prohibited by the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Discrimination in rental terms and conditions; discriminatory statements

Section 3604(b) bars race-based discrimination in the terms and conditions of renting a dwelling, and § 3604(c) bars statements indicating a racial preference or intent to discriminate in renting.

United States v. Gilman · filed 1972-03-22(b), (c)

(a) Defendants discriminated in the rental of housing under the JONES CLAIM by discriminating against blacks as to the terms and conditions of rental in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); ... (b) - Defendants discriminated in the rental of housing under the OPPENHEIMER CLAIM by making statements indicating their preference to rent apartments to white persons and in their intention to discriminate against black persons in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in covered housing because of race, color, religion, or national origin, but it does not authorize rent strikes or preclude state regulation of landlord-tenant relationships.

Housing Authority of Newark v. Henry · filed 1971-11-18(b)

Rent strikes are not sanctioned by 42 U.S.C. § 3604, and the general nature and broad scope of the statute cannot be said to preclude all state regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(c) applies to anyone who makes, prints, or publishes a notice or statement indicating a racial preference concerning the sale or rental of a dwelling, including a government recorder publishing racially restrictive covenants.

Mayers v. Ridley · filed 1972-06-30(c)

Thus a careful textual examination of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(c) makes clear that the Recorder's activity falls within its ambit.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits race-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling; the court held that the landlord did not violate that rule because the plaintiffs failed to show racially discriminatory treatment.

Wainwright v. Allen · filed 1978-12-05(b)

Sections 1982 and 3604 are clear on their face and do not admit of technical legal arguments as to what action they prohibit. Thus, the ultimate issue in this case is a factual question: Did Earl Allen discriminate against the Wainwrights in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of the house because they are black? I find that he did not.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits sex discrimination in the terms or conditions of a housing rental, but does not prohibit a landlord from considering the combined income of both spouses when evaluating an application.

Normal v. St. Louis Concrete Pipe Co. · filed 1978-02-15(b)

Plaintiffs' theory is that defendants' alleged refusal constitutes sex discrimination violative of Section 804(b) of Title VIII (42 U.S.C. Section 3604(b) ) in that had the income of the husband alone been sufficient, the application would have been acceptable. The difficulty with this contention is that it is not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. It is also inconsistent with the fact that defendants sought to verify the employment and salary of both spouses. We find that defendants were not guilty of sex discrimination in any respect. To the contrary, it was the consistent policy of defendants to take into consideration the combined income of both spouses.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits housing discrimination based on listed protected classes, but an English-only policy applied uniformly to all non-English-speaking tenants does not show a distinct national-origin impact.

Vialez v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1991-06-18(b)

All non-English speaking people are equally affected by English-only forms. There is no distinct impact on those of Hispanic origin.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination based on national origin in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in providing related services or facilities, and such allegations can sufficiently state a claim.

United States v. Sea Winds of Marco, Inc. · filed 1995-07-07(b)

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.” Taking the Plaintiffs allegations as true, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a valid claim under § 3604(b), pursuant to Rule 8(a), on behalf of all aggrieved persons named in the complaint.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling because of handicap, and a failure-to-accommodate claim requires a causal link between the challenged policy and the plaintiff’s injury.

Geter v. Horning Brothers Management · filed 2008-03-24(f)(2)

The FHA makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of [the person’s] handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). ... To prevail on the claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a causal link between defendants’ policy and the plaintiffs injury.” ... Plaintiff therefore has not established a causal link between his disability and an inability to pay the amount of rent required by the lease. ... Because plaintiff cannot demonstrate the requisite causation, he cannot prevail on his FHA claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discriminatory interference with the privileges of renting a dwelling, including eviction-related intrusion and the provision of related services or facilities.

Dickinson v. Zanesville Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 2013-09-30(b)

Ultimately, ZMHA began procedures to evict Plaintiffs from their apartment, the very essence of intrusion into the “privileges of ... rental of a dwelling,” as well as the “provision of services or facilities” in connection with a rental, under § 3604(b).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of race or another protected characteristic.

Downs v. Red Brick Management, LLC · filed 2020-07-28(b)

Plaintiff's claim in Ground Two, that the Defendants violated the FHA by filing a police report related to stolen televisions and targeted her because she is a Black woman, is not conduct that falls within the scope of the FHA, as it does not relate to any “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) prohibits sex discrimination in the terms and conditions of renting a dwelling, while § 3604(c) prohibits sex-discriminatory notices, statements, or advertisements related to its rental.

Torres v. Rothstein · filed 2020-12-26(b) and (c)

The FHA prohibits discrimination based on sex in the terms and conditions of the rental of a dwelling and in the making of discriminatory statements with respect to the rental of a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b)-(c). ... The material factual disputes therefore preclude summary judgment for the 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) claim and the parallel FHL claim. ... The FHA makes it unlawful to “make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination” based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). ... The factual disputes identified in the previous sections preclude summary judgment here. ... I therefore deny summary judgment of the FHA and FHL claims on this basis.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 3604(b) and (f)(2) do not require a landlord to police private tenant events it does not control, while section 3604(c) reaches oral statements by a rental manager that a reasonable juror could view as expressing a preference against a handicapped tenant.

Haynes v. Wilder Corp. of Delaware · filed 2010-06-22(b), (f)(2), (c)

Haynes utterly fails to present evidence of the defendant’s control over the Neighborhood Association’s pool tournaments and bingo nights. ... Although an expansive statute, the FHA fails to create a federal claim requiring a landlord to intervene each time a tenant excludes his neighbor from a private dinner party, pool tournament, or bingo night. ... A reasonable juror could conclude that Sanchez, while serving as the manager of Rice Creek, uttered a statement “indicating a preference” against a handicapped tenant who required assistance to enter the Rice Creek leasing office. ... Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to the FHA claim arising from Sanchez’s alleged tirade.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 1,978, oldest cases first.

