42 U.S.C. § 3604

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) defines a reasonable modification as a physical change to the premises paid for by the tenant, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) addresses reasonable accommodations involving changes to rules, policies, practices, or services affecting use and enjoyment of a dwelling.

C.R. v. PLB Management LLC · filed 2023-06-07(f)(3)(A), (f)(3)(B)

A request for a “modification” is a request for a physical change made to the premises whose expense is borne by the tenant. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A); 24 C.F.R. § 100.201; (see Order MSJ 9). In contrast, a request for an “accommodation” contemplates changes to the “rules, policies, practices, or services” affecting a tenant’s use and enjoyment of a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204; (see Order MSJ 9). ... The foregoing evidence is legally sufficient to support a reasonable mind’s conclusion that C.R. did not request a “modification” requiring a physical change to the premises, but instead requested an “accommodation” requiring a change to PLB’s parking policies.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not treat requests for construction or repair as reasonable accommodations in a rule, policy, practice, or service, and § 3604(f)(1) generally does not provide relief for a failure to remedy defective construction or create an independent discrimination claim.

Cobb v. Citrus Falls at Westchase Apartments, LLC · filed 2020-10-29(f)(3)(B), (f)(1)

Defendant’s contention that § 3604(f)(3)(B) does not provide for Defendant to undertake significant structural improvements to the physical condition of its property is well-taken. Neither the construction nor improvements Plaintiff seemingly desires are reasonable accommodations under the statute as neither is an accommodation in a rule, policy, practice, or service of Defendant, and therefore “a request for construction or repair is not actionable under subsection (B).” ... The second count as drafted seeks relief under §§ 3604(f)(1) and (2) for a failure to remedy defective construction. These sections generally do not provide such relief and do not constitute an independent act of prohibited discrimination.

Sections 3604(f)(3)(A) and (B) require disability-related housing modifications or accommodations to be reasonable and necessary, with necessity tied to directly ameliorating the disability and enabling equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling.

Siguel v. King Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc. · filed 2023-10-12(f)(3)(A) and (f)(3)(B)

An accommodation or modification is “reasonable” when it is “both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it.” ... An accommodation or modification is “necessary” when it provides a “direct amelioration of a disability's effect.”

Section 3604(f)(3) treats refusal to permit reasonable modifications or accommodations needed for equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling as housing discrimination.

Henderson v. Bryant · filed 2024-11-18(f)(3)

Under the relevant subsection, discrimination includes refusal to permit reasonable modifications or accommodations necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3). ... The Court finds that plaintiff has stated plausible FHA claims against defendants Cupples, HRI, Bryant, Rito, and Lindskog. He asserts that Cupples and HRI—through their agents and employees—refused to make reasonable accommodations or allow reasonable modifications that would afford him full enjoyment of the premises.

Section 3604(f)(3) does not make a restoration condition in a granted zoning variance discriminatory when the owners challenge only that condition, rather than the zoning policy or the variance itself.

Austin v. Town of Farmington · filed 2015-06-08(f)(3)(A) and (B)

Here, plaintiffs did not challenge defendant’s applicable zoning policy, or the variance that they have been granted, except for the specifically-directed condition imposed by the Town Board in granting the variance that plaintiffs restore their property to its original condition. Consequently, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for discrimination under either § 3604(f)(3)(A) or (B).

Section 3604(a) prohibits unequal treatment based on national origin that affects the availability of housing.

Noble Shaheed Allah El v. Avesta Homes, LLC · filed 2013-05-29(a)

In order to prevail on a claim under the FHA, plaintiffs must demonstrate unequal treatment on the basis of national origin that affects the availability of housing.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying rental because of race or national origin, and a disparate-treatment claim requires those protected traits to be a motivating factor.

de Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. Partnership · filed 2017-04-18(a)

To succeed on these claims, plaintiffs must ultimately prove that race or national origin 'was a “motivating factor” for the challenged housing decisions. ... Notably, it is undisputed that the female plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the Policy— and prove legal presence in the United States—not because of their race or national origin, but because they are, in fact, unlawfully present in the country.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) does not require a request to invoke the FHA or the phrase “reasonable modification,” but it must make clear to the housing provider that the requested structural change is because of a disability.

Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2013-09-24(f)(3)(A)

The requester need not mention the Act or use the words “reasonable modification,” but “the request must be made in a manner that a reasonable person would understand to be a request for permission to make a structural change because of a disability.”

Section 3604(f)(1)'s “otherwise make unavailable” prohibition reaches discrimination in an initial sale or rental, or acts directly related to that transaction, except for post-sale property-insurance transactions.

Vance v. City of Maumee · filed 2013-05-15(f)(1)

I find, with the exception of post-sale property insurance transactions, the “otherwise make unavailable” language in § 3604(f)(1) prohibits discrimination in the initial sale or rental of a dwelling or discriminatory acts directly related to the initial sale or rental of a dwelling.

Sections 3604(a) and 3604(f)(1) do not treat a dwelling's uninhabitability as making it unavailable or denied for purposes of an FHA claim.

Seals v. Itex Group LLC · filed 2023-08-30(a), (f)(1)

Caselaw makes clear that “uninhabitability” does not make a dwelling “unavailable” within the meaning of Section 3604(a). ... As “uninhabitability” is not considered “unavailable” under Section 3604(a), the same is true under Section 3604(f)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim under Section 3604(f)(1).

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) protects intended residents of a community residence from housing discrimination before the facility is licensed.

Easter Seal Society of New Jersey, Inc. v. Township of North Bergen · filed 1992-07-22(f)(1)(B)

The Fair Housing Act clearly prohibits any discrimination against or interference with individuals who “intend,” to establish an otherwise proper community residence.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits zoning practices that discriminate against disabled individuals when they contribute to making housing unavailable or denying housing to them.

Pacific Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach · filed 2013-09-20(f)(1)

It is equally well established that zoning practices that discriminate against disabled individuals can be discriminatory, and therefore violate § 3604, if they contribute to “mak[ing] unavailable or deny[ing]” housing to those persons.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits a municipality from using zoning enforcement motivated by discriminatory animus to make a dwelling unavailable to people with disabilities.

United States v. Borough of Audubon, NJ · filed 1991-09-09(f)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Audubon has violated § 3604(f) of the Act—by taking actions “to make unavailable or deny” the Vassar Road home to the OH-Vassar residence “because of a handicap,” and § 3617 of the Act—by taking actions to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with [the OH-Vassar residents] in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or protected” by the Act.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits a county from requiring neighbor notification for group homes serving people with disabilities when comparable homes face no such requirement and the county has no legitimate justification.

Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County · filed 1993-06-14(f)(1)

For these reasons, this Court concludes that the neighbor notification provisions of the Code and the Regulations violate § 3604(f)(1) of the FHAA and are therefore invalid.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits permit conditions imposed on housing for people with disabilities but not on comparable housing for people without disabilities.

Association for Advancement of the Mentally Handicapped, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth · filed 1994-10-25(f)(1)

The ordinance discriminates on its face by imposing conditions on the establishment of community residences for the developmentally disabled housing more than six persons that are not imposed on residences housing more than six persons who are not developmentally disabled.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits disability-based housing discrimination; a zoning ordinance is facially discriminatory when its terms treat people protected by the FHA differently.

Marriott Senior Living Services, Inc. v. Springfield Township · filed 1999-12-07(f)(2)

Thus, to establish that an ordinance is facially invalid, a plaintiff must show that the accused ordinance treats someone protected by the FHA in a different manner than others are treated. ... In contrast, in this case, Marriott has not identified any specific provision of the zoning code or land use ordinance it challenges whereby elderly persons with disabilities are expressly treated differently than others.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits housing discrimination based on handicap, including a group-home spacing rule that expressly limits housing choice without a legitimate government interest.

City of Coatesville v. Zoning Hearing Board · filed 2000-04-05(f)(2)

The FHAA makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person based on handicap with respect to housing. 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2). ... The 500-foot spacing requirement is unlawful to the extent that it creates an explicit classification based on handicap with no rational basis or legitimate government interest.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits facially discriminatory zoning requirements for housing for people with disabilities when the municipality fails to justify the different treatment.

HORIZON HOUSE, INC. v. EAST NORRITON TOWNSHIP · filed 2022-07-25(f)(1)

Here, the Township’s zoning ordinance is facially discriminatory. ... As it has not rebutted Horizon House’s prima facie case, Horizon House has proven a violation of the FHAA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) requires covered multifamily dwellings to provide accessible public areas and an accessible route; selling accessible parking to nondisabled residents may violate the statute when no alternative access is provided.

Jafri v. Chandler LLC · filed 2013-10-04(f)(3)(C)(i)

That is, while the sale of accessible spaces to residents without disabilities is not by itself an FHA violation, such sales may be an FHA violation if they are made without providing alternative means for making the building accessible.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) requires accessible routes in covered multifamily dwellings, and Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations necessary for disabled persons to have equivalent use and enjoyment of a facility.

Barrera · filed 2025-12-09(f)(3)(C), (f)(3)(B)

Here, Barrera alleges that Defendants’ design and construction of the qualified dwelling caused there to be “no safe, accessible route” from the shared parking garage to the building units where Barrera resides and “[n]o alternative accessible routes connect[ing] all buildings or shared facilities”—which is sufficient to state a claim for violations of Section 3604(f)(3)(C) of the FHA. ... Under the FHA, a reasonable accommodation is required if it is necessary to allow the plaintiff to have usage and enjoyment in a facility equivalent to individuals who are not disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); Providence, 902 F.3d at 459. ... Barrera sufficiently pleads a claim for failure to accommodate under the FHA in alleging that she requested an accommodation from Defendants in the form of an accessible parking spot to allow Barrera, a disabled person, access between her car and her residential unit, which Defendants denied despite knowledge of Barrera’s mobility limitations. ... Barrera thus states non-frivolous failure-to-accommodate claims under the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(1) covers disability discrimination through more burdensome or delayed rental application procedures.

