42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the charge is filed with a state deferral agency.

Tokuta v. Univ · filed 1998-11-23(e)(1)

Governed by the precedent set forth in Tinsley , we hold that because the VCHR is a state deferral agency, Tokuta had 300 days to file his EEOC charge.

A Title VII charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or within 300 days if the individual first files with the appropriate state agency.

De Almeida v. Children's Museum · filed 1998-11-30(e)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, an individual alleging an unlawful employment practice must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory incident occurred. If the individual first files a claim with the appropriate State agency, then the charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory incident occurred.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Harris v. Beecham · filed 1998-12-08(e)

In deferral states such as Pennsylvania, a charge under Title VII must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Thus, alleged acts which occurred before August 22, 1993 are untimely and may not be included in Harris’ Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged employment practice.

Wright v. Department of Corrections · filed 1998-12-14(e)

Therefore, based on the representation and concession by Wright, the court finds that Wright’s claims related to the touching and miscount incidents are time barred because they were filed outside of the 180 day time period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars a Title VII claim when the employee files an EEOC charge after the applicable filing period.

Rowe v. Board of Trustees for the Florida School for the Deaf & Blind · filed 1998-12-15(e)(1)

Even assuming that Visconti sexually harassed Plaintiff as late as December 31, 1991, Plaintiff would have had to file charges with the EEOC relating to such harassment on or before roughly November 1, 1992, which she clearly did not do. Plaintiffs Title VII claims are thus time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge arising in Virginia to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Demuren v. Old Dominion University · filed 1999-01-12(e)

A Title VII claim arising in Virginia must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of-the allegedly discriminatory action, else it is barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of alleged discrimination in Kansas; earlier acts are time-barred unless they form part of a continuing violation.

Johnson v. Board of Johnson County Commissioners · filed 1999-01-13(e)

As a result of the court’s finding that no continuing violation existed, any allegation of discrimination occurring before February 24, 1995 is time-barred and will not be addressed or considered by the court.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing deadline can be extended for a continuing violation when related discriminatory acts amount to an ongoing policy or practice.

Hall v. South Central Connecticut Regional Water Authority · filed 1998-12-05(e)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the continuing violation exception does not apply, and we confine our consideration of plaintiffs sex discrimination claims under Title VII to those acts that occurred on or after September 16,1994, and plaintiffs race discrimination claims to those acts that occurred after August 5, 1993.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file a discrimination charge in a deferral state; delayed notice to the employer and an amendment curing a technical defect do not defeat a timely original charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Commission v. Blue Cross Blue Shield · filed 1998-12-21(e)(1)

Title I of the ADA, which governs employment discrimination claims, is enforced pursuant to the “powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in section 2000e-5,” 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), which in a deferral state such as Connecticut requires a charge of discrimination to be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act. ... Given the liberal approach of the Second Circuit toward the filing requirements of Title VII and the fact that the second charge related back to the first filing, we hold that Mr. Pannone’s charge of discrimination was timely filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII claimant in Kansas to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged act.

Nash v. The University of Kansas Medical Center · filed 1999-01-11(e)(1)

In Kansas, a plaintiff must file Title VII discrimination charges within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when state agency proceedings are initiated; otherwise, the charge must be filed within 180 days.

Meyer v. Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. · filed 1999-02-16(e)(1)

At no time did the State agency ever become involved in Meyer’s charge, and, at no time did she require the extended time to file with the State agency and, thereafter, with the EEOC. This Court finds that the plaintiff failed to file her charge within the 180-days required under the plain reading of the statute, and the plaintiffs claim must fail.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a Title VII claimant in Kansas 300 days to file an EEOC charge, even if the claimant did not file separately with the state agency.

Stephens v. City of Topeka, Kan. · filed 1999-01-15(e)

Authority indicates, furthermore, that a plaintiff need not file suit with the appropriate state agency to reap the benefit accorded by the 300-day provision: ... Defendant has presented nothing to support a finding that plaintiff cannot avail himself of the 300-day period. The court declines to enter summary judgment for the alleged failure to timely file a , charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Plaintiff filed his charge within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of alleged discrimination when the plaintiff has filed with a state or local agency; earlier acts may be considered if they are part of a continuing violation.

Pittman v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1999-02-03(e)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct if the plaintiff has filed a complaint with a local or state agency such as the PHRC. ... Applying the 300-day limitations period, alleged acts occurring before June 2, 1995, which includes all of Plaintiffs time at the ticket counter, are unavailable to her claim unless they comprise part of a continuing violation.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; efforts to resolve a dispute internally do not give a claimant an unlimited extension through equitable tolling.

Patricia Hentosh, ph.d. v. Herman M. Finch University of Health Sciences/the Chicago Medical School and Samson T. Jacob, · filed 1999-02-09(e)

Equitable tolling does not permit plaintiffs to arrogate to themselves an unlimited period of time within which to file their charge with the EEOC, and such a result would certainly arise if we permitted plaintiffs to circumvent the statutory time limit by merely claiming they were engaged in their own endless efforts to resolve the case with their employer internally.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge filing requirement is nonjurisdictional and functions like a statute of limitations.

Triple-S, Inc. v. Pellot · filed 1999-01-29(e)

While the charge filing requirements of Title VII are not jurisdictional, they are akin to a statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of an act of harassment, including a present violation when the plaintiff relies on a continuing pattern.

Klein v. McGowan · filed 1999-02-16(e)(1)

The EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of an act of harassment. Some actionable harassment must have occurred within the 300-day limitations period, but a plaintiffs recovery is not limited to recovery for the actions occurring within the period. ... The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the deficiency slip was not a present violation and, therefore, that Plaintiffs claims of harassment are untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) generally requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discrimination, but a continuing violation can make earlier related acts timely.

Brown v. Middaugh · filed 1999-02-19(e)(1)

In states such as New York, where an agency first reviews charges of employment discrimination, claims of harassment must be brought within 300 days of the “alleged unlawful employment practice”; that is, a Title VII claim is time-barred if a plaintiff fails to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. ... If a continuing violation is shown, a plaintiff is entitled to have a court consider all relevant actions allegedly taken pursuant to the employer’s discriminatory policy or practice, including those that would otherwise be time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars discrimination claims based on incidents outside the applicable 300-day charge-filing period.

Juanita E. Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP · filed 1999-02-23(e)(1)

To the extent that Foster also complains about her failure to receive a promotion in 1990 and a reprimand she received in February 1995, these incidents occurred well beyond 300 days prior to her filing of a charge of discrimination and cannot be the basis of a discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Woodcock v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 1999-03-11(e)

Defendant .also correctly contends that plaintiffs allegations of discriminatory conduct occurring prior to June 13, 1996 are barred by Title VII’s 300 day statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an ADA Title I plaintiff in Maine to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the original allegedly discriminatory decision, rather than its later consequences.

