42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(g) makes front pay an equitable remedy for the judge to determine, rather than damages for the jury to award.

McCue v. Kansas, Department of Human Resources · filed 1999-01-07(g)

Front pay remains an equitable remedy available under section 2000e-5(g) and therefore expressly excluded from the damages available under section 1981a.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits front pay as discretionary equitable relief; front pay is outside the cap on compensatory and punitive damages.

Rivera v. Baccarat, Inc. · filed 1999-01-08(g)

Courts holding that the statutory cap does not include front pay recognize that front pay has long been an equitable remedy that may be awarded in the court’s discretion under Title VII. ... Front pay, then, does not come within the statutory cap, and Ms. Rivera’s application cannot be denied on that basis.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes front pay as equitable relief when reinstatement is impractical; front pay is outside the compensatory damages cap in § 1981a(b)(3).

Meriola Z. Gotthardt, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Dba Amtrak, Cross-A · filed 1999-09-14(g)

Before section 1981a’s enactment, this and other circuits' treated front pay as one of the forms of equitable relief authorized under section 706(g), using it to make plaintiffs whole when reinstatement was impractical.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits front pay as equitable relief, which is outside the federal cap on compensatory damages.

Craine v. Trinity College, No. Cv 95-0555013s (Dec. 27, 1999) · filed 1999-12-27(g)

Therefore, the court must determine whether front pay is encompassed within the "future pecuniary losses" capped by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3), or uncapped as `any other equitable relief' that the court deems appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g). ... The court adopts the reasoning of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and Rivera v. Baccarat, Inc. , supra, ... and concludes that front pay is not subject to the statutory cap in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a .

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes front pay as equitable relief, so a request for front pay does not create a statutory right to a jury trial.

Kennedy v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 2000-01-13(g)

Title VII provides that for violations a “complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(l), and the court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g). ... For the above reasons, this court agrees with the reasoning in McCue, and similarly holds that Title VII does not provide for jury trial of front-pay requests.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes front pay as equitable relief, so front pay is excluded from the compensatory damages cap.

Fernandez v. North Shore Orthopedic Surgery & Sports Medicine, P.C. · filed 2000-01-27(g)(1)

Amounts specifically excluded from the compensatory damages award under this section include “backpay, interest on back-pay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.2000e-5(g) ].” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (1994). ... Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court concludes that front pay is considered an equitable remedy in the Second Circuit and therefore the statutory cap applied to “future pecuniary losses” does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits front pay as equitable relief, with the judge deciding whether to award it.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. W&O, Inc. · filed 2000-05-30(g)(1)

We hold that front pay retains its equitable nature under Title VII after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and, thus, that the district court did not err in deciding front pay without submission to the jury.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows front pay as equitable relief for the judge to decide, even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

U.S. EEOC v. W & O, Inc. · filed 2000-05-30(g)(1)

We hold that front pay retains its equitable nature under Title VII after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and, thus, that the district court did not err in deciding front pay without submission to the jury.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits front pay to the future benefits the plaintiff would have received from the defendant if reinstated.

Aquilino v. University of Kansas · filed 2000-07-31(g)

As explained above, as ah alternative to reinstatement, front pay reflects only the estimated amount of future benefits plaintiff would have received with defendant if she had been reinstated.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits front pay as equitable relief; the court denied it after considering mitigation and the circumstances of the case.

Reiner v. Family Ford, Inc. · filed 2001-05-15(g)

In addition to authorizing the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, Title VII broadly provides that a court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Thus, the absence of a finding of egregious circumstances, coupled with plaintiff Reiner’s failure to mitigate her damages, compels the court to deny her claim for front pay herein.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes front pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Pollard v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · filed 2001-06-04(g)(1)

As to front pay awards that are made in lieu of reinstatement, we construe § 706(g) as authorizing these awards as well.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes front pay as equitable relief, so front pay is excluded from the compensatory damages cap.

Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2001-07-05(g)(1)

In addition, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that front pay is “any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g)” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ... Front pay, is therefore not subject to the damages cap, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes front pay, which is excluded from the statutory cap on compensatory damages.

Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc. · filed 2002-04-11(g)

The damages limit does not apply to back pay awards, or to relief authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes front pay, so front pay awards are outside Title VII’s compensatory damages cap.

McCaskill v. SCI Management Corp. · filed 2002-04-11(g)

The Supreme Court concluded that front pay awards were available under § 706(g), and therefore excluded under the term "compensatory damages," within the meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 1952. Following Pollard, we reject Tidyman's' claim that the Title VII statutory cap applied to the plaintiffs' front pay awards.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits front pay and lost benefits when reinstatement is not feasible or desirable.

Van Horn v. Specialized Support Services, Inc. · filed 2003-01-29(g)

The Court finds that reinstatement would not be a feasible or desirable remedy for the harm suffered by Ms. Van Horn and that an award of front pay and lost benefits in the amount she has requested is therefore appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits front pay when circumstances make reinstatement unfeasible; an award does not require egregious circumstances.

Armstrong v. Charlotte County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2003-04-10(g)

But where, as here, extenuating circumstances render reinstatement unfeasible, front pay should be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to deny front pay when the plaintiff fails to provide the information needed to calculate a reasonably certain award.

Gary McKNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant · filed 1992-09-11(g)

We also note that when a party fails to provide the district court with the essential data necessary to calculate a reasonably certain front pay award, the court may deny the front pay request.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes front pay when continuing hostility makes reinstatement unworkable.

Broadnax v. City of New Haven · filed 2005-07-20(g)(1)

The award of front pay in this case required evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that reinstatement was “not viable because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits reinstatement for a Title VII violation, but front pay may be awarded when reinstatement is inappropriate or unavailable.

Sands v. Menard, Inc. · filed 2010-07-21(g)(1)

Under Title VII, courts may "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l). ... However, reinstatement is not appropriate or even possible in all cases. Numerous courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have held that front pay— compensation for projected future earnings — may be awarded in Title VII cases where reinstatement is unavailable or inappropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes front pay as equitable relief when reinstatement is inappropriate.

Bergerson v. Office of Mental Health · filed 2011-07-21(g)(1)

Front pay may be awarded pursuant to section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides a court with authority to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,” including but not limited to “reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 853–54 (2001).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits front pay as an alternative to reinstatement, and a compensatory damages award does not by itself resolve whether front pay is warranted.

Bergerson v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2011-07-21(g)(1)

Because we hold that the District Court abused its discretion in its “specific finding” that Bergerson was not entitled to backpay, we cannot assume, as CNYPC would have us do, that front pay is likewise not warranted.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows a court to award front pay as equitable relief when reinstatement is impractical.

