42 U.S.C. § 3604

Section 3604(f)(9) does not require a housing provider to make a residential accommodation for a person with a handicap when the accommodation would jeopardize the health, safety, or property of others.

Canales v. Hernandez · filed 2004-12-21(f)(9)

25, 2003], involving employment accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act), such status does not require the Housing Authority to provide him with residential accommodation where it would jeopardize the health, safety or property of others (42 USC § 3604 [f] [9]).

Section 3604(b) protects a tenant's privilege of residing in a rented dwelling from discriminatory harassment after possession.

United States v. Koch · filed 2004-12-22(b)

Since the Eighth Circuit has found that “post-residence acquisition” claims based upon a tenant’s disability are cognizable under sections 3604 and 3617, and in view of the court’s reliance upon cases authorizing FHA claims based upon sexually-hostile housing environment allegations, I believe that the court would reject Koch’s assertion that the aggrieved persons’ “post-residence acquisition” claims “cannot be maintained under the FHA.”

Section 3604(b) covers discrimination based on familial status during a tenancy even when the tenants were not forced to leave.

Khalil v. Farash Corp. · filed 2003-04-23(b)

In addition, it must be remembered that plaintiffs also allege a violation of § 3604(b), which requires only that plaintiffs show that they were discriminated against “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of’ their rentals, or “in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,” because of their familial status. Thus, even if plaintiffs were not forced to leave, they could still state a claim based on discrimination that they endured during their tenancy at the complex.

Section 3604(b) prohibits a housing provider from allocating access to housing-related facilities on the basis of sex in a way that gives women materially less favorable times, even when total swimming hours are roughly equal.

Curto v. A COUNTRY PLACE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION · filed 2019-04-22(b)

In light of these specific inequitable features, the schedule discriminates against women under the FHA even though it provides roughly equal aggregate swimming time to each gender.

Section 3604(b) covers discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling or related services or facilities based on a protected characteristic; a nonhousing project falls outside that scope.

Baker v. City of San Diego · filed 2020-06-01(b)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in the “sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,” “because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... Plaintiffs fail to cite a case that finds a FHA violation that does not relate to the sale or rental of dwellings, or the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwellings. ... Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ first cause of action against the County.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination based on race in the terms, conditions, or privileges of dwelling sales or rentals and in related services or facilities.

Tasfay v. Ramos · filed 2022-02-14(b)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[to] discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race.” ... Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim of discrimination under the FHA. ... Thus, even under the “less stringent standard” accorded to pro se pleadings, the complaint fails to sufficiently allege discrimination in violation of FHA. The Court accordingly grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the FHA claims.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling sale or rental, or related services or facilities, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Kalashnikov v. Myfield Lane Homeowners' Association, Inc. · filed 2023-02-09(b)

The Plaintiffs' claim of familial status discrimination fails. The fact that the Plaintiffs were not permitted to install a playset for their children while Kozo was allowed to have a trampoline for his children is not evidence that the Plaintiffs were discriminated against on the basis of their familial status. Familial status discrimination entails "discrimination against families with children.” Bischoff v. Brittain, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To allege a claim of disparate treatment, the Plaintiffs must allege that they were treated differently than other similarly-situated individuals because of their protected status. Because Kozo also had children, the Plaintiffs were not treated differently because they had children. See Kendrick, 2011 WL 1118664, at *6 (for a prima facie case of familial status discrimination under § 3604(b), Plaintiff must show adverse conduct was taken against him "under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that he was discriminated against on the basis of his familial status.").

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a dwelling’s sale or rental, or in related services or facilities, and a hostile-housing-environment claim requires sufficiently severe and pervasive protected-class harassment connected to housing and imputable to defendants.

Ellis v. NAICA Housing Development Fund Company, Inc. · filed 2025-03-13(b)

Even if the Court assumes without deciding that the FHA governs sex discrimination in the services and facilities at NAICA’s temporary or transitional shelter, Plaintiff’s allegations that a staff member engaged in name calling are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted. ... A plaintiff seeking to state a hostile housing environment claim must allege that (1) she was subjected to harassment that was sufficiently pervasive and severe so as to create a hostile [housing] environment, (2) the harassment was because of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, and (3) a basis exists for imputing the allegedly harassing conduct to the defendants. Id. at *7 (citations and quotation marks omitted). ... A plaintiff bringing an FHA claim must also show a relationship between the discriminatory conduct and housing. ... Thus, although the Court does not condone such unprofessional behavior, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim for sex discrimination in violation of the FHA, where his claim is based on a single remark and there is no allegation of an adverse effect on his housing. Any FHA claim that Plaintiff is asserting must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 3604(b) prohibits national origin discrimination in services connected with a real estate transaction.

Firs Home Owners Association v. City of SeaTac · filed 2020-03-23(b)

RCW 49.60.222(1)(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) both prohibit national origin discrimination in the provision/furnishing of services in connection with a real estate transaction.

Section 3604(b) covers racially discriminatory reductions in services and facilities for existing tenants, even when the conduct does not affect housing availability.

Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Indian Trails Apartments v. Indian Trails Apartments · filed 1980-07-22(b)

Such a tortured interpretation of the application of § 3604(b) is ludicrous and runs counter to the plain and unequivocal language of the statute. Quite clearly, the plaintiffs have alleged that they are not getting the kinds of services and facilities that were available to tenants when the project was predominantly white, and that this differential treatment existed because they are black. ... The plaintiffs have stated a claim under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, specifically under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary for a person with a disability to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Evans v. 210 East Pearson Condominium Association · filed 2023-03-30(f)(3)(B)

Courts evaluate failure to accommodate claims under the Fair Housing Act in the same manner as under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). ... A disabled individual “need not ‘speak any magic words’” to request a reasonable accommodation under the FHA or ADA. ... Here, Evans has sufficiently alleged that (1) defendants were on notice regarding her disability, and (2) she requested to have packages delivered directly to her door long before July 12. Because plaintiff has established that she requested a reasonable accommodation sufficiently before defendants’ July 13 state court action, defendants’ ripeness argument fails and plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claims may proceed.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested accommodation that the housing provider refused to make.

Chahil v. Episcopal Church Home Friendship, Inc. · filed 2012-09-07(f)(3)(B)

FTR has shown that Chahil never requested a different accommodation than the procedure FTR had in place. Therefore, FTR did not refuse to make a requested accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) allows a tenant to request reasonable accommodation at any time before eviction.

Kravis v. Justice of the Peace Court 17 and MHC McNicol Place, LLC · filed 2023-04-17(f)(3)(B)

Under state and federal fair housing laws, a tenant can seek reasonable accommodation from a landlord up to the time of eviction. Kravis requested reasonable accommodation before eviction.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) permits a tenant to request a reasonable accommodation orally or in writing, and a landlord must consider an oral request.

Manor Park Apts. v. Garrison, Unpublished Decision (4-25-2005) · filed 2005-04-25(f)(3)(B)

Based on the Fair Housing Act, it is not required that a request be made in a particular manner or at a particular time. In fact, a reasonable accommodation request can be made orally or in writing, even though it is helpful for both the resident and housing provider if the request is made in writing.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not require a detailed accommodation proposal when a housing provider knows the resident needs additional time and assistance.

RUTLAND COURT OWNERS, INC. v. Taylor · filed 2010-07-08(f)(3)(B)

On these facts, it is enough that the Board was aware of Taylor’s need for an accommodation of additional time and cleaning assistance and the trial court had no basis for requiring that he develop a detailed proposal for the accommodation in order to avail himself of the reasonable accommodation defense.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a request for an accommodation; asserting a right to proceed without a special permit is not such a request.

Mannai Home LLC v. City of Fall River, Massachusetts · filed 2019-02-05(f)(3)(B)

While it is true that plaintiff was not required to obtain a special permit, its request to proceed as a matter of right is not a request for an “accommodation.”

A plaintiff bringing a reasonable accommodation claim must have requested an accommodation.

Parisi v. Sabal Springs Homeowners Association Inc. · filed 2023-01-11(f)(3)

But plaintiffs are required to request an accommodation, and the Amended Complaint fails to allege that Clark made such a request.

Section 3604(f) prohibits handicap discrimination in housing services and requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Southern California Housing Rights Center v. Los Feliz Towers Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2005-05-20(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

To show discrimination based on failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he or she suffers from a handicap as defined by the Fair Housing Act; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of Plaintiffs handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap “may be necessary” to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable accommodation, when necessary, to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, including the opportunity to live in the housing of their choice.

Women's Elevated Sober Living LLC v. City of Plano, Texas · filed 2021-08-27(f)(3)(B)

Consequently, the Court proceeds under the interpretation of § 3604(f)(3)(B) requiring that a reasonable accommodation must afford a disabled individual an equal opportunity to live in the dwelling of their choice.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits a housing provider from refusing reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Monterroso v. City of New York · filed 2024-01-31(f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits a housing provider’s “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). To state a failure-to-accommodate claim under the FHA (or under the NYSHRL), a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) that the plaintiff or a person living with the plaintiff had a disability as defined by the FHA, (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the disability, (3) that the accommodation was likely necessary to afford the disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, (4) that the accommodation requested was reasonable, and (5) that the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation. See Olsen, 759 F.3d at 156; accord Sykes v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 22 Civ. 2127, 2022 WL 2908015, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2022). “Plaintiffs must show that, but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice.” Olsen, 759 F.3d at 156. “Requested accommodations are reasonable where the cost is modest and they do not pose an undue hardship or a substantial burden on the housing provider.” Id.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling because of race, permits disparate-impact claims against private landlords, and requires the statutory burden-shifting analysis rather than a categorical exemption for Section 8 withdrawals.

Graoch Assoc 33 v. Louisville & Jefferson County · filed 2007-11-21(b)

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The Supreme Court held that Title VII, which uses similar language, “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The same analysis justifies the existence of disparate-impact liability under the FHA. “What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to [access to housing] when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.” Ibid. (discussing Title VII). Of course, not every housing practice that has a disparate impact is illegal. We use the burden-shifting framework described above – and especially the final inquiry considering the strength of the plaintiff’s statistical evidence and the strength of the defendant’s business reason – to distinguish the artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers proscribed by the FHA from valid policies and practices crafted to advance legitimate interests. Our analysis is derived from our interpretation of the statute, and we cannot create categorical exemptions from it without a statutory basis.