Conners v. Maine Medical Center · filed 1999-03-03(e)(1)

A plaintiff alleging a violation of Title I in Maine must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the accrual of his cause of action. ... Although this decision set into motion a chain of events making this original determination harder to bear, the subsequent termination of employment and pension contributions were mere effects of the earlier decision and are of no consequence to the statute of limitations inquiry.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct.

Barber v. City of Conover · filed 1999-03-05(e)(1)

Accordingly, since Plaintiff did not file an EEOC charge within 180 days of August 25, 1995, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review any conduct by Poovey from prior to that date.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC filing deadline is a waivable limitations requirement; an employer waives an untimeliness defense by failing to plead it.

Funk v. F & K SUPPLY, INC. · filed 1999-03-09(e)(1)

As defendants did not affirmatively plead that Michetti failed to file a timely administrative charge with the EEOC, they have waived this defense.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives Title VII claimants in Illinois 300 days to file an EEOC charge; alleged acts before that period were dismissed.

Welch v. Cook County Clerk's Office · filed 1999-01-14(e)(1)

In Illinois, claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are subject to a 300-day statutory limitations period. ... Any claims arising from conduct that pre-dates the limitation periods are dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of a discriminatory act in Illinois; earlier acts may be considered if they form one continuing violation with timely acts.

Filipovic v. K & R Express Systems, Incorporated · filed 1999-04-28(e)

Because Filipovic filed the first of his three charges of discrimination based on national origin with the EEOC on July 18, 1993, any discriminatory acts which occurred prior to September 21, 1992, would be time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), unless Filipovic can show that these acts were “related closely enough” to the acts occurring within the established time frame “to be considered one ongoing violation.”

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, subject to a continuing-violation exception.

Malone v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1999-04-30(e)

An exception to the 180-day filing requirement arises where the discriminatory act(s) constitutes a “continuing violation.” ... The court finds an issue of fact to exist concerning when, if ever, the alleged discriminatory acts created the degree of permanence which should have triggered Plaintiffs awareness of and duty to assert her rights, or which should have indicated to Plaintiff that the continued existence of the adverse consequences of the act is to be expected without being dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII claimant to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before bringing suit.

Shows v. Morgan · filed 1999-03-17(e)(1)

Shows admits that he failed to file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and that his Title VII claim is due to be dismissed. ... The defendants’ dismissal motion is therefore granted to this extent.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file a discrimination charge when state law prohibits the alleged practice and the charge is initially filed with a state deferral agency.

Rowland v. Amer Gen Finance · filed 1999-03-18(e)(1)

The filing period is extended to 300 days, however, when state law proscribes the alleged employment practice and the charge is initially filed with a state deferral agency. ... Accordingly, Rowland had 300 days to file her charge of discrimination. Because Rowland satisfied this requirement, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand this case to the district court for further consideration.

In Texas, a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice to maintain a Title VII claim.

Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc. · filed 1999-03-29(e)(1)

In addition, in Texas, to maintain a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing deadline is tolled for earlier acts that are part of an ongoing practice or pattern of discrimination.

Hunter v. Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections · filed 1999-04-07(e)

The court declines to do so because facts indicate that the continuing violation theory is applicable here. Under this theory, the statute of limitations is tolled for acts that occur outside of it if they are part of an ongoing practice or pattern of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day EEOC filing period applies separately to each paycheck in a recurring pay discrimination claim.

Meckenberg v. New York City Off-Track Betting · filed 1999-04-13(e)(1)

Thus, recurring pay discrimination does not constitute a continuing violation, as each receipt of a paycheck is the basis for a separate cause of action for which suit must be brought within the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets deadlines for filing a discrimination charge; under the continuing violation doctrine, an older act may be timely if it is part of an ongoing policy of discrimination and a related act is charged on time.

Leson v. ARI of Connecticut, Inc. · filed 1999-04-30(e)(1)

Title VII requires a claimant to file a discrimination charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a state of local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). An exception to this is a so-called “continuing violation” which provides that if a plaintiff files an EEOC charge as to any incident of alleged discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims or acts of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they Had been untimely standing alone. ... Although the Court believes this to be a close issue, it must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving party and, accordingly, holds that Leson’s claims are timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 180 days to file a discrimination charge, or 300 days when an action is first filed with a state or local agency.

Woodrum v. Thomas Memorial Hospital Foundation Inc. · filed 1999-04-12(e)(1)

Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 has a 180-day statute of limitations unless an action is first filed with a state or local agency, in which case the statute of limitations period is 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Plaintiff dual filed with the WVHRC and the EEOC 367 days after he was fired. His federal claims, therefore, are also time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period applies to discrimination and retaliation claims in a deferral state.

Risk v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1999-04-29(e)

We conclude that aside from Risk’s claim of sexual harassment, the 300-day statute of limitations bars Risk’s claims of discrimination and retaliation based on the 1994 awards of overtime and her January/February 1995 reclassification and transfer to the “table.”

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; earlier acts may qualify under the continuing violation exception.

Osier v. Broome County · filed 1999-05-11(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a charge of discrimination must be filed within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” ... Because these acts are not sufficiently continuous in time with one another or other timely acts, plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the continuing violation exception. ... Accordingly, any incidents alleged to have occurred prior to November 16, 1991 are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act, or within 300 days if the charge was first filed with a state or local agency.

Collins v. Christopher · filed 1999-05-25(e)(1)

Title VII requires a claimant to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action, or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination. ... In addition, the 300-day statute of limitations applicable to Title VII claims bars any such claim based on events before April 28, 1995.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant in a deferral state to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Matthews v. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. · filed 1999-05-26(e)

In states in which a state agency has authority to investigate employment discrimination (known as “deferral states”), Title VII requires claimants to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day charge-filing deadline applies to ADA claims, and a timely charge preserves a perceived disability claim when its allegations fairly encompass that claim.

Tubens v. Police Dept. of City of New York · filed 1999-06-01(e)(1)

Thus, under the ADA, as under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after the occurrence of the last discriminatory event alleged. ... Fairly read, Tubens’s original Charge, which defendant concedes was timely filed, alleges a claim of perceived disability discrimination. Thus, this Court finds that her perceived disability claim is not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars an untimely challenge to an employment action.