Roswick v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C. · filed 2019-11-13(g)(1)

“Front pay is an equitable remedy, which the district court in its discretion may award under the [civil rights statutes] to make the injured party whole.” Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., 110 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (authorizing equitable relief). ... The Court awards Dr. Roswick front pay of $430,000 to make him whole for lost future earnings without providing him with a windfall.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows a court to deny both reinstatement and front pay when equitable considerations warrant.

Bogan v. MTD Consumer Group, Inc. · filed 2020-10-29(g)(1)

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying both reinstatement and front pay here.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits front pay as equitable relief when reinstatement is inappropriate.

Ross v. Huhtamaki, Inc. · filed 2022-04-13(g)(1)

Those remedies include reinstatement or “any other equitable relief the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Courts prefer reinstatement, but front pay is an alternative equitable remedy when reinstatement is not appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) makes backpay and front pay equitable remedies for the court to decide.

Williams v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General · filed 2022-05-06(g)(1)

McGovern’s testimony and report pertain to Williams’ front pay and backpay damages, which are equitable remedies under Title VII for the Court to decide, not the jury. See Seventh Circuit Federal Civil Jury Instructions, No. 3.10 cmt. c (“Under Title VII and the ADA, back pay and front pay are equitable remedies to be decided by the court.”); Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir. 2000); 42 USC § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits front pay as an equitable substitute when reinstatement is unavailable.

PHILLIPS v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION · filed 2023-08-16(g)(1)

The Court, in exercising its discretion and in consideration of Donlin and Bianchi, will award Plaintiff front pay damages for thirteen years, until she reaches age 65.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits front pay as equitable relief, but a court may deny it when the plaintiff fails to diligently seek comparable work and the requested award is speculative.

Ellis v. Chronister · filed 2025-08-27(g)

Accordingly, a court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,” including “reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Despite a presumption in his favor, Ellis is not entitled to front pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) treats attorney fees separately from costs when an employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same action despite an impermissible motive.

Ballou v. McElvain · filed 2024-04-23(g)(2)(B)

In other words, as the Court understands it, if Defendants had been successful in demonstrating their mixed-motive defense, then the Rule 68 offer would have been invalid because attorney fees are distinct from costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) and cannot be included as part of a Rule 68 offer. ... Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude the Rule 68 offer was invalid at the time it was submitted or that it should not apply to attorney fees.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)'s same-decision affirmative defense need not be included in jury instructions when the employer has not raised it.

Galdamez v. Potter · filed 2005-07-14(g)(2)(B)

The district court declined to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense that the Postal Service would have taken the same action in the absence of an impermissible motivating factor, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), because the Postal Service never raised it. This was neither an abuse of discretion, nor a misstatement of the law, because it pre- served the portion of the mixed motive instruction required by the evidence, and because omission of the affirmative defense, if anything, favored Galdamez.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) precludes damages if an employer proves it would have made the same employment decision without considering the plaintiff’s sex.

Hines v. Grand Casino of Louisiana, L.L.C.—Tunica-Biloxi Indians · filed 2005-01-26(g)(2)(B)

The question at issue in this case asked the jury whether defendant had proven the limited affirmative defense provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), referenced above: that it would have treated Katy Hines similarly even if her gender had played no role in its employment decision. Under the statute, a response of “yes” to question number five would have precluded any award of damages, and a response of “no” would have allowed damages to be assessed.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Rawlinson v. Whitney National Bank · filed 2005-01-10(g)(2)(B)

Of course, as stated above, the defendant can still preclude some of the Title VII relief if it can show that it would have taken the same adverse-employment action against the plaintiff even in the absence of the impermissible factor.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits a same decision defense only for mixed motive claims under § 2000e-2(m).

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2004-06-21(g)(2)(B)

In that event, the Act would provide no basis for the assertion of a “same decision” defense at the remedy stage since, by the explicit statutory language, such defense applies only where the illegal conduct was the result of mixed-motives.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) places the burden on an employer to prove it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motive if it seeks to limit the remedies available in a mixed-motive case.

Levias v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice · filed 2004-04-15(g)(2)(B)

If the plaintiff prevails, under the second alternative, then if the defendant is to limit the remedies available to the plaintiff to injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs- — ie., to escape liability for damages — the burden shifts back to the defendant to prove the affirmative defense stated in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), which is that the defendant “would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”

Section 2000e-5(g) allows an employer to avoid retroactive promotion and back pay by proving it would have made the same decision without discrimination.

Thomas O. Bibbs, Jr. v. John Block, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture · filed 1985-12-11(g)

We reiterate that to avoid an award of retroactive promotion and back pay, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that Bibbs would not have received the promotion even if race had not been considered.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an employer to avoid retroactive promotion and backpay by proving that the employee would not have been promoted even without the discrimination.

Thomas O. Bibbs, Jr. v. United States Department of Agriculture · filed 1988-09-13(g)

Here, having found discrimination, the district court was required to decide under section 706(g) whether the employer had met its burden of showing that Bibbs would not have been promoted in the absence of the proven discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive; that showing does not eliminate liability.

Hicks v. Dothan City Board of Education · filed 1993-02-18(g)(2)(B)

Title VII provides that the employer may “demonstrate” that it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). However, such demonstration goes not to an employer’s liability but rather to the available relief. If the employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same action, the court could not order the employer to reinstate, hire or promote the complaining employee but could order other declaratory and injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits declaratory and injunctive relief, but bars damages and reinstatement, when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without a discriminatory motive.

Lewis v. American Foreign Service Ass'n · filed 1993-04-12(g)(2)(B)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the mixed motive doctrine and provides that if a defendant proves that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the discriminatory motive, the trial court “may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief ... and attorneys fees and costs ... [but] shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring [or] promotion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits damages in a mixed-motive case only if the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motive.

Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc. · filed 1994-03-08(g)(2)(B)

I am also convinced that plaintiff would have been fired even if the coffee issue had not arisen. Therefore, defendant is not eligible for mitigated damages under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits relief for a mixed-motive employment decision, but the 1991 provision does not apply retroactively.

Nixon v. Runyon · filed 1994-06-30(g)(2)(B)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which would permit relief where impermissible motives animate an employment decision that would have been taken regardless, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West Supp.1993), is not applicable to plaintiff's claim.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the remedies available when an employer would have made the same decision for lawful reasons despite an improper motive.

Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc. · filed 1994-12-01(g)(2)(B)

The amendments do not eliminate the “same decision test” but rather eliminate the complete defense component of that test. Under the amendments, if both proper and improper motivations exist for the employment decision, the court must find a violation of the act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). However, the remedies are limited as set forth in the act. Id.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motive; the 1991 amendment does not apply retroactively.

Linville v. State of Hawaii · filed 1994-12-02(g)(2)(B)

Under the 1991 amendments, however, if an employer is able to establish that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the illegitimate motive, plaintiff is not entitled to damages, but may only be awarded declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Nonetheless, the Court notes that the 1991 Amendments are not applied retroactively. ... Thus, since Plaintiff's action accrued in 1988, the original Price Waterhouse standard would be applicable to this case.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) requires a defendant in a mixed-motive claim to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motive.

Afande v. National Lutheran Home for the Aged · filed 1994-10-31(g)(2)(B)

The Civil- Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), overturned and clarified Price Waterhouse in that a defendant must now. demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motive.

Section 2000e-5 allows limited relief when discrimination was part of an employer’s reason for refusing to hire, even if the employer would have made the same decision otherwise.

Smith v. CONWAY ORGANIZATION, INC. · filed 1994-12-22(g)(2)(B)

In keeping with the rationale discussed above and with the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which modified case law and allowed some relief as long as a plaintiff can prove that a discriminatory reason was at least part of the employer’s motivation, the same framework should be applied in the failure to hire context.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies without eliminating liability when the employer proves it would have taken the same action absent an impermissible motive.

Hall v. City of Brawley · filed 1995-05-23(g)(2)(B)

This Court, therefore, finds that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) applies in this case and would not preclude Defendants’ liability but limit damages accordingly.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) gives an employer a partial affirmative defense if it would have taken the same employment action anyway.

Woodson v. Scott Paper Co. · filed 1995-08-04(g)(2)(B)

Once it is produced, defendant has a partial “mixed motive” affirmative defense that in any event it would have taken the same employment action ... against plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits fees for work on interrelated claims when that work cannot reasonably be separated from the successful mixed motive claim.

Hannon v. Chater · filed 1995-09-12(g)(2)(B)(i)

In this Court’s considered view, the phrase “directly attributable only” should not be read restrictively. ... The limited fees incurred by Hannon’s co-counsel beforehand, almost entirely in defense of Hannon’s deposition, were also directly attributable only to a mixed motive theory because they could not be reasonably disentangled from the common core of facts which underlay all of Hannon’s contentions.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) bars compensatory damages when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering the employee’s disability.

Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., American Trucking Associations, Inc., and Arkansas Motor Carriers Associat · filed 1995-09-22(g)(2)(B)(ii)

In light of that history, we think that the only reasonable construction of the “damages” language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) is as a reference to the compensatory damages authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) for cases other than those in which the employer proves that it would have taken the same action absent consideration of the employee’s disability.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) bars damages when an employer proves it would have taken the same action absent discrimination; an alternative unlawful motive does not establish that defense.

Mary Jane KERR-SELGAS, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. and Whadzen Carrasquillo, Defendants, Appellants · filed 1995-11-13(g)(2)(B)

That is, since the jury found that defendants’ employment decisions were motivated both by unlawful gender discrimination (special verdict 1) and by unlawful retaliation (special verdict 3), its affirmative responses to special verdicts 2 and 4 did not indicate that defendants had succeeded in establishing their affirmative defenses.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) requires the employer to prove it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive to avoid back pay and reinstatement.

Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Incorporated and Richard Burns · filed 1995-11-13(g)(2)(B)

In short, the 1991 Act provides that to avoid back pay and reinstatement, the employer, not the employee, must demonstrate that the employment decision would have occurred absent the impermissible motivating factor.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) bars damages if the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Dale v. Indianapolis Police Department · filed 1996-03-08(g)(2)(B)(ii)

Aid even if Dale succeeds in showing that race or gender was a motivating factor in Crowe’s evaluations and that Chief Toler relied on those evaluations, she cannot recover damages if the Department demonstrates that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Hearn v. General Electric Co. · filed 1996-06-03(g)(2)(B)

Thus, under these amendments, if the employee shows merely that gender was a motivating factor, she has established liability and thus may be entitled to some relief. Whether the employer has met its “same action” burden of proof would go to the nature of the relief available.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Salter v. Douglas MacArthur State Technical College · filed 1996-06-11(g)(2)(B)

Salter is not entitled to summary judgment on the second factor under Title VII, that is, whether the employer has failed to establish that it would have taken the same adverse employment action against the employee even in the absence of the impermissible factor. Under Title VII, Salter would be entitled to damages and full injunctive relief only if she prevailed on this second factor, and the evidence is in dispute as to this factor.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) bars damages for a mixed-motive violation if the employer would have taken the same action without the impermissible factor.

Buchanan v. City of San Antonio · filed 1996-06-13(g)(2)(B)

However, damages may not be awarded for such a violation if the defendant "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor...."

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) leaves an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the court’s discretion after a mixed motive verdict.

Snell v. Reno Hilton Resort · filed 1996-06-17(g)(2)(B)(i)

The word "may" in this section indicates that the grant of attorney's fees and costs lies within the court's discretion.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits declaratory relief and attorney fees when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination, but limits damages and reinstatement; those remedies do not apply retroactively.

Evans v. State of Conn. · filed 1996-07-11(g)(2)(B)

The 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act expressly overruled the Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse by providing that a defendant that meets its burden of showing that it would have taken the challenged actions even in the absence of the discriminatory factor does not escape the entry of a declaratory judgment against it, nor would it escape the assessment of attorneys fees, but is relieved from having to pay compensatory damages or from having to reinstate the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) makes attorney's fee awards in mixed-motive cases discretionary and requires courts to consider proportionality.

Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Center, Incorporated, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae · filed 1996-06-27(g)(2)(B)

To the contrary, we believe that the award of fees is discretionary under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), and that concerns of proportionality do play a part in the analysis.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive, but does not eliminate liability.

Allen v. City of Athens · filed 1996-09-03(g)(2)(B)

Instead of a judgment of no liability at all, the defendant’s proof of “no causation” serves only to limit its liability to the kinds of relief specified in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits discretionary attorney’s fees when discrimination was a motivating factor but the employer proves it would have taken the same action anyway, without requiring the plaintiff to be a prevailing party.

Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc. · filed 1996-08-30(g)(2)(B)

Rather than limit an attorney’s fee award to the same parties already entitled to recover fees under existing statutes, Congress drafted this new provision so as to define the circumstances under which “an individual,” as opposed to a “prevailing party,” could recover.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits limited relief when discrimination was a motivating factor but the employer proves it would have made the same decision without it.

Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education · filed 1996-11-20(g)(2)(B)

However, we must remand for further proceedings with respect to the possibility of limited relief against the defendant Board only as set out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities · filed 1997-05-23(g)(2)(B)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Thus, Congress changed pre-1991 law so that the affirmative defense that the adverse action would have been taken for a legitimate reason no longer provides insulation to the employer from all liability, but only limits the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering the impermissible factor.

Doane v. City of Omaha · filed 1997-06-16(g)(2)(B)

Because the city failed to prove that it would have taken the same action against Doane had it not considered his blindness in one eye, there is no basis for applying section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) in this case.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits available remedies when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering an impermissible factor.

Doane v. City of Omaha · filed 1997-07-30(g)(2)(B)

Because the city failed to prove that it would have taken the same action against Doane had it not considered his blindness in one eye, there is no basis for applying section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) in this case.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees, but not monetary relief or reinstatement, when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering a protected trait.

Venters v. City of Delphi and Larry Ives · filed 1997-08-19(g)(2)(B)

Moreover, even if the employer succeeds in proving that it still would have discharged the plaintiff even if the proscribed criterion had played no role in its decision, the plaintiff still may obtain declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney’s fees, albeit not monetary relief or reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without the discriminatory factor.

Carter v. Pena · filed 1997-10-23(g)(2)(B)

Furthermore, the 1991 Act affirmed the Price Waterhouse holding that mixed-motive is an affirmative defense on which an employer bears the burden of persuasion, but overruled the portion of the holding that an employer could avoid all liability by proving that it would have made the same decision despite the illegitimate factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Such a showing will only limit the scope of relief available to the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) makes the plaintiff’s degree of success the starting point for deciding an attorney fee request when the employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination.

Canup v. Chipman-Union, Inc. · filed 1997-10-08(g)(2)(B)

We hold that the starting point for considering fee requests under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) must be the degree of success obtained by the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) bars damages when the employer proves it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive.

Valentin v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center · filed 1997-11-03(g)(2)(B)

Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff is not entitled to damages unless the jury concludes the defendant would not have terminated the plaintiff absent the unlawful discriminatory motive.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) places on the employer the burden of showing it would have made the same decision absent discrimination and bars damages if the employer makes that showing.

Wolff v. Brown · filed 1997-11-04(g)(2)(B)

Because Wolff only sought damages for wrongful discharge, this instruction is consistent with the mandate in § 20003-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) that an employer is not liable for damages if it would have taken the same action absent its impermissible motive. Wolff argues that the instruction was plain error because it failed to place on the VA the burden of proving it would have made the same decision to discharge had it not discriminated on account of gender. We agree that both Price Waterhouse and the new statute expressly place this burden on the employer.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits a court to award fees and costs directly attributable to a mixed-motive claim when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without discrimination.

Forrest v. Stinson Seafood Co. · filed 1998-01-05(g)(2)(B)(i)

Plaintiff is'entitled, at the discretion of the Court, to have her attorney fees and costs which are “directly attributable” to the pursuit of her mixed-motive claim paid.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) places the burden on an employer to prove it would have made the same decision without discrimination; that showing limits remedies but does not defeat liability.

Cartagena v. Ogden Services Corp. · filed 1998-03-11(g)(2)(B)

Rather the burden of disproving but-for causation—i.e., the burden to show that the plaintiff would have been discharged regardless of the presence of any discriminatory animus—falls to the defendant if the plaintiff is able to show that a discriminatory motive was a factor (and then only as a means of limiting the available remedies, not to avoid liability). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Fields, 115 F.3d at 123.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs for mixed-motive discrimination claims under § 2000e-2(m), but does not extend those remedies to retaliation claims.

McNutt v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 1998-04-02(g)(2)(B)

This is a compelling logical argument, but it cannot overcome the simple fact that the relief McNutt sought and received is not authorized by the text of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). This statute allows courts to award injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and/or costs (but not compensatory damages) to parties proving mixed-motive discrimination under § 2000e-2(m). Because McNutt did not prove a violation of § 2000e-2(m), he is not entitled to any of these remedies.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) allows an employer to avoid monetary damages by proving it would have made the same decision absent pregnancy, even when pregnancy was a motivating factor.

Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd. · filed 1998-04-03(g)(2)(B)

If a plaintiff demonstrates that an employment decision was motivated in part by her pregnancy, the defendant cannot avoid a finding of liability by proving that it would have made the same decision had the plaintiff not been pregnant, but can escape monetary damages in such a situation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the available remedies if the employer shows it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Reynolds v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 1998-04-13(g)(2)(B)

However, under the 1991 amendments, to establish liability, the employee need only show “that race ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m), and then, to avoid the full array of remedies, the employer must “demonstrate!] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) requires findings on whether discrimination was a motivating factor and whether the employer would have made the same decision without it to determine the available remedies.

Mike AKRABAWI, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CARNES COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant · filed 1998-08-10(g)(2)(B)

Crucially, the statute allows the court to award certain relief — but not damages or reinstatement, promotion, etc. — in these cases. The statute demonstrates a congressional purpose to rectify discrimination even when it does not constitute the sole reason for an employment decision. To give effect to the statute, a court needs to find out whether discrimination constituted a motivating factor; but to determine the available remedies the court also needs to know whether the employer would have made the same decision absent discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits declaratory and limited injunctive relief when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination, but bars damages, back pay, and an order requiring promotion.

Peoples v. Florida Department of Children & Families · filed 1998-09-30(g)(2)(B)

Ms. Peoples thus is not foreclosed from all relief under Title VII. The court cannot order her promoted to the positions she sought nor award her back pay or damages. The court may, however, provide other declaratory or injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without discrimination, while allowing the plaintiff to remain the prevailing party.

Curley v. St. John's University · filed 1998-10-07(g)(2)(B)

Such a showing may limit plaintiff’s relief to equitable remedies and attorney’s fees and costs, but leaves plaintiff the prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief to fees, costs, and declaratory and certain injunctive relief if the employer proves it would have taken the same action without discrimination.

Porter v. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services · filed 1998-11-23(g)(2)(B)

If the employer proves that it would have taken the adverse action in the absence of discrimination, it can limit the plaintiff's relief to attorney's fees, costs, and declaratory and certain injunctive relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) allows attorney fees, costs, and declaratory and injunctive relief despite a mixed-motive defense, but the 1991 amendment did not govern a 1989 employment decision.

