42 U.S.C. § 3604

Sections 3604(b) and (f) prohibit discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of dwelling rentals based on listed protected characteristics, including handicap.

McCree v. KMG Prestiege Company · filed 2021-11-08(b) and (f)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b) and (f), and the ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability and require a housing provider to reasonably accommodate a tenant’s disability. ... Here, Plaintiff does not allege she is facing eviction, or any other action, because of her membership in any protected class, vaguely pleading only “stigma discrimination,” without further elaboration.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling or in related services, and disparate-treatment claims may be evaluated under a three-step burden-shifting framework.

Taylor v. Subsidized Properties I, L.P. · filed 2022-02-02(b)

Because Ms. Taylor brings indirect evidence of disparate treatment, the inquiry for Counts I, II, V, and VI distills to a single, three-step test. ... This inference can be raised by showing: (a) proof of membership in a protected group, (b) eligibility for a housing-related benefit, (c) denial of that benefit, and (d) the conferring of the benefit to someone outside the protected class. ... As the burden shifts back to Ms. Taylor, the Court finds she has shown there is clearly a genuine dispute of material fact as to the Defendants’ real reasons for their actions. ... Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I, II, V, and VI is therefore DENIED.

Section 3604(b) prohibits race discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling or in related services, and a claim must allege facts plausibly connecting the challenged actions to race.

Nelson v. Sorrento Tower Apartments · filed 2022-11-07(b)

However, the Court finds these allegations are conclusory and are insufficient to state a claim that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of section 3604. ... While Plaintiff claims Defendants refused to run a background check or provide him with information in his file, the complaint lacks any information as to whether Defendants’ actions were motivated by Plaintiff’s race ... Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s first cause of action fails to state a claim.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

ROSADO v. WHITCRAFT · filed 2024-03-26(b)

The FHA is a federal anti-discrimination statute intended to address discriminatory housing practices targeting members of specific protected classes. ... Rosado does not allege that he was discriminated against on account of his membership in a protected class. This is fatal to any FHA claim.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

SHEELY v. WARNER ROBINS HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2025-08-21(b)

“[u]nder the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful ‘[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms,

Section 3604(b) requires a plaintiff alleging discrimination in rental terms or related services to plead protected-class membership and an adverse action; absent those allegations, the claim is insufficient.

Bovasso v. Mountain Green Condo · filed 2026-03-26(b)

Count IV alleges that Defendant violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) by discriminating “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of protected class status, including disability and familial status.” ... As described in the analysis of Count II above, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class or that she suffered an adverse action. ... She has not stated facts that would support Count IV’s claim under the cited statutes, nor established standing when she alleges no injury in fact to herself.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination based on race or color in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling.

Dunn v. Park III Condominium Homeowners Assn. CA4/1 · filed 2022-10-21(b)

It is also unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling because of race or color. (Id., § 3604(b).)

Even assuming § 3604(b) permits an exploitation claim, the complaint must explain how the defendant could sustain above-market housing prices despite competition.

Rivera v. Incorporated Village · filed 2013-02-19(b)

However, even assuming arguendo that an exploitation theory of liability applies to claims made pursuant to the FHA and that the Second Circuit does (or would) recognize this theory, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ proposed amendment is still futile because plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to plead an exploitation claim.

Section 3604(b)'s prohibition on discrimination in the terms or conditions of renting a dwelling does not apply to rooms or units in an owner-occupied dwelling containing no more than four independent family living quarters.

Fred v. Kokinokos · filed 1972-08-03(b)

Plaintiffs’ claim under § 3604(b) fails because the type of apartment they sought to rent has clearly been exempted by Congress from its prohibition. Section 3603(b) is explicit in declaring that: ... (2) rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.

The small-owner exemption limits the application of § 3604 to qualifying owner-occupied small dwellings, but it does not authorize racial discrimination.

William Morris and Barbara Morris v. Norman R. Cizek and Florence Cizek · filed 1974-10-09

We first note that the exemption language of the 1968 Act itself specifies only that the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 shall not apply to the Mrs. Murphy situation. No positive right is conferred upon such owners to discriminate along racial lines in leasing their units. ... Rather, the language in the exemption before us specifically limits only 42 U.S.C. § 3604 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.

Liability under § 3604(e) for profit-motivated racial blockbusting does not depend on the unlawful conduct’s success.

Sanborn v. Wagner · filed 1973-02-15(e)

It makes no difference under § 3604(e) that the “busting” of the Winford Road “block” was not accomplished or even advanced due to Mrs. Sanborn’s subsequent refusal to move. ... The Court concludes Defendant Mrs. Wagner’s conduct was in clear violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) and therefore that Plaintiff is entitled to recover.

Section 3604(a)'s fair-housing obligations apply to a single-family rental when the transaction uses the services of a real-estate broker or a person in the business of renting dwellings.

Singleton v. Hilda Gendason and Edward Gendason · filed 1976-11-12(a)

Section 3603(b)(1) does not exempt the rental of single-family houses from the obligations of Section 3604(a) when the services of a real estate broker or any person in the business of renting dwellings are involved in the rental transaction.

Section 3604’s discrimination restrictions do not apply to a single-family home occupied by its owner under § 3603(b)(2).

Lunini v. Grayeb · filed 2004-02-27

The Court finds that a single family home that is occupied by the owner, is exempt pursuant to § 3603(b)(2), from the restrictions of § 3604.

Section 3604 is violated when racial discrimination is part of the decision not to rent, even if the landlord also relies on a policy of not renting to a prospective tenant's agent.

Steele v. Title Realty Company and Frank Sawatzki · filed 1973-05-16

Accepting the existence of a policy of not renting to a prospective tenant’s agent, if racial discrimination was a part of the determination not to rent, the statute was violated.

Section 3604(a) prohibits steering housing seekers to particular areas on the basis of race.

United States v. Henshaw Brothers, Inc. · filed 1974-06-13(a)

The defendants, through their agents, have deliberately engaged in the practice of steering persons to a particular area on the basis of race, and such conduct is violative of § 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race, and evidence of occupancy by other racial minorities is relevant but not conclusive in determining whether black applicants were discriminated against.

Weathers v. Peters Realty Corporation · filed 1974-07-05(a)

The court then concluded that this 23% minority occupancy would “discredit” allegations of discrimination by the defendants. This approach in our view represents a misapprehension of the effect of statistics pertaining to minority occupancy. It is a well known historical fact that blacks in our country have suffered from racial discrimination in many respects distinguishable in kind and degree from other racial minorities. Where in a case, such as this, the issue involves alleged discrimination against blacks only, statistical percentages including other minorities in the composite picture must be viewed with this distinction in mind. This the district court did not do as it obviously gave too much weight to the 23% minority figure as a factor favorable to the defendants’ case. We do not hold that evidence respecting occupancy by other racial minorities was not admissible in the present case. Our holding is that such evidence should be weighed along with all other relevant evidence in determining the basic issue of black minority discrimination. Such evidence, though relevant, was not conclusive that no racial discrimination existed. So too as to evidence bearing upon the conduct and attitude of the Realty Company’s operating officer. Such tangential evidence is to be weighed in light of the total record and not treated as conclusive.

Section 3604(a) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of race.

Cornelius v. City of Parma · filed 1974-02-22(a)

The Government, also seeks to directly challenge the passage and implementation of the two Parma ordinances as part of its pattern or practice action. But, as was discussed previously, these ordinances may not be said to have operated in any real sense to deny or make unavailable dwellings on the basis of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604(d) does not reach a neutral representation about a dwelling’s availability that is conveyed to all persons equally rather than because of a protected characteristic.

Barrick Realty, Incorporated v. City of Gary, Indiana · filed 1973-01-18(d)

Whatever representation may be conveyed by the absence of a “for sale” sign is conveyed to all persons equally.

Section 3604 does not impose liability for an indirect deprivation where the challenged action did not deny any housing to the plaintiffs.

Yarborough v. City of Warren · filed 1974-10-11(a)

Furthermore, the termination of NDP did not deny any housing to these plaintiffs. ... the allegations and proofs here support no cause of action under § 3604.

Section 3604(a) prohibits racial discrimination that effectively makes a dwelling unavailable, including denial of financial assistance connected with a home's sale.

Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co. · filed 1976-02-13(a)

If the plain meaning of § 3604 is observed, it becomes clear that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under its terms. The cost of housing being what it is today, a denial of financial assistance in connection with a sale of a home would effectively “make unavailable or deny” a “dwelling.” When such denial occurs as a result of racial considerations, § 3604(a) is transgressed.

Section 3604(a) bars refusing to rent or otherwise denying a dwelling because of race, and does not permit facially neutral criteria that exclude Black applicants unless they reasonably measure an applicant’s ability to be a successful tenant.

Bishop v. Pecsok · filed 1976-06-18(a)

Further, even if the defendant had been able to prove that he used objective criteria which were, on their face, neutral as to race, he still would have violated Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Objective criteria cannot have the effect of excluding blacks from housing unless the criteria are demonstrably a reasonable measure of the applicants’ ability to be a “successful tenant.”

