42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination; complaints about mistreatment of patients do not concern conduct it prohibits.

Mitchell, Jr. v. Planned Parenthood of Greater New York, Inc. · filed 2025-06-30

Plaintiff’s claims of “disregard for the welfare of black and brown” patients also do not implicate the conduct Title VII prohibits, namely, employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 addresses discrimination in employment and does not apply to claims unrelated to employment.

James v. Washington State Patrol · filed 2025-08-05

As to Plaintiff’s invocation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII protects individuals from discrimination within the context of employment. In substance, the statute, among other things, outlaws “unlawful employment practices.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Plaintiff’s claim here has nothing to do with employment, so Title VII is inapplicable.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to allege that the employer discriminated because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Asemota · filed 2025-09-16(a)(1)

To assert a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the employer discriminated against him (2) because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).

Section 2000e-2 requires a discrimination plaintiff to allege membership in a protected class and more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside that class.

Dishmon · filed 2025-09-26

Here, Plaintiff does not identify to what protected class he belongs, and does not allege any facts demonstrating similarly situated employees not in his protected class were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2 protects seeking employment or participation in training or apprenticeship programs, but does not protect marching to express support for equal employment rights.

Pennsylvania v. Hill · filed 1970-06-09(a), (c), (d)

The activities protected by those Sections consist of seeking employment or participation in training or apprenticeship programs but do not include marching or assembling in order to express sentiments publicly.

Section 703 protects equal employment and access to training or apprenticeship programs, but does not itself protect public street demonstrations supporting equal employment opportunities.

Pennsylvania v. Leonard · filed 1970-07-16

Section 703 protects the equal rights of all individuals, regardless of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, to employment and the participation in training or apprenticeship programs. ... Accepting as true the allegation that, while participating in this march, petitioners were acting in a lawful and peaceable manner, nevertheless, the activity of demonstrating upon public streets in support of the principle of equal employment opportunities was not in itself protected by §§ 601 and 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) concerns discrimination in employment, so reporting unequal school facilities is not protected opposition under Title VII when the report does not concern an employment practice.

Warren v. Kemp · filed 2023-08-22(a)(1)

Even if Warren was required as interim superintendent to report the disparity in the facilities, this conduct did not constitute opposition to a discriminatory employment practice because the disparity in the facilities had nothing to do with “compensation, terms, conditions, conditions, or privileges of employment.” See § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2 does not support a racial discrimination claim by an employee whose employment was unaffected by discrimination directed at coworkers.

Jackson v. Deen · filed 2013-08-12(a)(1)

That statute seeks to prevent individuals from being discriminated against by their employers with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. It does not operate to provide individuals working unaffected by unlawful racial discrimination with a cause of action to remedy racial discrimination directed toward third parties.

Section 2000e-2(a) concerns discrimination in employment; alleged mistreatment of a student unrelated to employment is not an unlawful employment practice.

Holt v. Lewis · filed 1995-12-13(a)

He has not alleged that this student was discharged from employment, not chosen for employment, or otherwise denied any privilege of employment by Samford.

Section 2000e-2(a) provides the basis for a discriminatory denial of promotion claim, but its text does not contain the term “pattern and practice.”

Revis v. Slocomb Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-02-19(a)

The term "pattern and practice” is not contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which is the statutory premise of plaintiff’s denial of promotion claim. The term “pattern or practice” does appear in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, which authorizes actions by the Attorney General.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) addresses discrimination in ultimate employment decisions, while the composition of a promotion review committee is a preliminary step outside its direct prohibition.

Carl F. PAGE, Appellant, v. William J. BOLGER, Appellee · filed 1981-04-02(a)(1)

Disparate treatment theory as it has emerged in application of this and comparable provisions of Title VII, most notably § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), has consistently focused on the question whether there has been discrimination in what could be characterized as ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating. ... We hold here merely that among the latter are mediate decisions such as those concerning composition of the review committees in the instant case that are simply steps in a process for making such obvious end-decisions as those to hire, to promote, etc.

An applicant alleging race discrimination in hiring under § 2000e-2(a)(1) may also seek to enjoin the same employer’s other unlawful employment practices that could affect the applicant because of race.

Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc. · filed 1970-06-12(a)(1)

The Commission’s brief and argument relate solely to the question of whether, in a suit brought pursuant to the Act by persons claiming that an employer has violated § 703(a) (1) of the Act by refusing to hire them because of their race, may also allege and seek to enjoin other unlawful employment practices committed by the same employer, if those practices, although not directly injurious to them at the time of their application for employment, potentially affect them because of their race. The Court holds that they can.

Section 2000e-2 allows employees to sue a city for discriminatory employment practices that occurred before their discharge, even if the discharge was lawful.

Johnson v. City of Albany, Ga. · filed 1976-05-06(a)

Named plaintiffs Roberts, Mayo, Culbreath, Johnson and Foggy regardless of the legality of their discharge, pursuant to that statute ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) and (2), — have a cause of action ... against the city of Albany as to the city’s employment practices during the period beginning March 24, 1972, and ending with their discharge of April 19, 1972.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) reaches temporary positions; an employer that offers no reason for failing to consider a qualified applicant may be liable for discrimination.

Kiper v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary & Secondary Education · filed 1984-08-01(a)(1)

The defendants articulated no reason as to why they did not consider Mr. Kiper for the temporary position. Defendants have cited no authority that title VII does not reach temporary jobs and failed to rebut the presumption that they discriminated against the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) defines unlawful employment practices as discrimination affecting hiring, discharge, compensation, or other aspects of employment, which the court read to exclude conduct after employment ends.

Polsby v. Chase · filed 1992-07-29(a)(1)

The definition comprises discrimination with respect to certain aspects of employment. Title VII does not redress discriminatory practices, however unsavory, which occur after the employment relationship has ended.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination concerning aspects of employment, which the court read as excluding conduct after the employment relationship ends.

Polsby v. Chase · filed 1992-08-12(a)(1)

The definition comprises discrimination with respect to certain aspects of employment. Title VII does not redress discriminatory practices, however unsavory, which occur after the employment relationship has ended.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) governs employment discrimination and does not cover claims unrelated to employment.

Luckett v. Rosenthal · filed 1993-05-21(a)(1)

Title VII governs claims of employment discrimination and does not provide a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employee to bring a sex discrimination claim concerning conditions of employment before termination.

Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp. · filed 2006-04-03(a)(1)

The Plaintiff in the instant case had a cognizable claim, however, because an employee need not wait until her or his employment is terminated before bringing suit under Title VII.