Section 3604(a) prohibits facially neutral housing rules or policies that have a discriminatory effect on a protected class, unless the defendant proves a bona fide legitimate justification with no less discriminatory alternative.

Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs · filed 2015-10-19(a)

In that case, we recognized that an FHA violation could be established through a showing that a facially neutral rule or policy had a discriminatory effect on a protected class. See id. at 934–35; accord Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). We further explained that the discriminatory effect of a rule could arise in “two contexts: adverse impact on a particular minority group [or] harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation.” 844 F.2d at 937. Should a plaintiff make out a “prima facie showing of discriminatory effect,” the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove “bona fide and legitimate justifications for its action with no less discriminatory alternative available.” Id. at 939.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of disability, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal of a necessary reasonable accommodation as discrimination.

Eagle Run Holdings, LLC v. ZHB of the City of Reading · filed 2023-07-06(f)(1) and (f)(3)(B)

In order to succeed, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act. ... The plaintiff must show that the facially neutral provision or action of the locality had a greater adverse impact on the disabled than on others. ... Eagle Run cited the Fair Housing Act in its appeal to the Board but presented no evidence (statistical or otherwise) that the R-1 district’s non-inclusion of group homes created a greater adverse impact on the disabled than on others also not allowed to reside in the R-1 district, such as nursing home residents or other groups of individuals who do not constitute a family. ... Here, Eagle Run failed to meet its initial burden to show that living in the R-1 district is necessary to afford its disabled residents a fair opportunity to use and enjoy housing in a residential area. ... As such, Eagle Run’s argument that the R-1 district is more desirable than the R-2 and R-3 districts, without more, did not establish necessity.

Section 3604(a) requires a plausible allegation that discriminatory conduct affected a person's access to or availability of housing.

Laney v. Thomas Ray Slaten, Jr. · filed 2017-05-01(a)

Neither does the complaint allege any sort of injury from the Hammocks defendants’ alleged discrimination other than her personal interactions with the Association. Thus, Laney did not plead enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief under the federal Fair Housing Act, and by extension, the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits housing-related permit delays caused in part by discriminatory intent even when the permits are ultimately granted.

South Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham · filed 2010-09-09(f)(1)

Discrimination under the FHA, however, includes delays in issuing permits that are caused in part by discriminatory intent, even if the permits are ultimately granted.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars discriminating in the rental of a dwelling because of a renter’s disability.

Choices in Community Living v. Michael Petkus, Jr. · filed 2013-03-21(f)(1)

The FHA makes it illegal to discriminate in the rental of a dwelling because of a renter’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). ... We analyze FHA discrimination claims using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm. ... However, defendants rebut this inference by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not showing the house to Boehm and her clients: the proposed tenancy was unlawful under the zoning code. ... Plaintiffs fail to sustain that burden.

Section 3604(c) prohibits disability-based statements about renting a dwelling when an ordinary listener would perceive a preference or limitation, while §§ 3604(f)(1) and (f)(2) prohibit making housing unavailable or imposing discriminatory rental terms because of disability.

Corey v. HUD · filed 2013-07-05(c), (f)(1), (f)(2)

Section 3604(c) of the FHA prohibits oral or written statements with respect to the rental of a dwelling that indicate a “preference, limitation, or discrimination” based on certain protected statuses, including disability. ... If an ordinary listener would believe that the statement suggests a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on a protected status, the statement is deemed discriminatory. ... by imposing more burdensome application procedures and generally discouraging the Walkers’ application, Corey “otherwise ma[de] [the property] unavailable” to the Walkers because of a disability, in violation of § 3604(f)(1), see Youritan, 370 F.Supp. at 648, and “discriminate[d] against [the Walkers] in the terms, conditions, or privileges” of a rental because of a disability, in violation of § 3604(f)(2).

Section 3604(b) prohibits race discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling and in related housing services; cumulative evidence of discriminatory failures to repair may support a prima facie pattern-or-practice claim.

United States v. Cochran · filed 2014-08-13(b)

Considering the most direct evidence of individual instances of discrimination, together and cumulatively with other instances permitting an inference of discrimination, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act. In particular, the evidence supports an inference of a pattern or practice of discrimination in the “the terms, conditions, or privileges” of rental, or interference with exercise of rights of a tenant, through withholding repair and maintenance, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) or § 3617.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the rental of a dwelling based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Spur at Williams Brice Owners Ass'n v. Lalla · filed 2015-11-18

The federal Fair Housing Act and South Carolina Fair Housing Law prohibit discrimination in the rental of a dwelling based upon a person’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. ... Here, the rental restriction is wholly unrelated to any classification protected by state and federal housing laws.

Section 3604(f)(1)-(2) bars disability discrimination in renting a dwelling or providing related services or facilities, and a claim requires an allegation that the plaintiff is disabled.

Noah v. Assor · filed 2019-03-08(f)(1)-(2)

Plaintiff also asserts in Count I that Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. Sections 3604(f)(1)-(2), which makes it unlawful to discriminate in renting a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with a dwelling, "because of a handicap." Defendant correctly argues Plaintiff's claims under Sections 3604(f)(1)-(2) should be dismissed because Plaintiff "does not allege that she is disabled."

Section 3604(f) prohibits disability-based discrimination in renting or denying a dwelling and in its rental terms, and a reasonable-accommodation claim requires a qualifying handicap, notice, necessity, reasonableness, and refusal.

White v. San Diego Sunrise Management Company · filed 2019-11-25(f)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(3)(B)

Section 3604 (f)(1) makes it unlawful to discriminate in the rental of a dwelling, or to otherwise deny a dwelling to any renter because of a handicap of: (a) the renter, (b) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling, or (c) any person associated with the renter. To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) a plaintiff must prove discrimination in the rental, or denial, of a living space attributable to the plaintiff’s handicap, the handicap of a cohabitant or potential cohabitant, or the handicap of a person associated with the plaintiff. ... Instead, Plaintiff alleges he was denied access to the rental dwelling as a form of retaliation for initiating a lawsuit against Defendants, not as a result of any handicap he or his father suffer. Accordingly, Todd White fails to state sufficient facts to state a claim under section 3604(f)(1). ... Section 3604(f)(2) makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of: (a) that person, (b) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling, or (c) any person associated with that person. ... Under 42 U.S.C § 3604(f)(3), a plaintiff must prove all of the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff or his associate is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997).

Section 3604(a)–(b) reaches a landlord’s race-based refusal to renew a lease, while conduct unrelated to the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental is outside § 3604(b).

Downs v. Red Brick Management, LLC · filed 2019-09-20(a)-(b)

Unlike Plaintiff's second cause of action related to the filing of a police report, this third cause of action falls squarely within the proscribed conduct outlined in the FHA.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in rental housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, and a claim must allege discriminatory rental practices by the defendants.

ALLEN v. JORDAN · filed 2020-01-13

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was “discriminate[d] against because of [his] race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” and that “thes[e] acts were manifested by proxies of [H]uman [R]elations.” (Docket Entry 2 at 5.) However, the Complaint alleges in a conclusory manner only that Human Relations failed to investigate “denial of housing by [Lenox] and [F]eather [S]tone [A]partments” (id. at 4). The Complaint does not, at any point, base its allegations upon any discriminatory rental practices of Defendants. (See id. at 1-7.) Therefore, the Complaint has failed to state a claim against Defendants under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits discrimination in the rental of property because of a handicap.

Pierson v. Martinelli · filed 2020-04-29(f)(1)

Under the FHA, an individual may not discriminate in the rental of property because of sex or because of a handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (handicap), § 3604(a) (sex). ... Applying the Arlington Heights factors, and assuming these allegations are all true, Ms. Pierson has alleged sufficient facts which could rise to an FHA violation based on disability.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and in related housing services based on protected characteristics.

Stroud v. Farr Rentals, LLC · filed 2020-10-13(b)

The FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f). ... Despite being previously advised of the necessity of doing so, plaintiff has failed to allege facts in support of her FHA discrimination claims. Plaintiff alleges no facts explaining the basis for her belief that she was treated differently on the basis of race, or any other impermissible basis.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in rental housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or disability, and the challenged conduct must be causally connected to a protected characteristic.

Manley v. Threeths · filed 2021-05-20(a)

Plaintiffs also assert that they were discriminated against in violation of the FHA. In particular, plaintiffs cite to three sections of the FHA: §§ 3604(a), (b), (f)(1). The FHA prohibits discrimination in rental housing or “in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b). And, the FHA makes it unlawful “to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” Id. § 3604(f)(1). The statute defines discrimination to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Plaintiffs make various complaints about the Property and Threeths. However, plaintiffs do not assert that they were prohibited from renting property or denied reasonable accommodations. Further, plaintiffs never allege facts that suggests a causal connection between the alleged incidents and plaintiffs’ race, age, religion, or disability.

Section 3604(b) bars discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling because of race, sex, or other protected characteristics, and § 3604(f) bars disability discrimination in the rental of a dwelling.

Norman v. Northwest Indiana CA · filed 2021-09-24(b), (f)

As with her first two complaints, the Plaintiff has alleged no facts connecting the collection of her unpaid rent to her race or sex and has offered no facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that her landlord or Northwest Indiana CA engaged in race or sex discrimination. ... It is illegal under the FHA to discriminate in the rental of a dwelling because of the renter’s disability. ... Because the Plaintiff has not alleged any information regarding a disability or how she was discriminated against based on a disability, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of discrimination in housing based on a disability.

Section 3604 prohibits discriminatory statements about renting a dwelling and discrimination in the availability, terms, or conditions of rental housing because of disability, and requires reasonable accommodations when necessary for equal use and enjoyment.

Watson v. Vici Community Development Corp · filed 2022-03-28(c), (f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

To prevail on a claim under section 3604(c), a plaintiff must present evidence that: (1) the defendant made a statement; (2) the statement was made with respect to the rental of a dwelling; and (3) the statement indicated a preference, limitation, or discrimination based upon handicap. ... The court concludes that the evidence proffered by Watson and existing in the record is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants made her dwelling unavailable or subjected her to different terms and conditions of the rental of that dwelling because of Watson’s handicap. ... To prevail on a claim under section 3604(f)(3)(B), Watson must prove that: (1) she is handicapped under the FHA; (2) the defendants knew or should have known of the claimed handicap; (3) the accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendants refused to make such accommodation. ... The court therefore concludes that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the section 3604(f)(3)(B) claim.

Section 3604(b) bars race-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling and in related housing services or facilities.