Beverly v. Widnall · filed 1999-02-08(g)(2)(B)

This particular analysis in Price Waterhouse was subsequently overruled by Congress in 1991 when it amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) to allow a plaintiff to recover attorneys fees and costs and to receive declaratory and injunctive relief even if a defendant makes a showing of mixed motive. Because the employment decision in this case was made in 1989, however, Price Waterhouse was properly considered by the district court.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides limited relief for claims under § 2000e-2(m), but does not apply to retaliation or ADEA claims.

Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n · filed 1999-06-10(g)(2)(B)

And § 107(b), which allows a finding of liability and the awarding of limited relief, states that it applies to claims where a violation is proven under § 107(a). ... The Court holds, therefore, that § 107 does not apply to Lewis’s claim in the instant action because § 107 does not apply to retaliation claims. Alternatively, the Court finds that § 107 is inapplicable here because it does not apply to ADEA claims.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)’s mixed motive remedies do not apply retroactively to employment terminated before the 1991 Act.

Vails v. Police Dept. of City of New York · filed 1999-07-15(g)(2)(B)

Section 107(b) of the Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), provides that if a plaintiff proves a violation of section 107(a), but the defendant demonstrates that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the court may grant declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees. ... Because Vails’s employment was terminated in 1989 and the 1991 Act does not apply retroactively, ... if the NYPD demonstrates that it would have taken the same action regardless, Vails would not be entitled to any relief, even assuming she proved that her gender was a motivating factor in the NYPD's decisions.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) precludes damages and reinstatement when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without considering a forbidden factor, but permits limited equitable relief and attorney's fees.

Hankins v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1999-08-18(g)(2)(B)

Where an employer proves that it would have taken the same adverse action against a plaintiff even if it did not consider the forbidden factor, the plaintiff will be precluded from seeking damages or reinstatement, but may still be entitled to declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) bars damages and reinstatement when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without discrimination, but permits limited equitable relief and attorney's fees.

No. 98-1327 · filed 1999-08-18(g)(2)(B)

Where an employer proves that it would have taken the same adverse action against a plaintiff even if it did not consider the forbidden factor, the plaintiff will be precluded from seeking damages or reinstatement, but may still be entitled to declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies if an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering an impermissible criterion.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Orkin Exterminating Co. · filed 1999-09-01(g)(2)(B)

If an employer establishes that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of the impermissible criterion, however, the plaintiffs remedies are limited. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to mixed-motive retaliation claims under the ADEA.

Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n · filed 2000-04-13(g)(2)(B)

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), therefore, does not change the treatment of mixed-motive cases of retaliation under the ADEA.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies in mixed-motive claims covered by § 2000e-2(m), but does not apply to ADEA retaliation claims.

Lewis v. YMCA · filed 2000-04-13(g)(2)(B)

We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to mixed- motive retaliation claims under the ADEA, and that the decision in Price Waterhouse and our subsequent decisions require that the summary judgment for the defendant be affirmed.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to mixed motive retaliation findings; when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without retaliation, the claim affords no relief.

Matima v. Celli · filed 2000-09-18(g)(2)(B)

However, all of our sisters circuits to have considered the issue have concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to mixed motive retaliation findings, and that a mixed motive finding acts as a complete bar to a retaliation claim, precluding any and all relief. ... We agree.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not authorize attorney’s fees or costs on a retaliation claim when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without a retaliatory motive.

Speedy, Robert D. v. Rexnord Corporation · filed 2001-03-16(g)(2)(B)

Specifically, we observed that while 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)/6 does allow courts to award injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and/or costs to parties proving mixed-motive discrimination under 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(m), discrimination based on retaliation is conspicuously absent from the list of protected categories in sec. 2000e-2(m). ... In this appeal, Speedy has merely rehashed the arguments we rejected in McNutt, and has thus failed to advance any rationale that would warrant the reconsideration of our previous decision.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides a nonmonetary remedy even when an employer establishes the mixed-motive affirmative defense, without changing the substantive mixed-motive analysis.

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., Dba Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino · filed 2001-10-02(g)(2)(B)

The 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act do not alter the substantive analysis under Price Waterhouse, but provides a nonmonetary remedy against discriminatory practices even where the employer establishes the affirmative defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2) permits limited relief when discrimination motivated an employment decision, while the employer’s proof that it would have made the same decision affects the availability of full relief.

Gagnon v. Sprint Corp. · filed 2002-03-19(g)(2)

Whether or not Sprint PCS satisfies its burden to show by a preponderance that it would have reached the same employment decision absent any discrimination is only relevant to determine whether the court may award full relief including damages, court ordered admissions, reinstatement, hiring, promotion or other such relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees when direct evidence establishes discrimination, even if the employer shows it would have made the same decision without discrimination.

Roberts v. Swift and Co. · filed 2002-04-25(g)(2)(B)

Hence, if the plaintiff can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact about whether he can meet his initial burden regarding direct evidence, then his claim must survive summary judgment because such direct evidence alone would entitle the plaintiff to recovery of declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Thus, evidence that the defendant offers on whether it would have subjected the plaintiff to the same employment decision regardless of discriminatory intent cannot defeat a claim altogether, it can only defeat certain remedies such as damages or equitable relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) places on the defendant the burden of proving that the plaintiff would have been fired regardless of discriminatory animus.

Jamieson v. Poughkeepsie City School District · filed 2002-03-20(g)(2)(B)

At trial, a defendant must then ... prove that plaintiff would have been fired regardless of the discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2) permits limited relief when discrimination motivated an employment decision, while the employer’s same-decision showing determines whether full relief is available.

William E. Gagnon, Jr. v. Sprint Corporation, Doing Business as Sprint Spectrum Finance Corporation, Doing Business as S · filed 2002-05-22(g)(2)

Whether or not Sprint PCS satisfies its burden to show by a preponderance that it would have reached the same employment decision absent any discrimination is only relevant to determine whether the court may award full relief including damages, court ordered admissions, reinstatement, hiring, promotion or other such relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees when sex motivated an employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without considering sex.

Dominicak-Brutus v. Urban Property Services Co. · filed 2002-08-30(g)(2)(B)

Even if the employer succeeds in proving that it would have made the same decision absent the illegal consideration, the plaintiff may still obtain declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motivating factor.

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., Dba Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino · filed 2002-08-02(g)(2)(B)

However, if the jury then finds that the employer has proved the "same decision" affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the employer will escape the imposition of damages and any order of reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and the like, and is liable solely for attorney's fees, declaratory relief, and an order prohibiting future discriminatory actions.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits certain remedies, but does not eliminate liability, when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Allen v. Barram · filed 2002-08-23(g)(2)(B)

Thus, under the statutory regime that supplanted the opinions in Price Water-house, the respondent who establishes that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor does not escape liability, but only certain forms of relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides a same-decision defense to damages; a motivating-factor verdict does not resolve that defense unless the jury receives an instruction or special interrogatory on it.