Section 3604(a) prohibits racial steering that impedes, delays, or discourages a prospective home buyer from purchasing housing, while § 3604(e) prohibits for-profit solicitations that induce or attempt to induce a sale through racial representations, including subtle representations and representations that do not explicitly mention race.

Zuch v. Hussey · filed 1975-04-28(a), (e)

Accordingly, any action by a real estate agent which in any way impedes, delays, or discourages on a racial basis a prospective home buyer from purchasing housing is unlawful. ... The Court, therefore, concludes as a matter of law that steering is a violation of Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Law. ... In construing the term “representation” as used in § 3604(e), this Court recognizes that each provision of the Fair Housing Act is to be given a liberal construction in order for it to accomplish its purpose. In that regard, the representations prohibited by Section 3604(e) include the subtle, as well as the more obvious, forms of racial inducements to sell. It is possible, therefore, for a representation to be a violation of the section even if race is not explicitly mentioned.

Section 3604 requires a plaintiff alleging race discrimination in a rental refusal to show that race was a significant factor, not that race was the sole reason.

Burris v. Zolon A. Wilkins, Sr., D/B/A Lexington Apartments and Motor Inn · filed 1977-01-03

The burden of proof on the plaintiff in an action under the Fair Housing Act alleging race discrimination is, therefore, not that the refusal to rent was due solely because he was black, but that race was a significant factor.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race, and a prima facie violation can be established by discriminatory effect without proof of discriminatory intent.

Ferdinand D. Wharton, Jr. v. Knefel · filed 1977-09-19(a)

The burden of proof in Title VIII cases is governed by the concept of the “prima facie case.” ... To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect. ... The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial discrimination in housing was racially motivated. ... Effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly, because ... [w]hatever our law was once, * * * we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.

Section 3604(a) prohibits steering renters into a particular group of dwellings based on race, and a significant discriminatory effect from rental decisions can establish a violation.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 1978-09-21(a)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) an agent or owner may not refuse to sell or rent after a bona fide offer, refuse to negotiate for the sale or rent of a dwelling, or "otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Steering blacks to a particular group of apartments in a complex effectively denies access to equal housing opportunities. ... The Fair Housing Act prohibits not only direct discrimination but practices with racially discouraging effects; steering evidences an intent to influence the choice of the renter on an impermissible racial basis. ... The government need only establish that race was a consideration and played some role in the real estate transaction. ... Therefore, a significant discriminatory effect flowing from rental decisions is sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Fair Housing Act. ... The district court's decision, based on statistical evidence and evidence of actions that effectively confined blacks to a section of the complex, is therefore consistent with the requirements of § 3604(a).

Section 3604(a) permits a prima facie case based on actual or predictable discriminatory effect.

United States of America v. City of Black Jack, Missouri · filed 1975-01-20(a)

To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect.

Section 3604(a) makes refusing to negotiate for a dwelling’s sale because of another person’s race or color unlawful.

Howard v. W. P. Bill Atkinson Enterprises · filed 1975-11-06(a)

Thus, the Act makes it illegal for a person to refuse to negotiate for the sale of a dwelling because of another person’s color or race.

Section 3604 gives an organization a cause of action for discriminatory housing practices directed toward a particular development, but not for an injury untethered to a specific project.

Planning for People Coalition v. County of DuPage · filed 1976-02-04

Since this section requires allegations of discrimination directed toward a particular development and since Planning for People Coalition makes no such allegations, it has not stated a “judicially cognizable” cause of action and thus does not have standing.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise making a dwelling unavailable because of race or color.

United States v. L & H Land Corp., Inc. · filed 1976-02-05(a)

makes it unlawful to refuse to rent a dwelling, or otherwise make dwellings unavailable to any person on account of race or color.

Section 3604(b) does not provide a remedy for discrimination based solely on occupation.

Lee v. Minnock · filed 1976-08-05(b)

We note that the Fair Housing Act does not include in its proscription discrimination upon the basis of occupation.

Section 3604(a) reaches a race-based decision that terminates a real-estate sale after the sellers learn the buyers are Black.

Crumble v. Blumthal · filed 1977-02-09(a)

Thus the breakdown of the deal had its roots in racial discrimination involving the buyers.

Section 3604 prohibits race discrimination against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling and in related services or facilities.

United States General, Inc. v. City of Joliet · filed 1977-04-05

prohibits discrimination because of race against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.

Section 3604(a) does not excuse sex discrimination in renting because the landlord’s stated motive is paternalistic or benign.

United States v. Reece · filed 1978-04-10(a)

A violation of the Fair Housing Act can be proved without establishing a malevolent or unlawful intent. ... Since this is so, an allegedly benign motivation, especially one as paternalistic and overbroad as the one presented here, cannot provide a defense.

Section 3604 bars private landlords from using racial quotas, withholding available apartments from minority applicants to reserve them for white applicants, or otherwise treating applicants differently because of race or national origin, regardless of motive.

United States v. Starrett City Associates · filed 1987-05-05(a) (b)

Such differential treatment violates the Fair Housing Act whatever its motivation.

For a § 3604(a) race-discrimination claim, race need not be the sole factor in a housing decision; it is enough that race was an effective reason for the decision.

Patricia Troy, Kevin Boston v. Suburban Management Corp. · filed 1990-07-13(a)

In order to prove their case, plaintiffs need not establish that race was the sole factor in the defendants’ decision to terminate Troy’s tenancy. Rather, it is sufficient to establish liability if race was an effective reason, if not the sole factor, in the defendants’ decision to terminate.

Section 3604(b) prohibits racial discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, and, read with § 3617, makes firing an employee for refusing to rent public housing in a racially discriminatory manner unlawful.

Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority · filed 1998-12-02(b)

Accordingly, we hold that sections 3617 and 3604, which were in effect in 1995, truly would have compelled a reasonable public official in Moran’s position to conclude that federal law prohibited firing an employee for refusing to rent public housing in a racially discriminatory manner.

Section 3604(b) bars racial discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling and in related housing services or facilities.

Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority · filed 1998-12-02(b)

Section 3604, in turn, bars racial discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith...." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, and a violation may be shown when race was a consideration that played some role in the housing decision.

Jim Sowell Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Coppell · filed 1999-08-19(a)

Section 804(a) of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), makes it unlawful to “make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.” “Courts have consistently given an expansive interpretation to the Fair Housing Act; to state a claim under the Act, it is enough to show that race was a consideration and played some role in a real estate transaction.”

As applied here, a § 3604 Fair Housing claim required proof of racial discrimination.

Roy v. Bd. of County Commissioners Walton · filed 2010-12-22

Those remaining claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981, §1982, and §1985(3), as well as a Fair Housing claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §3604. Each such claim required that plaintiff prove racial discrimination.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling to any person because of race.

Lynn v. Village of Pomona · filed 2007-01-09(a)

Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act makes it “unlawful [to] refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.”

Section 3604(a) does not require race to be the sole reason for a housing decision, but a disparate treatment claim needs evidence supporting a reasonable inference of racial discrimination.

Jones v. Baecker · filed 2016-12-28(a)

Although the plaintiff need not establish that discriminatory intent was the sole reason for the housing decision at issue, the evidence must be sufficiently compelling so as to give rise to a reasonable inference of racial discrimination.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, including through racially discriminatory municipal zoning that excludes housing providing rental opportunities to significant numbers of non-white persons.

United States v. City of Black Jack, Missouri · filed 1974-03-20(a)

In addition to prohibiting discriminatory refusals to rent or to negotiate rental, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) also makes it unlawful to "otherwise make unavailable" a dwelling, or to "deny" a dwelling, on account of race. The foregoing phraseology appears to be as broad as Congress could have made it. United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 374 F.Supp. 730, Battisti, C. J. (D.C. 1973). "Dwelling" is defined in 42 U. S.C. § 3602(b) as including "any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon" of residential property. Accordingly, where a municipality exercises its zoning powers in a racially discriminatory manner and thereby excludes housing which provides rental opportunities for significant numbers of non-white persons, such conduct constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, supra; Kennedy Park Homes v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F.Supp. 669, 694 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 1010, 91 S.Ct. 1256, 28 L.Ed.2d 546 (1971).

Section 3604 prohibits certain discriminatory housing practices without regard to their actual effect on the community, and an injunction may be supported by proof that the prohibited practice exists.

Topic v. CIRCLE REALTY COMPANY · filed 1974-05-20

Section 3604 of Title 42 prohibits certain .discriminatory practices without regard to their actual effect upon the community. So when a plaintiff alleges that the defendants have engaged in a prohibited discriminatory practice, all that is needed to support an injunction is proof that the practice exists.

In a § 3613 pattern-or-practice action, alleged racial steering does not establish a § 3604(a) violation without proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice.

United States v. Saroff · filed 1974-07-10(a)

The Government charges that Saroff accompanied his blockbusting activities with steering, in violation of Sections 3604(a), (b), (d) by directing prospective Black homebuyers away from White neighborhoods in West Knoxville and ' toward the transitional sector of East Knoxville. In view of the evidence heretofore summarized and the applicable law, it is the opinion of the Court that the Government has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that Saroff has engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of Section 3604(a), (b) or (d).