Estate of DaMon R. Fisher v. City of Annapolis · filed 2022-03-30(b)

As in White, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 539-40, the racially disproportionate impact is an important starting point supported by historical background pointing to discriminatory intent. Fisher has satisfactorily alleged that HACA denied or limited the services or facilities provided to him (including failing to properly maintain, inspect, and license his and other units), a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). HACA’s motion to dismiss Fisher’s FHA claim will be denied.

Section 3604(a) prohibits sex discrimination in the rental of housing, including adverse conduct that amounts to a constructive eviction.

United States v. Salazar · filed 2024-08-19(a)

The FHA prohibits discrimination based on sex in the sale or rental of housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... The Undersigned finds Defendants Salazar Jr. and Salazar Sr.’s failure to address the gas leak, amounted to a constructive eviction of McGinnis and retaliation under the FHA. See United States v. Morgan, No. CV 407-125, 2010 WL 11537561, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding adverse actions against female tenants when they refused sexual propositions could rise to the level of an eviction or constructive eviction and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)).

Section 3604(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to allege that the adverse housing action was taken because of disability and to state the supporting facts; allegations that disabled renters were denied the opportunity to tour and rent while nondisabled renters were allowed to do so plausibly satisfy that requirement.

Grossman · filed 2026-02-09(f)(1)

Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that entry of default judgment is warranted as to Counts V and X. ... She finds that under both 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 760.23(7), a plaintiff must allege at least “that [] adverse action was taken because of a disability and state the facts on which the plaintiff relies to support that claim.” ... Magistrate Judge Elfenbein notes that Plaintiff has alleged both that the subject property was toured by and rented to renters who were not disabled, and that Defendants “refused Plaintiff the ability to tour and rent the Property because of her disability.” ... Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to plausibly state that Defendants’ adverse actions were taken because of Plaintiff’s disability. ... The Court finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s reasoning as to Counts V and X. Therefore, the Court enters default judgment against Defendants as to Counts V and X.

Sections 3604(f)(1) and 3604(b) prohibit disability- and familial-status-based discrimination in rental housing, which requires treating an individual worse than similarly situated people.

Vanessa R. Williams, et al. v. Crystal Springs Apartments LLC · filed 2026-03-30(f)(1), (b)

The FHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate” in the rental of apartments based on disability or familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Plaintiffs have not alleged any instances of “discrimination.” The term “discriminate” means to treat an individual “worse than others who are similarly situated.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 657 (2020) (Title VII); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We apply Title VII discrimination analysis in examining [FHA] discrimination claims.”). For their FHA claims alleging disability or familial status discrimination, plaintiffs have not identified any other similarly-situated individuals who were treated better. For example, if non-disabled individuals were provided apartments that did not have cockroaches, plaintiffs might have some basis for a discrimination claim. But plaintiffs have already alleged defendants had “systemic knowledge of property-wide infestation conditions.” (Doc. 8 at 12.) In other words, plaintiffs have alleged that all units at Crystal Springs were infested with cockroaches, so they were not treated differently than anyone else. These discrimination claims fail.

A landlord’s reference to a tenant’s disability during a rent payment dispute, considered with evidence of personal conflict and a later cash payment option, may be insufficient to show a likely violation of § 3604.

Stemmons v. Corsco · filed 2022-02-04(f)(1)

On the whole, however, the record reflects the development of an acrimonious relationship between plaintiff and defendant, driven by a variety of mutual frustrations. ... On the basis of this limited record, and in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff has not demonstrated that “‘he is likely to succeed at trial’” on his FHA claim.

Section 3604(a) requires allegations that the defendant made a dwelling unavailable because of a protected characteristic.

Namin · filed 2025-10-17(a)

Plaintiff has not alleged Defendant made the rental property unavailable to him because of his “race, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination in the rental application process; receiving AFDC benefits does not by itself disqualify a family from applying.

Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corporation · filed 1997-03-05(a)

For example, the FHA prohibits discrimination in the application process itself, and the Gilligans were denied the opportunity to inspect, or even inquire about, a rental at Verdugo Gardens. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The Gilligans' status as AFDC recipients should not render them unqualified to apply, even though a review of their application might reveal that they are unqualified to rent.

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.

City of Fort Lauderdale v. Scott · filed 2011-02-28(a)

Count XI attempts to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). This subsection makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.... ” The Counterclaim merely alleges that the City violated this provision “due to the disproportionately adverse impact of their actions on the African Americans in the Northwest section.” ¶ 100. Although Counter-Plaintiffs reallege ¶¶ 45-65 within Count XI, the Court concludes that Counter-Plaintiffs have failed to make non-conclusory allegations as to how the City’s actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

Willis v. NG · filed 2024-10-17(a)

The Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits the refusal to sell or rent “a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “unequal treatment on the basis of race that affects the availability of housing.” Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty. Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff can establish a violation by proving intentional discrimination, discriminatory impact, or a refusal to make a reasonable accommodation.

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling based on the statute’s delineated protected characteristics.

Pickard · filed 2026-03-10(a)

The Fair Housing Act proscribes specific actions taken based on certain characteristics such as race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. For instance, the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling based on delineated characteristics. Id. § 3604(a). It also prohibits discriminating against a person in “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” based on the delineated characteristics. Id. § 3604(b). The Fair Housing Act also prohibits certain advertisements and representations about housing availability. Id. §§ 3604(c)–(d). But Mr. Pickard’s conclusory statements do not allege that the SPM Defendants did any of that prohibited conduct. See Doc. 24 at 36–39.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making housing unavailable because of race, including through indefinite racial quotas that restrict minority access to otherwise available rentals.

United States v. Starrett City Associates, Starrett City, Inc., Delmar Management Company · filed 1988-03-01(a)

Even if Starrett were a state actor with such a duty, the racial quotas and related practices employed at Starrett City to maintain integration violate the antidiscrimination provisions of the Act.

Section 3604(b) does not apply to a homeless shelter that is not a “dwelling” under the FHA.

Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries · filed 2010-05-12(b)

Accordingly, the Court holds that the homeless shelter is not a “dwelling” subject to the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not apply to the denial of a business trust account when the claim contains no allegations concerning a dwelling or its use or enjoyment.

CLARK v. PNC BANK · filed 2025-06-17(f)(3)(B)

Clark’s civil action concerns the purported denial of a business trust account and contains no factual or legal allegations related to a dwelling or the use or enjoyment of such. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(a) prohibits discriminatory refusal to sell or otherwise make unavailable a dwelling, so it does not cover a commercial property that is not a dwelling.

Hatch v. Barrett · filed 2021-09-13(a)

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). ... These are commercial—not residential—uses. ... The Property is not a dwelling for purposes of the FHA.

Section 3604's FHA protections apply only to dwellings, so a vehicle is not covered merely because the plaintiff claims it is a residence.

D'ERRICO · filed 2026-05-01

Fourth, given that D’Errico’s dogs were seized from his vehicle in a Walmart parking lot, he has failed to state a claim under the FHA notwithstanding his incorrect assertion that his vehicle constituted a dwelling. See Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The FHA applies only to ‘dwellings.’ 42 U.S.C. § 3604.”); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (“‘Dwelling’ means any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as a residence by one or more families . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B)’s reasonable accommodation requirement does not apply to a storage warehouse that is not a dwelling.

Kulin v. Deschutes County · filed 2012-05-31(f)(3)(B)

Given the ordinary meaning of the term “residence” adopted in Hughes, I find that the application of the FHAA does not apply to Kulin’s storage warehouse as it is not his temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation. As such, the FHAA does not apply to the issues involved in this matter, and, therefore, Kulin’s FHAA claim is dismissed.

Section 3604(b) applies to discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling.

McGee v. Poverello House · filed 2021-08-13(b)

Naomi’s House Is Not A “Dwelling” Under The FHA. ... Specifically, the FHA prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of . . . sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604 applies to dwellings, not commercial spaces.

EL v. PEOPLE'S EMERGENCY CENTER · filed 2020-02-06

The Fair Housing Act applies only to “dwelling[s],” not to commercial spaces.76 Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s claims under the Fair Housing Act relating to the LAVA space will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits housing discrimination because of handicap, including a refusal to make a necessary reasonable accommodation under the FHA.

Overlook Mutual Homes, Inc. v. Spencer · filed 2011-01-31(f)(2)

As amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, the FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Such discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... But given that the law regarding companion animals was somewhat unclear at the time that Overlook sought a declaratory judgment, and given that the Spencers had the benefit of their pet’s company while awaiting the outcome of the litigation, Overlook’s failure to engage in a more constructive dialogue with the Spencers did not constitute a denial of their request for an accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to grant a reasonable accommodation when the requester has supplied enough reliable information to show entitlement, and treating the request as constructively denied through excessive information demands and delay violates the statute.

Sabal Palm Condominiums of Pine Island Ridge Ass'n v. Fischer · filed 2014-03-19(f)(3)(B)

When a requestor has provided enough information such that the only reasonable decision is to grant the request, a housing provider violates § 3604(f)(3)(B) by refusing to grant the request, demanding more information, and suing, even if the housing provider allows the requestor to temporarily keep the service animal while the lawsuit is pending.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) treats undue delay in responding to a reasonable-modification request as potentially constituting a failure to permit the modification, or constructive denial.

Johnson v. Jennings · filed 2019-05-21(f)(3)(A)

“Discrimination” includes the “refusal to permit . . . reasonable modifications of existing premises . . . if such modifications may be necessary to afford . . . full enjoyment of the premises.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(A). ... This action, to be sure, is a reasonable-modification claim, not, as was the case in Bhogaita, a reasonable-accommodation claim. Fortunately, the same agencies published a joint statement on reasonable modification, too, and the meaning of “denial” is essentially the same. A housing provider must give “prompt responses to a reasonable modification request.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Reasonable Modifications Under the Fair Housing Act 10 (March 5, 2008). And “undue delay in responding to a reasonable modification request may be deemed a failure to permit a reasonable modification.” Id.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats an indeterminate delay in responding to a reasonable accommodation request as a denial.

Baptist Homes, Inc. v. City of Madison · filed 2026-05-11(f)(3)(B)

An “indeterminate delay” in responding to a request for reasonable accommodations qualifies as a denial. ... So the City’s 61-day silence on Baptist Homes’s accommodation request qualifies as an indeterminate delay.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars handicap-based discrimination in renting or denying a dwelling, while § 3604(c) bars rental-related statements indicating a handicap-based preference, limitation, or discrimination.

