42 U.S.C. § 3604

Section 3604(c) requires an actual notice, statement, or advertisement indicating a discriminatory housing preference; discriminatory conduct alone does not qualify.

routhier v. benoit · filed 2024-05-09(c)

Case law under the analogous federal provision, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), makes unassailably clear that the “notice, statement, or advertisement” that must be made, printed, or published is some sort of actual notice, statement, or advertisement—the plain meaning prevails.

Section 3604(c) applies to discriminatory statements made to someone responding to an offer to rent property, even when the statements do not explicitly propose a transaction.

United States v. Racey · filed 1997-05-07(c)

We find Racey's assertion that her statements to Jackson were not commercial unpersuasive. While Racey did not explicitly propose a commercial transaction in the conversation itself, the purpose of Jack- son's call was to respond to Racey's offer to rent property. Therefore, we find that the statements were made in the context of a potential commercial transaction.

Section 3604(c) covers statements indicating racial preferences when they are related to a rental decision, including statements to an inspector whose approval is needed for the rental.

Campbell v. Robb · filed 2006-01-09(c)

Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Robb's statement to the Section 8 inspector was related to the decisional process of whether or not to rent to Campbell, and therefore made "with respect to" the rental within the meaning of § 3604(c).

Section 3604(c) can prohibit statements directed at an individual that convey a disability-based housing preference to an ordinary listener, even if that individual is not disabled under the FHA.

Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc. · filed 2015-06-02(c)

For the reasons that follow, we hold that section 3604(c) can be violated by statements targeted at an individual that convey to an ordinary listener that the individual is disabled. In other words, it is not determinative that the individual being addressed is or is not disabled under the FHA; what matters is whether the ordinary listener would understand the statements as considering her as such and expressing discrimination or a preference against her on that basis.

Section 3604(c) covers discriminatory statements directly related to renting a dwelling, including statements that condition a tenant’s continued occupancy on submitting to sexual harassment.

Hernandez · filed 2026-03-23(c)

The plain text of the statute and its regulatory interpretation suggest that Section 3604(c) applies only to those statements made in direct relation to the rental of a unit itself, and not to any discriminatory post-acquisition statements made by a landlord or rental agent. ... In sum, the court finds that Hernandez has sufficiently stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) based on her allegations that she must acquiesce to Kusper’s harassment to avoid eviction.

Section 3604(a), (b), and (d) prohibit race-based refusal or denial of housing, discrimination in rental terms or related services, and false representations that available housing is unavailable.

Cabrera v. Fischler · filed 1993-02-17(a), (b), and (d)

Prior to amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 states that it is unlawful ... “(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... “(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... “(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.”

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling or renting a dwelling, or in related services or facilities.

Boodram v. Maryland Farms Condominium · filed 1994-02-01

Even assuming Boodram could proceed under the Fair Housing Act, which only prohibits discriminating "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith," 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604, he has proffered no evidence to sustain such a challenge beyond broad generalizations and conclusory allegations.

Section 3604 prohibits refusing or limiting a dwelling rental because of race, discriminating in rental terms or privileges, and making racial preference statements about housing.

United States v. Hylton · filed 2013-05-08(a), (b), and (c)

Once a plaintiff produces direct evidence of discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show that they would have made the same decision regardless of discriminatory animus. ... Therefore, this court finds that Mr. Hylton violated section 3604(a). ... The court concludes that Mr. Hylton discriminated in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a rental, in violation of section 3604(b), in two ways. ... To determine whether an owner or renter’s statement indicates impermissible racial discrimination, the court asks whether the statement “suggests to an ordinary ... listener that a particular race is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question.” ... Therefore, Mr. Hylton violated section 3604(c).

Section 3604(b) covers discrimination in the provision of housing based on national origin, including when inferior housing is provided as a condition of employment.

Barot v. Aldon Management · filed 2019-03-31(b)

Nonetheless, Aldon alternatively argues that Plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Act claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiffs only allege “post-acquisition housing discrimination,” which, it contends, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) of the Act does not prohibit. ... the Court need not address the scope of § 3604(b) here. Plaintiffs have alleged in their complaint that Aldon discriminated against them in the provision of housing; specifically, they allege that Plaintiffs were provided with inferior housing on account of their national origin when Constante Barot was hired as a custodian. ... Those allegations fall within the scope of § 3604(b).

Section 3604(f) requires a failure-to-accommodate claim to allege disability, the defendant’s knowledge, and failure to reasonably accommodate; § 3604(b) bars race discrimination in rental terms, conditions, privileges, or related services.

Talley v. The Housing Authority of Cook County · filed 2022-12-14(f), (b)

The Fair Housing Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act all prohibit disability discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (FHA); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (RA). To state a claim on the basis of a failure to accommodate, plaintiffs must allege that they were disabled, that the Housing Authority was aware of their disability, and that the Housing Authority failed to reasonably accommodate them. ... The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with a rental. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Section 3604 discrimination claims require proof of an intent to discriminate.

Echemendia v. Gene B. Glick Management Corp. · filed 2008-02-06

An intent to discriminate is an essential element of both her discrimination and retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act.

Sections 3604(a) and (b) prohibit racial discrimination in housing, and a claimant must prove discriminatory intent to recover.

Gao v. Brickyard Apartments Ex Rel. Snyder, L.L.C. · filed 2012-11-08(a), (b)

Gao claims that the landlord engaged in racial discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b), as well as retaliation for his exercise of rights protected under the Fair Housing Act, see id. § 3617. ... To recover on his claims under the Fair Housing Act, he needed to prove discriminatory intent. ... Based on the scanty record before us, we have no basis to disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Gao’s landlord did not intentionally discriminate against him.

Section 3604 requires facts linking an alleged housing discrimination claim to a protected characteristic.

Dickey v. City of Boston · filed 2019-09-17

First, he does not proffer any evidence that the City Defendants intended to deprive him of his property because of his membership in a protected class or on the basis of his “race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin,” as required to show discriminatory intent under the FHA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605.

Section 3604 permits a housing discrimination claim when a protected applicant is denied an available housing opportunity, but credible nondiscriminatory reasons can defeat the claim.

Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp. · filed 1983-09-28(a)

Because she is a woman and is of Irish origin, Catherine is a member of a protected class under 42 U.S.C. § 3604. ... However, Odesser and the Cooperative have convinced me that their intent was not discriminatory but instead was based on subjective, non-discriminatory reasons.

Section 3604 claims require facts that plausibly connect the challenged housing conduct to race.

Hood v. Tessa Pope · filed 2015-10-01

Hood and Williams have failed to establish a plausible basis for a contention that any defendant’s behavior was discriminatory, and the district court properly dismissed all of their claims brought under § 3604.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in the terms or conditions of housing, and a claim requires facts supporting an inference that the treatment was motivated by protected-class status.

Stone v. 23rd Chelsea Associates, LLC · filed 2020-03-30(b)

Under section 3604(b) of the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). ... These vague allegations at best suggest that Defendants harbored an antipathy towards Plaintiff, but fall far short of raising an inference that they acted with “discriminatory animus” based on his membership in a protected class.

Section 3604(c) prohibits statements made in connection with renting a dwelling that indicate a preference based on familial status.

United States v. Grishman · filed 1993-04-07(c)

The Act also makes it illegal to make any statement in connection with renting a dwelling “that indicates any preference ... based on ... familial status____” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). ... These are statements indicating a “preference” based on familial status.

Section 3604(c) is not violated merely because a housing provider asks whether a prospective tenant has a child; the inquiry must indicate an impermissible preference in context.

Soules v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1992-06-25(a), (c)

We agree with the respondents that, standing alone, an inquiry into whether a prospective tenant has a child does not constitute an FHA violation.

Section 3604(c) prohibits statements about a dwelling that an ordinary listener would understand as indicating a preference or limitation against people because of familial status, including parents living with minor children.

White, Shelia v. HUD · filed 2007-02-02(c)

To determine whether a statement indicates impermissible discrimination on the basis of familial status, an “ordinary listener” standard is used. ... The inquiry under this objective standard is whether the alleged statement would suggest to an “ordinary listener” that a person with a particular familial status is preferred or disfavored for the housing in question. ... Rather, Wooten’s statements would indicate to an ordinary listener that Wooten disfavored White on the basis of her familial status. ... We conclude that White has demonstrated that Wooten’s statements indicate disfavor for her familial status because her statements would allow an “ordinary listener” to infer she had a preference against White due to her familial status. ... Accordingly, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that White failed to establish a violation of §3604(c), and we reverse the decision against her on this claim.

Section 3604(a) prohibits attempting to make a dwelling unavailable to a family because it has a child.

United States v. Lepore · filed 1991-12-23(a)

3. By acting to evict Charles and Lori Meiler and their infant child from the L & L Mobile Home Park, defendants have attempted to “make unavailable or deny” a dwelling on the basis of familial status in violation of the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits housing discrimination based on handicap, § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations related to a handicap, and § 3604(f)(9) preserves a direct-threat limitation; whether those provisions applied to the requested group-home occupancy depended on evidence.

Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany · filed 1993-04-16(f)(1), (f)(3)(B), (f)(9)

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in housing based upon a handicap of an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The Act also requires that a reasonable accommodation be made to allow handicapped individuals to partake in the housing options available. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Of course, the question of what living conditions are necessary to a particular handicap (as opposed to the question of what accommodations are reasonable) is a factual determination which the court cannot make at this juncture. Rather, evidence must be presented by the parties which persuades the trier of fact that the living conditions proposed by the plaintiffs are required by their handicap. Because the court cannot begin to determine this question, it is incapable of assessing “likelihood of success on the merits.” Nonetheless, the existence of this question in the context of the instant case leads the court to conclude that there exist sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief. Therefore, on this ground alone the court finds sufficient reason to grant a preliminary injunction. ... Whether the occupancy of these Oxford House groups in the numbers they seek constitutes a “direct threat to the health and safety of other individuals” is not answered simply because it is proscribed by a local ordinance enacted pursuant to the City’s police power. Rather, the court is again faced by a determination which will turn on the evidence and legal arguments produced by the parties during the litigation. Presumably, this will answer the .dual question of whether the plaintiffs’ desired occupancy will present a direct threat to the health and safety of others and whether the Grouper Law is a reasonable local ordinance addressing maximum occupancy of a dwelling. The court does find, nonetheless, that this matter presents sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief. Therefore, on this ground the court again finds sufficient reason to grant a preliminary injunction.

Section 3604(f)(9) does not permit denying housing to a person posing a direct threat until the provider first makes reasonable accommodations that could eliminate or acceptably minimize the risk.

Roe v. Sugar River Mills Associates · filed 1993-05-12(f)(9)

The Court is persuaded that plaintiffs position is both better reasoned and more consistent with the express provisions and goals of the Act. Plaintiffs position also finds support in applicable legislative history. ... Accordingly, assuming plaintiff is handicapped, the Act requires defendants to demonstrate that no “reasonable accommodation” will eliminate or acceptably minimize the risk he poses to other residents at Sugar River Mills, before they may lawfully evict him.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of disability, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable zoning accommodations necessary for equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; the court held the eight-person rule was valid and that the residents' failure to seek a variance defeated their accommodation claim.

Oxford House-C, an Unincorporated Association Oxford House, Inc., a Delaware Not-For-Profit Corporation… · filed 1996-02-23(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

The Act prohibits the City from making a dwelling unavailable to handicapped people on the basis of their handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). In fact, the Act requires the City to make reasonable accommodations in its generally applicable zoning ordinances when necessary to give a handicapped person "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d 920, 924 (6th Cir.1993). ... We conclude the eight-person rule is rational. Cities have a legitimate interest in decreasing congestion, traffic, and noise in residential areas, and ordinances restricting the number of unrelated people who may occupy a single family residence are reasonably related to these legitimate goals. ... Also, the City did not fail to accommodate the Oxford Houses as the Act requires. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). The Oxford Houses want the City to let them operate with more than eight residents. The City has consistently said it cannot make an exception to the zoning code unless the Oxford Houses apply to the City's Board of Adjustments for a variance, see St. Louis, Mo., Rev.Code tit. 26, § 26.84.050(D) (1994), and the Oxford Houses refuse to apply. Their refusal is fatal to their reasonable accommodation claim. ... Thus, the Oxford Houses must apply if they want the City to accommodate them. We express no opinion about whether the Fair Housing Act would require the City to grant variances for the Oxford Houses if they apply.

Section 3604(f) requires a plaintiff to prove a mental impairment and intentional housing discrimination because of that impairment; the defendant may show a direct threat and reasonable measures addressing it.

Schroeder v. De Bertolo · filed 1996-08-21(f)

Under the FHAA, a plaintiff has the burden of proving first that the plaintiff suffered from a mental impairment, as defined by the statute, and second, that defendants intentionally discriminated against plaintiff because of her mental impairment, in violation of plaintiffs housing rights. If plaintiff proves those two elements, defendants may nevertheless demonstrate that plaintiff caused a direct threat to the health and safety of the other residents of the communal living area, and that defendants took reasonable measures to accommodate plaintiffs threat.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) addresses facially neutral laws that unintentionally burden people with disabilities and requires reasonable accommodations when necessary for equal housing opportunity.

Childrens Alliance v. City of Bellevue · filed 1997-01-08(f)(3)(B)

The Court concludes that the statute envisions situations where a facially neutral law unintentionally burdens a handicapped individual because the individual cannot comply with some of its requirements due to his or her handicap.

Section 3604(f)(2) requires discrimination because of handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) does not require waiving a licensing rule specifically directed at protecting disabled residents.

Williams-Batchelder v. Quasim · filed 2000-08-25(f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

Thus, Batchelder’s reasonable accommodation argument fails.

Section 3604(f) prohibits handicap discrimination in housing and does not permit treating a disabled tenant as a direct threat based solely on a violent act; the direct-threat exception requires an individualized assessment that considers the risk and whether reasonable modifications can mitigate it.

Sinisgallo v. Town of Islip Housing Authority · filed 2012-05-23(f)(2)(A), (f)(9)

Although the FHA provides an exception for landlords for providing a reasonable accommodation to a tenant who “constitute^] a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damages to the property of others”, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9), the fact that a disabled individual committed a violent act does not automatically warrant a finding that they constitute a “direct threat”.

Section 3604(f)(9) permits excluding a disabled tenant whose tenancy would pose a direct threat only after the housing authority assesses whether a reasonable accommodation can eliminate or acceptably minimize the risk.

Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters · filed 2009-01-07(f)(9)

Accordingly, before a federally assisted public housing authority such as the BHA may lawfully evict a disabled tenant who requests a reasonable accommodation as posing a threat to others, it must either demonstrate the failure of an accommodation instituted at the request of the tenant, or demonstrate that no reasonable accommodation will acceptably minimize the risk the tenant poses to other residents.

Section 3604(f)(2) bars handicap discrimination in housing, while the accommodation provisions require equal housing opportunity subject to § 3604(f)(9)'s direct-threat limitation.

Diltz v. Ashton · filed 2022-07-06(f)(2), (f)(3)(B), (f)(9)

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such a dwelling, because of a handicap of that person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(b). Nothing, however, “requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9); 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(d). Here, while defendants Mid-Atlantic and LPC had an obligation to make reasonable accommodations when necessary to afford handicapped individuals equal opportunities in housing, they also had discretion to deny the Ashton defendants’ accommodation request if Luna posed a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals. See id. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied on the issue of preemption.

Section 3604(f)(9) permits eviction for a direct threat only if no reasonable accommodation can eliminate or acceptably minimize the risk to others.

Roe v. Housing Authority of City of Boulder · filed 1995-12-26(f)(9)

I agree with the rationale in Sugar River Mills and hold that, assuming Roe is handicapped or disabled, before he may lawfully be evicted BHA must demonstrate that no “reasonable accommodation” will eliminate or acceptably minimize any risk Roe poses to other residents at Northport.

Section 3604 addresses discrimination by housing and services providers against tenants and potential tenants.

Hotel St. George Associates v. Morgenstern · filed 1993-04-20

Plaintiffs discrimination claim is also not permitted under the Fair Housing Act which concerns discrimination by providers of housing, such as owners, landlords, and municipal service providers against tenants and potential tenants.

Section 3604 does not reach an entity that neither provides housing nor directly participates in housing-related services.

Jones v Office of Comptroller of Currency · filed 1997-10-23(a)

In the absence of any direct participation in the provision of housing or housing services, the OCC cannot engage in discriminatory housing practices under Title VIII and plaintiff may not proceed against the OCC under 42 U.S.C. § 3613.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable because of handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable zoning accommodations that give disabled persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon · filed 1993-04-28(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

Applying § 213-1 of the Town Code to evict plaintiffs would discriminate against them because of their handicap. ... Therefore, a finding of a violation of the Town Code leading to the town’s eviction of plaintiffs from a dwelling due to the size or transient nature of plaintiffs’ group living arrangement actually or predictably results in discrimination. ... Because an Oxford House cannot exist in a single family, residential district under the Town Code, a modification of the definition of a “family” in plaintiffs’ situation is warranted so that they may have the same opportunity to rent a house as do persons without handicaps. ... Accordingly, even if the Court did not find that defendant’s conduct had a disparate impact on plaintiffs, there is nevertheless no genuine issue of material fact -with regard to defendant’s violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), and plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment would be granted on this ground as well.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie Fair Housing Act case by showing that a lender's conduct had a racially discriminatory effect, even without proving discriminatory motive.

Steptoe v. Savings of America · filed 1992-08-24(a), (b)

plaintiffs have certainly made out a ... prima facie ... case that SOA’s conduct had, at the very least, a racially discriminatory effect on the Steptoes and, possibly, all other potential borrowers who wished to purchase homes in the Old West End.

A § 3604 violation may be established through discriminatory intent or disparate impact in a municipality's treatment of housing for people with handicaps.

Support Ministries for Persons With Aids, Inc. v. Village of Waterford · filed 1992-12-04(f)(1), (f)(9)

A violation of section 3604 of the FHA can be proven by showing either “discriminatory intent” or “disparate impact.”

Section 3604(f) is not violated when a city applies the same zoning limits to a group home and to nonhandicapped residents and permits the proposed use in other districts.

City of St. Joseph v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc. · filed 1993-06-15(f)

Even assuming, arguendo, that individuals recovering from alcohol and drug abuse are handicapped for purposes of the Fair Housing Act, as accepted in ... there was no violation of the Act in the case at bar because the record does not reflect that anything was denied to those recovering from alcohol and drug abuse that is allowed to “non-handicapped” individuals under the City’s zoning laws.

Section 3604(a) allows a disparate-impact housing claim without proof of discriminatory intent when the challenged practice has a discriminatory effect.

Snyder v. Barry Realty Inc. · filed 1996-12-12(a)

Accordingly, the court finds that the Snyders have sufficiently established a prima facie case of familial status discrimination under a disparate impact theory.

Section 3604(a) permits disparate-impact claims only when a challenged policy or practice causes the disparity, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) treats refusal of necessary reasonable accommodations as disability discrimination.

