42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring; an applicant who shows different treatment must still prove discriminatory intent after the employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason.

Smith v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. · filed 1986-12-23(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Ms. Smith failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer was motivated by discriminatory purpose in adopting and using its policy of height differentials for female and male flight attendants. As a result Mary Smith has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was subjected to gender-based discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race, which the EEOC must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Anderson's Restaurant of Charlotte, Inc. · filed 1987-08-03(a)(1)

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to fail to hire an individual because of such individual’s race. The law does not state that a person may be refused employment if he or she is black; under the law, the EEOC must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that those claimants for whom it seeks relief were not hired because they were black.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant's race.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Anderson's Restaurant of Charlotte · filed 1989-03-24(a)(1)

Failure to hire an applicant because of that person's race constitutes an unlawful discriminatory employment practice. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring, and admissions and hiring statistics can establish a pattern or practice of such discrimination.

United States v. Gregory · filed 1989-07-20(a)(1)

The pattern or practice of discriminating against women stands so clearly revealed on the basis of the Sheriff's admissions and the statistical evidence that we do not need to rely, to establish the existence of pattern or practice, on the testimony of the three complainants to resolve the liability question.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racially discriminatory refusal to rehire a former employee even when the employer has no recall policy.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Beverage Canners · filed 1990-04-02(a)(1)

Title VII applies to the hiring of employees, regardless of whether an employee recall policy exists.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects applicants from discriminatory refusal to hire, including former employees seeking rehiring when the employer has no recall policy.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Beverage Canners, Inc. · filed 1990-04-02(a)(1)

Title VII applies to the hiring of employees, regardless of whether an employee recall policy exists. ... It is irrelevant whether the hiring is for the first time or the second time, pursuant to a recall policy or independent of such a policy.

A discriminatory refusal-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2 does not always require a formal job application.

Newark Branch, National Association For The Advancement Of Colored People, v. Town Of Harrison, New Jersey · filed 1990-07-13

While we agree with the NAACP that a Title VII plaintiff does not necessarily have to allege and prove in all cases that he or she formally applied for the job that was discriminatorily denied in order to establish that rights granted by the Act have been violated, we believe that this fact does not help the NAACP defend its original complaint.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit favoritism toward a relative unless the employment decision is discriminatory.

Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., Jack Thomas, and Savonda Thomas · filed 1990-08-10

However unseemly and regrettable nepotism may be as a basis for employment decisions in most contexts, ... it is clear that nepotism as such does not constitute discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits refusing to rehire someone because of sex; a refusal is not discriminatory when gender was not a determinative factor.

Becker v. Evansville Housing Authority, Board of Commissioners, Mayor Michael D. Vandeveer, and Vern Estey, D · filed 1991-02-15(a)

Although it would have been better had the district court made a finding regarding Lewis, there was sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to support the district court's conclusion that Becker's gender was not a determinative factor in the defendants' decision not to rehire him.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to interview or hire an applicant because of race.

Garland v. USAir, Inc. · filed 1991-04-25(a)(1)

The evidence further establishes, and the court concludes, that USAir acted with discriminatory intent and that USAir’s asserted reasons for not interviewing or hiring Captain Garland are pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hiring discrimination plaintiff to prove that the employer declined to hire the applicant because of race.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Jordan Graphics, Inc. · filed 1991-08-12(a)(1)

Rather, the law requires a Title VII plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because he is black.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of sex.

Baker v. Emery Worldwide · filed 1991-10-28(a)(1)

As it relates to plaintiff, it is the Court’s conclusion that unlawful sexual discrimination was pervasive throughout the hiring procedure that was utilized by defendant.

A qualified applicant in a protected class can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring when the employer rejects the applicant and continues seeking others for the position.

Bacon v. Secretary of the Air Force · filed 1991-12-04(a)(1)

Further, plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he was qualified for the position of Physical Science Technician GS-5 and that after rejecting his employment application, defendant continued to seek applicants for that position. Therefore, I conclude, as did Judge Smith in his May 2, 1990 Opinion and Order, that the evidence establishes a prima facia case of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make sex-based interview questions a per se violation; whether sex affected the hiring decision remains relevant.

Stukey v. United States Air Force · filed 1992-01-31(a)(1)

In the matter now before this Court, we follow the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Bruno and conclude that the subcommittee’s questions of Ms. Stukey were not per se violations of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability for bias in choosing an application process when the final hiring decision is gender neutral and selects the most qualified candidate.

Sharon Cesaro, Cross-Appellant v. Lakeville Community School District, Cross-Appellee, Lakeville Education Association T · filed 1992-04-17(a)(1)

We find that plaintiff was not discriminated against because gender was not a factor considered by the school board in its hiring decision. Although Petersen may have acted with a discriminatory motive in opening applications to outside candidates, we cannot find liability for mere use of a process by which the most qualified candidate was ultimately selected in a non-discriminatory manner.

A plaintiff claiming sex discrimination for failure to hire must show that the position she sought existed.

Dewilde v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co. · filed 1992-07-01(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that the position of account executive for which she informally applied existed. She has, therefore, failed adequately to prove her prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employer to reject an applicant in favor of a better qualified candidate when that reason is not a pretext for discrimination.

Richard Smith Jerome Williams v. American National Red Cross · filed 1992-12-04

As the district court pointed out, this court has consistently held that selection of a better qualified applicant is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting an applicant.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim for refusal to rehire requires proof of intentional discrimination, including that the applicant was qualified for the position.

Snell v. City and County of Denver, Denver Police Department, Civil Service Commission · filed 1993-07-02

To assert a valid claim under § 1981, the ADEA, or for disparate treatment under Title VII, Snell must prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination. ... Because Snell had been separated from the department for more than three years when he applied for reemployment, we conclude that he was not "qualified" for the position, based on the Department of Safety guideline.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to rehire someone because of national origin; a claimant must prove that ancestry motivated the decision.

Duplessis v. Training & Development Corp. · filed 1993-08-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to prove that the treatment, if unfair, was motivated by Plaintiffs ancestry. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims based on intentional discrimination under Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act fail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination hiring claim when an employer denies a qualified applicant a position because of race, even if it offers her a lower paying position.