Matarese v. ARCHSTONE PENTAGON CITY · filed 2011-05-31(f)(1), (c)

The Court holds that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of Ms. Matarese’s handicap in violation of FHA § 3604(f)(1) and VFHL section 36-96.3(A)(8) when they refused to renew Plaintiffs’ lease, converted the lease to a month-to-month tenancy, and refused to rent to Plaintiffs at other Archstone locations. ... Under FHA § 3604(f)(1), it is unlawful to discriminate in the rental, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a renter because of a handicap of the renter, or a person residing in the dwelling after it is rented. ... To make out a prima facie case under this provision, plaintiff must show that he or she is a member of a statutorily protected class, that defendants were aware of plaintiffs protected status, that plaintiff was willing and qualified to rent housing, and that plaintiff was rejected. ... The Court holds that Plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants McGregor and Mann made discriminatory statements in connection with the rental of Plaintiffs’ apartment in violation of FHA § 3604(c) and VFHL section 36-96.3(A)(3). Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it unlawful to make a statement with respect to the rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on handicap.

Sections 3604(a) and (b) reach facially neutral housing policies that have a disparate impact based on familial status, while § 3604(c) prohibits statements that an ordinary reader or listener would understand as indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on familial status.

Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Property Management Services, Inc. · filed 2011-06-23(a), (b), and (c)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful to refuse to rent housing to any person because of their familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). A disparate impact analysis under the FHA examines whether a facially neutral policy has a differential impact or effect on a particular group. ... To prevail on a disparate impact claim under the FHA, plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case by showing that the challenged policy has a discriminatory effect, in that it actually or predictably results in discrimination. ... Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that its actions furthered “a legitimate, bona fide ... interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect.” ... After the defendant presents a legitimate justification, the court must weigh the defendant’s justification against the degree of adverse effect shown by the plaintiff. ... The FHA prohibits the making of any statement “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... familial status ... or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). A statement is prohibited if it suggests to an ordinary reader or an ordinary listener that a particular protected group is favored or disfavored. ... A statement that is not facially discriminatory may nonetheless constitute a violation if the context suggests an impermissible preference. ... Although a lack of discriminatory intent does not provide an affirmative defense, a factfinder may examine intent to determine “the manner in which a statement was made and the way an ordinary listener would have interpreted it.”

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a protected characteristic and permits disparate-impact claims subject to a robust causal showing.

Burbank Apartments Tenant Association v. Kargman · filed 2016-04-13(a)

The fair housing statutes make it unlawful to "make unavailable or deny[] a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin," and bar discrimination "against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of . . . rental of a dwelling . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(b). See G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (6), (7), and (11). Based on the Supreme Court's pleading requirements, the plaintiffs must meet a "robust causality requirement" in order to show that a policy by the defendants created a disproportionately negative statistical discrepancy in available housing for members of a protected class. See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(b); G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (6), (7), and (11). The plaintiffs have failed to satisfy such pleading requirements.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent housing because of familial status and permits disparate-impact claims when a neutral policy disproportionately harms a protected class without sufficient justification.

FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF CENTRAL INDIANA, INC. v. M&J MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a THE SEXTON COMPANIES · filed 2024-08-19(a)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful to refuse to rent housing to any person because of their familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... To prevail on a disparate impact claim under the FHA, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and show that "the defendant's practices have a disproportionately adverse effect on the protected class and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale." ... Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests. ... To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must first identify an outwardly neutral policy and compare how that policy affects a protected class compared with others. ... This case is different. Here, Plaintiff identifies a direct connection between Defendants' occupancy restriction and its disproportionate exclusion of families with children, establishing the required robust causality.

The FHA's services provision covers only services of the kind usually provided by governmental units, and that meaning applies to § 3604(f)(2); homeless-shelter intake services are not covered services.

A Society Without a Name v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2011-08-24(b), (f)(2)

Although Jersey Heights dealt with the meaning of "services" in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), the term has the same meaning in § 3604(f)(2) because the relevant language is materially the same. ... Intake services to sign up for a homeless shelter are simply not within the type of services covered by the FHA because they are unlike "services generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection." ... Because the intake services in question do not fall within the ambit of the FHA, ASWAN’s FHA claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations and, more fundamentally, they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars making housing unavailable because of handicap, and § 3604(f)(2) bars disability discrimination in rental terms; a plaintiff must plausibly allege that they met the landlord’s objective rental requirements.

Johnson v. Levy · filed 2011-09-19(f)(1), (f)(2)

The FHA makes it illegal to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap”, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), and “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling .... because of a handicap”, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under section 3604(f), a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he sought and was qualified to rent or purchase the housing; (3) he was rejected, and (4) the housing opportunity remained available to other renters or purchasers.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not categorically prohibit landlords from rejecting disabled applicants because of criminal convictions.

Evans v. UDR, INC. · filed 2009-03-24(f)(3)(B)

As an initial matter, as the magistrate judge correctly noted, the FHA does not prohibit landlords from denying a disabled person’s rental application based on his criminal record.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a buyer or renter because of handicap, and a boarding-school dormitory can qualify as a dwelling because it is occupied as a residence by individuals.

Franchi v. New Hampton School · filed 2009-09-18(f)(1)

The FHA defines “dwelling” as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b). At first blush, this definition would appear to exclude school dormitories, which ordinarily do not house “families,” but the FHA instructs that “ ‘[fjamily’ includes a single individual.’ ” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(c). Because a boarding school dormitory is occupied as a residence by one or more individuals, then, it fits the statutory definition of dwelling.

Section 3604 does not regulate discrimination in selecting a roommate for a shared living unit because that arrangement is outside the statute's coverage of a “dwelling.”

Fair Housing Council v. Roommate. Com, LLC · filed 2012-02-02(b)

Because the construction of “dwelling” to include shared living units raises substantial constitutional concerns, we adopt the narrower construction that excludes roommate selection from the reach of the FHA.

Section 3604(f) requires intentional discrimination, but a plaintiff need not show malice, ill will, or that discriminatory animus was the defendant’s sole motive.

O'Neal Ex Rel. Boyd v. Alabama Department of Public Health · filed 1993-06-22(f)

In order to prove a violation of the Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s discrimination was intentional. This is not usually a heavy burden, as it is not necessary to show that the defendant acted out of malice or ill will or even that the defendant was solely motivated by a proscribed animus—it is sufficient to show that the discrimination was meant to occur and that it occurred.

For a disparate-treatment claim under § 3604(a), the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s challenged action arose from a discriminatory motive.

Haber v. ASN 50th St. LLC · filed 2012-03-07(a)

Because §§ 3604 and 3617 prohibit a wide range of conduct, courts in this Circuit have articulated the elements of a prima facie showing in differing ways depending on the conduct at issue. ... But regardless of how the prima facie standard is articulated, the plaintiff is required to show that defendants’ action against him arose from a discriminatory motive. In this case, Haber cannot present facts that could be reasonably viewed to demonstrate that any of Defendants’ actions arose out of such a motive. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Haber’s FHA claims.

Under §§ 3604(a) and (b), a disparate-treatment housing claim requires proof that the defendant’s challenged action was motivated by race.

Thomas v. Venditto · filed 2023-09-29(a) (b)

“Because §§ 3604 and 3617 prohibit a wide range of conduct, courts in this Circuit have articulated the elements of a prima facie showing in differing ways depending on the conduct at issue. But regardless of how the prima facie standard is articulated, [Plaintiffs are] required to show that defendants’ action against [them] arose from a discriminatory motive.”

Section 3604 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant discriminated against her because of a protected status.

Carey v. Torres · filed 2024-12-20

However, she has not alleged she is a member of a protected class under the FHA or that Defendants discriminated against her based on her protected status.

Section 3604(b) requires a claimant to show that the challenged conduct was based on race, national origin, or sex.

Baker v. Waterford Sq Homeown · filed 2003-01-07(b)

Because the district court’s finding that defendants’ conduct was not based on race, national origin, or sex was not clearly erroneous, these claims fail.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a tenant claiming a failure to accommodate to show that the tenant requested a reasonable accommodation and that the landlord refused it.

Meadowland Apartments v. Schumacher · filed 2012-04-25(f)(3)(B)

To establish a cause of action for failure to accommodate under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must show that “(1) [she] is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the [Fair Housing Act], (2) [she] requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) such accommodation was necessary to afford [her] an opportunity to use and enjoy [her] dwelling, and (4) the defendant[] refused to make the requested accommodation.” ... In this case, Schumacher has failed to show that she “requested a reasonable accommodation,” or that Meadowland “refused to make the requested accommodation.”

A reasonable accommodation claim is unripe when an applicant has not supplied information reasonably requested by the local authority that is relevant to whether the accommodation is necessary.

Caron Foundation of Florida, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach · filed 2012-05-04(f)(3)(B)

Because Caron could have provided the information the City requested, and at least some of that information was relevant to reasonable necessity, Caron’s reasonable accommodation claim is unripe at this time.

Section 3604(b) does not reach disparate-impact claims based solely on a facially neutral price that applies regardless of race or handicap.

Julia B. Williams, and Fred Mouzon Cheryl Mouzon v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corporation Carlyle House Unit Owners'… · filed 1996-12-03(b)

Therefore, we hold that when the alleged injury to a claimant is solely the product of a facially neutral price (e.g., a price that does not vary depending on one's race, handicap, or other status protected by the Fair Housing Act), no claim based on disparate impact can be brought under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing; a claim requires facts supporting housing discrimination, not generalized assertions about banks.

Powell v. American General Finance, Inc. · filed 2004-03-22

The FHA prohibits discrimination against protected classes in any transactions involving the sale or rental of housing. ... She did not allege how Defendants treated her differently from white applicants, nor has she offered any specific examples of discriminatory policies. Her generalized statement that banks discriminated against African-Americans from the 1900s onward is not sufficient to support a claim under the FHA.

Section 3604(a) and (b) claims may proceed under disparate-treatment or disparate-impact theories, but conclusory allegations lacking facts showing discriminatory intent or the elements of disparate impact fail at the pleading stage.

DUNNIVAN v. MITCHELL · filed 2022-08-29(a), (b)

Moreover, Plaintiff does not plead any facts as to the discriminatory intent of any of the Defendants. In the absence of any allegations regarding the Defendants' intent, Plaintiff still might pursue a disparate impact claim, but she has not pleaded any facts relevant to the five elements required of such a theory, let alone pleaded enough facts to establish a prima facie case. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1). Accordingly, any discrimination claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 3604 housing discrimination claims require factual allegations sufficient to support the claim.