Powell v. City of Norfolk Police Dept · filed 1999-06-08(e)(1)

However, because Powell did not timely challenge his suspension, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994), Powell's action is limited to a challenge of the decision not to reinstate him immediately following the dismissal of the criminal charge, rather than making him pursue his claim through the administrative appeal process.

In a deferral state, Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge; claims based on earlier conduct are time barred unless the continuing violation exception applies.

Valentine v. Standard & Poor's · filed 1999-06-24(e)(1)

In a “deferral” state such as New York, however, in which there is a designated state or local agency with jurisdiction to consider discriminatory employment claims, the limitations period for filing charges with the EEOC is extended to 300 days. ... Accordingly, he is barred from asserting any claims of discriminatory conduct alleged to have occurred prior to November 11, 1994, 300 days before the filing of the EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge for allegations to be considered in a Title VII claim.

DeWitt v. Mecklenburg County · filed 1999-06-25(e)(1)

Not having been the subject of a timely EEOC charge, these allegations will not be considered relevant to Plaintiff's claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a continuing violation claim to reach discriminatory acts outside the 300-day filing period in a deferral state when at least one act occurred within that period.

Alexander v. Local 496 · filed 1999-06-30(e)

From this filing date, the 300-day statute of limitations applicable to Title VII actions filed in deferral states normally would preclude consideration of alleged violations occurring prior to November 11, 1988. Based on this chronology, LIUNA argues that none of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurring before this date supports a finding of liability against it. Because we conclude that the defendants, including LIUNA, are guilty of a continuing violation, as explained below, this argument is unavailing.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a plaintiff to file an administrative complaint within the applicable period after an alleged unlawful act to pursue Title VII relief.

Maurey v. University of Southern California · filed 1999-07-02(e)

The temporal scope of Title VII is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). To pursue relief under the FEHA or Title VII, a plaintiff must, within one year or 300 days of the alleged unlawful act, file an administrative complaint with an agency.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; in a state with a deferral agency, the filing period is 300 days, and a continuing violation may save an otherwise untimely claim.

Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc. · filed 1999-07-07(e)

In sum, the Court finds that while Blair timely filed the claim concerning light-duty work in December of 1997, that claim cannot resuscitate the untimely claims arising from the alleged events of 1996 or July and September of 1997. Therefore, the Court concludes that these untimely claims cannot withstand the statutory time bar.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely administrative charge; for a hiring claim, the filing period runs from when the employee knows or has reason to know of the challenged hiring.

Rodriguez v. SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceutical, Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 1999-07-08(e)

The time period for deferral states like Puerto Rico, is extended to 300 days if the aggrieved person has first instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant relief for such alleged discriminatory practices. ... Because the discriminatory act at issue is Lopez’s hiring resulting in the passing over of Plaintiff for the position, the date of Lopez’s hiring starts the limitations period. López was hired in January 16, 1995, and Plaintiff filed her administrative complaint in June of 1997. Therefore, Plaintiff filed the complaint well after 300 days after Lopez’s hiring.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing period begins when an employee has notice of a concrete injury, rather than when an appraisal with no apparent tangible effect is presented.

Myrtle Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Company · filed 1999-07-15(e)(1)

We hold that the performance appraisals Thomas received in 1990, 1991, and 1992 did not trigger the statute of limitations in § 2000e-5(e)(l) at the time they were presented to Thomas, because they did not initially have any crystallized implications or apparent tangible effects. The notice of the layoff is the date on which the limitations period began to run because Thomas’s low appraisal scores first resulted in concrete injury in 1993 when they led to her layoff.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days in a deferral state; discrete failures to promote outside that period are not saved by the continuing violation doctrine.

Tilmon v. Dillard's Department Stores · filed 1999-07-16(e)(1)

In a deferral state like Kansas, a plaintiff asserting a claim under Title VII must file an administrative charge within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred. ... In sum, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient facts to raise a triable issue on whether defendant engaged in a continuing course of discrimination such that the court should consider the incidents that occurred prior to the 300-day filing limitations period. Accordingly, the court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs Title VII failure-to-promote claims arising before December 20, 1995.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s filing deadline can bar an ADA discriminatory transfer claim.

Durant v. Rikard Nursing Home · filed 1999-07-16(e)(1)

Likewise, even were Durant disabled under the ADA and thus entitled to its protection, her discrim- inatory transfer claim is time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(e)(1) (1994).

A Title VII claimant in a deferral state must file a charge within 300 days; the continuing violation doctrine requires at least one related discriminatory act within that period.

Miller v. Regents Of The Univ. · filed 1999-07-19(e)(1)

In sum, we conclude Ms. Miller has failed to allege at least one discriminatory act occurring within the 300-day limitation period and, as such, she cannot invoke the continuing violation doctrine to preserve her claims.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) required an EEOC complaint within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Antoine-Tubbs v. Local 513 · filed 1999-07-20(e)(1)

To avoid dismissal of her suit, Tubbs needed t o have filed her complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires the EEOC to receive a discrimination charge within the applicable filing period; mailing it before the deadline is insufficient.

Kelley v. SAU #54 · filed 1999-07-22(e)(1)

Thus, the court concludes that in order to be timely, a charge must be received by the EEOC within the pertinent limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII discrimination charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, or within 300 days if the charge is filed with the appropriate state agency.

Allison v. City of Fort Worth, Texas · filed 1999-07-22(e)(1)

A charge of discrimination under Title VII must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory action, unless the charging party instead files his claim with the appropriate state referral agency, in which case he has 300 days in which to file a complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within 300 days if the claimant initially instituted state or local proceedings.

Benedetti v. Computer Sciences Corp. · filed 1999-07-26(e)(1)

Thus, claimants are required to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, unless within that period the claimant had "initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency," in which case the charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file an EEOC charge.

Harris v. City of New York · filed 1999-08-03(e)(1)

Because the existence of its State Division of Human Rights ("DHR”) makes New York a so-called deferral state for Title VII (and hence ADA) purposes (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)), the seminal teaching of Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 816-17, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980) calls for application of the 300-day rale — and see such decisions in this Circuit as Pikulin v. City Univ. of New York, 176 F.3d 598, 599 (2d Cir.l999)(per curiam).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge after first filing with a state antidiscrimination agency, even if the state filing deadline has passed.

Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, and Hank Mancini John Squatrito · filed 1999-08-09(e)(1)

Charging parties have the benefit of the 300-day time limit for filing their federal claims even when they have missed the state’s filing deadline for submitting those claims to the state deferral agency.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars claims based on alleged harassment that occurred more than 300 days before an EEOC charge was filed in Illinois.