913 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

United States v. LRG CORPORATION, the court decides admissibility of evidence about school accommodations under Evidence Rule 403; it does not decide the reasonable-accommodation claim under § 3604(f)(3)(B). opinion →
Clover Communities Beavercreek, LLC v. Mussachio Architects P.C., the court decides assignability of FHA claims generally, not a rule of the particular § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim. opinion →
Green Miller, Jr. v. Poretsky, the relevant statutory discussion is in a concurrence addressing evidentiary relevance; it is not the majority’s holding about § 3604. opinion →
Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, the court’s § 3604 reference supplies background for its decision that later regulations and amendments governing the § 3607 senior-housing exemption did not apply retroactively; it does not construe or apply § 3604’s discrimination prohibition. opinion →
Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., the court mentions § 3604 in a general statement about racially motivated real-estate transactions, but its review and judgment concern the evidence under § 1982 rather than construing or applying § 3604. opinion →
Hughes v. Dyer, the court reports and endorses Wright’s conclusion about § 3604’s effect on punitive damages in a § 1982 action, but its own holding concerns punitive damages under § 1982 and does not independently construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
J. Howard Brandt, Inc. v. Commonwealth, the relevant discussion appears in a concurrence using § 3604(a) case law as guidance for tester evidence under Pennsylvania law; it is not the court’s holding about § 3604. opinion →
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., the opinion is a dissent and cites § 3604(b) only to contrast the Fair Housing Law's detailed housing-discrimination provisions with § 1982 and argue that the writ should be dismissed; it does not decide the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
The People of the State of New York v. James Horelick and Sandra Adickes, the court merely summarized the Fair Housing Act provisions while discussing its earlier decision in New York v. Davis; it did not construe or apply § 3604 to the present removal appeal. opinion →
United States v. Mitchell, the opinion mentions § 3604(e) as the source of the rights allegedly resisted, but the court does not construe or decide anything about that subsection. Its ruling concerns whether the Attorney General's reasonable-cause determination may be examined through interrogatories under § 3613. opinion →
Haywood Cash and Rennell Cash v. Swifton Land Corporation, the statute is identified as the basis for the complaint and alleged violation, but the court decides class-action sufficiency, mootness, and damages without construing or deciding what § 3604 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Shannon v. United States Department Of Housing And Urban Development, the court mentions § 3604 only while describing the scope of the 1968 Act's complaint and enforcement procedures. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604; its holding concerns HUD's affirmative duties under § 3608(d)(5) and related review procedures. opinion →
Kastner v. Brackett, the court merely identified the statutory basis of the damages action; it decided the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, expressly treating the issue as constitutional rather than construing or applying § 3604(d). opinion →
Martin v. John C. Bowers & Co., the court merely listed § 3604 among the statutes authorizing the action; its substantive discrimination conclusion was framed under § 1982, and the opinion does not explain or apply any specific requirement of § 3604. opinion →
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, the opinion merely reports the Department of Justice's assertion that the practice violated § 3604(c), along with the insurer's response, as background evidence concerning housing discrimination. It does not decide what § 3604(c) means or apply it to the title-insurance practice. opinion →
Crim v. Glover, the court only mentions § 3604 when recounting plaintiffs' allegations. Its holding concerns whether the remedies under Sections 810 and 812 are alternative and whether plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before suing; it does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Bigelow v. Commonwealth, section 3604(c) appears only in the court’s discussion of United States v. Hunter and the lower court’s ruling there; Bigelow does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 3604(c). opinion →
Cauley v. Smith, the court mentions § 3604(d) only while distinguishing Kastner in deciding whether the defendant was entitled to a jury under § 3612(c); it did not construe or decide the application of § 3604(d). opinion →
Kelly v. Armbrust, the court cites § 3604(a) to identify the statutory basis of the plaintiffs’ damages action, but it does not construe that subsection or decide what it requires. The holding concerns the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on damages, relying on the relief provision in § 3612(c). opinion →
United States v. Westside Building Co., the statute appears only in a consent decree's required nondiscrimination statement; the opinion text does not interpret, define, or apply 42 U.S.C. § 3604. opinion →
Higgins v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., the statute is mentioned in a footnote as part of historical evidence about the discontinuation of racial restrictions in title-insurance policies; the court does not construe or apply § 3604(c). opinion →
Johnson v. Zaremba, section 3604(a) is quoted and cited as background to the defendants’ argument and to contrast Title VIII with § 1982. The court’s ruling concerns § 3603(b)(2)’s exemption and holds that it does not apply to an independent § 1982 suit; it does not interpret or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, the court mentions § 3604 as one of the Fair Housing Act provisions whose rights may be enforced under § 3612(a), but the decision construes § 3612(a) and addresses constitutional and statutory integration duties rather than deciding what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, the court's statutory holding concerned the affirmative integration duty under § 3608(d)(5) and the enforcement provision in § 3612(a). Section 3604 was mentioned as one of the Fair Housing Act provisions underlying the claims and in explaining that plaintiffs were not proceeding solely under the Act, but the court did not interpret or apply § 3604's prohibition against discrimination. opinion →
United States v. Metro Development Corp., the court cited § 3604 only to identify the statutory language used in the complaint while deciding whether the pleading was sufficiently definite under Rule 8; it did not interpret or apply § 3604's substantive requirements. opinion →
Barrick Realty, Incorporated v. City of Gary, Indiana, section 3604(e) is cited only in a footnote as one of several authorities related to the general public-policy statement. The court does not construe the subsection, state what it requires, or decide its application. opinion →
Curtis v. Loether, the opinion mentions § 3604(a) only to identify the alleged underlying housing-discrimination violation. The Court's holding concerns the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in damages actions under § 812, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604(a). opinion →
United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. The City of Delray Beach, Florida, Etc., the court did not decide whether the City was within the ambit of § 3604 or whether the challenged conduct violated the Fair Housing Act; it expressly left that statutory jurisdictional question for the district court. The statute was discussed only in connection with unresolved jurisdiction and the court ultimately relied on the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983. opinion →
United States v. Pelzer Realty Company, Inc., the § 3604(1) violation is recited as the Fifth Circuit’s prior finding on remand. This order does not independently interpret or apply the statute’s meaning, coverage, or requirements; it addresses damages, jury-trial, pleading, and the form of injunctive relief. opinion →
GERMANIA FED. SAV. & LOAN v. Jacoby, the court cited § 3604(a) only while summarizing the holding and relevance of a prior case, Marine Park Associates. It did not construe or apply § 3604(a) in this case, and expressly stated that no civil-rights law was involved here. opinion →
Germania Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jacoby, the court only cites § 3604(a) while describing the facts and rationale of a prior case, Marine Park Associates, and uses that case as an example in resolving the state-law question of what defenses are germane in a forcible-entry-and-detainer action. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604(a) in this case. opinion →
Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston, the court only reported and discussed the federal statute as part of its description of Zuch v. Hussey, then contrasted it with the Evanston ordinance. It decided the meaning and application of the local ordinance, not 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), and expressly declined to reach broader antisteering questions. opinion →
Helen Smith and Herman Smith v. Stechel, the court mentions § 3604 in describing the Title VIII rights referenced by § 3617, but the decision construes the limitations period applicable to § 3617 and does not decide what § 3604 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Heights Community Congress v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., the opinion quotes another court's characterization of § 3604(a) while discussing the Fair Housing Act generally and deciding standing and class-certification issues; it does not independently construe or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. ITT Community Development Corp., the opinion is a consent order that reports plaintiffs’ allegations under § 3604(c) and sets out agreed injunctive measures; it does not decide whether the statute was violated or construe what § 3604(c) means or requires. opinion →
United States v. State of Wisconsin, the court reports § 3604(a) as the basis of the plaintiff's argument but expressly declines to consider that argument. Its holding invalidates the Wisconsin anti-testing provision based on conflict with the Fair Housing Act's general scheme and the Supremacy Clause, without construing § 3604(a). opinion →
Warth v. Seldin, the Court quoted § 3604(a) and (b) while explaining that the complaint did not allege discrimination covered by those provisions, but expressly declined to decide whether purposeful racial or ethnic discrimination would state a claim under § 804. The statute was therefore not construed or applied as part of the holding. opinion →
United States v. J. C. Long, Individually and as of the Estate of Frank J. Sottile, and the Worth Agency, a Partnership, section 3604 appears only in a footnote identifying Section 804 and in the court's report of the district judge's finding; the appellate court decided the separate question of monetary relief under Section 813 and did not construe or apply Section 3604 itself. opinion →
Rogers v. Exxon Research and Engineering Company, the court cites § 3604 in a string citation describing housing-discrimination cases as an analogy while deciding whether compensatory damages for pain and suffering are available under the ADEA. It does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Luddie Fort and James Bookwalter v. Robert C. White D/B/A Robert C. White Co. Realtors, the opinion mentions § 3604 only to report the district court’s finding of a violation in the procedural history. The appellate court addressed damages and attorneys’ fees under other provisions and did not interpret or decide what § 3604 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Johnson v. County of Chester, the court mentions § 3604 only to identify a type of Fair Housing Act claim that plaintiffs did not assert; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604. opinion →
Bradford Sorenson and Gail Sorenson v. Raymond, the court decided the appellants’ § 1982 claim and related evidentiary issues, not the meaning or application of § 3604. The § 3604(e) statement was comparative background in distinguishing Pelzer, and the companion § 3604 claim had been dismissed below on statute-of-limitations grounds and was not appealed. opinion →
Drain v. Friedman, the opinion was an action under § 1982 and its legal analysis and judgment construed and applied § 1982. Section 3604 appears only within a quotation reporting the Eighth Circuit’s statement in Williams, with no independent construction or application by this court. opinion →
Williamsburg Fair Housing Committee v. New York City Housing Authority, the court mentions § 3604(b) only as one of the statutes plaintiffs alleged was violated. The decision addresses consolidation of the actions and joinder of HUD, and does not construe or apply § 3604(b). opinion →
Harper v. Union Savings Ass'n, the court expressly declined to decide whether the complaint stated a cause of action under § 3604(a); it resolved the pleading issue under § 3605 instead. opinion →
Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., the opinion does not decide the meaning or application of § 3604(b): it states that defendants did not contest racial steering’s violation of the Fair Housing Act and discusses § 3604(b) only in the background. The court’s actual ruling concerns plaintiffs’ standing and cause of action under § 3612. opinion →
Blue Arm v. Volk, the court only identifies § 3604 as one of the statutes invoked in the complaint. It decides the appealability of an interlocutory order and damages for a frivolous appeal, without interpreting or applying § 3604. opinion →
Homestead Realty Co. v. Stack, the statute appears only in the factual and procedural background to describe a prior government action and allegation. The court decided a state-law libel issue and did not interpret or apply 42 U.S.C. § 3604. opinion →
Smith v. Woodhollow Apartments, section 3604 appears only in the complaint's list of asserted jurisdictional bases. The court did not construe or apply § 3604; its rulings addressed the timeliness provisions of §§ 3610 and 3612 and claims under §§ 1981 and 1982. opinion →
Morgan v. Parcener's Ltd., section 3604 is cited in the complaint's jurisdictional list, but the court does not construe or apply that provision; it dismisses the Fair Housing Act claims as untimely under §§ 3610 and 3612. opinion →
Hodorowski v. Bell, the court described § 3604(c) while explaining the § 3603(b) single-family-house exemption, but it granted summary judgment on the exemption and did not decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 3604(c). opinion →
Kreiger v. Merifield Acres, Inc., the court cited § 3604 only to identify one of the claims being dismissed; its analysis and ruling concerned the 180-day limitations period in § 3612(a), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604 itself. opinion →
U. S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, the court expressly treated the mention of housing discrimination and the federal statutes, including § 3604(b), as background; it dismissed Count III on pleading, standing, counterclaim, and jurisdiction grounds without deciding what § 3604(b) means or requires. opinion →
Bunn v. Central Realty of Louisiana, section 3604 is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the statutory basis of the suit and explaining that § 3612 permits attorney’s fees in § 3604 suits. The court's actual ruling concerns attorney's fees under § 1988 and damages, so it does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Court decided the scope of standing under § 812 and Article III, while expressly declining to decide whether racial steering is prohibited by § 3604. opinion →
Newspaper Printing Corp. v. Galbreath, the court mentions § 3604(c) only in a footnote as one citation supporting the general proposition that freedom of the press has narrow exceptions. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
United States v. Rent-A-Homes Systems of Illinois, Inc., section 3604 is mentioned only in a quoted account of this court’s earlier denial of interlocutory review, as part of the procedural history. The opinion decides the scope of monetary relief under § 3613 and does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Turner v. A. B. Carter, Inc., the court expressly declined to resolve tester plaintiffs’ standing to litigate racial-steering claims under the Fair Housing Act. Its discussion comparing § 3604(a) and (b) was incidental to deciding Rule 23 class-representation adequacy, not a holding about § 3604. opinion →
Deborah L. Bills, and Nancy D. Fahnley v. Joseph H. Hodges, Sr., the court expressly declined to decide whether the Fair Housing Act, including § 3604, applied because the result was the same under 42 U.S.C. § 1982; the opinion therefore does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Daubner v. Harris, the court noted the § 3604 claim but said plaintiffs had abandoned the Fair Housing Act as a separate theory for relief; its discussion of the Act was expressly hypothetical, while the decision addressed constitutional equal protection claims. opinion →
Alschuler v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, the court cites § 3604 in passing as support for its discussion of affirmative housing marketing plans while deciding a challenge to HUD’s regulatory approval under 24 C.F.R. § 881.206(b). It does not construe or apply § 3604 itself. opinion →
Oliver v. Foster, section 3604 is cited only as part of the statutes underlying the plaintiffs’ FHA claim. The court’s rulings address exhaustion, limitations, and damages under § 3612 and § 1982, without interpreting or applying § 3604’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Odie v. Evans v. Lester Tubbe, the court mentioned § 3604(a) and described the plaintiffs’ claims as only “arguably valid” while deciding whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed; it expressly did not decide the merits of the Fair Housing Act claims. opinion →
Evans v. CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TEL. CO. OF MD., section 3604 is mentioned only while describing a prior Fourth Circuit decision involving the limitations period for § 1982 claims. This opinion decides the limitations period for § 1981, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604. opinion →
Nasser v. City Of Homewood, the court cites § 3604(a) only to describe the Fair Housing Act's general policy and protected interests. Its actual decision is that the plaintiffs lacked standing under § 3612 and could not proceed under § 3617; it does not interpret or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
Nasser v. City of Homewood, the court cited § 3604(a) only as an example of the Fair Housing Act's general policy while deciding standing under §§ 3612 and 3617; it did not interpret or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