Resources for Human Development, Inc. v. Lower Providence Township · filed 2025-03-27(a), (f)(3)(B)

The FHAA extends the protections of the FHA to individuals with disabilities and requires local land use boards to make “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies [and] practices” when reviewing proposals for supportive housing. ... Moreover, even if it had, RHD would have to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing reasonable accommodation claims in court. ... Indeed, the FHA encompasses disparate-impact claims. ... The Complaint lacks any allegations to show this necessary causal link. It does not identify any specific Township policy or practice that could be evaluated under the FHA’s disparate-impact framework.

Section 3604(a) prohibits refusing to rent, making a dwelling unavailable, or denying it because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; conclusory allegations unsupported by specific evidence do not defeat summary judgment.

Avington v. A.J.S. Associates, Dba, Foothill Villa Apartments Ronald Levine Construction Corp Patricia Tyler · filed 1993-05-06(a)

Similarly, sections 3604(a) and (b) of the Fair Housing Act, make it unlawful, respectively, "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" or "[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of service or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) & (b). ... A motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated by making conclusory allegations of discrimination unsupported by specific facts. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Avington's claims under sections 1982 and 3604.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in generally applicable zoning rules when necessary to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing, but it does not categorically waive neutral permit procedures; the accommodation requires balancing the parties’ interests under the facts of each case.

Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, Va. · filed 1993-07-02(f)(3)(B)

Indeed, inherent in the concept of “reasonable accommodation”, as established by the Fair Housing Act, is that the interest of, and benefit to, handicapped individuals in securing equal access to housing must be balanced against the interest of, and burden to, municipalities in making the requested accommodation under the facts of each case. In requiring reasonable accommodation, therefore, Congress surely did not mandate a blanket waiver of all facially neutral zoning policies and rules, regardless of the facts.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars disability discrimination in zoning and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires municipalities to make reasonable accommodations that give disabled residents equal housing opportunity.

United States v. City of Taylor, Mich. · filed 1992-07-14(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

There is no question in the Court’s mind that Taylor could have reasonably accommodated Smith and Lee’s proposal to house twelve disabled, elderly residents in light of its zoning requirements.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable zoning accommodations but does not require an accommodation that is unnecessary, preferential, or fundamentally alters the zoning scheme.

Evans v. ZON. HEARING BD. OF SPRING CITY · filed 1999-06-21(f)(3)(B)

We conclude, therefore, that the record fails to demonstrate that the proposed accommodation was reasonable and necessary to afford Jennifer an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” under Section 3604(f)(3)(B). ... Further, the proposed accommodation, if granted in the face of the Evans’ total disregard of the zoning requirements, would undermine and fundamentally alter the Borough’s zoning scheme.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations to zoning rules when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and an accommodation is not unreasonable merely because it creates a limited exception to a single-family zoning rule.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION ANTIDISCRIMINATION & LABOR v. Paradise Town · filed 2009-09-16(f)(3)(B)

The Town argues that the Leishmans’ request is unreasonable. The Town does not argue that any undue burdens are involved in the Leishmans’ request, nor does the record support any such argument. Instead, the Town argues that the request would fundamentally alter the nature of their zoning plan. But this argument fails because the Leishmans seek only a conditional use permit or other accommodation, not a re-zoning of their lot, much less of the entire area. The Town’s argument is premised on a misconception that allowing the accommodation to the Leishmans would require it to allow other residents to place dual residences on their single family lots. The accommodation, however, is an exception, not a fundamental change of the zoning requirements. Similar exceptions would have to be granted only if there were other residents who also had disabled members of their families who needed the same accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable zoning accommodations when necessary to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Community Services, Inc. v. Heidelberg Township · filed 2006-07-25(f)(3)(B)

Clearly, plaintiffs requests for a variance and special exception, or for its proposed use to be classified as a “family,” were necessary. And the record before the Zoning Board is devoid of any evidence that the requests were unreasonable.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations to housing rules when needed to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

ASS'N FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, INC. v. City of Fultondale · filed 1995-08-25(f)(3)(B)

We find that at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City of Fultondale discriminated against these handicapped persons by "refus[ing] to make reasonable accommodations in [its] rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [mentally retarded] person[s] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations to zoning rules when needed to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Granada House, Inc. v. City of Boston · filed 1997-02-15(f)(3)(B)

Even if the City’s classification of Granada House as a “Group Care Residence, General” under the Code could be deemed facially nondiscriminatory under the FHA, the court nevertheless concludes that the City has violated the FHA by failing to make “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires municipalities to make reasonable zoning accommodations when necessary to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.

ReMed Recovery Care Centers v. Township of Willistown · filed 1999-02-10(f)(3)(B)

Willistown must make a reasonable accommodation, pursuant to § 3604(f)(3)(B), from its limitation on the number of unrelated persons that can constitute a family under the zoning ordinance. The township is preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the limit of five unrelated persons against the Willistown Home at 84 Devon Road.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable zoning accommodations when necessary to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Groome Resources, Ltd., L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson · filed 1999-06-18(f)(3)(B)

The requested accommodation is clearly reasonable and necessary to allow the handicapped to have equal opportunity to live in residential settings of their choice, as mandated by the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988.

Section 3604(a) does not override the H-2A housing rule; in that setting, family housing is required only when it is the prevailing practice in the area and occupation.

Farmer v. Employment Security Commission · filed 1993-09-02(a)

Under these circumstances, we conclude that 8 U.S.G. § 1188(c)(4) controls over 42 U.S.C. § 3604: We therefore hold that participating H-2A farmers must provide family housing to temporary agricultural laborers, whether foreign or domestic, only when such is the prevailing practice ■ in the area and occupation of intended employment.

Section 3604(c) does not require expert testimony or survey evidence to prove that a housing advertisement expresses a racial preference to an ordinary reader.

Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co. · filed 1993-09-29(c)

We never have held that a plaintiff is required to submit survey evidence or expert testimony to prove whether the ordinary reader would find an advertisement to express a racial preference, and we decline to do so here.

Section 3604(c) prohibits housing statements or advertisements that indicate a preference or limitation based on race or family status, judged by an objective ordinary-reader standard; subjective intent to discriminate is not required.

Jancik v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities and · filed 1995-01-06(c)

Section 3604(c) prohibits the making or publishing of any statement or advertisement that “indicates” any preference or limitation based on, among other factors, race or family status. Whether a given statement or advertisement “indicates” such a preference is therefore central to our analysis. Although we have not previously dealt with the “indicates” aspect of section 3604(c), the circuit courts that have done so have employed a relatively straightforward approach, which we also find appropriate. First, every circuit that has considered a claim under section 3604(c) has held that an objective “ordinary reader” standard should be applied in determining what is “indicated” by an ad. ... Significantly, no showing of a subjective intent to discriminate is therefore necessary to establish a violation of the section.

Section 3604 reaches homeowners associations that exercise owner- or manager-like control over housing occupancy and are not expressly exempt.

Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n · filed 1993-10-07

Second, Congress intended to rid the entire housing market of discrimination and homeowners’ associations are not expressly omitted from the reach of the Act. ... The declaration and the Association’s powers distinguish this case from that of a single family homeowner and place the Association within the reach of the Act. ... Thus, the Association has performed functions of an owner and manager and is not expressly exempt from the Act’s provisions.

Section 3604(f)(1)(A) bars disability discrimination but does not prevent eviction or refusal to deal when a person cannot meet a provider’s reasonable requirements, regardless of the cause of that inability.

Rodriguez v. Westhab, Inc. · filed 1993-10-15(f)(1)(A)

Similarly, the Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act bar discrimination because of disability, but they do not bar eviction or other declination to deal with a person because of that person’s inability to meet reasonable requirements of a provider (regardless of cause of such inability). 42 U.S.C. § 12182; 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A).

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) and (f)(3)(A) do not require a condominium to provide a pool heater when heating the pool is unnecessary for a disabled resident's equal enjoyment of the pool area.

Wood v. Briarwinds Condominium Ass'n Board of Directors · filed 2010-03-03(f)(2)(A) (f)(3)(A)

Wood does not allege that Briarwinds refused his offer to modify any of the above-mentioned property conditions at his own expense, other than the lack of a pool heater, which does not constitute discrimination under the FHA because heating the pool is not required to ensure that Wood can enjoy the pool area equally with non-disabled residents, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(A) & (B).

Section 3604(a)'s familial-status amendments validly regulate housing sales and rentals under Congress's commerce power and do not violate the Tenth Amendment.

Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp · filed 1992-07-13(a)

Because Congress had a rational basis for amending the Fair Housing Act — namely, the nationwide problem caused by familial status discrimination in the housing market — and because the housing market affects interstate commerce, plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment claim fails.

The familial-status discrimination prohibition in § 3604 was not applied retroactively to conduct predating its March 12, 1989 effective date.

Deer Hill Arms II Ltd. v. Danbury Plan. Comm'n, No. 30 41 25 (Jul. 25, 1994) · filed 1994-07-25(b)

The 1988 amendment to the FHA prohibiting discrimination on the basis of familial status became effective March 12, 1989; U.S. v. Southern Management Corp. , 955 F.2d 914 , 918 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1992), and is not to be applied retrospectively. Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n., Inc. v. Kemp , supra, 1035 n. 7.

Section 3604(f)(1) covers sellers, their agents, and others integrally involved in a real-estate transaction who are directly able to make a dwelling unavailable, not neighbors without control over the property.

Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin · filed 1992-07-22(f)(1)

Section 3604(f)(1) covers only those actors who are in a position ... directly ... to make a dwelling unavailable — that is, a seller, his agent, or another person or entity integrally involved in the sale or financing of real estate.