Hafer v. Unknown · filed 2020-12-28

If plaintiff is seeking a raise a claim for housing discrimination, plaintiff fails to provide enough factual details to support it.

Section 3604(b) requires facts that plausibly show housing discrimination, but a complaint need not plead a prima facie case.

Dogbe v. The Lakes at Lemmon Valley, LLC · filed 2024-12-02(b)

While Plaintiffs need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas’ burden shifting analysis, they must include facts sufficient to plausibly assert a claim for relief under section 3604(b) to satisfy Iqbal and Twombly.

A § 3604 housing discrimination complaint need not plead every element of a prima facie case when its allegations give defendants fair notice of the claim and its grounds.

Lindsay v. Yates · filed 2007-08-15

A fair reading of the Lindsays’ complaint shows that they have pleaded claims for which relief may be granted. The Lindsays have alleged the statutory bases for their claims (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 3604) and have set forth the factual predicate of those claims. ... Because these allegations are sufficient to apprise the Defendants of the Lindsays’ claims and the grounds upon which they rest, the Lindsays have satisfied their pleading burden.

Section 3604(f)(1)(A) prohibits a landlord from terminating a lease or refusing to rent to disabled persons only for properties owned, operated, or financed by the federal government.

Fowler v. Incor · filed 2008-05-12(f)(1)(A)

The error was compounded by relying on 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A) for the conclusion that a landlord could not terminate the lease and/or refuse to rent to disabled persons. The statute, however, applies only to properties owned, operated, or financed by the federal government. See id. § 3603(a)(1)(A)-(D).

Section 3604 requires familial-status or disability discrimination to affect housing availability; in disability cases, refusing reasonable accommodations necessary for equal use and enjoyment can make housing unavailable.

Petty v. Portofino Council of Coowners, Inc. · filed 2010-03-12(a)-(c), (f)(1)-(2), (f)(3)(B)

To survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs’ familial status claims must allege that Defendant’s actions affected the availability of housing. ... Therefore, this Court will not grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss §§ 3604(a)-(c), and 3617 on the basis of a failure to plead discrimination affecting the availability of housing. ... Defendant argues that just like §§ 3604(a)-(b), to claim disability discrimination under § 3604(f), Plaintiffs must show that the discrimination affected the availability of their housing. (D.E. 16, p. 6.) This Court agrees. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs state a claim of disability discrimination affecting the availability of housing.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discrimination that makes a dwelling unavailable because of listed protected characteristics and generally applies to housing providers, including municipal service providers, rather than to habitability conditions.

Kingman Park Civic Association v. Gray · filed 2013-08-26(a)

The Defendant logically assumes that the Plaintiff intends to raise a claim under section 804 of the Fair Housing Act, which makes it unlawful to, among other things, “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). This provision “reach[es] only discrimination that adversely affects the availability of housing,” not habitability. Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Moreover, this section generally applies only to the “providers of housing, such as owners and landlords, and [] municipal service providers.” Id.

Section 3604(a) protects the availability of housing, including against actions that make housing unavailable because of a protected characteristic.

S&R Dev. Estates, LLC v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2018-08-29(a)

The FHA's text reveals that the availability of housing is central to § 3604(a) claims.

Sections 3604(a) and (d) prohibit, respectively, making or denying a dwelling because of a protected characteristic and falsely representing that an available dwelling is unavailable; FHA discrimination claims may proceed under disparate-treatment, disparate-impact, and hostile-environment theories.

West v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2022-05-17(d), (a)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of related services or facilities, based upon someone’s “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603–04. Specifically, section 3604(d) makes it unlawful to “represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d). Courts “apply Title VII discrimination analysis in examining [FHA] discrimination claims.” Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997). “Thus, a plaintiff can establish an FHA discrimination claim under a theory of disparate treatment, or disparate impact.” Id. at 304–05 (citation omitted). ... Plaintiff correctly points out that under the FHA, it is unlawful not only to make a rental or a sale but to “otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race or sex.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of constant slurs and harassing language coupled with ECS’s failure to hear or address Plaintiff’s concerns are stated enough to state a hostile housing environment claim under the FHA. Thus, the Court DENIES ECS’s motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s FHA hostile environment claim.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of disability, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Wallace v. Carefree Shadowwood LLC · filed 2023-04-12(f)(1) and (f)(3)(B)

Although Shadowwood has required tenants to remove dogs in the past, Mr. Wallace has plausibly alleged that Shadowwood made housing unavailable to him because of his disability. ... Here, Mr. Wallace has plausibly alleged that he was seeking a reasonable accommodation to Shadowwood’s practice of requiring a dog leave the community after an altercation in light of Mr. Wallace’s “disability related need to reside with Zena for emotional support.” ... Thus, at this stage, Mr. Wallace has sufficiently alleged that his request to keep Zena at his home under certain conditions was a reasonable accommodation, which Shadowwood denied.

Section 3604(a) protects a dwelling's availability, while § 3604(b) broadly covers pre- and post-acquisition discrimination in housing terms, conditions, privileges, and connected services, including homeowners-insurance claims processing.

Huskey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company · filed 2023-09-11(a) and (b)

Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.” ... Since neither Plaintiff has adequately alleged that State Farm made their homes “unavailable,” they cannot proceed under § 3604(a). ... Section 3604(b) prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race.” ... Since lenders require borrowers to obtain homeowners insurance, it is a “service” that insurers provide “in connection” with the sale of a dwelling. ... Contrary to State Farm’s contention, homeowners insurance neither ceases to be a “service” nor loses its connection to the sale of a dwelling once the insured moves into their new home. ... Accordingly, the text of § 3604(b) does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ claim.

Section 3604(d) prohibits falsely representing that a dwelling is unavailable when it is available, and a plaintiff need not submit an application when the misrepresentation prevented the application.

Watkins v. Property Management Service Incorporated · filed 2024-02-16(d)

But FHA also prohibits “represent[ing] . . . that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” Id. § 3604(d). In this situation, which was alleged in Asbury and is asserted here, the person is prevented from making an application, and the actual submission of an application is not required.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discriminatory denial or unavailability of housing and requires the discrimination to affect housing availability, not merely the habitability of an occupied dwelling.

Anderson v. Sunridge Management Group, Inc. · filed 2024-03-19(a)

At the outset, Anderson and Edwards’ claims under § 3604 fail because they relate to the habitability of their apartment rather than the availability of housing. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741–47 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that §§ 3604(a)–(b) require a showing that discrimination affected housing availability).

Section 3604(a) and (b) do not cover complaints about housing conditions that affect habitability without making housing unavailable.

Pelot v. Criterion 3, LLC · filed 2016-01-04(a), (b)

Plaintiffs protests relate to habitability, not to availability. His complaints to Criterion would not give rise to a cognizable claim under clear Fifth Circuit authority.

Section 3604(a) and (b) do not cover a citywide property tax scheme where the plaintiffs allege no denial or unavailability of housing and the defendants are not involved in rental terms or related services.

Robinson v. City of New York · filed 2016-10-27(a), (b)

Moreover, there is no allegation that plaintiffs have had housing denied or been made “unavailable” to them as a result of the tax scheme (42 USC § 3604 [a]), and defendants are not involved in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” (42 USC § 3604 [b]; Housing Justice Campaign v Koch, 164 AD2d 656, 672-673 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 858 [1991]).

Section 3604(a) does not cover municipal action that makes an area less desirable for religious practice without making housing harder to obtain or regulating housing or activities within the home.

Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc. v. The Borough Of Tenafly · filed 2002-10-24(a)

We believe that expanding § 3604(a) as the plaintiffs suggest is unwarranted, as it would "create an FHA claim in every circumstance where a religious group is denied a request to use municipal property to make an area more appealing for the private practice of their religion," even if the municipal action has nothing to do with housing.

Section 3604(a) requires a close connection between the challenged action and housing availability, and § 3604(b) covers services specifically connected to housing; industrial air permits with only indirect housing effects fall outside both provisions.

South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2003-04-16(a)-(b)

A survey of the case law in this area reveals that, in order to have a cognizable claim under § 3604(a), plaintiffs must establish a far closer nexus between housing availability and the challenged action. ... Although the NJDEP clearly provides a number of valuable services to the citizens of the State of New Jersey by enacting regulations and overseeing their implementation, it does not follow that it provides specific residential services. ... The SCCIA Plaintiffs, therefore, have failed to state a cognizable claim under § 3604(b).

Section 3604(a) covers discriminatory conduct that directly affects access to housing.

Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass'n · filed 2003-08-08(a)

Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court limits Section 3604(a) to conduct that directly impacts the accessibility to housing because of a protected classification.

Section 3604(a) can cover denial of utilities when it makes a dwelling unavailable; reduced habitability alone does not establish that the dwelling was unavailable.

Cooke v. Town of Colorado City · filed 2013-02-13(a)

Plaintiffs are correct that there are certainly circumstances where the denial of the provision of services, such as water and utility services, could make the dwelling unavailable within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 3604(a) and Arizona Revised Statutes section 41-1491.14(A). ... Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the Academy Avenue Property was unavailable to them within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 3604(a) and Arizona Revised Statutes section 41-1491.14(A), Defendant Colorado City and the Hildale Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) claim in Count Four of Plaintiffs’ Complaint and on Count Seven of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits handicap discrimination in providing services connected with a dwelling, § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to provide equal housing opportunity, and § 3604(c) reaches discriminatory notices only when they concern the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Hayden Lake Recreational Water & Sewer District v. Haydenview Cottage, LLC · filed 2011-12-20(f)(2), (f)(3)(B), (c)

The FHA makes it illegal to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” ... The Court finds that neither party is entitled to summary judgment on this issue due to the existence of disputed material facts. ... Unlike 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2), which expressly prohibits discrimination “in the provision of services” in connection with a dwelling based on handicap, § 3604(c) only prohibits notices, statements, or advertisements “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... handicap.” Based upon the plain language of the statute, the Court finds that the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

Section 3604(f)(3) requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the disability and refused a reasonable accommodation, while § 3604(c) prohibits housing statements that an ordinary reader would understand as indicating a preference for or against a protected group.

