42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy; evidence of discriminatory intent can require a trial on a pregnancy discrimination claim.

Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc. · filed 1996-02-13(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits, inter alia, an employer from discharging an employee because of the employee’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... The court denies Stauffer’s motion for summary judgment on Guden-kaufs PDA claim.

When a pregnancy is neither apparent nor disclosed, a plaintiff must present evidence from which a jury could infer that the employer knew of it to make out a prima facie pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Geraci v. Intl · filed 1996-04-30(a)(1)

If the pregnancy is not apparent and the employee has not disclosed it to her employer, she must allege knowledge and present, as part of her prima facie case, evidence from which a rational jury could infer that the employer knew that she was pregnant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect an employee from discrimination based solely on her status as a new mother.

Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc. · filed 1996-06-04(a)(1)

It is this Court's belief that plaintiff does not state a cognizable disparate treatment cause of action because her status as a "new mother" is not a protected trait under the PDA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of pregnancy or childbirth, regardless of whether she has a medical reason to remain on leave.

Notter v. North Hand Protection, a Division of Siebe, Incorporated · filed 1996-06-21(a)(1)

In any event, Notter's claim does not stand or fall with her medical condition because the jury could have found that she was discriminated against (1) because of her pregnancy, or (2) because of her childbirth, or (3) because of medical conditions related to her pregnancy or childbirth.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment terms; a factual dispute about why an employer assigned a pregnant employee to light duty can preclude summary judgment.

Richards v. City of Topeka · filed 1996-07-01(a)

Richards maintains that she was informed by the fire chief during a phone conversation that the sole reason she was being placed on light duty was for the good and safety of the fetus. The defendant emphatically denies this and contends that Richards was placed on light duty in compliance with the union contract. This dispute over what was said is a factual issue, one that must be considered by the jury. ... IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) as to Count I of the amended complaint regarding the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1979 is denied.

An employer may enforce a rule against extramarital sex against a pregnant employee if it applies the rule equally to both sexes and the employee does not prove that the stated reason is a pretext for sex discrimination.

Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc. · filed 1996-07-09(a)(1)

Although Title VII requires that this code of conduct be applied equally to both sexes, see Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F.Supp. 266, 271 (N.D.Iowa 1980), defendant presented uncontroverted evidence at trial that Dr. Bowie had terminated at least four individuals, both male and female, who had engaged in extramarital sexual relationships that did not result in pregnancy.

Adverse treatment during pregnancy does not establish discrimination without evidence that the treatment was because of pregnancy rather than absence from work.

Geier v. Medtronic, Inc. And David H. Roberts · filed 1996-10-29(a)(1)

However, Geier makes no showing that Roberts’ treatment was because of her pregnancy, rather than because she was absent from work.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits adverse employment decisions based on pregnancy even when the decision occurs after childbirth.

Donaldson v. American Banco Corp., Inc. · filed 1996-11-20(a)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), as amended by the PDA, § 2000e(k), prohibits discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” ... It would make little sense to prohibit an employer from firing a woman during her pregnancy but permit the employer to terminate her the day after delivery if the reason for termination was that the woman became pregnant in the first place.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment but does not require preferential treatment for pregnant employees.

Pasha Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago · filed 1997-01-17(a)(1)

The PDA does not require preferential treatment for a pregnant employee—just the same treatment as a non-pregnant employee would receive. Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees without violating the PDA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of pregnancy, but an employee must offer concrete evidence of discrimination or pretext when the employer gives legitimate reasons for the discharge.

Knezevic v. Hipage Co., Inc. · filed 1997-01-28(a)(1)

Without any concrete facts or evidence from which to draw inferences of intentional discrimination or to show pretext, the court holds that Knezevic has failed to meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas test.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) recognizes a claim for harassment because of pregnancy.

Mentch v. Eastern Savings Bank, FSB · filed 1997-01-08(a)(1)

A claim of pregnancy harassment fits logically under Title VII as amended. ... Thus, I conclude that Title VII recognizes a claim for pregnancy harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim when the alleged discrimination occurs after pregnancy, if the employee was pregnant at or near the time of the discrimination.

Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. · filed 1997-04-25(a)

The plain language of the statute does not require plaintiff to be pregnant when the alleged discrimination occurs. Thus, I conclude that a plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim under the PDA even if she is not pregnant at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. However, a Title VII PDA plaintiff must nevertheless show she was pregnant at or near the time of the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim when pregnancy was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a role.

Lori M. GLEASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MESIROW FINANCIAL, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-06-25(m)

We are convinced that the evidence in this record is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Gleason’s termination was motivated, even in part, by the fact that she was pregnant.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an employer to consider an employee's maternity leave in an employment decision if it would treat comparable disability leave the same way.

In Re: CARNEGIE CENTER ASSOCIATES, Debtor. Deborah RHETT, Appellant, v. CARNEGIE CENTER ASSOCIATES · filed 1997-10-31(a)

It is not a violation of the PDA for an employer to consider an employee's absence on maternity leave in making an adverse employment decision if it also would have considered the absence of an employee on a different type of disability leave in the same way.

Section 2000e-2 requires a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff to prove that the employer acted because of her pregnancy.

DeJarnette v. Corning Inc. · filed 1998-01-05(a)(1)

In a pregnancy discrimination case, the plaintiff thus bears the ultimate burden of establishing that the defendant discriminated against her "because of" her pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) & (2) (1994).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence could show that pregnancy motivated a termination and the employer has not established that it would have made the same decision otherwise.

Hietala v. Real Estate Equities/Village Green, LLC · filed 1998-03-02(a)(1)

Having concluded that Hietala’s evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to REE’s motivation in terminating her, the burden shifts to REE to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its decision would have been the same absent the discriminatory motive. ... In light of the short time period Hietala worked alongside Stone (three days) and the timing of her termination in relation to Manders’ alleged comments, a rational factfinder could conclude that REE would not have terminated Hietala were it not for her pregnancy. Accordingly, REE’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of sex, including pregnancy.

Migis v. Pearle Vision Inc · filed 1998-03-10(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employer discrimination against an individual because of such individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The term “because of sex” includes “because of . . . pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Id. § 2000e(k). While Pearle Vision presented a substantial case that Migis’s termination was not based on her pregnancy, but instead was part of an ongoing, large-scale reduction in force, we cannot say that the district court’s finding of discrimination was clearly erroneous.

Pregnancy is a prohibited motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.

Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd. · filed 1998-04-03(m)

An unlawful employment practice is established whenever pregnancy is a motivating factor for an adverse employment decision.