Johnson v. Indopco, Inc. · filed 1993-10-21(a)(1)

Wilkes has alleged sufficient facts to establish a Title VII violation. In her complaint, she alleges that she applied for the position of an executive secretary at Uniche-ma, that she was qualified for the position and that Unichema refused to hire her as an executive secretary due to her race. The fact that she was offered the position of a receptionist/secretary, which pays a lower wage, is independent from Unichema’s refusal to hire Wilkes as an executive secretary due to her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring; when an applicant makes a prima facie case, the employer must give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Stott v. Contra Costa Community College District Board of Trustees Charles Sapper, Dean of Instruction, Diablo · filed 1993-11-10(a)(1)

Pursuant to Title VII, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of gender when making employment decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Where, as here, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. ... Here, the District met its burden of providing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decisions involving Stott.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a rejected job applicant to prove that race caused the employer’s decision.

Nelson v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Department · filed 1994-08-12(a)(1)

It is the finding of this Court, after considering all the evidence presented, that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proving that the reason he was not selected for an interview was because he is black. Judgment therefore shall be for the defendants.

Poor performance in a job interview can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to hire an applicant that rebuts a prima facie discrimination claim.

Wechsler v. R D Management Corp. · filed 1994-08-23(a)(1)

In the context of an allegation of a discriminatory refusal to hire, an unsuccessful performance at a job interview, wherein the applicant fails to convince the prospective employer that he or she is capable of handling the responsibilities of the job, is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason which adequately rebuts a Title VII plaintiffs prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging a hiring decision to prove that unlawful discrimination motivated it; a withdrawn job offer alone does not establish that motive.

Davis v. Yazoo County Welfare Department · filed 1994-11-08(a)(1)

Here, plaintiff had the proof burden to show that Blain’s decision not to hire him was motivated by discriminatory concerns. ... But, plaintiff has not shown that Blain’s decision to withdraw the offer was tainted by unlawful discriminatory motives.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination at any stage of hiring, including initial screening, regardless of the applicant’s qualifications relative to those ultimately hired.

Shipley v. Dugan · filed 1995-01-19(a)(1)

Title VII, and sections 1981 and 1983 provide Plaintiff a right to be free from discrimination throughout the selection process. If the process is discriminatory at any stage, Plaintiff is entitled to relief regardless of her qualifications relative to those ultimately hired.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a qualified applicant because of sex, including when its stated hiring reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. · filed 1995-05-04(a)

Based upon the Court’s review of the entire record, including the testimony and all exhibits, and having assessed the witnesses and their credibility, the Court is persuaded that the evidence establishes that Ringling’s reason for not interviewing or hiring Plaintiff was not gender neutral.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; a hiring discrimination claim requires a prima facie showing and must overcome an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejection.

Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. · filed 1996-06-20(a)

In light of Little’s uncontroverted affidavit, Steward can not set out a prima facie ease of discrimination with respect to Gwaltney’s refusal to hire Steward. Little claims that Steward was not qualified for the position because Steward previously had been fired for insubordination and misconduct. This also serves as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Steward.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race, and evidence that an employer’s stated reasons were pretextual can support a finding of intentional discrimination.

Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-07-26(a)(1)

Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an individual by failing or refusing to hire him on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... A review of the record ... as a whole shows that the trial court’s finding of intentional discrimination was not clearly erroneous.

A discriminatory failure-to-hire claim requires the applicant to show that he was qualified for the position sought.

Wheatley v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. · filed 1998-04-17(a)(1)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case because he has not demonstrated that he was qualified for the LPN position Defendant was seeking to fill.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a qualified applicant because of sex.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc. · filed 1998-08-12(a)(1)

Although fully qualified to work at Joe’s, she was not selected because Joe’s hiring personnel engaged in sex discrimination and gave her a lower rating than she deserved.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging race discrimination in hiring to show that he was qualified and rejected while the employer hired a similarly or less qualified person of another race.

Malesevic v. Tecom Fleet Services, Inc. · filed 1998-09-23(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination for failure to hire, the plaintiff must show: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he applied for and was qualified for the position; (3) he was rejected for the position; and (4) the defendant hired a black person with similar or lesser qualifications than the plaintiff.

An employer with no recollection of a job applicant may support its nondiscriminatory explanation for failing to hire with circumstantial evidence of its hiring practices and the applicant’s materials.

Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc. · filed 1999-01-06(a)(1)

We hold that Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is supported by admissible circumstantial evidence of their employment practices and Plaintiff’s resumes, applications, and employment history.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a claim when an employer denies an applicant an interview because of race and thereby deprives or tends to deprive the applicant of an employment opportunity.

Buchanan v. Tower Automotive, Inc. · filed 1999-01-08(a)(2)

In my view, depriving a person of an opportunity to interview for a job because of his or her race is precisely the kind of limitation, segregation or classification of applicants at which § 2000e-2(a)(2) is directed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from considering an applicant’s race as an adverse factor in hiring.

Pollocks v. Sunland Training Center · filed 2000-02-23(a)(1)

If, as plaintiffs claim, the persons making hiring decisions at Sun-land considered plaintiffs’ race as an adverse factor in the employment process, then the state violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits discriminatory exclusion during hiring even if the person ultimately hired was more qualified.

Lee v. New Mexico State University Board of Regents · filed 2000-07-11(a)(2)

Defendants are erroneous in their assertion that there was no violation of Title VII if the applicant ultimately hired was more qualified than Plaintiff. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), it is a violation for an employer to “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee-because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” ... If the process is discriminatory at any stage, Plaintiff is entitled to relief regardless of her qualifications relative to those ultimately hired.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in hiring, but an applicant must offer evidence that she met the employer’s legitimate expectations and that its stated reasons for rejecting her were pretextual.

Kehrer v. City of Springfield · filed 2000-07-18(a)(1)

The combination of her unfavorable personal and professional references, criminal conviction, and failure to include all the information requested in the questionnaire prevents her from establishing that her application met the Defendants’ legitimate expectations for police officer candidates. Moreover, Kehrer produced no evidence to cast suspicion on the Defendants’ reasons for not hiring her. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Kehrer’s gender discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex; suspicion alone does not establish that sex affected the hiring decision.

Jones v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2000-09-27(a)(1)

In sum, plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her gender played any role in defendants’ failure to hire her.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a person because of race, including when the applicant is white.

Nugent v. City of Houston · filed 2001-07-20(a)

An employer’s decision not to hire a person violates Title VII when that decision is based on race, whether that race be white or black.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of sex.