L.C. & Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc. v. LeFrak Organization, Inc. · filed 2013-12-13(f)(1)

Based on her allegations, L.C. has identified two ways in which she was treated differently (1) in the information given to her regarding available apartments, namely that she was not shown such apartments, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); and (2) in the qualification and rental criteria applied to her, namely a more burdensome and delayed process, id. § 3604(f)(1).

Section 3604(f)(1) limits the relevant class to buyers, renters, or people denied the opportunity to become buyers or renters.

Abdus-Sabur v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2016-12-22(f)(1)

Nonetheless, even construing the Fair Housing Act as broadly as possible, the clear language of the statute restricts the class of people who can bring a claim under [§] 3604(f)(1) to a ‘buyer or renter,’ or, at its broadest, individuals who were otherwise denied the opportunity to become a buyer or renter.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of religion or familial status; a claimant must also show qualification under the owner's applicable criteria.

Wood v. Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. · filed 2021-09-14(a)

The FHA prohibits “refus[ing] to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . religion . . . [or] familial status[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); see also id. § 3605. ... Claims of housing discrimination are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case “by showing (1) that they are members of a protected class; (2) that they sought and were qualified to rent or purchase the housing; (3) that they were rejected; and (4) that the housing opportunity remained available to other renters or purchasers.” Id. “To satisfy the ‘qualified’ element for a prima facie FHA claim, the renter must satisfy the applicable criteria that the owner established.” Kennedy v. Related Mgmt., No. 08 Civ. 3969, 2009 WL 2222530, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009).

Section 3604(a) does not support a refusal-to-sell claim against a person who bought the property rather than sold it.

Terzneh v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2021-10-04(a)

Because Defendant Tigert was the Property’s buyer, not seller, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against him under § 3604(a).

Section 3604’s sale and rental discrimination provisions do not give landlords a cause of action against their tenants.

Hoostein v. Mental Health Ass'n · filed 2015-04-13

By the text of the named provisions of the FHA, under which Plaintiffs bring their claim, the statute is not designed to provide landlords with a cause of action against their tenants.

Section 3604(f)(1) limits disability discrimination claims to buyers, renters, and people denied the opportunity to become one.

Hunter Ex Rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-08-18(f)(1)

Even in light of the Court,s obligation to construe the FHA as broadly as possible, the clear language of the statute restricts the class of people who can bring a claim under section 3604(f) (1) to a "buyer or renter," or, at its broadest, individuals who were otherwise denied the opportunity to become a buyer or a renter.

Section 3604(f)(1) requires a discrimination claimant to be a buyer or renter, which entails giving consideration in exchange for an interest in the property.

HONKALA v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT · filed 2022-01-31(f)(1)

To bring a discrimination claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is a “buyer or renter” within the meaning of the FHA. A claimant is said to be a “buyer or renter” when he or she supplies consideration in exchange for an interest in property.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal to make a reasonable accommodation as discrimination when the accommodation may be necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Walker v. City of Wilmington · filed 2014-09-05(f)(3)(B)

Similarly, under the FHAA, discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a protected] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . . . .” To establish a claim for failure to provide a “reasonable accommodation” under the FHAA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he suffers from a handicap as defined by the FHAA; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff‟s handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap „may be necessary‟ to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, and alleged § 3604(b) violations remain subject to the § 3603(b) exemption requirements.

United States v. Hylton · filed 2014-10-27(b)

Mrs. Hylton’s alleged violations of §§ 3604(a) and (b) are subject to the exemptions in § 3603(b). To be eligible for an exemption, the property at issue must be a “single-family house sold or rented by an owner. . . [provided that] such house is sold or rented . . . without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any . . . person in the business of selling or renting dwellings.” 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b). The district court held that Mrs. Hylton failed to qualify for the exemption because she used the services of Mr. Hylton in renting the property, and Mr. Hylton testified that he is in the business of owning and managing rental properties. Mr. Hylton conducted the leasing of the Property even though he held no ownership stake in it, and he used rental applications and leases for the Property with the name of his company, HREM, on them. The district court’s findings that Mr. Hylton was a “person in the business of selling or renting dwellings,” and that Mrs. Hylton used his services to rent the Property, were thus not in error, much less clearly so.

Section 3604 prohibits racial discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, and the single-family-house exemption does not apply to a condo rented to three unrelated occupants through an agent.

Ho v. Donovan · filed 2009-06-23

Fung does not dispute the ALJ’s conclusion that the admitted facts show racial discrimination. Instead he maintains that he is entitled to discriminate by 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1), which says that § 3604 does not apply to “any single-family house sold or rented by an owner: ... Fung’s claim to the exemption fails anyway, because the condo was not a single-family dwelling. Fung rented it to three unrelated persons; that’s not a single family by anyone’s definition. Then there is the fact that Ho acted as Fung’s agent, something that Fung admitted by failing to answer the complaint, which alleged that an agency relation existed.

Section 3604 does not apply under the single-family-house exemption when its statutory conditions are met, but the exemption is an affirmative defense that must be timely asserted and does not cover a condo rented to three unrelated persons through an agent.

Donovan v. Ho · filed 2009-06-23

Fung does not dispute the ALJ’s conclusion that the admitted facts show racial discrimination. Instead he maintains that he is entitled to discriminate by 42 U.S.C. §3603(b)(1), which says that §3604 does not apply to “any single-family house sold or rented by an owner: Provided, That such private individual does not own more than three such single-family houses at any one time: . . . Provided further, That . . . the sale or rental of any such single-family house shall be excepted . . . only if such house is sold or rented (A) without the use . . . of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman . . . .” Fung claims the benefit of this exemption because, he says, the condo is a single-family dwelling, he does not own more than three single-family dwellings, and Ho did not act as his agent. ... Section 3603(b) is captioned “Exemptions”, which makes it an affirmative defense. ... An affirmative defense must be timely asserted—usually in the answer, and certainly at the trial. Fung did not file an answer or participate in the trial, so he forfeited this defense. ... Fung’s claim to the exemption fails anyway, because the condo was not a single-family dwelling. Fung rented it to three unrelated persons; that’s not a single family by anyone’s definition. Then there is the fact that Ho acted as Fung’s agent, something that Fung admitted by failing to answer the complaint, which alleged that an agency relation existed.

Section 3604's prohibition on housing discrimination is subject to the single family house exemption only when the owner satisfies its conditions.

Izard v. Arndt · filed 1980-01-25

42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) provides that the provisions of § 3604 prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing do not apply to owners of single family houses if a number of conditions are met. ... Since there now appears to be a genuine factual issue as to the applicability of the exception, the issuance of summary judgment is precluded.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonably specific accommodation request that enables the housing provider to conduct a meaningful review, and a claim requires refusal of the accommodation; delay is not a denial when the disabled person retains access to it.

Kromenhoek v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Ass'n · filed 2014-12-24(f)(3)(B)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... A request for an accommodation must be reasonably specific. ... Kromenhoek’s initial filing of documents with an individual who was not a Board member, and concomitant refusal to allow the Board to see the documents, prevented the Board and the Association from conducting a meaningful review of the accommodation sought. As such, Kromenhoek’s initial filing of her doctor’s letter and Oliver’s certificates is not a specific request for accommodation, as is required by the FHA. ... In the instant matter, Kromenhoek at all times had access to her emotional support dog and was not punished for the support dog’s presence. As such, it cannot be said that the alleged delay in processing her request constituted a refusal to grant her a reasonable accommodation. ... A delay in responding to a request for accommodations does not constitute denial where the denial does not deprive the disabled person of the accommodation. ... On these facts, as previously stated, the Court does not find as a matter of law that Kromen-hoek was at any time actually denied the accommodation sought.

Section 3604(b) permits fair-housing claims against individual nonprofit-board members and property managers involved in unlawful housing discrimination, regardless of whether the conduct was within the scope of employment.

Henlopen Landing Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Russell H. Vester and Jakara Vester · filed 2015-02-25(b)

Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, claims may be brought against individual board members of non-profit corporations who are allegedly involved in unlawful housing discrimination, and also against property managers, regardless of whether the alleged unlawful actions were committed within the course and scope of employment.

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) prohibits rejecting a qualified housing applicant because of the handicap of a person who will reside in the dwelling with the applicant when the circumstances support an inference of discrimination, and the plaintiff must establish the listed prima facie elements.

Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc. · filed 2014-07-18(f)(1)(B)

In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of FHA § 3604(f)(1)(B), a plaintiff must show (1) that a person residing in or intending to reside in the dwelling after its sale or rental to the plaintiff had a handicap as defined in the FHA, (2) that the plaintiff sought and was qualified to purchase or rent the housing, (3) that he was rejected, and (4) that the rejection occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of the handicap of the person residing or intending to reside with the plaintiff.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap, including through explicit facial discrimination.

THE HANSEN FOUNDATION, INC. v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY · filed 2020-12-03(f)(1)

The FHAA makes it unlawful “to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” ... The Court easily finds that § 152-1 is explicitly discriminatory. ... This is a clear example of explicit discrimination.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services as discrimination when necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Holy Ghost Revival Ministries v. City of Marysville · filed 2015-04-07(f)(3)(B)

In the context of handicaps, FHA defines “discrimination” to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Accordingly, a handicapped person can bring three types of discrimination claims under the FHA: disparate impact, disparate treatment, and refusal to make reasonable accommodations.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits housing discrimination based on handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing necessary reasonable accommodations as discrimination when they are needed to give handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Ledford v. Williams · filed 2019-11-05(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

One of Plaintiff’s claims is that he was denied reasonable accommodations or alternatives. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., as amended in 1988, prohibits—among other things—discrimination in housing based on handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The definition of discrimination under the Act includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [the handicapped] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Plaintiff has not identified how this Act could apply to his situation. He has not even alleged what accommodation he was in need of, or for what reason.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats a refusal to make a necessary and reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services as discrimination and requires a plaintiff to plead the elements of a reasonable-accommodation claim.

Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2021-01-22(f)(3)(B)

The Amended Complaint fails to allege a discrimination claim under the FHA based on the failure to provide reasonable accommodations. To bring this claim, a complaint must allege that: (1) the plaintiff suffers from a handicap as defined by the FHA; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) the requested accommodation was reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused to make such accommodation. ... The Amended Complaint does not adequately allege the first two elements, and so the remaining elements are not addressed at this time.

Section 3604(f)(1)(A) prohibits denying or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of a renter’s handicap, and the FHA’s reasonable-accommodation provision requires accommodations necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Bush v. Broad Management Group · filed 2023-05-10(f)(1)(A)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . that buyer or renter.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A). ... Prohibited discrimination under the FHA includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to Bush’s reasonable accommodation claim.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits discrimination in housing because of a buyer’s, renter’s, resident’s, or associate’s handicap but does not prohibit favoring handicapped persons over non-handicapped persons; § 3604(c) prohibits publishing statements expressing a handicap-based preference; § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a disabled person to request a necessary reasonable accommodation that the defendant refuses; and § 3604(f)(2) prohibits handicap-based discrimination in housing terms, conditions, privileges, or related services.

Murphy v. Villages at Noah's Landing, LTD · filed 2025-09-30(f)(1), (c), (f)(3)(B), and (f)(2)

Section 3604(f)(1), by its terms, prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental “because of the handicap of . . . that renter or buyer” or of someone associated with the renter or buyer or someone living in the house after the sale or rental. This section does not prohibit discrimination against a non-handicapped person in favor of handicapped persons. ... Count II alleges a violation of § 3604(c) of the FHA, which prohibits the publication of statements that express a preference “based on” handicap with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. ... To prevail on a claim under § 3604(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must establish “(1) he is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) such accommodation was necessary to afford him an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation.” ... Accordingly, Defendants’ purported knowledge of Plaintiffs’ disability does not dispense with the requirement that Plaintiffs request an accommodation for purposes of a claim under § 3604(f)(3). ... 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of (A) that person; or (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that person.”

Section 3604(b) does not entitle a party accused of discriminatory housing sales to relief when that party has not itself suffered discrimination in a housing sale or rental.

Mathis v. United Homes, LLC · filed 2009-04-20(b)

Neither the UH Defendants nor U.S. Bank are “aggrieved persons” entitled to relief under the FHA. The UH Defendants are not persons who have been discriminated against “in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” because of their “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”

Section 3604 protects a housing developer from dismissal merely because it lacks a personal race, color, or national origin, and permits a non-protected plaintiff to sue when discrimination thwarts plans to develop housing for a protected-class member.

VETERAN RELOCATION PROJECT, LLC v. BOROUGH OF BRADLEY BEACH · filed 2022-11-08(b)

To start, VRP is a limited liability company and does not have a race, color, or national origin to plead. (Am. Compl. § 7.) It would certainly defy reason to allow a business entity—in this case, a limited liability company—to bring an action under Title VII yet allow that action to be dismissed because the entity could not plead race, color, or national origin. Plaintiffs, furthermore, who are not members of a protected class have standing to bring causes of action under Title VII “where [their] plans to develop housing for a protected class member are thwarted by an allegedly discriminatory practice.” ... This is almost precisely what Plaintiffs allege here: VRP intended to develop housing for Anu Garrison, a woman of Indian descent, and Defendants discriminated against them because of it. ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to raise a plausible claim for relief. The Motion to Dismiss as to Count I is, accordingly, denied.

A damages claim under § 3604 can survive summary judgment when the evidence directly connects the plaintiff’s loss to the alleged housing discrimination.

Judy Shaw Foundation v. City of Howard · filed 2026-01-05

The record shows there is “some direct relation” between JSF’s monetary damages—stemming from iRecover’s withdrawal from the purchase agreement—and the City’s adoption of Ordinances 745 and 746.

A damages claim under § 3604(b) requires the plaintiff to plead that the alleged discrimination proximately caused the injury.

City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co. · filed 2015-09-01(b)

As we explained at some length in the companion case, we agree with the district court that a plaintiff bringing an action for damages under the Fair Housing Act must plead proximate cause between his injury and the defendant’s unlawful conduct.

Section 3604(a) does not impose liability on an agent merely because the principal made a discriminatory housing decision; the agent must have authority and personally committed or contributed to the violation, while § 3604(b) permits the claim to proceed where a property manager personally enforced allegedly discriminatory rental rules.

Fair Housing Center of the Greater Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Sonoma Bay Community Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2015-10-01(a), (b)

“However, “[t]he principle of vicarious liability flows ‘upward,’ not ‘downward.’ Thus, an agent is not liable simply because his principal violates the Fair Housing Act.” ... Accordingly, “agents such as property managers can be held liable when they have ‘personally committed or contributed to a Fair Housing Act violation:’ ” ... Here; like Trapani, Emanuel and EMS had no authority over Sonoma Bay’s decision to allegedly deny Plaintiffs housing on the basis of familial status under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), because Emanuel had no authority to grant or deny applications; her role was purely ministerial. ... At this stage, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is evidence from which a reasonable jury might conclude that Emanuel “ ‘personally committed or contributed to a Fair Housing Act violation’” by enforcing Sonoma Bay’s allegedly discriminatory policies.”

Sections 3604(a) and (b) can apply to a tenant-screening company whose screening practices make housing unavailable or affect rental terms, privileges, or related services because of protected characteristics, including through disparate impact.

Louis v. SAFERENT SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2023-07-26(a) (b)

Plaintiffs allege that SafeRent has violated two provisions of the FHA: Section 3604(a), which prohibits conduct that “otherwise make[s] unavailable . . . a dwelling to any person because of race . . . or national origin,” and Section 3604(b), which proscribes discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of a sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services” because of race or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Contrary to SafeRent’s assertions, neither provision limits liability to people or entities that “make housing decisions.” [See, e.g., Dkt. 32 at 15-17]. Section 3604 instead “focuses on prohibited acts,” Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003), and the Supreme Court has explained that the “language of the Act is broad and inclusive,” Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). That is, “Congress’ use of the phrase ‘otherwise make unavailable’ refers to the consequences of an action rather than the actor’s intent,” and it is “results-oriented.” Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 534. Moreover, regulations issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) provide that an actor may be held liable under the FHA for its “own conduct that results in a discriminatory housing practice.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). While “housing providers are often the target of FHA claims . . . other entities are frequently held liable under the FHA,” and “[n]othing in the language of the statute precludes” SafeRent’s liability here.

Section 3604(f) permits a Fair Housing Act claim against an individual board member who personally committed or contributed to disability-based housing discrimination.

Portnoy v. MEI Condominium Association, Inc. · filed 2024-02-28

At this early stage of the case, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for individual liability under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) makes a real estate agent and the agent's company liable when the agent knowingly participates in a racially motivated refusal to sell a home.

Dillon v. Afbic Development Corporation · filed 1979-08-09(a)

We agree with the plaintiffs that Smith's participation in the refusals to sell renders both RSI and him liable under the Fair Housing Act and § 1982.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or negotiate for a dwelling, making it unavailable, or imposing different rental qualification standards because of race.

Lowman v. Platinum Property Management Services, Inc. · filed 2016-02-23(a)

The Federal FHA makes it unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support his claim that Defendant violated the Federal FHA by initially rejecting his application and imposing more onerous application requirements on him based on his race. Indeed, binding precedent in this circuit makes clear that “Section 3604(a) is not limited to discriminatory practices by actual lessors and vendors of dwellings. The Fair Housing Act prohibits not only direct discrimination but practices with racially discouraging effects.” ... As other courts have found, without necessarily addressing whether a violation of § 100.60 provides an independent cause of action, § 100.60 does provide a list of discriminatory actions that give rise to a violation of § 3604(a).

Section 3604(d) prohibits misrepresentations about housing availability when they are made because of race or another protected characteristic, rather than prohibiting every misrepresentation about availability.

Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc · filed 2019-06-04(d)

Indeed, the statute itself does not prohibit all misrepresentations about housing availability, but only those made “because of race” or some other protected characteristic. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).

Section 3604(c) prohibits publishing a housing notice, statement, or advertisement indicating discrimination based on handicap, but a plaintiff must show an injury that the provision was designed to redress.

Conlin v. RU Cliff · filed 2020-07-16(c)

Under that section, it is unlawful to ... make, print, or publish or caused to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on … handicap … or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). ... The court does not reach the merits of Ms. Conlin’s § 3604(c) claim. Viewing the undisputed facts in light of the Tenth Circuit decision in Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996), the court holds that Ms. Conlin does not have standing to bring a claim under § 3604(c) because she has not suffered an injury § 3604(c) was designed to redress.

Section 3604(c) broadly prohibits written or oral statements about renting a dwelling that indicate a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on familial status, and the § 3603(b)(1) private-owner exemption does not apply to that prohibition.

Czerwinski v. Gallagher · filed 2023-03-14(c)

The Court finds that, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Gallagher, every reasonable juror would conclude that Gallagher’s emails violated § 3604(c). ... The Court finds that § 3603(b)(1) does not exempt Gallagher from § 3604(c). The very beginning of § 3603(b)(1) specifically states that “[n]othing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection (c)) shall apply to” the exempted situations it then lays out.

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing owners or agents from making rental statements indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on disability or an intent to discriminate.