Porter v. United States Agency for International Development · filed 2002-11-22(g)(2)(B)

The question of whether the employer would have made same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive is not put to the jury — and is not answered by the verdict — unless the jury is either instructed on the affirmative defense afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) or given a special interrogatory.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination, but the employer remains liable under Title VII.

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Incorporated · filed 2003-01-07(g)(2)(B)

Consequently, even if Lockheed is able to prove that it would have made the same decision despite discriminatory animus, that showing would only limit the relief available to Hill under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). It would not affect Lockheed’s Title VII liability on the sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) allows an employer to limit remedies by demonstrating that it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor; that showing does not require direct evidence.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa · filed 2003-06-09(g)(2)(B)

For instance, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) requires an employer to "demonstrat[e] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor" in order to take advantage of the partial affirmative defense. Due to the similarity in structure between that provision and § 2000e-2(m), it would be logical to assume that the term "demonstrates" would carry the same meaning with respect to both provisions. ... Absent some congressional indication to the contrary, we decline to give the same term in the same Act a different meaning depending on whether the rights of the plaintiff or the defendant are at issue.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides a same-decision defense to damages in mixed-motive cases, and its burden framework applies to ADA disparate treatment claims.

Skomsky v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C. · filed 2003-06-13(g)(2)(B)

The interests of uniformity require the Court to extend the burden-shifting paradigm articulated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) to ADA disparate treatment claims, including perceived disability claims.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) lets an employer avoid damages by proving it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motivating factor.

Gonzalez v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2003-06-13(g)(2)(B)

In response, a defendant may avoid having to pay damages by proving an affirmative defense that it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)’s same-decision defense can limit damages in single-motive as well as mixed-motive discrimination claims.

Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-06-13(g)(2)(B)

The “same decision test” that the Civil Rights Act requires defendants to pass as part of a limited affirmative defense functions just as effectively when applied to single-motive claims as it does when applied to mixed-motive claims.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the remedies available when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without the discriminatory motive.

Louis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board · filed 2003-12-19(g)(2)(B)

This defense does not totally absolve the employer of liability; however, establishing the defense does restrict the remedies available to the plaintiff to include only declaratory relief, certain types of injunctive relief, and attorneys fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) lets an employer limit remedies in a mixed-motive case by proving it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers of Iowa, Inc. · filed 2003-10-07(g)(2)(B)

If the plaintiff prevails under the second alternative, then if the defendant is to limit the remedies available to the plaintiff to injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs — ie., to escape liability for damages — the burden shifts back to the defendant to prove the affirmative defense stated in § 2Q00e-5(g)(2)(B), which is that the defendant “would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) allows limited relief when sex was a motivating factor but the employer proves it would have made the same decision without it; damages and an order requiring promotion are unavailable.

White v. Verizon South, Inc. · filed 2003-12-29(g)(2)(B)

Of course, in accordance with Title VII’s relief provisions discussed above, should White prevail on her motivation claim, her relief would be limited to declaratory relief, in-junctive relief other than a promotion, and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable to the pursuit of the motivation claim. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Because she would not have prevailed on anything other than that her gender was a motivating factor, she would not be entitled to an award of damages or an order requiring her promotion to cable splicer.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the remedies available when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motivating factor.

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc. · filed 2004-01-05(g)(2)(B)

Rather, through such proof, the employer can now only limit the remedies available to the employee for the violation. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination, but the defense does not eliminate liability.

Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation Department · filed 2005-09-14(g)(2)(B)

Under the cur- rent statutory scheme, an employer who proves that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discriminatory animus will be entitled to a partial affirmative defense that limits the remedies a court may impose. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(g)(2)(B). However, an employer who proves the defense will not avoid liability.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies to declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs if the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Webb v. Merck & Co., Inc. · filed 2006-09-08(g)(2)(B)

In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must "demonstrate that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If the employer meets it’s burden, the only available remedies to the plaintiff include declaratory relief, certain types of injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits a plaintiff's remedies if the employer shows it would have taken the same action without the unlawful motive.

Burnett v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. · filed 2007-01-29(g)(2)(B)

The amended statute merely restricts plaintiff's remedies — as opposed to absolving liability altogether — if defendant shows that it would have taken the same action absent the unlawful motive.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) limits relief to attorney’s fees, costs, declaratory relief, and certain injunctive relief when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination.

Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Cady · filed 2006-12-13(g)(2)(B)(i)

If the employer proves that it would have taken the same action in the absence of discrimination, it can limit the complainant’s relief to ... attorney’s fees, costs, declaratory and certain injunctive relief. ... Consequently, even if Cady had established a discriminatory motive in recruiting for the music position, the Board established by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have hired Cady in the absence of any discrimination and, therefore, Cady was not entitled to actual damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) allows a same-decision defense at the remedy stage only for mixed-motive claims.

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2007-02-05(g)(2)(B)

This means that Wal-Mart is not entitled to present a “same decision defense” because such a defense at the remedy stage applies only where the conduct was the result of “mixed motives.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits a court to grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and limited attorney’s fees and costs in a mixed-motive case.

Carter v. Diamondback Golf Club, Inc. · filed 2007-03-30(g)(2)(B)

Notably, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available in a mixed-motive case: the district court “may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . , and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of” a mixed motive claim.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor, but does not eliminate liability.

Tamayo v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico · filed 2007-04-04(g)(2)(B)

Once the plaintiff establishes that the employment decision was motivated by a discriminatory animus, even if only in part, “the employer has a limited affirmative defense that does not absolve it of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff.” ... “In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must ‘demonstrate that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.’”

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits monetary relief when an employer proves it would have taken the same action in a mixed-motive case; the limit does not apply to a single-motive claim.

Fogg v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-29(g)(2)(B)

In a mixed-motive case 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides the employer with a “limited affirmative defense” that “does not absolve it of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff.” ... In sum, the district court properly concluded both that there are alternative ways of establishing liability under Title VII and that the “same action” showing is a defense to damage liability only under the mixed-motive theory of § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) leaves an employer liable for Title VII discrimination even if it proves it would have made the same decision without considering race or gender.

Metoyer v. Screen Actors Guild · filed 2007-09-25(g)(2)(B)

In a Title VII discrimination case, even an employer who can successfully prove a mixed-motive defense, i.e., he would have made the same decision regarding a particular person without taking race or gender into account, does not escape liability.