A single § 2000e-2(a)(2) discrimination claim can encompass disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and gender-motivated discharge; a second count based on the same conduct is duplicative.

Gabel v. Richards Spears Kibbe & Orbe, LLP · filed 2009-05-13(a)(2)

I perceive no difference between the two claims as alleged, and so dismiss Count 2. Plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment during her employment, hostile work environment and gender-motivated discharge are all encompassed within the broad allegations of Count I.

Denial of a promotion or training opportunity is a discrete act of discrimination that cannot alone establish a hostile work environment.

Hunter v. Secretary of United States Army · filed 2009-05-18

The failure to promote an employee or select him for a training program is a discrete act that cannot alone amount to a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination claim to allege an adverse employment action that gives rise to an inference of discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Jackson v. Acedo · filed 2009-08-26(a)(1)

In short, the plaintiff has not alleged a prima facie case for discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or nationality under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination in employment and does not apply to a family dispute over estate assets.

Stroupe v. Borchert · filed 2023-06-29(a)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Plaintiff does not explain why he would be entitled to relief under either statute, nor is the Court able to discern from plaintiff’s complaint or briefing how either statute is relevant to this dispute.

Section 2000e-2(d) applies to joint labor-management committees that control apprenticeships.

United States v. LOCAL NO. 8, INT. ASS'N OF BRIDGE, S., O. & RI · filed 1970-06-16(d)

1. Defendant J.A.C. is a joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeships within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d).

Section 2000e-2(d) covers joint labor-management committees that control apprenticeship programs.

Rule v. INTERN. ASS'N OF BRIDGE, STRUCT. & ORN. IRONWKRS. · filed 1976-10-06(d)

JAC is a joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeships within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d).

Section 2000e-2(d) holds a joint apprenticeship committee responsible for the discriminatory impact of its admission procedures even when employers select individual apprentices under delegated authority.

Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee · filed 1987-12-09(d)

It cannot avoid liability for the effects of its own admission procedures by pointing to the discriminatory practices of those to whom it has delegated the power to select apprentices.

A violation of § 2000e-2(d) in apprenticeship admissions can require ending a discriminatory selection practice, using a neutral referral list, and adopting temporary affirmative action.

Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee · filed 1996-09-09(d)

We REVERSE the adoption the two-track system proposed by the JATC, and we REMAND -with instructions to adopt the following proposals of the plaintiff class: eliminate the hunting license system, require all applicants to use the sequential referral list to satisfy the first-job requirement, implement a 20% affirmative action program, and appoint a monitor.

Section 2000e-2(d) permits an apprentice to bring a hostile work environment claim for sex-based harassment during classroom or on-the-job training.

Herrera v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union, Local No. 68 · filed 2002-10-15(d)

Therefore, Plaintiff may assert a sexual discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) because she has pointed to facts sufficient to give rise to an inference that the harassment she endured while enrolled in DJEATC’s training program created a hostile work environment.

A prior arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement does not preclude an employee from bringing a Title VII religious discrimination claim in federal court.

Shirley v. Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife · filed 2025-05-07(a)(1)

Gardner–Denver squarely controls the application of claim preclusion in this matter; Plaintiffs Shirley and Hone are not precluded from bringing their Title VII claims.

A grievance determination or arbitration award does not conclusively determine an employee’s rights under Section 2000e-2(a).

Willie A. HUTCHINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1970-06-19(a)

An arbitration award, whether adverse or favorable to the employee, is not per se conclusive of the determination of Title VII rights by the federal courts, nor is an intermediate grievance determination deemed “settled” under the bargaining contract to be given this effect.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) reaches past discriminatory practices that continue to have discriminatory effects, including practices that appear neutral.

United States of America, by Ramsey Clark Acting Attorney General v. Dillon Supply Company, a Corporation · filed 1970-07-08(a)(2)

The district court was, therefore, in error in limiting Title VII to present specific acts of racial discrimination. It should have considered any past specific or general act, practice, policy or pattern of racial discrimination which the proof showed had any present discriminatory effect.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a no-transfer policy that perpetuates past racial discrimination when business necessity does not justify the policy.

William E. BING Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1971-06-29(a)

In sum, then, we conclude that Roadway’s no-transfer policy carries forward the discriminatory effects of the Company’s former employment practices; that the no-transfer rule is not predicated upon business necessity; and that to the extent that Roadway insisted upon carrying forward exclusion of Bing and the members of his class, without business necessity, it committed, with the requisite intent, an unfair employment practice as defined by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a facially neutral promotion policy that perpetuates the present effects of past discrimination, regardless of the employer’s present good faith.

Martin MARQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OMAHA DISTRICT SALES OFFICE, FORD DIVISION OF FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appe · filed 1971-03-31(a)(1)

However, where an employer’s present advancement policy serves to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, although neutral on its face, it rejuvenates the past discrimination in both fact and law regardless of present good faith.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits enforcing a collectively bargained retirement age that perpetuates the effects of an employer’s past racial discrimination.

Boyd Peters v. Missouri-Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant-Third Party v. United Transportation Union, Third Party · filed 1973-11-05(a)

But if the conditions which created the intraunion economic warfare underlying the age 65 agreement and which made necessary the intraunion choice between the competing economic interests of its members were themselves, in substantial part, effects of past racial discrimination by the employer, then the agreement violates Title VII as a present effect of prior employer racial discrimination. It is not shielded by the facts that it is the product of collective bargaining and meets the standards of fair representation imposed by the RLA and Steele.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a current layoff that perpetuates alleged discriminatory hiring from before Title VII covered municipal employers.

Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Department, Inc v. Civil Service Commission of New York · filed 1977-03-17(a)(1)

To the contrary, the layoff of police officers in 1975 brings the pre-1972 alleged discriminatory practices within the scope of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat the continuing pay effects of a discriminatory act that preceded Title VII coverage as a present violation when the current pay system is neutral as to sex.

Farris v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis · filed 1978-05-17

She similarly does not allege, nor does the record suggest, that she is in any different position from other persons, men or women, who suffered an unexcused absence of fifty or more days in a school term prior to 1972. That being the case, the system cannot be said to discriminate now on the basis of sex and there is accordingly no present violation.

A refusal to reinstate is a separate sex discrimination violation only if the refusal itself is discriminatory; a later effect of a discriminatory separation is not another violation.

Masco v. United Airlines · filed 1978-05-11(a)(1)

But where the act of discrimination is limited in time, we cannot characterize every effect of that initial act as another violation. In the present case, appellees do not claim that they were refused reinstatement because they were women rather, their contentions regarding United's refusals to reinstate have life only because of their initial separations.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not require an employer to eliminate every lingering effect of discrimination that was lawful when it occurred.