MCCLENDON V. PETER BRESLER · filed 2022-12-27(f)(3), (c)

To prevail on a reasonable accommodation claim under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3), a plaintiff must prove: (1) the plaintiff or his associate has a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to have known of the disability; (3) an accommodation may be necessary to afford the disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) the requested accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation. ... It is unlawful to “make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955(c). A statement violates § 3604(c) if an ordinary reader would interpret the statement as indicating a preference for or against a protected group.

Section 3604(f)(2)'s reference to “services” does not encompass mortgage servicing originated by another party.

Adler v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. · filed 2012-06-28(f)(2)

In sum, Adler does not provide any legal authority supporting his contention that servicing a mortgage originated by another party is a “service” under § 3604(f)(2). Adler would nevertheless have me conclude that the term includes this activity. Absent supporting authority, and in light of the law militating against that conclusion, I decline. Adler therefore fails to state a claim under § 3604(f)(2). Accordingly, I grant this portion of American’s second motion.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination because of handicap in providing services or facilities connected with a dwelling, and a policy restricting a facility may violate that protection when it denies equal use and enjoyment.

Kirsten v. Cape Royale at Ski Harbor Condominium Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2022-10-12(f)(2)

The FHA prohibits discriminating “against any person…in the provision of services or facilities in connection with [a dwelling], because of a handicap of…that person.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f)(2). ... While Defendant’s policy preventing drop-down boat covers does not render Plaintiff’s boat well entirely unavailable, Plaintiff’s complaint and the FHA language go further. ... Policy prohibiting use of drop-down boat covers on the awning above the boat well is the nexus between the boat well (the alleged facility in connection with the dwelling) and Plaintiff’s drop-down cover. Strict enforcement of such policy may affect Defendant’s provision of a facility in connection with a dwelling. ... For purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts vis-à-vis Defendant’s specific objections to demonstrate relief may be available under the FHA.

Section 3604 protects against housing discrimination based on membership in a protected class; an allegation that housing was denied for another reason does not state a claim.

MURRAY · filed 2025-11-24

Murray does not allege that he was discriminated against because he was a member of a protected class. This is fatal to any FHA claim, including any FHA retaliation claim.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits disability discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling and requires a claimant to show that he was qualified to purchase the housing to establish a prima facie claim.

Petrello v. Prucka · filed 2012-08-02(f)(1)

To assert a prima facie claim of housing discrimination under this section of the FHA, a plaintiff must prove that he (or a family member) is a member of a protected class; he applied for and was “qualified to purchase” the housing; he was rejected; and the housing remained available to other similarly situated purchasers thereafter.

Section 3604 discrimination claims require factual allegations showing that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class and that each defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.

Karim-Panahi v. 4000 Mass. Apartments · filed 2018-03-27

To state a discrimination claim under federal law, Plaintiff must "plead" facts establishing that he belongs to a protected class and that each "defendant acted with discriminatory purpose," which "requires more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences."

Section 3604(a) prohibits private housing-market actors from refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race or national origin; a prima facie case requires a qualified protected-class applicant, rejection, and a housing opportunity that remained available, and discriminatory effect suffices without proof of intent.

De La Fuente v. The Sherry Netherland, Inc. · filed 2019-07-30(a)

The FHA, enacted as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, makes it unlawful for private actors in the housing market to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... Under Robinson, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by proving that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he applied for and was qualified to purchase the housing at issue, (3) he was rejected, and (4) the housing opportunity remained available. ... No more need be shown: “the Robinson standard requires proof of discriminatory effect only, not proof of discriminatory intent.” ... See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (making it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of .. . national origin”). ... In recognizing that these facts make out a prima facie case, the Court emphasizes that this determination—which requires only the limited showings above, i.e., that a qualified protected- class applicant was denied a housing opportunity that thereafter remained open—does not, and should not be taken to, connote that there is affirmative evidence of discriminatory intent here on any defendant’s part.

Section 3604(a) requires an intentional-discrimination claimant to allege protected-class membership, a denied or unavailable dwelling or refused sale or rental negotiations after a bona fide offer, and that protected status motivated the challenged conduct.

Goodwin v. City Attorney's Office · filed 2023-08-03(a)

Among other things, the Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). To state a claim for discrimination under § 3604(a), a party must allege that (1) they are a member of protected class; (2) they were denied the sale or rent of a dwelling after making a bona fide offer, was refused negotiations concerning the sale or rental of a dwelling, or that a dwelling was otherwise made unavailable or denied to plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff’s protected class was a motivating factor for the discriminatory conduct.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, refusing to negotiate, or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of a protected characteristic; an intentional-discrimination claim requires protected-class membership, a qualifying denial or refusal, and the protected characteristic as a motivating factor.

Goodwin v. City Attorney's Office · filed 2023-09-12(a)

Among other things, the Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). To state a claim for discrimination under § 3604(a), a party must allege that (1) they are a member of protected class; (2) they were denied the sale or rent of a dwelling after making a bona fide offer, was refused negotiations concerning the sale or rental of a dwelling, or that a dwelling was otherwise made unavailable or denied to plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff’s protected class was a motivating factor for the discriminatory conduct.

Section 3604(a) requires a prima facie showing of discriminatory denial in the inspection, negotiation, or rental of a dwelling, while § 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in rental terms or services and requires similarly situated renters to have been treated differently because of race.

Blackburn v. Webb · filed 2023-09-12(a), (b)

Plaintiffs must show four elements to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination relating to the inspection of, negotiation for, or rental of a dwelling under section 3604(a) of the FHA. ... They must show (1) they are members of a protected class, (2) they were qualified to rent the property, (3) they were denied the opportunity to rent or negotiate for rental of the property, and (4) the housing opportunity remained available following their denial. ... Additionally, they must show Defendants had a “discriminatory intent” behind their actions. ... A discriminatory intent exists if race was a factor in the decision to no longer rent the property to Plaintiffs; however, race need not be the dominant or sole factor. ... Thus, Plaintiffs have not pled a prima facie case of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the FHA. ... Section 3604(b) makes discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” unlawful. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... To support a claim of disparate treatment under the FHA, Plaintiffs must show they were “similarly situated” to other renters and were treated differently on account of their race. ... Without any facts showing the neighbors’ circumstances were similar and their treatment was different, Plaintiffs do not nudge their claim across the line from conceivable to plausible. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not properly state a claim under § 3604(b) of the FHA.

Section 3604 permits a housing-discrimination claim based on allegations that a qualified applicant was denied an apartment because of protected characteristics, including race, sex, or disability-related status.

Gibson v. 526 W. 158th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. · filed 2023-11-14

The motion court correctly determined that plaintiff's second amended complaint adequately pleaded a claim for housing discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act (42 USC § 3604 et seq .), and the New York State and City Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 et seq .; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[5]) by alleging that she is a member of a protected class as an African-American woman who has a son with autism, she was qualified to purchase the apartment, HDFC nevertheless denied her application, and the circumstances surrounding that denial give rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Sayeh v 66 Madison Ave. Apt. Corp. , 73 AD3d 459, 461 [1st Dept 2010]).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or otherwise making housing unavailable because of race, and a housing-discrimination plaintiff may establish a prima facie case through additional evidence of discriminatory intent even without proving that the property remained available.

Lindsay v. Yates · filed 2009-08-21(a)

Specifically, we have held that a prima facie case arises when: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) he or she applied for and was qualified to purchase certain property or housing; (3) he or she was rejected; and (4) the housing remained available thereafter. ... Accordingly, a plaintiffs inability to create a genuine issue of material fact over the “remained available” element is not necessarily fatal to a prima facie housing discrimination claim on summary judgment so long as there exists “additional evidence” from which a reasonable juror could find an inference of discrimination. ... Thus, we rule the district court erred in granting the Yateses’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence in the record that 2268 Eckert “remained available.”

A rental applicant must show that they were qualified to rent; consistently applied income requirements may defeat a prima facie claim of racial discrimination.

Mencer v. Princeton Square Apartments · filed 2000-10-03(a)

Plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination. The Menc-ers were not financially qualified to rent according to defendant’s policies. They did not show that defendant’s income requirements were born of bias or inconsistently applied.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations in rules or policies when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and an accommodation may include an untrained emotional support animal.

Overlook Mutual Homes, Inc. v. Spencer · filed 2009-07-16(f)(3)(B)

Simply stated, there is a difference between not requiring the owner of a movie theater to allow a customer to bring her emotional support dog, which is not a service animal, into the theater to watch a two-hour movie, an ADA-type issue, on one hand, and permitting the provider of housing to refuse to allow a renter to keep such an animal in her apartment in order to provide emotional support to her and to assist her to cope with her depression, an FHA-type issue, on the other. ... In sum, this Court concludes that the types of animals that can qualify as reasonable accommodations under the FHA include emotional support animals, which need not be individually trained. Accordingly, the Court rejects Overlook’s assertion that it is entitled to summary judgment, because Scooby was not so trained.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a fact-specific determination of whether an assistance animal is necessary and reasonable to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and it does not permit categorical rejection solely because the animal lacks specialized training.

Association of Apartment Owners of Liliuokalani Gardens v. Taylor · filed 2012-08-31(f)(3)(B)

Because the analysis must start with the disability, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that an untrained emotional support animal unequivocally is or is not a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. In some instances, a plaintiff may have a disability that requires an assistance animal with some type of training; in other instances, it may be possible that no training is necessary. This determination must be the result of a fact-specific inquiry and case-by-case determination.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable housing accommodations for a person with a disability when necessary to provide equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling; an assistance-animal request may be denied for a direct threat or lack of necessity, issues that can present factual questions.

Andrade v. Westlo Management LLC · filed 2022-06-17(f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), unlawful discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]” ... In order to establish that a defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation in the form of an assistance animal, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is a person with a disability, (2) the plaintiff requested an accommodation, (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff is a person with a disability, (4) the defendant denied the plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation, and (5) an assistance animal is reasonable and necessary to afford him or her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his or her dwelling. ... Accordingly, we hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Andrade’s dog was a direct threat to the health and safety of others in the complex. ... Additionally, Westlo presented Andrade with the option of terminating his lease early when it informed him that his dog was not permitted on the premises; Andrade, however, continued to live at the complex until he was evicted for nonpayment of rent in December 2012. ... Taking these facts into consideration, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the issue of necessity.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) and (B) require a housing-accommodation claimant to show that the requested animal is needed to afford equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling; for a unique animal, the claimant must establish a disability-related therapeutic need for that specific animal.