Guzman v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 1999-08-10(e)

Failure to do so, bars the litigation of those claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Because Guzman filed her employment discrimination charges with the EEOC on March 1, 1996, any alleged conduct prior to May 7, 1995 is time-barred and cannot form the basis for this suit.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days in a deferral state, and a known, discrete hiring decision cannot be revived through a continuing violation theory.

Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1999-08-12(e)(1)

In Colorado, ADEA and Title VII complainants must file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice occurred. ... We agree with the district court’s conclusion that, although the 1993 conduct is of the same general type as the 1995 conduct, the 1993 decision was a discrete and salient event that put Ms. Bullington on notice that United violated her rights.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline can exclude evidence of alleged harassment occurring before the applicable filing period.

Guzman v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 1999-08-24(e)

Thus, any evidence of alleged harassment occurring pri- or to May 7, 1995 is excluded. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 128 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.1997).

In New York, a Title VII plaintiff has 300 days from an unlawful employment practice to file an EEOC charge.

Marks v. New York University · filed 1999-08-31(e)(1)

Marks filed her EEOC charge on May 6, 1997, (Compl. ¶ 39; Kahn Aff., Ex. 38), and therefore only those claims based on adverse actions taken on or after July 9,1996 are timely for purposes of her Title VII and ADEA causes of action.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a later verified EEOC charge to relate back to a timely unverified charge, satisfying the filing deadline.

Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. · filed 1999-09-01(e)(1)

Therefore, the verified Charge of Discrimination, filed on December 15, 1997, will relate back to the August 1, 1997 filing of the unverified ADA Information Form, thereby remedying the untimely filing of the verified charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of an alleged unlawful employment practice; a discrete denial of promotion does not become timely as a continuing violation.

Van Cleve v. Nordstrom, Inc. · filed 1999-09-10(e)

An employment discrimination plaintiff must file an EEOC Charge within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). This filing is a prerequisite to a civil suit under Title VII. ... Because plaintiff did not file her EEOC Charge until January 6, 1997, she missed the deadline for filing a complaint about not getting that job.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge concerning an employment practice proscribed by Virginia law; earlier acts are barred unless they qualify as a continuing violation.

Stringfield v. Christopher Newport University · filed 1999-09-14(e)

The appropriate limitations period for filing a Title VII claim with the EEOC of an employment practice proscribed by Virginia law is 300 days from the allegedly discriminatory action. ... In light of the Fourth Circuit’s adherence to the Berry factors and the essential nature of the third factor, any claims under Title VII related to acts occurring prior to August 29, 1995, are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or 300 days when the claimant has instituted proceedings with a state or local equal employment agency.

Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp. · filed 1999-09-15(e)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within either 180 or 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, the latter being applicable where the claimant has instituted proceedings with a state or local equal employment agency.

Section 2000e-5(e), incorporated into the ADA, bars a discrimination claim when the EEOC charge is filed after the applicable deadline.

McKenzie v. Lunds, Inc. · filed 1999-09-15(e)

If the charge of discrimination is not filed with the EEOC, within 300 days of the date of the alleged discrimination, or within 30 days after receiving notice than a State or local agency has terminated its enforcement proceedings, then the claim becomes time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff in a deferral jurisdiction to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice; a continuing violation requires discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory policy to persist into that period.

Williams v. Astra USA, Inc. · filed 1999-09-21(e)

In the absence of such allegations, the continuing violation doctrine fails to assist Williams in clearing the limitations hurdle. Therefore, the Title VII claim cannot be deemed to have been timely filed and will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an ADA charge with the EEOC when a work-sharing agreement makes the EEOC the state agency’s receiving agent and the state agency waives its initial processing period.

Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers · filed 1999-09-22(e)(1)

For several reasons, however, we hold that Tewksbury satisfied the sequential filing requirement and that his ADA charge is subject to the 300-day limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, or within 300 days if the plaintiff first begins timely state or local proceedings.

Fils-Aime v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. · filed 1999-09-30(e)(1)

If a plaintiff takes no other action, that time is 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful practice; but if plaintiff initially institutes timely proceedings with a state or local agency, the EEOC filing period is extended to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.

Anderson v. Twitchell-A Tyco International Ltd. · filed 1999-10-05(e)

The plaintiff is required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. ... Therefore, based on Plaintiffs concession, the court finds that Plaintiffs claims regarding events that transpired prior to 1997 are due to be dismissed as a matter of law because they were filed outside of the 180 day time period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.

Snellgrove v. Abbeville · filed 1999-10-06(e)

To maintain an action under Title VII, an employee must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged discrimination. ... Plaintiffs’ EEOC charges were filed nearly nine months after the date the QC Inspector position was filled by Pemberton. Defendant argues that any promotion claim based upon Pemberton’s selection is, therefore, time-barred. The court agrees, and concludes that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ promotion claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing deadline bars earlier harassment from a continuing violation claim when a substantial break interrupts the alleged pattern.

Bishop v. National RR Passenger Corp. · filed 1999-10-07(e)(1)

Clearly, the approximately four-year break in Ms. Bishop’s situation, including three years in which she did not report to work because of a disability leave, bars any acts alleged to have occurred before Mr. Platt was bumped in 1991 from coverage by the continuing violation theory.

In Illinois, Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge identifying a Title VII discrimination claim within 300 days of the alleged act.

Cleaves v. City of Chicago · filed 1999-10-14(e)

In order to bring suit in federal court under Title YII for discrimination, a plaintiff must have filed a charge with the EEOC detailing the basis of the plaintiffs allegations within 300 days of the date of its occurrence. ... Mr. Cleaves’ race discrimination claim is therefore dismissed as time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or within 300 days if the claimant first filed with a state or local agency.

Matthews v. City of Gulfport · filed 1999-10-19(e)(1)

Title VII requires that a claimant file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged misconduct, or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a state or local agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory misconduct. ... Under Title VII, Matthews is statutorily barred from pursuing all claims arising prior to June 16, 1996 (300 days).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s EEOC filing period begins when a person knows or reasonably should know enough facts to allege discrimination.

Russell v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil · filed 1999-11-04(e)(1)

Because appellants knew or should have known facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case in late 1994, their knowledge of the facts was sufficient to commence the limitations period for the filing of a complaint with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discrimination when the charge is also filed with a state agency, subject to equitable exceptions.

Jones v. WDAS FM/AM RADIO STATIONS · filed 1999-11-09(e)(1)

Plaintiffs retaliation claim based upon her claim that she received an unfavorable compensation package is clearly barred because it is undisputed that plaintiff received the unfavorable proposal from Anderson on January 19, 1994 and she did not file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of this adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the challenged discriminatory act in states with discrimination laws, including for ADA claims.