Brown v. Suri Hurley, LLC · filed 2023-06-21(c)

“The FHA makes it unlawful for owners or their agents to make any statement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based [handicap] or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.” ... This section “applies to all oral notices or statements by a person engaged in the rental of a dwelling.” ... However, under § 3604(c), a “stray remark” that “is unrelated to the decisional process . . . is insufficient to show discrimination.” ... Although the fact that Matlock sent this email could be interpreted as undermining the sincerity or importance of Matlock’s statement, it appears to indicate that she was involved in the decision-making process. Moreover, considering that the statement was uttered in the days between issuing plaintiffs an eviction notice and providing them a service animal application, it cannot reasonably be understood as temporally unrelated to the decision-making process. ... Thus, at this stage, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether plaintiffs have suffered a cognizable injury under the FHA, and their claims cannot be dismissed for lack of standing.”

A § 3604(c) claim based on a misrepresentation about housing opportunities requires sufficient evidence that the investigator or tester was the object of that misrepresentation.

Arkansas Acorn Fair v. Southwest Nursing · filed 1998-09-30(c)

The district court ruled there was insufficient evidence to establish AAFH's Fair Housing Act claim that its investigator/tester was the object of a misrepresentation about housing opportunities for minority residents at SNH's residential care facility made unlawful under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1994). We review the district court's ruling under a well-established standard. Based on the record before us, we conclude the district court's ruling on the merits was correct and that an extended opinion is not warranted.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C)'s accessibility requirements do not apply to an existing commercial or other nonresidential building converted into residential units because the building was not first occupied as a covered multifamily dwelling after the statutory effective date.

Fair Housing Rights Center v. Post Goldtex GP, LLC · filed 2016-05-17(f)(3)(C)

Therefore, because this provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it cannot reveal the clear intention of Congress to require buildings constructed before March 13, 1991, but remodeled after that date, to comply with the accessibility requirements. Thus, we move on to the second step in the Chevron analysis to determine whether HUD’s interpretations of that provision are reasonable and permissible. ... HUD, in both interpretive regulations and in other guidance, has been consistent in concluding that the accessibility requirements do not apply to buildings like the Goldtex Building because it was not newly constructed and was not first occupied after the effective date of the requirements. These interpretations are reasonable and certainly reflect a legitimate policy choice by the agency in administering an ambiguous statute. Therefore, like the District Court, we defer to HUD’s reasonable interpretation of this provision.

Section 3604(f)(1) requires a plausible showing that housing was denied because of a handicap, while § 3604(f)(9) does not require making a dwelling available when the tenancy would pose a direct threat to others.

Thomas v. Salvation Army Southern Territory · filed 2016-11-08(f)(1), (f)(9)

To state a claim under the FHA, Thomas must show that the defendants denied her housing “because of” her handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... In fact, Congress anticipated this very problem and repeatedly declined to extend statutory protection to individuals who present a threat to public health or the safety of others. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (“Nothing in [the FHA] requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (“Nothing in [the ADA] shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”); McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is a defense to claims under the Rehabilitation Act that [a plaintiff] may pose a ‘direct threat’ to the welfare of others.”).

Section 3604(b) requires a housing-discrimination claimant to allege facts showing that an adverse housing action—such as nonrenewal or eviction—was taken because of a protected status.

Alexander v. The Croix Townhomes LLC · filed 2023-06-15(b)

The plaintiffs’ claim of housing discrimination relies on their assertion that the defendants’ actions were motivated by the plaintiffs’ age and/or familial status. ... But the plaintiffs do not allege a single fact, or even the existence of facts beyond the present scope of their knowledge, tending to push that claim from possible to plausible. They contend that the defendants’ decisions to (1) not to renew their lease and (2) evict them evince discrimination. ... But the Alexanders make no mention of how they were discriminated against; a prima facie case of discrimination requires more than the defendants taking adverse housing actions, but rather that the defendants took adverse housing action due to the plaintiffs’ age and/or familial status. ... Put simply, the plaintiffs do not allege a single fact probative of causation. There is no way to construe the facts alleged in the complaint as supporting a prima facie case of housing discrimination, and for that reason, their housing discrimination claim must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 3604(f) bars disability discrimination in housing, and the direct-threat exception requires an individualized assessment based on reliable objective evidence.

Lundregan v. Housing Opportunities Commission · filed 2024-04-24(f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(9)

Based on the foregoing, a trier of fact could reasonably ‘conclude that Cohen violated Lundregan’s rights under the FHA and/or her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by improperly determining, without objective evidence and despite contradictory evidence, based only on her mental disability, that Lundregan constituted a “danger” and “direct threat” to others. ... a public official, without objective evidence and without an individualized assessment, may not determine that the “direct threat” exception applies, and if he does he will be found to have discriminated against an individual on the basis of a mental disability in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her housing. ... A determination that an individual poses a direct threat must rely on an individualized assessment that is based on reliable objective evidence.”

Section 3604(f)(2) requires a causal connection between a resident’s disability and an adverse housing decision.

Winters Ex Rel. Winters v. CHUGIAK SENIOR CITIZENS · filed 2007-09-26(f)(2)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established that CSC’s efforts to evict Plaintiff were because of her disabilities. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs claims under the Alaska Human Rights and the Fair Housing Act of 1988 fail for the same reasons.

A disability discrimination claim under § 3604(f)(1) must plausibly allege a causal connection between the disability and the adverse action.

Morgan v. Carrington Mortgage Services · filed 2017-12-12(f)(1)

To state a plausible claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must ... allege a causal connection between her disability or protected activity and the alleged adverse action. ... Given this chronology, even if we assume Bank of America notified Carrington of the HUD complaint, it is implausible that Carrington declined to review the successive, untimely application for loss-mitigation options on her loan because of Ms. Morgan’s alleged disability or protected activity.

Section 3604(f)(2) requires facts connecting alleged differences in housing treatment to a disability; a conclusory assertion of different treatment is insufficient.

Mason v. Integra Peak Management Inc., et · filed 2020-09-15(f)(2)

Here, the alleged facts are insufficient to establish causality. Though Mason has made the conclusory statement that he was treated differently from non-handicap tenants, he has not alleged specific facts showing that any different treatment was because of his disability. Therefore, the pleadings are insufficient to establish the claim.

Section 3604(a)'s prohibition on making a dwelling otherwise unavailable reaches discriminatory administration of a Section 8 housing voucher program by a public housing agency.

A.S. v. Been · filed 2017-01-23(a)

In this case, HPD’s decision regarding Plaintiffs Section 8 voucher impacted Plaintiffs ability to secure housing. The Court is persuaded that Defendants, through their administration of the Housing Choice Voucher Program, have the capacity to “otherwise make unavailable” Section 8 vouchers to individuals, such that their actions are subject to the FHA. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs FHA claim falls within the scope of the statute.

A damages claim under § 3604(c) requires a causal connection between the discriminatory statement and the claimed damages.

M.R.G. v. Marsh Harbour Maintenance Association, Inc. · filed 2017-03-15(c)

But the dissent then argues that proximate causation is not an element of a damages claim under § 3604(c). This argument is mistaken. Our Court has noted the requirement of a causal connection in a § 3604(c) case, albeit in a non-published, non-binding opinion. ... As to the § 3604(c) claim, the jury may have reasonably concluded the Plaintiffs failed to show a causal connection between the mere publication of the Rules ... and the Plaintiffs’ alleged substantial damages.

Section 3604 discrimination claims may be proved under a mixed-motive causation framework rather than requiring but-for causation.

Gilead Community Services, Inc. v. Cromwell · filed 2022-05-27

Courts within this Circuit are still bound by the mixed-motive framework. See MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 616 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that the argument that Gross, a case which held that the use of “because of” in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act meant plaintiffs needed to show age was the but-for cause of an employer’s decision, “runs headlong into Circuit precedent” holding that a mixed-motive standard applies to Fair Housing Act cases (citing Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 383)). ... As a result, the Supreme Court’s Comcast decision clearly did not hold that the but-for standard applies to Fair Housing Act cases.

Section 3604(f) claims may be analyzed under a “motivating factor” causation standard.

CMDS Residential, LLC v. Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore · filed 2024-03-18(f)

Because the argument was raised for the first time in this motion for reconsideration and is not supported by any post-Gross and Gentry case law, the court finds that applying the “motivating factor” causation standard to CMDS’s FHA claim was not “clear error.”

Sections 3604(a) and (b) allow Fair Housing Act discrimination claims under either a disparate-impact or disparate-treatment theory.

Logan v. Matveevskii · filed 2016-03-30(a) (b)

Similarly, under §§ 3604(a) and (b) of the Fair Housing Act, “[a] plaintiff can make out a claim of discrimination either on a theory of disparate impact or one of disparate treatment.”

Section 3604(a) supports disparate-impact liability, but a plaintiff must identify an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary policy causing the alleged disparity.

Ellis v. The City of Minneapolis · filed 2017-06-27(a)

In sum, we conclude the Ellises have not pleaded a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA. Under Inclusive Communities, a plaintiff must, at the very least, point to an “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary” policy causing the problematic disparity.

Section 3604(2) bars making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race or national origin, and disparate-impact liability can be shown when a challenged policy causes the racial disparity.

Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n · filed 2018-03-21(2)

At this procedural posture, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts to support their theory that the policy of delegation of discretion or failure to supervise and differential maintenance based on the properties' age and value as the robust cause of discriminatory impact.

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact claims, requiring a prima facie showing that a housing policy caused a disproportionate effect on a protected class.

De Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. P'ship · filed 2018-09-12(a)

Accordingly, we now hold that Plaintiffs have made a prima facie case that Waples' Policy disparately impacted Latinos in violation of the FHA, satisfying step one of the disparate-impact analysis, and that the district court therefore erred in concluding otherwise.

A disparate-impact claim under § 3604(a) requires an alleged artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier; valid governmental policies, including health and safety code enforcement, are not displaced.