Amherst Farms Homeowners Association, Inc. v. D.M. and L.S. · filed 2025-12-19(f)(3)(A), (f)(3)(B)

Stated another way, we affirm on the narrow ground that defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating under the second element a material issue of fact existed regarding L.S.'s disability-related therapeutic need for the six chickens.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to make a reasonable accommodation, including allowing an assistance animal when it provides a disability-related benefit necessary for a person with a disability to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Sanzaro v. Ardiente Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2014-05-23(f)(3)(B)

Given the differences in the applicable regulations and the guidance from HUD and DOJ, the Court concludes that no special training i's required for an animal to qualify as a service or assistance animal for FHA purposes. Rather, the relevant inquiry under the FHA is whether the animal “performs the disability-related assistance or provides the disability-related benefit needed by the person with the disability.” HUD Handbook 43503 at 2-41. Whether the animal performs such services or provides such a benefit generally is a question of fact.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to make a reasonable accommodation when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Roman v. Jefferson at Hollywood Lp · filed 2012-10-30(f)(3)(B)

The district court properly concluded that Appellant failed to state a claim under the FHA. To show reasonable accommodation discrimination, a plaintiff is required to show that: (1) he suffers a “handicap” as defined by the FHA; (2) defendants knew or should have known of plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation “may be necessary” to afford the plaintiff “an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling”; and (4) defendants refused to make such an accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on disability and requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Thompson v. NYC · filed 2019-06-12(b), (f)

“Among the discriminatory practices prohibited by the FHAA is a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [the handicapped individual] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” ... “Thompson does not assert any facts suggestingthat Defendants failed toaccommodate her disability. Even if the Court assumes that Thompson is disabled within the meaning ofthese antidiscrimination statutes, herallegations do not suggest that NYCHA’s failure to address the conditions of her apartment related to the need to accommodate her underlying disability.” ... “In addition to requiring reasonable accommodation,the FHA also prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale orrental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,national origin,”or disability.42 U.S.C.§3604(b), (f).”

Section 3604 prohibits discriminatory treatment in housing-related services or denial of a dwelling because of protected characteristics, and requires a claimant seeking reasonable accommodation to have requested an accommodation for disability-related needs.

Henlopen Landing Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Vester · filed 2019-08-01(b), (f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

In other words, I find that the denial of common-area access was not based on racial, familial status, or disability discrimination. ... Because the Vesters did not request an accommodation for their son’s autism, the accommodation claim under the Fair Housing Acts must fail.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination based on handicap in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling or in related services and facilities.

Robinson v. District of Columbia · filed 2024-05-20(f)(2)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). In order to plead a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of a handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the handicap; (3) that the accommodation ‘may be necessary’ to afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) that defendants refused to make the requested accommodation.” United States v. District of Columbia, 538 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217–18 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2016). ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Robinson’s amended complaint does not sufficiently plead a request for a reasonable accommodation. ... Hence, Robinson’s federal discrimination claim, as alleged in the proposed amended complaint, would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the proposed amendment would be futile.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits refusing a reasonable accommodation when it may be necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Bjurling · filed 2025-10-31(f)(2)

Third, to state a claim for disability discrimination under the FHA, Ms. Bjurling must plausibly allege that: (1) that she is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that Mr. Holder knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that Mr. Holder refused to make the requested accommodation. Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). As a fellow tenant, Mr. Holder’s conduct is only regulated by the FHA through traditional agency principles. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290-91 (2003) (affirming that courts should determine FHA principal liability “in accordance with traditional principles of vicarious liability”); 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (“A person is vicariously liable for discriminatory housing practice by the person’s agent or employee[.]”). Ms. Bjurling’s § 3604(f) claim against Mr. Holder fails because she has not plausibly alleged that Mr. Holder, as a fellow tenant, is directly or vicariously liable for a discriminatory housing practice.

Section 3604 requires a housing provider to make a reasonable accommodation for a disability when the requested change is necessary to afford equal housing opportunity and addresses a barrier created by the disability itself.

David Sutton, Jr. v. Piper · filed 2009-07-30

The FHAA requires accommodation of a person’s disability when “the rule in question, if left unmodified, hurts handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than by virtue of what they have in common with other people, such as a limited amount of money to spend on housing.” ... Stated a different way, “the FHAA’s accommodation requirement is limited only to lowering barriers to housing that are created by the disability itself.” ... If a disabled person is able to satisfy this “necessity-causality” element, then the housing entity must make a reasonable accommodation to that person and such accommodation could include some sort of economic-financial component. ... “When analyzing whether an accommodation is required under this Act, the three operative elements are ‘reasonable,’ ‘equal opportunity’ and ‘necessary.’”

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits denying a dwelling because of disability, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give disabled persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Providence Behavioral Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist. · filed 2018-08-28(f)(1) (f)(3)(B)

The ADA, FHA, and TFHA all prohibit governmental entities from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Title II of the ADA states “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by any such entity”); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (the FHA makes it unlawful “to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap”); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 301.025 (the TFHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental of, or make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a disability”). ... Under the FHA, a public entity engages in a discriminatory practice if it refuses to make a “reasonable accommodation” to “rules, policies, practices or services when such accommodation may be necessary to afford [a disabled person] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Reasonable accommodation claims under the FHA and ADA both require that a reasonable accommodation be provided to the plaintiffs if necessary to allow the plaintiffs to have usage and enjoyment in a facility equivalent to individuals who are not disabled. ... Importantly, the failure to provide sewage and water services to the Providence Health facility did not create a situation where disabled individuals had an unequal ability to use and enjoy the facility compared to individuals who do not have a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

Section 3604(f)(2) protects any person from disability discrimination in the provision of services or facilities connected with a dwelling, including post-acquisition discrimination against property owners.

U.S. v. Avatar Properties · filed 2015-05-07(f)(2)

Apropos of defendants’ argument, the court notes that while 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) prohibits discrimination against buyers and renters when they are buying or renting dwellings, the protection offered by § 3604(f)(2) is not similarly limited; it extends to “any person” and bars a wider range of discriminatory conduct.

Section 3604(b) covers post-acquisition discrimination that affects the provision of services and facilities connected to a rental, including access to meals and common areas.

Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC · filed 2018-08-27(b)

At a minimum then, Wetzel has a cognizable post-acquisition claim because discrimination affected the provision of services and facilities connected to her rental.

Section 3604(b) reaches intentional discrimination occurring after a person acquires a dwelling, including discrimination in enjoying the residence or receiving associated services.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. · filed 2019-12-06(b)

We therefore conclude that § 3604(b) reaches conduct that, as here, “would constitute discrimination in the enjoyment of residence in a dwelling or in the provision of services associated with that dwelling” after acquisition.

Section 3604(b) reaches intentional housing discrimination occurring after a person occupies a dwelling, including discrimination affecting the enjoyment of the residence or related services.

Doe v. YWCA of Northeastern NY · filed 2020-02-12(b)

The act applies as well to “so-called ‘post-acquisition’ claims that arise from intentional discrimination that occurs after a party occupies the property.

Section 3604(a) prohibits discriminatory conduct that makes a dwelling unavailable based on a protected characteristic, even when the plaintiff pays no rent, is not homeless, or seeks a transfer after acquiring housing.

Webb v. United States Veterans Initiative · filed 2021-04-16(a)

Here, Webb alleges that U.S. Vets rejected his application for a single-occupancy unit even though he was qualified, while offering one to a less-qualified female applicant, i.e., that U.S. Vets made housing “unavailable” to him because of his sex. Because Webb claims to have been injured by that conduct, he qualifies as an aggrieved person who may bring suit under the Act, whether he paid rent or not. ... Section 3604, however, contains no textual limitation making an otherwise discriminatory housing practice lawful simply because the aggrieved person is not yet homeless. Rather, alleging that someone made “a dwelling”—whether or not the plaintiff’s current dwelling—unavailable based on a protected characteristic is sufficient. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). Put differently, nothing in the statute required Webb to be kicked out of his multiple-occupancy unit to sue U.S. Vets for refusing to offer him a one-bedroom unit on the basis of his sex.

Section 3604(a) reaches discriminatory conduct after a housing sale or rental when it makes the dwelling unavailable, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a disability-accommodation plaintiff to show a disability, the defendant’s knowledge of it, and failure to reasonably accommodate it.

Watters v. Homeowners Association at the · filed 2022-09-12(a), (f)(3)(B)

§ 3604(a) and § 3617 reach post-acquisition conduct, not just the initial sale or rental of housing. ... To pursue a failure to accommodate claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must plead elements that match those required under the Americans with Disabilities Act: (1) the plaintiff had a disability; (2) the defendant was aware of disability; and (3) the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.

Section 3604(b) can reach post-acquisition discriminatory eviction claims, but the plaintiff must allege that the dwelling was made unavailable or that the privilege of inhabiting it was taken away; damage alone is insufficient.

Williams v. Village Of Hazel Crest · filed 2023-06-13(b)

In response, Williams cites Bloch v. Frischholz, which the Court agrees allows for post-acquisition claims under Section 3604: “Sections 3604(a) and (b) prohibit discriminatory evictions. Eviction, actual or constructive, can only occur after the sale or rental is complete. Therefore, ‘interference’ with certain rights protected by [Section] 3604—rights that prohibit discriminatory evictions—may also occur post-acquisition.” ... The Bloch court states: “[Section] 3604 requires that the plaintiffs’ dwelling be made truly unavailable, or that defendants deprived plaintiffs of their privilege to inhabit their dwelling.” ... The court also notes that a plaintiff alleging constructive eviction “must show her residence is ‘unfit for occupancy,’ often to the point that she is ‘compelled to leave.’” ... Furthermore, “[p]laintiffs must show more than a mere diminution in property values, more than just that their properties would be less desirable to a certain group . . . . Availability, not simply habitability, is the right that [Section] 3604(a) protects.” ... see id. at 779 (applying same analysis to Section 3604(b)). Williams’s complaint does not contain any allegations regarding constructive eviction or the unavailability of her home. All that Williams alleges is that the floods caused damage, which she repaired. This says nothing about Williams’s ability to occupy the Property. ... For the foregoing reasons, the FHA claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 3604(b) reaches race discrimination in post-acquisition mortgage-related services or rights tied to the sale, while §3604(c) requires a discriminatory notice, statement, or advertisement to be with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.