A pregnancy discrimination claim may survive summary judgment when a reasonable juror could find that the employer’s stated reason for demotion was a pretext for discrimination.

Cross v. Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc. · filed 1998-05-08(a)(1)

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of showing that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant’s proffered reason for demoting Plaintiff is a pretext for pregnancy discrimination and Defendant thus is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

A pregnant employee can establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim through constructive discharge when sufficient evidence supports a jury finding in her favor.

Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co. · filed 1998-08-11(a)(1)

Having found that Ek presented sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in her favor on the issue of constructive discharge, we conclude Ek established a prima facie case of sex discrimination based upon pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff to produce evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that the employer acted because of pregnancy.

Leeker v. Gill Studios, Inc. · filed 1998-09-10(a)(1)

In any event, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of producing evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that Gill Studios discriminated against her because she was pregnant. The Court therefore sustains Gill Studio’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because she is pregnant, but permits discharge for poor attendance when that reason is not shown to be pretextual.

Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc. · filed 1998-12-31(a)(1)

While Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibit adverse employment actions because an employee is female and pregnant, the law was not designed to prevent an employer from firing a non-performing employee who happens to be pregnant.

Section 2000e-2(a) bars an employer from firing a pregnant employee based on assumptions about her future ability to work without sufficiently strong evidence.

Maldonado v. U.S. Bank and Manufacturers Bank · filed 1999-07-09(a)

But an employer cannot take anticipatory action unless it has a good faith basis, supported by sufficiently strong evidence, that the normal inconveniences of an employee’s pregnancy will require special treatment.

A pregnant employee who makes a prima facie case of discrimination cannot prevail if she fails to rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Gleklen v. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, Inc. · filed 2000-01-11(a)(1)

Although Gleklen made out a prima facie case on each of her claims, she cannot prevail on any of them. The Democratic Committee put forward reasonable and nondiscriminatory reasons for requiring Gleklen to work full time if she wanted to keep her job: they were planning to launch a major new off-cycle initiative which required the full-time efforts of existing employees as well as the hiring of new ones.

A supervisor’s pregnancy-related remark does not establish discrimination in salary decisions made before that supervisor arrived.

Miller v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2000-02-16(a)

American Family made its decisions on Miller’s 1994 and 1995 salaries before King arrived. Thus, even if these salaries were unlawfully low, King could not have been responsible for them. As a result, his April 1996 statement has no probative value for the legality of those earlier salaries.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of pregnancy, but the timing of a discharge and isolated remarks may be insufficient to sustain a discrimination verdict.

Wallace v. Methodist Hospital System · filed 2000-02-25(a)(1)

The evidence that this occurred just as Wallace was about to begin a maternity leave; that Wallace believed Hahus resented her repeated pregnancies; and that Hahus and Schmitz made isolated remarks that may suggest discrimination, is simply insufficient, on this record, to sustain the jury’s verdict.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a religious school from discriminating because of pregnancy, but allows it to enforce a premarital sex policy equally against male and female employees.

Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo · filed 2000-03-14(a)(1)

The central question in this case, therefore, is whether St. Paul's nonrenewal of Cline's contract constituted discrimination based on her pregnancy as opposed to a gender-neutral enforcement of the school's premarital sex policy. While the former violates Title VII, the latter does not.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in employment; in a pregnancy discrimination claim, the comparison turns on employees’ ability or inability to work, regardless of its cause.

Sumner v. Wayne County · filed 2000-03-23

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... The proper focus under the comparison prong is whether the employees are similar in their ability or inability to work, regardless of the source of the injury or illness.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim when an employer denies a requested transfer because of pregnancy.

Gorski v. Corrections · filed 2000-07-19(a)

Likewise, her allegation that Kench explicitly gave her pregnancy as a reason for denying the transfer suffices as an allegation that she was treated differently from other employees who were not pregnant. Therefore, Gorski’s allegations as to the denial of her requested transfer state a claim under Title VII.

A pregnant employee can satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie discrimination case by showing that the employer continued to need her duties performed after terminating her.

Miranda v. BBII Acquisition Corp. · filed 2000-10-16(a)(1)

The evidence shows that there was a continued need by BBII to have Plaintiffs duties performed, therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied the fourth prong in the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.

Under the indirect proof framework, a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff must show that similarly situated nonpregnant employees received more favorable treatment.

Holmes v. E.Spire Communications, Inc. · filed 2001-03-15(a)(1)

As explained in the following discussion, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII pregnancy discrimination because she has not offered evidence that Defendants treated similarly situated nonpregnant employees more favorably than pregnant employees.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging pregnancy discrimination to establish a prima facie case; unresolved evidence about whether a nonpregnant employee filled her position cannot support summary judgment on liability.

Brittain v. Family Care Services, Inc. · filed 2001-06-20

The Transcript's failure to directly address these issues results in the lack of adequate and uncontroverted proof of the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy, and a factual dispute over the reason for discharge precludes summary judgment.

Jones v. Gem Chevrolet · filed 2001-08-20(a)(1)

Title VII provides that it is unlawful to discharge an individual because of the individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... Hence, whether Plaintiff was terminated because of her pregnancy or voluntarily laid off is a question of material fact for the jury to determine. Summary judgment is, therefore, denied as to the First Cause of Action.

Section 2000e-2 requires a pregnancy disparate-treatment claimant to show that the employer treated her differently from nonpregnant employees with a similar ability or inability to work.

Green v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. · filed 2002-01-29(a)(1)

Plaintiffs nemesis in this regard is the PDA’s requirement that she demonstrate that she was treated differently than other, non-pregnant employees with a similar ability or inability to work.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, but firing a pregnant employee for the same performance reason as her coworkers does not establish discriminatory intent.

Cabrera v. Trataros Construction Inc. · filed 2002-01-31(a)(1)

Here Trataros terminated every member of the team for one and the same reason entirely unrelated to Alvarez’s pregnancy: their unsatisfactory performance in the eyes of the Navy. Without any admissible evidence that Trataros treated Alvarez differently from the rest of the team, because of her pregnancy, no inference of discriminatory intent can be imputed to Trataros.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require employers to excuse pregnancy-related absences more leniently than other absences under an equally applied attendance policy.

Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 2002-02-19(a)(1)

This is not the law–the PDA does not require preferential treatment of pregnant employees and does not require employers to treat pregnancy related absences more leniently than other absences.

A plaintiff alleging pregnancy discrimination must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for discharge was pretextual.

Purdham v. Strategic Technologies, Inc. · filed 2002-05-15(a)(1)

Even if we were to conclude that Purdham set forth sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case, our review of the record convinces us that Purdham has not shown STI’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating her employment was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a pregnancy-discrimination plaintiff to show she was qualified for her position; excessive absenteeism can defeat that showing.