Section 3604(f) does not require a housing provider to accommodate a tenant who was a current illegal drug user when the eviction notice was sent.

A.B. ex rel. Kehoe v. Housing Authority of South Bend · filed 2012-12-20(f)

At the end of the day, however, we do not reach the issue of “reasonable accommodation” because under the law, Oliver was not “disabled” given her “current drug user” status at the relevant time.

Section 3604(a)'s bona-fide-offer requirement applies only to refusals to sell or rent, not to refusals to negotiate or conduct that otherwise makes a dwelling unavailable or denies it.

Housing Rights Initiative v. Compass, Inc. · filed 2023-02-14(a)

Accordingly, the bona fide offer requirement only applies to refusals to sell or rent and does not apply to “refus[als] to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added).

Section 3604(a)'s bona fide offer requirement applies only to refusals to rent, not to refusals to negotiate or other conduct that makes housing unavailable.

United States v. Youritan Construction Company · filed 1973-02-08(a)

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to rent an apartment after the making of a bona fide offer, to refuse to negotiate for rental, and to otherwise make unavailable or deny an apartment, because of race. The sentence is so constructed that the “bona fide offer” requirement grammatically applies only to refusals to rent, and not to the remainder of the prohibition.

Section 3604(a) reaches discriminatory practices that make housing unavailable, and section 3604(b) covers discriminatory maintenance as a housing-related service connected with sale or rental.

National Fair Housing Alliance v. Bank of America, National Association · filed 2019-07-18(a), (b)

The plaintiffs have sufficiently pled unavailability under Section 804(a). ... The factual allegations here, by contrast, fit well within the language of Section 804(b), which explicitly extends the purview of the FHA to “the provision of services or facilities” in connection with the sale or rental of houses. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The fact that HUD interprets this language to include maintenance merely ratifies the conclusion that allegedly discriminatory maintenance of REOs falls within the statute’s reach. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65. Unlike the highway in Jersey Heights, the service in question here, as explained above, is sufficiently “housing-related” to render the FHA applicable. Indeed, it pertains to the homes’ physical integrity.

Section 3604(b) reaches certain post-acquisition discriminatory conduct and covers housing-related services directly connected to a dwelling's sale or rental, including essential water, gas, and electricity services.

Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange, Georgia · filed 2019-10-10(b)

Accordingly, we conclude that § 3604(b) is unambiguous and reaches certain post-acquisition conduct, including post-acquisition conduct related to the provision of services, as long as those services are connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling. ... Accordingly, we hold that a service within the meaning of § 3604(b) must be a housing-related service that is directly connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling. ... Therefore, we conclude that because the water, gas, and electricity services at issue in this case are essential to the habitability of a dwelling and closely connected with the sale or rental of housing, they unambiguously fall within the scope of § 3604(b). ... While it is true that the majority of cases under § 3604(b) involve providers of housing who are also responsible for the services associated with the dwelling, the text of § 3604(b) does not limit its applicability in such a manner and our case law has never held that only housing providers are subject to liability thereunder.

Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination in services or facilities connected with the sale or rental of a dwelling, including governmental services such as garbage collection.

Eldridge v. City of Alton, Illinois · filed 2025-03-28(b)

Section 3604(b) also prohibits discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection sale or rental of a dwelling, including services generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection.

Section 3604(b) can reach discrimination after a dwelling is acquired, but a claim must plausibly connect the defendant to the dwelling or related services.

DOE v. University of Scranton · filed 2020-10-09(b)

While the Court does not go so far as to hold universities like Defendant are entirely insulated from liability under the FHA, Plaintiff’s Section 3604(b) claims do not survive dismissal here.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing provider to reasonably modify rules or policies when necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc. · filed 1994-01-25(f)(3)(B)

I conclude that a “reasonable accommodation” of plaintiffs needs by reason of her handicap will in all probability require modification of defendants’ first come/first served policy. In insisting that the policy of first come/first served remain inviolable whatever plaintiffs handicap and needs, defendants display the frame of mind which Congress sought to alter by requiring reasonable accommodations of the needs of the handicapped.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars handicap-based housing discrimination, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires necessary reasonable accommodations; neutral zoning conditions applicable to comparable property uses are not discriminatory merely because they increase costs.

Means v. City of Dayton · filed 2000-07-28(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

The requirement that the Plaintiff comply with the parking regulations flows from the fact that she is seeking to alter the use to which she will put her residence, not from the fact that mentally disabled adults will reside therein. ... In contrast, the relevant provisions in the Dayton Zoning Code do not single out the disabled for adverse treatment; rather, anyone seeking to alter the use of his or her property, beyond one permitted by ordinance, must comply with the parking, screening and drainage requirements. ... This Court finds the rationale and result of that decision to be persuasive and holds that the Defendant did not violate § 3604(f)(3)(B), even though the conditions imposed upon the granting of the conditional use permit has caused her to incur additional expenses.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, unless the accommodation would fundamentally alter the program or impose undue financial or administrative burdens.

Josephinium Associates v. Kahli · filed 2002-05-06(f)(3)(B)

The federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of handicap. ... Discrimination also includes "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." ... An accommodation is reasonable, and therefore required, if it does not cause a "fundamental alteration in the nature of a program" or "`undue financial and administrative burdens.'" ... Whether a requested accommodation is required under the FHAA is "`highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.' " ... A landlord is not required to incur significant expense or fundamentally alter its programs to accommodate a disability.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodation for disability-related needs, but does not require religious accommodation.

Bloch v. Frischholz · filed 2008-07-10(f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Act requires accommodation — -but only of handicaps. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a housing-discrimination plaintiff seeking a reasonable accommodation to request it and give the defendant enough information to know both the disability and the desired accommodation, unless the connection is obvious.

Ely v. Mobile Housing Board · filed 2014-04-07(f)(3)(B)

However, she must do something to make the defendant aware of a connection between her request and the underlying disability (or the nexus must be obvious).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits disability discrimination in housing, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits refusing reasonable accommodations necessary to give a person with a handicap equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; the statute does not prohibit a facially nondiscriminatory zoning distinction based on residential size.

Restore House, Inc. v. Helga Township · filed 2014-12-22(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

The Act prohibits disability discrimination in housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (2012). Unlawful discrimination includes “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules . . . when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2012). ... This denial was compelled by a facially and practically nondiscriminatory local ordinance. ... And because the ordinance allows for no new multifamily uses in the “Agricultural/Rural Residential District,” it does not discriminate on the basis of chemical dependency but, rather, on the basis of residential size. The act does not prohibit this kind of distinction.

Section 3604(f)(3) requires a plaintiff to prove handicap, the defendant's knowledge or constructive knowledge, necessity of the accommodation for equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling, reasonableness, and refusal to make the requested accommodation.

Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries Ex Rel. Fair Housing Council of Oregon v. Chandler Apartments, LLC · filed 2017-07-26(f)(3)

To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3), a plaintiff must prove all of the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff or his associate is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable changes to housing rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give disabled persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Valencia v. City of Springfield · filed 2018-03-01(f)(3)(B)

The FHAA requires public entities “to reasonably accommodate a disabled person by making changes in rules, policies, practices or services as is necessary to provide that person with access to housing that is equal to that of those who are not disabled.”

Section 3604(f) prohibits housing discrimination based on handicap and requires landlords to provide reasonable accommodations when necessary for a disabled tenant to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, subject to risks to other tenants.

Matter of Prospect Union Assoc. v. DeJesus · filed 2018-12-27(f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B)

Under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), as amended, it is unlawful to discriminate in housing practices on the basis of a "handicap" (42 USC § 3604[f][2][A]). Handicap is very broadly defined, and a person is considered handicapped and thereby protected under the FHA if he or she: 1. Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or 2. Has a record of such impairment, or 3. Is regarded as having such an impairment. No specific diagnosis is necessary for a person to be "handicapped" and protected under the statute. In fact, the determination may even be based upon the observations of a lay person ( Douglas v Kriegsfeld Corp. , 884 A2d 1109, 1131 [DC 2005]). The appointment of an article 81 guardian for tenants sufficiently establishes that these tenants are "handicapped" within the meaning of the FHA, leading us to consider whether they are entitled to a reasonable accommodation. What is "reasonable" varies from case to case, because it is necessarily fact-specific ( see Shapiro v Cadman Towers Inc. , 844 FSupp 116 [EDNY 1994] [bladder disorder necessitated moving tenant to the top of the waiting list for an indoor parking spot], affd 51 F3d 828 [2d Cir 1995]). The overarching guiding factor, however, is that a landlord is obligated to provide a tenant with a reasonable accommodation if necessary for the tenant to keep his or her apartment. The " refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [the handicapped individual] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling'" is a discriminatory practice ( see e.g. Shapiro 51 F3d at 333, quoting 42 USC § 3604[f][3][B]). A landlord does not have to provide a reasonable accommodation if it puts other tenants at risk, but should consider whether such risks can be minimized ( see Sinisgallo v Town of Islip Hous. Auth. , 865 F Supp 2d 307 [ED NY 2012] [a reasonable accommodation might be imposition of a probationary period after tenant with bipolar disorder attacked a neighbor]).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a landlord to make a reasonable accommodation for a disabled tenant when necessary to let the tenant keep the apartment, subject to the direct-threat and substantial-property-damage exception in § 3604(f)(9).