Davis v. Money Source Inc. · filed 2021-08-30(b), (c)

The words “privileges of sale” and “provisions of services or facilities in connection therewith” connote that the protections afforded by §3604(b) do not expire upon the closing of the sale but continue throughout the course of the ongoing relationship. ... Thus, Space Hunters stands for the proposition that section 3604(c) applies broadly to anyone who makes a discriminatory statement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. It does not support a conclusion that the statement is not required to be one that is with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. Here, the facts alleged show that the statements at issue were not made with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. Thus, the motions to dismiss are being granted with respect to Count I to the extent that it is based on §3604(c).

Section 3604(b) applies to at least some discriminatory conduct occurring after a tenant acquires housing.

Trujillo v. Amity Plaza LLC · filed 2024-01-31(b)

This Court’s independent statutory interpretation analysis and review of relevant jurisprudence lead to the conclusion that § 3604(b) applies to post-acquisition discrimination claims.

Section 3604(a) can reach discriminatory post-acquisition conduct that makes housing unavailable, while § 3604(b) covers discrimination in the terms, conditions, privileges, or related services and facilities of housing.

Stennis v. The Moorings of Oak Harbor Property Owners' Association LLC · filed 2024-09-17(a), (b)

The Court rejects Defendants’ arguments that actionable claims under the FHA involve only pre-purchase activity. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as true, sufficiently state a claim that Defendants made housing unavailable to Plaintiffs.

Section 3604(b) reaches discriminatory post-acquisition rental conditions and services, while § 3604(f)'s reasonable-accommodation duty covers rules, policies, practices, or services necessary for equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling, not requested repairs.

Hobbs, Sr v. Goncharko · filed 2025-09-03(b), (f)

Accepting these statements as true, as the court must at the dismissal stage, Hobbs’s allegations fall under the Bloch-Wetzel umbrella. Section 3604(b) applies to the discriminatory overcharging of rent, since rent is a condition of sale. ... Meanwhile, this jurisdiction has explicitly recognized discriminatory eviction, denied maintenance, and denied access to the “totality of the rented premises” as actionable under § 3604(b). ... The use of slurs may also qualify, depending on their frequency, severity, and whether they are “physically threatening or humiliating rather than merely offensive.” ... Prong three poses the problem. Reasonable accommodations, under § 3604, refer to “rules, policies, practices, or services” that are “necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” These are distinct from “reasonable modifications,” which a landlord need only permit the tenant to make at his own expense. ... But “a ‘request for (re)construction or repair is more appropriately a request for a modification than an accommodation’ and therefore is not actionable under the FHA.” ... Because neither the requested repairs nor targeted eviction is actionable, the § 3604(f) claim does not survive dismissal.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in housing-related terms, conditions, privileges, services, or facilities even after a tenant or owner has acquired the dwelling.

COMMITTEE CONCERNING COMMUNITY IMP. v. Modesto · filed 2009-10-08(b)

First, the statutory language does not preclude all post-acquisition claims. The statute prohibits discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in provision of services or facilities in connection therewith." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The inclusion of the word "privileges" implicates continuing rights, such as the privilege of quiet enjoyment of the dwelling. ... Under this natural reading, the reach of the statute encompasses claims regarding services or facilities perceived to be wanting after the owner or tenant has acquired possession of the dwelling.

Section 3604(b) reaches discrimination occurring after an owner or tenant has acquired possession of a dwelling.

Committee Concerning Community Improvement v. City of Modesto · filed 2009-10-08(b)

In our view, the FHA does apply to post-acquisition discrimination, and the District Court erred in deciding otherwise.

Section 3604(a) can reach post-acquisition discrimination that makes a dwelling unavailable, while section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in purchase terms or conditions, including a condominium association’s discriminatory enforcement of rules authorized by those terms.

Bloch v. Frischholtz · filed 2009-11-13(a), (b)

So we agree with Halprin that § 3604(a) may reach post-acquisition discriminatory conduct that makes a dwelling unavailable to the owner or tenant, somewhat like a constructive eviction. ... Section 3604(a) does not contemplate attempted constructive eviction. ... Consequently, because the Blochs purchased dwellings subject to the condition that the Condo Association can enact rules that restrict the buyer’s rights in the future, § 3604(b) prohibits the Association from discriminating against the Blochs through its enforcement of the rules, even facially neutral rules.

Section 3604(b) reaches discriminatory housing practices occurring after the acquisition of housing, including sexual harassment.

Fair Housing Council v. Penasquitos Casablanca Owner's Ass'n · filed 2010-06-02(b)

The PCOA argues that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) covers only discrimination in connection with the acquisition of housing. Such a narrow interpretation, however, would pre-elude the FHA from reaching acts of discrimination, including sexual harassment, on the sole basis of the timing of the discriminatory act. ... As we have concluded, such an interpretation contravenes a natural reading of the relevant statutory and regulatory language.

Section 3604 reaches discrimination in repairs to housing that has already been sold or rented.

Dodev v. D.R. Horton Incorporated · filed 2025-06-11

Defendants challenge the Dodevs’ allegations by asserting that the FHA only prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, not discrimination in repair of housing ... already sold or rented. (Doc. 19 at 10-11.) The C.F.R. and Committee Concerning Community Improvement, 583 F.3d at 712-13, explicitly contradict this position.

Section 3604(b) reaches discrimination in housing privileges and related services after a dwelling has been acquired.

Viens v. America Empire Surplus Lines Ins. · filed 2015-06-23(b)

The Court finds this analysis persuasive and concurs with the conclusion in Davis and City of Modesto that post-acquisition claims are cognizable under the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(2) covers severe and pervasive disability discrimination in housing services after residents move in, without requiring constructive eviction.

D.K. ex rel. L.K. v. Teams · filed 2017-07-05(f)(2)

... includes discrimination against people with disabilities after their acquisition of housing that need not rise to the level of a constructive eviction.

Sections 3604(a) and (b) cover discrimination that directly affects access to housing and do not impose liability for a homeowners association’s failure to stop a neighbor’s harassment after purchase.

Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2004-05-11(a), (b)

This Court agrees that sections 3604(a) and (b) are limited to conduct that directly impacts the accessibility to housing because of a protected classification, such as race.

Section 3604(b) covers discrimination occurring after a person buys or rents housing.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. · filed 2019-03-04(b)

We hold that so-called "post-acquisition" claims are cognizable under § 3604.

Section 3604(b) covers discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a rental throughout the tenancy.

Paulsen v. Great Bridge Attleboro Limited Partnership · filed 2021-08-05(b)

Second, the words included therein imply that § 3604(b) covers such post-acquisition conduct in that it prohibits discrimination in the “terms”, “conditions” and “privileges” of the rental of a dwelling.

Section 3604 permits a housing discrimination claim against a property co-owner even if the other co-owner personally carried out the alleged discrimination; an owner cannot delegate away the duty to comply.

Payton v. Arias de Velasco Guallart · filed 2023-02-17

But Defendant Tschappatt co-owns the apartment at issue with his wife, Defendant Arias, and they rented the apartment to Plaintiffs. ... The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “compliance with the . . . FHA . . . is ‘nondelegable’” so “an owner cannot ‘insulate himself from liability for . . . discrimination in regard to living premises owned by him and managed for his benefit merely by relinquishing the responsibility for preventing such discrimination to another party.’” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Associates, 602 F.3d 597, 602 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1992)). ... As such, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts to support their claims against Defendant Tschappatt, as required by the Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, standard.

Section 3604(f)(1) and (2) can support a disability discrimination claim against a housing owner without an affirmative act of discrimination when the allegations plausibly show discriminatory intent.

National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Bodner Co. · filed 2012-02-17(f)(1), (f)(2)

Accordingly, the court will not read into the Act a requirement of an “affirmative act,” when the same is unnecessary for the owners to have a discriminatory intent. The court finds that the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are sufficient at this point to lay out a plausible claim of discrimination.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing and reaches practices that cause or predictably will cause segregative or disparate effects on protected groups.

Atlantic Housing Partners L.L.L.P. v. Brevard County · filed 2024-09-19

The FHA protects certain classes of people from discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing. ... In an FHA case, the plaintiff “has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” ... A plaintiff can demonstrate a discriminatory effect in two ways. ... First, “it can demonstrate that the decision [at issue] has a segregative effect.” ... Second, the plaintiff can show that the decision “makes housing options significantly more restrictive for members of a protected group than for persons outside that group.” ... The second method is commonly called as a “disparate impact” claim.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) covers reasonable changes to rules, policies, practices, or services, while construction or repair of existing premises is treated as a modification under § 3604(f)(3)(A), potentially at the disabled person's expense.

Weiss v. 2100 Condominium Ass'n · filed 2013-04-08(f)(3)(A), (f)(3)(B)

The plain language of the FHA defines accommodations in terms of reasonable accommodations in “rules, policies, practices, or services.” § 3604(f)(3)(B). Subsection (B) makes no mention of adjustments or improvements to existing structures, and, in contrast with § 3604(f)(2), fails to make any mention of “facilities.” ... Thus, the plain language of § 3604(f)(3)(B), read in conjunction with the statute as a whole, directs the conclusion that a request for (re)construction or repair is more appropriately a request for a modification than an accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) and (B) make reasonable-modification and reasonable-accommodation claims independently actionable, without requiring proof of discriminatory animus.

Evans v. Forkids, Inc. · filed 2018-01-23(f)(3)(A), (f)(3)(B)

Accordingly, this Court finds that to appropriately give effect to all separately numbered statutory clauses, the proper interpretation is that discriminatory animus is not a required element of proving a claim under § 3604(f)(3)(A) or § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(A) treats physical changes to existing premises as reasonable modifications paid for by the disabled tenant, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) covers changes to rules, policies, practices, or services and requires the accommodation to be necessary and reasonable.

C.R. v. PLB Management LLC · filed 2023-02-22(f)(3)(A), (f)(3)(B)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A), “reasonable modification” contemplates changes to the “existing premises occupied” by the disabled tenant. ... In contrast, “reasonable accommodations” under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) contemplates changes to the “rules, policies, practices, or services” affecting a tenant’s use and enjoyment of a dwelling. ... The Court finds the request here, to provide upgraded windows in Plaintiff’s unit, to be more like those examples of reasonable modifications found under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A), 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c), than the examples of reasonable accommodations under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b). ... As a request for a reasonable modification, under the FHA Plaintiff must bear the expense. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (providing for reasonable modifications at the expense of the handicapped person). ... To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), based on the failure to reasonably accommodate, among other things a plaintiff must show that the requested accommodation is necessary and reasonable.