Gorman v. Wells Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2002-07-15(a)(1)

As it did with respect to her ADA claim, Gorman’s excessive absenteeism precludes deeming her qualified to perform the essential functions of her job.

A pregnancy discrimination claim based on disparate treatment fails at summary judgment when the plaintiff lacks admissible evidence that similarly situated employees received different treatment.

Horton v. American Railcar Industries, Inc. · filed 2002-07-23(a)

Under these circumstances, the Court must find that plaintiff has not offered sufficient admissible evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees.

A pregnancy discrimination claim based on a demotion requires evidence that the employer knew of the pregnancy when it made the decision.

Riding v. Kaufmann's Department Store · filed 2002-08-08

Plaintiffs counter statement of facts seriously muddies the waters in an attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact as to management’s knowledge of her second pregnancy at the time Kaufmann’s demoted her in May 1998, but the record is clear enough to show the evidence does not support an essential element of her claim for pregnancy discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires employers to give pregnant employees the same opportunities and benefits as similarly limited nonpregnant employees, but does not require special accommodations.

Sermons v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia · filed 2002-09-06(a)

The PDA does not require an employer to provide special accommodations to its employees. Instead, the PDA only ensures that pregnant employees are given the same opportunities and benefits as non-pregnant employees who are similarly limited in their ability to work.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a pregnancy discrimination claimant to show that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably; employees with medical restrictions are not comparable to a pregnant employee without such restrictions.

Atteberry v. Department of State Police · filed 2002-09-30(a)

Plaintiff has presented no testimony that she was treated less favorably than any employees at the ISP who experienced medical conditions without medical restrictions. In addition, there is no evidence that Schroder, Long, Buescher, and Diller would fall into that category. As such, Plaintiff has failed to prove an element necessary to her discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1983.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits termination for unexcused absences even when they are due to pregnancy.

Quaranta v. Management Support · filed 2003-03-31(a)(1)

As further discussed in the next section, unexcused absences from work, even if due to pregnancy, are permissible grounds for termination.

Conditioning a permanent job offer on whether and when a pregnant worker will return after childbirth is not, by itself, direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination.

Venturelli, Celena v. ARC Comm Services · filed 2003-07-16(a)(1)

In light of Troupe, even if ARC conditioned its offer of a permanent job as administra- tive assistant on if and when Venturelli would come back after having the baby, that is not direct evidence of a violation of the PDA.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment decisions motivated in part by pregnancy, but a plaintiff claiming pretext must show that intentional discrimination was part of the employer’s real motive.

Cleveland v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2003-11-28(a)

Plaintiff must do more than show that Defendant’s stated reason for the adverse employment action is false. Rather, in making the pretext argument, Plaintiff must also carry the burden of persuading the trier of fact that intentional discrimination was part of the employer’s real motive for the adverse employment action. There is no evidence on the record to support an inference of intentional discrimination because of pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence permits a factfinder to infer that the employer’s stated reason for denying a continuing contract was pretextual.

Johnson v. SCHOOL UNION, 107 · filed 2003-12-11(a)(1)

The facts present a classic case under the Santiago-Ramos formulation wherein it would be possible for a factfinder to infer that the defendants did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons, but rather acted out of discriminatory animus. That determination can only be made in the context of a trial on the merits.

Pregnancy discrimination claims under § 2000e-2(a) are analyzed like other Title VII sex discrimination claims.

Ploplis v. Panos Hotel Group, LLC · filed 2004-01-12(a)

A pregnancy discrimination claim is analyzed identically to any other Title VII sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a pregnancy disparate treatment claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual or that pregnancy determined its decision.

Zisumbo v. McLeodusa Telecommunications Services, Inc. · filed 2004-05-11(a)(1)

In sum, Plaintiffs allegations, taken individually or as a whole, fail to show that Plaintiffs gender or pregnancy were determinative factors in Defendant’s action, nor do they undermine Defendant’s articulated reason for reassigning Plaintiff to an AE position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy; evidence of decision makers’ discriminatory statements can support a claim that survives summary judgment.

Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc. · filed 2004-06-14(a)(1)

The alleged statements by Mikesich and Neil are evidence of sex and pregnancy discrimination and demonstrate a discriminatory animus. Further, the alleged statements were made by decision makers and were allegedly made within 30 to 90 days prior to Snyder's termination. I find that because material issues of fact remain in dispute, Yellow's motion for summary judgment will be denied.

Section 2000e-2 allows a pregnancy and sex discrimination claim to proceed when disputed evidence about an employer’s light duty policy could show pretext.

Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distributing, Co. · filed 2004-08-12

It is clear that the evidence surrounding the 2001 light duty policy change, taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, presents a question of fact for the jury to decide. Therefore, Nesbit’s motion for summary judgment on the pregnancy and sex discrimination claims is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination and requires pregnant employees to be treated the same as other employees based on their ability to work.

Mullet v. Wayne-Dalton Corp. · filed 2004-09-27(a)

Employers are not required to treat pregnant employees in any special way. Rather, such employees must be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their “ability or inability to work.”

An employer’s failure to follow its own procedures may be evidence of pregnancy discrimination, but does not by itself establish discriminatory motive.

Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distributing Co. · filed 2005-02-14(a)

Whether an employer followed proper procedure and whether an employer engaged in illegal discrimination are two separate questions. One may be evidence of the other, but the presence of one does not mean the other is necessarily true.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employer health plan must treat the risk of pregnancy no less favorably than comparable health risks.

In Re Union Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation · filed 2005-07-22(a)

Because the PDA plainly states that its protection from discrimination, including discrimination in “receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs,” applies to “women affected by pregnancy” and not merely to pregnant women, the clear language of the statute requires that the Plans treat the risk of pregnancy no less favorably than the Plans treat other similar health risks.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that her employer intentionally discriminated against her because she was pregnant.

Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distributing Co. · filed 2005-12-22(a)

In evaluating Walker’s argument, we first note that Walker had the ultimate burden of proof in her claim that Nesbit intentionally discriminated against her because she was pregnant.

An employer’s failure to independently assess a pregnant employee’s work restriction does not, by itself, show that its stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Bergman v. Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2006-01-18(a)(1)

But even if BHS should have determined independently the amount of work that Bergman could perform, that does not indicate that BHS’s justification for terminating her was pretextual.

A pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee offers no facts showing that the employer’s economic reason for discharge was a pretext for discrimination.