Clara M. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARDS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellant, section 3604 appears only in the court's discussion of an analogous Pelzer Realty case and the damages ruling reported from that case; this opinion does not construe, apply, or adopt a rule about § 3604. opinion →
Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Commission, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote recounting appellants' argument and the holding in Havens Realty. This court does not decide what § 3604(d) means or requires, and does not adopt or apply that proposition. opinion →
Debose v. Mueller, the court merely identifies § 3604 as one basis for plaintiffs' complaint; it decides only whether to enforce the settlement and award attorney's fees, without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
Huertas v. East River Housing Corp., the opinion decides organizational standing and merely assumes that the alleged conduct could support a Fair Housing Act claim; its footnote reproduces portions of § 3604 without construing or deciding the statute’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Athens Lumber Company, Incorporated v. Federal Election Commission, the opinion cites § 3604(d) only while describing the Supreme Court's Havens Realty decision as an example supporting the plaintiffs' standing argument; this court did not decide what § 3604(d) means or requires. opinion →
Milton Sutton and Emma Sutton v. Bloom, section 3604 is mentioned only in the court's summary of the claims alleged in Warner v. Perrino. The court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 3604 in this case. opinion →
Betty J. Block, Appellee-Plaintiff v. R.H. MacY & Company, the court mentions § 3604 only to identify the statute involved in a cited Fair Housing Act case; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., section 3604 is mentioned only to identify the statute involved in a case cited by the defendant; this court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Cynthia Richardson and Gale Richardson v. Howard, the opinion mentions § 3604 only as the statute underlying one of the appellants' claims; it does not construe the statute or explain its requirements. The remand concerns the district court's treatment of tester testimony and burden of proof, while the footnote merely notes differing burdens under the Fair Housing Act without defining or applying them. opinion →
Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, the dissent mentions § 3604 only while describing the facts and holding of Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, which it uses as a standing comparison; it does not construe, apply, or decide what § 3604 requires. opinion →
Lotz Realty Co., Inc. v. United States Department Of Housing And Urban Development, the court merely identifies § 3604(c) as the legal basis for the League's administrative complaint and describes the type of discrimination it proscribes in the background. The holding concerns whether the League was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604(c). opinion →
Lotz Realty Co. v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, the court mentions § 3604(c) only to identify the legal basis of the League's administrative complaint and to describe the laws involved; it decides attorney's-fee and prevailing-party issues under § 1988, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604(c). opinion →
Hope, Inc., an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, Plaintiffs v. The County of Dupage, Illinois, the court mentioned § 3604 only while distinguishing Havens in its constitutional standing analysis. It did not decide what § 3604 means, requires, or covers, and expressly did not reach the merits of the discrimination claim. opinion →
Jenkins v. State of Mo., the court mentioned § 3604 only in a general summary of the Fair Housing Act's provisions; it did not construe or apply § 3604, and its ruling concerned HUD's constitutional liability and Title VIII generally. opinion →
Greater Baltimore Board of Realtors v. Hughes, the court cites § 3604(a) and (e) only as an example of federal laws available as a less restrictive alternative to the state sign ban. It does not construe, apply, or decide what § 3604 requires. opinion →
Maria Difilippo and Raina Difilippo, by Her Mother and Next Friend Maria Difilippo, Cross-Appellees v. Tullio Morizio, C, section 3604 is mentioned as the statutory basis of the underlying lawsuit and in recounting the district court's finding; the appellate court's decision concerns attorney's fees under §§ 1988 and 3612(c), not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., James E. Boyd, Maybelle Stickel and Morrowood Garden Apartments, Ltd., the court mentioned § 3604(d) as background and relied on Havens to describe standing under the Fair Housing Act, but the appeal's holding concerned Watts's standing under § 1982, not the meaning or application of § 3604(d). opinion →
Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, the dissent mentions § 3604 only to identify the statutory basis of the claim in Trafficante while discussing Article III standing; it does not construe or apply § 3604 itself. opinion →
Williams v. Adams, the opinion identifies § 3604 as one statutory basis for the suit and reproduces statutory language in a footnote, but it does not interpret or independently apply § 3604; its ruling on the complaint rests on generic notice-pleading standards. opinion →
North Carolina Human Relations Council ex rel. Leach v. Weaver Realty Co., the court cited § 3604 only to identify the federal statute that served as a model and to explain that federal interpretations were useful but not controlling. It decided the meaning and application of North Carolina's State Fair Housing Act, not 42 U.S.C. § 3604. opinion →
Bell v. Busse, the court merely cited § 3604(a) while reporting Curtis v. Loether's characterization of a Fair Housing Act damages action; it did not construe or apply § 3604(a). The court's actual Fair Housing Act ruling concerned § 3603(b)(2), and its decision addressed insanity under §§ 1981 and 1982. opinion →
Keith v. Volpe, this is an attorneys’ fees order that merely reports the court’s earlier ruling that Hawthorne violated § 3604(a); the present opinion does not interpret or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
Jade Tolliver v. Emil F. Amici and Virginia Amici, the opinion mentions § 3604 only to identify the statutory basis of the suit and reports the district court's discrimination judgment; the appellate decision addresses punitive damages and attorneys' fees, not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Charles Vaughner, Cross-Appellants v. F.J. Pulito, the court mentioned the Fair Housing Act requirement only as part of its reasoning that the landlord's insurance policy did not cover the plaintiffs' intentional-discrimination claims; it did not decide an independent issue about the meaning or application of § 3604(a). opinion →
Haitian Refugee Center v. James S. Gracey, Admiral/commandant, United States Coast Guard, the court cites § 3604 only while describing the Havens case and its Article III injury-in-fact analysis; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank, section 3604 is mentioned only as one of the statutes plaintiffs allegedly violated; the court's decision addressed attorney's fees and deposition costs, not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Ferner v. Village of Sheffield, the opinion discusses § 3604 only to summarize Havens and use its continuing-violation reasoning by analogy in deciding Ferner’s § 1983 limitations issue; it does not decide what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Rose Torres, D.B.A. Legal Secretarial Services v. Rebarchak, the opinion merely identifies § 3604 as the basis for Count III and reports that the district court dismissed that count for failure to state a claim; the appellate court says Torres did not challenge that dismissal and does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
United States v. Gilbert, section 3604(a) appears only in a citation to and quotation from another court's discussion in Stackhouse. This court decided the case under 42 U.S.C. § 3631 and did not construe, apply, or hold anything about § 3604(a). opinion →
Douglas v. Metro Rental Services, Inc., the court reproduced § 3604 in a footnote, but did not construe the statute or decide what it requires. Its decision concerned whether Metro's default judgment was inconsistent with the individual defendant's jury verdict and whether the damages were excessive. opinion →
Saville v. Quaker Hill Place, the court mentioned § 3604(a) only as an analogous federal statute while construing Delaware’s housing-discrimination provision; it did not decide what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, the opinion mentions § 3604(b) and (c) only as claims alleged in the complaint and reports their dismissal; it does not construe or decide what either subsection means, requires, or covers. The later discussion concerns attorneys’ fees and Rule 11, not the merits of § 3604. opinion →
Michael Fonte and Gilda Fonte v. The Board of Managers of Continental Towers Condominium, the opinion mentions § 3604 only as one of the statutes cited in the plaintiffs’ complaint. The court vacated and remanded on pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) procedural grounds without deciding what § 3604 means or how it applies. opinion →
Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., the opinion mentions § 3604 only in a footnote reporting that the plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act count had been dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds; the court’s merits ruling addressed §§ 1981 and 1982 and Maryland law, not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Opinion No. Oag 59-88, (1988), the opinion mentions 42 U.S.C. § 3604 only while reporting the federal court's Mayers decision and expressly rejects applying that construction to the state statute; it does not construe or apply § 3604 itself. opinion →
Walker v. The City of Mesquite, section 3604 appears only in the procedural history as part of the plaintiff's allegation; the court decides standing to appeal a class-action consent decree and does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Walker v. City of Mesquite, the statute is mentioned only as part of the plaintiff's allegations in the procedural history. The court decided standing to appeal a consent decree and did not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Staples v. Wickesberg, section 3604 is cited only in the factual description of the claims asserted. The court decided attorney’s fees and the effect of a Rule 68 settlement offer, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604. opinion →
Verland C.L.A., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board, the court quoted § 3604(f) but expressly declined to address what effect the Fair Housing Amendments might have on group-residence spacing requirements; its statement about the absence of a cause of action was part of explaining why it would not reach the statute's application. opinion →
Public Citizen v. Federal Trade Commission, the court mentions § 3604(d) only as part of a discussion of Havens Realty and statutory-injury standing. It does not decide what § 3604(d) means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., the court only found the proposed failure-to-state-a-claim defenses colorable enough to be added and expressly said the merits were more properly addressed in a motion to dismiss; it did not decide what § 3604(a) or (c) means or whether the statute regulates discriminatory advertising. opinion →
Jones v. Deutsch, the statute appears only in a footnote listing the legal violations alleged in count II. The court does not construe § 3604 or decide how it applies; it dismisses the claims as unripe and for lack of a cognizable federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). opinion →
Edwards v. Atrium Village, the court merely identifies § 3604(d) as the basis of one of Edwards’s claims while discussing whether to bifurcate the trial; it does not construe, apply, or decide the statute. opinion →
Bijan N. Tabrizi and Fahimeh A. Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, the opinion cites § 3604(b) and (c) to identify claims pleaded by the plaintiffs and reports the lower court's dismissal of those claims, but the appellate decision concerns Rule 11 sanctions and attorney's fees and does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Stirgus v. Benoit, the plaintiff withdrew the § 3604 claim, so the court did not decide its meaning or application. The court's discussion concerned whether the separate § 3617 claim could proceed without a § 3604 violation. opinion →
McGrath v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, the opinion cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 et seq. in describing the plaintiffs’ Title VIII claim, but it expressly identifies § 3608(e)(5) as the applicable provision and decides the case based on HUD’s duties under that section. Thus, it does not hold what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
National Association of Realtors v. National Real Estate Association, Inc., the court cites § 3604(d) as an example in a general discussion of statutory standing and substantive rights; it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Durrett v. Housing Authority of the City of Providence, the court only identifies § 3604(b) as one statutory basis for the tenants' action. It does not interpret the subsection, state what it requires or covers, or apply its elements; the decision concerns appellate jurisdiction and approval of a consent decree. opinion →
Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., Inc., the court cites § 3604(a) only as an example of another court applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting formula in a leasing case; it decides the plaintiff's § 1981 claim and does not construe or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
Hibbing v. Sofarelli, the court cites § 3604 only to state, without analysis or statutory explanation, that the plaintiff inadequately pleaded a Fair Housing Act claim; it does not construe or explain the statute. opinion →
United States v. Rent America, Corp., the statute is cited only to describe the discrimination allegations in the complaint. The court's actual rulings concern the retroactive application and remedies under 42 U.S.C.A. § 3614, not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Colony Cove Associates v. Brown, the court states the general rule in § 3604 as background, but its decision does not construe or apply § 3604; it upholds the policy under the separate “housing for older persons” exception in § 3607. opinion →
McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, N.C., section 3604 appears only in the complaint's list of statutes allegedly violated; the appellate court did not analyze, construe, or adopt a holding concerning the Fair Housing Act, instead resolving the appeal on constitutional and related claims. opinion →
Favors v. MAQ Management Corp., the court cited § 3604 only to describe the housing-discrimination scheme allegedly enabled by discriminatory hiring; it construed and applied § 3606, not § 3604. opinion →
Stella Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School District Board of Education, the court mentioned § 3604 only while describing the Supreme Court’s decision in Havens Realty and borrowing its continuing-violation reasoning for the plaintiff’s § 1983 limitations issue; it did not construe or decide anything about § 3604 itself. opinion →
Darcy Foster v. Mydas Associates, Inc., Etc., the opinion only describes § 3604(a) as the basis of Count 1 in the procedural history. It does not interpret or apply the statute; the appeal concerns the inadequately explained award of fees and sanctions. opinion →
McCallister v. Nelson, section 3604(f)(1) is mentioned only in a footnote recounting counsel's advice and the Board of Zoning Appeals' action. The court did not construe or apply the federal statute; its holding concerns municipal veto authority under W.Va.Code § 8-1-7. opinion →
Lime Tree Village Community Club Ass'n v. State Farm General Insurance, the court merely recounts that an underlying complaint alleged violations of § 3604. Its decision concerns whether the insurer had a duty to defend or indemnify for alleged intentional discrimination, not what § 3604 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Windmill Pointe Village Club Ass'n v. State Farm General Insurance, section 3604 is mentioned only to describe allegations in the underlying Rogers complaint; the court decided the insurance coverage and duty-to-defend issue and did not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Untitled California Attorney General Opinion, the opinion recites § 3604(c) as background while discussing California's state fair-housing law; it does not construe or apply the federal section. opinion →
Human Development of Erie, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board, section 3604(f) is mentioned in a footnote describing the Fair Housing Act and in reporting the trial court's merits finding. This court expressly said it did not address whether the trial court properly raised the issue; the appellate holding concerned attorney's fees under Sections 1988 and 3613(c). opinion →
Foster v. Mydas Associates, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote describing the claims pleaded in the complaint. The court did not interpret or apply § 3604(a); its ruling concerned attorney fees and costs under § 1988. opinion →
Boston Housing Authority v. Atlanta International Insurance, the opinion mentions § 3604 only as one of the statutes alleged in the underlying NAACP complaint; the court decides insurance coverage under Massachusetts law and the policy terms without construing or applying § 3604. opinion →
People Helpers Foundation, Inc. v. City of Richmond, the court cited § 3604(a) only to identify protected classes as part of the elements of a § 3617 claim; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 3604(a). opinion →
United States v. Curlee, section 3604 is mentioned only in the procedural history as the statute allegedly violated in HUD's charges and the government's complaint; the court decides the motion based on the 100-day investigation deadline under § 3610 and does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
United States v. Southern Management Corporation, the opinion cites § 3604(f)(9) only in a list of the Fair Housing Act’s three exclusions. The court does not interpret or apply the direct-threat or property-damage exclusion; its holding concerns the separate addiction exclusion in § 3602(h). opinion →
Duane v. Government Employees Insurance, section 3604 appears only in a parenthetical string citation identifying the statutes discussed in Mackey; this court neither analyzes nor decides anything about § 3604. opinion →
Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia, the court resolved the appeal under the maximum-occupancy exemption in § 3607(b)(1) and expressly declined to address the discriminatory-effect and reasonable-accommodation issues under § 3604(f). opinion →