In re Coho Energy, Inc. · filed 2001-08-23(a)(1)

Coho did not fail or refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate against Locke on the basis of her sex when it did not extend an offer of employment to her in January, 1998.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from denying an applicant a hiring opportunity because of the applicant’s sex.

Medcalf v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania · filed 2003-07-30(a)(1)

In conclusion, the jury rationally could have concluded that Medcalf was more qualified than the other candidates who received interviews, and that Penn’s failure to grant him an interview was based upon his gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a failure-to-hire discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and raises a genuine issue about an employer’s stated reason for its decision.

Trujillo v. BD., EDUC., ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 2005-10-26(a)(1)

Trujillo has established a prima facie case of discrimination. The Defendants have responded by stating three legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring Trujillo. Trujillo has not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to two of these reasons. The genuine issue that Trujillo has shown on the remaining reason casts enough doubt on the Defendants’ case to allow Trujillo to survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) may support a claim when an applicant is denied a chance to retake a hiring test because of gender.

Conroy v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2006-03-15(a)

Thus, Ms. Conroy may have a Title VII claim against the City if she can establish, as alleged, that she was refused an opportunity to retake the test on the basis of gender.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race.

Allen v. Deerfield Manufacturing Inc. · filed 2006-03-29(a)(1)

It is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual or to otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

A sex discrimination claim over a hiring decision can survive summary judgment when evidence raises a genuine question whether the applicant’s sex motivated the employer’s choice.

Banks v. Pocatello School District No. 25 · filed 2006-04-25(a)(1)

Thus, a genuine question of fact exists that Banks’s sex motivated the district’s selection of Smith-Stoor over him.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying an applicant a job because of sex, and a claim can proceed when a reasonable jury could find that gender motivated the decision.

Gatsas v. SD · filed 2006-11-07(a)(1)

Coupled with the affirmation allegedly made by Ferrisi, the bare facts presented, taken in the light most favorable to Gatsas, could support a reasonable jury’s determination that plaintiff was denied the interim position because of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in hiring; direct evidence of discrimination shifts the burden to the employer to show it would have made the same decision regardless.

Taylor v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools · filed 2007-07-13(a)(1)

Because the plaintiffs proffered direct evidence of discrimination, the burdens of production and persuasion shifted to the School Board to demonstrate that it would not have hired Taylor or Childress, irrespective of its discriminatory intent.

After an employer gives a legitimate reason for a hiring decision, an applicant must show that the reason was pretextual or that national origin was a motivating factor.

Thomas v. Trico Products Corp. · filed 2007-10-26(a)(1)

We hold that Thomas has failed to disprove Trico’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation that Eich was better qualified for the position. He also has not presented other evidence of pretext for discrimination, nor has he shown that his national origin was a motivating factor in Trico’s hiring decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire an applicant because the applicant does not share the employer’s religious beliefs.

Fischer v. Forestwood Co., Inc. · filed 2008-05-12(a)(1)

We conclude that these recordings constitute direct evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Forestwood refused to rehire Fischer because he is not a member of the FLDS church.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination at any stage of a hiring selection process; circumstantial evidence that the process was discriminatory can defeat summary judgment.

Jackson v. Verizon Wireless · filed 2009-10-28(a)(1)

Here, while there is no direct evidence that Mr. Jackson was the victim of a discriminatory hiring process, there is clearly sufficient circumstantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact under the direct method of proof regarding whether Verizon’s selection process was tainted by discrimination, thereby negatively affecting Mr. Jackson.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from intentionally favoring men over women in hiring because of sex.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2010-05-13(a)(1)

Regardless of the weight given to the total absence of female hires, the remaining anecdotal evidence was more than sufficient to show that DOT lacked consistent hiring standards in the Bridge Painter Section, that less qualified men were given preferences over more qualified women, and that the disparate treatment was intentional appeasement of DOT’S existing all-male workforce.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex; a plaintiff claiming sex discrimination in hiring must prove that gender was the determinative factor.

Joyce v. Postmaster General, United States Postal Service · filed 2012-02-28(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire ... or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In order to make a claim that her non-hiring was in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that her gender was the determinative factor in her not being hired.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race.

May v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2013-06-20(a)(1)

Here, the record reveals that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that MDOC did not decline to hire May on the basis of her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a separate failure-to-hire claim based on discriminatory remarks during hiring when the applicant receives the job and the hiring process does not amount to an actionable failure or refusal to hire; the remarks may support a hostile work environment claim.

Fisher v. Town of Orange · filed 2013-08-09(a)(1)

Her treatment during the hiring process did not result in an actionable “failure” or “refusal” to hire her; it did, however, contribute to a pattern of unequal treatment in the workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in hiring; applicants hired for different openings did not support an inference that UPS discriminated against Rainey.

Rainey v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2013-11-26(a)(1)

But the three white applicants named by Rainey — hired in June 2007, September 2008, and 2010 — were not hired to fill the position he interviewed for in March 2008. And no adverse inference can be drawn from the company’s rejection of the four black applicants named by Rai-ney; the evidence at summary judgment shows that in 2007 two other black applicants who had worked for Roadway Express were hired at Hodgkins, as were 46 other black drivers during 2007 and 2008.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire applicants because of sex; allegations of discriminatory directives and hiring decisions can plausibly support a pattern or practice claim.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Performance Food Group, Inc. · filed 2014-03-11(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual ... because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... The Court finds that the EEOC has pled sufficiently a plausible claim that PFG engaged in an ongoing pattern or practice of gender-based discrimination by failing to hire a class of female applicants for certain operative positions at the Broadline Division warehouse facilities.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits refusing to hire an applicant because of pregnancy; a disputed employer justification can allow the claim to proceed.

Bennett v. Capitol BC Restaurants, LLC · filed 2014-10-23(a)

Because there is a genuine dispute as to whether defendant has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing to hire plaintiff, there is no need at this juncture for plaintiff to show that the decision was pretextual. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as to the refusal-to-hire claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring, but an applicant’s superior qualifications alone do not establish discrimination when the employer chose another applicant for a legitimate reason.

Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc. · filed 2014-12-10(a)(1)

Seen in this light, the undisputed fact that Ripberger was more qualified than Smith does not raise an inference of sex ... discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race, including when that practice is widespread.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rosebud Restaurants, Inc. · filed 2015-04-07(a)(1)

It is undisputed that the failure to hire an individual because of his race is a practice made unlawful by § 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). When performed on a regular, purposeful, and widespread basis, such actions remain a subset of the discrimination prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of religion.