Telemaco v. Mobile Paints Manufacturing Co. · filed 2006-03-14(a)(1)

Given our view that Plaintiff has failed to provide any facts indicating that Mobile Paints’ economic justification for her discharge is a sham, we find no possibility on this record that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the company discriminated against Plaintiff because she was pregnant or took maternity leave.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from applying a moral conduct policy in a way that discriminates against women because of pregnancy.

Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists · filed 2006-07-26(a)(1)

Nevertheless, the issues raised by plaintiff, alongside comments that plaintiff should conceal her stomach, at least raise a question of fact regarding whether defendant’s policy is applied in a discriminatory fashion and whether plaintiff was terminated because of her sex and pregnancy, as prohibited by Title VII.

A pregnancy discrimination claim based on indirect evidence requires evidence that the employer knew of the pregnancy to support an inference of unlawful discharge.

Reifer v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20 · filed 2006-11-07(a)

In a case alleging pregnancy discrimination, to raise an inference of an unlawful discharge, the plaintiff must adduce evidence of the employer’s knowledge of the her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of pregnancy, and circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer that pregnancy motivated the discharge can sustain a claim at summary judgment.

Drebing v. Provo Group, Inc. · filed 2007-10-11(a)(1)

These comments and actions, coupled with evidence from other female employees that Provo treated them in exactly the same way (even if these events were not contemporaneous with Drebing’s termination), do create a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that Provo terminated her because of her pregnancy.

A plaintiff alleging pregnancy discrimination under Title VII must show satisfactory job performance to establish a prima facie case.

Cordero-Irizarry v. Sears Roebuck of Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 2007-12-18(a)(1)

After reviewing this uncontested evidence, the Court determines that Plaintiff Cordero has failed to establish her prima facie case because she did not show that her job performance was satisfactory.

For a pregnancy discrimination claim arising from a reduction in force, a plaintiff whose duties were reassigned can satisfy the fourth element of the indirect proof framework by showing that most employees who assumed those duties were outside the protected class.

Anderson v. GSF Mortgage Corp. · filed 2008-01-25(a)(1)

However, the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas is considerably easier for a plaintiff to prove in a mini-RIF case: the mini-RIF plaintiff need demonstrate only that a majority of the employees who assumed her duties were not members of the protected class.

A pregnant employee establishes a prima facie discrimination claim by showing satisfactory performance, discharge, and replacement by a non-pregnant employee.

Lambert v. Erickson · filed 2008-03-31(a)(1)

Plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to meet the four elements required to make out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination: (1) she was pregnant; (2) she satisfactorily performed her duties as Creative Director; (3) she was discharged; and (4) she was terminated after she became pregnant, and her position was ultimately filled by a non-pregnant employee.

A supervisor’s comment that does not reveal discriminatory animus does not support a pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a).

Forde v. Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 2008-04-22(a)

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to her, the comment does not reveal discriminatory animus.

Title VII permits a sex discrimination claim when an employer takes adverse action against a woman for undergoing IVF because of her childbearing capacity.

Hall v. Nalco Co. · filed 2008-07-16(a)(2)

Because adverse employment actions taken on account of childbearing capacity affect only women, Hall has stated a cognizable sex-discrimination claim under the language of the PDA.

An employee’s stated wish to start a family may support an inference that she intends to become pregnant and is protected against sex discrimination.

Batchelor v. MERCK & CO., INC. · filed 2008-12-10(a)(2)

Here, a finder of fact could very reasonably infer that plaintiff, a married woman in her thirties with several stepchildren, was stating her intent to become pregnant when she told her supervisor that she wanted to “start a family.” Indeed, because most parents produce their own children, rather than adopting, this inference is inherently logical. Therefore, this court rejects defendant’s contention that plaintiff has failed to show that she is a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, does not require an employer to provide additional paid break time for expressing breast milk beyond the breaks other employees receive.

Puente v. Ridge · filed 2009-05-12(a)(1)

At bottom, Puente asked for a benefit different from that which every other BPA received. While she was allegedly denied that benefit, she never alleges that she received less than the status quo as a result of her request. Assuming without deciding that Puente would fall within the class of persons protected by the PDA, “the PDA does not impose an affirmative obligation on employers to grant preferential treatment . . . .” Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-86 (1987)).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits firing an employee because of pregnancy, but pregnancy does not prevent dismissal for poor job performance.

Muhleisen v. Wear Me Apparel LLC · filed 2009-07-30(a)

Although the law does not permit an individual to be fired because she was pregnant or took medical leave, simply being pregnant or taking leave does not preclude dismissal.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff can establish a prima facie case with evidence that a similarly situated employee received lighter discipline for substantially similar misconduct.

Griffin v. Webb · filed 2009-09-03(a)(1)

Griffin’s remaining Title VII and § 1983 claims survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ... Taking the facts in a light most favorable to Griffin, because Elliott was similarly situated to Griffin but punished differently, Griffin’s prima facie showing is sufficient.

A pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when medical restrictions prevent the employee from performing essential job duties.

Appel v. INSPIRE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. · filed 2010-04-30(a)(1)

The court therefore finds that Appel was not “qualified” to perform the job of Territory Manager while under the medical restrictions placed upon her by her doctor. Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires pregnant employees to receive the same treatment as similarly limited nonpregnant employees, but does not require special accommodations.

Nelson v. Chattahoochee Valley Hospital Society · filed 2010-08-04(a)(1)

But pregnant employees are not acceptable comparators in disparate-treatment suits alleging pregnancy discrimination. This is because the PDA does not required an employer to provide special accommodations to its pregnant employees; instead, the PDA only ensures that pregnant employees are given the same opportunities and benefits as nonpregnant employees who are similarly limited in their ability to work.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of employer knowledge, job qualification, and an adverse employment action creates a genuine factual dispute.

Hardee-Guerra v. Shire Pharmaceuticals · filed 2010-08-25(a)(1)

The evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. Hardee-Guerra has presented evidence that her employer knew she was pregnant, that she was qualified for the position, and that she suffered an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, including pregnancy; a plaintiff using the direct method must present evidence creating a triable question of intentional discrimination.

Silverman v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago · filed 2011-03-21(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because of that person’s sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... To avoid summary judgment under the direct approach, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to create a triable question of intentional discrimination in the employer’s decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence allows a jury to find that pregnancy motivated an adverse employment action.

Buchanan-Rushing v. City of Royse City, Texas · filed 2011-06-07(a)(1)

Taking all evidence as true, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Rushing’s pregnancy was the primary motivation behind the decision to place her on involuntary leave and ultimately terminate her position.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII violation to be shown when pregnancy or a pregnancy-related condition was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. High Speed Enterprise, Inc. · filed 2011-06-27(m)

A plaintiff may show a Title VII violation by demonstrating pregnancy or a pregnancy-related condition was “a motivating factor” in an adverse employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment will be granted as to liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when the alleged circumstances of an employee’s termination support an inference of discrimination.