Briseno v. City of Santa Ana, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting an issue raised by amici curiae; the court did not decide or adopt that contention. opinion →
Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, section 3604 appears only in a footnote describing the Act and its enforcement framework. The court did not construe or decide an issue under § 3604; its holding concerned whether the community qualified for the housing-for-older-persons exemption under § 3607(b)(2)(C). opinion →
United States v. City of Hayward, Cal., the court mentions § 3604(a) only in a footnote stating the FHA's general prohibition on housing discrimination. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604(a); the decision concerns § 3617 and the older-persons exemption under § 3607(b). opinion →
Littlefield v. Mcguffey, the court mentions § 3604 only to identify an underlying claim and describe the procedural history. The appeal actually decides whether the insurer's policy covers attorney's fees under § 1988, not what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Littlefield v. McGuffey, the court merely identifies § 3604 as the statute underlying Count II in the complaint; it decides an insurance-policy dispute and holds nothing about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604. opinion →
City of Peekskill v. Rehabilitation Support Services, Inc., the court cited § 3604(f)(1) in its discussion of the equities and as a warning about the City's position, but it did not decide an FHA claim or construe the statute. opinion →
Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, the court mentions § 3604(c) only as the federal provision interpreted in Ragin, an analogous authority. It adopts Ragin's ordinary-reader test for the Wisconsin Open Housing Act and does not decide what § 3604(c) means or how it applies. opinion →
Lime Tree Village Community Club Association, Inc. v. State Farm General Insurance Company, the opinion reports the allegations in the underlying Bradley suit and cites § 3604 only to describe those claims. The court's holding concerns State Farm's duty to defend under the insurance policy, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604. opinion →
Mitchell v. Sung, the opinion mentions § 3604 et seq. only in listing the plaintiff's causes of action. The court dismisses the third and fifth causes of action and does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Fair Housing Act claim. opinion →
Elliott v. City of Athens, the majority resolved the appeal under the § 3607(b)(1) maximum-occupancy exemption and expressly declined to decide the discriminatory-effect and reasonable-accommodation issues under § 3604(f); the § 3604 references therefore do not state a holding about that statute. opinion →
Sandra Hooker Richard Hooker and Fair Housing Contact Service v. Terry Weathers Shamrock Motel and John Doe, the court mentions § 3604 only when describing the statutory basis of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Its decision concerns standing, the procedural defect in the district court’s marginal order, and the defendants’ affirmative defense under the older-persons exemption in § 3607, without deciding what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Comer v. Kemp, the opinion only reports the plaintiffs’ allegations that Title VIII, including §§ 3604 and 3608, was violated; it does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., the court merely reported and quoted the Supreme Court’s holding in Havens Realty about § 3604(d) while using it by analogy to decide standing under Title VII; it did not independently construe or apply § 3604(d). opinion →
Woodlawn Veterans Mutual Housing Co. v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal, the court cites § 3604(b) and (d) as authority for a general proposition while deciding the constitutional challenge to DHCR’s race-conscious affirmative-action plan; it does not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
United States v. Presidio Investments, the opinion recounts the government's allegation under § 3604(b), but the court does not construe that provision or decide its coverage or requirements. The holding concerns the retroactive application of the 1988 Act's enforcement procedures to a pending case. opinion →
United States v. Presidio Investments, Ltd., the opinion reports the government's allegation under § 3604(b), but the court did not construe or decide what § 3604(b) means or requires. Its holding concerns the retroactive application of procedural and remedial 1988 amendments and the government's enforcement authority under other provisions. opinion →
New York State Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, the court quotes § 3604(e), reports the Sixth Circuit's analysis of that statute, and cites it as background for the existence of federal blockbusting law. The court's own decision addresses the constitutionality of New York Real Property Law § 442-h and related regulations, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604(e). opinion →
United States v. Scott, the court decided whether HUD's § 3610 investigation deadline barred the action; § 3604 appeared in the factual allegations and was not construed. opinion →
Ward v. Harte, the court's holding concerned the preclusive effect of a local Fair Housing Board decision; the § 3604 language described the board's finding and was not independently construed. opinion →
Littlefield v. McGuffey (In Re McGuffey), the appellate holding concerned nondischargeability under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6); the Fair Housing Act appeared in the background and jury-instruction discussion. opinion →
Johnson v. Hillside Homes Groups, Inc., the memorandum affirmed denial of removal jurisdiction; its reference to § 3604(b) only identified the federal right asserted and did not construe the statute. opinion →
Rogers v. Rucker, the court mentioned § 3604(b) only to identify the defendant's counterclaim and addressed whether that counterclaim supported removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1); it did not interpret or decide the substantive requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604(b). opinion →
Martin v. Voinovich, the court cites § 3604 only while reporting Havens Realty's continuing-violation ruling as an analogy in its statute-of-limitations analysis. It does not interpret or apply § 3604 to decide the claims in Martin v. Voinovich. opinion →
Toledo Fair Housing Center v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, section 3604 appears only in a citation to an annotation discussing redlining and the federal Fair Housing Act; the court decided the motion under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, and expressly noted that plaintiffs asserted no substantive federal Fair Housing Act claim. opinion →
Pargo v. First Realty Property Management, Ltd. Alan McFee, the court mentions §§ 3604(a) and (b) only to identify the statutory basis of Pargo's suit; it affirms on the absence of trial evidence and does not construe or apply the statute's requirements. opinion →
Research Center of Hawaii v. Kina'u Boyd Kamali'i, Nancy McGuckin Judith Naniole, Winifred Ishimoto, and Gary Kajiwara, the court affirmed summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. It expressly said that the validity of state dispersal laws under the FHA was not clearly established and did not decide whether Act 205 was preempted or whether the FHA was violated; the statute was relevant only to the immunity analysis. opinion →
Knapp v. Smiljanic, the court mentions § 3604 only as a comparison while analyzing the distinct Section 8 statute, § 1437f(t); it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604. opinion →
United States v. Hughes, the court cites § 3604(f)(1) only to describe the Act's general prohibition; its actual holding construes § 3617's prohibition on interference. opinion →
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, the statute is mentioned in a dissent as a comparative aside supporting the dissent's analysis of an Alaska constitutional free-exercise issue; the court did not adjudicate a claim under § 3604 or adopt a holding construing or applying it. opinion →
Bell v. Mike Ford Realty Co., the opinion merely reports Bell's allegation under §§ 3604(a) and (d); the court's Fair Housing Act analysis and judgment address § 3605(a), without construing or applying § 3604. opinion →
New York State Association of Realtors, Inc. And Clifford Hall v. Gail S. Shaffer, Individually and as Secretary of Stat, the citation appears in a list of claims asserted by the Realtors; the appellate court did not construe or apply § 3604(e), and it declined to address the additional Fair Housing claim. opinion →
Pine Cone Harbour Condominium Association, Incorporated v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the opinion mentions § 3604(f)(2) only to identify the Fair Housing Act claims brought by the Bernaus. The court decided whether Nationwide's insurance policy covered those claims and did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
United States v. Gorman Towers Apartments, the court did not construe or decide the requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(B); it merely recited the alleged parking-accommodation refusal while deciding that the HUD complaint was timely under § 3610 and involved a continuing violation. opinion →
Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. Bmc Marketing Corporation, T/a Snelling & Snelling Personnel Cons, the court recited § 3604(d) and the related enforcement provision while distinguishing Havens from the testers’ separate § 1981 claim. It did not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 3604(d) in this case. opinion →
Smart Unique Services Corp. v. Mortgage Correspondence of Illinois, the opinion merely recounts what the court held in the earlier motion-to-dismiss ruling, including the earlier court's citation to § 3604(a), while deciding that the plaintiffs could not use Rule 60(b) to challenge those legal rulings. It does not independently construe or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
Brooks v. Center Park Associates, the opinion mentions § 3604 only in describing the plaintiffs' complaint and the procedural history. The court decided the attorney's-fee issue under § 3613(c)(2), without construing or applying § 3604. opinion →
Brooks v. Center Park Associates, section 3604 is mentioned only to describe the plaintiffs’ complaint; the court did not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
United States v. Tierra Apartments Ltd. Partnership, section 3604 appears only in the complaint's description of the discrimination allegations. The court decided the jurisdictional effect of the filing deadline in § 3612(o)(1), not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, the dissent cites § 3604 as background support for its argument that there is no firm national policy against marital-status discrimination, while the case concerns whether RFRA's compelling-interest test is satisfied; the court is not adjudicating a claim under or otherwise construing § 3604. opinion →
Judy Justice v. Pendleton Place Apartments, the court dismissed the interlocutory appeal on Rule 54(b) grounds and expressly declined to decide the damages issue under the Fair Housing Act; its discussion of § 3604 only describes the pleaded claims and directs the district court to consider the statute and its history. opinion →
Orange Lake Associates, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, the court decided legislative immunity, due process, and equal-protection challenges to zoning; § 3604 appeared only in the plaintiff's allegations and was not construed or applied by the court. opinion →
Peabody Properties, Inc. v. Sherman, the cited discussion appears in a dissent and reports the trial judge's accommodation ruling; the majority's disposition did not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Strange v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, the court used the Fair Housing Act's treatment of insurance redlining as public-policy background to a wrongful-discharge claim; it did not adjudicate the substantive § 3604 claim. opinion →
Ragin v. Harry MacKlowe Real Estate Co., the opinion is an attorneys’ fee decision and mentions § 3604(c) only in describing the plaintiffs’ underlying allegations and the prior judgment; it does not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
United States v. Country Club Garden Owners Ass'n, the opinion only recounts the government's allegations under § 3604(f)(3)(A) and (B); it decides intervention and jury-demand issues and does not adjudicate what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Relationship Between Department of Justice Attorneys and Persons on Whose Behalf the United States Brings Suits Under th, section 3604 is included only in the introductory citation to the Fair Housing Act’s statutory range. The opinion does not interpret or apply § 3604; its substantive discussion addresses the government’s enforcement role and attorney-client relationship under other provisions, chiefly §§ 3610–3614. opinion →
Marinoff v. US DEPT. OF HUD, the court gives a general description of the FHA and cites § 3604 as background; it does not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 3604. The ruling concerns whether HUD may be sued for its investigation and dismissal of a complaint. opinion →
Marinoff v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, the court merely describes the FHA and cites § 3604 in background discussion. It does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604; its ruling concerns whether HUD can be sued for failing to investigate and whether that agency action is reviewable under the APA. opinion →
Debolt v. Espy, section 3604 appears only in a string citation identifying the Fair Housing Act provisions invoked by the plaintiff. The court expressly declined to address the merits of those claims and decided the appeal on standing and mootness. opinion →
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., the Court expressly did not decide whether Edmonds’s actions violated § 3604(f)(1)(A) or § 3604(f)(3)(B); its holding concerned only whether the zoning rule was exempt under § 3607(b)(1). opinion →
Jess Aylett and Barbara Aylett v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, on Behalf of Bobbie Burris, and Bobbie Bur, section 3604(b) is cited in the procedural history to identify HUD's charge, and the opinion reports the agency's conclusion about the alleged statements. The appellate court's actual holding concerned heightened scrutiny of the Secretary's credibility reversal and ordered dismissal; it did not independently construe or apply § 3604(b) to a proven violation. opinion →
Salute v. Stratford Greens, the opinion mentions § 3604(f)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(3)(B) only as claims advanced by the plaintiffs; the court granted relief on the separate United States Housing Act claim and expressly stated that it need not address the Fair Housing Act claims. opinion →
Glendale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Greensboro Housing Authority, the opinion reports Jackson's description of standing under § 3604 and relies on that precedent in deciding standing, but this court does not construe or independently apply § 3604; its merits analysis concerns HUD regulations and the Administrative Procedure Act. opinion →
Town of Northborough v. Collins, the court identifies whether § 3604's familial-status language reaches age status as an issue but does not decide it; it resolves the federal-law argument by relying on the housing-for-older-persons exception in § 3607(b). opinion →
Travis W. Jones and Audie J. Jones v. Alan Boyer, First Chicago Trust Company of Illinois, and Chuck Kaplan, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting an allegation plaintiffs made on appeal. The court did not interpret or apply § 3604; it affirmed dismissal because the lawsuit was frivolous and devoid of merit. opinion →
Lloyd v. Housing Authority Of The City Of Kirksville, the court cited § 3604(f)(3)(B) to identify an established reasonable-accommodation principle in its qualified-immunity analysis; it did not decide the FHA claim or construe or apply the subsection on the merits. opinion →
Lloyd v. Housing Authority of Kirksville, the court recites the Fair Housing Amendments Act's accommodation requirement as background law relevant to qualified immunity, but does not decide a claim under § 3604 or interpret how the statute applies. opinion →
El-Yafi v. 360 East 72nd Owners Corp., the statute appears only in the magistrate judge’s procedural description of the discrimination claims. The court decided the case on willful discovery violations and Rule 37(d) sanctions, without construing or applying § 3604. opinion →
United States v. Fairways Villas Condominium Ass'n, the opinion reports the United States' allegations and then enters a consent order without any admission of liability; it does not decide what § 3604(f)(2)(A) or § 3604(f)(3)(B) means or whether defendants violated them. opinion →
Schroeder v. De Bertolo, the court mentioned § 3604(f) only to describe the plaintiffs’ unadjudicated Fair Housing Amendments Act allegations while deciding that the counterclaim for malicious prosecution was premature; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Commercial Union Insurance v. Image Control Property Management, Inc., the opinion mentions § 3604 only to describe the claims alleged in the underlying complaint; this court did not construe or decide what § 3604 means or requires, and expressly stated that it expressed no opinion on whether the Fair Housing Act provides for recovery of the claimed injuries. opinion →
Wesley Group Home Ministries v. HALLANDALE, the opinion does not review or construe the merits of § 3604; it reports the trial court's finding under (f)(1) and (f)(3)(B) and holds only that the certiorari proceeding qualifies as a civil action for attorney's fees under § 3613. opinion →
Alice Sanders James Sanders v. Nancy Dorris Century 21 Real Estate, Robertson County Chandler Sales, the opinion mentions § 3604 in the background and reports the district court's finding of a violation, but the Sixth Circuit does not construe or decide what § 3604 means or requires. Its own rulings concern evidentiary exclusion, damages, and injunctive relief. opinion →
Floyd A. Brandt and Delores D. Brandt v. Village of Chebanse, Illinois, the court merely stated the accessibility requirement in § 3604(f)(3)(C) as background. It did not construe or decide a claim under that subsection; the dispositive analysis concerned reasonable accommodation under § 3604(f)(3)(B). opinion →
Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains, the court mentioned § 3604(f)(3)(B) in a footnote as an analogy supporting its conclusion that Title II of the ADA covers zoning. It did not decide an FHA claim or construe § 3604 as applied to the parties. opinion →