Hellwege v. Tampa Family Health Centers · filed 2015-04-10(a)

Both statutes make it unlawful to fail or refuse to hire an individual on the basis of religion. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Hellwege has adequately alleged a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of her sex.

Overman v. City of East Baton Rouge · filed 2015-09-22

The preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that in choosing the new Baton Rouge police chief the defendants intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII and the LEDL. Defendants did not select the plaintiff as police chief because of her sex.

A sex-based failure-to-hire claim requires the applicant to show that he was qualified and that the employer hired someone with similar or inferior qualifications.

Cruz v. Hagel · filed 2016-01-27(a)(1)

But he was not qualified and cannot bypass the qualification baseline of those hired to occupy the positions he applied for in this case.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits firing or refusing to hire a worker because of race, even when the worker has no contractual right to the job.

Deets v. Massman Construction Co. · filed 2016-02-03(a)(1)

Title VII applies even to at-will employment and does not permit an employer either to fail to hire or to fire workers based on race.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex; a failure-to-hire claim requires evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that sex played a role.

Dubensky v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-06-15(a)(1)

On this record, no reasonable juror could find that Dubensky’s sex played any role in the CPL’s decision not to hire him for the Librarian I-GIS position and instead to hire a female applicant. The City accordingly is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2 does not permit efficiency to justify intentional discrimination, but an efficient hiring method does not establish discriminatory intent merely because it produces a workforce concentrated in one national-origin group.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cross-Appellee v. Consolidated Service Systems, Cross-Appellant · filed 1993-03-04(k)(2)

If the most efficient method of hiring, adopted because it is the most efficient (not defended because it is efficient — the statute does not allow an employer to justify intentional discrimination by reference to efficiency, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2)), just happens to produce a work force whose racial or religious or ethnic or national-origin or gender composition pleases the employer, this is not intentional discrimination.

A race-based failure-to-hire claim can pass initial Title VII screening when its allegations state a tenable claim.

Tulipat v. Lombardo · filed 2020-11-09(a)(1)

Construing plaintiff’s claims liberally since he filled out the court approved form that has limited space, made specific allegations against the LVMPD, and listed the individual defendants in his complaint, the Court finds that the plaintiff has stated a tenable failure to hire claim under Title VII against the LVMPD and the individual defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects people of every race from discrimination in hiring.

Moore v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners · filed 2020-11-30(a)(1)

Moore is a member of a protected class, because Title VII protects all persons from race-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that an employer refused to hire someone because of race; alleging that the employer hired a person of another race is insufficient by itself.

Tedder v. Pride Enterprises Incorporated, Corporate Office · filed 2021-03-01(a)(1)

The Court finds that a mere reference to the hiring of a black inmate without any well-pled facts from which one could plausibly infer that race discrimination occurred does not state a plausible claim for relief.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race and color discrimination in hiring, but a claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision and the plaintiff offers no evidence that the reason was pretextual.

Arms v. Milwaukee County · filed 2021-04-01(a)

Moreover, the County has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for conducting a nationwide search—the County Executive’s concerns that, under Stein’s leadership, the Department was on the wrong track, and a concern that appointing someone who had been mentored by Stein would simply perpetuate those problems. Arms has not produced evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that this explanation was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex, and a statement that the employer does not hire women can be direct evidence of discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. NDI Office Furniture, LLC · filed 2021-06-25(a)(1)

There is direct evidence of discrimination in this case. As already discussed, Pearson observed Semien telling Alicia that “[t]hey do not hire women in the warehouse” when she inquired about the Warehouse Coordinator position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring, but a failure-to-hire claim requires evidence that could support an inference of gender bias.

Villeti v. Guidepoint Global LLC · filed 2021-08-11(a)(1)

Even if this Court assumes that Jibril was qualified for the position, no reasonable juror could conclude that Guidepoint’s decision not to hire her was motivated by her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects applicants from religious discrimination in hiring even if they are not yet employees.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 2021-08-12(a)(1)

In any event, even if Hadith qualified only as an applicant, she was nonetheless entitled to be free of discrimination on the basis of religion in the hiring process. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in hiring; a rejected applicant states a claim when the pleaded facts plausibly suggest race affected the decision.

Macedo v. Elrich · filed 2021-09-24(a)(1)

When viewing these facts most favorably to Macedo, the Complaint makes plausible that he had not been selected on account of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects applicants from religious discrimination in hiring.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 2021-11-09(a)(1)

In any event, even if Hadith qualified only as an applicant, she was nonetheless entitled to be free of discrimination on the basis of religion in the hiring process.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race.

Brown v. Mercedes-Benz US International Inc · filed 2022-03-04(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse “to hire . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any individual [ ] because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination failure-to-hire claim to proceed when evidence of a decision-maker’s preference for a man could support a finding that sex affected the hiring decision.

EMBLETON v. SUNMAN-DEARBORN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS · filed 2022-03-29(a)(1)

A reasonable jury could find that the school didn’t hire Ms. Embleton because of her gender if the jury believed that Mrs. Roth made the alleged comments.

A sex-discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case.

Lyons v. Secretary of the Air Force · filed 2022-04-07(a)(1)

For these reasons, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists and Plaintiff has failed satisfy the fourth prong of her prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race-based failure-to-hire claim to reach a jury when the evidence supports an inference of discriminatory intent in the hiring decision.

Rodriguez v. Hartford · filed 2022-04-15(a)(1)

The next question then is whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that the decision not to hire the Plaintiff occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racially discriminatory intent. The Court answers this inquiry in the affirmative.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an applicant alleging race discrimination in hiring to plead facts supporting a plausible inference that race motivated the employer’s decision.

Stalling v. T3 Trading Group LLC · filed 2022-05-31(a)

Allegations that Plaintiff’s partially completed application did “not move forward” (ECF 5 at 6) and that this determination was subsequent to his submission of application materials from which his race could have been ascertained is insufficient, without more, to give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination on the basis of race. The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s amended complaint thus fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in hiring, but a failure-to-hire claim fails when the applicant cannot show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Barnes-Staples v. General Services Administration · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

In short, Barnes has not shown the GSA’s nondiscriminatory reason for hiring a different candidate was pretextual, that is, a “lie.” Ferril/, 860 F.3d at 500 (quoting Smith, 806 F.3d at 905). Thus, her race-discrimination claim falters, and summary judgment for the GSA is appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire an applicant because of race; a negative employment reference can justify the decision when there is insufficient evidence of pretext or racial animus.