Freed v. Board of Regents · filed 1999-11-12(e)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is applicable to ADA actions, a lawsuit alleging discrimination must be based on discriminatory actions which occurred within 300 days of the filing of an EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(e). ... Upon examining the issues raised in the parties’ briefs and other submissions in the record, and after examining the district court’s order, this court AFFIRMS the dismissal of Freed’s complaint for substantially the reasons stated in the district court order.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) limits timely Title VII claims in this case to acts within 300 days before the EEOC charge.

Petrosky v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles · filed 1999-11-15(e)(1)

It is not disputed that the 300 day period applies here. ... Therefore, only those incidents of allegedly discriminatory conduct that occurred on or after May 23,1994 are timely.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits consideration of older discriminatory acts under the continuing violation doctrine when they are linked to acts within the filing period.

Simpson v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc. · filed 1999-11-18(e)

Under Title VII, such complaints are generally time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). However, the “continuing violation doctrine” developed under Title VII allows a complainant to obtain relief for a time-barred act of discrimination if she can link it with acts that fall within the statutory limitations period. ... Therefore, the continuing violation doctrine arguably applies, and we may properly consider all of these incidents.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff in Texas to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of learning of the alleged conduct; discrete promotion and account-assignment decisions do not extend that deadline under the continuing violation theory.

Wayne v. Dallas Morning News · filed 1999-11-24(e)(1)

Accordingly, the continuing violation theory does not apply to these claims, and they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant first files a discrimination complaint with a state agency.

Walker v. Envirotest Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-12-10(e)(1)

Plaintiff is correct that, although she only had 180 days within which to file her state charge with the CCHRO, under Title VII, she had 300 days to file her federal charge with the EEOC so long as she had first filed a discrimination complaint with the State agency.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an ADA claimant in a state that prohibits discrimination to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged adverse employment action.

Smith v. Park County School · filed 1999-12-13(e)(1)

The district court correctly dismissed Smith’s ADA claim because he did not file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, subject to the continuing violation doctrine.

Blalock v. Dale County Board of Education · filed 1999-12-15(e)

Concerning the first requirement, which is the only one in dispute, a plaintiff is required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits recovery for sexual harassment to conduct occurring within 300 days before the employee files an EEOC charge.

Carroll v. Celanese · filed 1999-12-20(e)

Carroll can recover under Title VII only for sexual harassment ... that occurred during the 300 days before she filed her Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the challenged conduct; older conduct may support a suit if it is part of a systematic or serial continuing violation.

Klein v. McGowan · filed 1999-12-20(e)

Before bringing a Title VII action, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the event giving rise to the cause of action. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e). Conduct which occurred more than 300 days before the date of filing cannot be grounds for a suit unless it is part of a continuing violation which is systematic or serial.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, or within 300 days if state or local proceedings were initiated.

Malveaux v. City of Dunn · filed 1999-12-30(e)(1)

The aggrieved person is required to have filed a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act if state or local proceedings were initiated.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant initially files with a state or local employment agency.

Nowak v. EGW Home Care, Inc. · filed 2000-01-04(e)(1)

Title VII requires a claimant to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action, unless the claimant initially instituted proceedings with a state or local equal employment agency, in which case the claimant has 300 days to file her charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge in Illinois to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Cross v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees · filed 2000-01-04(e)(1)

Because these alleged retaliatory acts occurred outside of the 300-day statute of limitations period, his claim based on these acts is time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day charge period does not require an instruction barring liability for earlier acts when those acts are offered only as evidence and the plaintiff seeks no relief for them.

Hasham v. California State Board of Equalization · filed 2000-01-05(e)(1)

Finally, Defendant contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury that CBOE cannot be held liable for any acts that transpired before March 1993, 300 days prior to Plaintiff filing his charge with the EEOC under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). CBOE was concerned that the jury would assign liability for previous employment acts that were presented by Hasham as circumstantial evidence of discrimination. The trial judge declined to include the instruction because the proposed instruction improperly discussed statute of limitation problems and Hasham was not claiming relief for CBOE’s prior employment decisions. ... Accordingly, because the trial court’s jury instructions were supported by the record and were a fair and accurate recitation of the law, we are convinced that there is no reason to disturb the trial judge’s denials of Defendant’s proposed additions to the instructions.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff in New York to file an EEOC charge within 300 days; the continuing violation exception does not apply when the employer lacked notice of the alleged discrimination.

Curtis v. Airborne Freight Corp. · filed 2000-01-11(e)

However, even assuming that the incidents alleged by plaintiffs do reflect a “course and pattern” of discrimination, the continuing violation exception is inapplicable. Plaintiffs failed to put defendant on notice of the alleged incidents of discrimination by Zaranski and Patterson, and therefore “it cannot fairly be said that [defendant] ‘permitted’ [the discrimination] to continue unremedied.”

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars Title VII claims based on discrete acts outside the 300-day period before the EEOC charge was filed.

Smith v. Libbey Glass · filed 2000-01-14(e)(1)

As a result, Smith was foreclosed from pursuing his failure to promote claims unless they arose in the 300-day period before the filing of his EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets a 300-day deadline for filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC; a continuing violation may permit challenges to related acts outside that period.

Demarah v. Texaco Group, Inc. · filed 2000-03-23(e)(1)

Title VII bars a plaintiff from seeking relief for sex discrimination alleged to have occurred more than 300 days before a charge of discrimination is filed with the EEOC. ... These facts raise a triable issue on the material issue of whether the alleged illegal acts were repeated during the limitations period or constituted a series of related acts against her sufficient to invoke the continuing violation doctrine. Accordingly, Texaco is not entitled to summary judgment on the second and third claims for relief.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day filing period can make older incidents too remote to support a hostile work environment claim.

Norris v. City of Anderson · filed 2000-01-20(e)(1)

Many of these events occurred outside the 300-day limitation period and/or were not directed toward Plaintiff personally. ... Norris bases his claim of hostile environment discrimination on either incidents which are too remote in time to fall within the law’s purview or on isolated instances which do not rise to the level of actionable harassment.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) required a charge within 300 days in this case, and a plaintiff on inquiry notice of earlier discrimination could not use a continuing violation theory to avoid that deadline.

Paumer v. Crown Cork and Seal · filed 2000-01-27(e)(1)

It is agreed that under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a charge of discrimination in the instant case has to be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and that such filing is a “prerequisite” to a civil suit under Title VII. ... So in the instant case Paumer was at least on “inquiry notice” of Crown Cork’s alleged discrimination as early as 1993, and “she had a duty to assert her rights at that time and she cannot rely on a continuing violation theory to avoid the statutory time bar.”