Grier v. Rumsfeld · filed 1979-03-08(h)

On the other hand, the analysis of the Supreme Court majority in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra, reveals that an employer, by virtue of § 703(h) of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) has an obligation to avoid post-Act discrimination but does not have an obligation to root out every vestige or remnant of pre-Act segregation. Accordingly, the defendant here had no legal obligation to eliminate every lingering effect of discrimination which was legal at the time it was practiced.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a no-transfer rule that perpetuates past racial discrimination by keeping employees in jobs without opportunities for advancement.

United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1979-09-21(a)

The Supreme Court, in Griggs, unquestionably affirmed that part of the court of appeals decision which reversed the district court’s finding that Title VII was to be prospective only and that the impact of pre-Act discrimination was not covered by the Act. It thus fully supported the trial court’s ruling here that the no-transfer doctrine was prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not require an employer with no current discriminatory policy to remedy the continuing effects of past discrimination.

Sandoval v. Saticoy Lemon Ass'n · filed 1990-08-31(j)

Where no present discriminatory policy exists, an employer is not liable or required to remedy the continuing effects of prior discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 does not conflict with a state law requiring daily overtime pay for women when an employer can comply with both laws by paying the same overtime to men.

Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays · filed 1970-10-12(a)(1)

As far as Act 191 of 1915 is concerned, an employer can comply with it and with the Civil Rights Act by paying daily overtime to both men and women, as Potlatch contends that it is in fact doing.

Federal courts should not abstain from deciding a sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 merely because a state court might invalidate the challenged law under its state constitution.

Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commission · filed 1971-01-11(a)(1) and (2)

But we think the principle does preclude abstaining from deciding any issue in this case upon the ground that a state court might invalidate the state statute under attack as being inconsistent with the state constitution when, as here, Congress has identified a federal interest in the questions presented by enacting a Civil Rights Act ... dealing specifically with sex discrimination.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff whose pregnancy was not apparent or disclosed must present evidence that the employer knew of it to establish a prima facie case under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Patricia McGuirk GERACI, Appellant, v. MOODY-TOTTRUP, INTERNATIONAL, INC. · filed 1996-04-30(a)(1)

If the pregnancy is not apparent and the employee has not disclosed it to her employer, she must allege knowledge and present, as part of her prima facie case, evidence from which a rational jury could infer that the employer knew that she was pregnant.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit pregnancy disability benefits when providing them does not discriminate against men.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky · filed 1981-05-11(a)(1), (a)(2)

Title VII forbids employers to "discriminate" against their employees "because of ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2). ... In short, the HRL did not require employers to discriminate against men on the basis of their sex and was therefore not unlawful under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits a pregnancy leave policy that denies women employment opportunities by requiring a normal menstrual cycle before returning to work, absent a business justification.

Bertha J. HARPER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-06-19(a)(2)

Under the Satty rationale and its progeny, in the absence of any business justification, the policy constitutes an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 703(a)(2).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits a maternity leave policy that grants less seniority than disability leave when the difference adversely affects women’s employment status.

Communications Workers of America v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1980-05-05(a)(2)

By refusing to credit employees with seniority during the entire period of maternity leave, Illinois Bell discriminates against women by adversely affecting their status as employees upon return.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit pregnancy disability coverage merely because it benefits women.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky · filed 1980-01-28

It does not follow, however, as the airlines contend, that plans that include coverage for pregnancy related disabilities do violate Title VII. That the statute does not require coverage does not mean that it forbids it.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a blanket policy terminating pregnant employees before delivery when the employer cannot justify it as a bona fide occupational qualification.

Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission · filed 1971-02-25(a)

Although Defendants’ policy is thus violative of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), it can be sustained by showing under 2000e-2(e) that it “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” ... Defendants clearly did not sustain their burden under this exception.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discharging an employee because of unwed pregnancy when that condition is unrelated to job performance and is not a bona fide occupational qualification.

Doe v. Osteopathic Hospital of Wichita, Inc. · filed 1971-10-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s discharge on May 6, 1970 was an unlawful discrimination, on the basis of sex, in violation of the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2, in that, she was dismissed because of unwed pregnancy, a condition peculiar to the female physiology, which condition was not a bona fide occupational disqualification by reason of being reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business of the Osteopathic Hospital.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits requiring pregnant employees to take leave at a fixed point without considering their individual ability to continue working.

Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1973-12-31(a)(1)

In summary, the policy of the defendant as it existed in 1970 requiring female ground employees to take maternity leave at the end of the fifth month of pregnancy without giving consideration to the individual abilities of such employees to continue working amounts to discrimination based upon sex and is violative of Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from denying sick-leave benefits for childbirth-related disabilities while providing them for other temporary disabilities.

Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School District No. 7 · filed 1974-04-25(a)

Defendants have intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They have discriminated on the basis of sex by denying sick-leave benefits for childbirth-related disabilities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits an employer from treating pregnancy-related temporary disability less favorably than other temporary disabilities.

Vineyard v. Hollister Elementary School District · filed 1974-11-01(a)(2)

Under Title VII and the E.E.O.C. Guidelines which accompany it (29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b)), treating pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities is discriminatory and flatly prohibited.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits pregnancy policies that strip job-bidding seniority and deny sick leave when the employer shows no business necessity for them.

Satty v. Nashville Gas Company · filed 1974-11-04(e)(1)

In the opinion of this court, defendant’s employment practices are discriminatory in the following respects: (1) only pregnant women are required to take leave and thereby lose job bidding seniority and no leave is required in other non-work related disabilities; and (2) only pregnant women are denied sick leave benefits while in all other cases of non-work related disability sick leave benefits are available. ... Defendant has introduced no proof of any business necessity in support of these discriminatory policies. The court must therefore assume no justification exists.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from excluding pregnancy from sick leave coverage available for other temporary disabilities.

Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Board of Education · filed 1975-01-08(a)(1)

Creating a sick leave program that compensates employees during a time of temporary disability except when the disability is caused by pregnancy is the type of discrimination which Title VII is designed to eliminate. Apparently, no other forms of disability, whether of a quasi-voluntary nature or physiologically occurring more frequently in one sex, are similarly excluded from coverage. Since only females are biologically capable of becoming pregnant, denying sick leave pay solely for pregnancy seems clearly to be setting up differentials in the compensation or terms of employment prohibited by the Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of pregnancy when the employer allows leave for other temporary disabilities.