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., the opinion mentions § 3604 only to report the Supreme Court's holding in Havens Realty as an analogy supporting its analysis of standing under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; this court did not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Pisello v. Town of Brookhaven, section 3604 is cited only to identify the proposed Fair Housing Act claim. The court ruled on leave to amend under Rule 15(a) and did not interpret or apply § 3604; its brief substantive description concerned § 3617. opinion →
Selmon v. Portsmouth Drive Condominium Ass'n, the opinion mentions § 3604 only as the basis of claims asserted in the state-court counterclaim and federal complaint. The court decided the abstention issue and whether the federal case should be stayed or dismissed; it did not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Selmon v. Portsmouth Drive Condominium Association, the court mentions § 3604 only to identify claims alleged in the parallel federal and state proceedings. Its holding concerns whether the federal case should be stayed or dismissed under Colorado River abstention, and it does not interpret or apply § 3604's substantive requirements. opinion →
Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance, the court merely reproduced the plaintiff's housing-discrimination allegation under § 3604(a) while deciding whether insurance coverage for intentional discrimination was barred by Oregon public policy; it did not construe or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
State v. Keding, the court decided the meaning and application of Iowa Code § 216.8(3), not § 3604. It mentioned § 3604 as the federal provision on which the Iowa statute was patterned and cited a Seventh Circuit interpretation as persuasive authority. opinion →
Kelly v. Secretary, United States Department of Housing & Urban Development ex rel. Staples, the opinion only reports the ALJ's finding of liability under § 3604 and decides the proper damages and attorney's fees after remand; it does not interpret or apply § 3604 itself. opinion →
Boyd v. Browner, the opinion only recounts the plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act contention in the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply § 3604(a); it later noted that the plaintiffs' brief appeared to abandon the declaratory claims. opinion →
Montview Park v. HUD, the court only recounts HUD’s discrimination allegations under § 3604(a) and (c) as procedural background; it decides entitlement to attorney fees under the EAJA and does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, the opinion mentions § 3604 only in describing the claims pleaded in the complaint. The court dismissed the action under the Younger abstention doctrine and did not interpret, define, or decide any issue concerning § 3604. opinion →
Fair Housing Council v. Boyertown Area Times, the court only recited § 3604(e) in describing the Fair Housing Act and expressly declined to decide whether the advertisement was discriminatory; the decision concerned the plaintiff organization's standing. opinion →
Jacobs v. Town of Scituate, the statute is mentioned only to identify a Fair Housing Act claim that this court had already dismissed in an earlier order; this opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604. opinion →
Gadson v. Royal/Concord Gardens, the court cited § 3604 only while describing the elements of plaintiffs' FHA claims in the context of a res judicata and collateral-estoppel motion. It did not construe or decide the application or merits of § 3604. opinion →
Patel v. Penman, the opinion only reports the district court’s disposition of the Patels’ § 3604(b) claim in the procedural history and notes that the ruling was not appealed; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Amrut N. Patel Sita Patel v. Penman, the opinion only reports that the Patels pleaded a Fair Housing Act claim under § 3604(b), and notes that the district court granted summary judgment on that claim without analyzing the statute. The appellate court did not decide what § 3604(b) means or requires. opinion →
Deer Hill Arms II Ltd. Partnership v. Planning Commission, the court mentions § 3604 only in describing the Act's statutory history and discrimination provisions; it decides the case under the separate § 3607(b)(2)(C) exemption. opinion →
Banai v. Secretary, United States Department of Housing & Urban Development Ex Rel. Times, the opinion reports the ALJ's finding under § 3604(a) and (c) and the defendants' concession, but the appellate court decided only whether the compensatory-damages award was supported by substantial evidence; it did not construe or apply § 3604's substantive prohibitions. opinion →
Kelly v. Secretary, United States Department Of Housing And Urban Development, the opinion merely reports the ALJ's liability finding under § 3604 and states that an earlier appeal upheld that finding; this appeal addresses the damages award and attorney's fees, without deciding what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Collins v. Asmara Ltd, the opinion merely identifies the statutory basis of Collins's action and affirms the district court's summary judgment by relying on the lower court's analysis; it does not interpret or apply § 3604(d). opinion →
Filicore v. Jossel, the court did not decide the federal Fair Housing Act claim or construe § 3604; it states that the parallel claim was dismissed as time-barred and then decides the constitutionality and application of New York Real Property Law § 236. opinion →
Ambruster v. Monument 3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd., section 3604(f)(1) appears only in the complaint's list of alleged FHA violations. The court decided whether emotional-distress damages survive a plaintiff's death under the FHA, relying on 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c), without construing or applying § 3604(f)(1). opinion →
Pearson v. Edgar, the opinion mentions § 3604(e) only as an example of an alternative statute that could be used to prosecute blockbusting or panic peddling. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue about § 3604(e); the holding concerns the constitutionality of the Illinois anti-solicitation statute. opinion →
Samaritan Inns, Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellant v. District of Columbia, Appellants/cross-Appellees, the opinion mentions § 3604(f)(3)(B) in recounting the claim and disposes of that claim as moot; it expressly declines to address the statute’s requirements. The § 3604(f)(1) reference likewise reports the lower court’s finding and is not construed by this court. opinion →
Jennings v. MENTAL HEALTH OFF, the opinion mentions § 3604 only in a footnote reporting an unaddressed preemption contention and expressly declines to reach the issue; it does not decide what § 3604 means or how it applies. opinion →
Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental Health, the opinion mentions 42 U.S.C. § 3604 only in a footnote reporting Larkin’s holding as an example of possible federal preemption, then expressly declines to reach the preemption issue. opinion →
Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, the court mentions § 3604 in the statutory-background discussion, but its actual decision concerns the retroactive application of HUD regulations and FHA amendments and the housing-for-older-persons exemption under § 3607; it does not construe or decide how § 3604 itself applies. opinion →
David W. Childress Augustus G. Harvey, III Vincent J. Matassa Henry W. Mease Howard S. Noyes Daniel G.…, the opinion mentions § 3604(a)-(b) only in a footnote comparing Title VIII's wording with Title VII's wording; it does not decide what § 3604 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Riedel v. Human Relations Commission of Reading, the court merely gives a general description of the enumerated Federal Fair Housing Act sections, including § 3604, as background while deciding the scope of a local ordinance modeled on § 3617. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604. opinion →
United States v. Housing Authority of Milford, the opinion mentions § 3604 only in recounting a warning letter and the background of the Government's Fair Housing Act lawsuit. The court decides attorney-client privilege and whether to permit an ex parte interview, not the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Arkansas Acorn Fair Housing, Inc. v. Greystone Ltd., the court decided only that AFH lacked standing and granted summary judgment; its references to § 3604, including the quoted advertising provision, were background or merits discussion, and the court expressly said the merits were not before it. opinion →
Wasserman v. Three Seasons Ass'n No. 1, Inc., the opinion quotes § 3604(a) in recounting the plaintiffs’ FHA claim, but dismisses the complaint for lack of standing under the FHA’s aggrieved-person framework. It does not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or merits application of § 3604(a). opinion →
Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, Janet Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, the opinion mentions § 3604(a) only while reporting the lower court's Fair Housing Act ruling in United States v. City of Birmingham as an analogy in a § 1983 municipal-liability discussion; this court does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, John Beeding, Jr., Harry Diehl, Jolyne Fisher, and Rex A. Burgess, the court mentions § 3604 only to identify a Fair Housing Act claim in the procedural background. It decides the applicability of Younger abstention and the need to stay rather than dismiss the federal action, without interpreting or applying § 3604’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Furtick v. Medford Housing Authority, the court decided sovereign immunity for monetary claims under another waiver statute; § 3604 was only listed among the alleged claims and was not construed or applied. opinion →
Arias v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, the opinion merely reports the HUD administrative law judge's determination, quoted in a footnote. The appellate court did not adopt, interpret, or decide any issue under § 3604(a); its holding concerned the lack of disciplinary penalty guidelines under Florida law. opinion →
Hofsheier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the opinion merely identifies § 3604(a) as a statute underlying the plaintiff's claim and holds that the insurance policy excluded coverage for the claim; it does not interpret or decide what § 3604(a) means or requires. opinion →
United States v. Oak Manor Apartments, the opinion only recounts that the complaint alleged violations of § 3604(a)-(e) and reports the resulting discrimination finding; it does not construe or decide what § 3604 means or requires. Its analysis addresses limitations, damages, and § 3614. opinion →
Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court cites § 3604(f)(9) only as a parallel Fair Housing Act provision when explaining the origin of the ADA's direct-threat rule; it construes and applies the ADA provision, not § 3604. opinion →
AR ACORN Fair v. Bailey Corp., the opinion merely identifies the statutory claim and affirms the judgment without discussing what § 3604(a) means or requires, expressly relying on the district court's memorandum opinion. opinion →
AR Acorn Fair v. Greystone Dev., Ltd., the court cited § 3604(c) only to identify the statutory basis of ACORN’s lawsuit. It decided the case on organizational standing and did not interpret or apply the requirements of § 3604(c). opinion →
Arkansas Acorn Fair Housing, Inc. v. Greystone Development, Ltd. Co., Doing Business as Greystone, a Golf Community, the court cites § 3604(c) only to identify the statutory basis of ACORN's claim. It decides the case on organizational standing and does not determine what § 3604(c) means, requires, or whether Greystone's advertisements violated it. opinion →
Assisted Living Associates of Moorestown, L.L.C. v. Moorestown Township, the court resolved the case by interpreting the restrictive covenant under state law and expressly declined to decide whether enforcement of the covenant would violate the FHA; § 3604(f) is quoted in a footnote and referenced only as the basis of an earlier preliminary injunction. opinion →
American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, the court describes § 3604(f)(3)(C) and § 3604(f)(1) as background to the FHAA and to explain available remedies, but it does not interpret or apply either provision. The decision concerns whether APA review may compel HUD's generalized investigation and enforcement practices. opinion →
American Disabled For Attendant Programs Today v. United States Department Of Housing And Urban Development, the court summarized the FHAA's accessibility requirements while deciding whether the APA permitted review of HUD's generalized investigative and enforcement inaction. It did not decide a dispute about the meaning, coverage, or application of § 3604. opinion →
Radecki v. Joura, the court cites § 3604(f)(1) only to identify the statutory basis of Radecki's claim; it decides evidentiary, scheduling, due-process, and dismissal issues rather than construing or applying the statute. opinion →
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler, section 3604 is mentioned only to describe the statute at issue in Havens Realty, which the court cites as precedent for general organizational-standing principles; this opinion does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, the court cites § 3604(f)(3) only as an example supporting its analysis of reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA; it does not interpret or apply the Fair Housing Amendments Act provision. opinion →
West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Wilson Estates, Inc., the state court decided a claim under the West Virginia Fair Housing Act; its quotation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 is background and the court did not adjudicate a federal § 3604 claim. opinion →
Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Association, Incorporated, the court cited § 3604(f)(3) only as an example of another statute recognizing a failure-to-accommodate theory; it did not interpret or apply § 3604(f)(3), and its holding concerned Title II of the ADA. opinion →
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler, the court mentions § 3604 only to identify the statute involved in the prior Havens Realty case while discussing organizational standing; it does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604. opinion →
Tadeusz Radecki, Dr. v. James Joura Carol Joura, the statute appears only as a citation identifying the Fair Housing Act claim. The court decided evidentiary and case-management issues concerning exclusion of expert testimony and dismissal for failure to prosecute, without interpreting or applying § 3604(f)(1)'s substantive requirements. opinion →
Flynn v. 3900 Watson Place, Inc., the court cites § 3604(f)(3)(B) only to identify the Fair Housing Act defense plaintiffs could have raised in the prior landlord-tenant proceeding. It does not construe the subsection or decide whether the defendant violated its substantive requirements; the holding concerns res judicata and due process. opinion →
215 ALLIANCE v. Cuomo, the opinion recounts the plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Act argument under §§ 3604 and 3608 but expressly declines to decide it after resolving the case under Public Law 104-204. opinion →
Killingham v. Wilshire Investments Corp., the court cites § 3604(f)(3)(B) only in a footnote describing the background to a later D.C. housing-code amendment; it does not interpret or apply the federal statute. opinion →
Taye Addisu Mokhtar Al-Saeed Ghassan Abu Hemdeh v. Fred Meyer, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, the court mentioned § 3604(d) only as an analogy contrasting the Fair Housing Act with § 1981, and relied on the reported Supreme Court ruling rather than deciding an issue under § 3604. opinion →
United States v. County of Nassau, Ny, the court merely reports the Government’s allegation that the tax-assessment methodology violated § 3604(b); it decides the case on Tax Injunction Act jurisdiction and does not construe or apply § 3604(b) on the merits. opinion →
Malibu Investment Co. v. Sparks, the discussion of § 3604(c) appears only in a dissent that disagrees with the majority and proposes what the court should do; the majority's holding did not construe or apply § 3604(c). opinion →
Creasy v. Rusk, the court mentions § 3604 only in a list of federal legislative developments cited as background for Indiana public policy concerning integration of people with disabilities. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the Fair Housing Act. opinion →
Kyles, Kyra v. JK Guardian Security, the court discussed § 3604 only to summarize and use prior Fair Housing Act tester-standing decisions as an analogy supporting its Title VII analysis. No § 3604 claim, statutory disposition, or independent holding under that statute was before the court. opinion →
Kyra Kyles and Lolita Pierce v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, Inc., D/B/A Guardian Security Services, the court discussed § 3604(a) and § 3604(d) only as Fair Housing Act precedents used by analogy in deciding tester standing under Title VII; this case involved no Fair Housing Act claim and did not decide an issue under § 3604. opinion →
Szwast v. Carlton Apartments, section 3604 appears only in the introductory description of the plaintiffs’ claim. The opinion does not construe or apply the statute; its references to the Fair Housing Act and the prior liability ruling are background to the post-trial damages and attorney’s-fee issues. opinion →
Riedel v. Human Relations Commission, section 3604 is mentioned only as part of the FHA's statutory range and in a footnote listing statutes incorporated into the local ordinance. The court decided the meaning and application of the local ordinance and Section 3617, not Section 3604. opinion →
van den Berk v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, section 3604 appears only in a footnote as a comparison to the Missouri housing-discrimination statute; the court did not construe or apply the federal statute and decided the case under Missouri law. opinion →
Nationalist Found. v. Commissioner, the court merely describes petitioner's planned use of § 3604(e) in the factual background of a tax-exemption dispute; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale College, the court quoted § 3604(a) and (b) to describe the plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Act claims, but its ruling concerned standing under §§ 3613 and 3602; it did not construe or decide the merits or application of § 3604. opinion →
Xiangyuan (Sue) Zhu v. Fisher, Cavanaugh, Smith & Lemon, P.A., the court cited § 3604(b) only to describe the FHA's background and then decided the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim under § 3617; it did not construe or apply § 3604(b) itself. opinion →
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, section 3604 appears only in Appendix B to Justice Breyer's opinion, in a list of disability discrimination laws enacted before the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Community Stabilization Project v. Cuomo, the court mentioned § 3604(d) while describing Havens and evaluating the CSP’s Article III standing. It dismissed for lack of injury in fact and did not decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or merits application. opinion →