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to sell a dwelling after a bona fide offer and refusing to negotiate for its sale because of race, color, religion, or national origin.

Lucas v. Hooper · filed 1974-08-16(a)

Sec. 3604 prohibits not only the refusal to sell property to a person making a bona fide offer, but also the refusal to negotiate for the sale of property. The court has found that the Travises refused to sell their home to the Lucas couple, and it is certainly obvious that the owners were completely unwilling to even negotiate. Therefore, there was a complete violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it to a person because of religion, including through discriminatory zoning restrictions.

LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher · filed 1995-09-21(a)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The phrase “otherwise make unavailable” has been interpreted to reach a wide variety of discriminatory housing practices, including discriminatory zoning restrictions.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of religion, including through discriminatory zoning restrictions.

Rabbi Yitzchok Leblanc-Sternberg, Chanie Leblanc-Sternberg, Fred Walfish, Lewis Kamman, Park Avenue… · filed 1995-09-21(a)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... religion." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(a). The phrase "otherwise make unavailable" has been interpreted to reach a wide variety of discriminatory housing practices, including discriminatory zoning restrictions.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing, making unavailable, or denying a dwelling because of race or national origin, and it reaches discriminatory zoning practices, including claims based on disparate impact.

Fair Housing In Huntington Committee Inc. v. Town Of Huntington · filed 2003-01-17(a)

The FHA provides that it shall be unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent, ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race ... or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2002). Conduct prohibited by this section includes discriminatory zoning practices. LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 424 (2d Cir.1995). A plaintiff can make out a claim of discrimination either "on a theory of disparate impact or one of disparate treatment." Id. at 425. Plaintiffs here rely on a theory of disparate impact.

Section 3604(a) permits a discriminatory housing claim to proceed when a factual dispute remains over whether zoning laws were adopted to prevent housing because of race or color.

Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona · filed 2015-09-29(a)

Because, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently raised an issue of material fact as to whether “the Village adopted the Challenged Laws with a discriminatory purpose,” namely to prevent the construction of the rabbinical college and its associated housing, Tartikov, 915 F.Supp.2d at 610, their FHA claims also survive summary judgment, see Ryan v. Ramsey, 936 F.Supp. 417, 427 (S.D.Tx.1996) (denying summary judgment on FHA claim because there were “outstanding issues of material fact” as to discriminatory intent, namely whether “a jury could have reasonably inferred that race was a significant factor in the defendants’ decision”).

Section 3604 claims filed after the applicable Fair Housing Act limitations period may be dismissed as untimely.

Hampton v. Roberts · filed 1974-11-11

This court, however, orders the action dismissed as it pertains to 42 U.S.C. § 3604 as the time has lapsed for the maintenance of a suit under this latter section.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) imposes an ongoing duty on housing owners and managers who control a building, so the limitations period for a design-and-construction claim begins when an inaccessible unit is leased.

Kuchmas v. Towson University · filed 2008-05-15(f)(3)(C)

In conclusion, this Court holds that Defendants Collegiate Housing Foundation, Capstone Development Corp., Capstone Properties Corp., and Capstone On-Campus Management, LLC, had an ongoing duty in light of their control of Millennium Hall. Accordingly, the statute of limitations with respect to a design and construction claim began when Plaintiff Mark Kuchmas leased a unit in Millennium Hall.

A § 3604 claim is subject to a two-year limitations period, which may be extended under the continuing-violation theory only when an ongoing discriminatory practice reaches into that period.

Clement v. United Homes, LLC · filed 2012-12-27

To bring a claim under either 42 U.S.C. § 3604 or § 3605 of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), “[a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice.” ... The statute of limitations for certain discrimination claims, including the FHA, can be effectively extended under the “continuing violation” theory, whereby the plaintiff claims, not just an isolated violation, but an ongoing policy of discrimination which extend into the limitations period. ... Here, however, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply. ... Because plaintiff only makes generalized allegations about a continuing policy that could even possibly extend into the statutory period, the continuing violation theory cannot be applied to render her claims timely.

A design and construction violation occurs when construction is completed; the continued existence of inaccessible features is not a continuing violation.

Moseke v. Miller and Smith, Inc. · filed 2002-05-17(f)(3)(C)

The Court finds that the completion of the construction triggered the FHA statute of limitations for a design and construct claim and that neither the continuing violation doctrine nor the discovery rule are applicable here. Therefore, the Court holds that the existence of a FHA non-compliant building is not a continuing violation of the FHA.

For a design and construction accessibility claim under § 3604(f)(3)(C), the limitations period runs from the initial rental of the last unit available for rent; a unit reserved as a model does not extend it.

George v. Overall Creek Apartments, LLC · filed 2024-06-21(f)(3)(C)

It is undisputed on the record that the last unit at the Property available for rent was initially rented on March 19, 2021. George filed this lawsuit on March 31, 2023, more than two years after that date. As a result, her FHA claim is time-barred.

Section 3604 does not govern discrimination claims arising from mortgage-loan enforcement when the dwelling was already acquired; those claims fall under § 3605.

Webster Bank v. Oakley · filed 2003-09-02(f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

We conclude, however, that § 3604 of the FHAA, and its reasonable accommodations provision, afford the defendant no relief. Indeed, discrimination in mortgage foreclosures is addressed solely by a different section of the FHAA, namely, 42 U.S.C. § 3605.

Section 3604(a)'s ban on making housing unavailable or denying housing because of race reaches discriminatory mortgage-lending practices.

National Community Reinvestment Coalition v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co. · filed 2008-08-28(a)

Judge Lamberth noted that this Court had previously stated that “the broad, general language reflected in phrases such as ‘otherwise make unavailable or deny’ was intended to be flexible enough to cover multiple types of housing-related transactions.” ... In accord with Judge Lamberth’s reasoning, this Court determines that the plaintiff has stated a claim under Section 804 of the FHA. Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the Section 804 claims.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodation of disability-related inability to satisfy a landlord's ordinary financial qualification policy, including allowing a financially qualified parent to rent for the disabled person.

Giebeler v. Associates · filed 2003-09-15(f)(3)(B)

Giebeler's modest request that his financially qualified mother be allowed to rent an apartment for him to live in, affording him the opportunity to live in a suitable dwelling despite his disability, was a request for a reasonable accommodation within the intendment of the FHAA, and should have been honored.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires landlords to reasonably modify rental policies, including financial-responsibility or no-cosigner policies, when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, unless the modification is unreasonable or causes undue hardship.

Giebeler v. M & B ASSOCIATES · filed 2003-09-15(f)(3)(B)

Giebeler’s modest request that his financially qualified mother be allowed to rent an apartment for him to five in, affording him the opportunity to live in a suitable dwelling despite his disability, was a request for a reasonable accommodation within the in-tendment of the FHAA, and should have been honored.

Section 3604(f)(2) and (f)(3)(B) prohibit denying a qualified tenant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling by refusing a necessary reasonable accommodation; the refusal may be constructive, including through excessive information demands or adverse action, and is determined case by case.

United States v. 111 East 88th Partners · filed 2020-04-27(f)(2) and (f)(3)(B)

“Under the fourth prong of the prima facie test, a refusal of a request for a reasonable accommodation ‘can be both actual or constructive. . . .’” ... The “determination of when a request for a reasonable accommodation is constructively denied . . . is highly fact-specific, and is made on a case-by-case basis.” ... Here, there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant constructively denied Reich’s reasonable accommodation requests.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable accommodation when it may be necessary to give a disabled tenant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Watson v. Vici Community Development Corp · filed 2021-04-12(f)(3)(B)

With respect to the fifth element, defendants are correct that Watson has alleged that they granted her request to reinstate the third Wednesday payment privilege. However, Watson has also set forth factual allegations sufficient to support a reasonable inference that while defendants granted that request on paper, they essentially denied the request each month thereafter by issuing the notices of lease violation. Watson has additionally alleged that defendants terminated her third Wednesday payment privilege without notice after having granted the requested accommodation for four years. The court concludes that Watson has plausibly alleged a failure-to-reasonably-accommodate claim under § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) covers discriminatory failures in the design and construction of covered multifamily dwellings; for an architect’s improper design, continuing effects do not create a continuing violation.

Sentell v. RPM Management Company, Inc. · filed 2009-07-13(f)(3)(C)

Although the Eighth Circuit has yet to rule on whether the alleged discriminatory practice may form a continuing violation in FHA design and construction cases, the Court is persuaded that, based on the reasoning in the line of cases cited by Bailey, the continuing violation doctrine should not apply to Sentell’s claims against Bailey. ... Although the effects of Bailey’s allegedly improper design may be felt years into the future, the discrete act of alleged misconduct occurred when Bailey designed the apartment complex. ... Thus, the statute of limitations on Sentell’s claim against Bailey for improper design began to run when Bailey completed his last act as the architect for the allegedly non-compliant building.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) requires covered multifamily dwellings to be designed and constructed for accessibility, but FHA accessibility guidelines are not mandatory or the exclusive means of satisfying that requirement.