Edith M. HOLTHAUS, Appellant, v. COMPTON & SONS, INC., a Corporation, Appellee · filed 1975-04-10(a)(1)

We think the evidence establishes a policy of discrimination against pregnant women, Doe v. Osteopathic Hospital, Inc., 333 F.Supp. 1357, 1362 (D.Kan.1971), and we find that Mrs. Holthaus was discharged on the basis of her sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from excluding pregnancy disabilities from a broad disability benefits plan and imposing a separate maternity leave limit based on generalizations about women.

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1975-02-11(a)(1)

We conclude that Liberty Mutual’s income protection plan violates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by excluding pregnancy benefits from coverage while including other kinds of temporary disabilities. ... A maternity leave policy that is applied to one sex only, that is based on class generalizations of that sex, and that treats pregnancy different from other temporary disabilities, is not permitted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination complaint alleging unequal treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities to proceed despite Geduldig v. Aiello’s ruling under the Equal Protection Clause.

Communications Workers of America v. American Telephone · filed 1975-03-26(a)(1)

We hold only that Aiello did not require the dismissal of the complaint as a matter of law for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from a disability benefit plan that covers other disabilities.

Martha v. GILBERT Et Al., Appellees, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Appellant · filed 1975-06-27(a)(1)

Its denial of pregnancy-related disability from the application of its employee disability benefit program, in our opinion, falls clearly within the prohibitions of Title VII and Aiello confers no immunity for such denial.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits less favorable employment benefits for pregnancy related disabilities and medical expenses than for other disabilities and medical expenses.

Guse v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1976-01-07(a)

Indeed, the only rational' conclusion one could draw from a comparison of disability coverages is that coverage for pregnancy related medical expenses is less favorable than that provided for other disabilities. Accordingly, this aspect of the defendant’s medical insurance program is also violative of title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits excluding pregnancy and childbirth related disabilities from an employer's sick leave plan.

11 Fair empl.prac.cas. 161, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,325 Barbara R. Hutchison, Cross-Appellant v. Lake Oswego School Dis · filed 1975-09-10(a)

We affirm that portion of the district court's judgment and opinion finding that the Lake Oswego School District Board's sick leave policy violates Title VII, enjoining exclusion of pregnancy and childbirth related disabilities from the plan and awarding back pay, costs, and attorney's fees against said Oswego School District Board.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires pregnancy to be treated consistently with other temporary disabilities; an employer may apply the same work restrictions to pregnant employees and similarly situated male employees.

Roller v. City of San Mateo · filed 1975-08-12(a)

Numerous cases have pointed out that pregnancy, because it is a condition which is limited to females, cannot be used in employment as a criterion for discrimination, but rather must be treated consistently with other temporary disabilities. ... When the inferences which follow from the above summation are combined with the consistent evidence which indicates that the city does not have an arbitrary maternity leave policy, but treats its pregnant employees on a case-by-case basis, we are bound to conclude that defendants did not discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of her sex in ordering her to discontinue her police duties, but rather reasonably and consistently applied the standards of CMD #7.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2) prohibit a policy requiring three months of maternity leave before and after childbirth as sex discrimination.

Fabian v. IND. SCH. DIST. NO. 89 OF OKL. CTY., OKL. · filed 1976-02-09(a)(1) and (2)

The mandatory maternity leave policy established by defendants, by requiring three months leave prior to and three months leave subsequent to childbirth, constitutes prohibited discrimination based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to renew employment solely because of pregnancy.

Mitchell v. BD. OF TR. OF PICKENS CTY. SD" A" · filed 1976-04-06(a)(1)

The Court concludes that defendants’ actions violated the above mentioned provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the EEOC guidelines promulgated thereunder. This conclusion is based on the finding that plaintiff was denied employment or renewal of her employment solely because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a health plan from requiring both male and female employees to purchase dependent coverage to receive pregnancy benefits.

Willett v. Emory and Henry College · filed 1977-01-27(a)(1)

The mere fact that the pregnancy benefits listed in the policy are not available to single persons does not give rise to a cause of action for sex discrimination under Title VII or under the provisions of the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits terminating or constructively discharging an employee because she is pregnant and unmarried.

14 Fair empl.prac.cas. 687, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,537 Rose M. Jacobs, Cross-Appellant v. The Martin Sweets Company, I · filed 1977-02-11(a)

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the district court committed no error in concluding, as a matter of law, that the termination and/or constructive termination of Jacobs’ employment constituted a violation of section 703 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) reaches a mandatory unpaid pregnancy leave policy that disproportionately affects female employees.

Gardner v. National Airlines, Inc. · filed 1977-05-17(a)

Under National’s policy, when a female flight attendant knows she is pregnant she must cease working, terminating her income. There is no other condition which automatically results in such deprivation. Because pregnancy is an exclusively female condition, the policy inevitably has a disproportionate impact on females.

Section 2000e-2(a) reaches a mandatory maternity leave policy that has a discriminatory effect on female employees.

Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1977-09-02(a)(1), (2)

The record in the instant case demonstrates that Pan Am’s policy has a discriminatory effect upon its female flight attendants within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits a policy that strips employees returning from pregnancy leave of accumulated seniority and thereby deprives them of employment opportunities without business necessity.

Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty · filed 1977-12-06(a)(2)

We conclude that petitioner's policy of denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from pregnancy leave violates § 703 (a) (2) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (1970 ed., Supp. V).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a seniority policy that preserves accrued seniority but stops further accrual during personal leave when the policy does not impose a substantial burden on women.

Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1977-12-19(a)(2)

Denying seniority for time during which an employee is not working cannot be regarded as the imposition of a burden. It .is more akin to the denial of a benefit which, under the Gilbert analysis as applied to the facts of this case, does not run afoul of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits claims challenging pregnancy-related seniority and leave policies that allegedly impose substantial burdens on women.

Eberts v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1978-07-18(a)(2)

Moreover, it is noteworthy that counts two through seven of the complaint here do concern conditions alleged to impose substantial burdens on women "that men need not suffer." ... Accordingly, in view of the analyses in Gilbert and Satty especially when they are considered together we have concluded that the district court erred in summarily dismissing counts two through seven.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits a maternity leave policy that burdens women’s employment opportunities unless the employer shows business necessity.

Pennington v. Lexington School District 2 · filed 1978-07-03(a)(2)

Here, as in Satty, a comparison of the maternity and general leave policies shows that the board has "imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer." 98 S.Ct. at 351. Therefore, unless the board's maternity leave policy can be justified by business necessity, it violates § 2000e-2(a)(2).

Section 2000e-2 treats mandatory ninth-month maternity leave as prima facie sex discrimination, but permits the policy when the employer establishes business necessity.