When an employer proves it would have taken the same action without an impermissible motive, the employer remains liable under Title VII, but the available remedies are limited.

Tuli v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. · filed 2008-07-02(g)(2)(B)

If the defendant demonstrates that it “would have taken the same action in absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the statute limits the remedies available to the plaintiff, but does not defeat liability.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) gives courts discretion to award costs to a plaintiff who proves an impermissible motivating factor, even when the employer proves it would have taken the same action anyway.

Cooper v. Ambassador Personnel, Inc. · filed 2008-08-11(g)(2)(B)

Title VII empowers district courts with the discretion to award costs to the plaintiff upon a finding that there was an impermissible motivating factor in the defendant’s adverse-employment action.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and discretionary fees and costs when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the unlawful discrimination.

Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. · filed 2008-10-23(g)(2)(B)(i)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a court may award declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs to a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case who proves unlawful discrimination but who cannot recover damages because the defendant would have taken the same adverse employment action for a non-discriminatory reason.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) allows an employer to raise a same-decision defense after the plaintiff proves a mixed-motives claim and limits the remedies if the defense succeeds.

Coe v. Northern Pipe Products, Inc. · filed 2008-12-02(g)(2)(B)

The final point to be made, about “mixed motives” claims is that, if the plaintiff pursues a “mixed motives” claim, then the defendant may elect to assert the limited “same decision” affirmative defense under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not require a same-decision inquiry when race, color, or gender was not a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Buckley v. Potter · filed 2009-04-28(g)(2)(B)

However, the court specifically found that “neither race, color or gender was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to award the position to Ms. Whitehead.” Therefore, the court was not required to consider whether the Postal Service would have made the same decision absent discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits attorney’s fees and declaratory or injunctive relief, but not damages, when discrimination motivated an employment decision even though the employer would have made the same decision anyway.

Darchak v. City of Chicago Board of Education · filed 2009-09-03(g)(2)(B)

In mixed-motive cases, the defendant “escapes having to pay damages but, by virtue of the 1991 amendment [to the Civil Rights Act], still has to pay the plaintiffs attorney’s fees and is also subject to declaratory and injunctive relief’ if the employment decision had some discriminatory motivation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits attorney’s fees and declaratory and injunctive relief in a mixed-motive discrimination case even when the employer avoids damages.

Darchak v. Bd Educ City Chicago · filed 2009-09-03(g)(2)(B)

In mixed-motive cases, the defen- dant “escapes having to pay damages but, by virtue of the 1991 amendment [to the Civil Rights Act], still has to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and is also subject to declaratory and injunctive relief” if the employment decision had some discriminatory motivation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides limited remedies for mixed-motive claims but does not itself create liability under the ADA.

Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. · filed 2010-01-15(g)(2)(B)

Yet, although section 12117(a) cross-references the remedies set forth in section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) for mixed-motive cases, it does not cross-reference the provision of Title VII, section 2000e-2(m), which renders employers liable for mixed-motive employment decisions.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies for certain claims under § 2000e-2(m); it does not apply to ADEA claims.

King v. United States · filed 2010-02-09(g)(2)(B)

Thus, neither § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) nor § 2000e-2 (m) applied to ADEA claims.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Perrea v. Cincinnati Public Schools · filed 2010-04-20(g)(2)(B)

The defendants can establish a limited affirmative defense to a mixed-motive case — “that [the employer] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor” — “which limits the available remedy to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief in a mixed motive discrimination claim when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without discrimination.

Nuskey v. Hochberg · filed 2010-07-26(g)(2)(B)

The defendant is correct that if plaintiff pursues a mixed motive claim only, or if the evidence supports only a mixed motive claim, and if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action regardless of discrimination, then the plaintiff is entitled only to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees — but not to compensatory damages, reinstatement, or back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief on a mixed-motive Title VII claim to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs when the employer shows it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motive.

Spees v. James Marine, Inc. · filed 2010-08-10(g)(2)(B)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim is entitled only to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs where the employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence of an impermissible motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

When an employer proves it would have taken the same action without an impermissible motivating factor, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief in a mixed-motive case to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Beckham v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 2010-09-09(g)(2)(B)

To address the second point, Congress added 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), providing that, in a case under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (a mixed-motive case), if the employer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action without regard to an impermissible motivating factor, the plaintiff is entitled only to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs, but not to damages or reinstatement.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies for a proven mixed-motive violation when the employer shows it would have taken the same action without the impermissible factor; it does not apply to a single-motive claim.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Con-Way Freight, Inc. · filed 2010-09-22(g)(2)(B)

Because § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) by its own terms applies only to "a claim in which an individual proves a violation under § 2000e-2(m)," we read it to be inapplicable in a single-motive case such as this one.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies for motivating-factor discrimination claims when the employer proves it would have taken the same action; it does not cover retaliation claims.

Hayes v. Sebelius · filed 2011-02-02(g)(2)(B)

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of the 1991 Act provides yet another example. As set forth above, this provision governs remedies when a plaintiff proves that an impermissible factor motivated the decision, but the defendant shows that the illicit factor was not the but-for cause of its decision. It also does not mention retaliation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies when an employer proves it would have taken the same action without an impermissible motivating factor; it does not apply to retaliation claims.

Hayes v. Leavitt · filed 2011-02-02(g)(2)(B)

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of the 1991 Act provides yet another example. As set forth above, this provision governs remedies when a plaintiff proves that an impermissible factor motivated the decision, but the defendant shows that the illicit factor was not the but-for cause of its decision. It also does not mention retaliation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) limits relief to injunctive and declaratory relief, costs, and attorney’s fees when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Piatt v. City of Austin · filed 2011-08-05(g)(2)(B)(i)

But even where a plaintiff establishes an unlawful practice through proof at trial, his remedy is limited to injunctive and declaratory relief, costs, and attorney’s fees if the employer can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(2)(B)(i); accord Garcia v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2000).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) makes mixed-motive remedies available only when the plaintiff establishes liability under § 2000e-2(m).

Palmquist v. Shinseki · filed 2011-08-26(g)(2)(B)

The remedies available under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) are expressly contingent on a finding of liability under § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies in a mixed-motive claim if the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Bobo v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2012-01-09(g)(2)(B)

If Bobo can make that showing, UPS is liable, although Bobo’s remedies are limited if UPS can establish that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief to declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and fees and costs when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Ponce v. Billington · filed 2012-05-18(g)(2)(B)

Importantly, however, relief in a mixed-motive case is limited to “declaratory relief,” certain “injunctive relief,” and certain fees and costs if the defendant “demonstrates that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not authorize injunctive relief for discrete acts of retaliation when the employer proves it would have taken the same actions without the retaliatory motive.