529 W. 29th LLC v. Reyes · filed 2019-04-22(f)(3)(B), (f)(9)

Under the FHA, a landlord is obligated to provide a handicapped tenant with a reasonable [*2] accommodation if necessary for the tenant to keep his or her apartment ( see 42 USC 3604[f][3][B]). Although a landlord is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual "whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others" (42 USC § 3604[f][9]), the landlord is obligated to either reasonably accommodate the tenant's handicap or show that no reasonable accommodation will eliminate or acceptably minimize the risk posed by the handicapped tenant ( see Sinisgallo v Town of Islip Hous. Auth ., 865 F Supp 2d 307, 341 [ED NY 2012]; Matter of Prospect Union Assoc. v DeJesus , 167 AD3d at 543 ["A landlord does not have to provide a reasonable accommodation if it puts other tenants at risk, but should consider whether such risks can be minimized"]).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable housing accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and the court held that a variance excusing a commercial sprinkler requirement was reasonable here.

NEW HORIZONS REHABILITATION, INC. v. STATE OF INDIANA · filed 2019-07-19(f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in housing decisions. For purposes of the FHA, discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... The designated evidence supports New Horizons’ claim that its requested accommodation—a variance to build its proposed home without a commercial fire suppression system—is reasonable. The Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the requested accommodation is unreasonable or would present undue hardship for the State. Therefore, the Court grants New Horizons’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to its reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA, FHAA, and Rehabilitation Act.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of handicap, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services needed to provide equal access to housing; the Act applies to municipal zoning decisions.

Manzke, Sara v. Jefferson County · filed 2019-11-14(f)(1), (f)(3)(B)

The Fair Housing Amendments Act makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The Act applies to municipal zoning decisions, Valencia v. City of Springfield, Illinois, 883 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 752 n.12 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002)), and requires public entities “to reasonably accommodate a disabled person by making changes in rules, policies, practices or services as is necessary to provide that person with access to housing that is equal to that of those who are not disabled.” Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2003). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodation to rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Payne v. City of San Antonio, Texas · filed 2019-12-20(f)(3)(B)

Under the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), “a public entity engages in a discriminatory practice if it refuses to make a ‘reasonable accommodation’ to ‘rules, policies, practices or services when such accommodation may be necessary to afford [a disabled person] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’” ... “Reasonable accommodation claims under the FHA . . . require that a reasonable accommodation be provided to the plaintiffs if necessary to allow the plaintiffs to have usage and enjoyment in a facility equivalent to individuals who are not disabled.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in housing rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Banks v. Gates Hudson & Associates, Inc. · filed 2020-06-23(f)(3)(B)

Under § 3604, it is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f}(2). For purposes of subsection (f), discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... In sum, plaintiffs have failed to allege: (i) that they were denied an accommodation; (ii) that Banks has a handicap as defined under the FHA; and (iii) that they were discriminated against because of any handicap or disability. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the FHA for discrimination.

Section 3604(f)(1) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of handicap, § 3604(f)(2) bars handicap-based discrimination in housing terms or services, and § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable and necessary accommodation that the defendant has refused.

Harmony Haus Westlake, LLC v. Parkstone Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2020-06-23(f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

To survive a motion to dismiss on such a claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that an adverse action making the [dwelling] unavailable occurred, (2) that the action was taken against someone with a ‘handicap,’ and (3) ‘that the adverse action was taken because of a [handicap].’” ... The statute prohibits discrimination “because of a handicap,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2), and Plaintiffs have not plead any such discrimination. ... Thus, if a person is handicapped under the FHA,8 he or she must show that the requested accommodation was reasonable and necessary, and that the defendant refused to make such an accommodation. ... For all of these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim of failure to accommodate under § 3604(f)(3)(B), and thus grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.

Section 3604(f)(2)(A) prohibits housing providers from discriminating because of handicap in dwelling rental terms, conditions, privileges, or related services, and a failure-to-accommodate claim requires allegations of handicap, knowledge, necessity, and refusal.

(PS) Roberts v. Sacramento Housing & Redevelopment Agency · filed 2022-10-06(f)(2)(A)

Plaintiff names the Fair Housing Act, which makes it unlawful for a housing provider “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of that person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). Plaintiff alleges that reasonable accommodations were not provided. To properly plead a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that: (1) she suffers from a handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) the defendants knew or reasonably should have known of her handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap “may be necessary” to afford the plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) the defendants refused to make such accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(2), read with § 3604(f)(3)(B), bars housing discrimination against disabled tenants, including refusal of a reasonable accommodation necessary for equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling.

Kiemle & Hagood Company v. Mariam P. Daniels a/k/a Phoebe Daniels · filed 2023-04-27(f)(2)

Both federal and state law prohibit landlords from discriminating against disabled tenants, including the failure to reasonably accommodate a tenant’s disability. 6 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2), (3)(B); RCW 49.60.222(1)(f), (2)(b). A tenant’s claim that a landlord has failed to accommodate their disability may constitute a defense to eviction. ... A tenant raising failure to accommodate as an affirmative defense must show five elements: (1) they have a “disability” as that term is statutorily defined, (2) their landlord “knew or reasonably should have known” of the disability, (3) the requested accommodation “‘may be necessary’ to afford [the tenant] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their dwelling”, and (4) the landlord denied the request. ... Further, the tenant is not entitled to their requested accommodation unless it is (5) “reasonable.” ... We agree with Ms. Daniels and amicus curiae the Attorney General of Washington that third-party verification of a tenant’s disability is unwarranted when a tenant’s disability is obvious or otherwise known to the landlord. ... For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Daniels has presented sufficient facts to allow a jury to decide whether her requested accommodation was reasonable. This affirmative defense was prematurely rejected.

Section 3604(f) prohibits disability discrimination in housing, including unequal rental terms and refusing reasonable accommodations necessary for equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling.

Triplett v. Seldin Company · filed 2024-03-25(f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(3)(B)

The FHA forbids discrimination “in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter” and “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap4 of” the buyer or renter, a person residing in or intending to reside in the dwelling, or any person associated with the buyer or renter. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) & (f)(2). Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... However, Plaintiff’s allegations affirmatively establish that she was permitted to transfer to an accessible unit in February 2021. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants refused to make her requested accommodation of transfer to an accessible unit and her claim premised on this accommodation request fails.

A reasonable-accommodation plaintiff must show that the housing provider had actual or constructive knowledge of the claimed disability, but the disability need not have been affirmatively disclosed.

McClendon v. Bresler · filed 2024-05-28(f)(3)(B)

To prevail on a reasonable accommodation claim under the FHAA and FEHA, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the claimed disability. ... And, as we explained in McClendon I, a defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge does not require an affirmative disclosure of a prospective tenant’s disability.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a reasonable and necessary accommodation that affords a person with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and the accommodation request must be reasonably specific.

Doll v. Trellis Walnut Towers LLC · filed 2024-09-30(f)(3)(B)

The FHAA requires accommodation of a handicap if it is reasonable and necessary to afford a handicapped person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ... An accommodation request must be reasonably specific. ... The problem with Plaintiffs’ failure-to-accommodate theory is that the Complaint does not identify a reasonably specific requested accommodation. ... The request that the elevator “work consistently” is not reasonably specific. ... The request for “access to their apartments” when the elevator is inoperable is also not specific.

Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits housing discrimination because of a handicap and requires a plaintiff claiming failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to show that the accommodation may be necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling.

(PS) Roberts v. Sacramento Housing & Redevelopment Agency · filed 2025-01-14(f)(2)

To show discrimination based on failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she suffers from a handicap as defined by the Fair Housing Act; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendant ... refused to make such accommodation.

Under § 3604(f)(2), sending recertification paperwork by mail can satisfy a landlord’s reasonable-accommodation obligation.

Johnson v. Simonson · filed 2025-09-29(f)(2)

Moreover, the fact that Simonson declined to post plaintiff’s paperwork on his door and instead sent them to plaintiff through the mail means that plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements of a failure to accommodate claim under FHA; sending the paperwork to plaintiff through the mail was a reasonable accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

LOPEZ · filed 2025-12-31(f)(3)(B)

As for a claim arising under the reasonable accommodations provision of the FHA, the Court must consider three factors: “whether the requested accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary to (3) afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.” ... Under the reasonable accommodations provision, “the initial burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the accommodations that [he] requested are necessary to afford [him an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the requested accommodations are unreasonable.”

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodation of a handicap when necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Hasenkamp v. The Shah Trust · filed 2022-01-20(f)(3)(B)

To make out a claim under the Federal and Arizona Fair Housing Acts, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff or his associate is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably should be expected to know of the handicap; (3) that the accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) allows a disabled housing voucher holder to state a reasonable accommodation claim by alleging that a housing authority refused an extension needed because of the disability.

Burgess v. Alameda Housing Authority · filed 2004-05-03(f)(3)(B)

We therefore conclude that Burgess’s allegations are adequate to state a claim for failure to accommodate her disability under the Fair Housing Act.

Section 3604(f)(1) does not reach conduct by nonowners that only indirectly affects housing availability through ordinary economic competition.

Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin · filed 1994-03-02(f)(1)

Consequently, however broad § 3604(f) may be, the scope of the statute cannot encompass the acts of the neighbors in this case. Their action in collecting money to buy the house is not direct enough to fall within the terms of § 3604(f)(1).

Sections 3604(a) and (b) prohibit housing discrimination affecting the buying, selling, renting, or accessibility of a dwelling, including discrimination in its sale or rental terms, based on a protected characteristic.

Truesdale v. Venice Arms, Inc. · filed 2024-01-27(a) and (b)

Federal courts have consistently found “that section 3604 of the FHA applies only to claims relating to the buying or selling or leasing of housing.” ... But because the Amended Complaint does not allege “conduct that directly impacts the accessibility to housing because of a protected classification, such as race,” sections 3604(a) and (b) appear entirely inapplicable on these alleged facts.