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives an ADA claimant 300 days to file an agency charge after an alleged discriminatory act.

Johnson v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. · filed 2000-02-05(e)(1)

The ADA requires a plaintiff to file a charge with the appropriate federal or state agency within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... Because Johnson alleges he was wrongfully terminated when he attempted to return from disability leave on February 27, 1995, his ADA and MHRA claims are not precluded by their respective limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the challenged conduct; promotion denials outside that period are time-barred when no timely denial supports a continuing violation.

Lowery v. University of Houston-Clear Lake · filed 2000-02-08(e)(1)

Under Title VII, a civil action based upon employment discrimination cannot be commenced unless the plaintiff has filed a charge within three hundred days of the challenged conduct. ... Thus, to the extent the alleged failure to promote claims occurred before September 30, 1997, they are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice; an ongoing discriminatory policy or mechanism may support a continuing-violation exception.

Findlay v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc. · filed 2000-02-09(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a charge of discrimination must be filed within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” ... Both charges filed with the EEOC fail to allege, with the requisite degree of specificity, the existence of a formal and ongoing discriminatory policy or mechanism at Reynolds sufficient to trigger the continuing violations exception.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge regardless of whether the claimant first filed with a state agency.

Malone v. Specialty Products & Insulation Co. · filed 2000-02-17(e)

Defendants’ argument is therefore incorrect; the appropriate statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s administrative claim is 300-days.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice.

Hospodor v. Indust · filed 2000-02-23(e)

Pursuant to the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII, an employee can- not seek redress in federal court for an employer's alleged discrimina- tory conduct unless he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days "after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1994); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117(a) (West 1995); McCullough v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (claim is time-barred in federal court if employee does not file a timely charge with the EEOC).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or within 300 days if the claimant has already filed with a state or local agency.

Kodengada v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 2000-03-13(e)(1)

Thus, only events that occurred during the 180 day period before filing — that is, on or after March 30, 1997 — are actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge, but a retaliation claim may proceed if it is reasonably related to an earlier charge.

Mendes v. Jednak · filed 2000-03-22(e)

In order for the plaintiffs to bring an action under Title VII, the ADA, or ADEA, they must file an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... A plaintiff may bypass this requirement by demonstrating that any new discrimination claims are reasonably related to charges that were previously filed with the EEOC. ... The Court finds that Ms. Mendes’s claims of retaliation are reasonably related to her allegations in her EEOC complaints. Summary judgment will be denied on Counts One, Two and Fifteen.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or within 300 days if the plaintiff filed a charge with a state agency; the continuing violation doctrine can make earlier harassment actionable.

Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc. · filed 2000-03-27(e)(1)

Title VII requires that a charge of discrimination be filed with the EEOC within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged misconduct, or if the plaintiff has filed a charge of discrimination with a state agency, within three hundred (300) days of the alleged discriminatory actions. ... As Plaintiff has satisfied all three prongs of the continuing violation doctrine, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims are not time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s filing deadline bars earlier discriminatory acts when a break in employment defeats a continuing violation claim.

Cortes v. R.I. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2000-04-18(e)(1)

In sum, I find that plaintiffs decision to terminate her employment and her subsequent return to work a year later under improved circumstances evidence a lack of continuity. Accordingly, I hold that plaintiffs Title VII claims for relief relating to her first period of employment are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 180-day EEOC charge deadline permits a claim based on a continuing violation when at least one related act occurred within the filing period.

Taylor v. Alabama · filed 2000-04-19(e)(1)

Because the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a continuing violation, Harris and the State Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss Plaintiffs Title VII claims on a timeliness argument are due to be denied.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge within 300 days, but a continuing series of related discriminatory acts can permit consideration of earlier acts when one falls within that period.

Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. · filed 2000-05-01(e)

To bring an ADA claim, an employee must file a discrimination charge with the state agency within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred to exhaust his administrative remedies. ... Looking at the facts- in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the court finds a reasonable jury could conclude that Midland continuously maintained the discriminatory practice of refusing to provide the reasonable accommodation of reassignment to Smith. Therefore, summary judgment is not proper.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of an alleged discriminatory act in Illinois, but closely related acts may constitute one continuing violation.

Powell v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-05-11(e)

Because plaintiff filed his EEOC charge against the CFD on January 14, 1999, any racial harassment occurring before March 3, 1998, would be time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), unless plaintiff can show that these acts were “related closely enough” to the acts occurring within the established time frame “to be considered one ongoing violation.” ... Plaintiff has therefore stated a continuing violations claim in the instant case.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge in a deferral state to be filed within 300 days of the alleged violation; earlier acts may be considered if they form a continuing violation.

Patton v. AFG Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-03-29(e)

Sept. 13, 1997 is three hundred days before Mr. Patton filed EEOC charges, July 10, 1998. Prior-occurring events may only be considered in support of Mr. Patton’s ADA claims if there was a continuing violation. Because the court finds no continuing pattern of discrimination, and no acts alleged within the statutory period which constitute distinct violations of the ADA, it holds that Mr. Patton’s EEOC charge was not timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) extends the time to file an EEOC charge to 300 days when the charge is first filed with a state or local agency whose law forbids the conduct.

Bampoe v. Coach Stores, Inc. · filed 2000-03-30(e)(1)

If the charge is first filed with a state or local agency where the state or locality has a law forbidding such conduct, as New York does, plaintiffs time to file a charge with the EEOC is extended to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e) starts the charge-filing period for a failure-to-promote claim when the employee learns that another applicant was selected.

Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico · filed 2000-04-06(e)

For purposes of his failure to promote claim, the clock began to run no later than April, 1993, when Bou filled the position Landrau had sought, necessarily notifying Landrau that Bou had been selected instead of him.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant who first pursues state or local agency proceedings 300 days to file an EEOC charge; for a discharge claim, the period begins at termination.

Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. · filed 2000-04-24(e)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), for causes of action in which the aggrieved party has “initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief,” an EEOC Charge must be filed “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” ... For Title VII claims based on an employee’s termination, the 300-day statute of limitations period for filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC begins to run at the time of termination, which is viewed as a discrete act of discrimination. ... Accordingly, Byers’s claims of discrimination and retaliatory discharge in violation of VII are not barred under that law’s statue of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing period extends to discriminatory acts under an ongoing policy of discrimination, but earlier acts outside that policy do not qualify for the continuing-violation exception.

Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc. · filed 2000-04-21(e)

The continuing violation exception does not apply, however, to Robinson’s claims of discrimination for the period before April 1995, because the record shows that Robinson was not subjected to an ongoing and consistent policy of adverse conduct by TWI during that time.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge-filing period can include earlier acts when related discrimination continues unremedied long enough to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice.

Sedotto v. Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp. · filed 2000-05-08(e)(1)

We find this to be sufficiently continuous to render the continuing violation exception applicable to defendant’s alleged failure to address this problem.

Section 2000e-5 requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of an alleged discriminatory act in Florida, but a continuing violation can permit a claim based on related acts when at least one falls within that period.

Gillis v. Sports Authority, Inc. · filed 2000-04-24(e)(1)

As a general proposition, a person filing a charge of discrimination pursuant to the ADA must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. In Florida, the required administrative charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action. ... Therefore, applying the Berry factors of subject matter, frequency and permanence to the instant case, the Court finds, for the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, that Gillis has sufficiently alleged a continuing violation. Accordingly, TSA’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count I of the complaint is denied.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day filing period does not prevent earlier harassment from being admitted as relevant evidence.

Peck v. HUDSON CITY SCHOOL DIST., HUDSON, NY · filed 2000-05-18(e)(1)

For that reason, the fact that such conduct occurred outside the 300-day period is irrelevant. Even if evidence of this type is barred under the statute of limitations, it may be admissible as relevant to the issues.

Section 2000e-5 allows an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination when a state agency waives the 60-day deferral period under a work-sharing agreement.

Smith v. Chrysler Financial Corp. · filed 2000-05-30(e)(1)

Generally under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) of Title VII, no charge may be filed with the EEOC until 60 days have elapsed from the time a charge is filed with a local state agency having the authority to administer state civil rights laws that prohibit unlawful employment practices. ... However, if the EEOC enters into work sharing agreements with a state agency authorized to enforce state employment discrimination laws, and the state waives the Title VII statutory 60 day deferral period, the state’s investigation is considered “terminated”, and a claimant may file a discrimination charge directly with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory conduct — even if the claimant has not filed a timely state charge. ... Consequently, plaintiffs claims based on discriminatory conduct that occurred 300 days before the EEOC received plaintiffs April 23, 1997 Charge of Discrimination, being claims based on conduct that occurred on or after July 2, 1996, are timely as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars claims based on acts outside the 300-day EEOC filing period when the plaintiff cannot establish a continuing violation.

Ofudu v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2000-06-02(e)(1)

Here, the Court has no basis on which to apply the continuing violation doctrine. The Plaintiff alleges a number of discrete acts that he contends discriminated against him. He has come forward with no evidence of any specific policy or mechanism for discrimination in place. ... Defendant’s motion to preclude consideration of acts that took place prior to March 4, 1997 is granted.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days in a work-sharing state; earlier discriminatory acts are time-barred unless the continuing violation theory applies.

Cooper v. Lederle · filed 2000-06-09(e)(1)

Title VII requires that a claimant file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of an alleged unlawful employment action, or within 300 days if the claimant files in a work-sharing State. ... Therefore, all acts of discrimination that occurred prior to 300 days before Plaintiff filed her charge are time-barred (unless they are revived under the so-called continuing violation theory).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge-filing period does not reach isolated sexist remarks spread over years when they do not form a continuing violation.

Buckner v. General Signal Technology Corp. · filed 2000-06-13(e)(1)

Clearly, a handful of isolated sexist remarks over a number of years, typically followed by months, if not years, of harmonious working relations, is not the “continuing violation” which the law was intended to remedy. Finding no continuing violation, the court will consider the sexist remark that occurred within the statutory period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an administrative charge in Kansas, and a continuing violation can make an ADA claim timely when the alleged conduct began earlier.

Land v. Midwest Office Technology, Inc. · filed 2000-07-07(e)(1)

As with Title VII claims, ADA claims must be filed in states such as Kansas within 300 days after the occurrence of the unlawful discriminatory practice. ... Under the continuing violation theory, see Martin, 3 F.3d 1410, the court will consider plaintiffs claims to be timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a plaintiff 180 days to file an employment discrimination charge, or 300 days if the plaintiff first files with the appropriate state agency.

Joanne Fielder v. Ual Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Dba United Airlines, Defendantappellee · filed 2000-07-10(e)(1)

Before a suit may be filed under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e, a plaintiff must either file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the alleged violation or within 300-days if the plaintiff initially instituted proceedings with the appropriate state agency.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a plaintiff who can file with an authorized state agency to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Gorski v. Corrections · filed 2000-07-19(e)(1)

In states where a plaintiff can file a charge with an authorized state agency, the plaintiff must do so within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a claimant in a deferral state to make at least a nominal filing with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Burrell v. Brown · filed 2000-07-28(e)(1)

Therefore, Burrell was required to make some sort of nominal filing with the EEOC within 300 days of the complained-of action.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars claims based on discriminatory acts more than 300 days before the EEOC charge when the claimant cannot establish a continuing violation.

McCain v. Waste Management, Inc. · filed 2000-09-14(e)(1)

First, the Court believes that Plaintiff did not comply with the time limitations requirement that EEOC discrimination charges must be filed within 300 days of a discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, or within 300 days if filed with a state or local agency.

Rodriguez v. Beecham · filed 2000-08-16(e)(1)

However, as the district court correctly noted, any person seeking relief under Title VII must file a charge with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged employment practice occurred," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), or if a claim is filed with a state or local agency "within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," id.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a 300-day period to file an EEOC charge when state proceedings begin within that period, even if the state filing deadline has passed.

Beaulieu v. Northrop Grumman Corp. · filed 2000-09-28(e)

A Complainant can avail himself of the 300-day extension regardless of whether he has missed the state agency’s filing deadline.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely discrimination charge; fear of retaliation for filing does not, by itself, toll the filing deadline.

Kirk v. Hitchcock · filed 2000-09-29(e)

Even accepting Kirk’s explanation as true, failing to file out of fear of retaliatory action is not an exceptional circumstance beyond her control, particularly since Title VII provides specific remedies for retaliation. Therefore, Kirk has not put forth a sufficient basis for tolling the filing deadline, and any claim of discrimination based on Currie’s refusal to assign Kirk to APD “because she is a woman” is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a wage-discrimination charge filed within 180 days of an allegedly discriminatory paycheck because each such paycheck is a recurring violation.

Gibbons v. Auburn University at Montgomery (AUM) · filed 2000-08-16(e)

Therefore, so long as the employee files his EEOC charge within 180 days after the last discriminatory paycheck, the court can discern an instance of discrimination within the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a jurisdiction where a state or local agency has authority over the claim.

Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc. · filed 2000-09-21(e)

In a dual filing jurisdiction such as Pennsylvania, if a plaintiff files a complaint with a state or local agency with authority over the claim, she is allowed 300 days from the date of the alleged discrimination within which to file a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC.

In a deferral state, a Title VII charge filed with both the state agency and the EEOC is subject to a 300-day filing period.

Ericson v. City of Meriden · filed 2000-09-25(e)(1)

Plaintiff in this case filed her charges concurrently with the CCHRO and the EEOC, and, because Connecticut is a deferral state, the 300-day rule applies. Thus, any alleged discriminatory acts which occurred prior to July 8, 1997 (300 days prior to Plaintiffs first EEOC filing of May 4, 1998) are time-barred and may not be considered as a basis for relief under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits a claim involving continuing harassment when at least part of the alleged violation occurred within the 300-day filing period.

Gauthier v. NH Dept. of Corrections · filed 2000-08-28(e)(1)

At this stage of the litigation, therefore, Gauthier has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that the conduct ascribed to Brochu and Tarillo constitutes a “continuing violation” under Title VII, at least a portion of which occurred within the 300-day limit.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge and allows earlier harassment to be considered as a continuing violation only when it is sufficiently connected to harassment within the filing period.

Schwebach v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln · filed 2000-08-30(e)(1)

She did not show a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment within the statutory time frame, and thus clearly cannot establish a nexus, let alone a substantial nexus, between incidents occurring within the statutory time frame and those occurring outside the time frame.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge deadline runs from the last discriminatory act; later neutral dividend payments do not extend it as a continuing violation.

Carter v. West Publishing Co. · filed 2000-09-07(e)

Even though the most painful consequence of the discrimination—the loss of dividends and capital gains from the sale of West—occurred later, the statute of limitations commenced when the last discriminatory act occurred—West's last sale of stock to employees.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 300 days in Maryland; earlier acts may be considered under the continuing violation exception only when its requirements are met.

Van Slyke v. Northrop Grumman Corp. · filed 2000-09-18(e)(1)

As Plaintiff cannot satisfy her burden of establishing the existence of a continuing violation, the Court’s analysis will be restricted to Plaintiffs claim that Defendant failed to promote her in favor of three less experienced men and to her related claims of discrimination occurring within the 300 day period prior to filing her EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) precludes consideration of an untimely harassment incident when no continuing violation is established.

Robinson v. Valmont Industries · filed 2000-10-16(e)(1)

Robinson alleges an earlier incident of racially motivated harassment which occurred in 1991. We do not address this claim because it is neither timely nor has Robinson established a continuing violation.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge within 300 days, but a sufficiently alleged continuing violation can preserve related earlier incidents at the pleading stage.

Gonzalez v. New York State Department of Correctional Services Fishkill Correctional Facility · filed 2000-11-29(e)

Liberally read, the Complaint alleges a pattern of discriminatory conduct beginning in January 1996 and extending until October 1997 that DOCS and Fishkill permitted to continue unremedied. The acts are purported to be part of a single discriminatory or retaliatory scheme and consist of similar, related incidents. This is sufficient at this early stage of the litigation to keep in all of Plaintiffs claims notwithstanding the 300 day bar.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC charge filing period begins when an allegedly discriminatory promotion roster is issued; later neutral promotions from that roster do not restart it.

Cox v. City of Memphis · filed 2000-10-18(e)(1)

This Court believes the better view is that promotion or hiring from an allegedly tainted promotions roster is not a “continuing act” but is merely the effect of previous discrimination. It is at the point of promulgation of the roster that a potential plaintiff is aware that alleged discrimination is likely to play a pivotal role in her future advancement.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC filing deadline is nonjurisdictional, and an employer can waive a timing defense by failing to raise it on appeal.

Hayatdavoudi v. Univ LA Sys Bd Trst · filed 2000-11-28(e)(1)

Title VII’s time limits are not jurisdictional and therefore may be waived by a party for whom they would otherwise serve as a defense. ... Thus, to the extent that the University may have been able to assert a defense based on the fact that Hayatavoudi’s EEOC complaint was not filed until June 1997, it has waived that defense by failing to assert it on appeal.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s filing deadline is not extended by the continuing violations doctrine for a discrete failure to promote.

High v. University of Minnesota · filed 2000-12-20(e)(1)

High’s response is that his claim is not barred because his failure to promote claim falls under the continuing violations doctrine. This court has never applied the continuing violations doctrine to a discrete act, such as failure to promote, and we decline to do so now.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC discrimination charge within 180 days, or within 300 days if the claimant has filed with a proper state or local agency; an earlier act may be considered if it is part of a continuing violation.

McCoy v. City of New York · filed 2001-02-14(e)(1)

Title VII requires a claimant to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a proper state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination. ... As such, this incident cannot be viewed as part of a continuing violation and may not be considered in this motion.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge if the claimant first institutes state or local agency proceedings; otherwise, the filing period is 180 days.

Washington v. George G. Sharp, Inc. · filed 2000-12-20(e)(1)

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the 180-day period applies to Ms. Washington’s discrimination charges, rather than the 300-day period. The 300-day period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) would apply only if the Plaintiff initially had charged Sharp with disability discrimination before a state or local agency.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant 300 days to file a discrimination charge when the claimant also institutes proceedings with an authorized state or local agency.

Samedi v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2001-01-26(e)(1)

Accordingly, Plaintiff may allege incidents of discrimination or other unlawful employment practices that occurred in the 300 days preceding September 8, 1997. ... Thus, all allegations of Jones’s harassment of Samedi are time-barred pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s filing deadline is not extended by the continuing violations doctrine for a discrete failure-to-promote claim.

High v. Univ. of MN · filed 2000-12-20(e)(1)

It also argues that High’s claim is time barred by Title VII’s statute of limitations.1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). High’s response is that his claim is not barred because his failure to promote claim falls under the continuing violations doctrine. This court has never applied the continuing violations doctrine to a discrete act, such as failure to promote, and we decline to do so now.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a charge alleging a single continuing violation to cover earlier manifestations if the violation was last manifested within 180 days before filing.

Morris v. Wallace Community College-Selma · filed 2001-01-08(e)(1)

When a true continuing violation exists, a charge of discrimination is timely if the discrimination is last manifested within 180 days before the charge is filed. Moreover, because only a single violation has occurred, the charge is timely with respect to all manifestations of the violation, including those occurring more than 180 days before the charge was filed, and the plaintiff may recover for these remote manifestations as well as for those occurring within 180 days of the charge.