Briggs v. Women in Need, Inc. · filed 2011-08-24(a)(1)

Taking her allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor, plaintiff has met her burden of alleging sufficient facts to raise an inference of discrimination at this stage of the litigation.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination, including pregnancy discrimination; an employer may apply the same light duty rule to pregnant and nonpregnant employees with non-work-related conditions.

Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC · filed 2011-08-26(a)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex. ... The policy complies with the PDA because it does, in fact, treat nonpregnant employees the same as pregnant ... employees—both are denied an accommodation of light duty work for non-work-related injuries.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff challenging a hiring decision must show that she was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case.

Martinez-Burgos v. Guayama Corp. · filed 2011-08-26(a)(1)

Because the undisputed record demonstrates that Martinez was not qualified for the position, we need not consider whether a similarly qualified individual was selected.

A pregnancy discrimination claim may proceed when the evidence raises a genuine dispute whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Hillins v. Marketing Architects, Inc. · filed 2011-09-06

Although the FMLA claim is based on MAI’s response to Hillins’ decision to take FMLA leave and the Title VII and MHRA claims are based on Hillins’ pregnancy, Hillins announced her pregnancy and intent to take leave at the same time and the two are intertwined, so the analysis of the claims is substantially the same. Similarly, the Court concludes that Hillins has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext for the same reasons as explained with regard to her FMLA claim.

A pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that the employer treated the employee differently because of pregnancy.

Mashal v. Royal Jordanian Airlines · filed 2011-09-13

Apart from plaintiffs own statements that Sami Zakha denied her paid sick days to see her physician for pregnancy related issues, there is nothing in the record to suggest such a correlation. Therefore, there is no material question of fact as to whether plaintiff was discriminated against based on her sex or pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, but an employee does not establish a prima facie case through differential discipline when the employer followed its policy in disciplining her for a serious error.

Slater v. Energy Services Group International Inc. · filed 2011-09-23(a)(1)

In addition, Progress Energy did not violate its discipline policy when it terminated Slater because the evidence shows that levels of discipline could be skipped for serious offenses, and Slater’s critical error in administering the vision test was a serious offense. Thus, Slater has not established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination.

A pregnancy discrimination claim requires evidence that the employer treated pregnancy or related conditions differently from other medical conditions; evidence of general sex discrimination alone is insufficient.

Hobbs v. Ketera Technologies, Inc. · filed 2012-03-30(a)(1)

Evidence of general sex discrimination, however, is not probative of pregnancy discrimination, because the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires courts to inquire whether the employer treats pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions differently than other medical conditions.

A pregnancy discrimination claim can survive summary judgment without a nonpregnant comparator when other circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination.

Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc. · filed 2012-05-16(a)(1)

But she does not have to show a comparator if she can show enough non- comparison circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination, see id. at 1328 (“[T]he plaintiff’s failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom [her] case.”), and she has done that.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim to survive summary judgment without a comparator when other circumstantial evidence permits a reasonable inference of discrimination.

Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc. · filed 2012-06-11(a)(1)

Williams does not have to use the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary judgment because the record contains enough non-comparator evidence for a jury to reasonably infer that Baxter discriminated against Williams because she was pregnant.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment, and a jury may infer discrimination when it reasonably finds the employer’s stated reason for termination pretextual.

Brown v. YRC Inc. · filed 2012-07-30(a)

Because a reasonable jury could conclude Ms. Brown met her burden of demonstrating YRC’s proffered reason for terminating her employment was a pretext for pregnancy discrimination, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court, REINSTATE the jury’s verdict, and REMAND the case for a determination of attorney’s fees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex or pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence that layoff decision makers made discriminatory comments creates a genuine dispute about their motive.

Govan v. Caterpillar, Inc. · filed 2012-09-26(a)(1)

Plaintiffs evidence that Johnson, Johns, and Faulling selected her for lay-off after previously making discriminatory comments about her pregnancies raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs sex and/or pregnancy actually played a role in the decision-making process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)'s sex discrimination framework governs pregnancy discrimination claims; the PDA does not create a separate cause of action.

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2013-01-09(a)(1)

Although the second clause can be read broadly, we conclude that its placement in the definitional section of Title VII, and grounding within the confines of sex discrimination under § 703, make clear that it does not create a distinct and independent cause of action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment; a plaintiff challenging a termination must show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason.

Malave-Torres v. Cusido · filed 2013-01-28(a)(1)

Therefore, Plaintiff must not only demonstrate that Defendants’ reason is pretextual, but also that the real reason was impermissible discrimination. ... After evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to the issues of pretext and discriminatory animus due to Plaintiffs pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in employment, including discrimination because of pregnancy.

Mocic v. Sumner County Emergency Medical Services · filed 2013-03-07(a)(1)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may not “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012). As amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, this includes discrimination because of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff can establish intentional discrimination through circumstantial evidence without identifying a nonpregnant comparator.

Zottola v. Anesthesia Consultants of Savannah, P.C. · filed 2013-03-29(a)

However, Plaintiff does not have to show a comparator if she can show enough non-comparator circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case through comparators who did not engage in the same misconduct.

Hubbard v. Meritage Homes of Florida, Inc. · filed 2013-05-30(a)(1)

In other words, neither Roberts nor Temmel was similarly situated to Hubbard and thus is not a sufficient comparator. Therefore, Hubbard cannot make out the fourth prong of a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas approach.

Under § 2000e-2, employees who received light duty for on-the-job injuries do not establish disparate treatment or pretext for a pregnant employee whose condition did not result from an on-the-job injury.

Freppon v. City of Chandler · filed 2013-07-01

To begin with, because Ms. Freppon’s condition did not result from an on-the-job injury, she was not similarly situated to the two male police officers who were accommodated with light duty assignments. As a result, the evidence concerning the other officers is insufficient to establish pretext or disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method to show satisfactory job performance at the time of termination.

Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc. · filed 2013-07-19(a)

For the purposes of Heatherly’s pregnancy discrimination claim, she must establish that: (1) she was pregnant and her employer knew she was pregnant; (2) she was performing her job duties satisfactorily; (3) she was terminated; and (4) similarly situated, non-pregnant employees were treated more favorably. ... Based on the above, Heatherly cannot establish that at the time of her termination she was meeting Portillo’s job expectations.

In a pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a prima facie case shifts the burden of production to the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.