Section 3604(f)(1)(B) bars making a dwelling unavailable because of the handicap of a person who resides or intends to reside there, while § 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford equal housing opportunity.

Smith & Lee Associates, Inc., A/K/A Mortenview Manor, a Michigan Corporation United States of America v. City of Taylor, · filed 1994-03-11(f)(1)(B), (f)(3)(B)

The FHAA prohibits excluding disabled persons from housing because of their disability and requires that reasonable accommodations necessary to ensure the handicapped equal housing opportunities be made. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1) and 3604(f)(3)(B). ... The appropriate inquiry on accommodation thus was not whether the City should give a letter to the state, but rather, whether refusal to rezone constitutes a violation of the FHAA’s reasonable accommodation provision. ... The present case is distinguishable on the grounds that there is no provision authorizing Taylor to grant variances in R-1A zones. We must decide whether in absence of a variance procedure a city must rezone or amend its laws to accommodate handicapped persons under the FHAA and the circumstances here. In no cases have the courts required a city to rezone or to amend its zoning ordinance to comply with the FHAA. ... However, we recognize that the handicapped may have little choice but to live in a commercial home if they desire to live in a residential neighborhood. To provide the handicapped with equal housing opportunities, the City must make the necessary “reasonable accommodations.” The question then becomes whether the proposed accommodation is reasonable.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires municipalities to accommodate disability-related housing needs, but a neutral zoning procedure may be enforced when the requested accommodation is not justified by the facts.

Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson · filed 1996-06-25(f)(3)(B)

The FHAA forces municipalities to accommodate the way handicapped people differ from people without disabilities; requiring full plans and insisting that a roadway be configured consistent with a master zoning plan are not some of those ways.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a plaintiff to use available, non-futile zoning procedures before claiming that the city refused a reasonable accommodation.

Oxford House-A v. City of Univ. City · filed 1996-07-05(f)(3)(B)

Thus, the timing of the lawsuit was unreasonable.

A facially neutral zoning restriction is analyzed under Section 3604(f)(3)(B)'s reasonable-accommodation requirement rather than treated as facial disability discrimination.

Oxford House-A v. City of University City · filed 1996-07-05(f)(3)(B)

group of four unrelated individuals could occupy a single-family residence without obtaining some type of zoning exemption.

Section 3604 requires a reasonable accommodation only when it is necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, so a zoning accommodation is not required when residents do not need the group living arrangement because of their disabilities.

State Ex Rel. Bruskewitz v. City of Madison · filed 2001-09-20(f)(3)(B), (f)(2), (f)(9)

We conclude that because the proposed residents are not living in a CLA because of their disabilities, the City is not obligated to make a reasonable accommodation to Tellurian in the application of the 2,500 foot requirement.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in housing rules or policies when they are necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

One Love Housing, LLC v. City of Anoka, MN · filed 2024-02-15(f)(3)(B)

The FHA prohibits “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped person] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... We agree with these decisions and hold that, ordinarily, “federal courts should limit their review to the materials that were presented to the local land use board, except in circumstances where the board prevents applicants from presenting sufficient information.” Id. at 450.4 We think this general rule is in harmony with our conclusion in Oxford House-C that Congress “did not intend the federal courts to act as zoning boards by deciding fact-intensive accommodation issues in the first instance.” 77 F.3d at 253.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a city to make reasonable accommodations to zoning rules when necessary to give disabled people an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc. v. City of Dallas · filed 2000-12-18(f)(3)(B)

The Court does find, however, that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant discriminated against the handicapped in refusing to make reasonable accommodations in the City’s zoning rules when such accommodations may be necessary to afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Section 3604 requires municipalities to make reasonable accommodations in zoning rules when needed to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Burns v. Hargrove, No. Cv 99-0429323s (Mar. 2, 2000) · filed 2000-03-02(f)(3)(B)

The defendants raise for the first time before the Superior Court the issue of whether the action of the ZBA contravenes the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 , the section of the Fair Housing Act that requires a municipality to make reasonable accommodation in its rules and policies when necessary to afford persons with disabilities the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ... The defendants have failed to show that the action of the North Haven ZBA contravenes the cited amendments to the Fair Housing Act, or even that the act applies in this set of circumstances.

An accommodation to a zoning rule can satisfy § 3604(f)(3)(B)’s reasonableness requirement when it imposes no financial or administrative burden and does not fundamentally alter the zoning code.

United States v. Irmo South Carolina, Town of · filed 2020-05-11(f)(3)(B)

Here, Irmo conceded that the carport did not pose a financial or administrative burden, and that it did not cause a fundamental alteration to the zoning code. ... Therefore, the court concludes that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff has satisfied this element.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations to housing rules when needed to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Horizon House Developmental Services, Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton · filed 1992-08-28(f)(3)(B)

The Township is also violating the reasonable accommodation provision of the Fair Housing Act through the enactment and enforcement of the 1,000-foot rule in Ordinance No. 300. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... The Township’s position that a provider obtain a variance to open up a group home within 1,000 feet of another is no accommodation at all.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodation of zoning rules when necessary to give people with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill · filed 1992-09-10(f)(3)(B)

Further, we hold that defendant did not meet its burden of establishing that no less restrictive alternative was available or that no reasonable accommodation could be made.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) may require a municipality to waive zoning restrictions for housing for disabled people; providing a variance procedure alone does not satisfy the reasonable accommodation requirement.

JUDY B. v. Borough of Tioga · filed 1995-06-19(f)(3)(B)

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that the existence of the variance procedure, of which UCM has availed itself is, by itself, the only “reasonable accommodation” required by the FHAA. This court does not agree. As UCM’s experience proves, an applicant for a variance is not guaranteed success. The procedure does nothing more than provide property owners with a mechanism whereby they can seek permission to vary the permitted use.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a city to initiate a reasonable accommodation when its zoning rules prevent people with disabilities from using a dwelling.

CORP. OF EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. West Valley City · filed 2000-08-16(f)(3)(B)

Accordingly, the court finds that the responsibility rested with the City to initiate and make the accommodation of Plaintiffs, something it admittedly did not do.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires a city to make a reasonable zoning accommodation when necessary to give disabled residents an equal opportunity to live in a dwelling of their choice.

United States v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 2001-03-21(f)(3)(B)

The City failed to make such a reasonable accommodation by refusing to grant Thresholds a special use permit to locate within 1,000 feet of the existing family community residence.

Under § 3604(a) and (b), a private landlord may defend a disparate-impact occupancy policy by proving a sufficiently compelling business necessity; on this record, the statute did not require the landlord to spend $1.63 million to accommodate families with children.

United States v. Weiss · filed 1994-03-15(a) and (b)

This Court finds that defendants have shown a compelling business necessity to limit the number of persons who may occupy an apartment in Grand Plaza. For a Court to order a 1.63 million dollar expenditure to upgrade the hot water capacity of the complex to accommodate families with children would be an unwarranted extension of Congressional intent in enacting the Familial Amendments to the Fair Housing Act. This conclusion is especially compelled on this record where there has been no proof that defendants intentionally discriminated against families with children and is under no public duty to furnish such families with housing accommodations.

Section 3604(f)(1) reaches property owners and agents who directly affect a disabled person's housing availability, and may reach other actors directly positioned to deny housing rights, but does not cover neighbors whose money-collection to purchase a house is merely indirect economic competition.

Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Incorporated v. Babin · filed 1994-04-13(f)(1)

We agree with the Third Circuit that Congress's intent in enacting Sec. 3604(f)(1) was to reach property owners and their agents who directly affect the availability of housing for a disabled individual. However, the scope of Sec. 3604(f)(1) may extend further, to other actors who, though not owners or agents, are in a position directly to deny a member of a protected group housing rights. ... Consequently, however broad Sec. 3604(f) may be, the scope of the statute cannot encompass the acts of the neighbors in this case. Their action in collecting money to buy the house is not direct enough to fall within the terms of Sec. 3604(f)(1). ... We hold that the plaintiffs' claim against the neighbors is not cognizable under Sec. 3604(f)(1) because the neighbors' actions did not directly affect the availability of housing or impede a transaction that the plaintiffs were undertaking.

Section 3604(f)(1) makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling because of a person's handicap.

Broadmoor San Clemente Homeowners Assn. v. Nelson · filed 1994-05-23(f)(1)

The Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, was amended in 1988, to make it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of. . . H] a person, residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available. . . .” (42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).) Restrictions on housing accommodations for the disabled violate the Federal Fair Housing Act as amended in 1988.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of the handicap of a person who will reside there, including through facially discriminatory spacing and notice rules for group homes.

Larkin v. State Of Michigan Department Of Social Services · filed 1996-07-16(f)(1)

The FHA, as amended by the FHAA, makes it unlawful to: ... discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of-- ... (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available. ... It is well-settled that the FHAA applies to the regulation of group homes. ... By their very terms, these statutes apply only to AFC facilities which will house the disabled, and not to other living arrangements. ... Accordingly, this is a case of intentional discrimination or disparate treatment, rather than disparate impact. ... Therefore, in order for facially discriminatory statutes to survive a challenge under the FHAA, the defendant must demonstrate that they are "warranted by the unique and specific needs and abilities of those handicapped persons" to whom the regulations apply. ... Therefore, the 1500-foot spacing requirement violates the FHAA and is preempted by it. ... We find that the notice requirements violate the FHAA and are preempted by it.