Diane T. Gowski, M.D. v. Peake · filed 2012-06-04(g)(2)(B)

The Secretary contends, and we agree, that no injunctive relief is available when a defendant prevails in a mixed-motive retaliation case.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) makes mixed-motive remedies available only for violations of § 2000e-2(m), so they do not extend to Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims.

Palmquist v. Shinseki · filed 2012-08-02(g)(2)(B)

To do otherwise would require us to ignore the plain text of section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), which nowhere mentions retaliation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief for a mixed-motive discrimination claim to declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees and costs attributable to that claim.

Megivern v. Glacier Hills Incorporated · filed 2013-05-16(g)(2)(B)

Under a mixed-motive theory of discrimination, Megivern can only recover declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs directly attributable to the mixed-motive claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the remedies available for a mixed-motive violation when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motive.

Vicino v. Maryland · filed 2013-11-08(g)(2)(B)

However, an employer may effectively limit the remedies available to an employee where the employer can show it would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motivation.

Section 2000e-5 limits relief on a proven mixed-motive claim when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible factor.

Hawkins v. Center for Spinal Surgery · filed 2014-07-29(g)(2)(B)

... but the employer also proves, in response, that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor," the plaintiff’s recovery is limited to (1) declaratory relief, (2) injunctive relief, and (3) attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be "directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under § 2000e-2(m).” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) permits discretionary declaratory relief in a mixed-motive case, and the court must consider that relief even if the plaintiff did not request it in the complaint, provided the defendant is not prejudiced.

Pitrolo v. County of Buncombe, NC · filed 2014-10-20(g)(2)(B)(i)

Therefore, in that circumstance § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) and Rule 54(c) together obligate the district court to determine, in its discretion, if declaratory relief is an appropriate remedy, provided that doing so would not prejudice the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) permits a same-decision defense that can limit damages but does not defeat liability.

Meyer v. State of New York Office of Mental Health · filed 2016-03-28(g)(2)(B)

Though the defendants may prove, as a "limited affirmative defense” to mitigate damages, that they " ‘would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor[,]' ” ... (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)), proof of this affirmative defense does not, in itself, establish defendants' entitlement to summary judgment on liability.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) bars backpay and reinstatement when the employer proves it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating factor.

Morris v. Jackson · filed 2018-12-03(g)(2)(B)

To wit, if an employer demonstrates that it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the court may not award the plaintiff backpay or reinstatement on account of the employment action, even if it was a violation of Title VII. ... Having reviewed this trial evidence, the Court sides with EPA: Morris would have received the same seven-day suspension even if the agency had not considered her race.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits damages and certain equitable relief if an employer proves it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motivating factor.

Saweress v. Ivey · filed 2019-01-01(g)(2)(B)

The "same decision" defense "provides that if an employer can demonstrate it 'would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court ... shall not award damages' or certain equitable relief." ... Here, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to Defendant, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff would not have been hired regardless of any "impermissible motivating factor."

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits equitable relief when an employer shows it would have taken the same action without discrimination; an employer that raised the defense in its answer and opposition to equitable relief may argue it at the equitable-relief stage.

Morris v. Jackson · filed 2019-02-13(g)(2)(B)

In its Answer, it stated that the relief Plaintiff sought “may be further limited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B),” referring to the Title VII provision setting out the same-action defense. See ECF No. 15 (Answer), ¶ 24. The bottom line is that, while Defendant might have made its intentions clearer, it did not forfeit the ability to argue at the equitable-relief stage that it would have taken the same action regardless of any discriminatory motivation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) bars back pay, damages, and reinstatement when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination.

Pitts v. Lindsey & Company Inc · filed 2019-05-17(g)(2)(B)

Where, like here, an ADA plaintiff proves that her employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of disability, but that the company would have made the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons, the plaintiff cannot recover back pay or damages, nor can the Court order reinstatement. Pedigo I, 60 F.3d at 1301-02; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). She is entitled only to declaratory relief on her ADA discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) makes limited relief available only when a plaintiff proves a violation of § 2000e-2(m), which does not cover disability discrimination.

Murray v. Mayo Clinic · filed 2019-08-20(g)(2)(B)

Relief under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) is available only if ... the plaintiff proves a violation under § 2000e-2(m). Section 2000e-2(m) narrowly prohibits the consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin as a motivating factor for any employment practice. It does not prohibit the consideration of disability.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not require particular wording in a judgment for a plaintiff to seek relief after proving discrimination under a motivating factor theory.

Sourgoutsis v. United States Capitol Police · filed 2020-01-09(g)(2)(B)

But the text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not require that the Court’s judgment contain any specific language where a plaintiff proves that the defendant was motivated by a protected characteristic yet the defendant proves it would have taken the same action regardless.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits damages and compelled reinstatement when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering race, while leaving other relief available.

Brandt v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2020-04-22(g)(2)(B)

If the plaintiff succeeds, the employer still has a "limited affirmative defense" if it can show it would have made the same decision even if race hadn't factored in (meaning race wasn't the "but-for" cause of the ... failure to hire). Id. at 94 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). But that defense is "limited" because it only staves off damages and compelled reinstatement — not liability, other injunctive remedies, declaratory relief, or attorneys' fees and costs.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) limits relief after an employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering a protected trait; front pay is unavailable.

Debose v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees · filed 2020-04-27(g)(2)(B)(i)

When a defendant proves a “same decision” defense, the court may only grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i); see also Quigg v. Thomas Cty. School Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.9 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that the “same decision” defense allows an employer to avoid damages and certain forms of equitable relief in a Title VII case). Front pay is a form of equitable relief. See Ramsey v. Chrysler First, Inc., 861 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1988). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of front pay on this basis as well.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits relief for a mixed-motive claim to declaratory relief and attributable attorney’s fees and costs, excluding damages, reinstatement, hiring, and promotion.

Campbell v. Circustrix LLC · filed 2023-09-28(g)(2)(B)

Unlike single-motive theories, a court may not award damages or require reinstatement, hiring, or promotion under a mixed-motive theory; it may only grant declaratory relief and attorney’s fees and costs directly attributable to the mixed- motive claim.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits remedies when an employer proves it would have made the same decision without discrimination, but leaves declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees available.

McCreight v. Auburn Bank · filed 2024-09-19(g)(2)(B)

While the same-decision defense restricts the plaintiff’s remedies, it does not absolve the employer from liability— declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney’s fees, remain available.