Burton v. Will County Sheriff's Merit Commission · filed 2023-03-30(a)(1)

The Court agrees. There is no genuine dispute that the Merit Commission removed Burton from the certification process because of the poor reference from his then-current employer. Burton has not adduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to be able to conclude otherwise.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plausible link between a hiring decision and a protected trait; confidential job postings and coworkers’ surnames alone do not establish that link.

Brzozowski v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commissi · filed 2023-05-12(a)

We accordingly agree with the District Court that Brzozowski’s allegations fail to give rise to an inference of discrimination, as there is no plausible indication that his inability to apply to these positions was based on his age, sex, or national origin (as opposed to the confidentiality of the postings).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire complaint to plausibly allege that race was a motivating factor in the hiring decision.

Adams v. Robert Half International Inc. · filed 2023-08-28(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is African American, and that Defendant did not hire him, but he does not allege a plausible connection between his race and Defendant’s decision not to hire him.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious discrimination in hiring; a disparate-treatment applicant must allege qualifications and more favorable treatment of people outside the protected class.

HARDAWAY v. TRADER JOE'S COMPANY · filed 2024-05-20(a)(1)

But he does not allege he is qualified for the position and those outside his protected class were treated more favorably by Trader Joe’s.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim to proceed when a biased interview panel’s actions could have caused an applicant’s non-selection.

Sickels v. McDonough · filed 2024-08-16(a)(1)

This evidence establishes a genuine dispute of whether the interview panel’s discriminatory animus and actions were a proximate cause of Sargent’s decision not to select Sickels. The Court will accordingly deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count I with respect to the August 2018 Electrician position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex, including sexual orientation; a claim needs facts supporting an inference of discrimination.

Buchanan v. Doris Duke Foundation - Shangri-La Museum of Islamic Art · filed 2024-10-02(a)(1)

Such bare assertions, without more, do not plausibly establish that Defendants discriminated against Buchanan because of her gender or sexual orientation.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit coaching an applicant absent evidence that an applicant was denied a job or adversely affected because of race.

Jones v. Regan · filed 2025-03-03(a)

Moore’s alleged assertion that Louie was coached because of her race is not evidence that she or the other applicants (1) were not hired because of their race, or (2) were adversely affected because of their race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of race; a claim of discriminatory non-selection must plead facts that plausibly link the decision to race.

Webster v. Haaland · filed 2025-05-02(a)(1)

Most importantly, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to plausibly suggest non- selection was “because of” his race.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that a union declined to pursue a member’s grievance because of the member’s religion.

Asing v. Hawaii Government Employees Association - Afscme Local 152, Afl-Cio · filed 2025-06-05(c)(1)

Asing’s FAC fails to plead any facts that state a plausible prima facie claim of discrimination. Indeed, the FAC alleges that the union consistently declined to pursue grievances for its members who did not comply with the testing requirement, suggesting that the union did not decline to file a grievance because of Asing’s religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a union member claiming sex discrimination to show that the union discriminated in performing its representative functions.

Brown v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2025-03-31(c)

In the context of union representation, Brown must show that Local 241 has “discriminated in the performance of its agency function.”

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) covers sex discrimination by a labor union in its treatment of members, including in internal union affairs.

Mercer v. Amalgamated Transit Union Division 689 · filed 2023-02-24(c)(1)

Thus, a fair reading of Section 2000e-2(c)(1) “bars any kind of ‘discrimination’ by a union,” including, for instance, discrimination in the treatment of grievances and the creation of a hostile work environment for a union member on the basis of race or sex.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) permits a race discrimination claim against a labor union when the union stops placing a member in potential jobs because of race.

Rippley v. Teamsters Local 50 · filed 2023-02-06(c)(2)

Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled a Title VII race discrimination claim; he alleges that, because of his race, Defendants stopped his placement for potential jobs, which is sufficient under federal pleading standards. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2).

Section 2000e-2(c) can make a union liable for discriminatory referrals to leadership positions even when contractors make the final hiring decision.

King v. UA Local 91 · filed 2022-03-15(c)

The fact that the SCMMA vests the ultimate decision with the contractors whether to hire or appoint a referred Union member to a leadership position does not negate that UA Local 91 plausibly could be liable for discrimination in its referral process for leadership positions.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a union from refusing to process a member’s grievances because of race; a complaint must allege facts supporting that inference.

Webb v. AFSCME Council 31, Local 654 · filed 2020-02-26(c)(1)

Construing his pro se allegations liberally, Webb has not alleged sufficient factual details that raise his race discrimination and retaliation claims above a speculative level.

A union can be liable for discriminatory job referrals, but liability for tasks assigned after a referral requires evidence that the union controlled those tasks.

Earnest Johnson, Jr. v. International Longshoremen's · filed 2013-03-29(c)(2)

Johnson has not provided evidence that the union exercised control over job tasks after it fulfilled an employer’s referral request, so he has not shown that the union, rather than his employer, picked the white worker to drive the forklift.

A union may be liable for discrimination in job referrals, but it is not liable for an employer’s assignment of tasks that the union does not control.

Johnson v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, Local 815 AFL-CIO · filed 2013-03-29(c)(2)

Johnson has not provided evidence that the union exercised control over job tasks after it fulfilled an employer’s referral request, so he has not shown that the union, rather than his employer, picked the white worker to drive the forklift.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits liability when a union instigates or actively supports an employer’s discrimination.

Smith v. Delaware River Stevedores · filed 2011-11-28(c)

The Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the defendant discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff or that the defendant instigated or supported discriminatory or retaliatory behavior by the foremen.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits liability when a union instigates or actively supports an employer’s discrimination.

Franklin v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n Local Union No. 2 · filed 2008-02-21(c)

For liability under those circumstances, the union must have itself instigated unlawful discrimination or actively supported the employers’ discriminatory acts.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a union from deliberately declining to pursue a member’s claim because of the member’s sex.