Mahmood Khan v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2019-04-30(a)

Khan has since abandoned all his claims except a disparate-impact claim under the FHA, a claim that challenges practices having a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities without a justifiable rationale. ... The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized these kinds of claims, but it has cautioned that they are "properly limited" to the removal of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers, not the displacement of valid governmental policies." ... It explained, moreover, that the FHA "is not an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder their priorities" or to prevent them "from achieving legitimate objectives, such as ensuring compliance with health and safety codes." ... So courts must "examine with care," and promptly decide, whether plaintiffs have made out a prima facie disparate-impact case. ... In short, we think Ellis controls. We therefore conclude that Khan has failed to allege a plausible claim to relief under the FHA and that judgment on the pleadings was appropriate.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, color, or national origin, and permits FHA claims based on disparate treatment or disparate impact when the complaint plausibly alleges the required facts.

Mill Street Partners, LLC v. City of Newburgh · filed 2019-09-10(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... To assert a disparate treatment-based FHA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting “animus against the protected group was a significant factor in the position taken by the municipal decision-makers themselves or by those to whom the decision-makers were knowingly responsive.” ... These allegations, if proven, would support the inference that racial animus was a significant factor in the City’s refusal to support the project. ... To state a claim under a disparate impact theory of discrimination, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that an “outwardly neutral practice has a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact” on persons in the protected class. ... Therefore, Mill Street has plausibly alleged facts to support a disparate impact-based FHA claim. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the FHA claim is denied. ... Mill Street may proceed under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) permits an occupancy limit that has a disparate impact on families with children if the limit is sufficiently justified by a nondiscriminatory rationale.

Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2020-03-23(a)

Any occupancy limit, including the PCOA’s limit, that is sufficiently justified is permissible under the FHA even if, under the Court’s methodology, it has a disparate impact on families with children.

Section 3604(a) reaches disparate-impact policies only when they create an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier to fair housing; it does not require housing authorities to reorder development priorities.

AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2020-06-15(a)

Assuming the truth of these allegations, AHF has not alleged the City’s approval of the Projects—and its decisions and implementation of land use policies that went with it—is itself a barrier to fair housing as Inclusive Communities requires. ... In the absence of the City placing actual restrictions on housing, we cannot conclude the City’s approval of the Projects is actionable under the FHA or FEHA based on the reduction of affordable housing units as a result of private actors’ anticipated increase of rents due to the revitalization of the area stemming from new development. ... The FHA and FEHA, however, were designed not to impose land use policies on public and private actors, but rather to eliminate those policies that are barriers to fair housing. AHF has not alleged such a policy exists here.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits housing discrimination because of handicap, including disparate treatment through a facially discriminatory zoning regulation.

HORIZON HOUSE, INC. v. EAST NORRITON TOWNSHIP · filed 2020-04-20(f)(2)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for disparate treatment based on a facially discriminatory regulation.

Section 3604(a) prohibits intentional discrimination and segregative disparate-impact policies in housing, while § 3604(b) prohibits discriminatory terms and conditions of sale or rental, including tax burdens that affect sale prices or rents.

Tax Equity Now NY v. City of New York · filed 2024-03-19(a), (b)

The complaint also alleges that the City’s taxation assessment practices discriminate with respect to the terms and conditions of housing under 42 USC § 3604 (b). ... This transfer of tax burdens to home buyers and renters, are alleged to be part of a discriminatory practice based on the protected classifications, and thus violates the FHA. Therefore, the fifteenth cause of action also sufficiently alleges an FHA violation. ... Thus, intentional conduct or a policy that has a segregative disparate impact based on any of the protected classifications violates the FHA (see 42 USC § 3604 [a]), although a party claiming such must provide more than bare statistics (see ICP, 576 US at 543).

Section 3604(f)(2) bars land-use rules that disproportionately deny disabled people access to supportive housing, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable zoning accommodations necessary to give them an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.

CAREONE AT BIRCHWOOD, LLC v. TOWNSHIP OF EDISON · filed 2024-03-27(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

The Court finds the Code is discriminatory in violation of the FHAA to the extent it precludes development of assisted living facilities and other types of supportive housing in the Township’s residential districts. ... Section 3604(f)(3)(B) defines discrimination to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” ... Reasonable accommodations claims also employ “a burden-shifting analysis in which the initial burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the accommodations that it requested are ‘necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] [an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’”

For a § 3604(b) disparate-impact claim, the plaintiff must plead that theory and provide evidence that a facially neutral policy has or is expected to have a significant adverse impact on a protected group.

Awnuh v. Public Housing Agency of the City of Saint Paul · filed 2020-12-01(b)

This provision encompasses individual claims for disparate treatment as well as claims of disparate impact. ... The PHA’s motion for summary judgment, insofar as it concerns Awnuh’s disparate-impact claim under the FHA, is granted on this basis alone. Even if Awnuh had pled a disparate-impact claim, he has not provided evidence to support such a claim. An FHA disparate-impact claim requires Awnuh to demonstrate that a facially neutral policy or practice either has or can be expected to have “a significant adverse impact on members of a protected minority group.”

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a disability, and its disparate-treatment prohibition requires that persons with disabilities be treated less favorably than comparable persons without disabilities.

Women's Elevated Sober Living LLC v. City of Plano, Texas · filed 2020-12-03(f)(1)

Phrased differently, disparate treatment under the FHA occurs when those with disabilities are made worse off compared to those without disabilities. ... Though the Ordinance discriminates in the sense that it “treats people with disabilities differently,” it does not discriminate under the FHA because the Ordinance “treats individuals with disabilities better than those without disabilities.”

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and an FHA complaint survives dismissal when it plausibly alleges an inference of discrimination.

Xia v. 65 West 87th Street Housing Development Fund Corporation · filed 2020-12-08

The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits the denial of housing due to race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. A complaint alleging discrimination under the FHA must allege facts that plausibly give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 3604(a) prohibits racial discrimination in housing sales or rentals, and a disparate-impact claim requires a specific policy causing a disparate effect on a protected group rather than an isolated instance.

Grays v. Kittredge CO Partners, LLC · filed 2021-03-17(a)

Grays brings a claim against Cortland Defendants pursuant to § 3604(a) of the FHA, which prohibits racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. ... To state a claim for disparate impact discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a specific policy of the defendant caused a disparate effect on a protected group. ... “Moreover, a disparate impact claim must allege a pattern or practice of discrimination, not merely an isolated instance of it.” ... Given the dearth of statistical evidence or factual allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that Grays’s FHA claim is legally deficient.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits housing practices that make a dwelling unavailable or deny it because of handicap and permits disparate-impact claims under a burden-shifting framework: the plaintiff shows a neutral practice's significant disproportionate impact, the defendant shows business necessity, and the plaintiff may show a less discriminatory alternative.

Long Island Housing Services, Inc. v. NPS Holiday Square LLC · filed 2021-09-09(f)(1)

The FHA provides that it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... A plaintiff may demonstrate unlawful housing discrimination under a disparate impact theory. ... Disparate impact claims are analyzed under a burden-shifting framework. ... First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing “(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices.” ... If a plaintiff presents a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the “challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests” of the defendant. ... If the defendant meets its burden, “the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the ‘substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.’”

Section 3604(a) permits both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact housing-discrimination claims.

Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2021-10-29(a)

Both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims are cognizable under § 3604(a).

Section 3604(a) prohibits policies and practices that make dwellings unavailable because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, including disparate-impact theories subject to limits against injecting race into housing decisions.

Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of L.A. · filed 2022-03-03(a)

The Fair Housing Act only prohibits policies and practices that discriminate—by intent or by effect—on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” (42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a).) The Fair Housing Act does not reach discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic status ... and does not reach discrimination on the basis of race unless it has a “‘significantly disparate impact on nonwhites’” ... Thus, accepting gentrification as a valid theory would inexorably “cause[] race to be used and considered in a pervasive and explicit manner [in deciding whether] to justify governmental or private actions,” thereby “inject[ing] racial considerations into [the] decision.” (Inclusive Communities, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 543.) Inclusive Communities says such a theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(b) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to first show that she was treated differently than others.

Arthur v. Windsor Shadows Homeowner's Association · filed 2022-07-06(b)

To bring a disparate treatment discrimination claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must first show that she has been treated differently than others.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling; a disparate-treatment plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and then rebut the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason as pretext.

Mandawala v. Struga Management · filed 2023-03-30(b)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale . . . of a dwelling . . . because of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). To prevail on a claim of disparate treatment under the FHA, Mandawala must show “(1) membership in [a] protected class, (2) that [he] applied and was qualified to rent or purchase housing[,] (3) that [he] was rejected, and (4) that the housing thereafter remained open to similarly situated applicants.” Crain v. City of Selma, 952 F.3d 634, 640-41 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, courts employ the McDonnell–Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. at 641. First, the defendant is given a chance to put forth a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the rejection.” Inclusive Comms. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 911 (5th Cir. 2019). “The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the reason offered . . . by showing it is a pretext for discrimination.” Id. Under a disparate treatment theory, “there can be no liability without a finding that the protected trait (e.g., race) motivated the challenged action.” Id. at 910. The ultimate burden, however, remains with the plaintiff. See Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 2002).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying housing because of a protected characteristic, and it reaches discriminatory practices causing disparate impact without proof of discriminatory intent.

Martinez v. City of Clovis · filed 2023-04-07(a)

The trial court’s error in concluding a municipality violates the FHA’s discrimination provision only when it has denied something also can be explained by referring to the statutory phrase “make unavailable or deny,” which the district court in Avenue 6E stated included “municipal land use decisions that block or impede the provision of housing.” (Avenue 6E, supra, 217 F.Supp.3d 1047, italics added.) The trial court’s conclusion overemphasizes the statutory term “deny” and its synonym “block” and did not give the proper interpretation to the term “make unavailable” and its synonym “impede.” The verb “impede” means “to bar or hinder the progress of; obstruct or delay.” (Webster’s New World Dict. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 703.) Thus, a municipal practice that delays the availability of housing to people of color is actionable under the FHA. Furthermore, the phrase “or otherwise make unavailable or deny” (42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)) was identified by the United States Supreme Court as the textual foundation for disparate impact liability under the FHA. (Inclusive Communities, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 534.) Accordingly, determining whether the challenged practice has made housing unavailable requires a court to determine whether the practice results in a disparate impact.