Equal Rights Center v. Post Properties, Inc. · filed 2007-07-25(f)(3)(C)

Moreover, the guidelines promulgated pursuant to the FHA do not constitute mandatory requirements upon builders, and, although compliance with the guidelines are sufficient to satisfy the FHA’s requirements, they are not the “exclusive means of doing so.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) treats failure to design and construct a covered multifamily dwelling with required accessibility features as a discrete discriminatory practice; a private FHA action based on that violation must be filed within two years after construction is complete, when the last certificate of occupancy is issued.

Garcia v. Brockway · filed 2007-09-20(f)(3)(C)

As both districts courts held, an aggrieved person must bring a private civil action under the FHA for a failure to properly design and construct within two years of the completion of the construction phase, which concludes on the date that the last certificate of occupancy is issued. Because neither plaintiff brought a timely suit, their cases were properly dismissed.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) treats failure to design and construct a compliant multifamily dwelling as a discrete FHA discriminatory practice that ends when the design-and-construction phase is complete.

Garcia v. Brockway · filed 2008-05-13(f)(3)(C)

Here, the practice is “a failure to design and construct,” which is not an indefinitely continuing practice, but a discrete instance of discrimination that terminates at the conclusion of the design-and-construction phase.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C)(i) requires multifamily dwellings’ public-use and common-use portions to be readily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities.

Barker v. Niles Bolton Associates, Inc. · filed 2009-03-02(f)(3)(C)(i)

Discrimination under the FHA includes the failure to design and construct multifamily dwellings in such a manner that: (1) “the public use and common use portions of such dwellings are readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons”; (2) there is “an accessible route into and through the dwelling”; and (3) thermostats are in accessible locations. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(i), (iii)(I), (iii)(II).

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) requires covered multifamily dwellings to be designed and constructed with accessible public and common-use portions, including accessible exterior routes.

Shaw v. Cherokee Meadows, LP · filed 2019-12-30(f)(3)(C)

Blackledge is not entitled to summary judgment related to plaintiffs’ § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim premised on failure to provide an accessible exterior route throughout the Community.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) treats the design and construction of covered multifamily dwellings that are not readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons as discrimination.

Turk v. TIG Insurance · filed 2009-04-17(f)(3)(C)

Thompson and DRAC’s only cause of action is for violation of the Fair Housing Act, and they specifically cite section 3604(f)(3)(c) of the Act, which states that “discrimination includes ... the design and construction of covered multifamily dwellings [that are not] readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons.” As outlined by the Act, the construction of a building, if not done in compliance with the Federal Housing Act, is an act of discrimination. Turk’s assertion is therefore incorrect.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) imposes an affirmative obligation to design and construct covered dwellings with minimum accessibility, and a plaintiff need not allege an individual act of discrimination to state a violation based on observed inaccessibility.

Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc. v. 203 Jay St. Associates, LLC · filed 2022-08-04(f)(3)(C)

The Act imposes an affirmative obligation on property owners to design and construct dwellings to meet minimum standards of accessibility. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604()(3)(C). ... This court thus joins the district courts in $.C. Bodner and JDS Development Center and the Ninth Circuit in holding that a plaintiff need not allege an individual act of discrimination against a disabled person to state a violation of the FHA’s design and construction provision and that a housing organization may allege discrimination on the basis of observing inaccessibility at dwellings that are held out for rent or sale.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) requires covered multifamily dwellings to be designed and constructed with accessible public and common-use areas and accessible routes into and through the dwellings, and it can apply to participants whose work contributed to a violation.

United States v. Albert C. Kobayashi, Inc. · filed 2023-02-22(f)(3)(C)(i), (f)(3)(C)(iii)(I)

The FHA does not make such a distinction. What matters under the FHA is whether the Moving Defendants failed to design and construct covered multifamily dwellings with common use and public use areas that “are readily accessible to and usable by” persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(i). ... To the extent that ACKI performed work up to five feet outside the building line, in conjunction with its other responsibilities, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether ACKI failed to design and construct “an accessible route into and through the dwelling[s]” at Napilihau. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(iii)(I).

Section 3604(f)(7)(A) defines the covered multifamily dwellings at issue, and section 3604(f)(3)(C) requires those dwellings to comply with specified accessibility design and construction requirements.

Nitschke · filed 2026-02-12(f)(7)(A), (f)(3)(C)

At the apartment complex, all ground-floor units and upper floor units served by elevators are “covered multifamily dwellings” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(7)(A), were built for occupancy after March 13, 1991, and are subject to the design and construction requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) of the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) treats inaccessible design or construction as discrimination when a protected person encounters the inaccessible features.

Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc. v. JDS Development LLC · filed 2020-03-09(f)(3)(C)

The means of such discrimination may be a building’s inaccessible design or construction, which may have existed for some time before the prospective buyer or renter appears. But it takes two to discriminate: until the prospective buyer or renter has been exposed to the unlawful condition, the “discriminatory housing practice” has not “occur[red].” Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A).

When a housing design departs from accessibility safe harbors, the builder must show compliance with a recognized, comparable, objective measure of accessibility.

United States v. Noble Homes, Inc. · filed 2016-03-23(f)(3)(C)

As such, to some extent, the burden shifting discussed in Nelson above is applicable. Noble Homes, therefore, must demonstrate compliance with a recognized, comparable, objective measure of accessibility.

Section 3604(f)(3)(C) requires covered multifamily housing to include accessible entrances, controls, outlets, door hardware, and common areas when constructed.

Montana Fair Housing, Inc. v. American Capital Development, Inc. · filed 1999-11-30(f)(3)(C)

Plaintiffs Betty Sept, Summit Independent Living Center, Inc., and Montana Fair Housing, Inc., are entitled to partial summary judgment on the grounds that inaccessible ground-floor entrances, placement of all environmental controls and electrical outlets, use of twist-type doorknobs rather than levers or U-shaped handles, installation of only top-loading washer/dryer units, and the use of railroad ties around the play area violated the Fan-Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C), and the Montana Human Rights Act, MontCode Ann. § 49-2-305(5)(c)(i).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations necessary to provide disabled persons equal housing opportunity, but does not require landlords to make substantial property modifications at their sole expense; § 3604(f)(3)(A) places the expense of reasonable modifications on the disabled person.

Mengistu v. Forestview Apartments, LLC · filed 2022-06-15(f)(3)(B), (f)(3)(A), (f)(1)(A)

In resolving this tension, the Court rejects any suggestion by Mengistu that the “reasonable accommodations” required by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) include making substantial modifications to a property at the landlord’s sole expense. Such a reading would obliterate the provision in the previous subdivision which indicates that discrimination occurs when the landlord refuses to permit reasonable modifications “at the expense of the disabled person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).

Sections 3604(f)(1) and (f)(3)(B) require a municipality to waive a generally applicable zoning rule when the waiver is a reasonable accommodation necessary to give disabled people an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, so long as it does not impose undue financial or administrative burdens.

Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church · filed 2003-12-02(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

We conclude the Fair Housing Amendment Act requires a waiver of a zoning ordinance if the waiver is capable of producing desirable results while not imposing undue financial or administrative burdens on the municipality and is needed to allow disabled people the same opportunity to live in a certain neighborhood as people without disabilities.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodation of disability-related needs, but the Fair Housing Act does not require private housing providers to accommodate religious beliefs or practices.

Bloch v. Frischholtz · filed 2008-07-10(f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Act requires accommodation—but only of handicaps. See 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(B). ... It would be especially inappropriate to adopt in the name of the Fair Housing Act a principle that lack of accommodation = discrimination, since the FHA itself distinguishes the two. By requiring accommodation of handicap but not race, sex, or religion, the statute’s structure tells us that the FHA uses the word “discriminate” to mean something other than “failure to accommodate.” We cannot create an accommodation requirement for religion (race, sex, and so on).

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits disability discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of dwelling rental and related services, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Filho v. Chinatown Community Development Center, Inc. · filed 2022-07-13(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits discrimination against a person “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling” because of a person’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). The FHA’s definition of discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). The “use and enjoyment” of a dwelling is not “limited to a complete denial of the use of a home.” See McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1262 (9th Cir. 2004). “It is well-settled that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) imposes an ‘affirmative duty’ on public agencies to reasonably accommodate disabled individuals by modifying administrative rules or policies.” Id. at 1264. To establish a claim under the FHA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff has a disability; (2) the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the disability; (3) accommodation of the disability may be necessary to afford the plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation. See Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). The SAC alleges that by not forwarding Filho’s request for a new apartment to DAH, CCDC refused his request for a reasonable accommodation and violated the FHA. SAC ¶ 14.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable and necessary accommodation when needed to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and safety risks are relevant to reasonableness under § 3604(f)(9).

Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Ass'n · filed 2013-05-17(f)(3)(B), (f)(9)

The FHAA defines "discrimination" in relevant part as "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d at 603. ... In enacting the FHAA, Congress made clear that the health and safety of other persons are relevant factors in determining whether a person or entity violated the FHAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) ("Nothing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals.") (emphasis added).

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits housing discrimination because of handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Mazzini v. Strathman · filed 2014-04-16(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). A landlord engages in unlawful discrimination under if FHA if he or she refuses “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(F)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f) prohibits disability discrimination in housing and requires reasonable accommodations necessary to give disabled residents an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their dwelling.

Anderson Ex Rel. C.A. v. City of Blue Ash · filed 2015-08-14(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

The FHAA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Such discrimination includes a “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]” Id. at § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... The FHAA “creates an affirmative duty on [a] municipalit[y] . . . to afford its disabled citizens reasonable accommodations in its municipal zoning practices if necessary to afford such persons equal opportunity in the use and enjoyment of their property.” ... Because the FHAA requires accommodations that are necessary for the same enjoyment of a dwelling that a non-disabled person would receive, not just those that are necessary to remain in the dwelling at all, the City’s reliance on Howard is misplaced. ... We conclude that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Anderson’s requested accommodation is reasonable and necessary to afford her and C.A. an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their dwelling, and so we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on the plaintiffs’ FHAA reasonable-accommodation claim.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination because of a handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing a reasonable accommodation necessary for equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling as discrimination.

Garnes v. Washington Manor · filed 2020-01-24(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination against any person “because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations . . . when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not require landlords to undertake wholly new construction or modify existing facilities, while section 3604(f)(3)(C) does not apply to renovations of older buildings undertaken after March 1991.

Reyes Ex Rel. Reyes v. Fairfield Properties · filed 2009-09-24(f)(3)(B), (f)(3)(C)

This Court agrees with the majority of these other courts and holds, based upon the plain meaning of section 3604(f)(3)(B), that wholly new construction in or modifications of existing facilities is not required under this section. ... Such an interpretation of section 3604(f)(3)(C) is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and, thus, the Court holds that section 3604(f)(3)(C) is not made applicable by renovations undertaken in an older building that take place after March 1991.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars disability discrimination that makes a dwelling unavailable, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal of necessary reasonable accommodations in housing rules, policies, practices, or services as prohibited discrimination.

Wolf v. City of Millbrae · filed 2021-08-23(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . that buyer or renter.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). “[P]rohibited discrimination encompasses ‘a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’” Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). An accommodation is reasonable where it would not require a fundamental alteration in the nature of the housing provider’s business or impose on the housing provider an undue financial or administrative hardship. Id. at 1157.

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) prohibits disability discrimination in providing services or facilities connected with a dwelling, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling.

Prado v. City of Berkeley · filed 2024-08-06(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

The FHAA makes it unlawful to “discriminate in . . . the provision of services or facilities in connection with . . . a dwelling” because of an individual’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). Disability discrimination under the FHAA includes a refusal to “make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a). “It is well-settled that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) imposes an ‘affirmative duty’ on public agencies to reasonably accommodate disabled individuals by modifying administrative rules and policies.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B)(ii) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Jones · filed 2025-10-16(f)(3)(B)(ii)

But to state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she suffers from a disability within the meaning of FHA; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the disability; (3) the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford “an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling;” (4) the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused to make the accommodation. Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 415 F. App’x 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2011); see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)(ii) (prohibiting the refusal “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling”). While the Court can infer from the fact that Jones receives SSDI (see ECF No. 5, PageID.14) that she is disabled, she makes no allegations about any of the other elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim. Instead, the focus of her complaint is her lack of hot water and the defendant’s notice to quit, not any failure to accommodate a disability.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits handicap discrimination in housing-related services or facilities, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal of a reasonable accommodation as discrimination when the accommodation may be necessary to give a disabled person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Hiatt v. Sun City Festival Community Association Incorporated · filed 2024-10-16(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person . . . in the provision of services or facilities in connection with [his] dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204. ... To show that a defendant has violated the FHA, a plaintiff must prove all of the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested accommodation. Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). “The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and the statute bars denying that opportunity by confining the person to only part of the dwelling.

L. Rockers & S. Rockers v. Haverford Twp ZHB & Haverford Twp. · filed 2026-01-22(f)(1)(B), (f)(3)(B)

Confining G.R. to the first floor of his family house denies him the ability “to use and enjoy a dwelling,” in violation of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) bars handicap discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing and related services, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Lucas v. Riverside Park Condominiums Unit Owners Ass'n · filed 2009-12-22(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A), it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of [that person’s] handicap.” ... “[Discrimination” is defined to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); ... Under the case law on reasonable accommodations, these conclusory and ambiguous statements are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that an accommodation is necessary to afford Lucas an equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. ... Because of the concluso-ry and ambiguous nature of Lucas’s documents in support of his request, the Association was justified in seeking additional information to enable it to make a meaningful review of and an informed decision on his request.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits housing discrimination based on handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations that are necessary to give a person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Osborne v. Belton · filed 2022-08-03(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

In order to establish a prima facie case against Belton for failure to accommodate his disability under the Section 3604(F)(3)(B) of the FHA, Mr. Osborne must have been able to show, at minimum, the following: ... (3) That an accommodation may be necessary to give the resident an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; ... (4) That the requested accommodation is reasonable; and ... (5) The owner refused to make the accommodation. ... The Court finds that Mr. Osborne’s emotional support animal is necessary to give him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling. ... “An accommodation is reasonable if it does not cause any undue hardship or fiscal or administrative burden.” ... “[T]he types of animals that can qualify as reasonable accommodations under the FHA include emotional support animals, which need not be individually trained.” ... The Court finds that Mr. Osborne’s request to have his emotional support dog in the rental property was reasonable. ... It is uncontested that Belton refused to make the accommodation when he removed the emotional support dog from the property. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case against Belton for his failure to reasonably accommodate Mr. Osborn’s disability.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a local government to make a reasonable accommodation to a rule when necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

United States v. Village of Marshall, Wis. · filed 1991-04-22(f)(3)(B)

Since the evidence before the Board contained nothing that could support a finding that the' location of the group home at 410 Hubbell Street would have any significant adverse impact on the legitimate goals of the Wisconsin Statute or would impose any expenses or burden upon the Village, failure to grant the exception constituted a failure to make reasonable accommodation as required by § 3604(f)(3)(B) and, consequently, was an act of discrimination as defined in the Fair Housing Amendments Act.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; an accommodation is unreasonable if it imposes undue financial or administrative burdens or fundamentally alters the program.

Liddy v. Cisneros · filed 1993-05-25(f)(3)(B)

The FHAA defines discrimination as “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations are necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... An accommodation in rules, policies or practices is not “reasonable” for purposes of the FHAA if it “either imposes undue financial and administrative burdens” on the entity making the accommodation, or “requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program.” ... For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Liddy has failed to show a likelihood of success of the merits regarding her claim that HUD’s refusal to create a preference or to grant an exception to the preference requirements currently in place on the basis of her medical need constitutes discrimination for which she may be afforded relief under the FHAA. Accordingly, her motion for preliminary injunction on the basis of the FHAA is denied.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires municipalities to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give handicapped persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

North Shore-Chicago Rehabilitation Inc. v. Village of Skokie · filed 1993-07-09(f)(3)(B)

Section 804(f)(3)(B) of the Fair Housing Act, as amended, makes it unlawful for municipalities such as Skokie to fail to make “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services ... necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) reaches covered landlords’ refusal to make reasonable accommodations, but does not itself impose a duty on municipalities to alter zoning ordinances for an exempt single-family house.

Pulcinella v. Ridley Township · filed 1993-07-26(f)(3)(B)

I think that a proper reading of subsection (f)(3)(B) refers only to a refusal by landlords to make reasonable accommodations in rules, practices, et cetera. Obviously, it applies only to those single family dwelling houses covered by the FHAA. Landlords, such as Mrs. Dobrikovie, under the exemption of section 3603(b) are not required to make any accommodation, reasonable or otherwise. The statute by its wording exempts “any single-family house” that otherwise qualifies for the exemption. Because 717 Mount Vernon Avenue, Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, is a single family house that does qualify under the Act for the exemption, the house is entirely exempt from the strictures of the FHAA so far as being required to provide reasonable accommodations to a handicapped person. Neither the house nor the owner is subject to FHAA. It appears illogical to contend, as do the plaintiffs, that nevertheless the Township Zoning Ordinance must allow a variance so that an addition to the house may be built to accommodate Mr. Pulcinella’s handicap.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable changes to zoning rules when needed to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and does not require a causal link between the rule and the disability.

United States v. City of Philadelphia, Pa. · filed 1993-11-19(f)(3)(B)

Section 3604(f)(3) contains an independent definition of “discrimination” — a definition not modified by the phrase “because of ... handicap” found in §§ 3604(f)(1) & (2). Thus the language of § 3604(f) does not suggest that to establish a Fair Housing Act violation, a plaintiff must show a “causal nexus” between the challenged provision and the handicaps of the prospective residents.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing a necessary reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services as discrimination when the accommodation is needed to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Thornton v. City of Allegan · filed 1993-12-20(f)(3)(B)

The Court recognizes that with regard to- a person with a handicap the FHAA defines “discrimination” as including the “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). However, the Court finds that Defendant has made reasonable accommodations and Plaintiffs have set forth no evidence to the contrary. It is disingenuous for Plaintiffs to argue that Defendant’s making of “reasonable accommodations” requires that Defendant grant Plaintiffs application for the special use permit. Such an interpretation would give handicapped persons carte blanche to determine where and how they would live regardless of zoning ordinances to the contrary. Certainly, this is not what Congress intended when it defined “discrimination” to include not making “reasonable accommodations.” Cities retain the power to enforce zoning ordinances which are not “unduly burdensome” to handicapped persons.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; a municipality may require neutral, lawful procedures unless resort to them would be futile.

United States v. Village of Palatine, Illinois, Matthew Klein, Dick Kozdras · filed 1994-10-11(f)(3)(B)

On appeal the Village argues, among other things, that it cannot be found to have failed in its obligation to make a reasonable accommodation necessary to afford the residents of Oxford House-Mallard an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their dwelling because Oxford House-Mallard never invoked the procedures that would allow the Village to make such an accommodation. We agree. ... To the extent that the plaintiffs federal suit alleges that the Village did not make a reasonable accommodation in its application of its zoning laws to Oxford House-Mallard, the issue is not ripe. ... However, determining whether a requested accommodation is reasonable requires, among other things, balancing the needs of the parties involved. ... In this case the burden on the inhabitants of Oxford House-Mallard imposed by the public hearing—which they need not attend—does not outweigh the Village’s interest in applying its facially neutral law to all applicants for a special use approval. ... Even though Palatine’s procedures do not themselves violate the Act, plaintiff need not resort to them if such resort is manifestly futile. ... In a case such as this, where plaintiffs sole argument is that the Village failed to make a reasonable accommodation under the Act, the Village must be afforded an opportunity to make such an accommodation pursuant to its own lawful procedures—unless it is clear that the result of such procedures is foredoomed, which is not the case here—before plaintiff will have a ripe claim.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) makes a refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation discriminatory only when the accommodation is necessary to afford a person with disabilities equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Md. · filed 1996-01-19(f)(3)(B)

Under § 3604(f)(3)(B), a refusal to make reasonable accommodations is discriminatory only when “such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped person] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”

Section 3604(f)(2) bars disability discrimination in providing services or facilities connected with renting a dwelling, and § 3604(f)(3) treats refusal of necessary reasonable accommodations for equal use and enjoyment as discrimination.

Rakuz v. Spunt · filed 1995-08-24(f)(2), (f)(3)

The trustee has reasonably accommodated the plaintiff and has afforded him the “equal opportunity to use and enjoy [his apartment],” satisfying the requirements of the FHAA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires municipalities to make reasonable accommodations in their rules when necessary to give handicapped persons an equal opportunity for housing.

Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell · filed 1996-01-24(f)(3)(B)

But the Fair Housing Act is violated when a municipality refuses “to make reasonable accommodations” in its rules when “such accommodations may be necessary” to afford handicapped persons “equal opportunity” for housing.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires municipalities to make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities, but does not require every requested accommodation; reasonableness involves balancing the parties’ needs, and neutral procedures cannot be applied discriminatorily.

Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson · filed 1996-05-24(f)(3)(B)

But not every refusal to grant a conditional use permit, even if the request is reasonable, violates the FHAA. Also, a “procedure, neutral on its face, may not be applied in a discriminatory manner” and, as we have previously noted, “determining whether a requested accommodation is reasonable requires, among other things, balancing the needs of the parties involved.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a municipality to make reasonable accommodations in its zoning rules when necessary to give handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Hovsons, Inc. v. Township Of Brick · filed 1996-07-18(f)(3)(B)

We hold that under the facts in this case, § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires that the Township of Brick permit Hovsons to proceed with its plans to build a nursing home in its R-R-2 zone.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations for a person with a handicap, but does not require landlords to evict an existing tenant and her children to accommodate a disabled tenant.

Toni Temple v. Gunsalus · filed 1996-09-20(f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate in the rental of a dwelling place, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such a rental, based on an individual's handicap. "Discrimination," in this context, includes "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling...." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... The district court concluded that "[s]uch an accommodation [eviction of the Spaniers] is not required by either federal or state housing discrimination laws, particularly in light of the fact that Spanier was the prior tenant and that her greatest fault appears to be the habit of keeping her premises meticulously clean." We agree. ... "The requirement of reasonable accommodation does not entail an obligation to do everything humanly possible to accommodate a disabled person," see Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir.1995), and in the case at bar we are not persuaded that the requirement could be found to have entailed an obligation to deprive Ms. Spanier and her children of their accommodations.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B)'s reasonable-accommodation duty does not require adjustments that substantially or fundamentally alter an existing program or impose an undue hardship or substantial burden.

Salute v. Greens · filed 1996-03-21(f)(3)(B)

Although the reasonable accommodations provision can and often will require a landlord to incur some expense, it does not require adjustments or modifications to existing programs that would be substantial, or would fundamentally alter the nature of the program, or pose an undue hardship or substantial burden.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) places the burden of proving a reasonable-accommodation violation on the plaintiff, including proof that the requested accommodation was reasonable.

Elderhaven Inc v. City of Lubbock TX · filed 1996-10-11(f)(3)(B)

Initially, we reject the suggestion of certain courts that a Fair Housing Act defendant bears the burden of proof on the question of reasonableness.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not require a landlord to construct an entirely new facility as a reasonable accommodation of a rule, policy, practice, or service.

Rodriguez v. 551 West 157th Street Owners Corp. · filed 1998-01-27(f)(3)(B)

However, the plain language of the statute defines this requirement in terms of reasonable accommodations in “rules, policies, practices, or services,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) and, by contrast with § 3604(f)(2), notably fails to mention “facilities.” To undertake to construct an entirely new facility in an existing building does not, under these circumstances, qualify as an “accommodation” of a “rule, policy, practice or service,” when the term “construction” is nowhere to be found and the term “facility” is excluded.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not require a landlord to accept Section 8 tenants as a reasonable accommodation when the requested accommodation addresses economic disadvantage rather than a need caused by the tenant's disability.

Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments · filed 1998-02-05(f)(3)(B)

Economic discrimination--such as the refusal to accept Section 8 tenants--is not cognizable as a failure to make reasonable accommodations, in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not require invalidating neutral safety guidelines when reasonable exceptions provide meaningful access to the housing and services.

United States v the Hillhaven Corp · filed 1997-02-07(f)(3)(B)

The guidelines are not an outright ban on the use of motorized carts but restrict their use in selected common areas at meal times.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable modifications to disability-related rules unless the modification would impose an undue burden or fundamentally alter the program.

Green v Housing Authority of Clackamas County · filed 1998-02-19(f)(3)(B)

The intent of Title II, the FHA and § 504 was to balance inequities.

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) prohibits disability discrimination in housing services or facilities, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Gittleman v. Woodhaven Condominium Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1997-08-12(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

The Association’s failure to promulgate appropriate rules despite its apparent ability to do so is precisely the type of conduct regulated by the FHAA.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing a reasonable accommodation in a generally applicable zoning rule or policy as potentially discriminatory when the accommodation may be necessary to give people with handicaps an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Keys Youth Services, Inc. v. City of Olathe, Kan. · filed 1999-02-23(f)(3)(B)

The FHA defines discrimination to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... In contrast, in the instant case, Keys challenges defendants’ failure to change an ordinance that is generally applicable. A reasonable accommodation claim appears to be appropriate. ... Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, plaintiff arguably has alleged a violation of the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal to make reasonable accommodations necessary for equal use and enjoyment as discrimination; however, no accommodation is required to create a housing opportunity unavailable to persons without disabilities.

Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town Of North Hempstead · filed 1999-04-16(f)(1) (f)(3)(B)

The FHA makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), and the statute defines discrimination to include "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... We agree with the district court that if a building permit would not be granted even for comparable "traditional" residences (that is, residences where persons without disabilities can live) in the relevant area, a municipality is not required to make accommodations that would facilitate a building permit for housing designed for the disabled. ... Because reasonable accommodations are not required where comparable housing opportunities for persons without disabilities have not been shown to exist, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires an accommodation for the plaintiffs themselves; accommodating another applicant or merely making an assisted-living facility theoretically possible is insufficient.

Assisted Living Associates of Moorestown, L.L.C. v. Moorestown Township · filed 1998-04-09(f)(3)(B)

The obligation to make reasonable accommodations under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) for Plaintiffs is not, on the facts before me, satisfied by making such accommodations for ... applicant.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a handicap-related reasonable accommodation and does not give protected persons carte blanche to disregard local zoning rules.

Advocacy and Resource Center v. Town of Chazy · filed 1999-08-11(f)(3)(B)

The accommodation sought must be related to the disability: the FHA does not grant protected classes carte blanche in determining where they can live in total disregard of local zoning codes.

Section 3604(f)(3) requires an individualized reasonable-accommodation inquiry and does not make accommodations involving non-service animals per se unreasonable.

Janush v. Charities Housing Development Corp. · filed 2000-06-22(f)(3)

Even if plaintiffs animals do not qualify as service animals, defendants have not established that there is no duty to reasonably accommodate non-service animals.

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) prohibits handicap discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the proposed accommodation is reasonable.

Howard Groner and Metropolitan Strategy Group v. Golden Gate Gardens Apartments · filed 2001-05-25(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against "any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale orrental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling," on the basis of that person's handicap. 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2)(A). Discrimination prohibited by the Act includes the refusal to make reasonable accommodations in "rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [the handicapped individual an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(B). ... Based on this court's own precedents and the weight of other authorities, we conclude that the plaintiff in a Fair Housing Act case has the burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) permits a claim against a zoning board for refusing a reasonable accommodation, and § 3604 does not limit civil actions to a narrower category of defendants.

Cohen v. Township of Cheltenham, Pennsylvania · filed 2001-11-15(f)(3)(B)

At the outset, the Court notes that 42 U.S.C. § 3604 does not limit the defendants who may be sued in a civil action. ... The Board clearly has authority to grant the requested reasonable accommodation. Plaintiffs may therefore allege that, by its failure to grant plaintiffs’ requested accommodation, the Board violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable housing accommodation unless it would impose an undue financial or administrative burden or fundamentally alter the zoning scheme, and the accommodation is necessary when its absence would deny disabled persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

United States v. City of Jackson, Mississippi · filed 2002-10-23(f)(3)(B)

An accommodation is “reasonable” under the FHAA unless it imposes an undue financial and administrative burden on the defendant or requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program at issue, which in this case is the City’s zoning scheme. Mem. Op., p. 34. ... In its initial liability decision, this court applied a “plain reading” to the language of § 804(f)(3)(B) of the FHAA and concluded that the necessity requirement “is satisfied when, absent an accommodation * * *, handicapped persons would be denied ‘equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’ ” Mem. Op., p. 40.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services as discrimination when the accommodation is necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Landmark Properties v. Olivo · filed 2004-07-06(f)(3)(B)

A refusal “to make reasonable accommodations in [the] rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodation may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” constitutes discrimination pursuant to the Fair Housing Act (42 USC § 3604 [f] [3] [B]; 24 CFR 100.204).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires public agencies to reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities by modifying administrative rules and policies when necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

McGary v. City of Portland · filed 2004-10-27(f)(3)(B)

It is well-settled that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) imposes an “affirmative duty” on public agencies to reasonably accommodate disabled individuals by modifying administrative rules and policies.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits refusing a reasonable and necessary accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services when needed to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Astralis Condominium Ass'n v. Secretary, United States Department of Housing & Urban Development Ex Rel. García-Guillén · filed 2010-09-16(f)(3)(B)

The FHAA prohibits discriminatory housing practices based on a person's handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). ... Discrimination includes a "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [handicapped persons] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Disparate treatment and disparate impact do not comprise the entire universe of pathways to FHAA liability. As the Supreme Court explained, "[d]iscrimination covered by the FHA[A] includes a refusal to make reasonable accommodations." City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 729 (1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the ALJ correctly deduced that a failure to make reasonable accommodations can pave the way to FHAA liability.

In zoning cases, § 3604(f)(3)(B)'s reference to “a dwelling” means a generic dwelling in a residential area, not a specific dwelling chosen by a person with a disability.

McKIVITZ v. Township of Stowe · filed 2010-12-22(f)(3)(B)

Consequently, the Court construes the phrase “a dwelling,” when employed in the zoning context, to mean a generic dwelling located in a residential area rather than a specific dwelling of a particular handicapped individual’s own choosing.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) covers reasonable accommodations involving all types of assistance animals, including animals that support mental disabilities, without requiring specialized training.

Fair Housing of the Dakotas, Inc. v. Goldmark Property Management, Inc. · filed 2011-03-30(f)(3)(B)

The Court finds the FHA encompasses all types of assistance animals regardless of training, including those that ameliorate a physical disability and those that ameliorate a mental disability.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Stevens v. Hollywood Towers & Condominium Ass'n · filed 2011-12-29(f)(3)(B)

The question of whether Defendants restrictions on Mary Jo’s access to the building’s entrances and exits while with the service animal were reasonable is a thin thread upon which to hang a case, but the Court hesitates to resolve this issue without a more complete factual record. ... The question of whether an accommodation is reasonable is a question of fact “determined by a close examination of the particular circumstances.” ... However, at this point, the Court will allow Plaintiffs’ claims under the FHAA and IHRA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to go forward, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III is denied.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a plaintiff seeking a reasonable accommodation to prove that the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation.

Dubois v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua · filed 2006-07-12(f)(3)(B)

To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3), a plaintiff must prove all of the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff or his associate is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); California Mobile Home, 107 F.3d at 1380; HUD v. Riverbay Corp., HUDALJ 02-93-0320-1 (Sept. 8, 1994). ... The Condominium Association never required Einstein to leave and thus never refused to make the requested accommodation, which is one of the essential elements of the FHA claim. ... Since the Condominium Association never refused to make the requested accommodation, plaintiffs’ FHA claim necessarily failed. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)(B), 3613(a)(1)(A) (requiring a defendant to “refus[e] to make reasonable accommodations” before a plaintiff can file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 3613); see also Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 602 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] violation [of the FHA] occurs when the disabled resident is first denied a reasonable accommodation. . . .”).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits refusing a reasonable accommodation, and a denial violates the Act when first made even if the defendant later takes remedial steps.

United States v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-03-14(f)(3)(B)

The Act is violated when a reasonable accommodation is first denied, regardless of remedial steps that may be taken later.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a requested housing accommodation to alleviate needs caused by a disability so that disabled persons have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island · filed 2008-10-08(f)(3)(B)

We agree that § 3604(f) plainly requires the plaintiffs to show that the accommodation they requested actually alleviates the effects of a handicap. To explain why, we turn, once again, to the language of the statute. The FHA’s reasonable accommodation provision requires only those accommodations that “may be necessary . . . to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphases added). The word “equal” is a relative term that requires a comparator to have meaning. In this context, “equal opportunity” can only mean that handicapped people must be afforded the same (or “equal”) opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling as non-handicapped people, which occurs when accommodations address the needs created by the handicaps.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits refusing reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; the court held the claim implausible where no accommodation was requested or shown necessary.

Gorham-Dimaggio v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2008-12-17(f)(3)(B)

Plaintiffs second claim under the FHA arises under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, “Discrimination in the Sale or Renting of Houses or other Prohibited Practices,” which makes it unlawful to “refus[e] to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Plaintiffs claim under the FHA that Defendants failed to make a reasonable accommodation is similarly without merit. Plaintiff has not established the elements for a discrimination claim because Plaintiff has not alleged that any request for an accommodation was ever made, or how any accommodation from the Defendants would have prevented her from defaulting on the loan. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a plausible claim for failure to make a reasonable accommodation, and both FHA claims must be dismissed.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing accommodation to be necessary to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Sun Harbor Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bonura · filed 2012-06-13(f)(3)(B)

The letter does not state how she is qualified, the limitations and difficulties she was suffering from, why she is entitled to the dog, or that the dog that occupied the residence was “necessary ... to afford [the plaintiff] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” due to her disability, as opposed to just desirable and helpful. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires accommodations that are necessary to give people with disabilities the same housing opportunities as people without disabilities, but does not require creating better or additional opportunities.

Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center, Inc. v. Saint George City · filed 2012-07-03(f)(3)(B)

What does it mean to be “necessary”? The word implies more than something merely helpful or conducive. It suggests instead something “indispensable,” “essential,” something that “cannot be done without.” ... Put simply, the statute requires accommodations that are necessary (or indispensable or essential) to achieving the objective of equal housing opportunities between those with disabilities and those without. ... But while the FHA requires accommodations necessary to ensure the disabled receive the same housing opportunities as everybody else, it does not require more or better opportunities. ... The law requires accommodations overcoming barriers, imposed by the disability, that prevent the disabled from obtaining a housing opportunity others can access.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits refusing a reasonable accommodation necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; the court held there was no violation because Habitat did not refuse the requested accommodation.

Al Jefferson Davis v. Habitat for Humanity of Bay County, Inc. · filed 2014-02-28(f)(3)(B)

The Davises cannot prove discrimination under the FHA because there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Habitat refused to make the requested accommodation of allowing the Davises to communicate with Habitat about needed modifications.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give people with handicaps an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Oxford Investments, L.P. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2014-05-15(f)(3)(B)

Discrimination is explicitly defined to include “refusals] to make reasonable accommodations in the rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Thus, to succeed on a reasonable accommodations claim, a plaintiff must show that the requested accommodation was “(1) reasonable and (2) necessary to (3) afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.” ... A “plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the requested accommodation is necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling ...” ... Only after a plaintiff makes this showing does the burden shift, and a defendant is required to demonstrate that the requested accommodation is unreasonable. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Oxford, the Court concludes that Oxford has failed to carry its initial burden by demonstrating the requested accommodation was necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the Property. ... Without evidence that the expansion would be necessary to the continued financial viability of the Property, Oxford has failed to demonstrate that the requested accommodation was necessary.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires only reasonable disability accommodations necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; it does not require an indefinite eviction delay for a person with no potentially valid contractual or legal basis to live there.

Von Beltz v. Bentley Homes CA2/2 · filed 2014-09-05(f)(3)(B)

Although individuals with disabilities are to be granted accommodations necessary to afford them “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” (42 U.S.C. § 3604, subd. (f)(3)(B)), no provision of the FHA provides an entitlement for an individual to use and enjoy a dwelling in which the individual has no potentially valid basis to live. ... Likewise, it would not be reasonable to require a property owner—who has validly acquired title and succeeded in a unlawful detainer action—to suffer a financial burden by indefinitely delaying eviction of a person to whom he or she has no ongoing contractual or legal obligation. ... In sum, defendants had no obligation to indefinitely delay plaintiff’s eviction. Therefore, plaintiff’s FHA claim could not succeed, and nonsuit was properly granted.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing a reasonable accommodation in housing rules, policies, practices, or services as unlawful disability discrimination when the accommodation may be necessary to provide an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Perkins v. Metropolitan Council, Metro HRA · filed 2014-05-23(f)(3)(B)

Under the FHAA, unlawful disability discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... “In the FHAA context, a requested accommodation is unreasonable when it fundamentally alters the nature of the program or imposes undue financial or administrative burdens.” ... Given Metro HRA’s requirement to comply with HUD regulations, the court concludes that excusing Perkins’s eviction for the serious lease violation and reinstating Section 8 benefits would likely not have been a reasonable accommodation for Perkins’s disabilities.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats a zoning variance as a reasonable accommodation in a rule or policy and does not categorically bar restoration conditions; whether the condition is reasonable depends on the facts.

Austin v. Town of Farmington · filed 2016-06-21(f)(3)(B)

However, a plain reading of the statute reveals that there is no per se rule against land-use regulators including restoration provisions in zoning variances or other land-use accommodations. ... Subsection (B) contains nothing, either directly or by negative inference, outlawing restoration provisions.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to make a reasonable accommodation when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, including an assistance animal when the applicant demonstrates a nexus between the animal’s assistance and the documented disability.

Kennedy House, Inc. v. Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations · filed 2016-07-11(f)(3)(B)

However, based on the language in HUD’s Interpretive Rule, and the cases, it is the burden of the individual with the disability to demonstrate a nexus between his or her disability and the function the service animal provides or, in other words, a connection to the disability-related assistance provided by the assistance animal. Under the specific facts in this case, we agree with Kennedy House that Ms. Rubin has not sufficiently met her burden of demonstrating a nexus between her disability and the assistance provided by Mira.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, including during the move-out process.

Wright v. Mishawaka Housing Authority · filed 2016-12-01(f)(3)(B)

Last, the accommodation must promote “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). It’s at this level that MHA argues the kind of accommodation allegedly requested falls outside the protections of the FHAA; evicting someone from her home and removing her property isn’t related to “using and enjoying a dwelling.” ... Unlike the phrase “otherwise make unavailable ..., a dwelling,”, the phrase “to use and enjoy a dwelling” in the definition of “discrimination” is more expansive, and must encompass the process of moving out of a unit at the expiration or termination of a tenant’s lease. ... The landlord’s duty to provide reasonable accommodation must extend until the tenant and her possessions are gone. ... Removing and destroying a tenant’s personal property from her unit might impact her ability to use and enjoy the dwelling. It’s plausible that MHA’s alleged unwillingness to accommodate Ms. Wright blocked her “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling,” and so it’s plausibly “discrimination” under the FHAA. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing a reasonable accommodation in a rule, policy, practice, or service as handicap discrimination when the accommodation may be necessary to give a person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Edwards v. Gene Salter Properties · filed 2016-12-19(f)(3)(B)

We conclude, however, that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that defendants violated the FHA by failing to make a reasonable accommodation necessary to afford them the equal opportunity to rent an apartment from defendants. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (stating that handicap discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling”). Plaintiffs may be able to show that the requested accommodation was reasonable, even if the inability to comply with defendants’ policy for documenting income was not caused by Edwards’s handicap.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in housing and permits a constructive-denial finding when the provider fails to conduct a timely, meaningful review of the request.

Bone v. Village Club, Inc. · filed 2016-10-12(f)(3)(B)

Pursuant to the FHA, discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... As a result, Capezza identifies sufficient record evidence to allow a factfinder to conclude that Defendants constructively denied Capezza’s request for accommodation. Because Defendants do not otherwise challenge Capezza’s ability to establish her failure-to-accommodate claims, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on those claims (Counts I, III, V, VI, VII, VIII).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable accommodation when it is necessary to give people with disabilities equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling; the court found that allowing at least six recovering people to live together in an Oxford House met that requirement.

Oxford House, Inc. v. Browning · filed 2017-07-24(f)(3)(B)

Therefore, the requested accommodation is “necessary” within the meaning of the statute because residency in an Oxford House directly ameliorates the effects of alcoholism and drug addiction, and at least six otherwise unrelated individuals who are recovering from alcoholism or drug addiction must reside together in a dwelling in order to achieve these ameliorative effects.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations only when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; it does not require accommodations for financial conditions unrelated to disability.

Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County, Inc. · filed 2017-07-24(f)(3)(B)

Taken together, the Court concludes the law of this Circuit does not require accommodations for a disabled person’s financial condition when those accommodations would not have been made for a non-disabled person.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations for a person with a disability, and the reasonableness of a requested accommodation and the basis for denying it may present factual questions for a jury.

Mengistu v. Hacla · filed 2018-07-20(f)(3)(B)

There is no dispute that HACLA was required to reasonably accommodate Appellant’s disability. The agency’s reason for denying a particular accommodation and the reasonableness of a particular accommodation are material questions of fact which turn “on the individual circumstances of each case.” ... In this case, Mr. Mengistu produced sufficient medical documentation to defeat HACLA’s motion for summary judgment. Given the unique constraints on Mr. Mengistu’s ability to access external health facilities, a jury could reasonably find that Mr. Mengistu’s requested accommodation was reasonable and HACLA’s denial was not based on a failure to certify the need for the equipment.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations to housing rules or policies when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; alternatives that impose an additional burden may not substitute for the accommodation.

Edwards v. G. Salter Prop & Salter Const. · filed 2018-10-09(f)(3)(B)

Regarding Salter Properties, we conclude that plaintiffs have shown that the requested accommodation was necessary and reasonable. See Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (stating that handicap discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling”). We conclude that allowing a co-signer or prepaying the full lease term were not substitutes for accommodating plaintiffs, who had sufficient income to rent the apartment, because those options did not level the playing field but instead posed an additional burden on the disabled applicant.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires landlords to make reasonable changes to neutral rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary and reasonable to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Martinez v. Lexington Gardens Assocs., Dennis Ovalle, L.A. Equities Corp. · filed 2018-08-28(f)(3)(B)

Defendants' argument misstates Lexington Gardens' obligations under federal law, which expressly require deviations from neutral rules when necessary and reasonable under the circumstances.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits disability discrimination through refusal to make a reasonable accommodation necessary for equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Poursaied v. Reserve at Research Park LLC · filed 2019-05-13(f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits discriminating against a person on the basis of a 'handicap,' [footnote omitted] or a disability, by refusing to make reasonable accommodations when necessary to afford the person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ... In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that she is disabled pursuant to the FHA which is paramount to a claim under the Act. ... As a result, defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted as to plaintiff's claims under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Matter of Washington v. Olatoye · filed 2019-06-11(f)(3)(B)

Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), it is unlawful discrimination for a housing provider to "refus[e] to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling" (42 USC § 3604[f][3][B]). Federal regulations exempt "animals that assist, support, or provide service to persons with disabilities" from public housing authority pet rules (24 CFR § 960.705[a]). Accordingly, respondent is obligated by both federal law and its own rules to accommodate petitioner's request to maintain his emotional support animal, Onyx, so long as petitioner meets his burden of showing that his dog assists him with aspects of his disability.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusing a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services as discrimination when the accommodation is necessary to give a person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

RAMOS v. RARITAN VALLEY HABITAT FOR HUMANITY · filed 2019-09-12(f)(3)(B)

Under the FHA discrimination is defined as “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Next, the Court must undertake a reasonable accommodation analysis. To determine whether DCA failed to reasonably accommodate Plaintiffs under the FHA, RHA and ADA, the Court must consider: “1) whether Plaintiff[s’] requested accommodation/modification was necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and 2) whether Plaintiff[s’] requested accommodation was reasonable, or whether it imposed an undue hardship on [DCA].”