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, Inc. v. Lazarus-Burman Assoc., the court cited § 3604(f)(1) while deciding whether EPVA had associational standing, and quoted § 3604(f)(3)(C) only as part of the alleged FHA violations. The court did not construe or decide the statute's accessibility requirements; its limitations ruling concerned § 3613. opinion →
Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, the court merely reports that the complaint sought relief under the Fair Housing Act; it does not construe or apply 42 U.S.C. § 3604, instead deciding jurisdiction and Younger abstention issues. opinion →
Robinson v. Gorman, the opinion merely identifies the FHA and § 3604 as one of the plaintiff's claims in the procedural background. The court decides the Rehabilitation Act motion and does not construe, apply, or hold anything about § 3604. opinion →
Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of America v. City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations, the opinion mentions § 3604(d) only in a parenthetical describing Havens Realty as cited by Kyles; the court decides standing under the Chicago ordinance and does not construe or apply § 3604(d) itself. opinion →
Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts v. City of Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations, the opinion mentions § 3604(d) only while reporting Havens Realty’s treatment of Fair Housing Act testers and describing Kyles’s reasoning by analogy. The court does not construe or apply § 3604(d) itself. opinion →
Presbyterian Child Welfare Agency of Buckhorn, Kentucky, Inc. v. Nelson County Board of Adjustment, the court only identifies § 3604(f) as the basis of an FHAA claim and addresses whether that claim is barred by preclusion, exhaustion, or Rooker-Feldman. It expressly declines to decide the claim's substantive aspects, so it does not hold what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
SUNDERLAND FAMILY TREATMENT v. City of Pasco, the court discussed § 3604(f) only as comparative background while deciding the separate Washington Housing Policy Act claim. It did not adjudicate the FHA claim; its disposition rested on the WHPA and it expressly declined to consider the other issues. opinion →
Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, the court discusses § 3604(f) and its reasonable-accommodation theory, but expressly limits its inquiry to the Washington Housing Policy Act and decides the appeal on that state-law ground; it does not decide the FHA claim. opinion →
Broward Garden Tenants Ass'n v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, section 3604 et seq. appears only as the statutory basis for count VI in the complaint, and the court dismissed that claim under CERCLA’s jurisdictional bar without interpreting or applying the Fair Housing Act’s requirements. opinion →
American Nat. Gen. Ins. Co. v. JACKSON, the court merely recounts the allegations in the underlying Fair Housing Act suit; its summary-judgment decision addresses insurance-policy coverage and exclusions, not the meaning or application of § 3604(a). opinion →
American National General Insurance v. L.T. Jackson, the court merely reports the government’s allegations and the statutory basis of the underlying FHA suit; it decides insurance coverage and the insurers’ duty to defend, not what § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
King v. A & R Katz Management, Inc., the court only describes the plaintiff's allegation and cites § 3604(b) as the asserted legal basis. It dismisses the appeal for failure to comply with appellate briefing requirements and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Banks v. Dallas Housing Authority, the opinion mentions § 3604 only in describing a Fair Housing Act claim that the jury rejected and that the plaintiffs did not appeal. The appellate court decided issues concerning former § 1437f(e), not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Woodside Village Condominium Association, Inc. v. Jahren, the court mentions § 3604 only in a footnote as an analogy to the Florida fair-housing provisions. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604; the holding concerns Florida condominium-law amendments and the Florida statute. opinion →
Beard v. Edmondson and Gallagher, the concurrence cites § 3604 only as an example of discrimination claims involving continuing violations while discussing the limitations doctrine; it expressly says those types of claims are not implicated and are not addressed in the opinion. opinion →
United States v. Nicholson, the statute is mentioned only in Nicholson's argument as part of a description of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Groome. This court decided the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 3631, did not construe or apply § 3604(f)(3)(B), and did not adopt a holding about it. opinion →
Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., the court mentioned § 3604(b) only to compare the legal theories in the state and federal complaints for res judicata purposes; it did not interpret, define, or decide how § 3604(b) applies. opinion →
Cynthia E. Canady, Marva Jean Saunders, Both Parties Individually and Representing a Class of Similarly…, the Fair Housing Act citation appears only in the procedural background as part of the plaintiffs' allegations. The court decided federal jurisdiction, the Anti-Injunction Act, the All Writs Act, and standing/relitigation issues, not the meaning or application of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). opinion →
EC, LLC v. Planning Bd. of Eastampton, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as the basis of a separate federal lawsuit's allegation. This opinion does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the court mentions § 3604 only while summarizing Count VI of the complaint; it neither interprets nor adjudicates the Fair Housing Act claim, affirming dismissal on CERCLA jurisdiction grounds. opinion →
Franks v. Ross, the opinion mentions § 3604(b) only in a footnote describing the statutory basis of an unchallenged Title VIII claim; the court expressly says it does not address that claim, so it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Frank's v. Ross, the opinion mentions 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) only to identify the Title VIII claim and its statutory text in a footnote; the court expressly states that the plaintiffs did not contest dismissal of that claim and that it does not address it. opinion →
Patterson v. Frazier, the opinion only reports the district court’s dismissal of Patterson’s § 3604(f)(2) claim and affirms without interpreting or applying § 3604. opinion →
Margan v. Niles, the opinion mentions § 3604(b) only while reporting the Supreme Court's holding in Meyer v. Holley and using it as an analogy in its analysis of vicarious liability under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act. This court did not construe or apply § 3604(b). opinion →
Snyder v. Barry Realty, Inc., the opinion mentions § 3604 only to identify the underlying discrimination claim. The court decided whether denying Rule 60(b)(1) relief was an abuse of discretion and did not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, the opinion mentions § 3604(f)(3)(B) only to describe the Fair Housing Act provision discussed in Groome; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about this statute. opinion →
Gaona v. Town & Country, the court mentions § 3604(f)(2)(B) in a footnote to distinguish its reasonable-accommodation provision from the § 3605 provision actually at issue. The court decided the FHA claim under § 3605 and did not construe or apply § 3604 as the basis for its holding. opinion →
Peter M. Gaona Annah M. Gaona v. Town & Country Credit the Chase Manhattan Bank, the court decided the FHA claim under § 3605. It mentioned § 3604(f)(2)(B) only in a footnote to explain that the reasonable-accommodation regulation applies to sales and rentals rather than loans; it did not decide the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium Association, the court addressed standing under the Fair Housing Act and remanded without reaching the merits of the substantive discrimination allegations, so its references to § 3604 were background rather than a holding about that statute. opinion →
Bumphus v. Hazeltree Apartments, the court cited § 3604 only as one of several FHA provisions in affirming dismissal for failure to allege a discriminatory housing practice; it did not interpret or apply any § 3604-specific requirement. opinion →
Wong v. City of Los Angeles, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of the claims pleaded in the complaint. The court addressed Pullman abstention and the proper stay-versus-dismissal remedy, without interpreting or applying § 3604(b). opinion →
Macone ex rel. BRAMAC Development Trust v. Town of Wakefield, the court was deciding state-law discrimination claims and mentioned the Fair Housing Act only as an analogy and source of guidance. It did not construe or apply 42 U.S.C. § 3604; the specific § 3604 reference appears in the footnote recounting why the federal court remanded the state claim. opinion →
Fitzgerald v. Cassil, the opinion merely identifies § 3604 as one of the claims plaintiffs brought; the court decides a motion to quash subpoenas based on relevance and psychotherapist-patient privilege and does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass'n Board v. St. Louis Housing Authority, the court identified the § 3604 claims and remanded because the district court had not adequately explained its findings; it did not decide what § 3604(a) means or requires, nor resolve whether the alleged conduct violated the statute. opinion →
Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited Inc, the opinion cites § 3604(f)(1) only while describing the earlier Growth Horizons case and the Fair Housing Act's text in support of its jurisdiction-versus-merits discussion under Title VII. It does not decide what § 3604 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc, the court quotes § 3604(f)(1) only in describing the procedural history and holding of Growth Horizons, a different Fair Housing Act case; it does not construe or apply this statute in the present case. opinion →
Franks v. Ross, the opinion only reports the earlier dismissal of the Title VIII claim and holds that the claim is barred because it was not appealed. Its footnote quotes § 3604(b), but the court does not interpret or apply that subsection. opinion →
Start, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md., section 3604(f)(1) is mentioned only in a footnote as a comparison to ADA § 12203(b); the court did not adjudicate an FHA claim or decide what § 3604(f)(1) requires or how it applies. opinion →
Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., the court mentioned § 3604(b) to identify the underlying sex-discrimination right relevant to a retaliation claim under § 3617, but expressly distinguished the claim under review from a discrimination claim under § 3604 and did not decide what § 3604(b) means or requires. opinion →
Burnett v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, the court cites § 3604(f)(9) only in a background discussion of the origin of the ADA’s direct-threat provision. It decides an ADA employment-discrimination claim and does not interpret or apply the Fair Housing Act provision. opinion →
Wisconsin Community Service v. City of Milwaukee, the court cited § 3604(f)(3)(B) to identify FHAA standards as an analogy for the ADA and Rehabilitation Act reasonable-accommodation analysis. It did not decide a FHAA claim or interpret or apply § 3604 itself. opinion →
Rosenberg Diamond Development Corp. v. Wausau Insurance, the court used the Fair Housing Act distinction only to characterize allegations in an underlying discrimination suit while deciding whether the insurer owed coverage; it did not construe or decide a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604. opinion →
Velocity Express v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, section 3604 appears only in a footnote describing the Fair Housing Act’s coverage. The court’s holding concerns the meaning and coverage of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and it does not construe or apply § 3604. opinion →
McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, the majority did not decide the meaning or application of § 3604. The passage appears in a dissent's discussion of Groome while addressing the constitutionality of ADA Title II, so the statute is mentioned as background to another issue. opinion →
Tandy v. City of Wichita, the court cited § 3604(d) to summarize Havens Realty and analogize its broad language to the ADA; it did not construe or apply § 3604(d) itself. opinion →
Auburn Woods I Homeowners Ass'n v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, the statute appears only in an attorney’s letter asking a doctor to identify the handicap; the court did not adopt that statement or construe § 3604(c), and decided the reasonable-accommodation issue under California FEHA. opinion →
McCarthy Ex Rel. Travis v. Hawkins, the opinion mentions § 3604(f)(3)(B) only while describing and distinguishing the holding in an earlier case, Groome, during its analysis of the constitutionality of ADA Title II. It does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604 in this case. opinion →
Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., the opinion addressed retaliation under § 3617 and mentioned § 3604(b) only to identify the underlying protected activity; it did not construe or apply § 3604(b). opinion →
Jones v. Wildgen, the court cited § 3604(a) only in a parenthetical description of another court’s dismissal and did not decide what § 3604(a) means or requires. opinion →
Bazzone v. Nationwide Mutual, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the basis for federal-question jurisdiction; the court decides arbitrability and does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Amone v. Aveiro, the court only recounts the plaintiff's allegation that the Fair Housing Act was violated while deciding class certification; it does not interpret or decide any issue under § 3604(f)(2). opinion →
Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the court cited § 3604 only to describe Havens and its continuing-violation analysis as an analogy for the plaintiffs’ ECOA and §§ 1981 and 1982 claims; it did not decide a claim under or otherwise construe § 3604. opinion →
Bensman, Jim v. US Forest Service, the court mentions § 3604(d) only as an example in a discussion of informational standing, reporting what the Supreme Court held in Havens Realty. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604(d); the case concerns standing under the Forest Service appeals process. opinion →
Jim Bensman, Mark Donham and Heartwood, Incorporated v. United States Forest Service and Randy Moore, the court cites § 3604(d) only in a footnote as an example while discussing informational injury and standing under other statutes. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3604(d). opinion →
Options Center for Independent Living v. G & V Development Co., the opinion mentions § 3604 only in recounting the plaintiffs’ allegations about accessibility and the defendants’ alleged liability. The court decided the cross-claim under Illinois economic-loss law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g), without construing or applying § 3604. opinion →
Hartman v. City of Allentown, section 3604 appears only in a footnote quoting the definition from a local ordinance discussed in the court's account of Riedel; this court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the federal statute. opinion →
Bhushan v. Loma Alta Towers Owner's Assn., the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of Bhushan’s asserted claims; the court expressly says the federal discrimination claims were rejected without need for discussion and does not construe or apply § 3604(b). opinion →
Clabault v. Shodeen Management, the court only identified possible FHA claims and addressed whether Rooker-Feldman deprived it of jurisdiction; it dismissed the FHA claim without prejudice because the alleged injury was unclear and did not construe § 3604 or decide whether its elements were satisfied. opinion →
Seymour v. Hug, the statute is mentioned only to identify claims alleged in the complaint. The court addresses settlement enforcement and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Brettler v. Purdue University, the court cited § 3604 only parenthetically as an authority for a Title II ADA accommodation proposition; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass'n v. King, section 3604 is mentioned only in a footnote describing an unreviewed trial-court pleading ruling; the appellate court expressly says that ruling is not at issue and does not construe § 3604. opinion →
Turner v. Crawford Square Apt, the court did not construe or decide what 42 U.S.C. § 3604 means or requires. It merely treated the FHA allegations as an alternative legal theory and held that res judicata barred the federal action; the statute is otherwise mentioned only in a general explanatory footnote. opinion →
Deanna Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments Iii, L.P. McCormack Baron Management Services, Inc, the opinion mentions § 3604 only in a footnote as a general description of Fair Housing Act protections. It does not construe or apply the statute; the appeal is resolved on Rooker-Feldman and res judicata grounds, and the court says the FHA claim particulars are not important to its disposition. opinion →
Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Village of Wesley Hills, the statute appears only in the introductory description of claims plaintiffs alleged; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3604. opinion →
Sabi v. Sterling, the court cited § 3604(f)(3)(B) as a largely identical federal analogue and summarized other courts’ interpretations while deciding a claim under California Civil Code § 54.1(b)(3)(B); it did not decide an issue under § 3604. opinion →
Opinion No. (2010), the opinion cites § 3604 only as part of a comparison between Missouri's statute and federal fair-housing law. It decides what the MHRA provides and does not construe, apply, or otherwise decide a legal issue about § 3604. opinion →
Norkunas v. SEAHORSE NB, LLC, the court cites § 3604(d) only through its description of Havens Realty to support an analogy about tester standing under the ADA. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604(d). opinion →
Allan v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, the opinion only describes and rejects the FHA claim for lack of evidence and argument; it does not interpret or decide what 42 U.S.C. § 3604 means or requires. opinion →