Simpson v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2013-10-03(a)(1)

As the Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, the burden of production now shifts to Amylin to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the Plaintiff’s discharge. The Defendant has satisfied that burden here.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers intentional pregnancy discrimination, and a plausibly pleaded claim can survive dismissal.

Speight v. Sonic Restaurants, Inc. · filed 2013-10-23(a)(1)

Accepting the facts alleged as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of discrimination under the PDA — that she was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy, child birth, or related medical condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence supports a prima facie case and shows that the employer’s stated reason for termination may be pretextual.

Latowski v. Northwoods Nursing Center · filed 2013-12-23(a)(1)

Latowski has provided sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case and to demonstrate that North Woods’ purported reason for terminating her employment was pretext for discrimination. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of North Woods on Latowski’s pregnancy discrimination claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A pregnancy discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that pregnancy motivated the employer's decision.

O'Rourke v. Boyne Resorts · filed 2014-02-07(a)(1)

And even assuming the existence of a triable issue regarding pretext, the evidence is insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude, with respect to the ultimate issue, that O'Rourke's pregnancy motivated Loon to terminate her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)’s prohibition on sex discrimination includes discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Services Inc. · filed 2014-07-31(a)(1)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act expanded the definition of the Title VII phrases “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” to include “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.”

Section 2000e-2 prohibits firing an employee because pregnancy-related medical conditions require her to work from home or take leave.

Taylor v. eCoast Sales Solutions, Ltd. · filed 2014-08-05(a)(1)

This evidence--which eCoast simply ignored in its opening summary judgment memorandum, and incorrectly dismissed as “unsupported allegations” in its reply--suffices to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether working from home and taking leave due to her pregnancy played an impermissible role in Taylor’s firing, notwithstanding the fact that her supervisor decided to fire her after receiving information that Taylor had engaged in misconduct after returning from leave.

A pregnancy discrimination claim fails when the decision makers were unaware of the pregnancy, because it could not have motivated their employment decision.

Yousuf v. Fairview Health Services · filed 2014-10-24(m)

Plaintiffs pregnancy-based discrimination claims must fail because there is no evidence that her supervisors were aware of her pregnancy. Without knowledge, the pregnancy cannot have been a motivating factor in Fairview’s decision to terminate Yousufs employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employment decisions based on deficient job performance during pregnancy when performance standards are applied equally.

Torres-Skair v. Medco Health Solutions of Hidden River, LC · filed 2014-12-04(a)(1)

In other words, deficient job performance remains a non-discriminatory basis on which employers may make employment decisions, so long as performance standards are applied equally.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff relying on similarly situated employees must provide evidence that employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Kaiser v. Trace, Inc. · filed 2014-12-12(a)(1)

In the absence of any evidence that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably by TRACE, Ms. Kaiser fails to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Summary judgment is accordingly proper with respect to Ms. Kaiser’s discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, but a termination claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Hite v. Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2015-08-06(a)(1)

Hite has failed to show that Hill’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her ... for violating the noncompetition provision of the June 2010 Agreement was a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a pregnancy disparate treatment plaintiff to show that her employer took an adverse action while treating nonpregnant employees differently.

Sanchez-Estrada v. MAPFRE Praico Insurance · filed 2015-09-04(a)(1)

To prove that a particular adverse employment action taken with respect to Plaintiff amounted to discrimination because of her pregnancy, she would have to show that “(1) she was pregnant at the relevant time, (2) her job performance was satisfactory, but (3) her employer took some adverse employment action against her while (4) treating non-pregnant employees differently.” ... As such, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants were treating non-pregnant employees differently for this employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from denying a promotion or changing employment conditions because an employee is pregnant.

Frey v. Coleman · filed 2015-10-09(a)(1)

The combination of Vaughn’s statements, the job change with reduced hours, the timing of the events, and HC’s admission during discovery, could lead a reasonable fact-finder to only one result: that HC intentionally discriminated against Frey for being pregnant. ... Thus, with respect to Frey’s Title VII and IHRA claims against HC for pregnancy discrimination, her summary judgment motion is granted.

In a pregnancy discrimination claim, the timing of an employee’s termination after the employer learns of her pregnancy cannot, by itself, establish pretext.

Fairchild v. All Amer Check Cashing, Inc. · filed 2016-01-27(a)(1)

Although the temporal proximity between the employer learning of the plaintiff’s pregnancy and her termination may support a plaintiff’s claim of pretext, such evidence—without more—is insufficient.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy; timing alone cannot establish pretext after an employer gives nondiscriminatory reasons.

Fairchild v. All Amer Check Cashing, Inc. · filed 2016-03-18(a)(1)

Therefore, with respect to evidence of timing, we decline to adopt a different analysis for pregnancy-based sex discrimination claims under Title VII. Although the temporal proximity between the employer learning of the plaintiff’s pregnancy and her termination may support a plaintiff’s claim of pretext, such evidence—without more—is insufficient.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex or pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of more favorable treatment of comparable employees raises a factual dispute about the employer’s stated reason for termination.

Burkard v. Finner N Finner, LLC · filed 2016-05-17(a)(1)

Burkard has shown factual disputes regarding her discrimination claim based on the evidence designated by the parties and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Further, she has sufficiently cast doubt on the veracity of Finner’s articulated reasons for her termination. Thus, summary judgment is DENIED on Burkard’s claim for sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 covers discrimination based on lactation because lactation is a medical condition related to pregnancy.

Mayer v. Professional Ambulance, LLC · filed 2016-09-30

Absent contrary guidance from the First Circuit, this Court follows the Houston Funding decision and EEOC guidance, and finds that lactation is a medical condition related to pregnancy, and therefore covered under Title VII and RICRA.

A plaintiff alleging pregnancy discrimination through disparate discipline must show that comparable employees engaged in nearly identical misconduct and received more favorable treatment.

Diaz v. Florida · filed 2016-11-04(a)(1)

Additionally, Diaz cannot satisfy this element of her prima facie case because she fails to sufficiently establish that the other mental health unit employees’ misconduct was “nearly identical.”

Using pregnancy as a trigger to enforce an employment policy can support an inference of intentional sex discrimination.

Richardson v. Northwest Christian University · filed 2017-03-16(a)

Defendant’s enforcement practices give rise to a plausible inference of discriminatory intent because pregnancy is the basis of one of two enforcement categories and only women can get pregnant.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence need not produce a comparator, but must show that the employer’s legitimate reason for its decision was pretextual.