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims challenging a housing provider’s categorical exclusion of applicants with felony convictions when the alleged policy disproportionately excludes African Americans and is intentionally adopted to achieve that result.

Lyman v. Montclair at Partridge Creek, LLC · filed 2023-09-18(a)

The weight of caselaw strongly indicates that—by pointing to local statistics showing that African Americans are significantly more likely to have a history of incarceration in the specific state and county where Defendants are located—Plaintiffs have plausibly pleaded that Defendants’ alleged policy of excluding all applicants with felony convictions has a disparate impact on African Americans. ... When considered together, Defendants’ alleged procedural departure and their purported commitment to an across-the-board rejection of felons in a county where felons are disproportionately African American—all in defiance of alleged industry norms and HUD guidance to the contrary—suffice to state a disparate-treatment claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits handicap discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of dwelling rentals or related services, and permits disparate-impact claims without proof of intent when the action has a greater adverse impact on the protected group.

431 E PALISADE AVENUE REAL ESTATE, LLC v. CITY OF ENGLEWOOD · filed 2023-09-19(f)(2)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Plaintiffs may bring both “(1) intentional discrimination claims (also called disparate treatment claims) and (2) disparate impact claims” pursuant to this provision. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005). Unlike intentional discrimination, a prima facie case of disparate impact may be brought “without proof of discriminatory intent.” Arc of New Jersey, Inc. v. State of N.J., 950 F. Supp. 637, 643 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Bryan v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 916 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Disparate impact claims do not require proof of discriminatory motive like disparate treatment claims”). However, “to make a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA[], the plaintiff must show that the [defendant’s] action had a greater adverse impact on the protected group (in this case the elderly handicapped) than on others.” Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466–67 (3d Cir. 2002).

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact liability against insurers, but state-law limits on underwriting or rating decisions may sever causation and defeat a particular claim without making the statute categorically inapplicable.

National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 2023-09-19(a)

To be clear, that “robust causality requirement” actually works in favor of NAMIC’s members if sued, making NAMIC’s argument both counterintuitive and ultimately unconvincing. Indeed, the causation element is meant to “protect[] defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.” Jd. at 542. If an insurer is sued under a disparate-impact theory of liability, it can try to show that a state law prohibits (or requires) certain underwriting or rating decisions in a way that severs the causal connection between the insurer’s practices and the disparate impact. Jd. at 543. If successful, the insurer should be able to get the case dismissed. /d. But that does not make the Disparate-Impact Rule unlawful or, somehow, categorically inapplicable to insurers. See Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394, 408 (Mass. 2016) (declining to adopt “a per se rule precluding disparate impact liability under the fair housing statutes where a property owner has acted in accord with statute, regulation, and contract’).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a disparate-treatment claim requires unequal treatment based on race that affects housing availability.

Price v. Howard · filed 2023-09-21(a)

The FHA prohibits the “refus[al] to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). To state a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege “unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing.” Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty. Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994). There are three ways a plaintiff can prevail on a claim under the FHA: (1) intentional discrimination (disparate treatment), (2) discriminatory impact (disparate impact), or (3) a refusal to make a reasonable accommodation. Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x 581, 583 (11th Cir. 2009). Of these theories, Price pleads disparate treatment. ... As a Black woman, Price is a member of a protected class as required under the FHA. Price also pleads facts suggesting that Howard’s background check and fee requirement for her partner were motivated by racial animus, which is prohibited under the FHA. 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b). ... Thus, Price’s factual allegations plausibly show that she was treated differently than similarly situated tenants, and Price has established a prima facie claim of disparate treatment under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it based on protected characteristics and reaches both intentional disparate-treatment claims and disparate-impact claims against unjustified policies.

Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership · filed 2024-01-23(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person” on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court construed this provision to encompass not only intentional discrimination under a disparate-treatment theory of liability, but also disparate-impact discrimination claims. 576 U.S. at 545–46. ... In other words, a defendant can be liable under the FHA for instituting policies that have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities and are not otherwise justified by a legitimate rationale. Id. ... Accordingly, we hold that Waples did not satisfy its burden at Step Two because its Policy did not serve in any realistic way to avoid liability under the anti-harboring statute.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits disability-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, but a disparate-treatment claim requires facts linking the challenged rental condition to disability discrimination.

LLOYD v. MANBEL DEVCO I LP · filed 2024-02-27(f)(2)

Generally, to prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that some discriminatory purpose was a ‘motivating factor’ behind the challenged action. ... However, she again fails to draw a nexus between the cashier’s check requirement and her disability, merely concluding that the decision was based on a discriminatory reason. ... For this reason, Count VI fails to state a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race and permits liability based on a policy’s discriminatory effect, assessed using the relevant populations subject to the challenged policy.

Estate of DaMon R. Fisher v. City of Annapolis · filed 2024-02-22(a)

Comparing the HACA properties to the general population sweeps in an untold number of citizens who are not subject to the licensing policy in any event and are therefore not relevant to the analysis. The proper comparison is between the racial composition of the population subject to the licensing and inspection regime, i.e. all renters in the City, and the racial composition of the population subject to the non-enforcement policy, i.e. renters in HACA properties.

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff challenging housing-related services or facilities to plausibly allege disparate impact from a facially neutral policy or intentional discrimination based on a protected class.

Briggs v. Campbell · filed 2024-03-20(b)

Even if a failure to maintain the premises is cognizable under § 3604(b), Plaintiffs do not state a claim for disparate impact or disparate treatment.

Section 3604(b) bars discrimination based on protected characteristics in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities; a disparate-treatment plaintiff must show a concrete adverse impact.

Morris v. West Hayden Estates First Add. · filed 2024-06-17(b)

Section 3604(b) of the FHA prohibits discrimination on protected grounds, including religion, “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... But to support a disparate treatment claim, plaintiffs must be able to point to some concrete adverse impact suffered as a result of the defendants’ behavior.

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact claims without requiring proof of discriminatory intent.

Military Road Revitalization Company, LLC v. St. Tammany Parish Government · filed 2024-08-14(a)

Indeed, disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA and do not require a showing of intent. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 524, 545–46 (2015).

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact liability for a facially neutral housing policy or practice that disproportionately harms a protected class, but the plaintiff must plausibly allege the required discriminatory effect and causal connection.

Smith v. New Neighborhoods, Inc. · filed 2025-09-10(a)

Section 3604(a) provides for disparate impact liability under the FHA. ... “A disparate impact analysis examines a facially-neutral policy or practice . . . for its differential impact or effect on a particular group.” ... Here, not only has Plaintiff failed to show a “discriminatory effect” of Defendants’ actions, as required, Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr., 478 F. Supp. 3d at 287 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1)), she has also failed to allege any facially neutral policy or practice adopted by Defendants that would disproportionately impact a minority group.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race discrimination in housing-related services and requires a disparate-impact plaintiff to identify a neutral policy causing a significant disproportionate effect on a protected class with robust causality.

Howlett v. City of Susanville · filed 2025-09-18(b)

As it relates to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), “[f]or a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact, he must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a policy, not a one-time decision, that is outwardly neutral; (2) a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected class; and (3) robust causality that shows, beyond mere evidence of a statistical disparity, that the challenged policy, and not some other factor or policy, caused the disproportionate effect.” Sw. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement Dist., 17 F.4th 950, 962 (9th Cir. 2021). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to “prov[e] that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.” §100.500(c)(2).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race.

Crawford v. Milner · filed 2025-09-29(a)

The Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Here, Plaintiff appears to be asserting a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA. Plaintiff’s claim fails on its face because she remains silent as to the race of the individual who received the unit. ... Even assuming Plaintiff can allege sufficient evidence someone of a different race received the unit, the facts as stated do not currently establish a disparate treatment claim under the FHA. “Disparate treatment is synonymous with intentional discrimination.” ... To prevail on this claim a “plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.” ... None succeed.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, and a facially neutral voucher ban may support disparate-treatment liability when plausibly motivated by race.

Dewanna Johnson, et al. v. Providence Homeowners Association · filed 2026-01-05(a)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of” race. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Plaintiffs plausibly allege facts supporting the ultimate elements of disparate treatment: that the Voucher Ban was enacted because of the race of the voucher holders, not the means they use to pay rent.

A disparate-treatment claim under § 3604(2) requires the plaintiff to allege discriminatory intent.

Hall-Johnson · filed 2026-01-29(2)

However, it appears that Hall-Johnson also needs to allege discriminatory intent in order to establish a disparate treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(b) disparate-impact plaintiffs must plead facts connecting the challenged policy or action to a disparate impact on a protected class.

Goncharko · filed 2026-01-16(b)

For an FHA disparate impact claim, plaintiffs “must plead facts alleging a causal connection between a policy or action and a disparate impact on a protected class.”

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap, including through discriminatory disparate treatment.

Harmony Home of Huntington, Inc. v. Executive Director · filed 2026-03-10(f)(1)

The current Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... Plaintiff has already established violations of these statutes by showing disparate treatment, and on that basis, Plaintiff is entitled to an injunction relieving the Home from Class 1 building requirements that are not imposed on Class 2 structures.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person because of race, and a claim based on discriminatory conduct must allege facts indicative of disparate impact or disparate treatment.