Fair Housing Center of the Greater Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Shutters Condominium Ass'n, the court merely identified the § 3604(c) claim and upheld the verdict because evidence supported the jury’s finding that the Center failed to prove causation and damages; it did not construe or apply the statute’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Green v. Lakeside Manor Home for Adults, Inc., the opinion mentions § 3604 only as one cause of action pleaded by the plaintiffs. The court resolved the appeal on Civil Court subject matter jurisdiction and did not construe or apply the Fair Housing Act provision. opinion →
Gallagher v. Magner, this is a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc that identifies unresolved questions about whether § 3604(a) permits disparate-impact liability and whether it applies to aggressive housing-code enforcement; it does not decide those questions. opinion →
United States v. Gumbaytay, the court mentioned § 3604(e) only in a footnote defining blockbusting while discussing precedent and the Attorney General’s standing under § 3614(a); it did not interpret or apply § 3604(e) or decide a claim under it. opinion →
Grimes v. Fremont General Corp., the opinion only identifies § 3604(b) as the provision allegedly violated and recites its language while describing plaintiffs’ allegations; it does not interpret or apply the subsection. opinion →
United States v. $186,416.00 in U.S. Currency, the opinion discusses the CAFRA attorney-fees provision and merely lists the Fair Housing Act, including § 3604 et seq., among statutes covered by a tax-deduction provision; it does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Balvage v. RYDERWOOD IMPROVEMENT AND SERVICE ASS'N, the court mentioned § 3604(a) only to describe conduct that would violate the FHA if no exemption applied. It expressly identified the sole issue as whether the defendant qualified for the § 3607(b) housing-for-older-persons exemption, and did not construe or apply § 3604(a)'s requirements. opinion →
Balvage v. Ryderwood Improvement & Service Ass'n, the opinion mentions § 3604(a) only to describe the background and potential underlying discrimination. The court expressly identifies the sole issue as whether the community qualifies for the § 3607(b) housing-for-older-persons exemption, and it construes § 3607 and its verification requirements rather than deciding what § 3604(a) means or requires. opinion →
Fialka-Feldman v. Oakland University Board of Trustees, the court merely recounts that the plaintiff asserted a Fair Housing Act claim in a string citation; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about 42 U.S.C. § 3604. The ruling rested on mootness and vacatur, while the district court's merits ruling concerned the Rehabilitation Act. opinion →
Taylor Ex Rel. Wazyluk v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, the opinion identifies §§ 3604(d) and (f) as statutes underlying plaintiffs' allegations and appeal, but does not construe either subsection or state a statute-specific rule. Its affirmance rests generally on the reasons articulated in the district court's opinion, so the references to § 3604 are incidental. opinion →
Fialka-Feldman v. Oakland University Board of Trustees, the court merely recited § 3604 as one of the statutes invoked in the complaint. It decided the appeal on mootness and vacatur grounds and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604. opinion →
Taylor Ex Rel. Wazyluk v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF NEW HAVEN, the opinion cites § 3604(d) and (f) to identify the plaintiffs' claims and then affirms the judgment by adopting the district court's reasoning; it does not construe either subsection or state what either provision requires or how it applies. opinion →
Allen v. Irmco Management Company, the court cites § 3604 only to identify the statutory basis of Allen's FHA claim. It decides the appeal under the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional doctrine and does not interpret or decide what § 3604 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Allen v. Irmco Management Com, the statute is cited only to identify the legal basis of Allen's complaint. The court decides the appeal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and does not construe, explain, or decide how § 3604 applies. opinion →
Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, the court recited the FHA's dwelling limitation but expressly declined to decide whether this shelter qualified; its actual disposition was qualified immunity based on the lack of clearly established law. opinion →
Patrick O. Ojo, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Farmers Group, the court recounted federal interpretations of § 3604(b), including disparate-impact liability and application to homeowner’s insurance, but expressly declined to resolve the FHA issue and decided only what Texas law permits. opinion →
Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc., the opinion describes federal courts' interpretations of § 3604(b) but expressly declines to resolve the federal FHA issue; it decides only whether Texas law provides disparate-impact liability and whether the FHA claim is reverse-preempted. opinion →
Braxton v. Georgia Department of Community Affairs, the opinion only identifies § 3604(d) as a statute Braxton alleged the defendants violated. The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint as frivolous based on the complaint's deficiencies and did not interpret, apply, or decide what § 3604(d) requires. opinion →
Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Village of Wesley Hills, the court recited the plaintiffs’ FHA allegations and dismissed the claims because the challenged conduct was unspecified and the conduct identified was protected by Noerr-Pennington; it did not construe or apply § 3604(a)’s substantive requirements. opinion →
McDonald v. Burton, the opinion mentions § 3604(b) only while quoting and reporting the holding of Richards v. Bono, an authority cited by McDonald. This court decided the evidentiary sufficiency of the quid pro quo housing claim and did not construe or independently apply § 3604(b). opinion →
Wallace H. Campbell & Co. v. Maryland Commission on Human Relations, the court construed and applied Maryland Article 49B § 22(a)(9), using § 3604(f)(3)(B) and federal decisions only as persuasive support for the state-law interpretation; it did not decide a claim under or independently hold the meaning of the federal statute. opinion →
Putnam Family Partnership v. CITY OF YUCAIPA, CAL., the court mentions § 3604(a) only in describing the Fair Housing Act's original prohibitions. Its actual holding concerns the § 3607(b)(1) senior-housing exemption and whether municipally zoned senior housing is permissible; it does not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 3604(a). opinion →
Sheppard v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Boston, the court mentioned 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) only as an analogous federal statute supporting the party’s argument about a state-law disability-discrimination provision. It expressly declined to resolve the boundaries of the state protection and did not construe or decide a claim under § 3604 itself. opinion →
Cooper v. Western & Southern Financial Group, Inc., the court expressly stated that plaintiffs did not assert a standalone § 3604(b) claim and did not decide one. It denied dismissal of the § 3617 claim, using § 3604(b) only to identify the fair-housing right allegedly protected from interference. opinion →
Matthews v. City of West Point, the opinion mentions § 3604 only in a footnote summarizing the allegations and injuries in Trafficante; Matthews does not decide what § 3604 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
United States v. Hurt, the court recited the FHA sexual-harassment standards while deciding whether the government's position was substantially justified for purposes of attorney fees under the EAJA. It did not decide liability under § 3604(a) or otherwise construe or apply that provision as the basis for its judgment. opinion →
Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc. v. Steiner & Associates Inc., section 3604(f) is cited only to identify the statute underlying the plaintiffs' allegations. The court did not interpret or apply that provision; it vacated and remanded because the district court had not addressed personal jurisdiction. opinion →
U. S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, the court did not construe or apply § 3604(b); it treated the statute's mention in Count III as background and dismissed the count on pleading, counterclaim, standing, and jurisdiction grounds. opinion →
Alpha III, Inc. v. City of San Diego, the court mentioned § 3604 only to characterize one category of alleged FHA discrimination in its analysis of the timeliness and continuing-violation theories. It did not interpret § 3604 or decide what the statute requires or whom it covers. opinion →
Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, the opinion is deciding attorneys’ fees and merely recounts the prior merits decision’s rejection of the Fair Housing Act claim; it does not decide what § 3604 means or how it applies. opinion →
Hawaii Medical Ass'n v. Hawaii Medical Service Ass'n, the opinion mentions § 3604 only while describing the Fair Housing Act claim in Havens Realty Corp.; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Combs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., the court merely recites that the underlying complaint included claims under the Fair Housing Act, including § 3604. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3604; the decision concerns insurance coverage under California Insurance Code section 533. opinion →
Combs v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the statute is mentioned only to identify one of the claims alleged in the underlying housing-discrimination action. The opinion does not interpret or apply § 3604; its holding concerns California Insurance Code section 533 and insurance coverage for attorney fees arising from intentional discrimination. opinion →
State Division of Human Rights v. Stoute, the court decided the claim under New York Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (2). Section 3604(b) was cited as a federal analogue and as background for principles borrowed from federal cases, but the court did not construe or apply the federal statute itself. opinion →
Sierotowicz v. New York City Housing Authority, section 3604(b) is cited as one of several authorities in the court’s discussion of whether the complaint adequately pleaded discrimination under the general pleading standard. The court did not construe the statute or decide its substantive requirements or application independently. opinion →
Silberstein v. Greenstein, the court mentions § 3604(b) only while recounting the petitioners’ discrimination argument. It does not interpret or independently apply the statute; instead, it assumes the housing rule may be subject to the Act and upholds the rule based on deference to HUD’s approval and interpretation. opinion →
Holloman v. Jacksonville Housing Auth, the court recited the FHA prohibition, including § 3604(a), but did not construe or explain what the statute requires. It resolved the FHA claim on the plaintiff’s failure to prove a connection between his protected characteristics and the eviction, and failure to show pretext. opinion →
United States v. Silva, section 3604(a) is cited only as part of the FHA provisions underlying the Secretary's charge and the United States' allegations; the court decided the bankruptcy automatic-stay issue under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), not the meaning or application of § 3604(a). opinion →
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., the court merely describes the plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Act theory while evaluating a proposed class settlement, attributing the disparate-impact proposition to an earlier opinion’s concurrence and dissent. It does not independently construe or apply 42 U.S.C. § 3604. opinion →
Reinhart v. Lincoln County, the court cited § 3604(f)(3)(B) only while reciting the FHA's general provisions. The appeal concerned a disparate-impact claim based on land-use regulations, and the court neither construed nor applied the reasonable-accommodation provision. opinion →
Reinhart v. Lincoln County, the court merely recited § 3604(f)(3)(B)'s reasonable-accommodation prohibition. The appeal concerned a disparate-impact claim, and the court's holding addressed the proof required for disparate impact, not reasonable accommodation. opinion →
Equal Rights Center v. Equity Residential, the court cited § 3604(f)(1) only while describing the plaintiff’s FHA claim. Its rulings addressed organizational standing, venue, and severance, and it did not construe or decide the merits or application of § 3604(f)(1). opinion →
Delkhah v. Moore, the opinion merely reports the district court's ruling that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case under § 3604(b); the appellate court provides no construction or application of the statute and affirms substantially for the district court's reasons. opinion →
Fair Housing Council v. roommates.com, LLC, the court expressly limited its decision to immunity under the Communications Decency Act and stated that the district court would decide in the first instance whether Roommate violated § 3604(c). opinion →
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley the Fair Housing Council of San Diego, Individually and on Behalf…, the opinion concerns immunity under the Communications Decency Act and merely describes the plaintiffs' FHA theories under § 3604(c); it expressly leaves whether the FHA was violated for the district court on remand. opinion →
Caddy v. J.P. Morgan Chase, the court quoted § 3604(b) only to compare the plaintiff’s FHA-like theory while deciding her separate § 1981 claim; it did not decide an FHA claim or otherwise construe or apply § 3604(b). opinion →
Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc., the opinion mentions § 3604 only while quoting the Fair Employment and Housing Commission's description of Havens Realty; the court's own decision concerns standing under California's FEHA, not the meaning or application of § 3604. opinion →
Caddy v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, the court did not decide a claim under the Fair Housing Act or construe § 3604(b); it cited the provision only by analogy while analyzing the plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim. opinion →
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester County, section 3604 is cited only as part of a general description and string citation to the Fair Housing Act. The court's ruling concerned a CDBG grantee's certification and affirmative-furthering obligations under 42 U.S.C. § 5304 and related regulations, not the meaning or application of § 3604 itself. opinion →
Merget v. Moss, the court merely identifies the Fair Housing Act claim and affirms summary judgment for lack of evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact; it does not interpret or decide what § 3604 requires or how its elements apply. opinion →
LaFlamme v. New Horizons, Inc., the court only recounts defendants’ reliance on § 3604(f)(9) as a defense and does not construe or adopt that statutory interpretation; its ruling rests on the preliminary-injunction record and on the HUD regulation concerning medical disclosures. opinion →
Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd., the opinion merely reports Havens's discussion of § 3604(d) in explaining tester standing; Buckland does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 3604(d) means or requires. opinion →
Appeal of Union Bank, the court merely identifies § 3604(f)(3)(B) in a footnote as the location of provisions it attributes to the ADA; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about this statute. Its holding concerns the ADA and municipal zoning jurisdiction. opinion →
Sierra v. City of New York, the opinion reports the plaintiff's allegation that the housing code violated § 3604(a), but the court decides Anti-Injunction Act and standing issues and does not construe or apply § 3604(a). opinion →
Wentworth v. Hedson, the opinion merely identifies § 3604(c) as one of the statutes pleaded by the plaintiffs; the court decides only whether to allow voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) and does not interpret or apply § 3604. opinion →
Sierra v. City of New York, the court quoted § 3604(a) and recited an existing interpretation while addressing Sierra’s standing, but its ruling denied dismissal for lack of standing and did not decide whether the New York housing code violated § 3604(a) or otherwise construe and apply that subsection to the merits. opinion →
Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., the opinion mentions § 3604(d) only while summarizing Havens Realty as an example of informational standing; it does not decide the statute's meaning, requirements, or application in this case. opinion →
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates. Com, LLC., the court expressly declined to decide whether Roommate’s questions violated § 3604(c); it decided only that the Communications Decency Act did not immunize the challenged conduct and remanded the FHA issue. opinion →
Fair Housing Coun., San Fernando v. Roommates. Com, the court decided only the scope of CDA immunity and expressly remanded the question whether the alleged conduct violated § 3604(c), so the statute was not actually construed or applied to final liability. opinion →
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Brookstone Court, LLC, the opinion concerns the calculation of attorney’s fees. Section 3604 is mentioned only as part of the trial court’s reported findings and as context for using federal housing-law precedent; the appellate court does not construe or decide what § 3604 requires. opinion →
Nails v. Franklin, the opinion merely identifies § 3604 as the statutory basis of Plaintiff’s discrimination claims and describes their dismissal; it does not interpret, define, or otherwise decide what § 3604 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Reasoner v. Housing Authority of the City of Teague, the court mentions § 3604 only to identify the statutory basis of Reasoner's lawsuit. The appellate holding concerns the pleading of and applicability of the separate § 3607(b) housing-for-older-persons exemption, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3604 itself. opinion →
Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the court did not decide what § 3604(b) means or whether it applies to private insurers; it expressly assumed that issue without deciding it and affirmed dismissal on McCarran–Ferguson preemption grounds. opinion →
Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the court cites § 3604(f)(3)(C) only by analogy while interpreting ADA § 12147(a); it does not decide what § 3604 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Disabled Action PA v. SEPTA, the opinion decides when claims accrue under ADA § 12147(a). It cites § 3604(f)(3)(C) only as a comparative analogy about regulated activities and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that Fair Housing Act provision. opinion →
…and 513 more.