Karen deLAURIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT and Lester G. Warrenbrock, Defendants-App · filed 1979-02-06(a)

Since it is plain that mandatory maternity leave is not the withholding of a potential benefit, but is a restriction on pregnant women's employment opportunities, it follows that such a policy does constitute a gender-based discrimination. ... We are therefore obliged to sustain his decision that the district successfully raised the job relatedness defense against deLaurier's attack on the mandatory maternity leave policy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a sex discrimination claim when a maternity leave policy denies women seniority and other benefits available to employees on ordinary sick leave.

Kathleen ZICHY and Jane E. Schofer, Appellants, v. the CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee · filed 1979-01-05(a)(2)

The plaintiffs here invoked in their Amended Complaint the precise language of section 703(a)(2). Their allegations are substantially the same as those held by Eberts to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) treats a pregnancy disclosure and contract nonrenewal policy that disproportionately burdens women as a prima facie violation, subject to a business necessity defense.

Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County School District A · filed 1979-05-25(a)(2)

The policies in combination clearly deprived women, including this plaintiff, of "employment opportunities" renewal for another year and "adversely affect(ed their) status as . . . employee(s)" "because of (their) sex" within the meaning of § 703(a)(2).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits a maternity leave policy that denies pregnant employees seniority, sick leave, and vacation benefits available to employees on ordinary sick leave.

Zichy v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1979-08-01(a)(2)

Based on this guidance from the higher courts, this Court finds that defendant’s maternity-related leave policy, with the exception of its pay provision, violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) may cover an employer’s denial of guaranteed reinstatement after pregnancy-related disability leave when employees returning from other disability leave receive that guarantee.

Page v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1979-08-02(a)(2)

But Bell’s policy of denying female employees returning from maternity leave guaranteed reinstatement to job positions held pri- or to the leaves may serve to deprive them of employment opportunities and adversely affect their status as employees, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) allows a sex-discrimination claim concerning an employer’s denial of guaranteed reinstatement after pregnancy-related disability leave when it guarantees reinstatement after other disability leave.

In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. Maternity Benefits Litigation · filed 1979-08-30(a)(2)

But Bell's policy of denying female employees returning from maternity leave guaranteed reinstatement to job positions held prior to the leaves may serve to deprive them of employment opportunities and adversely affect their status as employees, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). ... However, we reverse the court's order of summary judgment as it relates to Bell's reinstatement policy applied to women who take leaves for physical disability related to pregnancy.

Discrimination against pregnant employees, when established, constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.

Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Michigan · filed 1980-02-14

It cannot be questioned, of course, that discrimination suffered by pregnant employees, if found, constitutes discrimination based on sex for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a maternity leave policy that gives temporary female employees too little leave for pregnancy and childbirth.

Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union · filed 1981-08-14(a)(1)

Whatever might be said in justification for a difference in vacation leaves for permanent and temporary employees, maternity leave is something else again; temporary female employees need as much maternity leave as their counterparts in permanent positions, and even twenty-day maternity leaves for the temporary group would leave them short.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits pregnancy-based employment distinctions after the 1978 amendment unless the employer shows a bona fide occupational qualification.

Thompson v. Board of Education of the Romeo Community Schools · filed 1981-11-20(e)

Therefore, in evaluating employment practices subsequent to October 31, 1978, policies which create distinctions or discriminate on the basis of pregnancy are in violation absent a showing of a bona fide occupational qualification.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from denying pregnancy-related disability benefits while paying benefits for other disabilities that similarly prevent employees from working.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wooster Brush Co. · filed 1981-10-08(a)(1)

Moreover, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k) and 2000e-2(a)(l), the failure of an employer to pay pregnancy-related disability benefits while paying benefits for disabilities that render one similarly unable to work constitutes unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits an employer from substantially burdening a pregnant employee’s work opportunities because of her pregnancy.

Fancher v. Nimmo · filed 1982-11-02(a)(2)

With respect to the 1978 incidents, the Court finds that a prima facie case was established that the plaintiff was substantially burdened by the defendant’s failure to properly administer its personnel policies as they related to pregnant females. Under the defendant’s policies the plaintiff should have been detailed or temporarily assigned to do work which would not have exposed her to the radiation hazards. In failing to follow its policy, the defendant “burdened” plaintiff on April 19, 1978, by requiring her to return to full duties in Nuclear Medicine. The defendant further “burdened” plaintiff on April 28, 1978, by forcing her to choose among options which did not meet the hospital’s policies, and by exerting unnecessary pressure upon her to make a decision within an unreasonably short period of time. Thus the Court finds that the defendant burdened the plaintiff in such a way as to deprive her of employment opportunities because of her “different role” in violation of the mandates set forth in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, supra, 434 U.S. at 142, 98 S.Ct. at 351.

A pregnancy-based policy that deprives women of employment opportunities establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(2).

Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital · filed 1982-12-06(a)(2)

Applying the rules of Satty to the facts of the present case, we conclude as a matter of law that Zuniga established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. The Hospital’s unwritten policy requiring pregnant x-ray technicians to resign or be terminated without any guarantee of reinstatement deprives them of employment opportunities in the most clear-cut fashion imaginable, by permanently taking away their jobs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for contributing to a disability benefits plan that excludes pregnancy disability benefits.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wooster Brush Company Employees Relief Association · filed 1984-02-08(a)(1)

At the same time, we hold that the Employer, by making substantial contributions to a disability benefits plan which, if directly operated would violate the pregnancy amendments, has effectively discriminated against women on account of their sex in the "terms, privileges, and conditions" of their employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats a policy removing pregnant flight attendants from flight duty as prima facie sex discrimination.

Levin v. Delta Air Lines · filed 1984-04-30(a)

We agree with the district court that Delta’s pregnancy policy has been prima facie discriminatory under Title VII throughout the relevant period.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits unequal treatment of pregnancy in state temporary disability benefits that are a privilege of employment.

Barone v. Hackett · filed 1984-09-04(a)(1)

TDI benefits in Rhode Island are among the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” in this state. ... Therefore, the Court finds that defendants are liable under Title VII for treating pregnancy differently than other disabilities under the state TDI program.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an adverse employment decision based on pregnancy without requiring proof of animus toward pregnant women.

Felts v. Radio Distributing Co., Inc. · filed 1985-01-14(a)

To satisfy the intent element of Title VII, it is not necessary that plaintiff prove the employer had an animus for pregnant women and that the pretext of economic conditions was erected to mask bias or dislike for pregnant women. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes clear that women are discriminated against when their pregnant conditions forms the basis of an adverse employment decision. Defendant conceded that had Shirley Felts not earlier taken maternity leave, there would have been no reason to remove her in July 1982. She was, therefore, discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy, hence sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a state to guarantee pregnancy disability leave; equal employment opportunity does not require identical amounts of leave for men and women.

California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra · filed 1985-04-16(a)

It necessarily follows that Title VII does not preempt a state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with, nor unlawful under, Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a state to require pregnancy disability leave because equal employment opportunity does not require identical amounts of leave.

California Federal Sayings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra · filed 1985-04-16(a)

It necessarily follows that Title VII does not preempt a state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with, nor unlawful under, Title VII. The number of days guaranteed, like the number of dollars expended, is a means to the goal of employment opportunity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from offering a disability plan that excludes pregnancy-related care for spouses of male employees while covering spouses of female employees.

Schiffman v. Cimarron Aircraft Corp. · filed 1985-08-08(a)(1)

This Court holds that the disability insurance plan made available to employees of the Defendant does not comply with the PDA and, therefore, discriminates against the Plaintiff by making an unlawful distinction based on pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from forcing a woman to take leave because she is pregnant and unmarried.

Ponton v. Newport News School Board · filed 1986-03-19(a)(1)

The discrimination in the instant case was based on both an immutable sex characteristic — pregnancy — and a constitutionally protected activity — the right to bear a child out of wedlock. Accordingly, such discrimination must be considered a violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from terminating a pregnant employee under a maternity leave policy that allows less leave than the employer allows for comparable health conditions.

Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc. · filed 1985-05-06(a)(1)

Because defendant would have allowed a leave of absence of an equivalent duration for any other health condition of comparable severity, plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2 permits a pregnancy discrimination claim based on failure to reinstate after maternity leave to proceed when disputed facts could show discriminatory pretext.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. · filed 1986-08-06(a)(1)

This dispute is material in that Cushman & Wakefield’s assertion might be pretextual for establishing a pattern of discrimination against female employees needing maternity leave. ... We merely conclude that triable issues of fact exist with respect to her claim which preclude the success of a motion for summary judgment.

A dress code adopted to target and discharge a pregnant employee can establish intentional sex discrimination under Title VII.

Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co. · filed 1987-01-20

However, we agree with the district judge's decision and his reasoning. We find that the evidence supports the findings of the district court and that none of the findings are clearly erroneous. ... The district court found that the dress code was implemented for pretextual purposes and directed at plaintiff. This seems very clear. ... Here the dress code was adopted to furnish a basis for discharging the plaintiff. Gallof knew the plaintiff would not wear makeup and chose that course of action as a means of effecting the discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging employees because of pregnancy.

Ensor v. Painter · filed 1987-02-06(a)(1)

Therefore, after careful consideration, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ pregnancies made a difference in defendant’s decision to discharge them and that defendant’s articulated reasons are pretextural. Further, the Court finds that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs and that they are, therefore, entitled to awards of back pay and lost benefits.

A pregnant applicant can establish a prima facie failure-to-hire claim by showing she was qualified and rejected while the employer continued seeking similarly qualified applicants.

Todhunter v. Cullman County Commission on Education · filed 1987-07-21(a)(1)

This finding and conclusion is based on the evidence that in late August 1985 she was female and pregnant, that she applied for and was professionally qualified for the third grade teaching position at Fairview School in the Cullman County School System which began after school started for the 1985-86 school year, that despite her qualifications for the teaching position she was rejected, and that after her rejection the position remained open and the school board continued to seek applicants from persons of Mrs. Todhunter’s qualifications.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits placing a pregnant employee on unpaid leave because of a pregnancy-related restriction when she can perform her job and the employer cannot establish a bona fide occupational qualification.

Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc. · filed 1987-08-27(e)

The inquiry does not end here, however, as the defendant has the opportunity to show that its considerations amount to a bona fide occupational qualification under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). ... In this case, the Home failed to carry its burden of establishing a BFOQ defense, and in fact has conceded on appeal that the plaintiff could perform her job without difficulty.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits pregnancy discrimination claims based on either disparate treatment or disparate impact.

Scherr v. Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50 · filed 1988-11-01(a)(1)

Because the PDA is part of Title VII and derives its substance and procedures from the Act as a whole, a claim of pregnancy discrimination, like any other claim of discrimination under Title VII, may be based either on a theory of disparate treatment or a theory of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits recovery when sex or pregnancy contributes to an employer’s decision to discharge an employee.

Whites v. Hahn · filed 1988-11-09(a)

In order to recover under Title VII, the plaintiff need only prove that her sex or pregnancy was a contributing factor in the employment decision to terminate her. ... Thus, plaintiff prevails on her claim, as the Court concludes from the credible evidence that plaintiff's pregnancy was a substantial motivating factor in defendant's decision to discharge her.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits treating pregnant employees differently from other temporarily disabled employees, even if they suffer no tangible economic loss.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hacienda Hotel · filed 1989-08-10(a)

Even if no employee suffered a “tangible loss” of an “economic nature,” ... appellant’s implementation of a policy or practice under which pregnant employees were treated differently from other ... temporarily-disabled employees with similar capacity for work would still be a violation of both the letter and spirit of Title VII’s prohibition against pregnancy discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of pregnancy, including when the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Sanchez v. Banco Santander—Puerto Rico · filed 1989-10-31(a)(1)

If the bank’s management was aware for at least five years that Norm # 14 was being violated, and yet did nothing to enforce the rules until plaintiff became pregnant, it seems more likely to us that the proffered explanations are pretextual in nature.

An employer cannot justify discharging a pregnant employee under § 2000e-2(a) solely through subjective concerns about risks to her or her unborn child.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Service News Company · filed 1990-03-23(a)

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Phillips made out a prima facie case of overt discrimination. To establish a business necessity defense, Service News had the burden to prove that significant risks of harm to Phillips and her unborn child made it necessary to discharge her. This burden could not have been satisfied by the evidence presented in this case, which was wholly of a subjective nature.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits excluding pregnancy-related disability from a sick leave bank when other disabling conditions remain eligible.

United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Consol. High Sch. D. 230 · filed 1990-09-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, the CBA SLB provisions, by automatically excluding maternity benefits, discriminate against pregnant teachers who elected to utilize accumulated sick leave for their pregnancy-related disability. The court holds therefore that District 230 has engaged in a pattern or practice of sex discrimination against pregnant women in the implementation and maintenance of its SLB policies in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 treats fetal protection policies excluding fertile women as overt sex discrimination that an employer may justify only by proving a bona fide occupational qualification.

Grant v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1990-07-20(e)(1)

We agree with the view of the dissenters in Johnson Controls that fetal protection policies perforce amount to overt sex discrimination, which cannot logically be recast as disparate impact and cannot be countenanced without proof that infertility is a BFOQ.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an employer to provide additional personal leave for breastfeeding when that leave is unavailable to male employees.

Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co. · filed 1990-08-27(a)(1)

Nothing in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or Title VII, obliges employers to accommodate the child-care concerns of breast-feeding female workers by providing additional breast-feeding leave not available to male workers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects a pregnant employee from discriminatory discharge without requiring her to show medical necessity for a schedule adjustment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc. · filed 1991-02-20(a)(1)

The concept of requiring an employee to show “medical necessity” is not found in the language of the statute, and the Court declines the defense invitation to judicially augment this legislation.

An employer’s sex-specific fetal-protection policy is facial sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a), regardless of its purpose, and may be defended only as a bona fide occupational qualification.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · filed 1991-03-20(a)

The beneficence of an employer’s purpose does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under § 703(a) and thus may be defended only as a BFOQ.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sex or pregnancy discrimination to prove that her employer treated her less favorably because of her sex or pregnancy.

Spina v. Management Recruiters of O'Hare · filed 1991-05-24(a)(1)

In other words, a plaintiff must establish that her employer treated her less favorably than other employees because of her sex and/or pregnancy. ... Spina failed to present credible evidence that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male or non-pregnant employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee when sex or pregnancy is a determinative factor in the decision.

Gallo v. John Powell Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1991-05-24(a)

Viewed as a whole, the evidence showed both that the proffered reasons were not credible and that Gallo’s sex and her pregnancy more likely than not played a role in Struncis’ decision to terminate her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy, and requires proof that sex caused the discharge.

Radovanic v. Centex Real Estate Corp. · filed 1991-06-18(a)(1)

Based on all of the evidence, the Court concludes as a matter of fact that Plaintiff was not terminated by Defendant based on her gender or her status as a pregnant female.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a male employee to sue for sex discrimination if he alleges that his employer discharged him because of his wife’s pregnancy.

Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc. · filed 1991-09-30(a)(1)

Thus, even though Mr. Nicol is not a pregnant employee, he has standing to sue under Title VII because he was allegedly discharged and discriminated against on the basis of his own sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because of pregnancy.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ACKERMAN, HOOD & McQUEEN, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1992-02-10(a)(1)

The PDA emanates from Title VII, which, among other things, makes it unlawful to discriminate against any individual with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on the employee’s sex. ... There is ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings that AHM discriminated against Torbeck because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory discharge, but an employer does not violate it by firing a pregnant employee for insubordination when the stated reason is not shown to be a pretext for discrimination.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mid-Minnesota Federal Credit Union · filed 1992-03-31(a)(1)

Thus, even though Valesano may have been in a protected class, Mid-Minnesota did not violate Title VII by firing Valesano because the evidence indicates that it based its decision on Valesano’s insubordination and her difficulty in getting along with her supervisor. The EEOC has not satisfied its burden of producing evidence that Mid-Minnesota’s decision to fire Valesano was a mere pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits intentional sex discrimination in employment; an employer’s inconsistent application of a leave policy can establish that its stated reason for denying an assignment was pretextual.

Adams v. Nolan · filed 1992-04-23(a)(1)

Thus, setting aside the district court’s clear errors of fact, and completing the analysis under McDonnell Douglas-Bur-dine, we hold that defendants’ proffered reason for the adverse action against plaintiff was a pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, thus concluding the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis in plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to relief on her Title VII sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge when pregnancy is the determinative and motivating factor, even if the employer cites absenteeism.

Loree J. Stockard, and Debra L. Blair v. Red Eagle Resources Corporation · filed 1992-07-27(a)(1)

We disagree with Red Eagle Resources that the district court concluded as a matter of law that absenteeism can never be a legitimate reason for discharge if the absenteeism is caused by an employee's pregnancy. The district court found that Ms. Blair's pregnancy was the determinative and motivating factor in her discharge, and the evidence of record supports this determination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a sick leave policy that excludes pregnancy-related disabilities while allowing consideration of other nonelective medical disabilities.

United States v. Board Of Education Of The Consolidated High School District 230 · filed 1993-01-07(a)(1)

Despite the Board's arguments to the contrary, the district court did not err in finding a Title VII violation. The sick leave bank provision was discriminatory on its face. ... The provision, therefore, automatically excluded maternity benefits as the sole nonelective medical disability, whereas the provision gave the Board discretion to consider all other illnesses.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence could show that the employer’s stated reason for demotion was pretextual.

Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Systems Corp. · filed 1993-03-31(a)(1)

A finder of fact reasonably could infer from the timing of the events alone that EHS’ explanation was pretextual. ... For the foregoing reasons, Crnokrak is entitled to proceed on her disparate treatment claim under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits pregnancy-based disparate treatment, but an employer may apply the same leave reinstatement rule to pregnant and other employees.

Ulloa v. American Express Travel Related Services Co. · filed 1993-05-25(a)

Nevertheless, Title VII does not require corporations to treat their employees with fairness or kindness. It only requires that American Express not discriminate against pregnant women. In this instance, American Express followed its guidelines and treated Ulloa in the same manner it would have treated any other employee who took a leave of absence, but failed to return within the twelve-week reinstatement period.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discharging an employee who can perform her job because she is pregnant or because the employer fears for her health.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Corinth, Inc. · filed 1993-06-28(a)

Title VII does not permit an employer’s paternalistic notions of how a pregnant employee should conduct her affairs to be substituted for the woman’s own judgment. Unless the employee is unable to perform her job, her pregnancy is simply not the business of the employer.

Direct evidence that pregnancy motivated an employee’s discharge can create a triable Title VII claim.

Thompson v. La Petite Academy, Inc. · filed 1993-11-23(a)(1)

The ultimate question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff’s pregnancy was a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to terminate her employment. Plaintiff has presented sufficient direct evidence in support of such a finding to present a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of pregnancy; a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination by showing that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Continuity Programs Inc. · filed 1993-12-23(a)(1)

In the present case, the court is satisfied plaintiff has met this burden. In light of the overwhelming evidence suggesting discrimination, the court rejects defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating MeLemore’s employment. This conclusion, coupled with the elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case, are sufficient for a finding of intentional discrimination.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 survives summary judgment when pregnancy-related remarks and references to absences support an inference that the employee’s position was eliminated because of her gender.

Newton v. Lat Purser and Associates, Inc. · filed 1994-01-12

The Court finds there are factual disputes presented in the remaining Title VII count in need of resolution by a trial. Specifically, Plaintiff points to Mr. Monaghan’s admonition to her that she should fully consider the impact of parenthood on her decision to return to work and his file memorandum mentioning her pregnancy related absenteeism in connection with Defendant’s decision to eliminate her position. Plaintiff claims these facts, when taken in the light most favorable to her, permit the inference that her position was eliminated because of her gender and a trial is necessary to enable the finder of fact to weigh them in light of all the facts and to make credibility judgments. The Court agrees. Therefore, Defendant’s summary judgment motion must be denied.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment, and a factual dispute over constructive discharge can prevent summary judgment on such a claim.

Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A. · filed 1994-02-28(a)

Generally, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, and conditions of employment, or benefits because of the person’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). An amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, specifically defines discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy as unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII. ... Therefore, the issue of whether a constructive discharge did occur cannot be determined as a matter of law.

A pregnant worker is entitled to have the jury consider a supported claim that a hiring hall’s failure to explain its light-duty assignment system was discriminatory.

Laura KELBER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOINT INDUSTRY BOARD OF the ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-06-17(a)(2)

In the present case the district court knew of plaintiffs theory on light duty, but refused to explain the difference between plaintiffs view and defendant’s view of this significant term. That is to say, the trial court also failed to explain this factual misunderstanding to the jury and let that body resolve whether the Joint Board’s failure to explain the difference to Kelber constituted discrimination. Instead, as noted, it charged the jury that “light duty” meant what defendant said it did. Because the jury instructions taken as a whole gave the jury a misleading impression of plaintiffs claims, a new trial is warranted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital · filed 1994-07-19(a)(1)

Applying the rigorous summary judgment standard proposed by the Seventh Circuit in McCoy, 957 F.2d at 370-71, we conclude that the EEOC has provided enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Northwestern’s stated reasons for its decisions are pretext designed to conceal an underlying discriminatory motive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence would allow a jury to infer that pregnancy motivated an employer’s decision.

Decker v. Andersen Consulting · filed 1994-08-19(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment because of an individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a)(l). ... The court concludes that Decker’s proffered evidence would enable a jury to infer that her pregnancy was the reason she was denied partnership.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires sufficient evidence of discrimination to support a pregnancy discrimination claim.

Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Incorporated · filed 1994-10-03(a)

Armstrong’s discrimination claims fail for lack of evidence.

For conduct before the 1991 amendments, pregnancy discrimination requires pregnancy to be a significant or motivating factor in the discharge; an insignificant role does not warrant relief.

Kelly v. K.D. Construction of Florida, Inc. · filed 1994-10-26(a)(1)

This Court notes that at most Sheila Kelly’s pregnancy was only an insignificant factor in her firing and that reliance upon an insignificant factor does not warrant relief under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1), as defined by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, prohibits denying pregnant employees sick leave benefits afforded to similarly situated temporarily disabled employees.

Miranda BYRD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKESHORE HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-09-01(a)(1)

It is today a settled principle that the PDA and Title VII are violated when pregnant employees are denied privileges afforded non-pregnant temporarily disabled employees.

A plaintiff alleging discrimination because of a pregnancy-related medical condition must show that the condition at the time of the adverse employment action was related to pregnancy.

Brinkman v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 1994-09-13(a)(1)

The court believes that in order to make a prima facie showing of discrimination on her theory of relief, plaintiff must dó more than show she was, past tense, pregnant. She must at least make a prima facie showing that her medical conditions at or near the time of her termination were, in fact, related to her pregnancy. Plaintiff has not made such a showing.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging pregnancy discrimination to show that the employer knew she was pregnant as part of her prima facie case.

DeNardo v. Clarence House Imports, Ltd. · filed 1994-11-21(a)(1)

The court therefore finds that in order to show gender discrimination based on pregnancy, a plaintiff must initially show the employer knew she was pregnant and consequently, a member of the protected class.

An employer’s lack of knowledge or belief that an employee’s condition was pregnancy related defeats an inference that less favorable treatment was motivated by pregnancy.

Brinkman v. State of Kan., Dept. of Corrections · filed 1994-11-23(a)(1)

Absent knowledge or a belief on the part of the defendant that plaintiffs condition was related to her pregnancy, there can be no reasonable inference that plaintiffs pregnancy motivated the defendant to treat plaintiff less favorably than others with non-pregnancy related conditions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy; a decision made before the employer knew of a pregnancy cannot support an inference of pregnancy discrimination.

Todd v. Inn Development & Management, Inc. · filed 1994-12-02(a)(1)

Because Mr. Ruedinger did not know Plaintiff was pregnant until after he decided to eliminate her job, no rational trier of fact could infer that she was the victim of pregnancy discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence raises a factual issue about whether the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Shepherd v. ISS International Service System, Inc. · filed 1994-12-05

The Court finds that Plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to demonstrate an issue of fact as to whether Defendant’s articulated nón-discriminatory reasons are pretextual. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Title VII claim of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to eliminate a position for legitimate business reasons even if maternity leave revealed that the position was expendable.

Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co. · filed 1995-04-24(a)(1)

That the expendability of plaintiffs position was discovered as a direct result of her being absent on maternity leave also does not, by itself, convert an otherwise legitimate business decision into gender-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff to show, as part of her prima facie case, that her employer knew she was pregnant.

Geraci v. Moody-Totturp International, Inc. · filed 1995-06-07(a)(1)

We agree with this reasoning and conclude for the same reasons that a plaintiff must show as part of her prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination that her employer knew she was pregnant and, consequently, a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy, and requires evidence from which a factfinder could infer discriminatory intent.

O'Hara v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc. · filed 1995-11-13(a)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of his or her gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). ... The record does not contain evidence from which a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that the hospital fired O’Hara because she was pregnant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim when an employer discharges a woman because of her potential pregnancy, including her pursuit of infertility treatment.

Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges · filed 1995-10-18(a)(1)

Plaintiff alleges that she was discharged because of her potential pregnancy. Like the Supreme Court in Johnson Controls, the Court holds that “the PDA means what it says,” and, thus, Plaintiff states a claim under the PDA; accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied.

An employee alleging pregnancy-based disparate treatment under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must prove that her employer intentionally terminated her because of her pregnancy.

Smith v. F.W. Morse Co., Inc. · filed 1996-02-12(a)(1)

Here, the appellant alleged disparate treatment. Consequently, she had the burden of proving that the defendant purposefully terminated her employment because of her pregnancy.