Beck v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union · filed 2007-11-01(c)(1)

A union violates Title VII if it deliberately declines to pursue a member’s claim because of the member’s gender.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) permits a union member to bring a hostile environment claim against a labor organization when discrimination affects the terms, conditions or privileges of union membership.

Golleher v. Aerospace Dist. Lodge 837, IAMAW · filed 2000-11-16(c)(1)

The Court finds that Golleher has a cause of action under Title VII against the union as a labor organization for allegedly creating a hostile environment with regard to her union terms, conditions or privileges.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) allows a union representative’s role in causing or attempting to cause a hostile work environment to be imputed to the union when the union knew or is charged with knowing of the conduct and the conduct related to union activity and breached the duty of fair representation.

Agosto v. Correctional Officers Benevolent Ass'n · filed 2000-07-24(c)(3)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that for a union representative’s role in causing or attempting to cause a hostile work environment to be properly imputed to a union, a plaintiff must show not only that the union had actual or imputed knowledge of the improper conduct, but also that the union representative’s conduct related to union activity and that therefore, in acting in such a manner, the representative breached the duty of fair representation.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits a sex discrimination claim against a union when it leaves a breach of the collective bargaining agreement unrepaired and acts with discriminatory animus.

Badlam v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 1999-04-19(c)

The district courts within this Circuit have held that a prima facie case is established against a Union by demonstrating that: (1) the Union Defendants breached the DFR by allowing an 'alleged breach of the CBA to go unrepaired; and (2) the union defendants’ actions were motivated by animus to a protected class. ... Accordingly, the Court applies the two-part test articulated in Szarka and Doolittle.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a claim about a union’s handling of a grievance to allege an unlawful discriminatory reason or another prohibited employment practice.

Randolph v. Communications Workers of America · filed 1997-06-30(c)

After de novo review, see First Commercial Trust Co., N.A. v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 77 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir.1996), we conclude that the District Court was correct in dismissing Randolph's claims against the Union 2 : he failed to allege that the Union mishandled his labor grievance for an illegal, discriminatory reason, see Martin v. Local 1513 and Dist. 118 of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 859 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir.1988), and he failed to allege facts otherwise constituting an employment practice prohibited under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994).

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a claim against a union to allege that it mishandled a grievance for an illegal, discriminatory reason or engaged in another prohibited employment practice.

Randolph v. CWA, District 6 · filed 1997-06-30(c)

After de novo review, see First Commercial Trust Co., N.A. v. Colt’s Mfg. Co., 77 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996), we conclude that the District Court was correct in dismissing Randolph’s claims against the Union2: he failed to allege that the Union mishandled his labor grievance for an illegal, discriminatory reason, see Martin v. Local 1513 and Dist. 118 of Int'l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 859 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1988), and he failed to allege facts otherwise constituting an employment practice prohibited under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994).

Section 2000e-2(c) permits a claim against a union when the complaint alleges that it knowingly acquiesced in racial discrimination and refused to pursue a member's grievance.

Weaver v. Leon County Classroom Teachers Ass'n · filed 1996-03-27(c)

Civil rights violations through unlawful labor organization practices are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), which states: ... In this case, appellant alleged that despite its knowledge of the Board's past racial discrimination against him, the union acquiesced in the Board's retaliatory acts by failing to advise him of his right to have LCTA file a Step II grievance on his behalf after the Board denied his grievances. Appellant also alleged the LCTA refused to accept his request to file a Step II grievance procedure on his behalf, and the LCTA's failure to take any action in the face of the Board's acts of racial discrimination and retaliation caused him to be deprived of employment opportunities and affected his status as an employee. ... Although we offer no view as to appellant's ability to prove his claims at trial, see Weaver v. School Board of Leon County, 661 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we conclude the second amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action under our notice pleading.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) makes a union liable when it causes an employer to discriminate against an employee.

Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers · filed 1981-04-20(c)(3)

Section 703(c)(3) makes it unlawful for a union "to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section," thus plainly contemplating that both employer and union would be culpable where the employer accedes to a union's unlawful demand for discriminatory action.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) makes a union liable for causing an employer to discriminate when the employer complies with the union’s unlawful demand.

Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806 · filed 1981-02-27(c)(3)

Section 703(c)(3) makes it unlawful for a union “to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section,” thus plainly contemplating that both employer and union would be culpable where the employer accedes to a union’s unlawful demand for discriminatory action.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) can apply to a union with an essentially exclusive referral practice even if some workers are hired without referrals.

Mills v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1981-01-16(c)(2)

To establish a case of discrimination under § 2000e-2(c)(2), only an essentially exclusive practice of referral by the union had to be shown. The district court could make such a finding on the evidence even though some exceptions to the practice could be found in the record and there was no contractual obligation to hire exclusively on union referral.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits a labor organization from discriminatorily denying promotion or transfer opportunities even when the person remains employed.

Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47 · filed 1980-12-08(c)(2)

The statute makes illegal discriminatory deprivations of promotion or transfer opportunities, as well as discharges.

A union does not violate § 2000e-2(c)(1) by declining to process a discharge grievance when its decision was not motivated by race.

Miller v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. · filed 1980-08-27(c)(1)

Section 703(c)(1) of Title VII lists unlawful employment practices for which labor organizations can be held liable under Title VII. ... There is no evidence in the record from which the Court can infer that the union acted with a discriminatory motive in making its decision not to process a grievance regarding the discharge.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) requires a segregated union local to be included in a merger remedy when it is part of a system that denies equal employment opportunity, even if the local did not intend to discriminate.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n · filed 1980-08-13(c)(2)

That Local 1576 may not have intended to discriminate does not justify its exclusion from the order of merger mandated by this court.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) requires merger of segregated union locals when their separation denies equal employment opportunity, even if a local did not intend to discriminate.

24 Fair empl.prac.cas. 20, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,173 · filed 1980-08-13(c)(2)

Although the trial court may have been correct in stating that Local 1576 never actively discriminated against members of any racial group, the fact remains that as one of four segregated Galveston longshoremen's locals, Local 1576 has been part of a system which operates to discriminate against people because of race and national origin. That Local 1576 may not have intended to discriminate does not justify its exclusion from the order of merger mandated by this court.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits labor union practices that create a present threat of discriminatory employment opportunities.