A plaintiff asserting a § 3604 claim for third parties must have standing to vindicate those residents' rights.

De Jesus-Keolamphu v. Village of Pelham Manor · filed 1998-04-03

Again, however, plaintiffs lack third-party standing for the reasons just explained.

Sections 3604(a) and (b) prohibit making a dwelling unavailable or denying rental terms or privileges because of race, and allow a racially excluded visitor with distinct injury to pursue a Fair Housing Act claim.

Lane v. Cole · filed 2000-03-22(a), (b)

The court concludes that a visitor claiming a distinct and palpable injury as a result of a discriminatory housing practice has standing to sue. If it is a discriminatory housing practice to condition rental rights on the exclusion of black guests, it reasonably follows that a black invitee who is excluded or coerced into leaving because of race has been “aggrieved” or “injured by a discriminatory housing practice.” ... All plaintiffs have stated cognizable Fair Housing Act claims.

Section 3604 protects a person harmed by discriminatory housing practices, including a former tenant seeking damages for racial discrimination and discriminatory treatment by owners or agents.

Harris v. Edna Itzhaki Rafael Itzhaki · filed 1999-07-12(a), (b), (c), (d)

We also conclude that Harris’ claims are sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Section 3604 disparate-treatment claims use McDonnell Douglas burden shifting, while disparate-impact claims require a disproportionate burden from a housing policy or practice and failure to justify that practice or adopt an effective less-discriminatory alternative.

Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority · filed 2002-02-08

Oti Kaga’s claim of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act is without merit.

Section 3604(a) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of race, and a plaintiff may prove a violation through disparate impact without showing discriminatory intent.

Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs · filed 2010-09-28(a)

The FHA prohibits discrimination in the provision of housing. ... “A plaintiff seeking recovery under [the FHA] may proceed under either a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact.” ... To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory impact (also referred to as discriminatory effect), ICP must show “adverse impact on a particular minority group” or “harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation.” ... ICP need not show that TDHCA acted with discriminatory intent or motive. ... If ICP establishes its prima facie case of discriminatory effect, discrimination is presumed.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on protected characteristics such as race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin; an occupation such as exotic dancing is not itself a protected class.

Miller v. Board of Managers of Whispering Pines at Colonial Woods Condominium II · filed 2006-09-29

As defendants argue, plaintiffs fail to allege that defendants discriminated against them based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. Susan Miller’s occupation as an “exotic dancer” is not a class protected by the FHA.

Section 3604(f)'s anti-discrimination protections apply to university student housing because the housing facilities are dwellings within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act.

United States v. University of Nebraska at Kearney · filed 2013-04-19(f)

And based on the statute, UNK’s student housing facilities are clearly “dwellings” within the meaning of the FHA.

Section 3604 generally requires a plaintiff to allege unequal treatment based on a protected class that affects the availability of housing.

Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2016-11-09

In any case, under § 3604, a plaintiff generally must allege “unequal treatment on the basis of [a protected class] that affects the availability of housing,” and Jones did not do so. See Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994).

Section 3604 addresses discrimination by housing providers against tenants and prospective tenants.

Matter of PJB Equities, Inc. v. Village of Ossining · filed 2024-04-24

Additionally, based on the allegations made by the petitioners/plaintiffs, they lack standing to assert the causes of action alleged under the Fair Housing Act, which concerns discrimination by providers of housing such as the petitioners/plaintiffs against tenants and potential tenants ( see 42 USC § 3604; Hotel St. George Assoc. v. Morgenstern , 819 F Supp 310, 318-319 [SD NY]).

Section 3604(f) does not require a bona fide offer to establish standing, but the plaintiff must allege an interest in the dwelling.

Ricks v. Beta Development Co. · filed 1996-08-01(f)

While Ricks is correct that he need not make a bona fide offer to achieve standing under 3604(f), he must make some allegation of interest in the condominium.

A prospective tenant may pursue a § 3604(d) claim when a false statement that a dwelling is unavailable is directed to a companion speaking for both of them.

Lincoln v. Case · filed 2003-08-07(d)

Case argues that Weaver does not have standing to sue for violations of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (misrepresentation of unavailability) because Weaver does not assert that a misrepresentation was made to him personally. ... Lincoln inquired into the availability of the apartment for both she and Weaver, in essence, she was the spokesperson for the couple. Weaver was present when the apartment suddenly became unavailable. The fact that Case’s words may have been physically directed toward Lincoln is of no importance. It does not diminish Weaver’s injury, nor the fact that Weaver’s injury can be “fairly traceable” to Case’s actions.

Section 3604(a) prohibits sex-based denial or unavailability of a dwelling even without a sale or rental, while §§ 3604(b) and (c) apply when consideration for occupancy is provided by a third party even if the occupants pay nothing.

Woods v. Foster · filed 1995-01-04(a), (b), and (c)

Because subsection 3604(a) makes it unlawful to otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling because of sex, the Court rejects Defendants argument that the FHA is limited to acts related to the sale or rental of a dwelling. ... The statute, however, does not require that the consideration be provided by the occupant. Furthermore, “to rent” as defined in the FHA, is an act performed by the owner of the property, not the occupant. The acts of the Ministries in this case satisfy the requirements and establish that the Ministries “rented” the Shelter. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims under subsections 3604(b) and 3604(c) should not be dismissed.

Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act does not unambiguously waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity from monetary claims.

Boyd v. Browner · filed 1995-08-09(a)

But there is no need to decide that question, because sovereign immunity bars the relief plaintiffs seek. ... Because the Fair Housing Act does not “unambiguously waive” the government’s sovereign immunity defense, plaintiffs may not have a monetary recovery.

The Fair Housing Act does not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity.

Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2002-12-18

In any event, the FHA does not include a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 3604(a) claims against federal agencies seeking only injunctive relief are covered by the APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity, even though the claim does not arise under the APA.

Sandpiper Residents Association v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 2022-05-21(a)

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that HUD’s sovereign immunity challenge to Plaintiffs’ Section 3604(a) fails. “It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). HUD argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Section 3604(a) claim because the Fair Housing Act does not contain a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States. The premise of HUD’s argument is true, but its conclusion is wrong. Although HUD is correct that the Fair Housing Act does not include a waiver of sovereign immunity, that observation is immaterial because Plaintiffs’ claim is covered by the general waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. For the purposes of § 702, it makes no difference that Plaintiffs’ cause of action does not arise under the APA. As the D.C. Circuit has observed, “[t]here is nothing in the language of . . . § 702 that restricts its waiver to suits brought under the APA. The sentence waives sovereign immunity for ‘[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages,’ not for an action brought under the APA.” Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief, and they “claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority” in a manner that caused Plaintiffs to “suffer [a] legal wrong.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. To invoke Section 702’s waiver, that is all they are required to do.

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits land-use rules that make housing unavailable to people with disabilities by restricting where disability-related residences may be located.

Larkin v. Michigan · filed 1995-01-03(f)(1)

the court finds that M.C.L. § 125.583b(4) and § 400.716(3) violate the FHAA.

Section 3604(f) prohibits disability-based housing restrictions, including conditional-use, spacing, and quota provisions that make group-home housing unavailable.

Arc of New Jersey v. State of New Jersey · filed 1996-12-31(f)

the Court finds that the three enabling clauses at issue — the conditional use, spacing, and ceiling quota provisions— violate the FHAA.

Sections 3604(f)(1) and (f)(2) prohibit disability-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of housing, while § 3604(f)(9) permits a restriction only when justified by a direct threat, substantial property damage, or the unique and special needs and abilities of the protected persons.

Community Housing Trust v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs · filed 2003-04-16(f)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(9)

Defendants’ justification does not satisfy § 3604(f)(9); it neither explains the different treatment afforded CBRF’s, as opposed to “families,” nor responds to specific and legitimate safety concerns, nor benefits the disabled residents of Zeke’s House. ... In sum, the court concludes that, without adequate justification, the District of Columbia’s zoning regulations treat five persons with mental disabilities less favorably than five similarly-situated persons without such disabilities, and, in so doing, discriminate against such persons in the terms, conditions, and privileges of the sale and rental of single-family dwellings, in violation of §§ 3604(f)(1), (2). The court further finds that, in this case, the Zoning Administrator, in the exercise of his discretion, imposed a burden on Zeke’s House’s disabled residents, because of their disability, also in violation of the FHAA.

Section 3604(f) reaches discriminatory conduct that makes housing unavailable or denies its use beyond the initial sale or rental, including interference with an owner's continuing use and enjoyment of the dwelling and common areas.

Schroeder v. De Bertolo · filed 1995-03-23(f)(1), (f)(2)

housing rights did not terminate. She had the continuing right to quiet enjoyment and use of her condominium unit and common areas in the building.

A § 3604(c) challenger must show an Article III injury in fact; an organization’s litigation expenses alone do not satisfy that requirement.

Fair Housing Cncl v. Newspaper · filed 1998-03-31(c)

Because we are convinced by the unique set of facts surrounding the section 3604(c) claims that the FHC has failed to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement embodied in Article III, we find that the grant of summary judgment as to those claims was appropriate. ... We hold, therefore, that the pursuit of litigation alone cannot constitute an injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III.

A § 3604(c) violation does not automatically give a housing organization standing; the organization must show its own injury in fact.

The Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Main Line Times Acme Newspapers, Inc. No. 97-1169 · filed 1998-03-31(c)

a violation of the Act does not automatically confer standing on any plaintiff, even one who holds the status of a private attorney general.

Section 3604 permits a corporation directly harmed by alleged housing discrimination to assert the rights of unnamed third parties.

Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority · filed 2003-09-15

Oti Kaga alleges disparate treatment and disparate impact resulting from SDHDA’s refusal to grant state HOME Program funding in 1997, in violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and 3605. ... Instead, we must decide whether Oti Kaga can establish prudential standing by asserting the rights of third-parties who have not been named as plaintiffs in this action. We conclude it may.

Section 3604 allows a corporation directly harmed by alleged housing discrimination to assert the rights of unnamed third parties.

Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority · filed 2003-10-21

Instead, we must decide whether Oti Kaga can establish prudential standing by asserting the rights of third-parties who have not been named as plaintiffs in this action. We conclude it may.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, rather than age discrimination generally.

Gandolfi v. Desert Shadows RV Resort Owners Ass'n., Inc. · filed 1998-04-20

However, "familial status" discrimination is not mere age discrimination. ... To find out what legal rights the person has--and thus whether or not he can claim "injury"--it is necessary to turn to another section of the statute, namely 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibits various types of housing discrimination on account of "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."

Section 3604(a) recognizes sex-plus discrimination claims based on the combination of gender and marital status.

Lax v. 29 WOODMERE BOULEVARD OWNERS, INC. · filed 2011-09-23(a)

The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). ... In sum, this Court concludes that claims of “sex plus” discrimination based on the combination of gender and marital status are cognizable under the FHA. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss on that ground is denied.

Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on listed characteristics, including race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and handicap.

Chapman v. Franklin County Sheriff · filed 2022-07-22

Plaintiff brings a claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), alleging she was denied the ability “to participate in safe housing while at JPCC because of [her] religion.” (Doc. 3 at PAGEID 46). Among other things, the FHA prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts plausibly showing she qualifies for protection under the FHA under the circumstances alleged. This claim should be dismissed.

Section 3604 bars making housing unavailable because of a defined protected class; economic class alone is not a protected basis.

(PS) Trotter v. Sacramento Housing Program · filed 2022-09-28(b)

However, economic class is not a basis for a discrimination claim within the meaning of the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604; see also Community H, 490 F.3d at 1053 (noting a plaintiff must show they are a defined protected class to establish a prima facie case of FHA discrimination).

Section 3604(b) bars discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling or related services based on listed protected characteristics; felony status is not one of those characteristics.

Nance v. Mayfield Plaza Apartments Management · filed 2023-06-06(b)

“The [FHA] prohibits discrimination against ‘any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith[ ]’ on the basis of that person’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap.” Santiago v. Chill, No. 3:21-CV-720-RG], 2023 WL 2355903, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)). ... Additionally, Plaintiffs status as a felon is not a class protected by the FHA.

Section 3604 prohibits housing discrimination based on protected characteristics, but allegations based solely on socioeconomic status or conclusory assertions of racial motive do not state an FHA claim.

HILL v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY (PHA) · filed 2025-07-31

“‘The Fair Housing Act (‘FHA’), passed by Congress as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, gender, and national origin’—and, following the adoption of the FHAA in 1988, individuals with disabilities. ... Discrimination under the FHA includes failure to make repairs or delaying repairs if motivated by ones’ membership in a protected class, including race. ... To the extent Hill alleges that she was discriminated against based on her socioeconomic status, she has not alleged a protected class that is entitled to protection under the FHA or Title VI. ... To the extent Hill alleges that she was discriminated against because of her race, she alleges this only in a conclusory fashion, because she does not provide any factual basis for inferring that the time or manner in which the PHA and/or HUD handled her complaints about the condition of the unit related in any way to her race. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim under the FHA or Title VI.”

Sections 3604(a) and (f) require facts showing that the prohibited conduct occurred because of a person’s membership in a protected class.

Bloodgood-Loper v. Loper · filed 2024-08-27(a), (f)

Bloodgood-Loper failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants ... engaged in conduct made unlawful by that statute “because of” Bloodgood-Loper’s membership in a protected class.

Section 3604(f)(3)(B) requires reasonable accommodations in housing rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to give a handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, but § 3604(f)(9) does not require making a dwelling available when the tenancy would pose a direct threat to others’ health or safety.

Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters · filed 2007-08-20(f)(3)(B), (f)(9)

Under fair housing laws, discrimination includes a landlord’s “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). ... We therefore conclude that an individual who engages in conduct that violates a housing authority’s rules and that is significantly inimical to an authority’s obligation to provide a physically safe environment for its tenants is not a “qualified handicapped person” entitled to an authority’s general obligation to provide reasonable accommodations for its handicapped tenants. ... However, nothing in the public housing laws “requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damages to the property of others.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2000).

Section 3604(f)(1) prohibits making a dwelling unavailable or denying it because of disability, but § 3604(f)(9) does not require making a dwelling available when the individual's tenancy would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others.

Jenkins v. New York City Department of Homeless Services · filed 2010-08-30(f)(1), (f)(9)

There is no doubt that DHS did not “make unavailable or deny, a dwelling,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), to Jenkins. DHS concluded that, as a result of Jenkins’s mental illness—a diagnosis with which Jenkins disagrees but has not challenged—it was safer and more appropriate for Jenkins and other homeless shelter residents for Jenkins to be offered placement in a mental health shelter than in a general population shelter. In light of Congress’ unequivocal instruction that “[n]othing in [42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9)] requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct theat to the health or safety of other individuals[,]” Jenkins has failed to state a claim under the FHA, and to permit him leave to amend the complaint would be futile.

Section 3604(f)(9) permits excluding a person from a dwelling when the person’s tenancy would pose a direct threat to health or safety that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation, assessed using the best available objective evidence.

Friedel v. Park Place Community LLC · filed 2018-08-29(f)(9)

In its defense, Park Place had to prove that it made a “reasonable judgment” to banish the dog after “mak[ing] an individualized assessment . . . that relie[d] . . . on the best available objective evidence to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk” the dog created; “the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.”

Section 3604(f)(9) does not require housing to be made available to someone whose tenancy would directly threaten the health or safety of others.

Prince v. State of Michigan · filed 2025-01-28(f)(9)

The Fair Housing Act does not mandate that “that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(d).

Section 3604(f)(9) allows a housing provider to decline a tenancy when objective evidence shows it would directly threaten others’ health or safety or cause substantial physical damage to others’ property.

Partee · filed 2026-02-04(f)(9)

Given the foregoing evidence, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge Powers has shown its “conduct was supported by . . . objective evidence that [Naeem] posed a direct threat to persons or property, as is required to trigger the [direct threat] exception” to the FHA.

Section 3604(f)(9) does not treat an indecent exposure conviction as a categorical direct threat; treatment and current risk matter.

Simmons v. T.M. Assocs. Mgmt., Inc. · filed 2018-02-14(f)(9)

Because these allegations must be credited for now, Derek's behavior undergirding his conviction has been mitigated by treatment such that he does not pose a direct threat to others. ... For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the direct threat exception does not apply at this point in the litigation.

Section 3604(f)(9)'s direct-threat exception requires evidence that residents threaten health, safety, or property; neighbors' speculation is insufficient.

Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield · filed 1991-08-01(f)(9)

With regard to the third category, wherein individuals who pose a threat to health, safety, or property are not to be considered “handicapped” under the Act, defendants have pointed to no evidence that the category applies to plaintiff-residents, but only can point to the speculative conclusions of the neighbors.

Section 3604(f)(9)’s direct-threat exception requires objective evidence of acts that caused harm or directly threatened harm.

Wirtz Realty Corp. v. Freund · filed 1999-06-23(f)(9)

Thus, it is clear that there must be objective evidence of overt acts that caused harm or acts which directly threaten harm in order to establish that someone is a “direct threat.”

Section 3604(f)(9)’s direct-threat exception concerns threats to other people; a perceived threat to the tenant herself does not justify denying housing.

LaFlamme v. New Horizons, Inc. · filed 2009-03-31(f)(9)

Defendants also offer no basis on which to extend this exception to permit denial of housing to an individual who is a threat to herself, in light of the statute’s clear language referencing the “health or safety of other individuals.” 42 U.S.G. § 3604(f)(9) (emphasis added).

Section 3604(a) imposes liability for covered discriminatory conduct on property owners, landlords, and qualifying agents, but not on non-owner co-tenants who are not shown to be acting as agents.

Scutt v. Dorris · filed 2021-01-20(a)

The SAC has failed to correct the FAC’s deficiencies and Plaintiff has again failed to state a claim against Dorris under the FHA. That is, Plaintiff again fails to allege facts showing that Dorris qualifies as an individual subject to liability under the FHA. At all times relevant, Dorris was a co-tenant at Plaintiff’s apartment building. But as the court explained in the December 14 Order, “tenants who do not own the subject property are not liable under the FHA.” ... And while it is true that agents or employees of a property owner may be liable for their own unlawful conduct under the FHA, see, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979); Hintz v. Chase, 2017 WL 3421979, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug 9, 2017), Plaintiff has again failed to allege facts plausibly demonstrating an agency relationship between the Landlords and Dorris.

Section 3604 does not protect a person who was not trying to procure housing.

Pandozy v. Segan · filed 2009-08-11

First, the district court properly dismissed Pandozy’s claims under the Fair ... Housing Act (“FHA”) because Pandozy: (1)did not allege that his children were under the age of 18 or that he had been discriminated against because he had minor children, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k); (2) was not protected by 42 U.S.C. § 3604 because he had not been trying to procure housing; (3) did not allege that he had engaged in protected activity as required by 42 U.S.C. § 3617; and (4) did not allege that Defendants-Appellees had been engaged in “residential real-estate related transactions” or in providing brokerage services as defined by 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605 and 3606.