Matter of Casa Lajas, LLC v. Village of Nyack · filed 2026-06-17(a)

Under the FHA, it is "unlawful . . . [t]o . . . make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . race" (42 USC § 3604[a]). ... Here, the petitioners' contention that the ZBA's determination affirming the Chief Building Inspector's determination that under the Code a clubhouse shall not contain dwelling or sleeping units was the result of discriminatory conduct in violation of 42 USC §§ 3604(a) and 3617 is not supported by the requisite factual allegations indicative of disparate impact or disparate treatment ( see generally LeBlanc-Sternberg v Fletcher , 67 F3d 412, 425 [2d Cir]; Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v Town of Huntington , 844 F2d 926, 933 [2d Cir], affd in part 488 US 15).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of protected characteristics, and a violation may be shown through discriminatory effect without proof of intentional discrimination.

Homebuilders Ass'n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Brandon · filed 2009-07-16(a)

Under Section 3504(a) of the FHA, it is unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” To I’ecover under the FHA, an injured party may proceed under either a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact (also called “discriminatory effect”). ... To succeed on a discriminatory effect claim, the plaintiff is not required to produce evidence of intentional discrimination. ... When deciding a discriminatory effect claim under the FHA, the Court uses the same burden-shifting framework that is applied in Title VII cases.

Section 3604(b) bars race discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and related services or facilities; a claim requires evidence of discriminatory intent or disparate impact.

Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2010-02-05(b)

Section 3604(b) more broadly bans discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” because of race. ... Although we are not convinced that the FHA applies here, we also need not decide the issue. ... To succeed on her FHA claims, Davis must either prove Defendants’ discriminatory intent or show that Defendants’ conduct has a disparate impact on African-Americans. ... Davis must “show that race played some role in [Defendants’] decision” in order to succeed with her claim; at the very least, she must raise a question of material fact on this issue to survive Defendants’ motion.

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact claims but requires the plaintiff to show that the challenged policy caused the discriminatory disparity; a disparate-treatment claim requires a prima facie showing followed by burden shifting on legitimate reason and pretext.

The Inclusive Communities Project Inc v. Heartland Community Association Inc · filed 2019-08-07(a)

In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the FHA encompasses disparate-impact claims. ... A disparate-impact liability claim “must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.” ... The court, accordingly, determines that ICP has failed to plead adequately the first step of the burden-shifting analysis that requires a prima facie showing that the challenged practice causes a discriminatory effect and, therefore, will grant HCA’s motion to dismiss ICP’s disparate impact claim. ... To state a claim for disparate treatment under § 3604(a) of the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a prima facie case of: “(1) membership in protected class, (2) that the plaintiff applied and was qualified to rent or purchase housing, (3) that the plaintiff was rejected, and (4) that the housing thereafter remained open to similarly situated applicants after the plaintiff was rejected.” Id. at 910-11. “If a prima facie case is alleged, a defendant may offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the rejection.” Id. at 911. “The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the reason offered by the defendant by showing it is a pretext for discrimination.” Id.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Awnuh v. Public Housing Agency of the City of Saint Paul · filed 2019-12-03(b)

Disparate-treatment claims under the FHA are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII disparate-treatment claims. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 831. “Proof of discriminatory purpose is crucial for a disparate treatment claim.” Id. (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). Absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies. See id. ... Awnuh is unlikely to succeed on the merits of a disparate-treatment claim because he does not present any direct evidence that the PHA’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent, and it is difficult to infer discriminatory intent from the evidence in the record concerning the PHA’s conduct.

Section 3604(b) prohibits treating a person less favorably in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing or related services because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Wheatley v. Beasley · filed 2021-04-28(b)

Disparate treatment claims under the FHA are tested under the same framework as Title VII disparate treatment claims. See Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010). The standard is whether the defendant treated the plaintiff less favorably than others based on her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

For a Section 3604 disparate impact claim, the comparison groups must reflect the full scope of the challenged housing policy.

Rivera v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF FARMINGDALE · filed 2011-03-30

Therefore the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the “appropriate comparison” is between Hispanic Farmingdale citizens who are impacted by the alleged SARP (whose “phase one” is the renovation of the Building) and non-Hispanic Farmingdale citizens who are impacted by the alleged SARP.

Section 3604(b) requires evidence that a housing provider treated a tenant differently in rental-related services because of a protected trait to establish disparate-treatment discrimination.

Canty-Massey v. Vantage Management, Inc. · filed 2025-02-20(b)

Canty-Massey has provided no evidence to show that she was treated different than other Vantage tenants because of her membership in a protected class.

Section 3604(b) disparate treatment claims require allegations of a concrete adverse impact.

Alfieri · filed 2025-12-01(b)

Because the current complaint does not identify any concrete harm, Alfieri has not alleged the second element of a prima facie case.

Section 3604(b) requires a disparate impact claimant to allege that the challenged practice had a discriminatory effect.

Patel v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2002-08-08(b)

Additionally, Appellants never made any allegations regarding the “discriminatory effect” suffered as a result of the City’s actions.

Section 3604(b) prohibits both disparate treatment and disparate impact race discrimination in housing-related services.

Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc. · filed 2009-05-12(b)

The federal FHA prohibits both disparate treatment and disparate impact race discrimination.

At the pleading stage, the percentage of children in affected housing can serve as an indirect measure of the percentage of families with children for a § 3604 disparate impact claim.

Mabry v. City of East Chicago · filed 2021-03-24(a), (b)

The City Defendants argue that the percentage of children is an inaccurate representation of the protected class of families with children, but the percentage of children is an adequate indirect measure of the percentage of family unit at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 3604 permits a disparate impact claim in some circumstances, but a plaintiff must identify a policy or practice that disparately affects a protected group.

Smith v. Housing Authority · filed 2012-03-30

As noted above, in certain circumstances, discrimination can be shown by using a modified disparate impact theory under section 3604. However, the Smiths’ Amended Complaint does not identify any policy or practice by the HASB that disparately affects African Americans, nor do they mention disparate impact or address any of these issues in their response brief.

Section 3604(a) prohibits housing measures with an unjustified disparate racial impact; a legitimate and substantial goal can justify the impact.

Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority · filed 2000-03-27(a)

In light of Griggs and the similarity of the statutes, it is a fair reading of the Fair Housing Act's "because of race" prohibition to ask that a demonstrated disparate impact in housing be justified by a legitimate and substantial goal of the measure in question; but beyond that, we do not think that the courts' job is to "balance" objectives, with individual judges deciding which seem to them more worthy.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on race or national origin, and allegations of discriminatory eviction and refusal to sell can establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim.

Alcaraz v. KMF Oakland LLC · filed 2020-06-12

Taken together, these allegations suffice to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.

Section 3604(b) requires a disparate impact claim to identify a challenged policy or practice; a disparate treatment claim can be supported by allegations that tenants of other races held similar parties without being shut down or given eviction notices.

Dogbe v. The Lakes at Lemmon Valley, LLC · filed 2025-05-12(b)

However, Plaintiffs do not allege – either generally or specifically – what these policies or procedures were. ... Thus, Plaintiffs do not meet the pleading standard for a disparate impact discrimination theory relating to the Clubhouse or eviction policies procedures under section 3604(b), and Defendant’s motion is granted as to the disparate impact portion of the claim. ... Here, Plaintiffs have alleged they were given an eviction notice after having their party shut down and that when individuals of the white and/or other races held similar parties, they were not shut down or given eviction notices. This sufficiently alleges that Plaintiffs suffered severe harassment because of their race by Defendant and/or its employees. Morris, 104 F.4th at 1146. Thus, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim under § 3604(b).

Section 3604(a) requires facts supporting an inference that a housing provider treated a person less favorably because of a protected status; conclusory allegations do not state a claim.

Moore v. Model Cities · filed 2025-10-09(a)

First, Ms. Moore alleges no facts about what Model Cities, Safe Space Shelter, or any of their staff did that would support an inference that she was treated less favorably from others because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 3604(a) prohibits race discrimination in housing sales or rentals, and a disparate treatment claim requires facts showing less favorable treatment because of race.

Johnson v. Rinehart · filed 2026-01-02(a)

The FHA broadly prohibits ... discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Johnson’s Complaint provides far too few factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, as required by Twombly. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Johnson’s disparate treatment claims for discrimination based on his race and disability are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A disparate impact claim under § 3604(a) requires the plaintiff to identify a facially neutral policy.

Roy v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2009-03-31(a)

The Roys fail to specifically identify any facially neutral policy of the defendants in support of their FHA disparate impact claim, a necessary element of any FHA disparate impact prima facie case.

Section 3604(a) requires more than an inference of discriminatory impact to support preliminary relief on a disparate impact housing claim.

Pacific Community Resource Center v. City of Glendale · filed 2014-01-16(a)

Plaintiffs have only offered an inference of discriminatory impact. Plaintiffs’ strongest claim, disparate impact on the American Indian community of Glendale, is insufficient.

Section 3604(a) prohibits unjustified disparate impact from housing policies; a one-time condemnation is analyzed for disparate treatment instead.

City of Joliet v. New West, L.P. · filed 2016-06-17(a)

Disparate-impact analysis looks at the effects of policies, not one-off decisions, which are analyzed for disparate treatment.

Section 3604(a) does not prohibit a landlord’s conversion of open-market apartments to nondiscriminatory student housing merely because it disproportionately affects former minority tenants.

Dreher v. Rana Management, Inc. · filed 1980-07-07(a)

While the effects of this decision may fall disproportionately on individual minority tenants who had previously occupied the affected housing, and perhaps on the minority community which previously had access to the housing, this alone has never been held sufficient to constitute a violation of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604 does not prohibit displacement caused by apartments being unfit for habitation rather than by the tenants’ national origin.

Gomez v. Chody · filed 1989-01-31(a)-(b)

However, the record before the district court on summary judgment establishes that the Grove Street Apartments had to be closed because they had been found unfit for human habitation, not because of the national origin of the tenants.

Section 3604 allows a housing discrimination claim based on a significant disproportionate impact on a protected group; once plaintiffs establish a prima facie claim, defendants must assert a legitimate business purpose for the practice.

Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp. · filed 1995-07-13

Because plaintiffs have presented a valid prima facie claim under the Fair Housing Act, the burden is now on defendants to assert a legitimate business purpose or purposes for the challenged practice, namely the condominium conversion plan.

Section 3604(b) permits a disparate impact claim, but the plaintiff must present admissible evidence of an impact on a protected group.

Peoria Area Landlord Ass'n v. City of Peoria, IL · filed 2001-09-18(b)

By virtue of their reliance on the stricken statements in the Affidavits of Ballard, Meyer, and Jones to make their showing, the Court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiffs have failed to bring forth any admissible evidence demonstrating a disparate impact on minorities that would qualify for relief under the FHA.

Section 3604(b) requires a disparate impact claimant to show that a facially neutral policy actually or predictably under-represents families with children in the housing relative to the general population.

Meyer v. Bear Road Associates · filed 2005-03-07(b)

To establish a disparate impact claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), plaintiffs-appellants must demonstrate that a facially neutral policy actually or predictably leads to under-representation of families with children in the housing relative to the general population.

Section 3604 does not protect alienage itself, but a housing policy that disproportionately affects a protected racial or national origin group can satisfy the first element of a disparate impact claim.

Keller v. City of Fremont · filed 2012-02-20

This Court infers from the Supreme Court’s analysis of Title VII in Espinoza that the Fair Housing Act does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of alienage, and that aliens are not a protected minority group. Because the Ordinance will have a disparate impact on Hispanic/Latino residents by virtue of the fact that undocumented aliens in the Fremont community are more likely to have origins in Latin American countries than in other countries, however, the Plaintiffs satisfy the first prong of the three-prong analysis for disparate impact claims under the FHA.

Section 3604 requires evidence that similarly situated tenants were treated differently to establish a disparate treatment claim.

Mohamed v. McLaurin · filed 2019-05-30

Without comparator evidence, there is no means of determining whether Plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated tenants. ... To the extent she has not, the court finds that she has failed to establish the essential elements of a disparate treatment claim.

A disparate impact claim under § 3604(f)(2) must allege effects on disabled people as a class, rather than only on the plaintiff.

Wallace v. Greystone at the Highlands Association · filed 2020-11-16(f)(2)

No allegations relate the Parkers’ activity to broader effects on disabled people as a class compared to non-disabled people. The complaint solely deals with the Parkers’ impact on the Wallaces. They have failed to allege a disparate impact claim.

Section 3604(b) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to plead a specific policy and facts connecting it to a significant adverse effect on a protected group.

Bailey v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2021-09-30(b)

Further, a plaintiff must show “that a specific policy caused a significant disparate effect on a protected group.” ... Accordingly, because Plaintiffs also fail to state a disparate impact claim, the Court likewise grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count VIII.

Section 3604(a) recognizes claims based on either intentional discrimination or disparate impact in access to housing.

South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgetown County · filed 2023-09-28(a)

There are two theories of discrimination cognizable under the FHA: disparate treatment (or intentional discrimination) and disparate impact.

Section 3604 permits housing discrimination claims based on disparate treatment or disparate impact, supported by facts showing discrimination against a protected class.

Slaughter v. Valley View I LLP · filed 2023-10-04

The FHA protects individuals from various forms of housing discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... Ms. Slaughter neither alleges intentional discrimination based on her membership in a protected class, nor does she describe any neutral policy that adversely and disproportionately affected her based on her membership in a protected class. Accordingly, Ms. Slaughter’s bare allegation fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Section 3604(a) permits a disparate impact claim when a facially neutral housing practice disproportionately harms a protected class and is robustly linked to that disparity.

State v. City of Sunnyside · filed 2024-06-20(a)

For an FHA disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must show (1) there is an “‘outwardly neutral’” policy or practice, (2) “‘significantly ... adverse or disproportionate impact’” on a protected class, and (3) “‘robust causality’” between the policy and alleged disparities. ... There are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude judgment as a matter of law for the State’s claims under both the WLAD and the FHA.

Section 3604(b) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show protected status, an adverse action involving housing services or rules, and better treatment of people outside the protected group.

Larocque v. Spring Green Corporation · filed 2024-09-16(b)

Adjusting those elements to the context of Ms. Larocque’s case, she must show (a) membership in a protected group; (b) an adverse action by the Spring Green Defendants, such as failure to provide requested service or stringent enforcement of rules; and (c) evidence that others who are not members of the protected group received superior service or more lenient enforcement of the rules.

Section 3604 disparate impact claims require a causal link between a challenged rental policy and a disproportionate effect on a protected class; general statistics alone do not establish that link.

Ballantyne v. Guenther Management LLC · filed 2025-05-30(a)-(b)

In sum, Plaintiff offers no link between the statistics he provides and the actions of the Defendants, and the facts of the case do not support the inference he is attempting to draw.

Section 3604(a) can reach tenant-screening companies, but disparate-impact liability requires proof that the defendant proximately caused housing to become unavailable.

CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols. · filed 2026-02-20(a)

The FHA does not exclude any class of defendants from its scope. Whether any defendant is subject to liability under the FHA turns on whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination—including whether the defendant proximately caused the alleged harm.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of a handicap, including when discriminatory animus influences a municipal zoning decision.

Step by Step, Inc. v. City of Ogdensburg · filed 2016-04-05(f)(1)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... The sequence of events, strong community opposition partially based upon improper generalizations concerning SBS’s mentally ill clients, and the City’s failure to articulate any rationale for its denial sufficiently demonstrate that improper animus against the disabled individuals was a significant factor in the decision to deny plaintiffs application. As such, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. ... As a result, plaintiff has established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their discriminatory intent claim.

Section 3604(f)(1) allows a challenge to a zoning requirement that makes housing unavailable to people with disabilities, based on discriminatory treatment or disparate impact.

Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission · filed 1992-04-01(f)(1)

The court finds, for the reasons discussed below, there is a likelihood of success on the plaintiffs Fair Housing Act claims under §§ 3604(f)(1) and 3617.

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) prohibits a city from denying housing to residents because of their disabilities.

United States v. City of Taylor, Mich. · filed 1995-01-05(f)(1)(B)

After conducting an extensive trial on remand in which substantial new evidence was presented by all parties, this Court once again concludes that the City of Taylor has violated the FHAA, both in discriminating against present and proposed members of Mortenview Manor based on handicap, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B), and in refusing to make a reasonable accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits a city from imposing extra zoning procedures on residential treatment programs because their residents have disabilities.

United States v. City of Baltimore · filed 2012-02-29(f)(1)

The City does, however, discriminate against RSATPs who do self-identify as RSATPs in their zoning applications, because in order to avoid the requirement that these RSATPs obtain a CO, the City requires them to go through the City’s reasonable accommodation process. Although the record establishes that RSATPs falling in this category have successfully obtained relief, the reasonable accommodation process itself is a burden, imposing additional costs and delay.

Damages claims under § 3604(b) and (c) require proof of a causal connection between the discriminatory housing practice and the claimed damages.

Fair Housing Center of the Greater Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Sonoma Bay Community Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2017-03-15(b) (c)

The dissent acknowledges that proximate causation is a required element of a damages claim under § 3604(b) and that the plaintiffs knew they had to present evidence of causation and injury and did so. But the dissent then argues that proximate causation is not an element of a damages claim under § 3604(c). This argument is mistaken. ... As to the § 3604(c) claim, the jury may have reasonably concluded the Plaintiffs failed to show a causal connection between the mere publication of the Rules (which the Defendants had eliminated before trial) and the Plaintiffs’ alleged substantial damages.

Section 3604 can reach reverse-redlining conduct through both disparate-impact and intentional-targeting theories; at the pleading stage, allegations of predatory terms, targeted advertising, and a disproportionate racial impact can state a prima facie FHA claim.

Horne v. Harbour Portfolio VI, LP · filed 2018-03-20

Plaintiffs have alleged facts that, if true, would show that the Harbour Defendants' policy of only purchasing homes from Fannie Mae and only advertising those homes via yard signs and word of mouth caused a disproportionate impact on African-Americans. Plaintiffs have therefore stated a prima facie FHA claim under a theory of disparate impact. ... Plaintiffs have alleged that the Harbour Defendants intentionally targeted African-Americans by advertising properties via signs in front of each house for sale and via word of mouth, both of which were designed to reach the primarily African-American residents of communities where the Harbour Defendants purchased properties. This evidence, along with the evidence of the racial demographics of the relevant communities, is sufficient to state a claim for intentional targeting on the basis of race.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

Koso v. St. Josephs Senior Housing Village · filed 2019-08-14

The FHA prohibits housing discrimination based upon seven protected classes: race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

Section 3604 protects people from housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability.

Shieh v. N.Y.C.H.A. · filed 2020-02-14

The FHA protects an individual from housing discrimination that is based on the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. To state claim of discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show: (1) the defendant took discriminatory action against the plaintiff, and (2) the plaintiff’s protected characteristic (race, color, religion, familial status, national origin, or disability) was a motivating factor in the discriminatory action.

Section 3604 requires a Fair Housing Act plaintiff to show that challenged actions were motivated by discriminatory intent or have a disparate impact based on race.

Shay v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 2021-01-12

To establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff must show that the challenged actions were either motivated by discriminatory intent or that their actions have a disparate impact based on race.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability; refusal to participate in the Section 8 voucher program, standing alone, is not discrimination against a statutorily protected class.

DEJESUS v. VICKY · filed 2021-04-20

The FHA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting “[d]iscrimination in the sale or rental of housing”). Dejesus alleges, however, that he was discriminated against solely on his status as a Section 8 voucher holder, not based on his membership in a statutorily protected class. See Am. Compl. at ECF p. 2. Notably, a private property owner is not required to participate in the voucher program.