22 Fair empl.prac.cas. 445, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,742 · filed 1980-03-14(c)(2)

Plaintiff Bailey, however, as a member of the black local longshore union, suffers from a threat of employment discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) by the operation of the two racially segregated unions in conjunction with the defendants' 50%-50% hiring practice that required each longshore gang to be composed equally of blacks and whites.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) covers a present threat of employment discrimination caused by segregated unions operating with a race-based hiring rule.

Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co. · filed 1980-03-14(c)(2)

Plaintiff Bailey, however, as a member of the black local longshore union, suffers from a threat of employment discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) by the operation of the two racially segregated unions in conjunction with the defendants’ 50%-50% hiring practice that required each longshore gang to be composed equally of blacks and whites.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits liability when a union acquiesces in an employer's prohibited national-origin discrimination.

Romero v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1980-02-22(c)

A union cannot acquiesce in a company's prohibited employment discrimination and expect to evade Title VII liability for such discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 does not make employers liable for a union’s discriminatory hiring practices when they are required to hire through the union and have not themselves engaged in unlawful employment practices.

Vogler v. McCarty, Inc. · filed 1968-01-31

6. Neither McCarty, Inc. nor Branton Insulations, Inc. has engaged in unlawful employment practices affecting the employment status of Casimere Joseph, III, Paul Vogler, Jr. or Juan Gala-viz in violation of Sections 703 or 704, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. Sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3).

Section 2000e-2(c) does not prohibit a union hiring hall's referral system without evidence that it intends or actually causes racial discrimination.

United States v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. Int. Ass'n, LU No. 36 · filed 1968-03-07(c)

There was, in fact, no evidence that the referral systems of either defendant were intended to, or in practice actually did, discriminate among referents on the basis of race or color. The absence of such evidence leaves plaintiff's allegation that the systems discriminated against Negroes unsupported by any evidence presented to this Court.

Section 2000e-2(a) prevents an employer from using a union contract’s rest period provision to deny a woman employment because of her sex.

Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills · filed 1969-05-05(a)

The union contract’s rest period provisions may not be used to deny Miss Richards the rights given her under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Since the union and the employer are both prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and (c), they may not override the law’s guarantees in the form of a contractual benefit.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits unions from entering collective bargaining agreements that discriminate against employees because of race and perpetuate an employer’s discriminatory practices.

United States v. Georgia Power Company · filed 1969-05-16(c)

The complaint alleges that the Unions have entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Company which contains provisions discriminating against Negro employees because of their race and perpetuates the effects of the discriminating acts and practices of the Company. If plaintiff is able to establish facts proving this allegation, the Unions are in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(c), and plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Section 2000e-2(d) covers joint labor-management committees that control apprenticeship programs and prohibits racial exclusion from those programs.

United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States & · filed 1969-08-15(d)

JAC is a joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d). ... Based upon the foregoing findings as to the JAC, I conclude that prior to the institution of this action, the JAC had a policy of excluding Negroes from the apprenticeship program.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a claimant against a labor organization to show an unlawful labor organization practice, but does not require proof of unfair representation.

Austin v. Reynolds Metals Company · filed 1970-02-06(c)

Likewise, strictly speaking unfair representation is not a necessary element of the claim. Instead the plaintiffs must show one or more of the unlawful “labor organization practices” of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (c). Local 400’s motion to dismiss on this ground is therefore denied.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits a labor organization from maintaining separate local unions for white and Black employees.

Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation · filed 1970-02-25(c)(2)

130. The defendant International’s maintenance of separate local unions for white and Negro employees is violative of Section 703(c) (2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(c) (2).

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits a labor organization from maintaining racially segregated locals because that segregation tends to deprive members of equal employment opportunities.

United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n · filed 1970-12-03(c)(2)

This Court concludes that the maintenance of locals whose membership is segregated by race is a per se violation of Section 703(c) (2) of the Act.

Section 703(c) prohibits a union from discriminating by race in recruiting members.

United States v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers · filed 1971-01-27(c)

We think the allegations with respect to recruiting are relevant, and, if proven, constitute a violation of Section 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), United States v. Plumbers Local 73, Civil No. 68-C-45 (S.D.Ind. filed Aug. 15, 1969), Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F.Supp. 413 (S.D.Ohio 1968); and accordingly should not have been struck.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits racially segregated labor union locals even without specific proof that the segregation deprived members of employment opportunities.

Musicians' Protective Union Local No. 274 v. American Federation of Musicians of the United States & Canada · filed 1971-06-30(c)(2)

We agree with Judge Harvey’s conclusion and find that the segregated musicians’ locals are per se violative of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits maintaining segregated union locals when doing so deprives workers of equal opportunities because of race or national origin.

United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n · filed 1971-11-12(c)

However, this Court cannot believe that it was the intention of Congress to condemn all segregated locals. If it were, they could have easily said so. The Government must still show that the maintenance of segregated locals constitutes a pattern or practice depriving individuals of working opportunities, because of their race or national origin. However, in this ease, the Government has discharged this burden.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits maintaining separate local unions for white and Black employees.

Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Association · filed 1972-01-18(c)

Maintenance of separate local unions for white and Negro employees is violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

A labor union remains subject to Title VII’s ban on discriminatory membership and referral practices even if it did not sign an equal employment plan.

United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 169 · filed 1972-01-04(c)

In view of the record in this case, it is wholly immaterial whether the defendants were signatories or not. Congress did not intend that the Civil Rights Act be applicable to and enforceable against only those persons who contractually agree to be bound to a plan of implementation.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) permits a private claim against a labor organization based on a single act of racial discrimination; proof of a pattern or practice is unnecessary.

Ward King v. Laborers International Union of North America, Union Local No. 818 · filed 1971-05-13(c)(1)

Whereas it should have charged the jury in accordance with the statutory standards set out in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5. The jury should have been instructed that a single instance of discrimination may form the basis of a private suit.

A union’s voluntary merger of formerly segregated locals can bring it into compliance with Title VII’s prohibition on discriminatory union practices.

4 Fair empl.prac.cas. 257, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7647 Linell Long v. Georgia Kraft Company · filed 1972-01-28(c)

This voluntary merger, rather than violating Title VII as the appellants appear to contend, brought the union into compliance with federal law.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits a labor organization from maintaining racially segregated locals that tend to limit members’ employment opportunities.

United States v. International Longshoremen's Association · filed 1972-05-03(c)(2)

We agree with the district judge that the maintenance of racially segregated locals inevitably breeds discrimination that violates the Act.

A union's duties under § 2000e-2(c) do not depend on its signing a plan to provide equal employment opportunities.

United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters · filed 1972-02-08(c)

In view of the record in this case, it is wholly immaterial whether the defendants were signatories or not. Congress did not intend that the Civil Rights Act be applicable to and enforceable against only those persons who contractually agree to be bound to a plan of implementation.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits labor organization practices based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Marshall v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union 60 · filed 1972-05-30(c)

Clearly, this section refers only to practices based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits union job referral practices that perpetuate past racial discrimination, even without active discrimination.

United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steam · filed 1972-07-07(c)(2)

Local 40’s policies for admission of members and for referrals for work, which the Government has established as having the effect of perpetuating past discrimination, are unlawful.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits a union to allocate work by seniority when the system does not deny workers equal employment opportunities because of race.

McFadden v. Baltimore Steamship Trade Association · filed 1973-01-03(c)

This substantial hurdle must be faced by both black and white longshoremen who today have little seniority as checkers. As restrictive as the system is, so long as it does not deny a worker equal employment opportunities because of his race, it does not offend the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) covers a union’s race-based refusal to help file a grievance and adequately represent a member.

Massey v. ILLINOIS RANGE COMPANY · filed 1973-05-17(c)(1)

It is the opinion of this Court that the plaintiff has adequately stated a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1) in that the plaintiff has alleged that defendant Union discriminated against him because of his race in refusing to perform its duty as to the filing of his grievance and adequately representing him.

Section 2000e-2(c) provides no additional remedy for a dispute over whether a union election candidate worked in the area he sought to represent.

Tucker v. Tobacco Workers International Union, Afl-Cio, Local 183, and Tobacco Workers International Union, Afl · filed 1973-11-30(c)

The particular facts of this case are not sufficient to invoke an additional remedy under § 703(c) of Title VII.

A claim that a labor union caused an employer to discriminate under § 2000e-2(c) requires proof that the union caused the discrimination.

Tuma v. American Can Company · filed 1974-02-28(c)

Nor did plaintiffs prove their charge that the Union “caused” the Company to discriminate against the plaintiffs in violation of § 703(c) of the Civil Bights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)].

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) makes maintaining unions segregated by sex a per se unlawful employment practice.

Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel Lorraine Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders · filed 1974-09-12(c)(2)

We think the District Court correctly held that maintenance of unions segregated on the basis of sex constitutes a per se violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c).

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits labor organizations from maintaining racially segregated local unions.

Myers v. Gilman Paper Corporation · filed 1975-01-14(c)(2)

The maintenance of segregated local unions by the UPIU and its Locals 616, 446, and 958 constituted a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) requires merger of racially segregated union locals when their separation tends to deny employment opportunities.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION Et Al., Defend · filed 1975-04-11(c)(2)

I find that the edict of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) cannot be satisfied in the present case by measures short of the merger in each particular port of the racially segregated locals within that port.

Section 2000e-2(c) and (d) protect workers against discriminatory union practices that deny them equal access to employment and training.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 14 International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1976-05-06(c), (d)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Locals 14 and 15 of the International Union of Operating Engineers have engaged and are engaging in a pattern and practice of discrimination and of resistance to full enjoyment by non white and Spanish surnamed workers of rights secured to them by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) and § 2000e-2(d).

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) bars a labor organization's racially segregated hiring practice that threatens unequal employment opportunities, even without proof of actual discrimination.

Alton J. BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RYAN STEVEDORING COMPANY INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1976-06-17(c)(2)

The 50%-50% hiring practice represents a threat of employment discrimination and thus violates 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2(c)(2), which makes an employment practice unlawful if it “would deprive or tend to deprive” an individual of employment opportunities.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a claim against a labor union or its agents to allege discrimination; improper representation alone is insufficient.

Mills v. Fox · filed 1976-10-21(c)

This is not sufficient to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) which makes illegal union discrimination on the basis of sex, not just improper representation, ... Thus plaintiff’s claim against the Union, Davis and Baker is dismissed, but the plaintiff is given leave to amend her pleadings to allege discriminatory acts by the Union or its agents if in fact such acts occurred.

Section 2000e-2 requires factual allegations that a union discriminated based on a protected characteristic to state a Title VII claim.

Morpurgo v. Bd. of Higher Ed. in City of New York · filed 1976-11-18

Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient allegations that the. PSC discriminated against her on the basis of her race, color, religion, national origin or sex, nor does plaintiff provide any factual averments to that effect in opposition to the summary judgment motion.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) applies to a union only if it qualifies as a Title VII labor organization, which requires dealing with a statutory employer.

Renfro v. Office & Professional Employers International Union, Local 277 · filed 1977-01-17(c)(2)

Jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) exists against “labor organizations” which commit unlawful employment practices. ... Since the Council employs only one individual it is not an “employer”. For Local 277 to be a statutory “labor organization” it must deal with a statutory “employer”. It is clear Local 277 does not meet this requirement and this Court must conclude that Local 277 is not a “labor organization” under the statute with respect to its dealings with the Council. Therefore the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Renfro’s claim.

A union office eligibility rule does not establish sex discrimination without proof of disproportionate impact or discriminatory enforcement.

McNail v. The Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Afl-Cio · filed 1977-02-09(c)(1)

Without a showing of disproportionate impact or discriminatory enforcement, we cannot conclude that a validly promulgated union eligibility rule is a pretext for illegal sexual discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) applies to a union’s dealings with an employer only if the union qualifies as a statutory labor organization in those dealings.

Renfro v. Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 277 · filed 1977-02-28(c)(2)

Jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) exists against "labor organizations" which commit unlawful employment practices. ... For Local 277 to be a statutory "labor organization" it must deal with a statutory "employer". It is clear Local 277 does not meet this requirement and this Court must conclude that Local 277 is not a "labor organization" under the statute with respect to its dealings with the Council. Therefore the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Renfro's claim.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits labor organizations from maintaining collectively bargained practices that adversely affect women’s employment opportunities.

Stevenson v. International Paper Co. · filed 1977-04-29(c)(2)

The discriminatory practices constituted unlawful employment practices by a labor organization pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2).

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) prohibits a labor organization from causing or attempting to cause unlawful employment discrimination.

Sutton v. National Distillers Products Co. · filed 1978-02-24(c)(3)

In terms of the statute, the Union did not cause or attempt to cause discrimination as proscribed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3).