Everett v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp. · filed 2017-08-15

But even assuming Ms. Everett provided enough circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case, she was still required to show that the defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for denying her accommodation were pretex-tual.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment decisions based on assumptions about an employee’s pregnancy or future childbirth.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bob Evans Farms, LLC · filed 2017-08-17(a)

Therefore, the PDA outlaws discrimination against women because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related conditions with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including pregnancy; a genuine dispute about whether such a discharge occurred precludes summary judgment.

Mercado-Reyes v. City of Angels, Inc. · filed 2018-06-26(a)(1)

VHC's arguments are unpersuasive because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether VHC took an adverse employment action against Mercado on the basis of her sex or pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) does not establish pregnancy discrimination as a matter of law when a reasonable jury could find that the employer sent the employee home for a reason unrelated to pregnancy.

Patz v. Sureway Supermarket · filed 2019-07-30(a)(2)

Based on this testimony, a reasonable jury could have believed that Jambon’s reason for sending Vivian Patz home without pay was because Vivian Patz felt sick and had not seen a doctor, not because Vivian Patz was pregnant. As a result, the Court finds Vivian Patz is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her Title VII claim on the basis that she was sent home without pay because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects lactating employees from sex discrimination because lactation is related to pregnancy.

Ferrer-Marrero v. Misey Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2019-12-13(a)(1)

Because the trend has been to follow the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir.2013), holding that lactation is a “condition related to pregnancy” under the PDA, absent any argument to the contrary by the parties, this Court follows the rationale adopted by the Fifth Circuit, holding that a woman’s status as a lactating mother is afforded protected status under Title VII.

A pregnancy discrimination claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for reassignment and the employee fails to show pretext.

Choi v. Ferrellgas, Inc. · filed 2020-01-10(a)(1)

Also, for the above-noted reasons, the Court rules that Defendants had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this legitimate reason was pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim when allegations of unequal treatment and termination support an inference of discrimination.

Xiang v. Eagle Enterprises, LLC · filed 2020-01-16(a)(1)

Here, Xiang’s FAC pleads sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of Title VII pregnancy discrimination. ... The Court therefore denies defendants’ motion to dismiss Xiang’s claim of discrimination under Title VII.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff must show she was qualified for her position, including the ability to perform its essential duties.

Oquendo v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2020-04-07(a)(1)

Based on the foregoing, because Oquendo could not perform the requirements of her position during her pregnancy—as a result of her medical restrictions—the Court cannot find that she was qualified for her position—even if it was only temporary. Accordingly, Oquendo cannot meet the second prima facie element for a Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim.

A pregnant employee satisfies the prima facie comparator requirement when the employer accommodates nonpregnant employees who are similarly unable to perform the job, including employees injured on the job.

Durham v. Rural/Metro Corporation · filed 2020-04-17(a)(1)

Here, as in Young, Durham’s temporary inability to lift more than 50 pounds and her colleagues’ inabilities to lift more than 10 or 20 pounds rendered Durham, and her colleagues injured on the job, equally unable to perform the 100-pound lifting duties of an EMT. Thus, Durham and her colleagues who were injured on the job were “similar in their ability or inability to work.”

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when direct evidence shows pregnancy was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Bielawski v. Davis Roberts Boeller & Rife, P.A. · filed 2020-06-01(m)

As plaintiff has adduced direct evidence that her pregnancy “was a motivating factor” in her termination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the Court finds summary judgment is inappropriate for both the PDA and FCRA claims.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, including pregnancy.

Jones v. Technology Training Systems, Inc. · filed 2020-07-14

Plaintiff moves for default judgment and an award of damages against Defendant for FMLA interference, 29 U.S.C. § 2617, pregnancy and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and pregnancy discrimination in violation of Ohio law, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02. ... Based on the allegations in the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true, and the averments in affidavits submitted in support of default judgment, the Court finds that Defendant violated the FMLA, Title VII, and Ohio law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, and a pregnant employee’s termination satisfies the protected-class and adverse-action elements of a discrimination claim.

Farmer v. Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC · filed 2020-07-21(a)(1)

Farmer undisputedly satisfies the first and third elements of a prima facie case: She is a member of a protected class, as a pregnant woman, AC ¶¶ 8, 32; and she suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated, id. ¶¶ 70–71; see, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2004).

For a pregnancy discrimination claim using indirect proof, satisfactory job performance is a different inquiry from qualifications for a position.

JERLES v. STALLARD & ASSOCIATES, INC. · filed 2020-08-10(a)(1)

Under the "indirect method" for surviving summary judgment, the plaintiff must show that she was performing her job satisfactorily. The court views this as a different inquiry than whether the plaintiff is "qualified" for the job—the first question is answered by looking at performance reviews and testimony of the plaintiff's co-workers, while the second question seems to be answered merely by looking at the plaintiff's resume.

A pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can survive summary judgment when genuine factual disputes remain.

Acevedo-Milan v. Home Etc. Incorporado · filed 2020-09-30(a)(1)

Consequently, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment relating to Plaintiff’s gender and pregnancy discrimination, under of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the PDA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), is hereby DENIED because there exist genuine material issues of facts which could affect the outcome of the case.

In a pregnancy discrimination claim over a denied accommodation, the employee must show that the exclusion of pregnant workers imposes a significant burden that outweighs the employer’s legitimate reasons.

Durham v. Rural/Metro Corporation · filed 2020-11-30(a)(1)

But at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas test, the burden rests on the plaintiff to show why the exclusion of pregnant employees imposes a significant burden on them that outweighs the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

A pregnancy discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretext for discrimination.

Larkin-Gallagher v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital Medical Center · filed 2020-12-02(a)(1)

None of Larkin’s arguments or purported factual disputes regarding the circumstances surrounding her termination are sufficient for a rational jury to find that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Larkin was a pretext for discrimination.

A pregnant employee can raise a genuine dispute on the comparator element of a disparate-treatment claim by showing that the employer treated comparable nonpregnant employees more favorably.

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2015-03-25(a)(1)

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Young, there is a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from Young's.

Section 2000e-2's sex-discrimination cause of action covers pregnancy discrimination; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act creates no separate cause of action.

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2015-04-10(a)(1)

Although the second clause can be read broadly, we con- clude that its placement in the definitional section of Title VII, and grounding within the confines of sex discrimination under § 703, make clear that it does not create a distinct and independent cause of action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination based on pregnancy-related medical conditions, and circumstantial evidence can create a triable issue without a similarly situated comparator.

Brown v. Advanced Concept Innovations, LLC · filed 2021-02-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not identify any similarly situated comparators that were treated differently. But she has presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that her pregnancy played a significant role in her termination.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), adverse treatment soon after an employer learns of a pregnancy can support a plausible inference of discrimination.

Castro v. Yale University · filed 2021-02-09(a)(1)

These adverse actions, taken in quick succession after Dr. Eltorai informed Dr. Fontes about her pregnancy, create an inference of discrimination substantial enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of pregnancy; a termination message linking the firing to pregnancy can be direct evidence of discrimination.

Konczal v. Zim Tim, LLC · filed 2021-04-15(a)(1)

Plaintiff has presented direct evidence that her pregnancy was “at least a motivating factor” in Defendant’s decision to terminate her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment; evidence that an employer’s stated reason is pretextual can allow the claim to proceed to trial.

Alvarado v. Northwest Fire District · filed 2021-04-27(a)(1)

The Court finds material facts are at issue and summary judgment as to Alvarado’s claim of pregnancy discrimination is not appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim to reach a jury when the evidence could support an inference that pregnancy caused the employee’s termination.

Rayford v. La Petite Academy, Inc. · filed 2021-06-04(a)(1)

Combining this detail with the evidence of suspicious timing and pretext, a reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence, considered as a whole, is fishy enough to support an inference of discrimination or retaliation.

A pregnant female coworker cannot establish the comparator element of another pregnant employee’s sex discrimination claim.

Niles v. MCCI of Indiana LLC · filed 2021-07-12(a)

As MCCI notes, even if true, this argument would support only Niles’ race discrimination claim, but not her sex discrimination claim, since Smith is also female and was pregnant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees from sex discrimination based on childbearing capacity, including efforts to become pregnant through IVF.

Rehm v. Young Mens Christian Association of Greater Waukesha County Inc · filed 2021-07-19(a)(1)

The complaint alleges that Becker knew of the plaintiff’s problems getting pregnant and knew that she had sought IVF for a third time in the months leading up to her termination. Id. at ¶¶42-44. The plaintiff alleges that Becker previously had made “anti-pregnancy comments” to the plaintiff and other female employees. Id. at ¶71. The plaintiff alleges that on December 12, 2019— just two months before the plaintiff was terminated—Becker said “[n]o one else on [the plaintiff’s] team is allowed to get pregnant,” and “I am going to have to change the water” while in the plaintiff’s presence. Id. On a separate occasion, Becker allegedly told a pregnant female employee, “You are done after two, right.” Id. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that Becker had made negative comments about female employees’ use of the defendant’s childcare programs. Id. at ¶72. The combination of these statements supports the plaintiff’s conclusion that she was discriminated against based on her sex or child- bearing capacity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits termination because of sex or pregnancy; allegations that workplace statements reveal that motive can support a discrimination claim.

Fugarino v. Milling Benson Woodward L.L.P. · filed 2021-08-13(a)(1)

The content, nature, and timing of the statements lead the Court to conclude Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish she was terminated because of her sex and pregnancy.

In a pregnancy discrimination claim challenging a light-duty policy, the employee must provide evidence that the policy burdens pregnant workers or otherwise shows pretext.

Durham v. Rural/Metro Corporation · filed 2021-09-30(a)(1)

Ms. Durham now insists that it is Rural/Metro’s burden to show that its policy did not put a substantial burden on pregnant people. This is not just incorrect, it is inconsistent with how she characterized the case at the pre-trial conference.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to show that an employer’s decision was motivated by unlawful discrimination, but the evidence must support a reasonable inference of that motive.

Tynisha Key v. Central Georgia Kidney Specialists PC · filed 2021-11-16(a)(1)

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has demonstrated no “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” that would support a reasonable inference that the Prac- tice’s decision to terminate her employment was motivated by un- lawful pregnancy discrimination.

A pregnancy discrimination claim based on a delayed promotion must allege that the employer treated comparable absences by nonpregnant employees more favorably.

Carlson v. Gorenz & Associates, Ltd. · filed 2022-01-14(a)

Again, Plaintiff does not allege she was treated less favorably with respect to her promotion than any other employee who was about to miss 10 to 12 weeks of work. Because Plaintiff’s claim is squarely foreclosed by Troupe, this claim must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 allows a wrongful termination claim based on sex and pregnancy to proceed when the complaint alleges sufficient facts.

Hylton v. McMahon · filed 2022-01-21

At this point in the case, the Court finds that Hylton has stated a claim for wrongful termination of employment in violation of Title VII on the basis of sex and under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext for discrimination.

McClellan v. Midwest Machining, Inc · filed 2022-01-24(a)(1)

Once Midwest proffers a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, it is up to McClellan, who retains the burden of proof at all times, to marshal sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the reason was merely a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a pregnancy discrimination claim when pregnancy or a related medical condition was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Watkins v. Austin · filed 2022-02-03(m)

Additionally, as to her discriminatory discharge claim, Count 8, Watkins has alleged sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow the reasonable inference that her pregnancy and related medical conditions, viewed in context of the alleged “pattern or practice” of discrimination, were a motivating factor in her discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, and evidence that an employer’s stated reasons for termination are pretextual can support a claim.

Heuertz v. Caregivers Home Health LLC · filed 2022-03-03(a)(1)

Given this timing, and the lack of documentation or notice to plaintiff that she was not performing up to expectations, a reasonable jury could easily find that defendants’ stated reasons for termination are not only unworthy of belief but a pretext for sex discrimination. ... The Court therefore overrules defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff without direct or indirect evidence of a discriminatory attitude must proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

McKinney v. Cleveland County Board of Education · filed 2022-03-25(a)(1)

However, there is no direct or indirect evidence of any discriminatory attitude that bears on the contested employment action; thus, Plaintiff’s only available avenue is the burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas.

Section 2000e-2 permits a pregnancy discrimination claim when a qualified employee alleges termination under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Singhal v. Doughnut Plant, INC. · filed 2022-03-31

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has established her prima facie case and has sufficiently alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy-related medical conditions; evidence linking such a condition to an adverse employment decision and calling the employer’s stated reason into question can defeat summary judgment.

Navarro v. Robert J. Young Company, LLC · filed 2022-04-18(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual “with respect to [her] compensation, term, conditions, or privileges of employment” on the basis of her gender. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). This includes discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted evidence to raise the question of pretext to a jury. Accordingly, summary judgment will not be granted on Plaintiff’s pregnancy discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case with evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could infer a causal nexus between pregnancy and an adverse employment decision.

VASOLI v. YARDS BREWING COMPANY, LLC · filed 2022-05-05(a)(1)

In light of the Parties’ competing record evidence, and viewing the facts and drawing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable fact-finder could find that Plaintiff has shown causal nexus. Therefore, Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case.