Statutory history

(Pub. L. 90–284, title VIII, §804, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 83; Pub. L. 93–383, title VIII, §808(b)(1), Aug. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 729; Pub. L. 100–430, §§6(a)–(b)(2), (e), 15, Sept. 13, 1988, 102 Stat. 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636.)

  • 1988—Pub. L. 100–430, §6(e), inserted "and other prohibited practices" in section catchline.
  • Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 100–430, §6(b)(2), inserted "familial status," after "sex,".
  • Subsecs. (c) to (e). Pub. L. 100–430, §6(b)(1), inserted "handicap, familial status," after "sex,".
  • Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 100–430, §6(a), added subsec. (f).
  • Subsec. (f)(3)(A). Pub. L. 100–430, §15, which directed the substitution of "except that, in the case of a rental, the landlord may where it is reasonable to do so condition permission for a modification on the renter agreeing to restore the interior of the premises to the condition that existed before the modification, reasonable wear and tear excepted." for the period at the end of subpar. (A) was executed by making the substitution for a semicolon as the probable intent of Congress because subpar. (A) ended with a semicolon, not a period.
  • 1974—Pub. L. 93–383 inserted ", sex" after "religion" wherever appearing in cls. (a) to (e).

Enactment and amendment notes are the official text of the United States Code, 2024 edition (laws through 2025-01-06), Office of the Law Revision Counsel, via govinfo.gov.

Regulations under this section

CFR parts whose authority statement cites 42 U.S.C. § 3604:

10 C.F.R. Part 1040 · NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES
23 C.F.R. Part 200 · TITLE VI PROGRAM AND RELATED STATUTES—IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURES
24 C.F.R. Part 91 · CONSOLIDATED SUBMISSIONS FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
24 C.F.R. Part 100 · DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
24 C.F.R. Part 103 · FAIR HOUSING—COMPLAINT PROCESSING
24 C.F.R. Part 110 · FAIR HOUSING POSTER
24 C.F.R. Part 121 · COLLECTION OF DATA
24 C.F.R. Part 180 · CONSOLIDATED HUD HEARING PROCEDURES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS MATTERS

From each part's authority statement in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR).

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace